© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff 1 Agenda Part 2 of 3 A holistic view What Why a future Army? The...

© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff1

AgendaPart 2 of 3

A holistic viewWhatWhy a future Army?

The Future is Now

Understanding the Environment

How


Why?The Future is now

Time

=?

The “RMA”

Growing 4GW CapabilitiesCapability Overmatch

Today

Effect of Leader Development Not Keeping Pace with Change

Effectiveness Index

Capability



Time/CareerExperience

Exposure to And FamiliarizationOf ComplexProblems

2GW Time line(peace)

Ca

de

t

Lie

ute

na

nt

Ca

pta

in

Ma

jor

LT

C

2GW Time line (War)

Individual Tasks

Sqd & PLT Tasks

Co/TM Tasks

Tactical Planning

Nation Building TasksDealing w/other Cultures

Joint Operations

Line equals at what point does the officer haveto deal with the particular task under the giventype of culture

Grand Tactics

Operational Art

CO

L

3 & 4GW Time line (All)

With the use of varyingeducation and trainingtechniques described in this briefing, we will better prepare our officersearlier to deal with complex tasks

Moving Up Experience, Earlier

Given our current accessions system, we act like conditions have not changed.



YES! Battlefield conditions have changed:Since WWII, platoon zone from yards to kilometersTime has compressed—instant reporting Now, what was last, is often first Zero defects =>

Society’s instant gratificationAn individual-centric personnel system

LTs today need skills to command battalions of yesterday.The good news: WWII's BN Cdrs were often as old as today's

LTs We're capable today of delivering better leader development


Why?The Future is now: Leadership

The Army is still stuck with Frederick Taylor and Henry Ford, where: Workers were simply cogs in the wheel Workers were easily trained, easily replaceable Workers were not expected to think

In fact, thinking was discouragedThey were simply told when to show up and what to do. They had no say in production or engineering

But that model has been supplanted by W. Edwards Deming’s and Toyota’s: Lowest level workers must be empowered and take initiative Can stop the production line, at any time, for any reason Most successful companies use these concepts

But they demand professionalism and discipline But where is war evolving to?


Why?Understanding the environment

1GW: Aristocratic Culture, centers on skills of one individual Linear Tactics of Column and Line—Driven by Culture & TechnologyOperational Art—Napoleon’s Time & Space to Set Up Decisive Battle

2GW: Attrition Warfare, driven by technology (U.S. Army) Materialschlacht or industrial war of attrition Linear Tactics—Regularity driven by technology Operational Art—Procure success from top downSpace-Time Decisions SYNCHRONIZED (e.g., “Active Defense”)

3GW: Maneuver Warfare, driven by ideas WE NEED TO GET HERE FIRST TO DEAL w/ 4 GWInfiltration tactics—Blitzkrieg—USMC & OODA Loop Nonlinear Tactics Operational Art—Penetrate his OODA loops, (Boyd))

“If we look at the development of warfare in the modern era, we see three distinct generations … Third generation warfare was conceptually developed by the German offensive in the spring of 1918 … Is it not about time for the Fourth Generation to appear?”

“The Four Generations of War” William S. Lind, Nightengale, Wilson, et al,

Marine Corps Gazette, 1989



“The distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between 'civilian' and 'military' may disappear.”

“The Four Generations of War,” William S. Lind, Nightengale, Wilson, et al,

Marine Corps Gazette, 1989

Fourth Generation Warfare is evolving along two complimentary lines: One of the opponents is something other than the armed forces of

a state The ability to continue the conflict without coming apart at the

moral level



Despite the growing complexity of the battlefield, the Army is proposing only incremental changes to our officer accessions system because: It has become addicted to technology and technological solutions In our traditional view, the low-tech approaches of 4GW are the

“Tactics of the Weak" However, 4GW is often successful in circumventing our

military's far stronger high-tech-conventional posture.

Meanwhile, the Cadet Command vision:

“New focus requires wholesale shift in resource allocation: Scholarships; Budgets; Advertising”

“State of Command”U.S. Army Cadet Command (2002)



John Boyd: 3 Aspects of war: Physical Mental Moral

We are still focused on the Physical Aspect of War

No focus on the Mental aspect of war Enemy out-OODA loops us daily Reacting to enemy propaganda, threats, claims Solution to winning the GWOT: Information arrows

Moral actions have to be above reproach, or we will lose allies and the willing participation of our own people Can we recover?

ORIENT OBSERVE ACTDECIDE

OODA LOOP

Information Operations and 4GWGreg Wilcox SRI International 23 February 2005



Calls for extremely capable leaders that must:Have a cultural knowledge of the area, including

familiar with the languageUnderstand that intelligence and knowledge,

NOT just information, is key – getting beyond just kinetics, rethinking intelligence, information, “targets” & “weapons”

Consider non-lethal alternatives“The values, attributes, actions and skills most often mentioned as key to success as a junior officer Decision-making; particularly the ability to make complex and rapid decisions while fatigued and in a chaotic, ambiguous and time-constrained environment. The demands of the digitally-enhanced battlefield of the future will place a premium on these skills”

“Future Lieutenants Study”U.S. Army Cadet Command (2000)



Insurgents have an affinity for urban terrain and populations; future leaders have to understand they must:

Separate insurgents from the population that provides supportSeparate insurgents from media exposureGo where they are not (get in behind morally, mentality,

psychologically, and physically) Influence zones from where insurgents previously operated (don’t

want to occupy) Turn the population against the insurgentsCoordinate actions over a wide area and for a long time

“The capacity to eliminate irrelevant information is one of the most critical skills that junior officers will need on the digitally enhanced battlefield of the future. In addition, junior officers must be comfortable with ambiguity and pressure and possess the ability to make rapid decisions under conditions of uncertainty and stress. Without these attributes and skills, the officer will be unable to see through the ‘fog of war.’”

“Future Lieutenants Study”U.S. Army Cadet Command (2000)

Copyright@2005DonVandergriff


Why?Strategic Model

What happens when we define “what” and understand “why” but not “how”?

The CulturePresent-Strategic

Reform Officer Educationand Training=New ROTC

Future Army

Current and futureoperating environments

Emerging technology OpponentsTechnology

Global conditions

Some lower levelLeaders, SoldiersUnits do adapt-

this is climate, notculture change

These veterans will helpBut full potential not tappedDue to unchanged culture

Sen

ior

lead

ers,

pro

fess

ion

aljo

urn

als,

an

d “

exp

erts

”:“C

han

ge

the

cult

ure

” Continue to allowinternal factors to

impact effectivenessdistract from true

focus

?

PersonalEfforts fromBelow not

Enough mustHave support

From top

Go in withLess thanrequired


“Why”Conclusion

What this does for the Army: We have justified what we need to change, and why War is more complex War is more than just capturing the other guys’ capital The enemies are going to avoid direct confrontation with U.S. The enemy relies on smaller and decentralized groups Possible traditional enemies will also learn to merge all techniques to

counter U.S. technology and firepower

The Army understands “why” now is time to develop the “how” not only to win in the future, but a “how” to get us by the “what.”

© 2005 Donald E. Vandergriff 1 Agenda Part 2 of 3 A holistic view What Why a future Army? The...

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