The Growth of Indian Public Debt- Raja. J. Chelliah IMF Report

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    I M F W O R K I N G P P E R

    c

    1991 International M one tary Fu nd

    T h i s isawo r k in g paper and the au thor wo u ld w e l co me an y

    co mmen t s o n

    the

    present text. C i t a t ions s hou ld refer

    to an

    unpub l i she d man u s c r i p t men t i o n i n g the au thor and the

    dateofi s suanceby theIn ternat ionalMone ta ry F u n d .The

    v ie w s

    expressedarethoseof the author anddo notneces -

    sar i ly

    represent those

    of

    th e

    Fu n d .

    WP/91/72

    INTERNATIONAL

    MONETARY FUND

    F i s c a l A f f a i r s Department

    The GrowthofIndian P u b l i c Debt--

    Dimensionsof the ProblemandC orrecti v e Measures

    PreparedbyRajaJ.

    C h e l l i a h

    1/

    Authorized f orDistr i b u t ionbyV i t o Tanzi

    J u l y

    1991

    Abstract

    This

    paper tracesthec ausesof therapid growthofIndia's p u b l i c

    debt,with special referencetoi n t e r n a l debt. Itthen demonstrates

    thatthe growthofdebt woul dbecomeunsustainabl eby the end of the

    1990si fthe

    present trend s

    c ontinue. It

    develops

    a

    methodology

    to

    i t e r a t e

    thepathofgrowthofdebttod is co verthesustainabl e l e v e lof

    the

    primary

    d e f i c i t . F i n a l l y ,

    i t suggests concretemeasures

    tobring

    down theprimary d e f i c i t .

    J EL C l a s s i f i c a t i o nNumber

    H63

    1/ The main partof t h i s paperwaswritten while Professor RajaJ.

    C h e l l i a hof the

    National

    I n s t i t u t eof

    P u b l i c Finance

    andP o l i c y

    (NIPFPO),NewDelhi, India,was a V i s i t i n g Scholarat the F i s c a l A f f a i r s

    Departmentof the

    International Monetary Fund.

    The

    basic data

    were

    co l le cte d

    at the

    I n s t i t u t e

    at New

    Del hi ,

    where

    revisions

    were

    a l so

    carried

    out. Helpingatheringandc o d i f y i n g data fromR.D.Guptaand

    computational

    assistance

    fromK.K. A t r i (bothofNI PF P),andfurther

    computational

    assistanceinmaking

    projections

    from J . Brondoloof FAD,

    aswe l lasfromK.K. A t r iare

    g r a t e f u l l y

    acknowledged. Thanks f oruse-

    f u l

    commentsare due to

    V i t o

    Tanzi, Jo ce l y n Horne,Anupam Basu, Shankar

    Acharya,andSusan Sc hadl er. Theauthoris

    responsib le

    f oranyerrors

    that remain.

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    - i i -

    Contents Page

    I .

    I n t r o d u c t i o n 1

    1 . O b j e c t i v e s 1

    2 . D e f i n i t i o n o f p u b l i c

    debt

    a n d

    d e f i c i t

    2

    3 .

    Coverage

    a n d

    assumptions

    3

    4. T he p u b l i c

    debt

    p o s i t i o n i n t h e

    base

    year (1989/90) 5

    5 .

    Growth

    o f p u b l i c

    debt--1990/91 through2000/01:

    Assumption I 7

    6.

    Debtdy namics

    a n d r e l a t e d

    conceptual

    i s s u e s 18

    7.

    Growth

    o f

    debt--scenario

    under

    A ssumption

    I I 24

    8 . M a i n t a i n i n g a constant p r o p o r t i o n o f primary

    d e f i c i t

    t o G DP 2 6

    9.

    Measures

    t o reduce t h e

    primary d e f i c i t r a t i o

    3 0

    1 0 . A suggested

    accounting

    framework f o r a p p r a i s a l

    o f

    long-term

    f i s c a l

    stance

    3 9

    Text

    Tables

    1 . I n d i a : T he L e v e l o f

    Debt

    a n d i t s Composition 6

    2 . I n d i a : P r o j e c t i o n o f t h e Growth o f

    Debt

    t o G DP

    Under

    Assumptions I a nd I I 8

    3 . I n d i a : Growth o f I n t e r e s t o n P u b l i c

    Debt

    UnderAssumptions I a nd I I 9

    4. I n d i a : Gross I n t e r e s t

    Payments

    o n T o t a l

    Debt

    a s

    Percent

    o f

    Gross

    C e n t r a l

    Government Revenue

    11

    5. I n d i a : R a t i o o f Borrowing (Domestic a n d T o t a l )

    t o G D P

    UnderAssu mptions

    I a nd I I 12

    6. I n d i a : N et I n t e r e s t

    Payments

    o n T o t a l

    Debt

    a s

    Percent

    o f Ne t C e n t r a l Government Revenue 13

    7. I n d i a : Average I n t e r e s t

    Rate

    o n T o t a l

    Debt

    14

    8. I n d i a : N et Domestic Borrowing a s a

    Percent

    o f

    Gross DomesticSavings 16

    9. I n d i a :

    Primary D e f i c i t

    a s a

    Percent

    o f G DP 2 5

    1 0 . I n d i a :

    SimulatedDebt:GDP

    R a t i o 28

    1 1 . I n d i a :

    Simulated

    Debt:GDP R a t i o 29

    1 2. I n d i a : SimulatedDebt:GDP R a t i o 3 1

    1 3. I n d i a : Growth i n Revenue

    Expenditure

    o f t h e

    C e n t r a l

    Government

    33

    1 4. I n d i a : U t i l i z a t i o n o f C a p i t a l Receipts 37

    AppendixTabl e

    1 5. I n d i a : Decomposition o f

    Growth

    i n t he

    Debt

    o f C e n t r a l

    Government 4 3

    Appendix Decomposition o f Growth i n th e

    Debt

    o f C e n t r a l

    Government 4 2

    Chart I . Debt:GDP R a t i o 44

    References 4 5

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    - ii i -

    Summary

    Th is

    paper

    examines p u b l i c debt i n

    I n d i a

    and conclu des that i f present

    trends of b orrowing by the

    Government

    of

    I n d i a

    c ontinue, the cou ntry

    w i l l

    plunge i n t o

    f i n a n c i a l

    c r i s i s by the end of the 1990s. I t analys es the

    cau ses of the growth of debt by tra c i ng trends i n the t o t a l

    f i s c a l d e f i c i t

    and i n the primary

    d e f i c i t .

    I n the base year 1989/90, the primary d e f i c i t

    was nea rl y 4 percent of GDP, whi l e the t o t a l d e f i c i t was take n to be 7.6

    perc ent. On the b as i s of anumberof conserv ativ e (fav orab l e) assumptions

    and u si ng a simple proje ct ion methodology, th e a n al y s i s demonstrates th at

    maintaining

    the primary

    d e f i c i t

    even at a

    l e v e l

    of 3.5 percent i s u nsu stai n-

    a b l e because t h i s would

    raise

    the debt-to-GDP r a t i o to 77.4 perc ent i n

    2000/01from 60.2 p erc ent i n1989/90, and the d efi c i t-to- GDP r a t i o to nearl y

    10 percent. Interestpaymentswoul d then ab sorb 6.4 perc ent of GDP, ca st in g

    an unbearable burden on thebu dget.

    The

    paper

    showsthat the f i r s t stage of f i s c a l adjustment should

    con s ist of

    measures

    to enable the

    Government

    to reduce the primary

    d e f i c i t

    t o 2.5 per c ent of GDP by the y ear 2000/01. I f t h i s i sdone, the

    growth

    of

    p u b l i c debt w i l l slow and the t o t a l d e f i c i t w i l l be c ontai ned around 8 per-

    c ent of GDP i n

    2000/01.

    I n ord er to reduc e the primary d e f i c i t to 2.5 perc ent of GDP, ste ps

    mustbe taken to reduc e the d e f i c i t on the

    b u dget's

    revenue acc ount to

    takemuchof the f inan c in g of the p u b l i c

    enterprises

    out of the b udget,

    t o s t a b i l i z e the

    rate

    of c a p i t a l formati on on government acc ount, to

    raise

    the return on government len d i ng and inv estment, and to i nc reas e the income

    e l a s t i c i t y

    of taxes through tax reform. Giv en the waste and s l a c k i n

    Government,

    and i n vi ew of

    c erta i n u n j u s t i f i a b l e

    s u b s i d i e s ,

    expenditure

    red u c tion sho u l d be emphasizedmorethan tax i nc reases . Three steps are

    needed: narrowing the

    scope

    of

    gov ernment a c t i v i t i e s ,

    freezing

    government

    employment,and

    c u t t i n g s u b s i d i e s .

    To reduc e c a p i t a l expenditure, the

    Government shou l d p r i v a t i z e pu b l i c enterprises and c l o s edownor s e l l

    i n e s s e n t i a l loss-making ventu res, whi l e compensating or r e h a b i l i t a t i n g the

    workers who

    w i l l

    be d i s p l a c e d .

    F i n a l l y ,

    the P l anning Commission's approach

    o f approvi ng the

    growth

    of expenditure w i t h i n a f i ve - y ear horiz on without

    regard to how the hi gher expend itu re w i l l be su stained i n the f ut ure ,must

    be

    abandoned.

    Oncethe f i r s t stage of adjustment i s completed, l oan fi nanc e shou l d be

    l a r g e l y

    l i m i t e d to c a p i t a l expenditures,whose

    benef it s

    c ou l d be spread over

    anumberof y ears . The

    paper

    ends by sug gesting an acc ounting framework

    thatwoul d help regu l ate and eval u ate the r o l e of debt i ngov ernment

    finance.

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    I .

    I n t r o d u c t i o n

    1. Q b j e c t i v e s

    The

    u n i nterr u pte d

    and

    r a p i d

    growth of

    p u b l i c

    debt i n

    I n d i a

    d u r i n g

    t h e 1980s

    i s on l y a

    man i festat i on

    of the deepening

    f i s c a l c r i s i s t h a t

    has ov ertake n the c ou ntry .

    E a r l i e r

    on,

    most In d ian

    economists had

    h e l d

    t h a t

    the growth of p u b l i c debt i n pl anned magnitud e was normal and

    d e s i r a b l e

    i n a d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t ry

    s i n c e government

    b orrowing represented

    t h e a bs orpt ion by the

    Government

    of a

    part

    of domestic sav i ngs and of

    t h e

    i n f l o w of c a p i t a l from ab road, to

    f i nan c e

    and promote c a p i t a l forma-

    t i o n i n the p u b l i c

    s e c t o r

    and p r i o r i t y areas i n the p r i v a t e

    s e c t o r .

    The

    r a t h e r complacent

    a t t i t u d e

    togov ernment budget d e f i c i t ( i n the broad

    sens e) and the r e s u l t a n t growth i n p u b l i c debt was based on the assump-

    t i o n s

    t h a t

    b orrowed fu nds would be used only f o r c a p i t a l purposes and

    t h a t the r e s u l t a n t inv estments would yet y i e l d adequate d i r e c t or

    i n d i r e c t r e t u r n s . The assu mptions

    were o f t e n

    not

    f u l f i l l e d

    i n p r a c t i c e .

    The

    manner

    i n w hi c h

    c a p i t a l

    fu nds from the dom esti c

    p r i v a t e s e c t o r

    were

    r a i s e d

    and i t s impact on the a l l o c a t i o n of reso ur c es a l s o have not been

    a d e q u a te l y

    s t u d i e d

    and tak en note of . The

    f i s c a l c r i s i s

    and the a t t e n -

    dant exponential growth of p u b l i c debt has a r i s e n , not merely because of

    revenue ex pend it u res ru nning ahead of

    c u rrent

    rev enues, but a l s o because

    c a p i t a l e x p e n d i t u r e s

    f i nan c e d

    by b orrowing have no t been p r o d u c t i v e of

    adequate

    r e t u r n s .

    P u b l i c debt has

    grown

    ver y f a s t d u r i n g the 1980s--both a b s o l u t e l y

    and i n r e l a t i o n to GDP. The t o t a l debt of the

    C e n t r a l

    and s t a t e govern-

    ments

    1/,

    a c c o r d i n g

    to b u dgetary f i g u r e s ,

    grew

    from Rs

    215.77 b i l l i o n

    at

    t h e

    end of

    1970/71

    to Rs 663.51

    b i l l i o n

    at the end of 1980/8 1. From

    t h i s l e v e l ,

    i t

    grew r a p i d l y

    to Rs 2,637.58

    b i l l i o n

    at the end of

    1988/89.

    As a

    proport i on

    of GDP,

    t h i s

    meant

    a

    f a l l

    from 50 perc entat

    t h e

    end of Marc h, 1971, to 48.9 per c ent at the end of 198 0/81, and then

    a

    r i s e

    to 67.4 perc ent at the end of

    1988/89.

    Of the t o t a l p u b l i c debt

    ( c enter

    and

    s t a t e s ) , e x t e r n a l

    debt acc ounted f or Rs

    252.30 b i l l i o n

    or

    9.57 per c ent of the t o t a l at the end of 1988/89.

    The debt of the

    Government

    of I n d i a (GOI)

    grew

    from Rs 191.93

    b i l -

    l i o n

    at th e end of

    1970/71

    to Rs 594.49

    b i l l i o n

    at the end of 1980/8 1,

    and to Rs

    2,282.41 b i l l i o n

    at the end of

    1988/89;

    of

    t h i s ,

    i n t e r n a l debt

    ac c o unted

    f or Rs 2,027.02

    b i l l i o n .

    That i s ,

    i n t e r n a l

    debt at the end of

    1988-89 formed 51.8 perc ent of GDP i n t h a t y e a r .

    I t

    i s

    c l e a r

    t h a t d u r i n g rec ent y ears the p u b l i c debt in I n d i a has

    been

    growing at a

    r a t h e r

    a l a r m i n g

    r a t e , with

    the bu dget

    d e f i c i t s

    i n c r e a s i n g

    as a

    proportion

    of revenues as w e l l as of GDP. 2/

    A l o n g s i d e ,

    t h e proportion

    of the

    c e n t r a l

    government

    d e f i c i t f i nan c e d

    by net Reserve

    1/

    E l i m i n a t i n g do u b le c o u nting and i g n o r i n g the

    smal l

    p o r t i o n of

    c e n t r a l

    government

    s e c u r i t i e s

    h e l d

    by the s t a t e governments.

    2/ The r a t i o

    d e f i c i t

    to GDP was arou nd 8 per c ent i n1989/90 for th e

    GOI.

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    2

    Bankof

    I n d i a

    (RBI )

    c r e d i t

    has

    i n c r e a s e d

    from

    l e s s

    than16percentin

    t h e e a r l y

    1970s

    ton e a r l y one

    t h i r d

    d u r i n g the l a t t e r h a l f of the 1980s.

    T h i s

    b u rgeoning

    of

    p u b l i c debt

    and the

    d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e

    and r i s i n g

    share

    o f RBI c r e d i tin the

    t o t a l

    f i n a n c i n g of c e n t r a l

    government

    b udget

    d e f i -

    c i t has n a t u r a l l y g i v e n

    r i s e

    to s e r i o u s c oncernamong f i n a n c i a l e x p e r t s

    as w e l l

    as the

    general p u b l i c . Q u e s t i on s

    have been

    r a i s e d about

    the

    medium-or l ong-term

    l

    s u s t a i n a b i l i t y of thedebtandi t s b u r d en ,and

    f e a r s

    have been

    expressed about the

    Government

    and thec o u n t r y )

    f a l l i n g

    i n t o debt t r a p s , e x t e r n a l

    and

    i n t e r n a l .

    In c o n s i d e r i n g thegrowthof p u b l i c

    debt/GDP

    r a t i oandi t scon-

    seq uences,not

    j u s t i n t e r n a l

    d e b t ,butb oth

    i n t e r n a l

    and

    e x t e r n a l

    debt

    s h o u l d

    be

    i n c l u d e d .

    However,thegrowthof

    e x t e r n a l

    d e btat a

    f a s t

    pace

    and beyond a

    l i m i t

    c r e a t e s i t sown s p e c i a l problems, whichare a d d i -

    t i o n a l

    to theproblems cau sedby ther i s i n g debt/GDP

    r a t i o

    ass u c h ,and

    a

    d i s c u s s i o n

    of theproblems cau sedby

    e x t e r n a l

    debt must take noteof

    t h e

    t o t a l ,

    e x t e r n a l

    debt

    of the

    economy

    as a

    whole

    and not j u s t t h a t of

    t h e p u b l i c

    orgovernment

    s e c t o r .

    In t h i s paper,

    a t t e n t i o n

    i sf o c u s e don

    t h e i n t e r n a l p u b l i c

    debtof the GOI,a l t h o u g hthe

    GOI's

    e x t e r n a l

    d e btis

    a l s o taken i n t o a c c o untat thea p p r o p r i a t e stageforp r o j e c t i n g thepath

    o f

    growthof t o t a l

    p u b l i c

    debt/GDP

    r a t i o

    and thegrowthof

    i n t e r e s t

    b u rden.

    Threeof themost r e c e nt

    s t u d i e s

    of theprobl emof the

    r a p i d

    growth

    o f I n d i a n p u b l i c deb t, namely , Rangarajanet al( 1 9 9 0 ) , B u i t e r and P a t e l

    ( 1 9 9 0 ) ,andGenberg (1989b ) have

    c a r r i e d

    outmathematic al

    e x e r c i s e s ,

    on

    t h e b a s i s

    of an i m p l i c i t or e x p l i c i t model, to

    p r e d i c t

    thegrowthand

    n o n s u s t a i n a b i l i t y of the I n d i a n p u b l i c d e b t . The purposeof t h i spre-

    sent paper is not to

    e x p l o r e

    thec onsequences of thegrowthof

    p u b l i c

    debt

    on theb a s i s of an

    e x p l i c i t

    model, which takes

    i n t o

    a c c o u n t

    the

    i n t e r a c t i o n s

    between

    thegrowthof

    debt/GDP r a t i o ,

    r e a l i n t e r e s t r a t e ,

    growthof theeconomy ,and i n f l a t i o n . Thepurposeof

    t h i s

    paperi s

    r a t h e r

    todemonstrate to thep o l i c y m a k er s

    t h a t

    the

    r a t e

    ofgrowthof net

    p u b l i c b orrowing witnessed i nrecent y earsis not s u s t a i n a b l e onreason-

    a b l e

    ass umptions

    r e g a r d i n g i n t e r e s t

    andgrowth

    r a t e s

    even i ftheseand

    t h e

    i n f l a t i o n

    r a t e

    are

    h e l d i n v a r i a n t

    to the

    r a t e s

    ofgrowthof

    d e f i c i t / G D P and

    deb t/GDP

    r a t i o s . A f t e r s u c h d e mon strat i on , a t t e n t i o nis

    c on c entrate donworkingout thedegreeofadj u stment needed to r e s t r i c t

    t h e

    growthof

    i n t e r n a l

    debtto a

    s u s t a i n a b l e

    l e v e l ,and on the

    p o l i c y

    measures

    r e q u i r e d to move toward t h a t o b j e c t i v e . D uringthec o u r s eof

    t h e d i s c u s s i o n ,

    anattempt is

    a l s o

    made to c l a r i f y somec o n c e pt u a l

    i s s u e s.

    2.

    D e f i n i t i o n

    of

    p u b l i c

    debtand d e f i c i t

    In t h i s paper,by

    p u b l i c

    debt of

    I n d i a ,

    we mean the

    i n t e r n a l

    and

    e x t e r n a l debtof the GOI. The

    most

    comprehensive d e f i n i t i o n of I n d i a n

    p u b l i c debt would

    i n c l u d e

    thei nde b tednessofa l lthet h ree

    l e v e l s

    of

    Government

    anda l l

    p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s ,

    to thedomestic

    p r i v a t e s e c t o r

    and to thee x t e r n a l s e c t o r . S i n c ewe aremainl y concerned w i t h i d e n -

    t i t y i n g theb u d getary

    p o l i c y

    changes to be

    e f f e c t e d

    by theGOI- -the main

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    - 3 -

    a c t o r i n t h e f i e l d - - w e a r e c o n f i n i n g o u r s e l v e s t o t h e d e b t o f t h e G O I .

    I t s o h a p p e n s t h a t , a s o f t o d a y , t h e m a j o r p a r t o f t h e d e b t o f c e n t r a l

    p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s a n d o f t h e s t a t e g o v e r n m e n t s c o n s i s t s o f t h e i r i n d e b -

    t e d n e s s

    t o t h e G O I .

    H e n c e ,

    t h e

    d e b t

    o f G O I i s a

    g o o d

    i n d e x

    o f t h e

    I n d i a n

    p u b l i c d e b t .

    T h e R B I i s w h o l l y o w n e d b y t h e G O I . W e

    t r e a t

    R B I a s a p u b l i c

    f i n a n c i a l e n t e r p r i s e a n d e x c l u d e i t f r o m t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e G O I .

    S i n c e t h e l i a b i l i t i e s o f G O T t o R B I a r e t r e a t e d a s p a r t o f i t s d e b t , w e

    a r e a b l e t o c o n s i d e r s e p a r a t e l y R B I c r e d i t t o G o v e r n m e n t , a n d d i s c u s s

    i t s c o n s e q u e n c e s .

    ( H o w e v e r ,

    w h i l e d i s c u s s i n g t h e i n t e r e s t b u r d e n o n t h e

    c o m m u n i t y a r i s i n g f r o m p u b l i c d e b t , i t m a y b e p r o p e r t o e x c l u d e t h e

    i n t e r e s t p a i d t o R B I s i n c e a l m o s t a l l o f i t c a n , i n t h e o r y , b e r e r o u t e d

    t o G O I a s d i v i d e n d s . ) B o r r o w i n g f r o m R B I i s e q u i v a l e n t t o p r i n t i n g

    b a s e ) m o n e y , w h i c h i s t a k e n a s s e i g n o r a g e . S e i g n o r a g e e n a b l e s t h e

    G o v e r n m e n t

    t o o b t a i n r e s o u r c e s w i t h o u t

    i n c u r r i n g

    l i a b i l i t y t o r e p a y o r

    p a y

    i n t e r e s t .

    B o r r o w i n g f r o m

    t h e R B I

    d o e s

    n o t i n

    e f f e c t

    e n t a i l

    a n y

    l i a b i l i t y t o r e p a y , b u t i n t e r e s t i s p a i d o n t h e

    g o v e r n m e n t

    d e b t h e l d b y

    t M o s t o f

    t h i s

    i n t e r e s t i s n o t r e r o u t e d t o G O I b u t i s s p e n t i n

    v a r i o u s w a y s b y R B I a s a l l o c a t i o n o f i t s p r o f i t s . W e a r e t h e r e f o r e

    r e c k o n i n g t h e l i a b i l i t i e s o f t h e G O I t o R B I a s p a r t o f p u b l i c d e b t , a n d

    i n c l u d i n g

    t h e i n t e r e s t t h e r e o n i n t h e i n t e r e s t o n p u b l i c d e b t .

    T h e b u d g e t d e f i c i t h a s

    b e e n

    d e f i n e d i n m a n y w a y s . S i n c e w e a r e

    d e a l i n g

    w i t h p u b l i c d e b t a n d i t s g r o w t h , w e d e f i n e

    g o v e r n m e n t d e f i c i t

    a s

    t h e r e q u i r e d n e t b o r r o w i n g 1 / b y t h e

    G o v e r n m e n t

    t o c o v e r t h e g a p

    b e t w e e n

    e x p e n d i t u r e s a n d r e v e n u e s . S i n c e p a r t o f n e t b o r r o w i n g i s u s e d f o r

    l e n d i n g ,

    e x p e n d i t u r e s a r e t a k e n t o i n c l u d e t h o s e o n ( a ) g o o d s a n d

    s e r v i c e s ;

    ( b ) s u b s i d i e s a n d t r a n s f e r s o t h e r t h a n i n t e r e s t ; ( c ) i n t e r e s t ;

    a n d

    ( d ) n e t

    l e n d i n g , i n c l u d i n g i n v e s

    t m e n t

    i n

    e q u i t y . T h i s

    g a p i s

    g e n e -

    r a l l y r e f e r r e d t o a s

    f i s c a l

    d e f i c i t . F i s c a l

    d e f i c i t

    m i n u s i n t e r e s t

    p a y m e n t

    h a s

    b e e n

    d e f i n e d a s p r i m a r y

    d e f i c i t

    i n d i c a t i n g t h e g a p i n

    r e s o u r c e s o c c a s i o n e d b y t h e c u r r e n t p o l i c i e s o f t h e G o v e r n m e n t .

    T h u s ,

    p r i m a r y

    d e f i c i t

    = e x p e n d i t u r e o n g o o d s a n d s e r v i c e s + s u b s i d i e s a n d

    t r a n s f e r p a y m e n t s

    o t h e r t h a n i n t e r e s t + n e t l e n d i n g - c u r r e n t r e v e n u e s

    i n c l u s i v e o f i n t e r e s t a n d d i v i d e n d r e c e i p t s . I f p r i m a r y d e f i c i t i s

    z e r o ,

    i t w o u l d m e a n t h a t

    g o v e r n m e n t

    e x p e n d i t u r e o n t h e t h r e e i t e m s

    m e n t i o n e d i n t h e

    a b o v e

    e q u a t i o n i s c o n f i n e d w i t h i n t h e

    l i m i t

    o f t o t a l

    r e v e n u e s r a i s e d . 2 /

    3 . C o v e r a g e a n d a s s u m p t i o n s

    T h e s t u d y c o v e r s

    t h e

    i n t e r e s t - b e a r i n g o b l i g a t i o n s

    o f G O I

    e x c l u d i n g

    a )

    s e c u r i t i e s

    i s s u e d t o t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s ;

    b ) c o m p e n s a t i o n a n d s p e c i a l b e a r e r

    b o n d s ;

    a n d ( c ) r e s e r v e f u n d s a n d

    1 / G r o s s b o r r o w i n g m i n u s r e p a y m e n t ,

    i t a n y , o f

    p a r t

    o f e x i s t i n g

    d e b t .

    2 / T h e p r i m a r y

    d e f i c i t

    c a n a l s o b e c a l c u l a t e d a f t e r e x c l u d i n g n e t

    e n d i n g f r o m t h e e x p e n d i t u r e s i d e .

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    d e p o s i t s . The

    d e b t

    f i g u r e s

    u s e d h e r e

    t h e r e f o r e d i f f e r

    f r o m

    t h e

    b u d g e t

    f i g u r e s . T h e

    d e b t

    at th e end of

    1 9 8 9-9 0

    i s

    t a k e n

    a s t h e

    b a s e

    f o r

    p r o j e c t i o n s

    w h i c h

    a r e

    e x t e n d e d

    g e n e r a l l y up to th e

    y e a r

    2 0 0 0 / 0 1 .

    T o

    i n d i c a t e t h e n o n s u s t a i n a b i l i t y of th e f i s c a l

    p o l i c y

    s t a n c e

    o f

    r e c e n t

    y e a r s ,

    we f i r s t

    p r o j e c t

    t h e

    g r o w t h

    o f i n t e r n a l

    d e b t

    o n t h e

    a s s u m p t i o n t h a t n e t b o r r o w i n g f r o m d o m e s t i c s o u r c e s , e x c e p t R B I , w o u l d

    grow a t th e same r a t e a s i n t h e

    l a s t f i v e y e a r s ( A s s u m p t i o n

    I ) .

    B o r r o w i n g f r o m

    R BI i s

    t a k e n

    t o

    r e m a i n c o n s t a n t

    as p r o p o r t i o n o f GDP.

    D u r i n g t h e p r o j e c t i o n

    p e r i o d ,

    n o m i n a l

    G DP i s assumed t o

    grow

    a t t h e r a t e

    o f

    12 p e r c e n t pe r annum; c o m p r i s i n g a r e a l g r o w t h

    r a t e

    o f 5.5 p e r c e n t

    ( a s a c h i e v e d d u r i n g

    t h e

    S e v e n t h P l a n p e r i o d

    ( 1 9 8 5 - 9 0 ) and as s t i p u l a t e d

    i n t h e

    E i g h t h P l a n

    f o r t h e

    p e r i o d 1 9 9 0 - 9 5 ) ,

    an d a 6.5

    p e r c e n t r i s e

    i n

    t h e p r i c e l e v e l ( c l o s e t o t h e r a t e o f

    i n c r e a s e

    i n th e GDP

    d e f l a t o r

    i n

    t h e

    1 9 8 0 s ) .

    I n

    o r d e r

    t o

    keep

    c l o s e

    t o

    b u d g e t a r y

    p r a c t i c e

    and to

    f a c i l i t a t e

    t h e

    u s e

    of

    b u d g e t a r y d a t a , b o r r o w i n g f r o m

    RBI or

    m o n e t a r y

    d e f i c i t , h a s been

    t a k e n to be

    e q u i v a l e n t

    t o ( a ) i s s u e o f

    91- da y T r e a s u r y b i l l s , p l u s

    ( b ) r u n n i n g

    down of Government's

    c a s h b a l a n c e s . S i n c e

    ( b ) i s u s u a l l y

    n e g l i g i b l e ,

    we

    t a k e

    i n

    e f f e c t

    what

    r o u g h l y

    amounts t o

    s h o r t - t e r m

    b o r r o w i n g

    f r o m

    R B I . 1 / T h e

    r e a s o n

    f o r

    h o l d i n g c o n s t a n t

    t h e r a t i o o f

    b o r r o w i n g

    f r o m

    RB I i s to make

    r e a l i s t i c

    t h e

    a s s u m p t i o n

    t h a t t h e r a t e o f

    i n f l a t i o n w i l l

    n o t a c c e l e r a t e and

    w o u l d

    b e 6.5

    p e r c e n t

    pe r annum

    i . e . ,

    o n l y s l i g h t l y

    h i g h e r t h a n

    i n t h e

    p a s t

    i n

    t e r m s

    o f GDP d e f l a t o r ) .

    O n c e t h e

    r a t e

    o f

    i n c r e a s e

    i n t h e p r i c e l e v e l i s

    t a k e n

    t o

    r e m a i n

    t h e

    same as i n th e

    p a s t ,

    t h e

    n o m i n a l

    r a t e s o f i n t e r e s t on th e

    i n s t r u m e n t s

    o f

    government

    b o r r o w i n g

    a r e a l s o assumed t o

    r e m a i n

    th e same as i n1 9 8 9 / 9 0 .

    T h i s

    w o u l d i m p l y

    t h a t

    no

    i n c r e a s e

    i n t h e

    r e a l

    r a t e s

    o f

    i n t e r e s t

    w o u l d

    b e

    needed t o

    o b t a i n f u n d s

    on an i n c r e a s i n g s c a l e - - a t th e same r a p i d

    p a c e

    a s

    i n t h e

    p a s t

    f i v e

    y e a r s . T h i s

    i s a n u n r e a l i s t i c

    a s s u m p t i o n .

    B u t what

    c o u l d b e shown i s t h a t e v e n on s u c h an u n r e a l i s t i c a s s u m p t i o n , a p r o g r a m

    o f

    b o r r o w i n g

    b y GOI l e a d i n g t o t h e

    p a s t

    r a t e o f

    g r o w t h

    o f i n t e r n a l

    p u b l i c

    d e b t w o u l d

    not be s u s t a i n a b l e .

    T h e n o m i n a l

    r a t e s

    of

    i n t e r e s t

    on

    d i f f e r e n t

    i n s t r u m e n t s

    were

    a s

    f o l l o w s i n1 9 8 9 / 9 0 :

    1 /

    The

    m o n e t a r y

    d e f i c i t as

    d e f i n e d

    b y t h e

    R e p o r t

    o f t h eC omm ittee t o

    R e v i e w

    t h e

    W o r k i n g

    o f t h e

    M o n e t a r y S y s t e m ( R B I ,

    1 9 8 5 ) i s

    b r o a d e r

    and

    more a p p r o p r i a t e , b u t e v e n t h a t does not i n d i c a t e t h e f u l l m o n e t a r y

    i m p a c t

    of

    b u d g e t a r y o p e r a t i o n s

    s i n c e , f o r

    e x a m p l e ,

    i t

    e x c l u d e s

    f o r e i g n

    g r a n t s

    s p e n t

    d o m e s t i c a l l y and th e r e c e i p t of p r o f i t s

    f r o m

    R B I . I n

    r e c e n t y e a r s , t h e m o n e t i s e d d e f i c i t , as t a k e n h e r e , and as t r a d i t i o n a l l y

    measured i n I n d i a , and th e

    m o n e t a r y

    d e f i c i t as

    d e f i n e d

    b y t h e

    a b o v e -

    m e n t i o n e d

    C ommi ttee have been f a i r l y

    c l o s e

    a s

    p e r c e n t a g e

    of GDP.

    4

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    D e s c r i p t i o n K a t e o f

    I n t e r e s t

    M a r k e t l o a n s 1 1 . 5

    S m a l l s a v i n g s

    ( a ) P o s t

    o f f i c e

    s a v i n g s a c c o u n t . 5 . 5

    ( b ) O t h e r s 1 2 . 0

    P r o v i d e n t

    f u n d s , e t c . 1 2 . 0

    T r e a s u r y b i l l s 4 . 6

    T h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e n o m i n a l r a t e s o f

    i n t e r e s t o n f u t u r e borrow

    i n g

    w o u l d r e m a i n t h e

    same

    a s i n t h e

    base

    y e a r

    does

    n o t

    mean t h a t t h e

    a v e r a g e r a t e o f

    i n t e r e s t

    o n

    i n t e r n a l

    d e b t w o u l d n o t i n c r e a s e .

    I n f a c t

    t h a t

    w o u l d i n c r e a s e f o r t w o r e a s o n s : ( a ) t h e

    r e l a t i v e s h a r e o f T r e a s u r y

    b i l l s

    w i t h t h e l o w e s t

    r a t e

    o f

    i n t e r e s t

    w o u l d f a l l a s b o r r o w i n g

    f rom

    o t h e r

    s o u r c e s w o u l d b e

    r i s i n g f a s t e r

    t h a n G DP

    whereas

    borrowing from R B I

    w o u l d b e g r o w i n g o n l y a s

    f a s t

    a s G D P ; ( b ) t h e

    r a t e

    o f

    i n t e r e s t

    o n

    market

    l o a n s

    c o n t r a c t e d

    e a r l i e r

    a t l o w e r r a t e s o f

    i n t e r e s t

    a n d

    f o r m i n g p a r t

    o f

    t h e b a s e - y e a r

    i n t e r n a l

    d e b t , w o u l d g o u p a s t h e y

    mat ure

    a n d

    a r e

    c o n -

    v e r t e d i n t o

    n e w

    s e c u r i t i e s .

    I n d e e d , a n i m p o r t a n t f e a t u r e o f

    t h i s

    s t u d y i s t h a t

    t h e m a t u r i t y

    p a t t e r n a n d t h e

    d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t

    r a t e s o n t h e components o f

    t h e

    e x i s t i n g i n t e r n a l

    d e b t

    h a ve

    been t a k e n

    i n t o

    a c c o u n t , a n d

    a d d i t i o n a l

    i n t e r e s t

    l i a b i l i t y

    h a s been i n c l u d e d f r o m t h e

    r e s p e c t i v e

    d a t e s o f c o n -

    v e r s i o n .

    T h u s ,

    w e g e t a

    p r o f i l e

    o f

    i n t e r e s t

    b u r d e n i n r e s p e c t o f

    t h e

    d e b t

    e x i s t i n g

    i n t h e base y e a r d u r i n g t h e

    p r o j e c t i o n

    p e r i o d . T o

    t h i s

    i s

    added

    t h e

    i n t e r e s t

    o n

    a d d i t i o n a l

    d e b t

    a r i s i n g

    f r o m

    f u t u r e b u d g e t d e f i -

    c i t s

    .

    T h i s p r o c e d u r e e n a b l e s u s t o g e t a

    more

    r e a l i s t i c

    p i c t u r e o f

    t h e

    f u t u r e i n t e r e s t

    b u r d e n t h a n i f w e h a d

    assumed

    t h e

    same a v e r a g e r a t e

    o f

    i n t e r e s t

    a s i n t h e

    base

    y e a r , o r h a d

    a p p l i e d

    t h e m a r g i n a l

    r a t e s t o

    t h e

    d i f f e r e n t

    components o f

    t o t a l

    d e b t .

    H a v i n g t r a c e d t h e major

    i m p l i c a t i o n s

    o f t h e g r o w t h o f n e t domes-

    t i c

    b o r r o w i n g a t a

    pace r e g i s t e r e d

    d u r i n g t h e p a s t

    f i v e y e a r s

    ( A s s u m p t i o n I ) , w e t h e n

    p r o j e c t

    t h e g r o w t h o f

    i n t e r n a l

    d e b t o n t h e

    a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e

    r a t i o

    o f n e t d o m e s t i c b o r r o w i n g t o G D P r e m a i n s

    c o n s t a n t

    a t t h e

    l e v e l

    r e a c h e d i n

    1 9 8 9 / 9 0

    ( A s s u m p t i o n I I ) .

    I n both

    c a s e s ,

    i n o r d e r t o g i v e a n i d e a o f t h e

    t o t a l

    d e b t b u r d e n , w e a d d o n t h e

    g r o w t h o f e x t e r n a l d e b t o f G O I o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t e x t e r n a l b o r r o w i n g

    w o u l d f o r m t h e

    same

    p r o p o r t i o n o f G D P a s i n t h e

    base

    y e a r .

    4 . T h e

    p u b l i c

    d e b t

    p o s i t i o n

    i n t h e

    base

    y e a r

    ( 1 9 8 9 / 9 0 )

    A t t h e e n d o f 1 9 8 9 / 9 0 ,

    t o t a l i n t e r n a l

    d e b t amounted t o R s

    2,098.7

    b i l l i o n ,

    w h i c h

    c o n s t i t u t e d

    4 7 . 9 p e r c e n t o f G D P . T h e major components o f

    t h e

    i n t e r n a l

    d e b t a n d

    t h e i r r e l a t i v e

    i m p o r t a n c e a r e

    shown

    i n T a b l e 1 .

    T r e a s u r y

    b i l l s

    r e p r e s e n t i n g b o r r o w i n g f r o m R B I a n d

    market

    l o a n s

    were

    o f

    e q u a l i m p o r t a n c e , e a c h c a t e g o r y a c c o u n t i n g t o r a b o u t 3 0 p e r c e n t o f t h e

    t o t a l .

    W h i l e t h e T r e a s u r y

    b i l l s

    m e n t i o n e d h e r e a r e h e l d b y R B I

    , m u c h

    o f

    5

  • 8/10/2019 The Growth of Indian Public Debt- Raja. J. Chelliah IMF Report

    10/51

    -

    6 -

    t h e g r e a t e r p a r t o f m a r k e t l o a n s a r e h e l d

    by

    t h e

    b a n k s

    a n d o t h e r f i n a n -

    c i a l

    i n s t i t u t i o n s .

    On

    t h e o t h e r h a n d , p r o v i d e n t f u n d s a n d s m a l l s a v i n g s

    r e p r e s e n t d i r e c t

    l i a b i l i t i e s

    t o h o u s e h o l d s , a n d t h e s e t o g e t h e r a c c o u n t e d

    f o r

    a b o u t

    40

    p e r c e n t o f

    GOI's

    i n t e r n a l d e b t .

    T a b l e 1 . I n d i a : T h e L e v e l o f D e b t a nd i t s C o m p o s i t i o n

    I n

    B i l l i o n s

    o f

    R u p e e s

    P e r c e n t

    o f T o t a l

    M a r k e t l o a n s

    S m a l l s a v i n g s

    P r o v i d e n t f u n d s , e t c .

    T r e a s u r y b i l l s

    T o t a l d o m e s t i c d e b t

    E x t e r n a l d e b t

    6 2 4 . 4 2

    4 0 9 . 8 3

    4 3 6 . 4 3

    6 3 2 . 0 2

    2 , 0 9 8 . 7 0

    2 8 5 . 1 7

    2 9 8

    1 9 3

    2 0 8

    3 0 1

    1 0 0 0

    Total domestic

    de t

    / G D P

    External debt GDP

    Total debt GDP

    4 7 . 9 0

    0 . 6 5

    4 8 . 5 5

    E x t e r n a l

    d e b t a t t h e e n d o f

    1 9 8 9 / 9 0

    a m o u n t e d t o R s

    2 8 5 . 2 b i l l i o n ,

    w h i c h w a s o n l y 1 2 . 3 p e r c e n t o f G D P . T h u s , t h e t o t a l p u b l i c d e b t f o r m e d

    6 0 . 2 p e r c e n t o f G D P .

    1

    I n t h e

    s a m e

    y e a r , o f t h e t o t a l d o m e s t i c b o r r o w i n g , T r e a s u r y b i l l s

    c o n s t i t u t e d 3 3 p e r c e n t , p r o v i d e n t f u n d s 2 5 . 9 p e r c e n t , a n d s m a l l s a v i n g s

    1 9 . 6 p e r c e n t

    We

    n o t e

    t h a t

    t h e m a r g i n a l s h a r e o f T r e a s u r y b i l l s i s

    h i g h e r t h a n t h e i r a v e r a g e s h a r e , w h i l e i t i s l o w e r t h a n t h e a v e r a g e

    s h a r e

    i n r e s p e c t o f m a r k e t l o a n s . T h e c o m b i n e d m a r g i n a l s h a r e o f p r o v i -

    d e n t f u n d s a n d s m a l l s a v i n g s w a s h i g h e r t h a n t h e a v e r a g e . T h u s , w h i l e

    t h e G o v e r n m e n t w a s a b l e t o b o r r o w

    r e l a t i v e l y m o r e

    d i r e c t l y f r o m t h e

    h o u s e h o l d s l a r g e l y t h r o u g h h i g h e r p r o v i d e n t f u n d p a y m e n t s , i t w a s f o r c e d

    t o d e p e n d m u c h

    m o r e

    o n R B I

    c r e d i t

    t h a n i n t h e p a s t .

    1 / T h i s

    f i g u r e

    d i f f e r s f r o m i h e d e b t G D P r a t i o d e r i v e d f r o m

    u n a d j u s t e d

    b u d g e t a r y d a t a , w h i c h w a s g i v e n

    e a r l i e r

    w h i l e d i s c u s s i n g t h e

    p a s t

    g r o w t h o f d e b t . S e e A p p e n d i x 1t o r a n a l y s i s o f g r o w t h i n p u b l i c

    d e b t b e t w e e n 1 9 8 4 / 8 5 a n d 1 9 8 9 / 9 0 .

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    11/51

    7

    I n

    t h e b u d get

    proposa l s

    f o r 1989/90,

    i t

    ha d been

    d e c i d e d

    t o l i m i t

    borrowing from

    RBI

    through Treas u ry

    b i l l s t o

    around

    Rs 72.0

    b i l l i o n ,

    which would

    have

    formed

    1.64

    percent

    of GDP f o r

    that y ear.

    The

    r e v i s e d

    e s t i m a t e s ,

    however,

    showed th at b orrowi ng from

    RB I

    woul d reach

    Rs

    113.76

    b i l l i o n . R e a l i z i n g th at b orrowi ng from

    R BI i n

    s u c h r e l a t i v e magnitu de

    was h i g h l y i n f l a t i o n a r y ,

    th e

    Finance M i n i s t e r

    has

    proposed tha t

    i n

    1990/91,

    Treas u r y

    b i l l s

    i s s u e would

    be l i m i t e d to Rs 74.07

    b i l l i o n .

    Given

    t h e

    past performanc e

    and the

    trends

    i n

    e xpen d i t u re, i t appears

    t h a t

    t h i s l i m i t might

    be

    exceeded. However, s i n c e

    we

    w i s h

    t o

    preserve

    the assu mption tha t

    th e

    i n f l a t i o n

    r a t e

    would

    not a c c e l e r a t e , we

    wou l d

    l i k e

    t o

    proceed

    on the

    b a s i s that

    th e

    Government would

    b e

    ab l e from

    now

    on

    t o

    h o l d

    RBI c r e d i t t o

    i t s e l f

    a t 1.7

    percent

    o f GDP. We a r e

    t h e r e f o r e

    assuming that

    net RBI

    c r e d i t

    t o

    Government

    was

    o n l y

    Rs

    74.07 b i l l i o n

    i n

    1989/90, a n dhave

    d e r i v e d

    on

    that b as i s

    th e f i g u r e s f o r t h e

    s u c c e ed i n g

    years. C orrespon d i ng l y ,

    th e

    t o t a l

    net

    b orrowi ng d u r i ng

    1989/90,

    wh i c h

    forms

    t h e

    b a s i s

    o f

    p r o j e c t i o n s ,

    i s

    taken

    t o be Rs

    304.98

    b i l l i o n ,

    i n s t e a d of the r e v i s e d b u d get

    est i mate

    of Rs

    344.67 b i l l i o n .

    As taken here, th e

    t o t a l

    b u d get

    d e f i c i t

    i n

    1989/90

    c o n s t i t u t e d 7.65

    percent

    o f GDP

    ( i n t e r n a l borrowing

    7.0

    per c ent,

    and

    e x t e r n a l borrowing

    0.65 perc ent ). Primary d e f i c i t formed

    3.7

    percent

    of GDP, and

    gross

    i n t e r e s t payments 3.9

    per c ent.

    5.

    Growth of p u b l i c d e bt--1 9 9 0 / 9 1

    through

    2000/01:

    Assumption

    I

    Ta b l e

    2

    shows

    th e

    e v o l u t i o n

    of the i n t e r n a l

    debt/GDP r a t i o

    on th e

    ass u mpti on that a l l

    major components of

    domestic b orrowing oth er than

    RBI c r e d i t i . e . , market l oans , post o f f i c e sa v i ng s , other sma l l

    s a v i n g s , and

    provi dent funds ) wou l d grow

    at t he same

    r e s p e c t i v e r a t e s

    as

    d u r i n g th e l a s t f i v e

    y ears. T h i s

    i s

    taken

    t o

    represent

    t h e

    c o n t i n u a t i o n

    o f

    th e

    present stance

    o f f i s c a l

    p o l i c y .

    On th ea bo ve

    assumption,

    t h e

    i n t e r n a l

    debt/GDP

    r a t i o grows at an i n c r e a s i n g

    r a t e , from

    47.9

    percent

    a t the end of

    1989/90

    t o 102

    percent

    by t he end of 2000/01. The

    i n t e r e s t on i n t e r n a l

    d e b t c orrespon d i ng l y r i s e s from

    3.6

    percent

    o f GDP

    i n 1989/90

    t o 8.7

    percent

    i n

    2000/01 ( T a b l e

    3 ) .

    To

    th e above

    must

    be

    added

    th e

    burden

    of e x t e r n a l

    d e b t.

    We make

    the si mpl e assu mption that

    e x t e r n a l net

    b orrowing

    b y t h e Government

    would remain c onstant

    as

    p r o p o r t i o n

    of GDP at th e

    l e v e l

    i n 1989/90, and

    t h a t

    th e

    average

    i n t e r e s t r a t e on Gov ernment's e x t e r n a l

    debt

    w i l l not

    change.

    In

    p r a c t i c e ,

    t h i s

    assu mption might

    not

    h o l d

    good; most

    l i k e l y ,

    the

    l i a b i l i t i e s and the

    bu rden

    of i n t e r e s t i n

    terms

    o f

    rupees woul d

    be

    h i g h e r .

    1/

    Thi s wou l d onl y

    mean

    that i f an y th i ng,

    we a re

    u n d e r e s t i -

    mating

    th e e x t e r n a l

    part

    o f

    t o t a l l i a b i l i t i e s .

    When e x t e r n a l l i a b i l i -

    t i e s a r e

    added,

    th e

    t o t a l debt/GDP

    r a t i o i s

    seen

    t o r i s e

    from

    60.2

    percent

    of GDP at th e end of

    1989/90

    to 109.9

    percent

    i n

    2000/01

    ( T a b l e

    2 ) .

    The

    t o t a l

    i n t e r e s t payments r i s e

    from

    3.9

    percent

    of GDP i n

    1/

    The

    rupee might d epr ec i ate

    f a s t e r

    than

    th e r a t e of

    domestic

    i n f l a -

    t i o n ,

    th e

    i n t e r e s t

    i n d o l l a r

    terms might harden,

    and the

    r a t i o

    o f

    f o r e i g n

    borrowing

    t o GDP

    might r i s e .

  • 8/10/2019 The Growth of Indian Public Debt- Raja. J. Chelliah IMF Report

    12/51

    T

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  • 8/10/2019 The Growth of Indian Public Debt- Raja. J. Chelliah IMF Report

    13/51

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    0

    5

    .

    1

    0

    5

    .

    2

    0

    5

    .

    2

    8

    5

    .

    3

    6

    5

    .

    4

    3

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    - 10 -

    1 9 8 9 / 9 0

    t o 9.1

    p e r c e n t

    i n2 0 0 0 / 0 1

    ( T a b l e

    3 ) . Even i f one a s s ume s

    t h a t

    t h e b u o y a n c y o f r e v e n u e s o f GOI w o u l d be 1 . 2 - - h i g h e r t h a n i n the p a s t - -

    g r o s s

    i n t e r e s t

    payments w o u l d a b s o r b

    as much as 60.6

    p e r c e n t

    o f

    r e v e n u e s

    i n

    2 0 0 0 / 0 1

    .

    A nd i f

    r e v e n u e s i n c r e a s e d o n l y

    as

    f a s t

    as GDP,

    i n t e r e s t

    payments w o u l d a b s o r b 76.5 p e r c e n t o f r e v e n u e s i n t h a t y e a r ( T a b l e 4 ) .

    B y t h a t y e a r

    t h e t o t a l

    f i s c a l d e f i c i t w o u l d have r e a c h e d

    2 0 . 0

    p e r c e n t

    of

    GDP and

    d o m e s t i c b o r r o w i n g w o u l d

    be 19.3

    p e r c e n t

    o f GDP,

    w i t h

    t h e

    p r i m a r y d e l i c i t r e a c h i n g n e a r l y 11 p e r c e n t o f GDP ( T a b l e s 5

    a n d

    9 ) .

    We

    have

    s o f a r

    c o n s i d e r e d

    t o t a l

    b o r r o w i n g

    and

    g r o s s

    i n t e r e s t p ay -

    ments

    o u t o f t h e b u d g e t . P a r t of th eGovernment's b o r r o w i n g h a s b e e n ,

    a n d i n t h e f u t u r e w o u l d b e , u s e d f o r n et f i n a n c i a l i n v e s t m e n t s . H e n c e ,

    t h e

    n e t i n t e r e s t

    b u r d e n

    on th e b u d g e t

    w o u l d depend

    on th e

    r e t u r n

    on

    s u c h

    i n v e s t m e n t s . To th e e x t e n t t h a t t h e r e t u r n s on f i n a n c i a l i n v e s t m e n t s

    c o v e r t h e

    i n t e r e s t

    on th e p a r t of b o r r o w i n g u s e d f o r s u c h i n v e s t m e n t s ,

    t h e

    n e t

    b u r d e n

    on th e

    b u d g e t

    w o u l d

    b e

    r e d u c e d

    ( o r

    w o u l d

    n o t

    i n c r e a s e ) .

    O v e r t h e y e a r s , t h e r a t i o of r e t u r n on i n v e s t m e n t s i n t h e f o r m o f

    r e c e i p t s

    o f i n t e r e s t and

    d i v i d e n d

    t o i n t e r e s t pa yments, h as

    beenf a l -

    l i n g .

    S u c h r e c e i p t s

    f o r m e d

    83

    p e r c e n t

    o f

    g r o s s

    i n t e r e s t paymentsi n

    1 9 8 2 / 8 3 ; b y 1 9 8 9 / 9 0 , t h e y had come down to 4 8. 4 p e r c e n t . C o r r e s p o n d -

    i n g l y ,

    net i n t e r e s t

    payments

    b y t h e Government

    ha ve

    r i s e n

    f r o m

    1 7 p e r -

    c e n t

    o f

    g r o s s

    payments i n1 9 8 2 / 8 3 to 51.6

    p e r c e n t

    i n1 9 8 9 / 9 0 . T h e r e

    seem t o be t h r e e main r e a s o n s f o r t h e f a l l i n t h e r a t i o o f r e t u r n s t o

    payments

    o f i n t e r e s t on

    d e b t . F i r s t ,

    an i n c r e a s i n g

    p a r t

    o f n e t

    b o r r o w -

    i n g b y t h e Gov ernment h as been

    a b s o r b e d

    b y

    e x p e n d i t u r e s o t h e r t h a n

    n e t

    l e n d i n g . S e c o n d , t h e r a t e s of i n t e r e s t c h a r g e d , an d r e c o v e r i e s o f

    i n t e r e s t d u e ,

    have been l a g g i n g b e h i n d

    i n t e r e s t pa yments.

    T h i r d ,

    th e

    a v e r a g e r a t e

    o f

    d i v i d e n d

    on

    e q u i t y

    i n

    p u b l i c

    e n t e r p r i s e s

    has

    been

    q u i t e

    l o w . I t i s n o t p o s s i b l et o p r e d i c t t h e

    movements

    i n t h e a b o v e t h r e e

    r e l a t i o n s i n t h e

    f u t u r e .

    We,

    t h e r e f o r e , c o n s i d e r

    two a l t e r n a t i v e

    p o s s i -

    b i l i t i e s . We work o u t net i n t e r e s t payments on two a l t e r n a t i v e

    ass ump-

    t i o n s ,

    n a me l y ,

    t h a t t h e y w o u l d r e m a i n 50 p e r c e n t o f g r o s s , and t h a t t h e y

    w o u l d f a l l

    a s

    p e r c e n t a g e

    of

    g r o s s g r a d u a l l y

    t o 25

    p e r c e n t

    b y 2 0 1 0 / 1 1 1/

    t h e l a t t e r

    w o u l d

    mean a r a d i c a l r e v e r s a l of

    p a s t t r e n d s ) .

    T a b l e 6 shows what t h e p r o p o r t i o n s of net

    i n t e r e s t

    payments to net

    r e v e n u e s

    ot th eGovernment

    w o u l d

    b e u n d e r d i f f e r e n t

    s e t s

    o f

    a s s u m p t i o n s

    c o n c e r n i n g t h e r a t e of g r o w t h o f r e v e n u e s an d th e p r o p o r t i o n s of net t o

    g r o s s payments of i n t e r e s t . I t n e t

    i n t e r e s t

    payments a r e 5 0 p e r c e n t of

    g r o s s

    payments u n d e r t h e

    a s s u m p t i o n

    o f

    Government's r e v e n u e s g r o w i n g

    a s

    f a s t

    as GDP, net

    i n t e r e s t

    payment

    as

    p e r c e n t

    of net

    r e v e n u e s w o u l d

    r i s e

    f r o m 2 0 . 7 p e r c e n t i n1 9 8 9 / 9 0 to 61.9 p e r c e n t i n

    2 0 0 0 / 0 1 ; e v e n

    w i t h a

    b u o y a n c y of 1.2, net i n t e r e s t payments

    w o u l d h a ve

    r i s e n t o 43. 4

    p e r c e n t

    o f n e t r e v e n u e s b y

    2 0 0 0 / 0 1 .

    If onea s s ume s t h a t n e t i n t e r e s t w o u l d t a l l

    t o 25 p e r c e n t of g r o s s i n t e r e s t , and government r e v e n u e s

    w i l l

    h a ve a

    b u o y a n c y of 1.2

    p e r c e n t - - b o t h f a v o r a b l e a s s u m p t i o n s - - n e t

    i n t e r e s t

    payments w o u l d

    r i s e

    to 29.4 p e r c e n t of net r e v e n u e s b y

    2 0 0 0 / 0 1 .

    But

    1 / T h i r t y - n i n e p e r c e n t

    b y 2 0 0 0 / 0 1 .

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    - 11 -

    Table

    4. I n d i a : Gross I n t e r e s t Payments on T o t a l Debt

    as

    P ercent

    of Gross C e n t r a l Government Revenue

    Year

    1989/90

    1990/91

    1991/92

    1992/93

    1993/94

    1994/95

    1995/96

    1996/97

    1997/98

    1998/99

    1999/00

    2000/01

    E l a s t i c i t y

    =1.0

    3 3 . 6

    3 5 . 7

    3 7 . 9

    4 0 . 2

    4 2 . 8

    4 5 . 8

    4 9 . 2

    5 3 . 2

    5 7 . 7

    6 3 . 0

    6 9 . 2

    7 6 . 5

    Assumption

    I

    E l a s t i c i t y

    =1.1

    3 3 . 6

    3 5 . 4

    3 7 . 1

    3 8 . 9

    4 1 . 0

    4 3 . 4

    4 6 . 2

    4 9 . 3

    5 3 . 0

    5 7 . 3

    6 2 . 2

    68.0

    E l a s t i c i t y

    =1.2

    3 3 . 6

    3 5 . 0

    3 6 . 3

    3 7 . 7

    3 9 . 3

    4 1 . 2

    4 3 . 4

    4 5 . 8

    4 8 . 7

    5 2 . 1

    5 6 . 0

    6 0 . 6

    Y e a r

    1989/90

    1990/91

    1991/92

    1992/93

    1993/94

    1994/95

    1995/96

    1996/97

    1997/98

    1998/99

    1999/00

    2000/01

    E l a s t i c i t y

    =1.0

    3 3 . 6

    3 6 . 0

    3 7 . 7

    3 9 . 2

    4 0 . 5

    4 1 . 6

    4 2 . 7

    4 3 . 6

    4 4 . 4

    4 5 . 1

    4 5 . 7

    46.3

    Assumption

    I I

    E l a s t i c i t y

    =1.1

    3 3 . 6

    3 5 . 7

    3 6 . 9

    3 8 . 0

    3 8 . 8

    3 9 . 5

    4 0 . 0

    4 0 . 4

    4 0 . 7

    4 1 . 0

    4 1 . 1

    4 1 . 2

    Elasticity

    =

    1.2

    3 3 . 6

    3 5 . 3

    3 6 . 2

    3 6 . 8

    3 7 . 2

    3 7 . 4

    3 7 . 6

    3 7 . 6

    3 7 . 4

    3 7 . 3

    3 7 . 0

    3 6 . 7

  • 8/10/2019 The Growth of Indian Public Debt- Raja. J. Chelliah IMF Report

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    Y

    e

    a

    r

    1

    9

    8

    9

    /

    9

    0

    1

    1

    1

    9

    9

    2

    /

    9

    3

    1 1

    9

    9

    4

    /

    9

    5

    1

    1

    1

    1

    9

    9

    8

    /

    9

    9

    1

    2

    0

    0

    0

    /

    0

    1

    T

    a

    b

    l

    e

    5

    I

    n

    d

    i

    a

    :

    D

    o

    m

    e

    s

    t

    i

    c

    B

    A

    s

    s

    u

    m

    p

    t

    i

    o

    n

    I

    7

    .

    0

    7

    .

    4

    7

    .

    9

    8

    .

    5

    9

    .

    3

    1

    1

    1

    2

    .

    2

    1

    1

    5

    .

    2

    1

    1

    R

    a

    t

    i

    o

    o

    f

    B

    o

    r

    r

    o

    w

    i

    n

    g

    U

    n

    d

    e

    r

    A

    s

    s

    u

    m

    p

    t

    i

    o

    n

    s

    T

    o

    t

    a

    l

    B

    o

    r

    r

    o

    w

    i

    n

    g

    A

    s

    s

    u

    m

    p

    t

    i

    o

    n

    I

    7

    8

    .

    1

    8

    9

    9

    1

    1 1 1 1

    1

    2

    D

    o

    m

    e

    s

    t

    i

    c

    a

    T

    o

    t

    a

    l

    )

    I

    a

    I

    D

    o

    m

    e

    s

    t

    i

    c

    B

    o

    r

    r

    o

    w

    i

    n

    g

    A

    s

    s

    u

    m

    p

    t

    i

    o

    n

    I

    I

    7 7

    7

    .

    0

    7 7

    7

    7

    7

    7 7 7

    7

    t

    o

    G

    T

    o

    t

    a

    l

    B

    o

    r

    r

    o

    w

    i

    n

    g

    A

    s

    s

    u

    m

    p

    t

    i

    o

    n

    I

    I

    7

    7

    7

    7

    7

    7

    7

    7 7 7

    7

    7

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    - 13 -

    T a b l e

    6.

    I n d i a :

    Net

    I n t e r e s t

    Payments on

    T o t a l

    Debt

    a s P e r c e n t

    of Net

    C e n t r a l

    Government Revenue

    P a r a m e t e r s

    T a b l e

    Growth In GDP

    Growth in r e v e n u e s of

    C e n t r a l Government

    f o r e l a s t i c i t y = 1. 0

    1.2

    0 . 1 2 0

    0 . 1 2 0

    0 . 1 4 4

    1989/90

    1990/91

    1991/92

    1992/93

    1993/94

    1994/95

    1995/96

    1996/97

    1997/98

    1998/99

    1999/00

    2000/01

    2001/02

    2002/03

    2003/04

    2004/05

    2005/06

    2006/07

    2007/08

    2008/09

    2009/10

    2010/11

    N e t

    Revenues of C e n t r a l Govt.

    A s s u m p t i o n I

    5 0 % wt

    20.7

    2 1 . 8

    2 3 . 3

    2 5 . 1

    2 7 . 2

    2 9 . 7

    3 2 . 7

    3 6 . 2

    4 0 . 6

    4 6 . 0

    5 2 . 9

    6 1 . 9

    7 3 . 9

    9 0 . 5

    1 1 4 . 5

    1 5 2 . 0

    2 1 7 . 4

    3 5 7 . 8

    8 5 9 . 7

    - 3 , 3 4 0 . 4

    - 6 2 4 . 1

    - 3 6 3 . 0

    5 0 - 2 5 % wt

    2 0 . 7

    2 1 . 8

    2 2 . 6

    2 3 . 6

    2 4 . 7

    2 6 . 0

    2 7 . 5

    2 9 . 2

    3 1 . 3

    3 3 . 7

    3 6 . 7

    4 0 . 2

    4 4 . 5

    4 9 . 8

    5 6 . 3

    6 4 . 5

    7 4 . 9

    8 8 . 3

    1 0 6 . 2

    1 3 0 . 9

    1 6 6 . 8

    2 2 2 . 7

    e = 1.0)

    A s s u m p t i o n

    I I

    5 0 %

    wt

    2 0 . 7

    2 2 . 0

    2 3 . 2

    2 4 . 4

    2 5 . 4

    2 6 . 3

    2 7 . 1

    2 7 . 9

    2 8 . 5

    2 9 . 1

    2 9 . 6

    3 0 . 1

    3 0 . 5

    3 0 . 9

    3 1 . 3

    3 1 . 6

    3 1 . 9

    3 2 . 1

    3 2 . 3

    3 2 . 5

    3 2 . 7

    3 2 . 9

    5 0 - 2 5 % wt

    2 0 . 7

    2 2 . 0

    2 2 . 5

    2 2 . 9

    2 3 . 0

    2 3 . 1

    2 3 . 0

    2 2 . 7

    2 2 . 4

    2 2 . 0

    2 1 . 5

    2 1 . 0

    2 0 . 4

    1 9 . 8

    1 9 . 2

    1 8 . 5

    1 7 . 8

    1 7 . 1

    1 6 . 3

    1 5 . 6

    1 4 . 9

    14.1

    N e t

    R e v e n u e s

    of

    A s s u m p t i o n

    I

    5 0 %

    wt

    2 0 . 7

    2 1 . 2

    2 2 . 2

    2 3 . 2

    2 4 . 5

    2 5 . 9

    2 7 . 7

    2 9 . 7

    3 2 . 2

    3 5 . 2

    3 8 . 9

    4 3 . 4

    4 9 . 1

    5 6 . 4

    6 5 . 8

    7 8 . 2

    9 5 . 3

    1 1 9 . 8

    1 5 7 . 5

    2 2 1 . 6

    3 5 3 . 0

    7 6 1 . 9

    5 0 - 2 5 %

    2 0 . 7

    2 1 . 2

    2 1 . 5

    2 1 . 8

    2 2 . 2

    2 2 . 8

    2 3 . 4

    2 4 . 2

    2 5 . 2

    2 6 . 3

    2 7 . 7

    2 9 . 4

    3 1 . 4

    3 3 . 8

    3 6 . 6

    3 9 . 9

    4 3 . 9

    4 8 . 6

    5 4 . 2

    6 1 . 0

    6 9 . 2

    7 9 . 1

    C e n t r a l

    G o v t = 1.2

    A s s u m p t i o n

    I I

    w t 50% wt

    2 0 . 7

    2 1 . 4

    2 2 . 1

    2 2 . 5

    2 2 . 8

    2 3 . 0

    2 3 . 1

    2 3 . 1

    2 3 . 0

    2 2 . 9

    2 2 . 7

    2 2 . 4

    2 2 . 2

    2 1 . 9

    2 1 . 5

    2 1 . 2

    2 0 . 8

    2 0 . 4

    2 0 . 0

    1 9 . 6

    1 9 . 2

    5 0 - 2 5 % wt

    2 0 . 7

    2 1 . 4

    2 1 . 4

    2 1 . 2

    2 0 . 8

    2 0 . 3

    1 9 . 7

    1 9 . 0

    1 8 . 3

    1 7 . 5

    1 6 . 7

    1 5 . 9

    1 5 . 1

    1 4 . 4

    1 3 . 6

    1 2 . 8

    1 2 . 1

    1 1 . 3

    1 0 . 6

    9.9

    9.2

    8.6

    N o t e :

    Net c e n t r a l

    g o v e r n m e n t

    r e v e n u e s

    =

    G r o s s r e v e n u e s

    - Net i n t e r e s t

    p a y m e n t s

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    - 1 4 -

    e v e n t h a t w o u l d c o n s t i t u t e a n u n s u s t a i n a b l e s i t u a t i o n , w h e r e i n o n l y

    7 0 . 6 p e r c e n t o f n e t r e v e n u e s w o u l d b e

    a v a i l a b l e

    f o r

    n o n i n t e r e s t

    e x p e n d i t u r e ;

    b y 2 0 1 0 / 1 1 , n e t

    i n t e r e s t

    p a y m e n t s w o u l d a b s o r b

    n e a r l y

    8 0 p e r c e n t o f n e t r e v e n u e s .

    T h e n u m b e r s r e g a r d i n g t h e d e b t b u r d e n w e h a v e g i v e n i n t h e p r e -

    c e d i n g p a r a g r a p h s

    c l e a r l y

    i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e b u d g e t of G O I w o u l d h a v e

    e n t e r e d a

    d i s a s t r o u s s i t u a t i o n

    b y t h e t u r n o f t h e c e n t u r y , i f n e t b o r -

    r o w i n g

    w e r e i n c r e a s e d d u r i n g t h e n e x t t e n y e a r s a s f a s t a s d u r i n g t h e

    l a s t f i v e y e a r s . T h e d e b t / G D P

    r a t i o

    w o u l d r i s e t o 1 1 0 p e r c e n t a n d t h e

    g r o s s i n t e r e s t b u r d e n w o u l d r i s e t o

    m o r e

    t h a n 9 . 0 p e r c e n t

    o f

    G D P ,

    a b s o r b i n g 6 1 - 7 7 p e r c e n t o f g o v e r n m e n t r e v e n u e s d e p e n d i n g o n w h e t h e r

    r e v e n u e s e x h i b i t e d a b u o y a n c y of 1 o r 1 . 2 . E v e n t h o u g h t h e a v e r a g e

    e f f e c t i v e r a t e o f i n t e r e s t

    p a i d

    o n d e b t ( T a b l e 7 ) w o u l d , o n o u r

    a s s u m p t i o n s , b e l o w e r t h a n t h e r a t e o f g r o w t h - - a r e a l r a t e o f i n t e r e s t

    o f 1 . 5 p e r c e n t a s a g a i n s t t h e

    r e a l

    r a t e o f g r o w t h o f 5 . 5 p e r c e n t - - t h e

    d e b t

    r a t i o

    w o u l d c o n t i n u e t o

    g r o w

    b e c a u s e o f t h e

    r i s i n g r a t i o

    o f p r i m a r y

    d e f i c i t t o G D P a n d t h e h i g h e r m a r g i n a l r a t e o f i n t e r e s t . T h e t a s k o f

    r e v e r s i n g t h e t r e n d s w o u l d b e f a r m o r e d i f f i c u l t i n 2 0 0 0 / 0 1 t h a n n o w .

    T a b l e 7 . I n d i a : A v e r a g e I n t e r e s t K a t e o n T o t a l D e b t

    Y e a r

    1 9 9 0 / 9 1

    1 9 9 1 / 9 2

    1 9 9 2 / 9 3

    1 9 9 3 / 9 4

    1 9 9 4 / 9 5

    1 9 9 6 / 9 7

    1 9 9 7 / 9 8

    1 9 9 8 / 9 9

    1 9 9 9 / 0 0

    2 0 0 0 / 0 1

    A s s u m p t i o n I

    A s s u m p t i o n I I

    6 . 5

    6 . 8

    6 . 9

    7 . 1

    7 . 3

    7 . 4

    7 . 6

    7 . 7

    7 . 8

    7 . 9

    6 . 5

    6 . 9

    7 . 1

    7 . 3

    7 . 4

    7 . 5

    7 . 6

    7 . 7

    7 . 8

    7 . 9

    8 . 0 7 . 9

    N o t e :

    b y

    t o t a l

    A v e r a g e

    i n t e r e s t .

    d e b t .

    r a t e c a l c u l a t e d

    a s

    t o t a l

    i n t e r e s t

    d i v i d e d

    I n t h e s c e n a r i o s k e t c h e d a b o v e , o n l y t h e

    f i r s t r o u n d - e f f e c t o f

    t h e

    g r o w t h of b o r r o w i n g o r

    d e f i c i t

    a s

    p r o p o r t i o n

    o f G D P h a s b e e n c o n s i d e r e d ,

    T h e i m p a c t o f t h e

    f a s t r a t e

    o f g r o w t h o f

    d e f i c i t

    a n d o f t h e d e b t / G D P

    r a t i o

    o n t h e r a t

    e

    o f

    i n t e r e s t ,

    t h e

    r a t e

    o f g r o w t h o f

    G D P

    , a n d t h e

    r a t e

  • 8/10/2019 The Growth of Indian Public Debt- Raja. J. Chelliah IMF Report

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    - 1 5 -

    o f

    i n f l a t i o n

    h a s n o t

    been

    t a k e n i n t o

    a c c o u n t .

    B ut s u r e l y , w i t h

    b o r r o w -

    i n g

    f r o m

    t h e RB I f r o z e n a s p e r c e n t o f G DP , t h e Government w o u l d

    f i n d

    i t

    i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t t o

    s q u e e z e

    more

    f u n d s

    o u t o f t h e

    m a r k e t . Even

    i f

    o n e

    assumes

    t h a t t h e r a t e o f

    d o m e s t i c

    s a v i n g s

    w o u l d

    r i s e ,

    s a y ,

    f r o m

    2 1 p e r c e n t o f G DP i n 1989/90 t o 2 3 p e r c e n t i n 2000/01, t h e

    Government's

    d o m e s t i c b o r r o w i n g on t h e s c a l e p o s t u l a t e d w o u l d

    a b s o r b

    a n i n c r e a s i n g

    p r o p o r t i o n o f

    d o m e s t i c

    s a v i n g s , g o i n g u p t o 7 4. 2 p e r c e n t b y 2000/01

    ( T a b l e 8 ) . T he a b s o r p t i o n o f s u c h a h i g h p r o p o r t i o n o f p r i v a t e s a v i n g s

    --government s e c t o r s a v i n g s a r e l i k e l y t o b e n e g l i g i b l e - - w o u l d n o t b e

    p o s s i b l e

    w i t h o u t a s t e e p i n c r e a s e i n t h e i n t e r e s t r a t e a nd s e v e r e

    c r o w d i n g

    o u t o f p r i v a t e i n v e s t m e n t r e s u l t i n g i n a

    f a l l

    i n t h e g r o w t h

    r a t e .

    1 /

    R a n g a r a j a n

    e t a l

    ( 1 9 9 0 )

    have

    a t t e m p t e d

    t o p r o j e c t t h e g r o w t h o f

    p u b l i c

    d e b t

    a n d i n t e r e s t

    b u r d e n

    b y f i r s t d e r i v i n g t h e

    g r o w t h

    o f n e t

    p r i m a r y

    d e f i c i t

    t h r o u g h

    e s t i m a t i n g n o n i n t e r e s t

    r e v e n u e s

    a n d n o n i n t e r e s t

    e x p e n d i t u r e s o n t h e b a s i s o f

    o b s e r v e d

    e l a s t i c i t i e s ,

    a n d

    t h e n

    e s t i m a t i n g

    t h e

    g r o w t h

    o f i n t e r e s t a n d

    d e b t

    u s i n g t h e p r i m a r y

    d e f i c i t

    f i g u r e s , a n d

    o n t h e b a s i s o f p l a u s i b l e

    a s s u m p t i o n s

    r e g a r d i n g r e l e v a n t k e y

    p a r a m e t e r s .

    A l t h o u g h t h e y have assumed t h e

    same

    g r o w t h r a t e o f

    n o m i n a l

    G DP a s i n o u r

    e x e r c i s e ,

    a n d

    k e p t

    c o n s t a n t t h e

    r a t i o

    o f e x t e r n a l b o r r o w i n g , a nd

    b o r r o w -

    i n g f r o m

    R B I t o G D P , a s w e

    have done,

    t h e y a r r i v e a t

    much

    l a r g e r

    e s t i -

    mates o f

    d e f i c i t

    a n d debt/GDP r a t i o s t h a n o u r s . T h e i r e s t i m a t e s o f t h e

    k e y r a t i o s f o r t h e y e a r 1999/2000 a r e a s g i v e n

    b e l o w :

    N o n i n t e r e s t

    Revenue

    1 6 . 0 5

    As percent o f G DP i n

    1999-2000

    Noninterest

    Expenditure

    N et

    Primary

    Excluding Net

    Lending

    D e f i c i t

    2 7 . 1 9

    1 1 . 1

    Gross

    Primary

    D e f i c i t Debt

    1 9 . 5

    1 4 9 . 7

    1 / I n s t e a d o f a s s u m i n g t h a t

    e a c h

    m a j o r c o m p o n e n t o f d o m e s t i c b o r -

    r o w i n g w o u l d

    g r o w a s d u r i n g t h e

    l a s t f i v e y e a r s ,

    o n e c o u l d a s s u m e t h a t

    t o t a l

    d o m e s t i c b o r r o w i n g w o u l d

    g r o w a t t h e s a m e r a t e ( 1 6 . 9 p e r c e n t p e r

    a n n u m ) .

    T h i s

    w o u l d

    i m p l y

    i m p o s i n g

    a

    u n i f o r m

    g r o w t h

    r a t e

    o n

    a l l

    c o m p o -

    n e n t s e x c e p t

    R B I

    c r e d i t .

    I f w e d i d

    t h a t ,

    t h e d e b t / G D P

    r a t i o w o u l d

    g r o w

    l e s s l a s t

    b u t n e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e s i t u a t i o n i n 2 0 0 0 / 0 1

    w o u l d

    b e q u i t e

    g r a v e . T h e d e b t / G D P

    r a t i o

    w o u l d h a v e r i s e n t o 8 4 . 9 p e r c e n t a n d t h e

    i n t e r e s t

    b u r d e n

    t o 7

    p e r c e n t . C r o s s

    i n t e r e s t

    p a y m e n t s

    w o u l d a b s o r b

    4 9 p e r c e n t o f

    r e v e n u e s

    w i t h a

    b u o y a n c y

    o f 1 . 2 , a n d 6 2 p e r c e n t w i t h a

    b u o y a n c y o f 1 . 0 .

    D o m e s t i c

    b o r r o w i n g w o u l d a b s o r b 4 8 . 7 p e r c e n t o f d o m e s -

    t i c

    s a v i n g , a s a g a i n s t 3 3 . 2 p e r c e n t i n 1 9 8 9 / 9 0 . E v e n

    t h e s e f i g u r e s

    i m p l y

    s e v e r e d i s r u p t i o n

    t o t h e e c o n o m y .

  • 8/10/2019 The Growth of Indian Public Debt- Raja. J. Chelliah IMF Report

    20/51

    T

    a

    b

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    e

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  • 8/10/2019 The Growth of Indian Public Debt- Raja. J. Chelliah IMF Report

    21/51

    - 17 -

    The

    main

    r ea s on s f o r Ra n gara ja n and o t h e r s o b t a i n i n g l a r g e r e s t i -

    mates than

    und e r

    our Assumption I

    seem

    t o be t h e h i g h e r e x p e n d i t u r e

    e l a s t i c i t y d e r i v e d t h r o u g h t h e us e o f l o n g e r p e r i o d data (we

    have

    used

    t h e t r e n d s o f t h e f i v e y e a r s p r e c e d i n g

    1990/91)

    and th e a p p l i c a t i o n o f

    t h e m a r gi n a l r a t e o f

    i n t e r e s t

    t o t o t a l d e b t . On t h e o t h e r h an d , t h e y

    seem t o be o v e r e s t i m a t i n g t h e r a t e o f

    i n t e r e s t

    r e c e i v e d by t h e G o v e r n -

    ment. However t h a t may b e, t h e tw o e x e r c i s e s p o i n t t o t h esame con-

    c l u s i o n ,

    nam e l y ,

    t h a t

    w i t h th e

    c o n t i n u a t i o n

    o f t h e p r e s en t s ta n c e o f

    f i s c a l

    p o l i c y ,

    t h e

    debt/GDP r a t i o

    and the

    r a t i o

    o f

    i n t e r e s t

    on p u b l i c

    debt to GDP would co ntin ue to g r o w , and that by the

    t u r n

    o f t h e c e n t u r y ,

    t h e f i s c a l

    s i t u a t i o n

    would

    have

    a l r e a d y c au se d g r e a t

    harm

    t o t h e

    economy. A l t h o u g h t h e m a r g i na l r a t e o f

    i n t e r e s t

    on b o r r o wi n g i s s t i l l

    b e l o w t h e assumed g r o w t h r a t e , w i t h p r i m ar y d e f i c i t r i s i n g a s a p e r c e n t

    of

    GDP, t h e

    debt/GDP r a t i o

    w oul d c o n ti n u e t o

    r i s e

    e v en

    a f t e r

    2001 unl es s

    t h e r e

    ar e r a d i c a l

    p o l i c y

    c o r r e c t i o n s .

    I t

    must

    b e p o i n t e d out

    that

    we

    have

    c ou n t e d o n l y t h e b o r r o wi n g and

    d e f i c i t of the GOI, which is of cour se the

    ma jor

    b o r r o w e r . B ut s t a t e

    g o v e r nm e n t s a l s o b o r r o w from the market, from f i n a n c i a l

    i n s t i t u t i o n s ,

    and t h r ou g h p r o vi d en t fun d

    d e p o s i t s .

    B e s i d e s , s e l e c t e d

    p u b l i c

    e n t e r -

    p r i s e s

    have been

    a l l o w e d t o b o r r o w from the market w i t h t a x c o n c e s s i o n s .

    They have a l s o b e e n p e r m i t t e d to i n c u r

    e x t e r n a l

    d e b t . I t i s t h e t o t a l

    demand f o r fu nd s o f t h e

    p u b l i c s e c t o r t h at must

    be k e p t i nmind w h i l e

    c o n s i d e r i n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of crow ding out of p r i v a t e i n v e s t m e n t , th e

    p r e s s u r e o n

    i n t e r e s t

    r a t e s , and the i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r b a l a n c e o f

    payment s .

    Government has a c a p t i v e market f r o m w h ic h i t a t t e m p t s t o o b t a i n a

    g