The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism

Dr. Charles D. FergusonScience and Technology Fellow

Council on Foreign Relations

September 29, 2004Georgetown University

Financial support: John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Ploughshares Fund, and Nuclear Threat Initiative

Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism

• Acquisition of an intact nuclear weapon

• Crude nuclear weapon or Improvised Nuclear Device (IND)

• Attack against or sabotage of a nuclear power plant or other nuclear facility

• Radiological dispersal device (RDD) or “dirty bomb”

Holmes to Watson: It’s Elementary

Motive Motive

MeansMeans

OpportunityOpportunity

Assessing RiskRisk = Probability X Consequence

Large uncertaintiesLack of data

Alternatively:

Risk = Motivation X Intention X Capability X Consequence

Terrorist Motivations• Why haven’t there been any RDD or crude

nuclear weapon terrorist attacks?

• Those who study terrorist motivations are “underwhelmed by the probability of such an event for most – but not all – terrorist groups.” – Jerrold Post (IAEA presentation, Nov. 2001)

• Psychological and political constraints are great for most groups

Terrorist Motivations (continued)• Traditional thinking: “Terrorists want a lot of people

watching, not a lot of people dead.”

-- Brian Jenkins, RAND

• New Breed of Terrorist Group: Al Qaeda – politico-religiousAum Shinrikyo – Apocalyptic

Want to kill many and have even more watching in dread

But Can They Get the Means?• Nuclear weapons and fissile material are difficult

to obtain

• Radioactive materials are much more accessible

• Variety of nuclear facilities to target: Security also varies

Acquisition of Intact Nuclear Weapon

• Theft

• Purchase

• Gift (a little help from their friends)?

• Coup

Estimated Nuclear ArsenalsNation Total Active

WeaponsRelatively Portable Weapons

United States 7,650 3,000

Russia 8,200 8,000-10,000

France 348 60?

Britain 200 Unknown

China 380 Unknown

Israel 75-200 Unknown

India 30-35 Unknown

Pakistan 24-48 Unknown

North Korea 0-8? Unknown

Greatest Risks of Terrorist Acquisition• Russia –

Large numbers of portable, forward deployed tactical nuclear weapons

• Pakistan – Presence of al QaedaUnstable political systemParts of government (ISI) sympathetic to

terrorist causesNascent nuclear command & control system

Highest Priority Efforts: Intact Nuclear Weapons

U.S. should:• press Russia to fully implement 1991-1992

Presidential Nuclear Initiative pledges.

• revamp policy prohibiting security assistance to operational Russian nuclear weapons.

• declare its intention to remove its tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

• provide security assistance to Pakistan contingent on constraints of NPT

Can Terrorists Build Their Own Nuclear Bomb?

• Gun-type: – Simplest

designCannot use

plutonium; must use HEU

Can Terrorists Build Their Own Nuclear Bomb? (continued)

• Implosion-type: – More sophisticated,

but still first generation weapon

Can use either plutonium or HEU

Major Hurdle: Acquisition of Fissile Material

Material Type Global Inventory (metric tons)

Military plutonium (Pu) 250

Civil Pu (separated) 205

Military HEU 1,670

Civil HEU 20

Highest Priority: Put HEU at the Head of the Queue

• Accelerate down-blending of Russian HEU

• Speed up repatriation of Soviet/Russian- and U.S.-origin HEU and accelerate conversion of research reactors

• Use Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility to secure HEU

• Subordinate Plutonium Disposition Program to HEU First Strategy

Attacks on Nuclear Facilities

• Commercial nuclear power plants

• Research reactors

• Spent fuel storage pools

• Reprocessing facilities

Nuclear Facilities: Highest Priority Efforts

• Design basis threat should reflect 9/11 magnitude of attack

• Rapidly identify and implement urgent upgrades to vulnerable plant systems

• Need performance-based (not-compliance based) security system

• Need formal government assessment of potential vulnerabilities at research reactors

Dirty Bombs – Myth versus Reality • RDDs (Dirty Bombs) are NOT Weapons of

Mass Destruction

– Few, if any, people would die immediately or shortly after exposure to ionizing radiation from typical RDD

• RDDs can be Weapons of Mass Disruption

Major effects:

• Panic (psychological and social effects)• Economic costs (decontamination and rebuilding)

High-Risk Radioactive Sources• Finding: Only a small

fraction of commercial radioactive sources pose inherently high security risks

• But still large number

• High-risk sources are:

• Portable• Dispersible• More radioactive

Dirty Bombs: Highest Priority Tasks

• Improve security of high-risk radioactive sources

Preparation and Response:

• Develop and stockpile effective decontamination technologies

• Involve public in development of decon standards• Provide better training of emergency first

responders• Educate public about real versus perceived risks

of radiation: psychological immunization