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Transcript of Atlantic Voices - Nuclear Terrorism
ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION
Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 11 1
- Flora Pidoux
The introduction of nuclear weapons into a state’s arsenal decisively changed the context of international relations and means of warfare. From the beginning, this new weaponry needed to be controlled and regulated, as illustrated by the number of treaties limiting the number of nuclear warheads, enriched uranium and conduct of weapon testing. Despite the various regulations, proliferation of nuclear weapons has been a major concern for most of the second half of the 20th century. This has been a particular concern on the part of the international community regarding rogue states such as North Korea, Libya, Syria and Iraq.
Perhaps more concerning is the risk posed by non-state actors who could potentially acquire nuclear and fissile materials through black market trade and/or illicit smuggling. Moreover, the threat of a terrorism organization attaining nuclear weapons is much harder to address.
This issue will analyze the implications posed to nuclear security as a result of the recent deal between Iran and the P5+1 as well as analyze the threat the Euro-Atlantic currently faces from non-state nuclear terrorism as a result of the instability throughout the Mediterranean region.
Nuclear Security Volume 5 - Issue 11 November 2015
Contents:
Implications of the Iran Nuclear Deal for NATO’s Eastern Front
Ms. Danielle Najjar analyzes how the Iran Nuclear Deal signed in July 2015
affects NATO’s Ballistic Missile Defense vis-à-vis Iran but also Russia and
NATO’s Central and Eastern European Allies and Partners.
The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism Amidst Crisis in the MENA Region Mr. Dean Patrick Rice, Dr. Howard Lewis Hall & Dr. Natalie
Manaeva Rice discuss how the current instability in the MENA region in-
creases the need to revise our preventative and response capabilities to cope
with the possibility of a nuclear or radiological attack.
The mushroom cloud of the first test of a hydrogen bomb is seen in a 1952 file photo (Photo: REUTERS/HANDOUT)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 11 2
By Danielle Najjar
A fter years of diplomatic talks and
negotiations, the world finally saw the
completion of a nuclear deal, the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), between the
P5 +1 (China, France, United Kingdom, United States,
Russia + Germany) and Iran on July 14, 2015. Since
then, there has been nonstop focus and debate over the
legitimacy of the deal and its further global implications
through congressional hearings, private briefings,
exhaustive media coverage, lobbying efforts as well as
intense public scrutiny. The intentions and layout for
the JCPOA are evident, but the implementation of the
deal may run into obstacles, namely caused by the
atmosphere of distrust surrounding Tehran.
The JCPOA is a defining moment for the world
order as it has the potential to set the precedent for
future nuclear negotiations. This deal stands on the
foundation of the 2013 Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) and
framework announced in Switzerland on April 2, 2015
that set the requirements for the deal.
Breakdown of the Iran Deal
According to the JCPOA, Iran must agree to
measures of transparency regarding its nuclear program
while limiting its nuclear infrastructure, growth of
uranium enrichment, procurement of nuclear
technologies and nuclear research. Once the conditions
are met by Iran, the international community will, in
return, lift the sanctions which have been imposed on
the country since Iran made its nuclear ambitions public
in 2002.
The deal states that Iran must limit its development
and research for enrichment of uranium and plutonium
for the next fifteen years as well as reduce its stockpile
and capacity of low-enriched uranium by 98 percent --
hence limiting enrichment to 3.7 percent and to 660
pounds of enriched uranium. Iran agreed to make several
changes involving the transformation of its Fordo nuclear
plant to a science research center; cut down in half the
number of centrifuges used to enrich uranium at the
Natanz plant; the nuclear reactor currently in
construction in Arak will now be reconstructed in order
to prevent the plant from creating weapons-grade
plutonium which is used to create nuclear bombs. Those
changes all aim at limiting Iran’s capacity to pursue its
project of becoming a nuclear power.
It is expected that the conditions outlined in the deal
will start being implemented within the next year. Iran is
also expected to become more transparent in regards to
allowing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
more access to their nuclear program, and accepting
further inspections and investigation by the IAEA for any
suspicion or allegations of uranium enrichment facilities,
for as long as twenty-five years.
The acceptance of all of these directives is the first
time the Iranian government has allowed for such intense
nuclear program inspections from international actors and
there is hope that it will foster a new age of cooperation
towards peace and stability throughout the region and the
international community at large.
NATO’s Commitment to Nuclear Negotiations
The Iran nuclear deal has many implications for the
security of the Euro-Atlantic region as the deal directly
affects the regional balance of the Middle East, and by
extension, that of the other side of the Mediterranean.
Moreover, this deal reinforces the legitimacy of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) whose credibility had been
Implications of the Iran Nuclear Deal for NATO’s Eastern Front
Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 11 3
largely criticized for its numerous violations and the
idleness of the international community.
NATO’s commitment to preventing the spread of the
nuclear threat has always been loudly proclaimed, to this
effect the Iran nuclear deal was widely applauded. NATO
Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated at the
announcement of the Iran nuclear deal: “This agreement
represents a historic breakthrough which, once fully
implemented, will strengthen international security. It is
critical for Iran to implement the provisions of today's
agreement and to fulfill all its
international obligations and advance
security in the region and beyond.”
Reassessing NATO’s Ballistic
Missile Defense
After the signing of the JCPOA,
NATO received criticism from
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov, who asked the United States,
in cooperation with the Alliance, to
reevaluate its ballistic missile defense
plans as announced in US President
Barack Obama’s speech in April 2009. There, the
American President stated that there would be no reason
to uphold missile defense in Europe once Iranian nuclear
threats were under control. Before the deal, Iran was
believed to have the largest and most advanced ballistic
missile system operating with ranges of 1500 to 2500 km
which had the potential to reach NATO countries like
Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria. Though Obama’s speech
specifically referred to the US’s European Phased
Adaptation Approach (EPAA) as opposed to the entire
NATO BMD, the EPAA is a part of NATO’s multilateral
framework to protect the entire European NATO
territory against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM).
For Russia, the opposition lies through seeing NATO's
BMD as an undermining force against Russia's strategic
deterrent and alter the strategic balance with the
Alliance. Russia views the implementation of EPAA
phases where SM-3 interceptors could potentially
destroy Russian ICBM and all ballistic missiles with the
offensive capacity of BMD interceptors.
Although Russia would like to see the elimination of
NATO’s BMD system after the JCPOA, NATO has
declared that their BMD was not directed at any
particular country and was strictly for protection
purposes against any nuclear, chemical, biological, or
conventional warfare. Despite
Russia’s demands, there seems to
be no voluntary change planned in
regards to NATO’s BMD plans.
Plus, the threat from Iran remains
as the JCPOA does not prohibit
and diminish Iran’s work or
acquisition of ballistic missiles
since they can be armed with
conventional warheads and not
necessarily by nuclear ones. It
would thus be a mistake for NATO
to change the BMD system since
there are still high risks emanating from Iran. A change
would have negative political and security implications
for NATO members and allies in Central and Eastern
Europe.
Turkey’s Role
Though Russia feels threatened by NATO’s BMD
system and its implications after the Iran nuclear deal,
the Russian threat is not the primary reason for ballistic
missile defense in the European region. If Iran had the
capability to acquire nuclear weapons before the
implementation of the JCPOA, it would have become
an immediate and imminent threat to the Alliance as
they would have had the capacity to reach neighboring
Turkey.
Russian President Putin and Security Council
Secretary Ivanov with then-Iranian chief nuclear
negotiator Rouhani during negotiations (Photo:
Reuters/Alexei Nikolsky/RIA Novosti/
Kremlin )
Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 11 4
Turkey has played a pivotal role in establishing
NATO’s BMD system. Although official NATO policy
states that the BMD system exists for assistance to any
and all potential threats, the reason stems from
Turkey’s history of requests for NATO’s assistance in
protecting its borders, specifically with Syria. NATO
has provided the Patriot anti-missile system in 2013 to
Turkey with claims that the missiles are only means to
defend and deter threats.
For this reason, Turkey insisted NATO deny that
Iran is the source of the threat to why the BMD system
is needed in Europe. Only when NATO is sure that
Iran no longer poses a threat to Turkey, could the
BMD system potentially be revoked. However, there
seems to be no sign of
complete trust with Tehran in
the near future, and the
geopolitical necessity of
maintaining the BMD system
remains.
Russian Implications in
Central and Eastern
Europe
The Alliance’s BMD
system asserts tensions with
Russia due to its geographic
positioning near the Russian border, allegedly
threatening Moscow’s strategic arsenal, which in turn
causes political and economic effects on NATO’s
Eastern borders. Thus, in the context of the Ukraine
confrontation, there is an increase in risk management
on both sides and an overall focus on Central and
Eastern European allies. A new environment of
suspicion due to additional Russian strategic arsenal
advancements has been created with the underlying
possibility of a new arms race.
NATO expresses concerns that Russia’s use of
nuclear weapons could be enacted at a lower threshold
than before. Currently, Russia holds 1,643 warheads on
528 deployed ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic
missiles (SLBMs), and warheads designed for heavy
bombers along with the current total stockpile of
deployed and non-deployed strategic and tactical nuclear
weapons of approximately 8,000 warheads. Therefore,
even with a diminished threat coming from Iran,
NATO’s obligation to ensure the security of its allies in
Central and Eastern Europe remains. The most effective
way to accomplish a sense of assurance for those
countries in the range of Russian and Iranian missiles is
by maintaining the BMD system which includes radars
and interceptors.
Russia’s support was a key factor in reaching the deal
with Iran and put the
agreement forward with
intentions of fostering better
relations and cooperation with
the four NATO countries
involved to pursue their own
national interests. Russia
supported the deal because
they did not want to see Iran
with nuclear weapons, but
they were fully aware of the
complications that lifting
sanctions would have on their energy-related influence.
Future of Deal Based Tensions
NATO’s concerns over tensions with Russia stem
from an overall atmosphere and relationship of distrust
and suspicion along with Russia’s new nuclear and
missile advancements. Russia is looking for more
cooperation and engagement from the Alliance in
removing the BMD system in Central and Eastern
Europe, as well as assistance in maintaining regional
power once Iran enters the energy market. However,
Russian S-400 Triumph/SA-21 Growler medium- and long-
range surface-to-air missile systems drive during the Victory
Day parade on the Red Square, Moscow on May 9, 2015
(Photo: Ria Novosti / Host Photo Agency / Reuters)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 11 5
NATO member countries must show the Central and
Eastern European countries that they are dedicated to the
security of the region. Therefore, the Alliance’s BMD must
stay in place for the security of the Alliance’s Eastern
Flank, as well as to act as a watchdog over Tehran’s
application of the JCPOA.
Additionally, more tension could arise between Iran
and Russia as once the Iran deal is fully implemented and
sanctions are lifted, Tehran could potentially transform
into an energy supplier for the Central and European
countries as an alternative to Russian services. Without
sanctions, Iran will be able to competitively engage key
markets with one of the world’s largest amounts of natural
gas and oil. Before the application of sanctions, Iran
shipped 600,000 barrels a day to Europe, which was about
17 percent of its production. Iran is also geographically
situated in a position to trade with both Asia and Europe
which makes it an even greater competitor to Russia.
Europe is responsible for consuming almost 70 percent
of Russia’s oil exports, with oil and gas sales accounting for
about half of Russia’s government revenues. The country is
already in recession to which the economic consequences
of the sanctions over Ukraine have been added. Iranian
exports can only be expected to worsen the economic
standing of Moscow. Iran’s entry into the world market
will cause a reduction in prices for Russia’s energy and take
a large piece of its quasi monopoly which could trigger a
domino effect of damages to the overall economy, decline
in military advancement and overall influence in the
Central and Eastern European region.
For the future of BMD in Europe, NATO and Russia
should be focused on the Iranian threat. Though countries
like the United States have downplayed the severity of the
threat it still remains a huge priority for the security of
Eurasia. Realistically, NATO’s BMD has the concrete
capability to deal with a threat from Tehran, and even
though it could quickly adapt to a Russian threat, that case
is far less likely. The Alliance’s BMD in Europe must
remain unchanged in order to complete its responsibility
to the security of the NATO member countries and
allies whose safety is being jeopardized by Russia.
However, it must also be made sure that the building of
new stages, implementing new technology, radars and
interceptors are not misinterpreted by Tehran in that
NATO does not trust them to abide by the JCPOA.
Reinforcing the Alliance’s BMD to counteract the
Russian threat could potentially trigger a security
dilemma for Iran, which would have negative
consequences for the security of Europe and the MENA
region as well as for the future of nuclear deals.
Danielle Najjar is an intern at the Atlantic Treaty
Association. Danielle is currently a student at American
University in Washington, D.C. where she is pursuing a
bachelor degree in International Relations. Her
academic and research focus are the global economy and
comparative governance.
"Ballistic Missile Defence." NATO. North Atlantic Treaty Association, 5 Nov. 2015.
Bermant, Azriel. "The Russian and Iranian Missile Threats: Implications for NATO Missile Defense." The Institute for National Security Studies, Nov. 2014.
Bermant, Azriel. "What Will the Iran Deal Mean for NATO Missile Defense?" INSS Insight 734 (2011): n. pag. The Institute for National Security Studies, 17 Aug. 2015.
Broad, William J., and Sergio PeÇanha. "The Iran Nuclear Deal – A Simple Guide." The New York Times. The New York Times, 30 Mar. 2015.
Khrennikova, Dina. "Russia's Oil Rivalry With Saudis Masks the Bigger Iranian Threat." Bloomberg.com. Bloomberg, 12 Nov. 2015.
"NATO’s Nuclear Policy." NATO. North Atlantic Treaty Association, 20 Nov. 2015.
"Profile for Russia." NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative. James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, July 2015. Web. 23 Nov. 2015.
"Statement on Iran Nuclear Agreement." NATO. North Atlantic Treaty Association, 14 July 2015.
About the author
Bibliography
Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 11 6
By Dean Patrick Rice, Howard Lewis Hall & Natalie Manaeva Rice
T he four-and-a-half-years of Syrian civil
war has resulted in more than half of
the Syrian population (11+ million)
being forced to flee their homes. More than four
million civilians have sought refuge in the border
countries of Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. Hundreds
of thousands are now seeking asylum in Europe,
creating what is quickly becoming an unprecedented
refugee crisis in Europe.
The flow of asylum seekers has dramatically
increased since Russia began its bombing campaign in
Syria in October 2015 and it is unlikely that the
migration will slow in the foreseeable future.
According to the International Organization for
Migration, the Greek island of Chios was receiving an
average of 300 refugees per day prior to the Russian
campaign and is now receiving up to 2,000 per day.
Greece as a whole took in over 27,000 fleeing Syrians
between October 17 and 21, 2015.
The Refugee Crisis and the Threat of Nuclear
Terrorism
The refugees are not necessarily a threat to
European countries. They are people who are
legitimately fleeing violence and death, and are
desperate for basic human needs. The flow of
legitimate asylum seekers, however, has also shown to
be the vehicle by which ISIS is moving individuals into
Europe to carry out acts of terror.
Even before the tragic terrorist attacks that took
place in Paris on the night of November 13, 2015, ISIS
stated that it intended to inflict acts of terror on
Western targets. As recently as August, 2015 two
German nationals, Abu Amar al-Almani and Abu Usama
al-Gharib who joined ISIS in Syria reportedly produced a
video calling on fellow Germans to either join them in
Syria or carry out terrorist attacks in Germany to avenge
the deaths of Muslims killed by coalition actions in
Afghanistan. This is only one example of ISIS’ proclaimed
intention of bringing terrorist attacks to Europe.
This, seen within the context of the current refugee
crisis, presents a significant challenge to European
nations in terms of increased risk of a radiological,
chemical and nuclear terrorist attacks. ISIS has acquired
radioactive material, including uranium, through its
seizure of lands in Iraq and especially the University of
Mosul. A story published in International Business Times
in August 2015 described how the FBI thwarted a
planned sale of the highly radioactive isotope cesium-137
in Moldova. The smuggler was reportedly seeking to sell
the cesium to ISIS. Although the use of non-fissile
uranium in any amount does not necessarily need to be
associated to a terrorist device, cesium-137 is a very
attractive isotope for anyone seeking to make what is
termed a “dirty bomb,” which designates a simple
explosive device which disperses radiological material
with the purpose of creating public hysteria.
Today, all the conditions for a nuclear/radiological
attack in Europe seem to be met: ISIS and Al Qaeda have
stated their intention to carry out attacks in Europe;
second, we know these organizations either possess or
can likely acquire radiological and/or chemical materials
as demonstrated by the seizing of the terrorists’ hideouts
The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism Amidst Crisis in
the MENA Region
Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 11 7
in Paris following the attacks earlier this month; third,
these organizations now have the mechanism, i.e. the
chaotic flow of immigrants to move material and/or
actors to almost any European country. Even if the
probability of a radiological terrorist attack may be
low, this devastating impact of even a small incident of
the kind demands careful consideration of the risks and
safeguarding measures that must be put into place.
French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian has said
that the possibility of a chemical or biological terrorist
attack by ISIS was among the risks for which Europe
must prepare itself. It is not unreasonable to extend
this logic to a radiological/nuclear attack.
Bomb vs. Materials
When considering the risk of
a nuclear terrorist attack, it is
important to distinguish between
an actual nuclear weapon and a
radiological dispersal device
(RDD). The likelihood of a
terrorist organization acquiring
or constructing a functioning
nuclear weapon is extremely small, but not
impossible. A very troubling analysis by the Center for
Public Integrity published on November 12, 2015,
based on the presence of identical fissile materials in
three smuggling incidents, indicated that a substantial
cache of nuclear-weapons-usable highly enriched
uranium may be “in the wild” and its unidentified
sellers are seeking buyers among international terrorist
organizations. Whether this assessment is accurate or
not, this risk exists and demands continued
transnational cooperation. This includes robust
safeguards and security efforts, such as the ones
established by NATO, the European Union and the
International Atomic Energy Agency. On the other
hand, the threat of a non-fissile radiological dispersal
device or “dirty bomb” is far greater due to the higher
availability (and lower protection) of radiological
material and the rudimentary nature of such a weapon.
During the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit held in
Washington, DC, the final Communiqué listed
acquiring nuclear materials as one of the greatest threats
to global security: “Nuclear terrorism is one of the most
challenging threats to international security, and strong
nuclear security measures are the most effective means
to prevent terrorists, criminals, or other unauthorized
actors from acquiring nuclear materials.”
The materials suitable for a nuclear weapon are
generally well secured and unlikely to fall into the hands
of terrorists. However, cesium-
137, cobalt-60, and a number of
other isotopes are widely used
in various industries, including
healthcare. Hospitals,
construction sites, and
universities do not share the
same commitment to security
that nuclear weapons facilities
do – hence making them “softer
targets” that are more readily prone to be acquisition
targets for terrorist actors seeking to build a dirty
bomb.
Short-Term Strategy
Short-term strategies designed by the Transatlantic
Alliance and the European Union to address the
increasing threat of nuclear terrorism should include a
combination of immediate actions which are detailed
below.
Ensuring Border Protection/Control and Preventing Nuclear
Smuggling
According to the National Nuclear Security
Administration’s (NNSA) Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation (DNN) Program, securing
Syrian children at the Zaatari refugee camp in
Jordan (Photo: Dean Rice)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 11 8
international land borders, seaports and airports is the
cornerstone of successful efforts to prevent illicit
trafficking of radioactive and nuclear materials. Securing
the borders of the European Union from possible nuclear
smuggling related to a current inflow of refugees should
include the following steps:
Equipping border cross points with appropriate
detection architecture, including radiation detection
equipment;
Training radiation detection equipment operators;
Securing the perimeter of the land border to prevent
unlawful crossing outside of the authorized crossing
points;
Training and workshops for the border and customs
personnel on preventing smuggling of materials.
Such efforts should be a joint action between
participating countries, EU and NATO regulatory and
law enforcement agencies as well as organizations and
associations specializing in nuclear and chemical issues.
The efforts aimed at enhancing border protection and
control should be implemented across the European
Union and NATO countries, with special focus on those
countries that serve as the crossing point for the refugees
and immigrants, namely the Balkans. Taking into
consideration the lack of border control at the internal
borders of the Schengen Area, it is critical to ensure the
protection of the perimeter borders against nuclear
smuggling.
In addition to preventing illicit trafficking of materials
across borders, the joint efforts should include training
sessions, workshops and providing detection technologies
for internal law enforcement personnel of the
participating countries, such as police, ministries of
internal affairs, and other agencies.
Although this measure goes beyond the prevention of
smuggling materials, border authorities of the European
Union should be engaged in close cooperation with
governments of countries currently hosting refugees,
such as Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, with the goal of
refusing the entry to the EU to people who have been
suspected of any involvement with radical groups or
activities. Sharing information on radicalized individuals
and groups between law enforcement agencies of the
European Union and countries with a large number of
displaced individuals is crucial to prevent radicalized
people from entering the EU territory. Eurojust and
Europol, which were created to support the member
states in their fight against organized cross-border crime,
are well-suited to take a leading role in such efforts.
Securing Nuclear and Radiological Materials
In order to prevent the theft of nuclear and
radiological materials by terrorist groups or individuals,
all possible sources of such materials in EU countries
should be safe and secure. The sources of radioactive
materials include not only the nuclear industry, but also
other operations such as universities, research
laboratories, hospitals and medical research institutions,
and certain construction operations where soil
measurement density systems are used.
Enhancing safety and security of such operations
should include nuclear security training of officials and
private sector employees responsible for the physical
protection of nuclear and radiological material and
facilities through workshops, training sessions, and
exchanging security best practices. In addition,
promoting nuclear security should include allocating
special funds available for public and private sectors for
upgrading security in critical industries and facilities.
Protection Against Insider Threats in Nuclear and Other
Critical Industries
According to Bunn and Glynn, nearly all of the
documented cases of theft of weapon-ready materials,
such as highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium,
have been perpetrated by insiders, that is to say people
Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 11 9
with direct access to the components. For example, in
1993, Russian naval officers conspired to steal
approximately 4.5 kg of highly enriched uranium
from a naval facility in Murmansk. In post-Soviet
Russia, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
concluded that “potatoes were better protected” than
fissile materials. Protection against insider threat
should be a critical measure to keep radioactive and
other dangerous materials from the reach of
terrorists. A broad range of measures to protect
against this problem are required in national
regulations for operations with weapon-usable
materials. Such measures, according to Bunn and
Glynn, include
implementing a
two-person or
three person rule,
the storage of
materials in secured vaults when not in use, the use of
unique identifiable tamper-indicating devices,
accurate and sufficient accounting of materials,
continued surveillance of materials operations,
vigorous background checks, etc.
While many of these measures are already in place
in operations using weapons-grade materials, they
should also be applied to operations that produce or
employ other radioactive materials, such as research
laboratories, universities, hospitals, and other
industries. A set of recommendations and best
practices have been developed by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (see “Preventive and
protective measures against insider threat, 2008”) and
the World Institute for Nuclear Security (see
“Managing internal threats: A WINS international best
practice guide for your organization,” 2010).
Reaction to the Use of a Dirty Bomb
As the United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission’s fact sheet on dirty bombs states, the
threat of the use of a radiological dispersal device by
terrorists lies in the actual harm caused by the release
of radiation, as well as in the spread of fear and panic
among the population. In order to manage public
reaction and prevent mass panic in a possible case of
terrorist acts involving nuclear weapons, it is necessary
to develop robust crisis communication plans and
educational strategies targeting the general public.
Shapiro et al. argued that in order to effectively
deal with the aftermath of terrorist attacks, public
authorities need a counter-terrorism communication
strategy designed to give the population security and
reassurance at the
local, national,
regional and
international levels.
The co-ordination of
the various institutions and authorities is critical to
reduce the impact of an attack and prevent the loss of
confidence and image for the public authorities.
Research on crisis communication, according to
Sandman, has pointed out two important elements of
public reaction to such critical events. First, release of
health-related information is one of the most critical
parts of the national response in case of terrorist attack
and other public health emergency. Second,
information seeking behavior and reaction to
information in emergencies substantially differ from
behavior in normal circumstances. Such strategy should
be based on previous research on crisis communication
in cases of disasters and other public health
emergencies in order to put in place the most effective
response possible.
Long-Term Strategy
Implementing the above-mentioned short-term
strategies alone, however, is not sufficient. A
The threat of the use of a radiological dispersal device by terrorists lies in the actual harm caused by the release of
radiation as well as in the spread of fear and panic among the population
Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 11 10
comprehensive strategy of long-term measures
addressing the underlying dynamics of the radicalized
Islamic threat should also be developed. Such a
strategy should be two-fold and include actions aimed
at preventing radicalization within the refugee
population in the long term, as well as addressing the
reasons behind the Syrian refugee crisis.
For example, previous research on radicalization
of the Muslim diaspora communities in Europe
demonstrated that failed assimilation and integration
in the host country is one of the primary reasons for
radicalization of both first and second-generations
migrants. The reasons are both internal and external
to that community, and include failure of the
immigrant population to
adapt and integrate to
the societies of the host
country, as well as the
local population’s unwillingness to accept immigrants.
Those problems were clearly visible in the interviews
of members of the Muslim diaspora in the U.K. after
the 2005 terrorist attacks in London. According to
the interviews described by Hoffman et al., while
Muslim immigrants were not always willing to
integrate into British society, the Britons were “not
necessarily ready to integrate with the Muslim
population either.”
The threat of radicalization of both newly arriving
refugees and second-generation immigrants should be
addressed by implementing a number of measures
focusing on incorporating the migrant population into
the fabric of the host society. Previous successful
strategies of preventing radicalization in the diaspora
communities in the European Union should serve as
guidelines for such efforts.
The examples of the Netherlands and Germany
demonstrate that successful assimilation requires a
comprehensive strategy implemented by cooperative
efforts between all levels of national governments and
various non-governmental organizations. In addition to
engaging the immigrant community, long-term efforts
should incorporate ongoing efforts of strategic
communication with the local populations to prevent
backlash against the incoming refugees and existing
immigrant diaspora. Existing structures of the
Transatlantic Alliance, such as the NATO Strategic
Communications Centre of Excellence, could be used to
implement such effort in cooperation with national
governments and non-governmental organizations.
Long-Term Actions
The threat of nuclear terrorism will continue as long
as terrorists thrive, plan and
prepare in the chaos of the
Syrian civil war. This simple
fact cannot be ignored, and
a holistic approach to ensuring security is required. The
most effective mean of reducing the threat of a terrorist
organization using the chaos of the migration crisis as a
cover for conducting a radiological attack on Western
targets is the cessation of the fighting in Syria.
According to the Deutsche Welle report, a recent
survey conducted by the Berlin Social Science Center,
which interviewed over 900 Syrians in displacement
centers around Germany, found that only 8 percent of
refugees want to remain in Europe. In addition, the
survey showed that over 70% of those questioned were
fleeing because of the military actions of the Syrian
government. While this was not a scientifically
representative sample, it provides insights into the mind
of the fleeing migrant.
NATO countries, in cooperation with the EU and
Arab countries, must therefore continue to push all
parties toward a resolution to the fighting in Syria while
also continue to work toward eliminating the ability of
The threat of nuclear terrorism will continue as long as terrorists thrive, plan and prepare in
the chaos of the Syrian civil war.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 11 11
ISIS, Al Qaeda and like-minded organizations to pose a
threat to the West and the MENA region.
Finally, the ultimate goal of all parties should be the
creation of a clear path toward a sustainable, free and
democratic civil society in Syria. Until this goal is
reached, the dangers that rise from the instability and
chaos of this civil war will remain. The Transatlantic
Alliance must therefore demand prudent vigilance in
matters of nuclear security with a constant recognition of
the humanitarian demand for compassion in all short and
long-term strategies.
The threat of nuclear terrorism is not, however,
limited to ISIS or any specific group, but rather is a global
threat, which will continue to demand active safeguard
measures and monitoring long after the Syrian crisis is
resolved.
Dean Rice is a Global Security Fellow with the UT
Institute for Nuclear Security. He has published articles
related to global security in a number of academic
journals and mass media outlets. He recently visited the
Syrian/Jordanian border, and interviewed numerous
Syrian refugees living in Zaatari camp, the largest Syrian
refugee camp in Jordan.
Howard Hall is the University of Tennessee and Oak
Ridge National Laboratory Governor’s Chair in Nuclear
Security. He is a Senior Fellow in Global Security Policy
at the Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public Policy,
where he directs the Global Security Policy Program. He
also directs the UT Institute for Nuclear Security.
Natalie Manaeva Rice is a Research Assistant at the
University of Tennessee's Institute for Nuclear Security,
and just finished her PhD focused on the rise of anti-
Americanism in Russia. She has published articles in peer
reviewed journals on issues related to global security and
public policy, with a special focus on nuclear security,
mass media and public opinion.
Bunn, M. G., & Glynn, K. M. (2013). Preventing Insider
Theft: Lessons from the Casino and Pharmaceutical Industries. Journal of Nuclear Materials Management, 41(3), p. 4-16.
Butler, D., & Ghirda, V. (2015, October 7). Nuclear black market seeks IS extremists. Associated Press. Retrieved from http://bigstory.ap.org/urn:publicid:ap.org:6fd1d202f40c4bb4939bd99c3f80ac2b
Deutsche Welle. (2015, October 11). Survey leaves no doubt: Syrians are fleeing Assad. Retrieved from http://www.dw.com/en/survey-leaves-no-doubt-syrians-are-fleeing-assad/a-18775789
Diehl, C., & Blohm, M. (2003). Rights or identity? Naturalization processes among “labor migrants” in Germany. International Migration Review, 37(1), p. 133-162.
Fahim, K., & Samaan, M. (2015, October 26). Violence in Syria Spurs a Huge Surge in Civilian Flight. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/27/world/middleeast/syria-russian-air-strike-refugees.html?_r=1
Fischhoff, B., Gonzalez, R., Small, D., & Lerner, J. (2003). Evaluating the success of terror risk communications. Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, 1, 255–258. http://www.liebertonline.com/doi/ pdf/10.1089/153871303771861450.
Hoffman, B. (2007). The Radicalization of Diasporas and Terrorism: A Joint Conference by the RAND Corporation and the Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich (Vol. 229). Rand Corporation.
International Atomic Energy Agency. (2002). Detection of radioactive materials at borders. Retrieved from: http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/te_1312_web.pdf
International Atomic Energy Agency. (2008). Preventive and Protective Measures against Insider Threats. Retrieved from: http://www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/security/security-series-drafts/implem-guides/nst041.pdf
International Organization for Migration. (2015, October 23). Greece Records Highest Weekly Migration Inflows in 2015 So Far. Retrieved from https://www.iom.int/news/greece-records-highest-weekly-migration-inflows-2015-so-far
Kaplan, M. (2015, August 6). ISIS Threatens Germany: Islamic State Jihadists Vow Attacks On European Soil For “Spilling The Blood Of Muslims” In Afghanistan. International Business Times. Retrieved from http://www.ibtimes.com/isis-threatens-germany-islamic-state-jihadists-vow-attacks-european-soil-spilling-2041662
National Nuclear Security Administration. (2011). Preventing Proliferation of Nuclear Materials and Technology. Retrieved from: http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/factsheets/dnnfactsheet2011
Sandman, P. (2005). Risk communications during a terrorist attack or other public health emergency. In Terrorism and Other Public Health Emergencies: A Reference Guide for the Media. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health & Human Services
Shpiro, S., Frimark, A., Abelmann, A., Nomikos, J., Fernández, A. M. D., Frey, K., ... & Mallon, S. (2011). The SAFE-COMMS Terrorism Crisis Communication Manual. Retrieved from: http://www.ulster.ac.uk/comm/files/2014/10/SAFE-COMMS-Manual-final_en.pdf
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (2012). Dirty Bombs Fact Sheet. Retrieved from: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/fs-dirty-bombs.pdf
About the authors
Bibliography
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ATA Programs On November 18 and 19, the Atlantic Treaty Association and
Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (YATA) gathered for their General
Assemblies in Brussels for an Official Dinner and a conference titled
“Cooperative Security & Interconnected Threats”. If you did not get
the chance to attend the conference or watch it live, you can still
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This year, the annual Atlantic Council Energy & Economic
Summit took place in Istanbul from November 18-20, 2015. The
summit aims to build bridges in a region spanning from Central Asia
to Central Europe and the Levant that is marred by centuries of
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together by so much. This year included various important leaders
including: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Croatian
President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, Albanian Prime Minister Edi
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