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6. Blas v. Santos

Article 776 of the Civil Code defines the inheritance of a person. Article 1347 of the same Code prohibits any contract in-volving future inheritance. Blas interprets the meaning of Article 1347 in connection with Article 776. —————————————-776- ART. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death.1347- Under Article 1347 of the Civil Code, no contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases ex-pressly authorized by law. Paragraph 2 of Article 1347 characterizes a contract entered into upon future inheritance as void. The law applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the succession has not yet been opened; (2) the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and (3) the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature.—————————————————————————

FACTS:

Simeon Blas and Marta Cruz had three children on their marriage. Only one of their children namely, Eulali o Blas, left le-gitimate descendants.

Descendants of Eulali O Blas are:

Maria Gervacio Blas, Marta Gervacio Blas, and Lazaro Blas.

Lazaro Blas (Grandson of Simeon Blas and Marta Cruz) has 3 legitimate descendants, namely, Manuel , Leoncio, and Loida, plaintiffs in this case. - Defendant is the Estate of Maxima Santos the Second wife.

Marta Cruz died in 1898, and the following year, Simeon Blas contracted a second marriage with Maxima Santos.

At the time of this second marriage, no liquidation of the properties required by Simeon Blas and Marta Cruz was made.

Simeon Blas did not have children with Maxima (Second Marriage)

Three of the properties left are fishponds located in Obando, Bulacan.

In 1936, Simeon Blas executed a will disposing half of his properties in favour of Maxima the other half for payment of debts, Blas also named devisees and legatees therein. In lieu of this, Maxima executed a document whereby she inti-mated that she understands the will of her husband, that she promises that she’ll be giving, upon her death, one half of the properties she will be acquiring to the heirs and legatees named in the will of his husband. that she can select or choose any of them depending upon the respect, service and treatment accorded to her by said legatees/heirs/devisees. (This document is referred to as Exhibit A in the case if sir asks)

Thus, this action is instituted by plaintiffs against the administration of the estate of Maxima Santos, to secure a judicial declaration that one-half of the properties left by Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas had been promised by the deceased Max-ima Santos to be delivered upon her death and in her will to the plaintiffs, and requesting that the said properties so promised be adjudicated to the plaintiffs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to receive inheritance from the estate of Maxima Santos based on Exhibit A or the promise of Maxima to give half of her estate to devisees and legatees.

HELD:

The Court declared that the document signed by Maxima Santos is a compromise to avoid litigation and thus enforceable upon her death. Though it is not a will (it lacks the formality) nor a donation, it is still enforceable because it is a compro-mise where she promised to devise to the heirs and legatees of her husband Simeon Blas, one-half of the properties she received as her share in the conjugal partnership of herself and her husband, and that she failed to comply with her aforementioned obligation.

It is not disputed that this document was prepared at the instance of Simeon Blas for the reason that the conjugal proper-ties of his first marriage had not been liquidated. It is an obligation or promise made by the maker to transit one half of her share in the conjugal properties acquired with her husband, which properties are stated or declared to be conjugal properties in the will of the husband.

It will be noted that what is prohibited to be the subject matter of a contract under Article 1271 of the Civil Code is "future inheritance." To us future inheritance is any property or right not in existence or capable of determination at the time of the contract, that a person may in the future acquire by succession. The properties subject of the contract are well de-fined properties, existing at the time of the agreement, which Simeon Blas declares in his statement as belonging to his

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wife as her share in the conjugal partnership. Certainly his wife's actual share in the conjugal properties may not be con-sidered as future inheritance because they were actually in existence at the time the document was executed.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant-appellee, administratrix of the estate of Maxima Santos, is ordered to convey and deliver one-half of the properties adjudicated to Maxima Santos as her share in the conjugal properties in said Civil Case No. 6707, entitled "Testamentaria del Finado Don Simeon Blas, Max-ima Santos vda. de Blas, Administradora," to the heirs and the legatees of her husband Simeon Blas. Considering that all said heirs and legatees designated in the will of Simeon Blas as the persons for whose benefit Exhibit "A" had been executed, have not appeared in these proceedings, the record is hereby remanded to the court below, with instructions that after the conveyance of the properties hereinabove ordered had been effected, the said heirs and legatees (of Simeon Blas) file adversary pleadings to determine the participation of each and every one of them in said properties. Cost against the defendant-appellee Rosalina Santos. ——————————————————————————————————————————————-

7. Vda. de Cabalu vs. Spouses Tabu - Art. 774, 1347

776- ART. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death.

1347- Under Article 1347 of the Civil Code, no contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases ex-pressly authorized by law. Paragraph 2 of Article 1347 characterizes a contract entered into upon future inheritance as void. The law applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the succession has not yet been opened; (2) the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and (3) the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature.

Petitioner won (Cabalu)

FACTS:

Faustina Maslum (Faustina) was the original owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 16776. The land had a total area of 140,211 square meters.

On December 8, 1941, Faustina died without any children. She left a holographic will, assigning and distributing her property to her nephews and nieces. The said holographic will, however, was not probated. (acknowledge in court)

Benjamin Laxamana was one of Faustinas heirs. He died in 1960. He had two heirs: his wife and his son, Domingo Laxamana (Domingo). On

March 5, 1975, Domingo executed a Deed of Sale in favor of Laureano Cabalu covering 9,000 square meters of the land inherited by his father from Faustina.

On August 1, 1994, the legitimate heirs of Faustina executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Succession with Partition. The said deed imparted 9,000 square meters of the land covered by TCT No. 16776 to Domingo.

Thereafter, Domingo sold 4,500 square meters of the 9,000 square meters of the land to his nephew, Eleazar Tabamo. The remaining portion was registered in Domingos name under TCT No. 281353.

On August 4, 1996, Domingo died. On October 8, 1996, or two (2) months after Domingos death, Domingo purportedly executed a Deed of Sale of TCT No. 281353 in favor of Renato Tabu (Tabu). Tabu and his wife Dolores Laxamana subdivided the lot into two which resulted to TCT Nos. 291338 and 291339.

Consequently, petitioners Milagros de Belen Vda. De Cabalu, Meliton Cabalu, Spouses Angela Cabalu and Rodolfo Ta-lavera, and Patricio Abus filed a complaint before the RTC seeking to declare TCT Nos. 291338 and 291339 as null and void. They averred that they were the lawful owners of the subject property because it was sold to their father, Laureano Cabalu, by Domingo, through a Deed of Absolute Sale, dated March 5, 1975.

The RTC declared the deeds dated March 5, 1975 and October 8, 1996 null and void. On appeal, the CA partially granted the petition and deleted the RTCs decision declaring the October 8, 1996 null and void.

ISSUES:

I. Whether or not the Deed of Sale of Undivided Parcel of Land covering the 9,000 square meter property executed by Domingo in favor of Laureano Cabalu on March 5, 1975, is valid?

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II. Whether or not the Deed of Sale dated October 8, 1996, covering the 4,500 square meter portion of the 9,000 square meter property, executed by Domingo in favor of Renato Tabu, is null and void?

HELD:

Petition is partially granted.

CIVIL LAW: future inheritance; contractual capacity

FIRST ISSUE: The CA did not err in declaring the March 5, 1975 Deed of Sale null and void.

Thus, and as correctly found by the RTC, even if Benjamin (father of Domingo) died sometime in 1960, Domingo in 1975 could not yet validly dispose of the whole or even a portion thereof for the reason that he was not the sole heir of Ben-jamin, as his mother only died sometime in 1980.

Besides, under Article 1347 of the Civil Code, "No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law." Paragraph 2 of Article 1347, characterizes a contract entered into upon future inheritance as void. The law applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the succession has not yet been opened; (2) the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and (3) the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature.

In this case, at the time the deed was executed, Faustina’s will was not yet probated; the object of the contract, the 9,000 square meter property, still formed part of the inheritance of his father from the estate of Faustina; and Domingo had a mere inchoate hereditary right therein.

Domingo became the owner of the said property only on August 1, 1994, the time of execution of the Deed of Extrajudi-cial Succession with Partition by the heirs of Faustian, when the 9,000 square meter lot was adjudicated to him.

SECOND ISSUE: The CA erred in deleting that portion in the RTC decision declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated October 8, 1996, null and void.

Regarding the deed of sale covering the remaining 4,500 square meters of the subject property executed in favor of Re-nato Tabu, it is evidently null and void.The document itself, the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated October 8, 1996, readily shows that it was executed on August 4, 1996 more than two months after the death of Domingo.

Contracting parties must be juristic entities at the time of the consummation of the contract. Stated otherwise, to form a valid and legal agreement it is necessary that there be a party capable of contracting and a party capable of being con-tracted with. Hence, if any one party to a supposed contract was already dead at the time of its execution, such contract is undoubtedly simulated and false and, therefore, null and void by reason of its having been made after the death of the party who appears as one of the contracting parties therein. The death of a person terminates contractual capacity.

The contract being null and void, the sale to Renato Tabu produced no legal effects and transmitted no rights whatso-ever. Consequently, TCT No. 286484 issued to Tabu by virtue of the October 8, 1996 Deed of Sale, as well as its deriva-tive titles, TCT Nos. 291338 and 291339, both registered in the name of Rena to Tabu, married to Dolores Laxamana, are likewise void.

Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.

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8. Macam vs. Gaitmaitan - Art. 781

781- Art. 781. The inheritance of a person includes not only the property and the transmissible rights and obligations ex-isting at the time of his death, but also those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession. (n)

Facts:

This is an action brought by the plaintiff as executrix of the testate estate of the deceased Macam, for the recovery from the defendant Juana Gatmaitan and Magno S. Gatmaitan of the ownership of the house described in paragraph 2 of the complaint.

The plaintiff appealed from the decision of the court absolving the defendants.

On September 24, 1929, the deceased Leonardo Macam and the defendant Juana Gatmaitan purchased the house in question for P3,000 from the spouses Generosa Inducil and Flora Ramos (Exhibit B).

It is stated in the deed of sale that the vendors received the purchase price of the house from the vendees, both single.

However, on June 12, 1932, the deceased Leonarda Macam and the defendant Juana Gatmaitan subscribed a docu-ment (Exhibit C) stating a transfer of the right of the one who dies first and shall be kept by the survivor; and none of our

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heirs shall claim the property mentioned in this document left by any us who dies first EXCLUDING THE FURNITURES INCLUDED IN PAR. 2 of Exhibit B. ‘The plaintiff contends that with respect to the house, Exhibit C, on the part of Leonarda, constitutes a donation mortis causa in favor of Juana, and that as it had not been executed with all the formalities required by law for a will, it is entirely invalid and did produce the effect of conveying the ownership of the house to Juana.

Issue:

Whether or not the transfer of ownership of the house constitutes a donation mortis cause in favor of Juana or not?

Held:

No, The lower court, in absolving the defendants from the complaint, considered the act of the deceased Leonarda as a transfer of the ownership of the house in favor of Juana, but not in the concept of a donation.

This conclusion of the court below is supported by the literal interpretation of Exhibit C, wherein the parties describe the act performed by them as an agreement and a transfer.

This court is of the opinion that Exhibit C is an aleatory contract whereby, according to article 1790 of the Civil Code, one of the parties or both reciprocally bind themselves to give or do something as an equivalent for that which the other party is to give or do in case of the occurrence of an event which is uncertain or will happen at an indeterminate time.

As already stated Leonarda was the owner of the house and Juana of the Buick automobile and most of the furniture. By virtue of Exhibit C, Juana would become the owner of the house in case Leonarda died first, and Leonarda would be-come the owner of the automobile and the furniture if Juana were to die first. In this manner Leonarda and Juana recipro-cally assigned their respective property to one another conditioned upon who might die first, the time of death determin-ing the event upon which the acquisition of such right by the one or the other depended.

This contract, as any other contract, is binding upon the parties thereto. Inasmuch as Leonarda had died before Juana the latter thereupon acquired the ownership of the house, in the same manner as Leonarda would have acquired the ownership of the automobile and of the furniture if Juana had died first.

DISPOSITIVE: In view of the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs to the appel-lant. So ordered.

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9. Rivera V. People’s Bank- Art. 781

10. Vitug v. Court of Appeals- Art. 781

781- Art. 781. The inheritance of a person includes not only the property and the transmissible rights and obligations ex-isting at the time of his death, but also those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession. (

This case is a chapter in an earlier suit involving the probate of the two wills of the late Dolores Luchangco Vitug naming private respondent Rowena Faustino-Corona executrix. In that case, the appointment of Nenita Alonte as co-special ad-ministrator of Mrs. Vitug's estate with her (Mrs. Vitug's) widower, petitioner Romarico G. Vitug, pending probate was upheld.

FACTS

Dolores Vitug, deceased, during her lifetime together with her husband Romarico Vitug, executed a survivorship agree-ment with the bank. It provides that after the death of either of them, the fund shall belong exclusively to the survivor.

Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking for authority from the probate court to sell certain shares of stock and real prop-erties belonging to the estate to cover allegedly his advances to the estate, plus interests, which he claimed were per-sonal funds. As found by the CA the alleged advances were spent for the payment of estate tax, deficiency estate tax, and “increment thereto.”

Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell on the ground that the same funds withdrawn were conjugal partnership properties and part of the estate, and hence, there was allegedly no ground for reimbursement. She also sought his ouster for failure to include the sums in question for inventory and for “concealment of funds belonging to the estate.”Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive property having acquired the same through a survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank.

The trial courts upheld the validity of such agreement.

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On the other hand, the CA held that the survivorship agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis causa which “did not comply with the formalities of a valid will as prescribed by Article 805 of the Civil Code,” and secondly, assuming that it is a mere donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation under the provisions of Article 133 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: W/N the survivorship agreement between the spouses Vitug constitutes a donation?

HELD: NO. The conveyance in question is not, first of all, one of mortis causa, which should be embodied in a will. A will has been defined as “a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies with duties to take effect after his death.” In other words, the bequest or device must pertain to the testator. In this case, the monies subject of savings account No. 35342-038 were in the nature of conjugal funds In the case relied on, Rivera v. People’s Bank and Trust Co., we rejected claims that a survivorship agreement pur-ports to deliver one party’s separate properties in favor of the other, but simply, their joint holdings.

There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and hence it must be presumed to be conjugal, having been acquired during the existence of the marital relations. (Pwedeng end na dito young case but I included the other ruling of the court just in case :)

Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious reasons, because it was to take effect after the death of one party. Secondly, it is not a donation between the spouses because it involved no conveyance of a spouse’s own properties to the other.

It is also our opinion that the agreement involves no modification petition of the conjugal partnership, as held by the Court of Appeals, by “mere stipulation”  and that it is no “cloak” to circumvent the law on conjugal property relations. Cer-tainly, the spouses are not prohibited by law to invest conjugal property, say, by way of a joint and several bank account, more commonly denominated in banking parlance as an “and/or” account. In the case at bar, when the spouses Vitug opened savings account No. 35342-038, they merely put what rightfully belonged to them in a money-making venture. They did not dispose of it in favor of the other, which would have arguably been sanctionable as a prohibited donation.

There is no demonstration here that the survivorship agreement had been executed for such unlawful purposes, or, as held by the respondent court, in order to frustrate our laws on wills, donations, and conjugal partnership.

The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug having predeceased her husband, the latter has acquired upon her death a vested right over the amounts under savings account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of America. Insofar as the respondent court ordered their inclusion in the inventory of assets left by Mrs. Vitug, we hold that the court was in error.

Being the separate property of petitioner, it forms no more part of the estate of the deceased.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court, dated June 29, 1987, and its resolution, dated February 9, 1988, are SET ASIDE.