The Future Personnel System Flexibility is theme Evolution is always Plug and Play Major Donald E....

The Future Personnel SystemThe Future Personnel SystemFlexibility is themeFlexibility is themeEvolution is alwaysEvolution is always

Plug and PlayPlug and Play

The Future Personnel SystemThe Future Personnel SystemFlexibility is themeFlexibility is themeEvolution is alwaysEvolution is always

Plug and PlayPlug and Play

Major Donald E. VandergriffAssistant Professor of Military Science

Georgetown University

9th EditionJune 3, 2005

© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff 2

Purpose

The Army is good at understanding Why, the start point, does good at developing What, the end point, but has trouble getting there, the How-to, the hard part, the details of tying Why to What.

I will set the conditions for success, by: Understanding war Understanding that incremental changes won’t do anymore Understanding how to develop and nurture adaptability Providing a recommendation, how-to, to tie the two after

redefining Why and briefly examining What the Army is doing now and in the near future.


Prepared for delivery, as supplement to “Minority Report,” January 2005 as well as to senior leaders, at all levels, with new ideas, editions from 1 through 9 were briefed to several groups from January to June 2005.

This briefing is a detailed summary of the forthcoming book, Raising the Bar: Creating Adaptive Leaders to deal with the Changing Face of War

This study reflects the observations and opinions of the author.

This study in no way reflect the official policy or opinion of the United States Army Cadet Command, the United States Army, Department of Defense, of the United States Government.

6th and 7th editions were delivered to TRADOC Commanding General, General Byrnes 3 & 17 March 2005

EXSUM delivered to Symposium “The Future of the U.S. Army,” Washington, D.C., 11 April 2005

EXSUM delivered to U.S. Army Strategy Conference, Army War College, 16 April 2005

8th edition was delivered to Cadet Command Commanding General Major General Thrasher 26 April 2005

9th edition was presented to the Army G1 for LTG Hagenbeck on 27 May and 3 June 2005 for presentation to Army Chief of Staff General Schoomaker

Will serve as a baseline for further development of a future personnel system

DRAFT – the final version may be different.

AdministrativeNotes

Please do not cite this draft version without permission of the author.

Please do not cite this draft version without permission of the author.


Background: Why I Took This On

For seven years now, I have been asking myself these questions: Can we do it better? Frustrated by saying, briefing and publishing, but do we do it? Can we still afford to change parts of the Army in isolation? Are we preparing our future leaders to deal beyond the conventional, yet

out of date view of war?: The evolution of war to Fourth Generation Warfare? Globalization? The “revolution in technology”? The Army as it evolves to an Expeditionary Army?

New ways to create Leaders must evolve parallel to the culture-to succeed-to nurture them as they develop and grow

“Centralized command and control systems produce methodical (i.e., predictable) Warfighting doctrines premised on the assumption that subordinates should not be free (i.e., can not be trusted) to make their own decisions while staying within the broad guidance of a commander's intent.”

Colonel John Boyd, USAF"Organic Design for Command and Control“


Points of Discussion

Purpose

Part I Why-The Generations of War Current and future operating environment What does it entail for leaders?

Part II What-Army is doing good things, but Factors identified in earlier Army and external studies still exist, despite

current great efforts

Part III How-to What the CSA can do now to begin the evolution Parallel Evolution and the culture-evolving together Recommendations to move from an Industrial based system to a system

that allows for trust tactics & a move to an Expeditionary Army

Conclusion


Purpose

To provide a Strategic how-to, including a new personnel strategy and

force structure to move Army cultural transformation

from a Second Generation Force to a Third Generation Force

in order to set the conditions to create, groom and nurture adaptive leaders

to cope with the emerging conditions of 4th Generation Warfare


Purpose-Summary

The Army is good at:

– Realizing “Why”– Defining “What”– But does not know “How”

To Make a Strategic Plan to Evolve the Culture in Order to Shape the Strategic Setting, so

Other Institutional Elements can Evolve Parallel to one another, Anticipating 2nd and 3rd Order Effects

Goal: An Expeditionary

Army

Goal: A Culture thatsupports a New

Generation Leading an Expeditionary Army

Goal: To

IntegrateIntegrateInstitutionalElements’ Efforts to Achieve Parallel

Objectives


Purpose: Summary What is Adaptability?

What is Adaptability? Adaptability refers to the process of adjusting practices, processes, and

systems to projected or actual changes of environment, e.g., the climate or the enemy.

Adaptability includes the creation of innovative combined arms organizations, doctrine, systems, and training concepts as demanded by the environment, allies, and the enemy.

Adaptive solutions to complex problems in chaotic, unpredictable situations are based more on intuition than on analysis, deliberate planning, and doctrine.

“Sun Tzu’s theory of adaptability to existing situations is an important aspect of his self thought. Just as water adapts itself to the conformation of the ground, so in war one must be flexible; he must adapt his tactics to the enemy situation.”

John Poole, The Last Hundred Yards


States & non-states wage war

States & non-states wage war

1600 1700 1800 1900 2000

Nuclear Weapons

ProliferateFall of USSR

Part I “Why”-The Generations of War

New commo & trans networks

3 GW

4 GW

Precursor activities – going back to Alexander & Sun Tzu

(and before)

maneuver concepts

2 GW

1GW

Highly irregular / partisan /guerrilla warfare; terrorism; criminal organizations, etc.

(all technically illegal)

Peace of Westphalia

State-vs-state— only “legal” form

of war

©Dr. Chet RichardsJaddams.com

“What” type of Army & Leaders?

Dr. Chet Richards


“Why”-The Generations of War

Evolution into the 4th Generation of War is, Non state groups have identified U.S. strengths and weaknesses

Hierarchal & Centralized units have slower decision-cycles

Breadth of time and space has no boundaries

Focused at retaining moral reason to continue

What does it mean for Army “Transformation” “Strategic Lieutenant” (and “corporal”) becoming reality

Pushing more demands/requirements to “lowest levels” Merging the traditional levels of war-decisions can impact strategy

“What” does this tell the Army?


Why?The Future is now

Time/CareerExperience

Exposure to And FamiliarizationOf ComplexProblems

2GW Time line(peace)

Ca

de

t

Lie

ute

na

nt

Ca

pta

in

Ma

jor

LT

C

2GW Time line (War)

Individual Tasks

Sqd & PLT Tasks

Co/TM Tasks

Tactical Planning

Nation Building TasksDealing w/other Cultures

Joint Operations

Line equals at what point does the officer haveto deal with the particular task under the giventype of culture

Grand Tactics

Operational Art

CO

L

3 & 4GW Time line (All)

With the use of varyingeducation and trainingtechniques described in this briefing, we will better prepare our officersearlier to deal with complex tasks

Moving Up Experience, Earlier

Given our current accessions system, we act like conditions have not changed.


“Why”-The Generations of WarInfluencing the “What”

What kind of war for the Army?

Large scale operation/small scale contingencyHow the enemy fights/operating environment

Not the same culture?

Flexibility? Which level has the “freedom of action”?

People-Centric WarfareInvesting in people

Politically tolerable to have junior “free-thinkers”?

Centers of Gravity for Winning Wars

Ch

ang

ed C

ultu

reH

ow

-to?

How is the ArmyReacting-with What?


Why?But? “What” is incomplete?

What happens when we define, “what” understand “Why”, but not “How”?

The CulturePresent-Strategic

Reform Officer Educationand Training=New ROTC

Future Army

Current and futureoperating environments

Emerging technology OpponentsTechnology

Global conditions

Some lower levelLeaders, SoldiersUnits do adapt-

this is climate, notculture change

These veterans will helpBut full potential not tappedDue to unchanged culture

Sen

ior

lead

ers,

pro

fess

ion

al jo

urn

als,

and

“ex

per

ts”:

“Ch

ang

e th

e cu

ltu

re”

Continue to allowinternal factors to

impact effectivenessdistract from true

focus

?

PersonalEfforts fromBelow not

Enough mustHave support

From top

Go in withLess thanrequired


Part II What?-Army Doing Good Things

• Most dramatic since reforms of Elihu Root (1899-1904)!

• Focused on more than one type of threat

• “17 focus areas” = parallel, systematic evolution - first time in army history

• Understands need to change career path progression to create ‘pentathlete’ or adaptive leader

Highly exemplary – but you must simultaneously evolvethe CULTURE to support the pentathlete!

Highly exemplary – but you must simultaneously evolvethe CULTURE to support the pentathlete!

BUT?


Strategic leaders understand and desire need to evolve

Stabilization program will assist in changing culture Most holistic program in 12 attempts

Views more than attaining unit cohesion Focused across the spectrum of the Army First time 2nd and 3rd Order effects analyzed

Aligned with modularity to Establish cyclic unit program Brigade Combat Teams (copied off Breaking the Phalanx) promise more flexibility

OPMS 3 attempting to Restructured to correct some old problems, but Accommodates new force structure Major challenges due to

"requirements line" of officer manning by grade/length of service over future years, and the "on hand" line foreseen under present trends

This gap is the result of years of severe officer losses beginning at the 5-8 years-of-service point, and it is hurting and will hurt the Army

What?-Army Doing Good Things

But, then “What” is the problem?


What?-Army Doing Good Things – But?

Major influences barriers to Transformation Mobilization doctrine (Path to Victory)

Despite Modularity: too weak, still too much overhead Stabilization

Hierarchy remains reminiscent of Napoleonic and Cold War (9 levels-pushing down-IO (e-mail) accelerates this)

Culture of Management Science Evolution of the training and evaluation process of Frederick Taylor

Focus on “fundamentals,” “there is time to learn the rest,” “academics-first,” “crawl-walk-run”-out of box seen as “fun” or “too-advanced” not training

Leadership evaluations focused on “checking-the-block”

Influence of Management Science leads too?



Factors identified as negative factors in past studies remain at base of culture: Such as,

The “up or out” promotion system Scientific management theme in manning approaches

“Production” of officers “Making-mission”

Leaders and Soldiers have been conditioned to accept non-traditional Army norms by centralized, functional specialization and selection systems that will continue too Emphasize competition Individual replacements Generalist, career model

What does this do to adaptive leaders?


Research has shown that individual performance appraisal and selection systems are, Inaccurate Unscientific Prone to sub-group subversion?

More than half of any rating variance is due to “idiosyncratic rater effects” such as, How much the rater likes the ratee Whether they have similar personalities Their views on performance Sterotypes on gender, race and ethnicity Self-interest Sub-group factional interests Variations in work context


What does this lead too?


Most importantly, centralized transfer promotion queues will continue to lead too, Frequent, expensive moves will still occur Reduce social capital Erode trust Add to careerist credentials

An “annual promotion tournament” will continue too, Shift people between units, as if robbing “Peter to pay Paul,” primarily to

reward the winners Team improvement suffers Legitimacy and commitment suffer because almost everyone not promoted to

senior officer and non-commissioned officer rank is dissatisfied with the current system

Those who are promoted and in control will dismiss the dissatisfaction as “sour grapes”


In Sum, the Problem?


“The Army “machine” equates 2LTs with ZERO years of experience to Captains with 10

years of years.” (PERSORSA)

“The Army “machine” equates 2LTs with ZERO years of experience to Captains with 10

years of years.” (PERSORSA)

What?-Army Doing Good Things – But?The result

The Army’s response to: current shortages future field grade short falls force structure changes, i.e., increase of Units of Action

But in reality: Experience goes down Quality decreases Competence suffers Retention pays EXAMPLE—Non-BQ CPTs

as APMS to schools

To meet the cycle of declineIncrease “mission”

Strategic, operational & tactical impacts

Mark Lewis “Army Transformation meets the junior officer exodus””


What?-Army Doing Good Things – But?In sum

Army is adapting, but by climate, not culture After the need goes away, so do the positive climates? Cultural engines identified by Army Training and Leadership

Development Panel (ATLDP) of 2001 remain “up or out” promotion (1916) Production line accessions=quantity trumps quality (1900) Bloated officer corps, driven by short-term measures (1947)

Culture must evolve slightly ahead of other institutional changes in order to be in place, To nurture traits of desired behavior Sustain changes brought about to ensure success

The hardest part to develop is the details in a Strategic how-to to move from here to there

What is the Solution?


What?-Army Doing Good Things – But?Conclusion

Army is adapting, but by climate, not culture After the need goes away, so do the positive climates? Cultural engines identified by Army Training and Leadership

Development Panel (ATLDP) of 2001 remain “up or out” promotion (1916) Production line accessions=quantity trumps quality (1900) Bloated officer corps, driven by short-term measures (1947)

Culture must evolve slightly ahead of other institutional changes in order to be in place, To nurture traits of desired behavior Sustain changes brought about to ensure success

The hardest part to develop is the details in a Strategic how-to to move from here to there


Part III How to-What Do We have?

VA

LU

ES

OP

ER

AT

ION

AL

PR

INC

IPLE

S

DOD – ARMY CULTURE

UNIT

ED

STATES

VALUES

CULTURE

STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP TRANSLATION

OPERATIONALPRINCIPLES

GOVERNMENT -

PUBLIC

SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

- PRIVATE

CHANGED CHANGED ARMY ARMY

CULTURE CULTURE ∆∆


How to-What Do We have?A modern, military bureaucracy

A modern bureaucracy that is, Tends to repeat the same solutions React late under pressure Remain tied to narrow goals of cost reduction and incremental

productivity

Translates into a culture that will continue too Inhibit innovation Have difficulty accommodating other philosophies, such as the

professional military ethos Institutional issues surrounding professional expertise, jurisdiction

and legitimacy fall outside the decision making routine of military (Army) bureaucracy

Translation Needed Hard to Do!


How to-Translation?

Army Strategic Leaders must, Define operational principles & values apart from general society’s:

humanistic, not materialistic! Be coincident– “Live along Side” general societies! Be service, not “stuff” oriented! Adapt “postmodernism professionalism” Set the example!

Get at change!


How-to: Suggestions to Get Started

Form an Ad-hoc, but sanctioned TF to take a Holist, System’s (Not ‘Pieces’) Institutional view and define what we must DO & HOW to Implement = CSA TF

Publicly Award & Assign RESPONSIBLE “Adaptive,” “Innovative” Leaders – Set the Value Example from the Top (Did they impact the Organization Positively?)! = CSA TF/G1

Shape the Executive & Legislative Branches’, Private Sector’s, and Public’s support for Army Cultural Evolution = CSA TF/PAO

Shape the Internal Environment – Get the Strategic and Senior Leader Cadres behind the Movement – They must support to make progress possible = CSA

Do all of these at the Same Time! = CSA TF/G3



Adopt “Trust tactics” — five principal facets to achieve decision cycle dominance over potential 4GW enemies through the successful and independent decision-making of subordinate commanders The first of these is scope for initiative. The second is prudent risk-taking. The third facet concerns the commander's intent to “trust tactics.” Fourth, superior-subordinate relations must be characterized by

mutual trust. Fifth, directive control presupposes subordinate initiative and feedback.

Now, it is time to implement changes to officer accessions



Create the environment required to create and support adaptive

leaders: Publicly praise and award signs of adaptability & innovators

Work with Army Times and AUSA to highlight their actions Put on army.mil with message talking about such people

Form a task force composed of such people despite the fact that

their careers may not appear to be “fast-tracked” as reflected

officially in their files The group advises and recommends the Army CSA on the necessary

cultural changes to support the 21st Century Army Continues to search for more examples of adaptability and innovation

Take these people and make them instructors in ROTC or at

West Point


How to-Get Δ Change?

Society's V&OP Society's V&OP Translated into Army Translated into Army Policy, Doctrine, Policy, Doctrine, Operating Policies & Operating Policies & Procedures = ARMY Procedures = ARMY CULTURE CULTURE ∆ = ∆ =

““How we want to do How we want to do Business!”Business!”

Strategic Leaders’Stated Values &

Operational Principles(V&OP)

How we actually Do Business –

Operational Reality

Monitor Δ of Intent Vs Outcome

Reinforce Statement of Values, Principles & Actions

Outside Influences:

Generations of War & Enemy

Internal Influences:

Society Support/Political

Understanding of Change

Resources Availability


How to-Who belongs and can build?How we want to do business: Moving to the details

Four categories of professional and psychological maturity: Stage 1: Not yet members of the profession Stage 2: Limited members of the profession Stage 3: They are true professionals Stage 4: Lead the Army profession

The personnel strategy and force structure reforms proposed

here aims to stream personnel into four main roles according to

their level of professional maturity.


How to–Change The Way We Do Business

Where are WE?

Such As?

• Zero Defects• ‘More’ Stuff

• Technology Focus• Individual Focus

• Error Tolerance – Surprise isn’t Bad

• Equal Tec & People • More ‘WE’ less ‘ME’• More Service – Less

Stuff

Where Must WE GO?

Such As?

Build Bridges –

How

to Transition

between where we are

to

where we

MUST GO

Define Present – Redefine – Build a Future “Picture” - Develop a Viable Plan to get

There!

Preserve the Past, Build on the Present, Create the Future Expeditionary

Army

Cold War – Legacy

THE STRATEGIC CHANGE MODEL: What we must DO!


How to: The Bridge – Parallel Evolution

Present Culture

Evolve Officer Educationand Training = New ROTC

Goal: Expeditionary

Army

Future Culture

Adaptive Leaders to Lead this Army

The Bridge -How to Get

There?

Doctrine

Personnel

Force Structure

Leadership

Other Cultural Systemic Factors

OPEN, HONEST, APPRAISALMove Beyond Rhetoric!

17 Focus Groups Evolving Together - Must Anticipate 2nd and 3rd Order Effects!


How-to: More DetailsWhat must occur simultaneously

Information

Capital (IC)

Organizational

Culture

People

CD + ED

Potential Value

Strategy (Map)

Strategic Leaders

The ‘Hidden’ Dimension of Soldiers (CD + ED) Determines

How Potential Value Materializes, the Realism of the Strategy, and the Nature of Internal Strategic Processes

The Three Components of Learning &Growth are NOT ‘Born Equal’

CD = Cognitive Development

ED = Social-Emotional Development

Min

ority

Re

po

rt A

nn

ex

Ao

f rep

ort



New Unit of Action (within new Stabilization)

Potential Value

Changed Culture

Strategic Leaders

How Potential Value Materializes, the Realism of the Strategy, and the Nature of Internal Strategic Processes

Repeat, the 17 Focused area Transformation needs to continue, with these adjustments but culture changes are guided by

Operational Staff

(makes changes to

OPMS 3)

Specialists(makes changes to

OPMS 3)Institutional Staff

New Accessions &

Education System



Today’s Culture Stress process Forecasting Risk aversion Bureaucratic Top-down Rank equals success Change is criticism = adherence to process

ensures success

Future Army Culture Stress innovation Experimentation Prudent risk-taking Agility Feedback loops Contribution valued Change is evolutionary =as long as objectives are achieved


How-to: More DetailsThe Personnel System

New promotion system Fill vacancies with or without a promotion Holds competitions open only to Soldiers serving in that unit Transfers and promotions not in sequence Not from central selection list Does not involve transfers from one BCT to another

Personnel specialists do selecting Freedom to select, weigh and interpret complex and detailed data

according to professional standards, the vacancy and circumstances of unit

Local competitions may be less costly than current, counterproductive, centralized, selection and promotion systems


How-to: More DetailsThe Personnel System

Specialists for personnel, social science and personnel management have sole authority for selection Observers from Army have veto but cannot force selection Chain of command has no vote, veto or otherwise Based on information collected throughout career within a stable

market of reputation and 360-degree view

Source of information on candidates can come from: Chain of command Peers Subordinates Stakeholders in other units

Information is not limited to surveys or performance reports


How-to: New Combined Arms Unit

All arms, all supporting brigade sized unit

Known by single name

No permanent unit, branches, corps occupations or affiliations that would sub-divide the BCT

Reduces resistance of competing affiliations and weapons systems to innovation and evolution

Provides sub-units for matrix organizations and networking for an array of mission

Regional recruited and based

Flexibility to assume role based on mission and campaign plan-fight one mission as infantry, rotate back and act as military police (after training and equipment switch)


How-to: New BCTThe people

Officers and Soldiers spend entire life with BCT (Stages 1-2: see slide 27)

Key is to promote learning organization, innovation and adaptability as a unit

Stability brings this about by building trust

Can continually experiment

Accessions of officers and enlisted are by need basis, allowing for strenuous professional entrance standards Moving to more mature Soldiers-leader and led More attuned to 4GW


How-to: New BCTCapabilities

Unit can evolve over time, can be switched to different types of mission over time Instead of specific branches, assign changing mission to cohesive, long-

standing unit led by vastly better educated and experienced leaders

Develops broad outlined doctrine that evolves based on lessons learned and experience of long serving members of UA Similar to German Jager Infantry culture which was foundation for Sturm

units used in World War I, and then evolved to Panzer units in WWII

Manages Stage 1 & 2 of Soldiers


How-to: Operational Staff

Not a “General Staff”

Selection and entrance into after experienced gained in stages 1 & 2 Selection built upon based on reputation over time Experts and understanding of evolution of war

Advise levels above BCT, such as Corps Group, to free BCT of operational and strategic concerns

Are not bureaucratic staff officers


How-to: Operational Staff

Mid-point of career is first opportunity, equals 10-15 years of service

Actual initial selection into Operational Staff, competition opened directly to members operational staff to fill vacant positions

Filled with major to Major General

One distinguishing badge and uniform


How-to: Specialists

Evolved from Social and Human sciences professions Military law, chaplain, IG, human resources, social work, social

science, counseling and family services, medical and dental care, etc….

Stage 3 & 4

Monitor and assist BCTs so they can focus on tasks to perform effectively in 4GW

Separate badge for entire corps as well


How-to: Specialists

Are not CS or CSS, these are included in BCT as one Soldier

Only Stage 2 to 3 Soldiers allowed to enter to take advantage of experience (mid-service)

Focused to the human and social sciences that shape the cultural assumptions and behavior of the Soldier


How-to: More DetailsLeader Education and Accessions

Complexity scale

Res

ou

rces

sca

le Complex Unit Tasks

Education:“How to think”

In sum:•Favor strengths•Educate early•task-train as necessary•to enhance decision making•as cognitive skills established plug in task training

Cognitive Skills education

TaskTraining

Ba

sel

ine

Favors Centralized

Training with resources,

ranges, personnel, time

Favors Campus-based Education, mental resources

Individual Tasks

Administrative Tasks

Weapon Tasks Training

Learning TheoryTactical Decision Games

Force-on-Force, Free-play exercises

Language (s)

Tasks Training:“What to think”

Cognitive development

Strategy


How-to: More DetailsEducation and Accessions

“Learning organization” exposes cadets-classical education- they find answers Experiencing the emotional trauma of failing within a safe, face saving environment that

is needed to promote ED Once cadets finds the answers themselves these lessons are emotionally marked in

time CD and ED need to be developed in synchrony

in order to maximize knowledge development, KD CD lays open to the individual a landscape of choices ED determines whether he or she makes the RIGHT CHOICES under prevailing

circumstances Tools to assist good teachers

Tactical decision games (TDGs) key Intensive confidential individual assessment, feedback, and development planning 360-degree double loop feedback Establishing the blend of instructional technologies to use, particularly in the institutional

setting, is critical to promoting synchronous growth in CD, ED, and, consequently, KD Force on force, free play exercises against a thinking enemy



Ft Benning

Ft Bliss

Ft Knox

Ft Sill

SC MI

QM OD FIAG

TC MS

FA AV

AD

IN AR

EN MP CM

FunctionalTraining

(ABN/Ranger,Scout Leader)

BOLC I BOLC II BOLC IIIEstablishes thefoundation in

cognitive skills“how to think”

sets the foundation

“Culturalize”Brings together

those who passedthrough the “gate

of commissioning,”creating bonds

Specializedtraining, and

administrativetasks

Academic Rigor begins here!

First tough cut comes here,

needs to come earlier than later

Rite of Passage

Beg

ins

wit

h t

ou

gh

scr

een

ing

These may be offered

earlier

First unit

Cognitive Skills education

Task Training

Bas

elin

e

Learning from the platoon sergeant/NCOs,COs, many tasks can be learned here



“Mental Preparation” is a long term investment, “we want to plant Oak trees, not Pine trees,” CSA April 11, 2003 BOLC is good start, with Phase II bonding/building trust early; BOLC III should favor

task training But…Phase I needs to develop cognitive development (CD) early, social emotional

development (ED), Perceptual & Learning process (P&L), and Knowledge development (KD) is the sum of the first two.

Plan must favor strengths, understand-avoid weaknesses (summary)

MajorFactors Strengths Weaknesses Action/Plan

ROTC (today’s Army)

Bridge with society; located w/intellectual capital; good at training; public more supportive of changes

Resource poor; training vice education; view of by Army culture;

CD early-45-50 TDGs in four years, reading list; free play force on force; task-training consolidated joint resources

Y-Gen Most educated/earlier; like mental challenges; seeks autonomy; impatient, expects more out of chain of cmd

Focused present; physical durability; removed from harsh reality of world (U.S. society)

CD is more advanced, ED is delta, give ldr spots earlier-mentor; 4 yrs-excitement; include more interaction

Expeditionary Army

Speed, no-notice; calls for more at lower levels; no build up and train up; Stabilization-”what right looks like”

Conflict with personnel system; conflict with force structure; still too technologically focused

Culture create & nurture adaptability & innovation; create systems that support above-promotion, evals, select.

War (how does it

favor U.S?)

Non-state harder to target; access to “off-the-shelf”; merging levels-of-war

“Strategic lieutenant” vice “intern”; 9-layer hierarchy slows OODA-loop

Must prepare ED and KD through painful, but safe CD and P&L



Commissioning Based on

forecasted UA needs not cohort numbers by law

BA Decisive LeadershipArmy loan forgiven

Contracts at end

Of first year, begins

Army loan

44O

pen to any person

admitted to school

That has completed

Stage 1 and passes

DO

DM

ERB

MS II

Foreign language

Attends A

rmy s

chools

Or cultu

ral e

xperie

nce

Stage 2

Prior service/

Green-to-Gold

MS III

MS IV

LDAC Evaluation

History,

Cultu

ral, and Leader r

equirements

MS I


How-to: More DetailsOther Considerations-Pay

Supports new force structure and personnel strategy, evolve together

Pay remains stratified by rank, but overlap to provide annual increases that reward accumulated military experience and commitment, regardless of degree of specialization

Personnel specialists in the Specialists corps manage a local system to support each BCT, Corps Group and Operational Staff


How-to: More DetailsOther Considerations-Career paths

All into BCT

At mid-point of career (after Stage 2), they can remain in BCT, acquiring additional abilities (with technology)

Or they can migrate to Specialist or compete to enter Operational staff


How-to: More DetailsOther Considerations

Personnel management by competencies, lead to the ability to have a matrix organization

Effectiveness of BCT determines missions

Specialist corps acculturate and manage supply and demand of personnel

Problems must be solved, and not wait out a bad commander or passed on later

BCT forced to develop human resources at hand

The Results!


How?Strategic Model – As I define What

The Cold War Army (2nd GW)ROTC trains officers for the Major Power War, where:They operate within boundaries

established by fixed chains of command, fixed doctrine, fixed force structure, & known threat

They train for certainty within these boundaries to fixed tasks, conditions, standards

Their decision making process assumes linearity with clear cause and effect relationships

Future, Expeditionary Army(3rd GW—to Deal with 4GW)

Instead, ROTC needs to educate and train the new officer to deal with Small Wars, to:Operate with flexible chains of

command, beyond doctrine, with variable force structure, & unknown threat

Train for uncertainty with no boundaries to uncertain tasks, in uncertain conditions, with uncertain standards

Solve asymmetric warfare problems that are non-linear and whose solutions lie outside the defined boundaries

John Tillson “Training for Adaptability”


ConclusionWhat this does for the Army

In terms of the Generations of war, the Army is very good at Second Generation Warfare, but needs to move to a culture that can fight 3rd Generation Warfare in order to understand and cope with Fourth Generation Warfare.

This study is not meant to imply criticism of our leaders and Soldiers, but of some of the way we do things now (culture).

Expeditionary (3GW-Maneuver), is a complete culture; it cannot be effectively adopted piecemeal, and without the dislocations that necessarily accompany true paradigm shifts. Current Army doctrine is not "broken," but even "whole," it may still be improved (better supported by our military culture). Evolving doctrine will be effective, but words and goals are not as fully supported by our current

"Methodical" culture as it could be. A 3GW culture could provide advantages in training, administration, logistics, and operations that

would enable current doctrine to achieve its full potential on the battlefield.

Countries have two very different military forces: one for peacetime, and one for war. These forces differ in size, structure, and most important of all, culture.

For all of the Army’s talk of "train the way you fight" and "Battle-Focus," the Army invariably trains using "peacetime" techniques and standards.

In the past mobilization and the early phases of war, we usually waste time and blood struggling to reorient ourselves to the inevitably different demands of war. This expensive process is, at its root, a cultural transformation. Wars often end before this transformation is completed.


Conclusion The Army of tomorrow!

The CultureStrategic

Contribution & seeking responsibility

Goal: Networked

Army? that worksseamlessly withother services

governmentagencies in order

To perform array ofmissions

Feed back loop: Bottom up encouraged by verticalCulture, i.e., companycommander.com

Hierarchal force structure flattenedTo four areas: tactical, operational,Strategic and technical-Command (control

taken out).

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Success=professionalism

Decisiveness at right time

Service oriented leaders

Leaders have ability tomulti-task, understand merging levels of war in a flat, matrix, networking force structure; Education & Training extensive

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Rank structure flattened to four areas: tactical, operational,strategic and technical, “perform orout” replaces “up or out”

Future combat system fielded/non-lethal, hand-held computers, time now information,

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Doctrine is in terms of principles to enhance evolution based on feedback loopobjective type orders

Has abilityTo understand& deal with it

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Culture Strategic leader(s) publicly awarding/praising members

4GW School/train/cross-fertilize with Government agencies networked teams

3GW Continue to evolve policies free-play/force-on-force cyclic units

Culture rigorous education & hard training=bond

4GW understanding of culture/language

3GW leads to cognitive excellence-networking

What? Expeditionary Army Networked Army(?)

Why? 4GW 5GW(?) 2GW(state)

What? Executes“how-to”

change culture


Back ups


How? How to facilitate these traits

Future Army Culture Stress innovation Experimentation Prudent risk-taking Agility Feedback loops Contribution valued Change is evolutionary = as long as objectives are

achieved

How to do it Stabilization and unit manning will

achieve “what right looks like” Army schools need to also

become centers of

experimentation evolving tactics

and techniques Contributions need to be

highlighted and rewarded Evaluation reports need to focus

on short-term as well as long term

contributions to the larger

organization up to the Army



In order to get here Stabilization and unit manning

will allow time to get to achieve

what right looks like Army schools need to also

become centers of

experimentation evolving tactics

and techniques Contributions need to be

highlighted and rewarded Evaluation reports need to focus

on short-term in present duties as

well as long term contributions to

the larger organization up to the

Army Encourage networking and

matching the right teams

How to Doctrine manuals are short,

concise and on principles Let personnel homestead, and

rotate to TDA back to unit

assignments After command or primary staff

positions, duty as an instructor at

Army school, ROTC, or West

Point is sought after, larger units

even oversee these places in

their regions allowing for rotation

to and from and hosting Change cultural definition of

success, address rank structure



To get here Doctrine manuals are short,

concise and on principles Let personnel homestead, and

rotate to TDA back to unit assignments

After command or primary staff positions, duty as an instructor at Army school, ROTC, or West Point is sought after. Larger units even oversee these places in their regions allowing for rotation to and from and hosting

Now we can addresshow to develop our leaders

How To Award innovators like those who

started and run Companycommand.com as a way to network and run a feedback loop

With units on cycle, they will rotate to and from places giving Soldiers array of experiences

Admit that each traditional level of war is complex and takes longer and more knowledge to master

Reduce bureaucratic staffs and flatten the organization see notes below



To Get There Award innovators like those who

started and run Company

command.com as a way to network

and run a feedback loop With units on cycle, they will rotate

to and from places giving Soldiers

array of experiences Admit that each traditional level of

war is complex and takes longer

and more knowledge to master Reduce bureaucratic staffs and

flatten the organization see notes

below

How To Convince Congress to pass a

Goldwater-Nichols for personnel

reform Move from up or out to perform or

out, but much more must be done

to make that work Access far fewer officers Make it tougher to commission Raise the pay of lower ranking

leaders so they can afford middle

class living, focus on profession New educational and training

requires a different instructional

technology than that used in

conventional E&T establishments

The Future Personnel System Flexibility is theme Evolution is always Plug and Play Major Donald E....

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