CHAPTER III

THE EVOLUTION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF KAMPUCHEA

Prince Norodom Sihanouk in the late 1950s used to

describe all those Communists in Cambodia who opposed him as

"Khmer Rougen 1 which "Red Khmer" or "Red Cambodian". It was

composed of the veterans of the Indo-Chinese Communist Party

( ICP) and the students who came to be known as the "Paris

Group", who came back by the end of 1960 from Paris after

completing their advance education, and the followers of

both the groups.

The following events which had taken place in Cambodia

during 1954-1960 gave scope for the rise of the "Paris

Group" and for the domination of the Communist movement in

Cambodia in the next two decades. In 1953, the French

granted full independence to Cambodia under the leadership

of the King Norodom Sihanouk and was authenticated at Geneva

in 1954. 2 The Khmer Communists failed to get entry into the

conference at Geneva and also failed to get regroupment zone

in Cambodia. 3 Therefore, the nearly 5,000 Khmer Viet Minh

volunteers moved to Hanoi leaving behind some in the

countryside and in cities. Those who had remained back

1. Wilfred Burchett, The China, Cambodia, Vietnam Triangle, London, 1981, p.47, see also Peter A.Poole, "Communism and Ethnic conflict in Cambodia, 1960-1975", in Joseph J. Zasloff and MacAlister Brown, (eds.), Communism in Indo-China : New Perspectives, London,1975, p.251.

2. V. M. Reddi, A History of the Cambodian Independence Movement, ~863-~955, Tirupati, 1970, pp.208-221.

3. Burchett, n.1, pp.27-29.

104

adopted such new means as newspapers and political platforms

to propagate their view point. This left a vaccum in the

secret work of the Communists in the country. As promised at

the Geneva in 1954, elections were held in September 1955.

The Khmer Communists through Pracheachon (People's Party)

contested in the elections and were defeated. All the seats

were won by Sangkum. 4 The Pracheachon fought the 1958

elections and lost. Their leaders were arbitrarily arrested

and newspapers were banned. After the defection of Sieu

Heng to the Government side in 1959, 5 the reigns of the

Khmer People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP) was taken over by

Tou Samouth. While the Communist cause received a serious

setback during 1954-1960, around 1960 a set of young

intellectuals arrived in Phnom Penh. With the arrival of the

'Paris Group', namely, Pol Pot, !eng Sary, Khieu Samphan, Hu

Nim and Hou Youn, the Khmer Communist movement took a new

turn. The Committee which was appointed in 1957 to study

the Cambodian and non-Cambodian experiences and to 'consider

the possibility of organising an independent and fully

constituted Marxist Leninst party' came out with a

4. Roger M. Smith, "Cambodia", in George McTurnan I

proposal to float a party "without outside help and with a

strict stand of independence and initiative. n 6 As noted

above, with the defection of Sieu Heng, Tou Samouth's urban

Party Comittee was made in charge of the country's general

affairs and entrusted the duty of organizing 'the second

General Assembly towards the end of 1959'. The Congress was

postponed till September 1960 in order to bring together'

"representatives from all branches of operations, overt as

well as secret, in the cities and the countryside".'

Despite Prince's praise of Khieu Samphan, he was

beaten up by the security services on 13 July. On 15 August

about thirty leftists were arrested and eighteen of them

were detained including Khieu Samphan, Non Suon, Chou Chet

and the staff of Pracheachon, Mittapeap and Ekapeap. They

were released on 21 September 1960. 8 It facilitated for

their participation in the Congress to launch the founding

of the Worker's Party of Kampuchea (WPK). 9

6. Laura summers, "Democratic Kampuchea", in Bogdan Szajkowski, (ed.), Marxist Governments : A World View, vol.2., London, 1981, p.417, see also Summary of World Broadcasts, FE/5629/C2/8, 1 October 1977.

7. summary of Annotated ... , n.5, p.258. 8. Laura Summers, "Translator's Introduction", in Khieu

Samphan's "Cambodia's Economy and Industrial Development", Ph.D. Thesis, Paris, Data Paper No.l11, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, 1979, pp.9-11.

9. Elizabeth Becker, When the Wa~ was Over : The Voices of Cambodia's RevoLution and its People, New York, 1986, p.l08.

106

As noted above, the WPK consisted of two groups namely,

the veterans of the ICP and the Paris Group. The Party

adopted Marxist-Leninist ideology. Even though the

leadership of the Party was in the hands of the veterans,

the Paris Group was able to find place in the Politburo and

the Central Committee of the party. Veterans agreed to work

within the framework of the Government and opted for

political struggle. Whereas the WPK adopted both political

and armed struggle. But within the Khmer Rouge, Pol Pot

opted for armed struggle. However, Hou Youn and Khieu

Samphan favoured political struggle. 10

Pol Pot decided not to contest in the 1962 elections.

Wth the disappearance of Tou Samouth in 1962, Pol Pot was

confirmed as Secretary General at the 1963 Congress of the

WPK. 11 More Paris Group members got entry into the Central

Committee and the politburo of the WPK.

When Cambodia rejected the US military aid on Khieu

Samphan's insistence, the armed forces were faced with the

shortage of financial assistance. Even though the People's

Republic of China (PRC) extended aid, it was not a match to

that of the us. 12 Therefore, the armed forces were unhappy

10.

11. 12.

Craig Etecheson, The Rise and Demise Kampuchea, London, 1984, p.58; see Ponchaud, Cambodia Year Zero, trans, London, 1978, pp.l72-179. Summary of Annotated, n.5, p.259. Milton Osborne, Politics and Power in Kong, 1973, pp.89-90.

107

of Democratic also Francois Nancy Amphoux,

Cambodia, Hong

and the Khmer Communists were happy with the alienation of

the army from the Government. In 1967, the disgruntled

forces revolted at Samlaut in Battambang province It

provided a good opportunity for the Khmer Rouge to launch

armed rebellion against the government. 13 Even though the

revolt was suppressed, the peasant unrest continued.

Finally, in a rightist coup, Prince Norodom Sihanouk was

ousted from power on 18 March 1970. 1 4

In this chapter, an attempt has been made to study the

evolution of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) from

1960 to the establishment of the Royal Govoernment of

National Union of Cambodia (RGNUC) in May 1970 in exile

under the leadership of Prince Sihanouk in which the Khmer

Rouge became a partner and played a vital role during the

Civil War period (1970-75) in ousting General Lon Nol from

Power.

FOQNDING OF THE WORKER'S PARTY OF KAMPUCHEA (WPK), 28-30

SEPTEMBER 1?60.

The meeting to restructure the party was held in the

railway station premises in Phnom Penh on 28-30 September

1960. It was attended by twenty one representatives of the

KPRP, i.e .• seven representatives from the urban and

13. Ben Kiernan, Tbe Samlaut Rebellion, Monash University Center of Southeast Asian Studies Working paper no. 4, n.d., part I, pp.19-24.

14. Norodom Sihanouk/Wilfred Burchett, My War with the CIA, New York, 1973, p.56.

108

fourteen representatives from rural. The 1960 Party

Congress was called to assess the losses suffered by the

Combodian Communists since 1954 and to suggest remedial

measures. 15

The 1973 Party History issued by the CPK's Eastern zone

treated the 1960 event as the Second Congress of the KPRP.1 6

But Pol Pot at the seventeenth anniversary of the CPK on 27

September 1977, treated the 1960 event as the First Congress

of the CPK. 17 Even Non Suon, who was in charge of the

organizational work among the urban workers since 1954,

treated the September 1960 event as "the study session in

the railway station11 • 18 The Workers Party of Kampuchea was

founded in September 1960. 19 Thus, the Khmer Rouge ignored

the 1951 events of the founding of the KPRP as the First

Congress. The Khmer Rouge also aimed at cutting the link

between the ICP and the KPRP with the WPK. Thus, the Khmer

Rouge had asserted their independence from the tutelage of

the Vietnamese.

The 1960 Congress had "approved a political line,

strategy, stratagems and Marxist-Leninist statutes for the

15. SWB FE/5629/C2/8-9, 1 October 1977. 16. Summary of Annotated ... , n.5, p.259. 17. SWB FE/5629/ C2/8, 1 October 1977. 18. Stephen Heder, "Kampuchea's Armed struggle The

origins of an Independent Revolution", Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholar, New York, vol.11, n.1, 1979, p.J.

19. Ben Kiernan "Origins of Khmer Commuism", in Kernial S. Sandhu (ed.), south East Asian Affairs 2982, Singapore, 1981, p.177.

109

party. It decided to form the Marxist-Leninist party in

Cambodia, to continually wage the Cambodian revolution and

to form a party Central Committee .•.

composed of eight persons with

secretary". 20

The party's main activities were

The Committee was

comrade T.S.M. as

"indoctrination,

proselytizing and carrying out the political line, strategy,

stratagems and the party's Marxist-Leninist statutes". 21

Subsequently, the electro! failures of 1955 and 1958 were

discussed. 22 By adopting a new name the WPK attained equal

status like that of the Lao Dong party of Vietnam and

showed its solidarity with it. The WPK, by assuming the

Marxist-Leninist ideology, became the vanguard of the

working class in cambodia.

Even after the September 1960 change, those Cambodian

Communists who had faith in parliamentary politics continued

in Pracheachon and others left it altogether. Tou Samouth

advocated the importance of solidarity with the Vietnamese

and favoured Sihanouks neutral foreign policy while seeking

to force domestic reforms. But Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, on

the other hand argued that "the class structure of Cambodia

20. Summary of Annotated •.• , n.5, p.259. 21. Ibid. 22. SWB FE/5629/C2/8, 1 october 1977, See also David

P.Chandler, "Revising the Past in Democratic Kampuchea When was the Birthday of the Party ?" (Notes and

Comments) , Pacific Affairs, New York, vol. 56, no. 2, Summer 1983, p.292.

110

was intolerably anachronistic, exploitative, and

vulnerable". Hence, this unjust regime should be defeated

through armed struggle.23

Even though, Tou Samouth line was upheld for the time

being, the Khmer Rouge intensified their attention for armed

struggle. Ieng Sary on the outcome of the 1960 Congress

said later thus :

We had adopted the correct stand on the necessity of armed struggle, but we still had much ideological work to do on this question. We had to educate the party members that the reform struggles - for land, democratic rights, better living standards, were very important, but that they could not give us power. Only the armed struggle, led by the part~, could put political power in our hands. ~

POLITIBORO OF THE WPK

After the party's name was changed, it was in a

position to elect a permanent Central Committee. Tou

Samouth was elected as party Secretary by the Congress. Nuon

Chea became the Deputy Secretary. These two vetrans

were friendly towards Vietnam. The Central Committee was

23. Etcheson, n.10, p.58. 2 4 . Dan Burstein ( ed. ) , Kampuchea today : An Eyewitness

Report from cambodia, Chicago, 1978, p.42.

111

composed of eight persons.25

Central Committee

Pol Pot

Moong (Koy Thuon)

Ieng Sary

Keo Meas

Son Ngoc Minh (absent)

So phim

prasith

Non Suon.

The rural committees cease·d to exist mainly due to the

attitude of the Government. Therefore, the Paris Group

viz., Pol Pot, Moong and Ieng Sary found place in the Phnom

Penh Committee. Since then, ninety per cent of the KPRP

members became passive and the few educated militants began

to dominate the Congress deliberations. Moong began to

spread the revolutionary spirit among the students. The WPK

in order to protect the party cadres, armed self-defence

units were created in 1961. But they failed to prevent the

arrests and assassinations of communists during 1961-62. 26

WPK's ATTITUDE TOWARDS PRINCE NORODOM SIBANOUK

The historical, political and ideological factors

contributed to the hatred of the monarchy by the Khmers.

25. Summary of Annotated ... , n.5, p.259. see also The Chinese Ruler's Crimes Against Kampuchea, (White Book), Phnom Penh, published by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of Kampuchea, October 1984,p.40.

26. Heder, n.18, p.3. see also Becker, n.9, p.109.

112

The Khmers in Cochin-China were political because, from

eighteenth century onwards, they were detached from their

mother country and lived under the Vietnamese control.27 As

a result of this, their Khmer honour suffered and were

compelled to defend their Khmer culture from their early

childhood. One of the Cochin-Chinese said : "Ever since we

were children, we were taught to hate the monarchy because

it was monarchy's fault that we had lost our Khmer

identity11 • 28 The important Khmer Rouge leaders who hailed

from Cochin-China were I eng Sary and Son Sen. Son Ngoc

Thanh, a non-Communist, also hailed from Cochin-China.

Since independence, among the Paris returned khmer

students and among the members of the 'Union of Khmer

students' (UEK), there existed two different attitudes

towards Prince Sihanouk. One group followed hard line

towards the Prince and advocated armed struggle to defeat

him.

Sen.

This line was adopted by Pol Pot, !eng Sary and Son

The other group advocated soft and moderate attitude

towards him because he was opposed to the US imperialism.

This line was advocated by Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn, Hu Him

and Chau Seng. 29 Hatred towards the institution of monarchy

27. For the details of Vietnamization of Khmer Culture. see o.G.E. Hall, A History of South-East Asia, London, 1968, pp.255-59, 436-43.

28. Ponchaud, n.lO, p.172. see also Becker, n.9, p.58. 29. Ponchaud, n.10, p.179.

113

and the hard and moderate lines continued to exist even

after 1960. About the Communist subversion in the country,

the Prince said : "I have been aware of the Communist danger

for a long time".30

Pol Pot's Views

Regarding the Khmer Communist's approach towards Prince

Sihanouk there was marked difference between the Pol Pot

group and the veterans. The Pol Pot group opposed the

Prince's regime, his feudal characteristics and personalized

authority. 31

veteran's Views

But in contrast, the veterans viewed Prince's regime

from a different angle. They treated the neutralist stance

and the anti-imperialist stand of the Prince as a positive

approach to continue the socialist struggle in Indo-China.

They felt that the credit goes to the Prince for maintaining

the country's indepenence. The Prince was popular among the

masses. To the rural people, independence means, de facto

cessation of taxes on rice harvest and the ending of rural

insecurity. When the Prince was critized, he expressed his

desire to step down and asked the Communists to form the

government and solve the country's problems. 32

30. Manila Bulletin, 11 March 1960. 31. Ben Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power : A History of

Communism in Kampuchea,l930-1975, London, 1985, p.l91. 32. Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 19 August 1961, See also

Guardian, Rangoon, 19 October 1960.

114

At the September 1960 Congress, it became clear that

Tou Samouth was a moderate. Even though he was anti-

imperialist, he was pro-Vietnamese and pro-Sihanouk. But

Pol Pot group was not happy about the analysis of the class

situation in Cambodia and its friendly policies towards the

Vietnamese Communists. Therefore, Pol Pot and his followers

started working on the formation of the nucleus of the

future Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) . 33

At the 19 60 Congress, the principle of national

independence was a major issue. In 1977 Pol Pot on this said

thus :

At that time, Cambodia was a satellite of imperialism of US imperialism in particular. This meant that Cambodia was not independent .... This was one analysis. Did this analysis generate any conflicting opinion ? Yes, it did. There were conflicts within our ranks and among the elements inside the national community. There were a number of factions which thought that Cambodia was independent. Some said it had achieved independence in 1949, while others claimed it became independent in 1954 through the Geneva agreement .... However, through our analysis we ~~und that Cambodia was not independent.

It is evident that for all practical purposes, cambodia

33. Etcheson, n.10, pp.58-59.

115

was an independent nation from 1954 onwards. Even though

the Pol Pot veteran Communists in Cambodia accepted this

group was unwilling to accept it. Pol Pot felt that during

that period "the party had not yet achieved its unity

throughout the . country", due to certain elements in the

pracheachon and others.35

THE STRATEGY OF THE ~

The Pol Pot group claimed that the 1960 Congress

adopted a strategy of both political and armed struggle, but

the veterans opted for political struggle. 36 It is evident

that the "Combined armed and political struggle" was adopted

in 1967. For example, Chou Chet started a newspaper,

namely, Pancha Sila, an indication of reposing faith in

Sihanouk's neutrality. Hou Youn also realised the

necessity. Khieu Samphan had dedicated his Ph.D. thesis to

the Prince, which was customary at that time. 37 Non Suon

too holds the view that the 1960 Congress followed

Vietnamese path, while the Khmers held state power. It

shows that the moderate sections had faith in political

34. 35.

36. 37.

SWB FE/5631/C2/1, 4 October 1977. Black Book (Issued by the Ministry of of Democratic Kampuchea, Phnom penh, pp.112, p.36. FBIS IV, 19 January 1977, p.H.3. Summers,n.9,p.2.

116

Foreign Affairs September 1978,

struggle.

Regarding the naming of the party as WPK, an expression

of both independence and solidarity with Vietnam, which held

the third Congress of the Vietnamese Workers Party three

weeks before i.e. 5-12 September 1960 at Hanoi 38 and decided

to form the NLF. This is how the khmer communists expressed

their attachment to that of VWP.

on the party strategy, Laura Summers felt that the

existence of the party was to remain secret because in the

1960s, the WPK has to fight against the Prince's regime for

which active external support was limited and they had to

assist the Vietnamese revolution when possible. The 1.960

Congress adopted three forms of struggle namely creation of

a clandestine guard in 1961 to protect the cadres from the

enemy, open and legal political struggle and clandestine and

illegal political struggle. 39

After the 1960 Congress, the Pol Pot group felt that

they were in a position to launch initiatives. In 1961 Pol

Pot claimed that the Deputy Party Secretary, Nuon Chea was

replaced by him. 40 But this change was not known in the

38. 50 Years of Activities of the Communist Party of Vietnam, Hanoi, 1980, p.l47.

39. SWB FE/5632/C/l., 5 October 1977, see also Summers, n.6, p.4l.8.

40. "Pol Pots interview with Yugoslav Journalists on 1.7 March 1978 11 (Document) reproduced in Journal of Contemporary Asia, Stockholm, vol.8, n.3, 1978, pp.413-421, at p.421.

117

eastern part of Cambodia. Pol Pot kept all these changes

very secret. Ieng Sary left the capital in 1961 to the

border provinces to reorganise the former UIF cadres. As

noted above, to protect the cadres a network of defence

units consisting of only youth were established. In July

1961 a secret Communist Women's Organisation was inagurated

with Khieu Ponnary, as its head and the secret Alliance of

Democratic khmer youth was founded in February 1962. 41

The ambivalent status enjoyed by the Communists

continued even in 1961. Cambodia's relations with Thailand

were broken off in October because of the latter's support

to the rightist Khmer Serei. 42 Hu Nim, the deputy president

of the National Assembly, attended the First Summit of the

Non-Aligned nations in Belgrade along with Prince Sihanouk.

In August, a Special National Congress was convened for the

purpose of denouncing the 'treason' of the Pracheachon

group. Basing on the revelation of the veterans past

and the present ties with Vietnamese Communists, 43

Sihanouk took a lenient view and said : "We have too many

41. Tiomothy carney, Communist Party Power in Kampuchea (Cambodia) : Documents and Discussion, Cornell University Southeast Asia Program Data Paper no.106, Ithaca, New York, 1977, p.33.

42. Hindustan Times, 4 July 1960, See also Bangkok World, 25 November 1961, Asian Recorder, New Delhi, vol.VII, no.48, 26 November - 2 December 1961, p.4283.

43. Roger M. Smith, Cambodia's Foreign Policy, Ithaca, New York, 1965, p.170.

118

memories in common which unite us. I cannot bring myself to

lose an old enemy. I therefore prefer to allow the

pracheachon to continue to subsist 11 • 44

As a result, there were no charges and no arrests. The

Prince reacted to panchasila' s criticism of his domestic

affairs and after a debate, Chou Chet was pardoned after he

apologised 45 and Panchasila was allowed to reappear in

December.

ELECTrONS TO THE NATrONAL ASSEMBLY, JUNE 19 62 AND THE

COMMUNrSTS

Elections to the National Assembly were scheduled for

June 1962. To discuss the tactics to be adopted in the

elections in December 1961, The Pracheachon Group leaders

like Keo Meas, Non Suon, Ney Sarann, Chou Chet and Urn Neng

met at Ney Sarann' s residence in Phnom Penh. Non Suon

favoured co-operation with Vietnam to fight against

imperialism. 46 But the Pol Pot group wanted to overthrow

the Prince's regime by armed rebellion. Therefore, the

Pracheachon should not contest in the elections. It seems

that both Non Suon and Tou Samouth were not aware of Pol

Pot's views.

On 10 January 1962, Non suon and thirteen of his

44. As quoted in Micheal Leifer, Cambodia : The Search for Security, New York, 1967, p.201.

45. Micheal Leifer, "The Cambodian Opposition", Asian survey, Berkeley, California, vol.II, no.1, January 1962, pp.10-15.

46. Kiernan, n.31, p.194.

119

associates were arrested in Kompong Cham province on the

charges of conspiring with agents of a foreign power namely

North Vietnam to overthrow the Prince's regime. They were

awarded death sentence. 47 Pracheachon continued its

solidarity with Vietnam and wanted to participate in the

elections under the aegies of the Prince's government. When

Pracheachon criticised the government it was closed down in

January. Then two newspapers were established namely

Samleng Apyiakrit (The Voice of Neutrality) and Yuvamitt

(Young Friends). The Pracheachon was unable to contest in

the 1962 elections. On this aspect, Tou Samouth writes

that :

In the upcoming elections there is no need for us to present candidates, since the results of these elections are known in advance and cannot evidence the power of our movement, given the fact that the people are undergoing the oppression of Sihanouk' s police and Army and will be unable to clearly demonstrate their support. 48

The Pracheachon continued its criticism of the Prince's

government. On the growing influence of Pracheachon a

western observer wrote in early 1962 thus

4 7. Asian Recorder, vol. VIII, no. 7, 12-18 February 1962, p.4415, see also Michael Leifer, "Cambodia : In Search of Neutrality", Asian Survey, vol. III, no.1, January 1963, p.5.

48. As quoted in Kiernan, n.31, p.196.

120

The only party to retain its identity outside of the popular ruling movement has been the Pracheachon, which has now not only become the focus of dissent within the country but also has the reputation of being a young party. Moreover, its left-wing (pro-Communist) leanings have aroused sympathy, particularl~ among the student population.

Even though Pracheachon had its disagreement with the

government, it supported the latter on certain issues. The

government's crackdown on them eliminated the minor

opposition they had offered. Therefore, it was a great

error on the part of the Prince because it eliminated the

moderate sections and helped the rise of Pol Pot faction.

The death sentence awarded to Non Suon and others was

converted into life imprisonment. Chou Chet was also given

one year jail term and Son Sen was shifted from Teacher's

Training College to a High School in Takeo as Principal

because of his anti-monarch and anti-Sangkum stand. The

Prince 'in an attempt to propitiate the young left-wing

intellectuals', asked them to contest on Sangkum platform. 50

Instead of punishing Hou Youn for his criticism of the

Prince, he was offered a ministerial berth in a

caretaker government and given Sangkum ticket to become

49. As quoted in Leifer, n.45, p.13. 50. Ponchaud, n.10, p.181.

121

Minister of Planning in the new Government headed by Prince

Norodom Kantol. 51 Thus, Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn, Hu Nim and

three other moderate Communists namely, So Nem, Son Phuoc

Tho and Chau Seng were also elected to the National

Assembly.

ministers. 5 2

Hou Youn, Hu Nim and Khieu Samphan became

D:ISAPPEARANCE OF TOU SAMOUTH AND R:ISE OF POL POT

Within a month after the elections to the National

Assembly, Tou Samouth, Secretary-General of the WPK was

kidnapped by the enemy from his safe hideout in Phnom Penh

on 20 July 1962 and was assassinated later. "This was great

grief for the party which had just been reorganized 11 • 53 At

that time it was believed that Tou Samouth died because of

the enemy work, Sihanouk's police and not the infighting in

WPK. 54 It was said that the hand of Sihanouk and Lon Nol

were suspected. Now, it is clear that Tou Samouth was

eliminated due to the handiwork of Pol Pot. 55 But Prince

Sihanouk felt that the Pol Pot - Ieng Sary group was behind

the murder of Tou Samouth in order to ensure the rise of Pol

Pot to the party leadership. 56 The elimination of Tou

Samouth severed the link between WPK and the old ICP and

51. 52. 53. 54.

55. 56.

Leifer, n.47, p.56. Ponchaud, n.lO, p.l81. Summary of Annotated ... , Pol Pot's Interview ... , n .18, p. 3. Kiernan, n.J1, pp.197-98. Burchett, n.1, p.57.

n.5, p.259. n.40, p.42l.

122

see also Heder,

helped Pol Pot to rise to the position of Secretary General.

Pol Pot also made use of the situation to develop the party

on his own lines. After this Pol Pot became Acting

Secretary - General of the party and Vorn Vet became the

secretary of the Phnom Penh branch. 57 In August 1962, the

Prince charged that the subversive activity was conducted in

the northeast at the behest of North Vietnam and the PRc. 58

The skepticism developed by WPK towards the Prince's regime

had its complications in its relations with the VWP. The

reason was that the DRVN was trying to cultivate good

relations with Sihanouk's regime and wanted that the WPK

should employ united front tactics to see that Sihanouk

should be out of the US orbit. 59 Similarly, the PRC also

tried to cultivate good relations with Cambodia and

supported neutrality and anti-US policy of Cambodia. It led

to complications in the relations between the WPK and the

Chinese Government. 60

THE THIRD CONGRESS, 20-21 FEBRUARY 1963

on 20-21 February 1963, the party's Third Congress was

held in Phnom Penh at a secret place. At short notice, the

57. Pol Pot's Interview ..• , n.40, p.421. 58. Bangkok World, 17 July 1962, see also Ibid., 21 August

1962, Manila Bulletin, 18 July 1962, Ibid., 21 August 1962.

59. Smith, n.43, pp.166-72. 60. Asian Recorder, vol. VIII, no. 4, 22-28 January 1962,

p.4379-80. see also J.D.Armstrong, Revolutionary Diplomacy, Berkeley, 1977,pp.186-97.

123

Phnom Penh Committee convened the meeting It adopted "a

new operational direction which would correspond to the

situation at that moment". 61 It was attended by twenty

delegates. Therefore, of those who had attended were very

few from rural areas and mostly from the provinces close to

Phnom Penh. Even though So Phim contested for the post of

Secretary-General, Pol Pot was confirmed as Secretary-

General of the party, the post which he occupied till 1981.

The 1973 Party History treated the February 1963

Congress as third. But the 1971 Party History distributed

by Ieng Sary stated that the Congress merely "decided to

choose a new comrade Party Secretary". 62 But others felt

that the event was treated as an "extraordinary Congress" to

elect a new party Secretary. Due to the then prevailing

conditions, it was difficult to convene a full Congress and

hold normal sessions. 63 The meeting was dominated by the

French-trained and urban-based militants who were all pro-

Pol Pot. It helped Pol Pot to get elected to.the post of

Party Secretary and promote his associates to the Party

positions.

The Politbureau and the Central Committee of the WPK

consisted of twelve members. 64 They were :

61. 62.

63. 64.

Summary of Annotated ... , n.5, p.259. The Party History distributed by Ieng Janury 1971, p.9. Burchett, n.1, p.57. Timothy carney, "The Organisation of D.Jackson (ed.), Cambodia 1975-1978 Death, New Jersey, 1989, pp.92-93.

124

Sany in Hanoi in

Power" , in Karl Rendezvous with

POLITBUREAU

Pol Pot - Secretary-General

Nuon Chea - Deputy Secretary

Ieng Sary

So Phim

Vorn Vet

CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Moong

Prasith

Muol Sambath

Mok

Phuong

Son Sen

Son Ngoc Minh

In the changed cc of the WPK, the Paris Group found

their entry. Whereas, Keo Meas and Non Suon were dropped.

Keo Meas was in the country side and Non Suon was in jail.

Though Son Ngoc Minh was included, he stayed in Hanoi.

Therefore, he had less chance to influence the policies of

the party. Veterans like, Chi Kim An, Ney Sarann, Urn Neng,

Chou Chet and Tea Sabun and those who had contested in the

1955 and 1958 elections were not included in the enlarged

CC. Keu was made Vorn Vet's Deputy on the Phnom Penh

Committee. Mok who had developed contacts with Pol Pot

became member of the cc. Mar (Nhim), Secretary of the South

western Zone disappeared. So Phim and Phuong were dispersed

to Prey Veng, Muol Sambath and Prasith were sent to the Thai

border to Cardamom ranges. so Phim, as Secretary of the

Eastern Zone, was entrusted with the work of geographic

responsibility. Now,

Pol Pot, Nuon Chea,

the Party 'Centre' was in the hands of

Ieng Sary and Vorn Vet who were in

125

charge of national activities. The Party Centre moved into

the countryside and i~tensified anti-Sihanouk activity. 65

After February 1963, the Paris Group began to control

the affairs of the party. It led to the struggle for the

control of the party and ideology. The KPRP cadre was

divided in their approach towards the Prince, the

Vietnamese, the US imperialism and the Chinese Revolution.

It was the end of co-operation between the KPRP and the

Paris Group. Pol Pot group was able to overcome the hurdles

in the party by the end of 1977. 66

GROWTH Q[ DISSIDENCE

After the June 1962 elections, a young cabinet took

office with full power to introduce reforms. 67 To solve

the country's economic problems, Prince Sihanouk allowed

Khieu Samphan to implement his ideas expressed in his

thesis. Prince Sihan~uk tolerated the Communists to counter

the growth of the Rightists in the country. He was also

soft towards political offenders. For example, Non Suon's

death sentence was commuted and his fourteen associates and

Chou Chet were all released from jail. Apart from this, the

Communist press also gained some ground. While Prince

Sihanouk was on a foreign tour, India and the PRC in Feruary

65. Kiernan, n.31, pp.201-202. 66. Etcheson, n.lO,p.60. 67. Asian Recorder, vol.VIII, no.46, 12-18 November 1962,

p.4885.

126

1963 urged his cabinet to introduce reforms in order

to "stop price rises, eliminate middlemen, stop waste ... 11 • 68

During the absence of the Prince in the country in the

middle of February 1963, a riot broke out in the city of

Siem Reap. A local police man in Siern Reap, suspected of

being smuggler had been harrassing school children and it

has confirmed that a school boy was found beaten to death.

The students accused the police as responsible for the

murder. When the local authorities defended the police, the

agitators led dernostrations and the government's efforts to

discuss the matter was turned down. When the situation went

out of control, the cabinet including Khieu Sarnphan resigned

en rnasse. 69 The Siem Reap outbreak spread to Kompong Cham

also. The Communists had strong influence there and there

was every posibility that those committed activists played

some role. By the end of February 1963, the Prince carne back

and advised the students to be calm. 70 Even though the

invol vernent of the Communists was not established in the

Siern Reap incidents, the Prince held Keng Vannsak, Son Sen,

Hou Youn and Khieu Samphan as responsible. 71 The rioting in

Siem Reap was no doubt a danger signal. The Prince was also

concerned about the influence of Communists in the country

and felt that it should not exploit political concessions

68. Summers, n.a, p.l6. 69. Ibid. , p .17, see also Micheal Leifer, "Cambodia : The

Politics of Accomodation", vol.IV, no.1, January 1964, p.674.

70. Bangkok World, 3 March 1963. 71. Leifer, n.69, p.675.

127

such as entry into government.72

To make matters worse, the Prince published a list of

34 subversive leaders mostly the urban left on 8 March

1963. 73 However, Chou Chet was not included in the list.

The inclusion of Khieu Samphan and Hou Youn created problem,

but they were allowed to continue in the cabinet despite Lon

Nol's suggestion to crackdown on the Communists. The Prince

was unwilling to take action on them because he wanted those

people in the government 'who understood how China worked'.

And "partly in order to maintain the weak left as leverage

against his competitors in the aristocracy and in business,

and partly out of continuing conviction that the young

progressives held the key to sorting out the country's

economic mess 11 • 74 With the publication of subversives list

by the Government the Communists realized that they could

not work in the system evolved by the Prince. Ok Sakun and

Thiounn Prasith fled to France. 7S During this period the

royal· police continued their witch hunt against the left-

wing intellectuals. 76 As a result several communists left

72. Ibid. 73. They were : Keng Vannsak, Hou Youn, Son Phuoc Tho, Uch

Ven, Son Sen, Chau seng, Tep Chhieu Kheng, Touch Phoeun, Thiounn Prasith, Sim Son, Saloth Sar, Ong Borey, Ieng Sary, In Sakhan, Sien An, Tiv 01, Siet Chhe, Sok Lay, Chou Chet, Thach Kim Son, Ream Yossar, Duong Sar inn, Yi Yong, Im Ron, Keat Chhon, Keo Sum Sipha, So Nem, Hu Nim, Monh Moeung, Khieu Samphan, Ping Say, Chi Kim An, Thach Nhuong and Ok Sakun. see summers, n.a, p.18, Kiernan, n.31, p.203, Carney, n.41, p.4,62-64.

74. Summers, n.a, p.18. 75. Ibid. 76. Ponchaud, n.10, pp.181-82.

128

Phnom Penh and other cities for the countryside. 77

The Prince felt that the urban left was behind the Siem

Reap incidents. Therefore, he invited the remaining 32

subversives for a debate. After putting Sien An in prison

the government stopped harassing others. The Siem Reap

incident subsid.ed. Pol Pot and the ninety per cent of the

Central Committee of the WPK fled to the northeastern

provinces of Ratnakiri. Thus, they kept themselves aloof

from the urban elements of the party, rural cadres and the

Prince's police. 78 Meanwhile, Ieng Sary disappeared from the

capital. A year later, Son Sen, Ney Sarann and Nuon Chea had

moved into the maquis. The wives of Pol Pot. Ieng Sary and

Son Sen joined them in September 1965. As a matter of fact,

the police was unaware of Pol Pot's positiion, but it

followed his activities. He said that they "Knew my name,

had no idea of my position". 79 Hu Nim was on the staff of

the daily named Neak Cheat Niyum (The nationalist). He

visited the PRC, North Korea and North Vietnam. In Beijing,

Hu Nim was entrused with the job of forming a Khmer-Chinese

Friendship Association by his hosts. 80

It was difficult to implement the policies of Khieu

Samphan because of the opposition from the right wing and

77. Sihanouk/Burchett, n.14, pp.117-118. 78. Chandler, n.22, p.293. 79. Pol pot's interview ... , n.40, p.421. 80. Carney, n.41, p.4.

129

the commercial circles and the lack of enthusiasm of the

Prince. 81 Hou Youn resigned because of the no-confidence

motion and Khieu Samphan, even though survived the censure

by two votes, resigned on 1 July 1963. 82 Khieu Samphan felt

that it was difficult to reform the state, but Hou Youn had

faith in the execution of the reforms.

Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, who had moved to the north east,

organized the hill tribes or the 'Montagnards' against the

Prince by remaining the next five years there. When there

was security problem, they sought shelter with the NLF of

South Vietnam. 83 In Cambodia, the people meant the

peasantry. Therefore, the revolutionaries had to go to the

countryside and make use of the Peasant grievances against

the Prince's Government. 84

THE DRVN ~ THE PRC ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE WPK POLICIES IN

CAMBODIA

The North Vietnamese were not happy with the organizing

and mobilization of peasant opposition to the Prince's

regime by the WPK. 85 The North Vietnamese, in order to

improve its relations with the Prince, recognised the

Cambodian sovereignty over the disputed islands in the

81. He was offered a bribe to allow an illicit meat trade, for which he refused. see Ponchaud, n.11, p.181, summers,n.8, p.16.

82. Summers, n.8, p.19, See also Leifer, n.69, p.675. 83. Burchett, n.1, pp.58-59. See also Heder, n.18,p.3. 84. Heder, n.18, p.4. 85. Nayan Chanda, "The Bloody Border : Vietnam prepares for

a Longer War",FEER, vol.100, no.16, 21 April 1978, p.18.

130

Gulf of Siam claimed by the South Vietnamese under Diem.86

The organization of the WPK in rural areas undermined the

aspirations of the DRVN in encouraging Sihanouk' s anti-US

and anti-Diem and the aim to liberate South Vietnam. The

North Vietnamese felt that the WPK instead of giving up

Sihanouk should support his anti-imperialism, protect the

flank of South Vietnam and to build up the CPK through

united front activities. But the Pol Pot group were engaged

in 'adventurist' and 'provocative' activities in the

countryside. 87 The Chinese President Liu Shao Chi visited

Phnom Penh in May 1963 and endorsed the PRC' s friendship

with Cambodia. 88 The PRC, by extending help to the

Cambodian Communists was not willing to antagonize Prince

Sihanouk. 89

RUPTURE ~ DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ~ SOUTH VIETNAM

Prince Sihanouk snapped diplomatic relations with South

Vietnam on 28 August 1963 following the South Vietnamese

incursion on to the Khmer territory in search of the NLF

forces and the clandestine Khmer language radio, which was

backed by the CIA, which supported the Khmer Serei and Son

Ngoc Thanh and criticized the Prince's regime. The

86. Smith, n.43, p.121. 87. Nayan Chanda, "The Bloody Border : Vietnam prepares for

a Long War", FEER, vol.100, no.16, p.18, see also Heder, n.18, p.4.

88. Smith, n.43, p.121, see also Melvin Gurtov, China and Southeast Asia : The Politics of Survival, Baltimore, 1975, pp.64-65, Washington Post, 22 May 1963.

89. Jay Taylor, China and Southeast Asia : Peking's Relations with Revolutionary Movements, New York, 1974, pp.199-200.

131

Communists should have pleased with the Prince's decision.

Chou Chet with his followers began a newspaper Smardey Khmer

(Khmer Consciousness) in September. On 2 November 1963 Ngo

Dinh Diem of South Vietnam was assassinated and it was a

shocking news to the Prince. In Phnom Penh there were

rumours of imminent coup. 90 Then on 10 November 1963, the

Prince announc~d the nationalization of the Import/Export

trade and banks. 91 Due to the pressure from the Communists,

the Prince at a Special Congress held on 19 November 1963,

announced the rejection of the US economic and military

aid. 92 Prince Sihanouk took this decision much against the

wishes of his advisers. 9 3 The restriction on luxury goods

and the Government control on Import/Export and foreign

banking was in tune with Khieu Samphan' s recommendations.

The severing of diplomatic relations with South Vietnam and

refusal of the us aid pleased the DRVN and the PRc. 94 Now,

the PRC extended military aid to Cambodia in December

1963. 95 In early 1964, the PRC delivered mortars, rocket-

launchers trucks and other weapons. The USSR,

Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia also supplied weapons. 96 Both

90. 91. 92.

Guardian, Rangoon, 19 November 1963. Statesman, New Delhi, 12 November 1963. Hindu, Madras, 17 November 1963, see also Rangoon, 23 November 1963, SWB FE/5632/C/3, 1977.

93. Osborne, n.12, p.87.

Guardian, 5 October

94. Gurtov, n.88, p.65, see also Smith, n.43, p.200. 95. Guardian, Rangoon, 25 November 1963, see also New York

Times, 7 october 1964. Even though the PRC had offered the aid in 1962, the Prince was unwilling to accept it fearing the US retaliation, see Armstrong, n.60, p.193.

96. Gurtov, n.88, p.66.

132

the PRC and the DRVN were on friendly relations in late 1963

and both the countries supported Sihanouk Government.97

Even though the WPK was impressed with the Prince's

moves, 98 there was no change in their legal, underground and

the countryside activities. The Prince aimed at utilizing

the rejection of the US aid to regain his waning popularity

among the peas~nts and the urban left and non-left. He

wanted to pacifty the peasantry about their suspicion of

foreigners and to neutralize the Communists pressure on the

government. 99 In the absence of the US aid, more socio-

economic problems would have flared up, in which the WPK had

little option except to "further escalate its struggle

agasinst the Sihanouk regime".lOO Thus, both the DRVN and

the PRC felt that with the refusal of the US aid, the WPK

should co-operate with the Prince. The refusal of the US

aid proved that there was no threat to the liberation

struggle in South Vietnam from Cambodia and life also

appeared easy for the WPK in Cambodia. It also alienated

the Prince from the peasantry and from the anti-Sihanouk and

pro-US elements and thus encouraged them for a Coup. "As

the Peasantry grew more rebellious and the right-wing forces

in the Sangkum more desperate, the CPK was drawn deeper into

a rural revolution and driven more completely from the

97.

98. 99. 100.

Donald S. Zagoria, Vietnam Triangle, pp.108-111, see also Jay Taylor, n.89, SWB, FE/5632/C/3, 5 October 1977. Smith, n.44, pp.200-201. Heder, n.18, p.5.

133

New York, p.22.

1967,

I

cities. This proces-s was quite independent of Sihanouk' s

foreign policies vis-a-vis China, Vietnam or the United

States 11 • 101

But the new Khmer left already abandoned the political

scene and resorted to the armed struggle to overthrow the

Prince's regime in order to establish a true independent

socialist state. According to Pol Pot's Black Book, by that

time the Vietnamese had "lost control of the revolutionary

movement in Kampuchea", but the year 1964 was to see attacks

on the new WPK leadership "by leading cadres right in the

heart of the Party's leadership organs". 102

DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE US AND THE BRITISH

Following the assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem, Prince

decided to close down embassies in London and Washington. 103

Demonstrations were organised against the US and British

embassies in March 1964 by the Minister of Information and

the communists .10• Prominent among the Communists were

Chau Seng and Hou Youn. The Prince said that 'these

demonstrations organised by the pro-Communist Khmers were

aimd at against the rightists within the Sangkum. 105

After the release of Sien An from jail, the Communists

101. Ibid. 102. Black Book, n. 35, p. 37. 103. Guradian, Manchester, 16 December 1963. 104. New York Times, 19 March 1964. 105. Kiernan, n. 31, p. 207.

134

started a new newspaper namely Chadomukh (Four Faces).

Unrest developed in the rubber plantations in Memut and

intensified by twenty party members in the district. Even

though "the party had a great deal of influence" in 1964, it

was unable to do any thing due to the policies of the new

leadership. 106 Then General Association of Khmer Students

was founded by ~houk Chhay and urban students. 107 Next year

he took job in the state bank and subsequently he was

appointed as Deputy Commissar-General of the Royal Khmer

Socialist Youth. Hou Youn shared the views of Phouk Chhay

and began working on a book entitled "The Co-operative

Question" (Pahnyaha Sahakor) which was published in khmer in

November 1964. He advocated the alliance between the Prince

and the socialists, supported the Prince's stand on the US

and the nationalisation.

The economic reforms would help to grow national

capitalism. He advocated the use of technology in

agriculture. Co-operative bodies, nationalised banks and

the creation of labour-pools and mutual aid-teams.

Accordintly, The towns should not suppress the peasants.

He favoured common property co-opearatives, low land rents,

low interest and elimination of money lenders. 108 On

106. 107. 108.

summary of Annotated ... , n. 5, p. 259. Summers, n. 8, p.19. Hou Youn "Solving Rural problems Programme to Safeguard the Nation" trans in Ben Kiernan and Chanthou Bhoua (eds.) Politics in Kampuchea, 1942-1981, London, 139-42, 144, 148-50.

135

A Socialist Chanthou Boua Peasants and

1982, pp.136,

commerce and capital usuary in Cambodia, Hu Nim felt that

the farmer has to sell his produce very cheap and buy the

needy i terns costly. It was due to the exploitation by

merchants, businessmen and usurers. Hence the debts

accumulate and the peasants were forced to sell their land.

At each sale .of agricultural produce middle men were

involved. Therefore, the farmer get very meagre value for

his produce. To help the farmer, the government started to

purchase the rice at a fixed price by the SONEXIM, namely

the states Import-Export Company. 109

Reforms had their positive effect on the economy. Rice

harvest increased during 1963 and 1964. This led to the

increase of rice exports. Balance of trade which was not

favourable since 1955 was attained in 1964. In 1965 after a

long time, National Bank recovered its deposits. No doubt

the reforms helped to achieve economic well-being. With the

war intensification in Vietnam in 1966, Cambodian rice was

being smuggled into Vietnam. As a result, the taxable rice

exports were reduced by two-thirds. Hence, the country's

exchequer was on the verge of bankruptcy. 11° Cambodia which exported rice from 1956 on an average 250,000 tons of rice

109. Hu Nim, "Land Tenure and Social Structure in Kampuchea", extracts from "Les Services Publics Economiques du Cambodge, Ph.D. thesis, University of Phnom penh, 1965, trans Ben Kiernan in Ben Kiernan and Chan thou Boua ( eds.) Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942-1981, London, 1982, pp.77-78.

110. Summers, n.S, p.13,

136

declined to 170,000 tons in 1966.

In the liberated area of South Vietnamese province of

Tay Ninh, Pol Pot and his associates of the party Centre

stayed in "Office 900" which was protected by the

Vietnamese. Both Pol Pot and Nuon Chea developed close ties

with Chan, the Deputy party secretary of the Eastern Zone's

Region 21. 111

THE GOVERNMENT CRACRS ~ ON THE COMMUNISTS

The reforms of late 1963 alienated the rightists.

There would have been political destabilization, if they

created more trouble. However, it would be a positive sign

for the revolution. so, the Prince in order to discredit

the opposition in May 1964 announced that Son Sen had joined

hands with Son Ngoc Thanh. When the Lon Nol forces started

to hunt for revolutionaries, Pol Pot advised them to move

into the bushes. As a result, So Phim took shelter in the

bushes in late 1964 in the Kompong Cham province. Whereas

Ke Vin was not aware of the Pol Pots's directive. As a

result of the Government repression several cadres moved

into the forest. Several cadres who had been arrested were

sent to jail. They resorted to propaganda work. This period

also witnessed the closing down of a newspaper titled

111. Kiernan, n. 31, p.209.

137

Chadomukh and the arrest of many youth. Meanwhile, keu

became the military chief of the party for the Northwestern

zone. Unrest continued in the Northeast. In January 1965,

Prince made a second visit to pacify the unrest. But the

problem erupted in other parts of the country over land

distribution. In February 1965, the Prince found fault with

Hou Youn for the trouble.112

But Hou Youn purused the problem of absentee landlords

and suggested for the equitable distribution of land.

Though the Prince found fault with Hou Youn, he was

protected because of 'his intellectual qualities'.

On 29 January 1965, Ly Sae, a nephew of Ney Sarann and

several students were arrested for displaying posters and

distributing leaflets criticising the government.

Similarly, a youth was hanged in the prison after his arrest

for his involvement in the propaganda work in Kompong Cham

in March 1965. It was followed by the student protests. For

this, the Prince said that the Khmer Rouge would be allowed

as long as they were not threatening the state.113

BREAKING OFF OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ~ THE US, MAX 1965

Prince Sihanouk, in order to escape the prospect of his

country becoming an arena of ideological rivalries and

battleground for the Viet Cong and the South Vietnamese

112. Ibid., pp. 213-215. 113. Ibid., p. 218.

138

forces had been requesting from time to time the us and

other major powers to help Cambodia to fix her borders with

Thailand and Vietnam. As a result of the neutrality adopted

by Cambodia, the US aid to Cambodia declined to a mere us

$31 million only by 1963. 114 As the propsects of the

solution to the border problem apeared dim, the Prince

announced on 12 November 1963 that Cambodia wished no

further American aid after 1 January 1964. He took the

decision on the ground that the us, by aiding South Vietnam,

was helping a campaign against him and that the CIA, by its

aid to the 'Free Cambodia' rebel movement, was interfering

in the internal affairs of the country.115

The Prince urged the US in February 1964 to convene a

Nine Power conference by May 1964 to guarantee his country's

neutrality. In the event of a failure, he threatened to

break diplomatic relations. Finally, he urged for a Four-

Power conference of Cambodia, South Vietnam, Thailand and

the Us. 116 But, Thailand declined. In May 1964, Cambodia

lodged a protest with the Security council against the US

and South Vietnam's acts of aggression on its territory. 117

Following the ill-treatment of Buddhists in South Vietnam,

114. Army Vandenbosch and Richard Butwell, The Changing Face of South East Asia, Lexington, 1966, p.234.

115. Ibid., Brazil Herald, 8 January 1964, see also Guardian Rangoon, 17 February 1964, The Times, 22 February 1964.

116. Asian Recorder, vol. X, no. 27, 1-7 July 1964, pp. 5903-5904.

117. Guardian, Rangoon, 12 May 1964, 11 September 1964.

139

Cambodia broke off her relations with Saigon on 26 August

1963. 118

In a further effort to reach an understanding with the

us, Prince Sihanouk on 17 November requested for a meeting

with a representative of the US in New Delhi on 6 December

1964.119 The meeting ended in a dead-lock. During

February-March 1965, a Conference of the Indo-Chinese

peoples was convened in Phnom Penh.120 The conference

concluded by asking for the reconvening of the Geneva

Conference in order to guarantee Cambodia's neutrality, to

withdraw the US forces from Vietnam and the liberation of

South Vietnam. The PRC supported Prince's demands. 121

The South Vietnam's Air Force attacked two Cambodian

border villages on 28 April 1965. An article published in

Newsweek affected the reputation of his mother. 122

Meanwhile, The US troops build up had begun in South

Vietnam. Hence, Cambodia broke off diplomatic relations with

the us on 4 May 1965. 123 The strained relations between the

US and Cambodia increased the influence of the PRC in the

118. Asian Recorder, vol.IX, no.39, 24-30 September 1963, pp.5433-34.

119. The Saigon post, 1 December 1964. 120. New York Times, 30 April 1965. 121. "China Backs Cambodia's Stand on International

Conference", Peking Review, Peking, vol. VIII, no.19, 7 May 1965, pp.11-12.

122. An article was published in the Newsweek of 5 April 1965, which undermines the image of Queen Kossamak, Asian Recorder, vol.XI, no.21, 21-27 May 1965, p.6460.

123. New York Times, 7 May 1965, see also Gurtov, n. 88, pp.69-70.

140

region. At this juncture Cambodia's gradual shift towards

the PRC seemed inevitable.

Prince Sihanouk was supported for his actions towards

the US by Non Suon. However, the Communists continued their

hold. For example, So Nem was the Secretary of State for

Commerce and Chau Seng was the Director of Sihanouk' s

Cabinet. Phouk Chhay led a Royal Khmer Socialist Youth

(JSR.K) delegation consisting of ten members on a visit to

the PRC on 17 July 1965. Phouk Chhay informed Sihanouk from

Beijing on 9 August 1965, part work and part study system of

education, the prevalent system in the PRC.

FOREIGN VISTS OF POL POT

Pol Pot along with the Keo Meas crossed the Cambodian

border into Laos in late 1964. He travelled through the Ho

Chi Minh Trail and went to Hanoi in summer 1965. Both Le

Duan and Hoang Tung, the Vietnamese leaders helped Pol Pot

with ·inter party affairs and then moved to Beijing and

Pyongyang. 124 He spent 'severl month' in Hanoi and met the

Cambodian Communists who had been undergoing training since

1954. The return of some of these cadres to Cambodia may

not have the WPK's approva1. 125 due to the disagreement with

the Prince. The Vietnamese aimed at cultivating good

124. Nayan Chanda, "Insight on Hanoi's War Aims", FEER, vo1.100, no.16., 21 April 1978, p.19.

125. Ibid.

141

relations with the Prince, because they needed his support

in their struggle to liberate South Vietnam. 12 6 The

Vietnamese wanted that the WPK should build up its forces

and support the foreign policy of the Prince. The veterans

shared this view. It could help the triumph of Communism and

liberation of South Vietnam. 12 7

Pol Pot stayed in Beijing for four months and worked

with Deng Xiao ping. What transpired between Pol Pot and

the Chiese leaders was not known. 128 Pol Pot's visit to the

PRC was important in the light of the commencement of the US

bombing and troop buildup, rift in the Sino-Soviet relations

and the growing rift in the WPK's relations with the VWP.

It was thought that the PRC might utilize the situation to

cultivate good relations with the WPK to be anti-soviet,

thereby anti-Vietnam.129 At this juncture, the Chinese

might have encouraged Pol Pot to differ with the VWP. 130

Moreover, the PRC also encouraged the break away parties

against Moscow in every country. Both the Burmese and the

Malayan Communist parties moved into the Chinese camp.

126. New York Times, 13 MArch 1964. 127. Gareth Porter, "Vietnamese Communist Policy Towards

Kampuchea, 1930-1970 11 , in David P.Chandler and Ben Kiernan ( eds.) Revolution and its Aftermath in Kampuchea, New Haven, 1983, p.76.

128. Heder, n.18, p.7. 129. Jay Taylor, n.89, pp.35-52, see also Zagoria, n.97,

pp.111-112. 130. Heder, n.18, p.7.

142

Likewise, some of the Thai Communist cadres were undergoing

training in Beijing.l31

Prince Sihanouk went to Beijing during September-

October 1965 to participate in the Chinese Natioal Day

Celebrations on 1 October 1965. 132 At that time Pol Pot was

in Beijing. If the Chinese wanted, they could have sorted

out the differences between the Prince and the Khmer Rouge.

Hu Nim reached Beijing on 20 September 1965 for a months

visit on the eve of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. 133 Hu

N im and Phouk Chhay too did not know about Pol Pot's

presence in Beijing.

When the Prince visited the North Korean capita1, 134

Pol Pot was there. Pol Pot left China in early 1966 just

before the formal inaguration of Cultural Revolution in

China and he wanted to take out the Communist movement from

the Vietnamese control. The Chinese encouraged Pol Pot to

that end. Thus, the year 1966 was a turning point in the

history of the WPK. The Black Book said : "In 1966, the CPK

consolidated and strengthened its position of independence,

sovereignty and self-reliance, and clearly discerned

131. Andrew Turton (ed.), Thailand: Roots of Conflct, Nottingham, 1978, pp.164-65.

132. "China Welcomes Prince Sihanouk", Peking Review, vol.VIII, no.40, 1 October 1965, pp.l3-14.

133. "Premier Chou on Sino-Cambodian Friendship", Peking Review, vol.VIII, no.43, 22 October 1965, p.15.

134. "Prince Sihanouk's Report on Visits to China and Korea", Peking Review, vol.VIII, no.43, 22 October 19651 PP • 19-21.

143

the true nature of the Vietnamese".135 The Vietnamese

sensed some danger that what transpired in China between Pol

Pot and his hosts. But the Vietnamese were unable to

alienate the Prince and destabilize his regime.

A clandestine newspaper namely Reaksmei Krahom (Red

Light) was started by the party after Pol Pot's return to

Cambodia. The paper began criticizing the Prince and the

Sangkum. It charged that the Prince supported the corrupt

and dishonest people. 136 In Kompong Cham several members of

the Pracheachon were arrested in February 1966. A number of

Secondary School instructors were also arrested else where.

They were in possession of the copies of Reaksmei Krahom.

After Pol Pot's return, the party began the 'armed struggle

in the cauntry side' to bring radical social radical social

revolution. He also took care that the differences with

vietnam and with khmer veterans should not be known to the

Prince. It was aimed at averting crack down on the Pol Pot

group by the Government. The Prince felt that between 1956

and 1965, the Pracheachon supported the Government's policy

of anti-US, neutrality and national unity. This harmony

lasted till 1965.

VIETNAM'S IMPACT ON CAMBODIA'S FUTURE

In February 1965, the US began bombing of North

135. Black Book, n. 35, p. 33. 136. Kiernan, n. 31, pp. 224-25.

144

Vietnam. 137 Then the us regular forces landed in South

Vietnam in May 1965. The increase of US troops to two lakhs

in a short span of time showed the signs of their permanent

stay there. Meanwhile, thousands of Vietnamese guerrillas

pushed by the US crossed the khmer border and took

shelter. 138 As a result of the war in Vietnam, forty per

cent of taxable Cambodian rice was illegally smuggled into

Vietnam in 1966. 139 It created a considerable loss to the

Cambodian exchequer.

In 1966, fire was exchanged eight times between the

Khmer border foces and the Viet Cong. The using of Khmer

territory for sanctuary purposes by the Viet Cong was not

liked by Cambodia. The Prince said "I categorically affirm

that there is no North or South Vietnamese base in my

country, no concentration of troops prepared to attack south

Vietnam or any passage of importance 11 • 140 Even though the

Prince was not fully aware of the situation on the border,

it worried Lon Nol. The Communist activity brought both the

Prince and Lon Nol together by the end of 1966.

Despite the changed scenario, Hou Youn, Chau Seng and

137. Asian Recorder, vol.XI, no.15, 9-15 April 1965, p.6395. 138. An Outline History of the Vietnam Worker's Party, 1930-

1975, Hanoi, 1976, pp.115-117. 139. New York Times, 26 January 1966. 140. Asian Recorder, vol.XII, no.36, 3-9 September 1966,

p.7263.

145

Son Phouc Tho felt that the system may be reformed.

Communists papers such as, La Depeche, Mea to Phu, Preah

Vihear, Dammoeng Thmey and Phnom Penh press were also

published. Phouk Chhay was appointed as Director-General of

the State owned national Import Company, SANAPRIM in

1966. 141 On ca~bodia's Economic problems, So Nem, Chau Seng

and Hu Nim gave their suggestions. Thus, they were able to

operate freely despite their subordinate position enjoyed by

them. In the countryside, the left was not in favour of

armed struggle.

The Cambodian Communists from their position of open

and active participation in politics, resorted to go

underground and lead armed struggle to establish a

proletarian state. The repression on the Communists started

in the middle of 1966 and The Pracheachon continued its

criticism of the Prince. In this context, it is interesting

to note the Prince saying that the Communists would swallow

Cambodia. 142 In July the tribal dissidence had begun in the

northeast of Cambodia because of the increased activities of

Pol Pot, Ieng Sary and Son Sen.

Prince Sihanouk, in order to reduce tension tried to

alleviate repression. Ly Sae and Sin Song were released

141. Kiernan, n.31, p.230. 142. Hindustan Times, 11 July 1966, see also The Times,

London, 11 July 1966.

146

from jail in 1966. But violent repressions increased. A

former Issarak activist was killed in Prey Veng and a

Buddist monk was imprisoned for his sympathies towards the

revolutionaries. Prasith from Koh Kong had fled to Thailand

due to mopping up operations of Lon Nol. The Prince advised

the people not to be a prey to the Communist propaganda. 143

In the changed political climate, the Communists who had

offered passive resistence, resorted to armed rebellion. It

was a dividing line in the policies of the Communists in

Cambodia.

In September 1966, the WPK' s Central Committee was

convened and took a provisional decision to change the

Party's name from Workers Party of Kampuchea to that of

Communist party of Kampuchea (CPK). 144 Now the CPK

considered itself ideologically more advanced than that of

the Vietnamese party, but at the equal level to that of the

Communist party to China.

ELECTIONS ~ THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, SEPTEMBER 1966

Elections to the National Assembly were held on 11

September 1966. Prince Sihanouk instead of nominating

Sangkum candidates in each electoral districts allowed more

than one member of the Sangkum to contest for the 82 seats.

The result was that 415 candidates contested in the

143. Kiernan, n.31, p.231. 144. Carney, n.41, p.56.

147

elections. 145 It was aimed at giving advantage to well:to-

do conservatives and to clear the Assembly of the

radicals. 146 The traditional elite and those who could

spend money in the elections had the advantage.147 The

Communists namely Son Phuoc Tho, So Nem and Chau Seng opted

not to contest. But Hou Youn, Hu Nim and Khieu Samphan

contested in the election and won with large majorities

despite Prince's active campaign against them. Another

Communist also won from kratie and Lon Nol group won

majority seats through vote-buying. In the East, Chuon Ya

Ngan, an associate of Chou Chet and Non Suon contested from

Krek and lost.148

A conservative government headed by General Lon Nol was

formed on 22 October 1966. The Communists refused to

share power with the rightists. Therefore, Lon Nol offered

to resign but persuaded to continue in office until 1967.

Prince Sihanouk in order to pacify the Communists announced

the formation of a 'counter-Government' with a 'Shadow

Cabinet' to serve as an institutional check on the right-

wing cabinet149 due to the pressure from the rightists. Hou

145. Michael Leifer, "Cambodia : The Limits of Diplomacy", Asian Survey, vol.VII, no.1 January 1967, p.73.

146. Heder, n.18, p.8, see also Leifer, n.145, p.73. 147. Stephen Heder, n.18, p.8. 148. Kiernan, n.31, p.233. 149. Michael Leifer, "Rebellion or Subversion in Cambodia

? 11 , current History, vol.56, no.JJO, February 1969, p.89, see also Becker, n.9, p.117.

148

Youn, Hu Nim and Khieu Samphan could not find berths in this

body. Chau Seng was removed from his post of Chef du

Cabinet. The existence of the counter-Government was not

liked by Lon Nol. 150 The Communists, threatened of its

political future, resorted to popular agitation and

cr i tcized the ~conomic policies of the Government. The

students who had demanded the dismissal of Lon Nol

government were arrested. The papers such as Preah Vihear

and Damnoeng Thmei were closed down for their criticism of

the Government and the men also disappeared. Thus, the co-

existence of the left with the right in the Sangkum Cambodia

came to an end. The Prince was unable to control the

politics of the country and to neutralize the activities of

Pol Pot. The Khmer veterans were unable to dictate terms to

the Pol Pot group. The Vietnamese also had to face

problems. The Pol Pot group wanted to show its strength by

resorting to armed rebellion at Samlaut in April 1967. The

ideological emotions gave scope further for the polarization

of the Khmer society.

THE SAMLAUT REBELLION, APRIL 1967

The outbreak of the Samlaut rebellion in early 1967 was

definitely a last blow on the Prince's regime. As noted

above, after the 1966 elections, the National Assembly was

dominated by the rightists. The Communists deprived of its

150. Ibid.

149

share in the government. Therefore, the rift widened

between the Right and the Left. In Phnom Penh, the

rightists also turned hostile to the Prince.151 The

rejection of the US aid in 1963 by Cambodia resulted in the

reduction of aid to the Cambodian forces. To compensate this

loss, the gover~ment tried to procure rice at low price and

export the same. But as a result of the smuggling of

Cambodian rice into Vietnam, rice exports declined in

Cambodia. Hence, Gen.Lon Nol used force to collect rice and

it generated opposition in many places in the country. But

in Samlaut 'this opposition combined with other peasant

grievances to precipitate a major peasant rebellion in

April-June 1967'.152

Samlaut was a very small town situated in an isolated

region, west of Battambang city which had been neglected in

the process of modernization by the government. During the

first .Indo-China war, 1945-1954, the Viet Minh had obtained

a strong foothold in this area. After the 1954 Geneva

Accords, some of the Viet Minh cadres stayed in the area.

It kept alive the hostility towards the government. 153

The factors which ultimatey contributed to the outbreak

of the samlaut rebellion on 2 April 1967, apart from

forceful rice collection, were due to the Government's plans

151. Osborne, n.12, p.101. 152. Heder, n.18, p.a. 153. Ponchaud, n.10, p.183.

150

to build a sugar refinery at Kompong Kol near Samlaut,

the problem of colonists, the official corruption and the

plight of the peasantry, the land distribution problem in

pailin, the exploitation of land owners and the domination

of Chinese and land owners.

In 1966 the provincial authorities of Battambang

decided a build a sugar-refinery at Kompong Kol near

Samlaut. The authorities obtained the land without paying

fair compensation to the land owners. The Viet Minh

instigated the people against the authorities which was

suppressed by military and the population was pushed into

the deep forest.154

From 1926 onwards a considerable number of people began

migraing from Mekong Delta area of South Vietnam to southern

Battambang and by the end of 1966 in Kampot, Takeo and

Battambang 12, 815 Khmer Krom took refuge. This number rose

to 17, 147 by 31 March 1968. Likewise the Vietnamese,

Laotian and some ethnic Khmers from Thailand, mainly former

Khmer Serei came to Cambodia. 155 The government settlements

were established in Kampot, Kirirom, Kompong Chhang,

Ratnakiri and Battambang. The Government showed undue

favour to them in constructing houses and alloting plots for

cultivation. It served as a potential source for the

154. Ibid. 155. Ben Kiernan, "The Samlaut Rebellion, 1967-68 11 in Ben

Kiernan and Chanthou Boua (ed.), Peasants and politics in Kampuchea,l942-1981, London, 1982, p.175.

151

conflict, because most of the local people did not even own

some land for themselves.156

The ordinary people were unhappy with the provincial

authorities in Bathambang. The officials supported the rich

and ignored the interests of the poor people. 157 Thus, the

official corruption added to the plight of the peasantry.

The land distribution problem was there in Pailin

district, a gem-mining town. The Burmese controlled fifty

per cent of the gem-deposits and the water courses and

canals. They demanded one-fourth of the value of the gem-

stones mined for the use of water under their control. Due

to lack of employment, diploma holders were forced to work

as labourers who in turn, instigated the rebellion at

Samlaut. 158

The population of the Pailin district increased with

the arrival of more people keeping in view of the fast

growing fruit industry, the Chinese and the Burmese bought

the best lands and converted them into fruit gardens.

Therefore, the peasants had to work there as labourers. 159

The condition of the peasants in the Andoeuk Hep was very

bad. The cotton yields were far low. The peasants were

unable to acquire new fields and they were also in debt.

156. Ibid., p.176. 157. SWB FE/2461/B/24, 10 May 1967. 158. Kiernan, n.155, p.178. 159. Ibid.

152

However, the 1966 crops failed. Subsidies and incentives of

the government had no effect. Cotton growing came down in

the area. Out of twenty two plantations ten were owned by

the Chinese and another six by the officials. Thus, the

rural proletariet who were forced to work as labourers were

unhappy.

The CPK cadres attempted to channel peasant complaints

in January and February in Battambang. In early March the

CPK cadres organized deomonstrations against the government

action and demanded the withdrawal of army units from the

area. Two of Lon Nol ministers resigned by the end of March

1967. Thus, both the legal and illegal cadres worked

effectively against Lon No1. 160

on 2 April 1967 the local CPK cadres attacked army

units collecting rice and snatched their arms. 161 The

cadres used these guns to attack the agricultural settlement

run by the Sangkum Youth Organisation known as the Royal

Khmer Socialist Youth (JSRK) at stung Kranhoung. 162 The

160. Heder, n.19, p.a. 161. Guardian, Manchester, 5 April 1967. 162. The farm was founded in 1957 with 80 youths, who came

from Takeo, Kampot, Kandol, Komong Speu and Phnom Penh. They were assisted by three agricultural advisers. By this, the government aimed to open remote areas for cultivation and to attract city youth to cultivation. But the experiment failed because the youth with city background and sons of Civil servants left the area by February 1967. see J.L.Girling, Cambodia and the Sihanouk Myth, Occasional Paper no.7, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1971, p.9.

153

penetration of the JSRK members was resented. The

distribution of land at stung kranhoung was the main source

of conflict. After 1966, high officials in the army and

police obtained titles. Therefore, the peasants who

regarded the land as their own had to pay rent which was

resented by them.

On provincial and local government offices, attacks

were intensifed by the cadres. Rebellion could not be

stopped even by summoning paratroopes, where 200 rebels were

captured and 19 killed. 163 Prince Sihanouk on 22 April 1967

charged Khieu Samphan, Hou 'ioun and Hu Nim for the

trouble. 164 The Prince also blamed the foriegn powers. He

said :

The rebellion in Battambang is basically political and launched from outside the country. Evidence of this abounds : Propaganda pamphlets printed in Peking and carrying the pornades, arms and communications equi~W~nt in the homes of Chinese terrorists.

There was a demand that they should be executed. But the

Prince wanted to send them to the Military Tribunal. On 24

April 1967 Khieu Samphan disappeared from the capital and

moved into the maquis. Hou 'ioun followed him. But Hu Nim

remained in public. It shows his faith in the Prince. Then

Lon Nol resigned. From the middle of 1967 Prince Sihanouk

163. Heder, n.18, p.a. 164. SWB FE/2447/A3/3, 24 April 1967. 165. New York Times, 24 March 1968.

154

aimed at cleaning the Phnom Penh politics from the clutches

of the urban radicals. 166 The Prince felt that the students

associations were under the Chinese influence. Therefore,

they were banned. 167 Phouk Chhay, the student's Association

president was arrested and given life imprisonment by

October . Hu Nim also moved into the maquis and Air force

was used to bomb areas of unrest. The heavy hand of the

government by which the peasants failed to withstand the

rebellion was brought to an end by June. 168 The Prince

toured the area and said that the rebellion ended officially

by end of August. 169 He blamed the pro-Peking Communists

for the trouble erupted in the country. 170

The support of Prince Sihanouk was valued very high by

the North Vietnamese particularly in helping to supply the

materials to the NLF from Sihanoukville. Now, the NLF was

facing nearly five lakh American forces. At this juncture,

the struggle launched by the CPK against the Prince's

Government was definitely not in the interest of the North

Vietnamese and the NLF because it might loose the sympathy

166. Osbone,n.l2, p.102. see also Christian Science Monitor, Boston, 6 May 1967, Year Book on International Communist Affairs 1969, California, 1970, p.95.

167. Malcolm Caldwell and Lek Tan, Cambodia in the Southeast Asian War, New York, 1973, p.165-66.

168. The Times, 22 June 1967. 169. Heder, n.18, p.9. see also Osborne, n.12,p.100. 170. Guardian, Rangoon, 9 August 1967.

155

of the Prince. Hence at this stage, the Vietnamese support

to the Khmer left was unlikely. Despite the Samlaut revolt,

the Prince pledged continued friendship with Communist

countries. 171

The revolutionary activity which was low since 1954

changed every thing by end of 1966. On this, Ieng Sary said

in 1971 thus

In 1966 everything changed. The non-endorsement of election candidates by Sihanouk opened the door to the guns of Lon Nol and the intrigue of the CIA, with the blessing of the extreme right-wing Assembly. Then, an actual civil war was begun against us. We ~ad to answer their guns with our guns. 1 2

FORMATION OF ~ "EXCEPTIONAL GOVERNMENT" QE NATIONAL SM'ETY

~ PRINCE SIHANOUK

In early May 1967, the Prince announced the resignation

of Lon Nol cabinet and the formation of an 'exceptional

government'. To maintain political balance two

conservaties, Penn Nouth and Son Sann and two Communists,

Chau Seng and So Nem were inducted into the Cabinet. The

Prince felt that the resignation of Lon Nol would pacify the

Communists. 173 The new government was expected in

171. Gurdian, Rangoon, 6 May 1967. 172. As quoted in Kiernan, n.155,p.168. 173. Christian science Monitor, 6 May 1967.

156

office for three months. In May military commander of the

Battambang region was removed. Meanwhile, In Tam replaced

Yem Monirath as provincial Governor.17 4

In order to rehabilitate the people who had fled from

their homes, Samdech Iv Teaot, the Chief monk of Battambang

Temple negotiat~d an amnesty to 200 men and women from the

Samlaut area. On 15 August when they visited the prince

they were well received. For them, houses and villages had

been rebuilt by the army, some of them in new locations. 175

Thus, by August the Samlaut affair came to an end.

In mid-1967, the CPK decided to start armed struggle

against the government. 176 The CPK also wanted to avail

'the readiness of the peasantry to revolt' and to protect

them from the government, 'it had to create a revolutionary

army' and as a result of the exclusion of Khieu Samphan and

Hou Youn from Phnom Penh politics compelled them to

concentrate "on revolutionary activities in the

countryside 11 • 177

In the light of the US plans to invade Khmer territory

to clean the Vietnamese sancturies, the CPK felt that it was

necessry to defened their zones of control. During the

height of the Chinese Cultural Revolution in the summer of

174. SWB FE/2461/B/24, 10 May 1967. 175. Kambuja,Phnom Penh, September 1967. 176. SWB FE/5632/C/4, 5 October 1977. 177. Heder, n.18,p.9.

157

1967, it advocated radical foreign policy. It was likely

that the explicit support came from China in favour of the

CPK's decision to resort to armed struggle in mid - 1967.178

The effect of Cultural Revolution was felt in Cambodia

leading to unrest in most of the Chinese schools in

Cambodia. The Chinese little Red Book was freely

available. 179 The "Red Guard-type activities by Chinese

residents in Kampuchea, which were supported by the Chinese

Embassy in Phnom Penh and by the Kampuchea-China Friendship

Association, and Sihanouk's moves to suppress these

activities resulted in a serious crisis in state-to-state

relations between China and Kampuchea during August and

September 1967 11 • 180 Prince even threatened to withdraw his

embassy staff from China. 181 Meanwhhle, the CPC's relations

with the CPK improved. There was change in China's

attitude towards the Vietnamese struggle. The CPK also was

in conflict with the VWP. The Vietnamese were also not

happy with the CPK' s move of armed rebellion and linking

with it would create more problems to them in their

liberation struggle of South Vietnam.

At this juncture, the DRVN and the NLF recognized the

178. Ibid., p.10. 179. Indian Express, New Delhi, 24 September 1968. 180. Heder, n.18, p.10. see also Asian Recorder, vol.XIII,

no.43, 22-28 October 1967, p.7975. 181. Armstrong, n.60, p.206.

158

present frontiers of Cambodia. 182 The Prince agreed to

enhance the status of the NLF in Phnom Penh to the status of

full embassy and agreed to allow the supply of materials to

the Vietnamese through Sihanoukville. 183 The Vietnamese

felt that the CPK had to avoid confrontation with Sihanouk,

otherwise it might endanger the interests of the Vietnamese.

But, the CPK wanted to wage armed struggle against him.

When there was open revolt of the Khmer Communists

against the government as a result of the change in the

policy of the. PRC towards the Prince's regime, the Khmer-

Chinese friendship society was dissolved because a telegram

from China denouncing the Cambodian Government was

published. 184 on 5 October 1967, the Prince launched

attacks on Hu Nim and Phouk Chhay. 185 On 9 October Hu Nim

disappeared and went into the maquis in Kompong Cham. It was

felt that he "made his way to Hanoi".186 Phouk Chhay was

arrested and condemned to death for subversion. He was

released by Lon Nol in May 1970. Later he joined the

maquis. Then on 11 September, the Prince dismissed Chau

182. Asian Recorder, vol.XIII, no.33, 13-19 August 1967, p.7856-57, 66.

183. Gurtov, n.88, pp.75-80, see also Jay Taylor, n.89, p.60. An Outline History of the Vietnam Workers Party, Hanoi, 1970, p.138.

184. New York Times, 12 September 1967. see also Asian Recorder, n.180, p.7975.

185. SWB, FE/2600/A3/3, 21 October 1967. 186. J.L.S.Girling, "The Resistance in Cambodia", Asian

Survey, vol.12, no.7, July 1972, p.562.

159

Seng, Minister of National Economy and Director of the

radical paper La Nouelle Depeche and So Nem, Minister of

Health and President of the banned Khmer-Chinese Friendship

Association. 187 By dismissing two cabinet colleagues, who

were friendly towards the Chinese, the Prince expressed his

displeaure to his Chinese friends. Thus, the friendly

relations existed between Cambodia and the PRC for more than

ten years tended to strain. Then So Nem was arrested and

Chau Seng went in exile to Paris. Follwed by this, some

Communist teachers were arrested and some others joined the

maquis. Thus, about one hundred teachers joined the

maquis. 188

The CPK's decision in mid-1967 to launch armed struggle

did not start immediately. The necessary preparations

continued till 17 January 1968. The first attack was on a

military post at Baydamram in Battambang province. In the

meantime, the PRC changed its view towards the Prince 1 s

regime and supplied the jet fighter bombers, transport and

training aircraft, machine guns, artillery, ammunition and

mines. 189 Already the VWP disapproved the CPK 1 s armed

struggle. But the Prince in February said : "The Communist

nations have made a pretense of being our friends - i.e.,

officially. Bu