Raising the Bar: Creating Adaptive Leaders to Deal With The Changing Face of War Major Donald E....

Raising the Bar:Raising the Bar:Creating Adaptive Leaders to Deal With Creating Adaptive Leaders to Deal With

The Changing Face of WarThe Changing Face of War

Raising the Bar:Raising the Bar:Creating Adaptive Leaders to Deal With Creating Adaptive Leaders to Deal With

The Changing Face of WarThe Changing Face of War

Major Donald E. VandergriffAssistant Professor of Military Science

Georgetown University

DRAFTSeventh Edition

March 2005

© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff2

Agenda (for entire briefing)This is a 5 part briefing

To present the case for reforming not only U.S. Army accessions process (officers), but the entire approach to changing an organization. This will set the conditions for success: “Part 1 Parallel Evolution,” set conditions with 3-parts to define

a strategic model along people-technology-culture “Part 2 Historical Traditions” Are we trapped by out of date

assumptions? This part says yes! “Part 3 Why is change hard?” We are also trapped, ironically,

by the U.S. society’s success as well as its isolation. “Part 4 New POI” parts 1-3 taken together point to a

revolutionary way to create officers. “Part 5 Need some help?” To do this, we are going to need the

U.S. Congress and the Army to do some things—at least address them and understand that it needs a new leader development paradigm.


• Prepared for delivery, as supplement to “Minority Report,” January 2005 as well as to senior leaders, at all levels, with new ideas

• This briefing is a detailed summary of the forthcoming book, Raising the Bar: Creating Adaptive Leaders to deal with the Changing Face of War

• This study reflects the observations and opinions of the author.

• This study in no way reflect the official policy or opinion of the United States Army Cadet Command, the United States Army, Department of Defense, of the United States Government.

DRAFT – the final version may be different.

AdministrativeNotes

Please do not cite this draft version without permission of the author.

Please do not cite this draft version without permission of the author.


Background: Why I Took This On

For seven years now, I have been asking myself these questions, Can we do it better? Frustrated by saying, briefing and publishing, but do we do it? Can we still afford to change parts of the Army in isolation? Are we preparing our future leaders to deal beyond the conventional, yet out

of date, view of war?: The evolution of war to Fourth Generation Warfare? Globalization? The “revolution in technology”? The Army as it evolves to an Expeditionary Army?

New ways to create Leaders must evolve parallel to the culture-to succeed-to nurture them as they develop and grow

“Centralized command and control systems produce methodical (i.e., predictable) Warfighting doctrines premised on the assumption that subordinates should not be free (i.e., can not be trusted) to make their own decisions while staying within the broad guidance of a commander's intent.”

Colonel John Boyd, USAF"Organic Design for Command and Control“


A Strategic ModelPurpose

Provide decision makers and their staffs a model of strategic problems with A holistic view

WhatWhyHow

In context of where we want to go shaped by the current and future environments

Ideas may be revolutionary, but change is evolutionary, examples do exist

Goal: An Expeditionary Army“People-Ideas-Hardware”


Strategic Model“What” must occur first?

Problem: The Army will fail if it tries to change its parts (institutions) in isolation without changing the culture, particularly in regards to providing the climate to nurture adaptive leaders and innovators.

Solution: “Parallel evolution” defines organizational evolution as a holistic problem in terms of:

What—Expeditionary Army through a Strategic “how-to”

Why—Army to 3rd Generation in order to deal with 4th Generation

How—Strategic leaders must have plan and execute to change culture

Defined as: A culture must evolve as the Army moves to change the way it creates and sustains adaptive leaders,

So before I go on to parts 2-5 that deal with leadership, “Parallel Evolution” (parts 1, 1-1, 1-2 & 1-3) sets the conditions through an evolved culture as war changes

WHY?What?

Change the culture

Adaptive Leader

Occurs atthe same

time


States & non-states wage war


1600 1700 1800 1900 2000

Nuclear Weapons

ProliferateFall of USSR

Strategic Model“Why” the culture as War Evolves

New commo & trans networks

3 GW

4 GW

Precursor activities – going back to Alexander & Sun Tzu

(and before)

maneuver concepts

2 GW

1GW

Highly irregular / partisan /guerrilla warfare; terrorism; criminal organizations, etc.

(all technically illegal)

Peace of Westphalia

State-vs-state— only “legal” form

of war

© Dr. Chet Richardswww.jaddams.com

“What” type of Army& Leaders?


1600 1700 1800 1900 2000

Peace of Westphalia

Nuclear Weapons

Proliferate

Fall of USSR

Strategic Model“Why” the culture as War Evolves


New commo & trans networks

Highly irregular / partisan /guerrilla warfare; terrorism; criminal organizations, etc.

(all technically illegal)

1GW

2 GW

3 GW

4 GW

maneuver concepts

©Dr. Chet RichardsJaddams.com

“What” type of Army& Leaders?


Strategic Model “What”: Negative Leadership Model

What the Army is sayingit wants the ExpeditionaryArmy to do, led byAdaptive leaders,cannot exist with this type ofLeadergroomed bytoday’s culture

Lack of Trust

Method driven orders

Underdevelopedprofessionalism

No initiativeWhat if the culture does not change?

Can the ExpeditionaryArmy do it with these?

How else will today’s culture

impactthe future?


“Increased centralization generates friction between the levels of command. Without well-established mutual trust, the temptation to micromanage overtakes commanders and slows decision cycles at all levels. Increased legislation works to create a rigid, mechanistic structure. All of these factors combine to create a rigid inefficient, and sluggish organization that is slow to adapt and ultimately combat ineffective!!.”

Colonel John Boyd

Strategic Model Negative Leadership negates Adaptability & Innovation

Then “What” ?


Strategic Model To a Positive Leadership Model

The Army knows what it wantsfrom leaders in the future.The culture mustexist to nurturethe traitsof theseleaders.

Trust

“Objective driven”or “Mission”

orders

Evolutionary Tactics

Adaptive Leaders

“How-to” Create and

nurture them?

Okay, good answer,then “What” ?

“What” for the Future?


“Increased decentralization throughout the organization harmonizes the rhythm of the slower strategic decision cycle with those of the faster tactical decision cycles. An efficient, highly adaptive and pro-active, organic whole emerges to become a Superior War-fighting Organization!”

Colonel John Boyd

Why? Negative Leadership negates Adaptability & Innovation

Then “What” ?The hard part now!

The Strategic “How-to”


A Strategic ModelAchieve “Parallel Evolution”

What? Cold War Army Expeditionary Army Why? Fight 2GW well opponents adapt global conditions WMD 4GW How? Strategic leaders lead change adjust policies/laws/beliefs

award/protect innovators/risk-takers educate outside influences-Congress

Institutional changes simultaneously evolve toward goal

The CulturePresent-StrategicInfluences all others

Evolve officer educationand training=New ROTC

Goal: Expeditionary

Army

To assist the people in between, those who planand execute, this must occur simultaneously

Requires evolved culture

Adaptive leaders to lead this Army

Cannot have One withoutThe otherDifficult part:

strategyfor getting

there (“how”)

doctrine

personnel

Force structure

Leadership

The critical part

Change cultureAdaptive leader


Strategic Model-Parallel EvolutionWhat must occur simultaneously

Information

Capital (IC)

Organizational

Culture

People

CD + ED

Potential Value

Strategy (Map)

Strategic Leaders

The ‘hidden’ dimension of soldiers (CD + ED) determines how potential value materializes, the realism of the strategy, and the

nature of internal strategic processes

The ‘hidden’ dimension of soldiers (CD + ED) determines how potential value materializes, the realism of the strategy, and the

nature of internal strategic processes

The Three Components of Learning &Growth are NOT ‘Born Equal’

CD = Cognitive Development

ED = Social-Emotional Development

Min

ority

Re

po

rt A

nn

ex

Ao

f rep

ort


A Strategic ModelA historical model-incomplete

What? From Tactical to Operational Maneuver continue leader evolution new force structures new technology

Why? Could not move beyond tactical zone technology resource competition How? von Seeckt critical AAR (1919) strenuous leadership selection

evolutionary experiments new technology stabilization feedback loops Institutional changes simultaneously evolve toward goal

The CultureStrategic

Encouraged/protect those who experiment &

take risks

Goal: Army that

moved fromtactical to

operational maneuver

(still neglected)strategy?)

Doctrine existed as principlesor guidelines- Truppenfuhrercould be evolved/expanded

Feed back loop: AAR (1919) critical of every aspectof Army performance in WWI

Force structure-Panzer Division Sturm battalions

Sc

ha

rnh

ors

tre

form

s(1

80

9)

Strenuous leader

selection

Sturm tactics

Encouraged to seek

responsibility

Airplane, tank and radio Machineguns, automobile

No strategic thinkers?

Not beyond operations?

Majority foot-driven

Too isolated from politics

No standard-too complex Germans understoodthe value of rapid decision-making throughstrength of character


A Strategic ModelWhat happens when only parts change?

What? AirLand Battle doctrine Agility-Initiative-Decisive-Synchronization Division 86 “The Big Five” M1, Apache, Patriot, MLRS, Hummet

Why? Beat Soviets quickly Low casualties short wars fragile & complicated tail How? DuPuy/Starry/Meyers/Ulmer volunteer Army quality of life but did not

evolve the foundation of demise in Vietnam (the culture of management science) Institutions did not change simultaneously toward goal


First major reform of ROTC (Wagner), training Revolution (NTC), attempted

COHORT (unit vice individual) Goal: Move U.S. Army from

attrition doctrine to

maneuver doctrineto win first battle ofnext war decisively

Achieved goal whenfighting another 2GWenemy that was/iseven more centralized

First time in history went toManeuver doctrine-FM 100-5 (82);“Synchronization” conflicted with it

Feed back loop: Veterans of Vietnam did not want torepeat experience of Vietnam; infusion of Reagan build-up

Force structure-Division 86, but retained top down hierarchy

ROAD

Mo

bil

iza

tio

n d

oc

trin

e(E

lih

u R

oo

t &

Ge

org

e M

ars

ha

ll) Never ending

make or break professionalism

Attrition Warfare

1970 War College Report

on Army culture

Precision weapons, improvedProtection, mobility, communication

Changes called for by1970 report did not occur

Policy adjustments helpedClimates but not culturei.e., longer cmd tours, COHORT

etc…

Mass-productionstandardization


A Strategic Model3GW to cope with 4GW?


Contribution & seeking responsibility

Goal: Networked

Army that worksseamlessly withother services

governmentagencies in order

to perform array ofmissions

Feed back loop: Bottom up encouraged by verticalCulture, i.e., companycommand.com

Hierarchal force structure flattenedTo four areas: tactical, operational,Strategic and technical-Command (control

taken out).

10 la

yers

C&

CM

od

ula

rity

UA

/UE

Arm

yT

ran

sfo

rma

tio

n(2

00

5-?

)

Neo

-Tay

lori

sm

care

er m

od

el

rep

lace

d b

y

Dem

min

g

Act

ion

beg

ins

to

rep

lace

rh

eto

ric

Tan

k, p

reci

sio

nS

trik

e, je

t/h

elo

Success=professionalism

Decisiveness at right time

Service oriented leaders

Leaders have ability tomulti-task, understand merging levels of war in a flat, matrix, networking force structure; Education & Training extensive

Culture Strategic leader(s) publicly awarding/praising members

4GW School/train/cross-fertilize with Government agencies networked teams

3GW Continue to evolve policies free-play/force-on-force cyclic units

Ear

ly r

igo

r=

com

mo

n la

ng

uag

e

Rank structure flattened to four areas: tactical, operational,strategic and technical, “perform orout” replaces “up or out”

Future combat system fielded/non-lethal, hand-held computers, time now information,

Qu

alit

y o

ver

qu

anti

ty

On

ce-

un

tou

chab

le

law

s, p

olic

ies

&

bel

iefs

are

fin

ally

add

ress

ed

Doctrine is in terms of principles to enhance evolution based on feedback loopobjective type orders

Culture rigorous education & hard training=bond

4GW understanding of culture/language

3GW leads to cognitive excellence-networking

Has abilityTo understand& deal with it

What? Expeditionary Army Networked Army(?)

Why? 4GW 5GW(?) 2GW(state)

What? Executes“how-to”

change culture

FM

1-0

FM

3-0

FM

7-0

“Ad

apti

ve L

ead

er”


Part I AgendaExplained in three parts

Setting conditions for success

Part 11- “What”Part 12- “Why”Part 13- “How”

Goal: An Expeditionary Army

3GW culture to understandAnd deal with 4GW.Leadership is key.

Culture is evolved and shaped toenhance people-centric warfare.


Part I Conclusion

The Army is

Part 11- Good at defining “What” Part 12- At realizing “Why” Part 13- but does not know “How”

To make a Strategic plan toEvolve the culture in order toSet the strategic setting, so

Other institutions can evolve, Parallel to one another, Adjusting to 2nd and 3rd order effects

Goal: An Expeditionary Army

Goal: A Culture thatsupports the

leadership of an Expeditionary Army

Goal: Tocombine

institutionsat goal

Raising the Bar: Creating Adaptive Leaders to Deal With The Changing Face of War Major Donald E....

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