Substitut Family

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THE DILEMMA OF GENDER SPECIALIZATION: SUBSTITUTING AND AUGMENTING WIVES’ HOUSEHOLD WORK Judith Treas ABSTRACT The greater the gender specialization in marriage, the less the overlap in the skill sets and motivations of the partners. The less the overlap, the less readily can the labor of the husband substitute for or augment the labor of the wife (and vice versa). With data on 26 countries from the 2001 International Social Survey Program, this specialization-substitution argument is evaluated based on wives’ preferences for household help and emotional support. As predicted, women in more specialized mar- riages are more likely to favor kin and others over the husband for assis- tance. In countries where the public approves of traditional gender roles and men avoid “woman’s work” in the home, wives are more likely than their counterparts elsewhere to prefer the assistance of kin and others over the husband’s help. KEY WORDS specialization gender household labor emotional support cross-national research Gary Becker (1981) famously argued for the efficiency of specialization within the household. Based on their comparative advantages in market and home, he reasoned, partners will devote their time to one or the other sphere, if only because the learning-by-doing returns to their specialized investments maximize total household production. Men were usually the ones to invest in the market and women in the home. Gender specializa- tion in the household, however, means that the labor of the husband can less readily substitute for the labor of the wife (and vice versa). Nor can the spouse’s labor be easily mobilized when a second worker is needed, either in the market or the home. When circumstances demand substitut- ing or augmenting labor, an individual in a highly specialized marriage faces the dilemma of having a partner who has cultivated a different set of skills and motivations. Rationality and Society Copyright © 2008 Sage Publications. Vol. 20(3): 259–282. http://rss.sagepub.com DOI: 10.1177/1043463108092529

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substitut family

Transcript of Substitut Family

THE DILEMMA OF GENDER SPECIALIZATION:

SUBSTITUTING AND AUGMENTING WIVES’HOUSEHOLD WORK

Judith Treas

ABSTRACT

The greater the gender specialization in marriage, the less the overlap inthe skill sets and motivations of the partners. The less the overlap, the lessreadily can the labor of the husband substitute for or augment the laborof the wife (and vice versa). With data on 26 countries from the 2001International Social Survey Program, this specialization-substitutionargument is evaluated based on wives’ preferences for household helpand emotional support. As predicted, women in more specialized mar-riages are more likely to favor kin and others over the husband for assis-tance. In countries where the public approves of traditional gender rolesand men avoid “woman’s work” in the home, wives are more likely thantheir counterparts elsewhere to prefer the assistance of kin and othersover the husband’s help.

KEY WORDS • specialization • gender • household labor • emotionalsupport • cross-national research

Gary Becker (1981) famously argued for the efficiency of specializationwithin the household. Based on their comparative advantages in marketand home, he reasoned, partners will devote their time to one or the othersphere, if only because the learning-by-doing returns to their specializedinvestments maximize total household production. Men were usually theones to invest in the market and women in the home. Gender specializa-tion in the household, however, means that the labor of the husband canless readily substitute for the labor of the wife (and vice versa). Nor canthe spouse’s labor be easily mobilized when a second worker is needed,either in the market or the home. When circumstances demand substitut-ing or augmenting labor, an individual in a highly specialized marriagefaces the dilemma of having a partner who has cultivated a different setof skills and motivations.

Rationality and Society Copyright © 2008 Sage Publications. Vol. 20(3): 259–282.http://rss.sagepub.com DOI: 10.1177/1043463108092529

To evaluate these implications of specialization, we examine marriedwomen’s responses to two questions from the 2001 International SocialSurvey Program (ISSP) data. First, we consider whom the wife prefersto help out around the house in the event of her short-term illness.Second, we ask whom she favors for social support when she feels dis-heartened. Both household work and emotional support are largely“women’s work.” Therefore, we anticipate that gender specializationwill work against the choice of the husband to help. With housework, thequestion is one of labor substitution, that is, who should do the workusually performed by the wife. By definition, social support is directedto enhancing the well-being of others. The wife selects a confidant toaugment – rather than to substitute for – her own efforts to better hermood. In either case, specialization is expected to figure in the wife’spreference for a helper.

Background

Specialization can be problematic in a number of circumstances. First,marginal returns on investments in routine activities decline, becausefatigue and boredom lead to falling productivity. This is recognized bylaws to limit hours on the job and by respite programs to relieve over-burdened family caregivers. Second, specializing in the home createsrisks for the homemaker. Her lack of income diminishes her clout inhousehold bargaining, but her specialized investments are not transfer-able to the marketplace nor to another relationship (Bernasco andGiesen 2000). Third, partitioned skill sets from specialization mean thathusband and wife lack knowledge of the demands of each other’s roles.This makes it harder to monitor one another’s performance (Treas1993). Fourth, the greater the gender specialization in marriage, the lessreadily can the labor of the husband augment or substitute for the laborof the wife (and vice versa).

The dilemmas of strict gender specialization are evident in everydaylife. If a husband becomes disabled, his wife may have to enter the laborforce unprepared. If his wife works a different shift, the husband will haveto fend for himself at home – taking on unfamiliar and perhaps unwel-come chores (Presser 1994). Gender specialization is vulnerable to theshifting demands of the life course, which may require two earners and/ortwo caregivers at some points (Oppenheimer 1997). Specialization is alsosusceptible to the absence of a partner, because it creates gender-specificlabor shortages in the household. Not surprisingly, single people spend

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significantly more money than married people to outsource householdtasks that routinely fall to the other gender (de Ruijter, Treas and Cohen2005).

Specialization: Explaining How Husbands and Wives DivideHousehold Work

Housekeeping, child minding, understanding loved ones, and express-ing compassion are all household work, if only because they entailopportunity costs (England and Farkas 1986; Erickson 2005). The dis-tinction between housework and emotional labor may be overstated.Women describe activities like meal preparation as addressing emo-tional as well as nutritional needs of family members (DeVault 1991).They regard a husband’s help with laundry or dishes as evidence of his“caring” (Sanchez and Kane 1996). Housework is primarily “women’swork,” being performed disproportionately by women (Brines 1994;van der Lippe and Siegers 1994; Singelmann, Kamo, Acock andGrimes 1996; Baxter 1997; Gupta 1999; Batalova and Cohen 2002;Bittman, England, Sayer, Folbre and Matheson 2003; Davis and Fuwa2004; Greenstein 2004; Geist 2005; Yodanis 2005). Women also pro-vide a disproportionate share of emotional support and take charge ofmanaging intimate relationships (Cancian and Gordon 1988; Seeryand Crowley 2000; Hook 2004).

Some attribute women’s specialization in housekeeping and caringlabor to innate gender differences. Sensitivity to others is widely attrib-uted to woman’s essential nature (Gilligan 1982; Erickson 2005).Therefore, women are held accountable for the family’s affective wel-fare, even if men do some of the emotion work in marriage (Sanchezand Kane 1996). Becker (1981) points to intrinsic biological differ-ences to explain women’s specialization in household production:biology gives women a comparative advantage in bearing and rearingchildren and in complementary household activities. Given compara-tive advantages in the market and the home, the husband and wife willspecialize in either paid employment or household production. Byvirtue of concentrated, learning-by-doing investments of time, they willenjoy higher productivity than if each focuses his/her efforts on differ-ent spheres. Of course, comparative biological advantages are lessimportant when paid jobs require little physical strength and coupleshave fewer children. Becker (1981) speculates that the rising value ofwomen’s time in the labor market and their decreasing fertility lead todeclining returns to household specialization.

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Aside from innate gender differences, a gender-neutral logic figuresprominently in the study of the allocation of household labor. The couple’s division of housework reflects the household’s demand fordomestic services and its labor supply (Shelton and John 1996). Moredemand for housekeeping translates to greater specialization in thehousehold division of labor. For instance, having young children islinked to more traditional housework arrangements (Presser 1994; Davisand Greenstein 2004; van der Lippe, Tijdens and de Ruijter 2004) aswell as less social support between spouses (Ishii-Kuntz and Seccombe1989). Each partner’s availability to do chores – as measured by hoursof employment (Coltrane 2000) or work shift (Presser 1994) – alsorelates to the household division of labor. Husbands do less houseworkand wives do more when the wife is a specialized, full-time homemakerrather than a paid worker (Shelton 1990; Blair and Lichter 1991; Cooke2004). Perhaps because health affects ability to do housework, age isnegatively associated with the husband’s participation in householdlabor (Coltrane 2000). Supply and demand factors, however, are notadequate explanations for the household division of labor.

First, the relative resources (e.g., earnings, educations) of husbandand wife are also associated with their relative shares of housework(Coltrane 2000). This is consistent with an exchange paradigm. Theresources of husband and wife translate into marital power, which influ-ences the outcome of their bargaining over housework (Brines 1993).From a game theoretic perspective, Breen and Cooke (2005) emphasizefemale economic autonomy. Women’s economic independence can pro-mote more egalitarian domestic arrangements by enhancing the credi-bility of women’s threats to leave an unsatisfactory marriage. Althoughresource-backed bargaining suggests gender-neutral exchange, otherresearch shows that wives’ resources are systematically discounted. Thisis especially true where there is less parity between men and women inthe broader society (Fuwa 2004).

Second, research questions the gender-neutral logic of both the timeavailability and relative resources arguments. Although wife’s earningsare positively associated with husband’s share of housework, a husbandwhose wife earns more than he does will perform less housework thanother husbands do (Brines 1994; Bittman, England, Sayer, Folbre andMatheson 2003). Contrary to Becker’s (1981) specialization argument,these husbands do not defer to their wives’ comparative advantage in thelabor market by investing more of their own time in the home. To explainthis paradox, the definition of household production has been broadenedto include “gender” manufactured through domestic interaction (Berk

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1985; West and Zimmerman 1987). Wives do housework and husbandseschew it in order to demonstrate the femininity and masculinity whichthey value. Even if they violate male breadwinner norms, husbands canreassure themselves and others of their masculinity by avoiding“women’s work” around the house. Another finding is also consistentwith the idea that an intimate heterosexual audience prompts people tobehave in a way that affirms their gender identity. Women do morehousework, and men do less, when they live with an adult of the oppo-site sex, rather than living alone or with a same-sex adult (South andSpitze 1994; Gupta 1999). If the selective performance of householdchores and emotional labor produces gender identities, the gender-neu-tral logic of supply, demand, and exchange may well be trumped bygender imperatives, which promote specialization between partners.

The gender-typing of domestic chores (Blair and Lichter 1991;Twiggs, McQuillan and Ferree 1999) underscores the gender special-ization in the household. The husband’s household work emphasizes“masculine” tasks like home maintenance, automobile upkeep, andyard work while the wife performs the more time-intensive, routine“feminine” jobs like cleaning, cooking, and laundry. Parents perpetuatethis gender-typing when they assign household chores to children(Duncan and Duncan 1978; Blair 1992; Evertsson 2004). These social-ization experiences not only provide gender-specific training in partic-ular domestic skills, but they also shape adult activity preferences,performance standards, and criteria for judging the fairness of the division of household labor (White and Brinkerhoff 1981; Gager 1998;Cunningham 2001).

Socialization not only teaches gender-specific skills, but it also resultsin internalized motivations inclining men and women to do, eschew,or share household activities with their partner. If they feel personallyresponsible for household chores, women are reluctant to involve theirhusbands in domestic and caring activities (Allen and Hawkins 1999). Ifhusbands do not participate in household chores, they express less con-fidence in their ability to take on the wife’s roles around the house (Castand Bird 2005). If gender specialization means that partners have dif-ferent skill sets and related motivations, they can less easily substitutefor or augment one another’s labor.

Other Sources of Household Help and Personal Assistance

Household help and emotional support come from others besides thespouse. There are markets for both household help and personal counseling,

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but they are not very popular. No more than 3% of Australians, Austrians,Americans, British, Hungarians, Italians, and West Germans say they wouldturn to a psychologist or counselor for depression or marital problems(Hoellinger and Haller 1990). Family doctors and clergy are not used mucheither, except in the U.S., where 6% report they would go to clergy.Surprisingly few households avail themselves of the convenience of paidhousehold help in the U.S. (de Ruijter, Treas and Cohen 2005), Australia(Bittman, Matheson and Meagher 1999), or the Netherlands (de Ruijter2004). Hiring household workers raises special issues of trust related to out-siders’ access to the private household (de Ruijter, van der Lippe and Raub2003). For short-term assistance around the house or with personal prob-lems, the transaction costs for negotiating a contract with an outsider are aptto outweigh the benefits. Household help and social support do not usuallydemand special talents beyond the aptitudes of ordinary family members(Pollak 1985). With illness or depression, intimates who are known andtrusted are apt to be preferred. As England and Folbre (2003) observe, “it isprecisely when we need care the most that we are least able to contract withothers to meet our needs.”

There are reasons family members are usually preferred for assistance(Wellman and Wortley 1990; Wade, Howell and Wells 1994; Klein andMilardo 2000). Because long-term relationships provide opportunitiesto learn one another’s needs and preferences, kin can help out withoutinstruction and monitoring. Family members’ good performance is fos-tered by enduring family bonds and tested by repeated interactionsbetween kin (Blau 1964; Pollak 1985). It is insured by internalizednorms (Ben-Porath 1980; Pollak 1985) and by the highly effective sanc-tioning of shared personal networks (Pollak 1985). Kin ties can be activated in emergencies – even if family members do not routinelyexchange help with one another (Silverstein and Bengtson 1997). Thisexplains why people rely on parents or grown children for both emo-tional support and household services (Wellman and Wortley 1990).

Nonrelatives – friends, neighbors, and co-workers – sometimes pro-vide assistance, especially if their tie is a strong one overcoming trustand information problems (Wellman and Wortley 1990). Non-kin rela-tionships are more specialized than the multipurpose relations with kin.Sharing similar lifestyles, friends are sources of companionship whileneighbors are tapped for small services because of their proximity(Wellman and Wortley 1990). Various categories of non-kin serve thesame functions in Austria, Australia, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, theNetherlands, and the U.S. (Freeman and Ruan 1997). From country tocountry, friends are called on for emotional support rather than for

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instrumental assistance (Hoellinger and Haller 1990). Neighbors giveinstrumental help, but not emotional support.

Given many options, the spouse is often the favored helper (Stone,Cafferata and Sangl 1987; Cantor 1991; Allen, Goldscheider andCiambrone 1999). Americans report that they feel the most obliged to helptheir spouse, followed by adult children and parents (Rossi and Rossi1992). Between 1985 and 2004, Americans became even more reliant ontheir spouse as a confidant (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Brashears2006). Marriage incurs many diffuse obligations which must be recipro-cated (Blau 1964). Malfeasance between husband and wife is discouragedby person-specific investments and expectations for a continued relation-ship (Williamson 1981). The privileged status of spouses reflects, in part,the fact that marriage qualifies as such a strong tie – defined as involvinga large and voluntary investment in the relationship, a commitment tobeing together into the indefinite future, and intimate knowledge and sup-port of one another’s needs (Wellman and Wortley 1990).

Proximity and face-to-face contact are positively associated with theexchange of household and other services (Wellman and Wortley 1990).Co-residence gives husbands and wives person-specific informationabout household routines, personal needs, and preferences (Treas 1993).Living together lowers the transaction costs of assistance. A husbandcan buy a few items on the way home from work. Others must make anextra trip to the shut-in’s home. On the downside, co-residence poses thepossibility of shared risks (Pollak 1985). If both partners are immobi-lized by the flu or struggling with the same depressing issues, the spousemay not be able to help.

To sum up, many factors favor spouses as first responders in time ofpersonal trouble. To the extent that married couples specialize, however,a husband may lack the gender-specific skills and related motivations toaugment or substitute for his wife’s labor. Gender specialization in mar-riage, we have argued, may give an edge to some of the many otherswho can provide assistance.

Gender Specialization: Couples and Countries

Research on the household division of labor has emphasized its micro-leveldeterminants, such as time availability or relative resources. Recent studiespoint to cross-national differences in the degree of gender specialization(Batalova and Cohen 2002; Fuwa 2004; Geist 2005; Yodanis 2005; Hook2006). As an ideal representation of work, family, and gender relations(Blair-Loy and Frankel 2005), the single-earner model of domestic life is

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embraced in conservative welfare states like Germany (Fuwa 2004; Geist2005). More egalitarian arrangements prevail in the social democraticcountries of Scandinavia. The societal context also conditions the relationof micro-level variables with the division of housework. Wife’s full-timeemployment matters more for household task sharing in countries withgreater gender parity in the political and economic spheres (Fuwa 2004).

Cross-national differences in public opinion on the appropriate rolesfor men and women are well documented (Alwin, Braun and Scott1992; Treas and Widmer 2000). Culture provides cognitive models toguide and rationalize behavior (Hitlin and Piliavin 2004). For example,where it is dominant, the breadwinner-homemaker model offers a convenient, off-the-shelf means of organizing one’s own domestic life.Ready-made cultural practices minimize the transaction costs (conflict,negotiations, trial-and-error) that personalized arrangements require(Treas 1993). Bolstering cultural templates, societal institutions supportdominant, taken-for-granted models of family life. This raises the costsand lowers the rewards of alternative family arrangements. Sendingchildren home at mid-day, Swiss schools presume stay-at-home mothers(Charles, Buchmann, Halebsky, Powers and Smith 2001). The lunch andafter-hours programs at American schools presume that mothers workfor pay outside the home. Dominant practices have both pragmatic andnormative currency. They offer efficiencies, and they are seen as morallyright and appropriate to emulate.

Within countries, public opinion is an indicator of the relative fre-quency of contact with individuals who hold, say, traditional gender val-ues. Contacts influence an individual’s attitudes and behaviors by virtueof social comparison processes (Festinger 1954) or the availability ofparticular reference groups (Kelley 1952; Merton 1957). As broad con-ceptions of desirable outcomes, personal values influence behavior(Hitlin and Piliavin 2004) although the link between attitudes and actionis generally weak (Ajzen and Fishbein 1997). Values that are importantto the self are more likely to be expressed in congruent behavior(Verplanken and Holland 2002). Because gender identity is central toself identity, it is not surprising that holding “traditional” gender atti-tudes is associated with a traditional, i.e., specialized, division of house-hold labor (Coltrane 2000).

Hypotheses and Rationale

Gender specialization implies that spouses develop different skill sets,motivations, and personal stakes in doing or avoiding various gender-typed

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activities. These differences work against their augmenting or substitutingfor one another’s labor. People in gender-specialized marriages areexpected to be more likely to turn to kin or others, rather than to spouse,for assistance in everyday life. Both individual and country-level indicatorsof gender specialization are expected to be associated with the choice ofhusband, kin, or others for household help or emotional support. Theanalysis focuses on women for three reasons: 1) Men virtually alwayschoose their wives for household assistance. 2) A number of married mensaid they talked to no one about their feelings – substantiating the assertionthat emotion work is not a traditional male skill. 3) Men are, if anything,more specialized than women, as they are less likely to take on the house-hold tasks associated with the opposite gender (Bianchi, Robinson andMilkie 2006).

Based on the discussion above, two individual-level hypotheses testwhether specialization works against spousal assistance.

1) The more the wife works for pay, the more likely she is to favor herhusband over kin and others for help.

Working wives have less specialized marriages than do women who donot work for pay. When the full-time homemaker needs extra help withhousework, she will be less likely to turn to her husband. Presumably,he will have little housekeeping experience and will lack the skills andmotivating feelings of competence and responsibility for domestictasks.2) If there are children in the household, the wife will be less likely to

turn to the husband for help than if there are no children.As research shows, children lead husband and wife to take on more“traditional” gender roles. Because this specialization means thehusband will have limited experience and felt-obligation for “woman’swork,” the wife is expected to turn elsewhere for casual support andassistance.

At the country-level, hypotheses predict that greater gender special-ization at the societal level will influence the choice of helper, net of thewife’s characteristics and the couple’s degree of specialization.3) Wives who reside in a country where husbands participate more in

female-typed household tasks will be more likely to rely on thehusband for help than wives in countries where husbands partici-pate less.

As discussed above, the dominant model of domestic arrangements in acountry will influence attitudes and behavior, either via social compari-son or reference group processes.

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4) Wives who reside in a country where public opinion is more liberalregarding women’s work and family roles will be more likely to relyon husbands for help than wives in countries with less liberal publicopinion.

Public opinion on the appropriate roles for women indicates the degreeof support for gender specialization. Public opinion influences individ-ual attitudes. Attitudes, particularly those tapping salient values likegender, will influence behavioral choices.

Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to theorize control vari-ables, previous research points to factors to be considered in a study ofthe division of labor between husband and wife. Specialization has beennegatively linked to the wife’s education, reflecting her resources inhousehold bargaining or the gender egalitarian influences of higher edu-cation (Shelton and John 1996; Coltrane 2000). Being negatively asso-ciated with husband’s participation in household labor (Coltrane 2000),age captures cohort or age differences (Artis and Pavalko 2003). Kinavailability is also controlled, because close family members are theleading alternatives to relying on a spouse. In addition to having a sur-viving mother and adult child, not having been residentially mobileincreases contact with kin (Fischer 1982).

Data and Methods

This paper analyzes the 2001 Social Networks Survey data from theInternational Social Survey Program (ISSP). This analysis covers 26countries, including Australia, Austria, Brazil, Chile, Czech Republic,Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (East and West), GreatBritain, Hungary, Israel, Japan, Latvia, New Zealand, Northern Ireland,Norway, The Philippines, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland,and the United States. Countries were limited to those also participatingin a 2002 ISSP survey, the source of macro-level indicators. The ISSP isconducted by independent organizations in member countries, often aspart of on-going studies. There are sampling differences, but the surveysare intended to be representative of national populations. The responserate (interviews completed for eligible cases) averaged 56.9% over the23 countries that provided necessary data to calculate responses (Kleinand Harkness 2001).

Respondents are women, 18–65, who were married or, according tothe conventions of a few countries, “living as married.” The very few

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married women who named no potential helpers or no confidantes areexcluded. Pooling across countries yields an effective sample of 7823.Because country samples are small, ranging from 103 in East Germanyto 478 in Russia, caution is advised in evaluating estimates on particularcountries, but the multi-level models are robust. We report weighted data.

Dependent variables come from two items in the 2001 ISSP: “First,suppose you had the ’flu and had to stay in bed for a few days andneeded help around the house, with shopping and so on. Who wouldyou turn to first for help?” “Now suppose you felt just a bit down ordepressed, and you wanted to talk about it. Who would you turn tofirst for help?” Responses were recoded into three categories –spouse, kin, and non-kin other. The wife’s work status (full-time,part-time, not employed/homemaker) is an indicator of gender spe-cialization. Preliminary analyses show that husband’s availability(i.e., employment status) is unrelated to the choice of helper. Thepresence of a child, 0–17, in the household also reflects on the degreeof specialization, consistent with parents’ more traditional domesticarrangements. The data do not permit us to distinguish between smallchildren who raise the demand for housekeeping and older ones whosupply help. Dummy variables indicate whether or not the woman hasa surviving mother, has an adult child, and has moved after age 17from the community where she was born.

Two country-level measures relating to gender specialization, bothstandardized by sex, are constructed from the 2002 ISSP Family andGender survey. Attitude toward gender specialization is measured withfive Likert-type attitudinal items: 1) A preschool child is likely to sufferif his or her mother works, 2) All in all, family life suffers when awoman has a full-time job, 3) A job is alright, but what women reallywant is a home and children, 4) Being a housewife is just as fulfilling asworking for pay, and 5) A man’s job is to earn money; A woman’s jobis to look after the home and family. The country-specific mean – withhigher values meaning more liberal views of gender roles – is derivedfrom a factor analysis for male and female respondents (alpha = .67).Parity in the division of household tasks is the country-specific mean,reported by married men and women, 18–65, for a scale of who doesfive female-typed, household chores. The chores are laundry, cleaning,grocery shopping, caring for sick family members, and meal prepara-tion. Responses are recoded to “1” (always the woman) to “5” (alwaysthe man). Omitting cases with responses on fewer than three items, thescale score is their summed value divided by the number of items withcomplete data.

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For each dependent variable, we first consider the results for aweighted, baseline model of the micro-level independent variables.The dependent variable is a set of unordered categories (husband, kin,other). A multinomial model simultaneously considers the likelihoodsof turning to kin versus husband and others versus husband. Then, wetest whether these likelihoods vary as a function of country-specificindicators of gender specialization. Using HLM software, multinomialhierarchical models estimate the individual-level model as well asincorporating the country-level variables in a macro-level model(Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). HLM multinomial logistic models per-mit the individual-level predictors to have different associations withthe probabilities of turning to kin versus husband and others versushusband (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). For each country, HLM pro-vides empirical Bayes estimates of the predicted preference for kinversus husband and others versus husband, net of controls. The Bayescoefficients for independent variables are similar to coefficients froma multinomial logistic model with a dummy variable for each country(Raudenbush and Bryk 2002), but HLM uses information from thetotal sample to produce estimates for each country that are closer tothe mean effects.

The multinomial logit link yields a pair of equations at the individual level:

η1ij = β0j(1) + βkj(1)Xkij,

η2ij = β0j(2) + βkj(2)Xkij.

where η1ij is the log-odds of respondent i turning to her kin in countryj (relative to husband), βkj(1)Xkij are individual-level independent vari-ables for the log-odds of turning to kin, η2ij is the log-odds of turning toothers (relative to husband) in country j and βkj(2)Xkij are individual-levelindependent variables. Because individual-level variables are centeredat their grand means, the effect of, say, age, is the deviation it producesfrom the overall log-odds of turning to kin versus husband (or othersversus husband) for a married woman with average characteristics onthe other individual-level variables. Each respondent’s log-odds equalher country-specific intercept.

The country-level equation predicts the log-odds of turning to kin ver-sus husband (β0j(1)) or others versus husband (β0j(2)) as a function of thecountry-level measures of public opinion and domestic arrangements withall individual-level characteristics fixed. The equation takes the form:

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β0j(1) = γ00(1) + γ0k(1)Wkj + u0j(1),

β0j(2) = γ00(2) + γ0k(2)Wkj + u0j(2).

where γ00(1) is the country-level log-odds of turning to kin (versushusband) in a “typical country,” γ0k(1)Wkj are a vector of controls, γ00(2)

is the log-odds of turning to others (versus husband) in a “typicalcountry,” γ0k(2)Wkj are control variables for the log-odds of turning toothers versus husband, and u0j(1) and u0j(2) are random effects at thecountry level for turning to kin versus husband or others versushusband, respectively. With the error term included, HLM producespredicted values for the intercept of the typical country (i.e., averagedover all countries). All individual- and country-level predictors arecentered at their grand means.

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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: Married Women, 18–65, in 26 Countries, 2001

Variables N Mean S.D. Min Max

Dependent VariablesHousework

Husband 7823 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00Kin 7823 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00Other 7823 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00

Emotional supportHusband 7823 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00Kin 7823 0.24 0.42 0.00 1.00Other 7823 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00

Independent VariablesIndividual-level

Full-time work 7823 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00Part-time work 7823 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00Children under 18 7823 0.57 0.49 0.00 1.00Age 7823 42.84 11.52 18.00 65.00Education (logged) 7823 2.37 0.41 0.00 3.18Mother living 7823 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00Adult child living 7823 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00Mobility 7823 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00

Country-levelHousehold task parity 26 2.08 0.16 1.66 2.38Liberal attitudes 26 0.43 0.47 −0.53 1.28

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Husband Other Kin

Figure 2. Distribution of Turning First to Husband, Other, or Kin for Emotional Support: Married Women, 18–65, in 26 countries, 2001

Findings

In the pooled sample, three-fourths of married women say they turn totheir husband first for household help when they are sick (Table 1).Women who do not turn to their husbands for household help almostalways rely on family members rather than non-kin others. When they aredepressed, half of women talk to their husband first. The rest are evenly split.About a quarter of all women opt for kin and another quarter for others.Figures 1 and 2 show the country-to-country variation in the percent of wiveswho rely on husbands. As seen in Figure 1, although 95% in Norway turn firstto the husband for household help, only 47% in Chile do. As for emotional sup-port, the numbers in Figure 2 range from 74% in Norway to 35% in Latvia.The Spearman rank order correlation of .70 indicates that countries wherewomen rely on husbands for housework tend to be ones where they look tothem for emotional support, too.

Help Around the House

In Table 2, we consider the choice of household helper. Model 1 showsthe association of individual-level variables with the choices of kin ver-sus husband and others versus husband. With homemakers as the omit-ted reference category, wives with full-time employment, an indicator oflow gender specialization, are predictably less reliant on kin (left panel,p < .001) and on others (right panel, p < .05) as opposed to the husband.Part-time employment does not differ significantly from homemaking atthe .05 level. Minor children, who are known to prompt gender special-ization, are also associated with greater reliance on kin as compared tohusband (p < .001). Children are unrelated to relying on others versushusband, however. Age is not statistically significant for the choice ofkin over husband. Net of kin availability, however, older women aremore likely (p < .05) to choose non-kin others, perhaps paid helpers, forhousehold assistance. Wife’s education is not statistically significant. Asexpected, the likelihood of turning to family members rather thanhusband for household help is significantly higher when the woman hasa surviving mother (p < .001) or an adult child (p < .001). An adult childis negatively associated (p < .05) with choosing others over husband. Awife’s residential mobility is negatively associated (p < .001) withchoosing kin, but not non-kin, over the husband.

Macro-level variables are added in Model 2. Controlling for the individual-level variables, women in countries where husbands, on aver-age, perform more of the “feminine” household tasks are significantly less

TREAS: THE DILEMMA OF GENDER SPECIALIZATION 273

likely (p < .001) to turn to kin over husband for household assistance.There is no significant association between the degree of task-sharing ina country and the wife’s choice of others rather than husband. In countrieswith more liberal attitudes on gender roles, respondents are, as hypothe-sized, less likely to favor either kin or others over husband. At the bottomof Table 2, the components of the between-country variance show thattaking account of individual-level differences can explain 16% of the vari-ance (.725 − .606)/.725 for the choice of kin versus husband and 5% forothers versus husband. With individual-level variables controlled, country-level indicators further reduce the variance—explaining 59% (kin versushusband) and 40% (others versus husband). Country-level variables arequite important, but the model better accounts for the helping patterns forkin versus husband than for non-kin others versus husband.

Emotional Support

Table 3 considers the person the wife talks to when feelingdepressed. For individual-level variables, wives who work full-time

274 RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 20(3)

Table 2. Odds Ratios of Turning to Kin and Other versus Husband forHousehold Help: Married Women, 18–65, in 26 Countries, 2001

Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2

Variables Kin vs. Husband Other vs. Husband

Intercept 0.252*** 0.247*** 0.243*** 0.031*** 0.029*** 0.029***Individual-level

Full-time work 0.707*** 0.711*** 0.677* 0.679*Part-time work 0.894 0.899 0.823 0.833Children 1.372*** 1.373*** 0.945 0.940Age 0.994 0.995 1.024* 1.025*Education (logged) 0.845 0.852 0.793 0.811Mother living 1.200*** 1.200*** 1.270 1.282Adult child living 1.610*** 1.605*** 0.629* 0.623*Mobility 0.662*** 0.662*** 1.196 1.185

Country-levelHousehold task parity 0.143*** 0.556Liberal attitudes 0.377*** 0.293***

Variance ComponentsIntercept variance 0.725*** 0.606*** 0.249*** 0.800*** 0.761*** 0.460***Variance explained 16% 59% 5% 40%

Significance level (one-tail): * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, N = 7823

for pay are again less likely (p < .001) than homemakers to favor kininstead of husband. With non-kin others, full-time workers are notsignificantly different from homemakers, but women who work part-time are more likely than homemakers to choose non-kin over thehusband (p < .05). Predictably, minor children are associated withhigher odds of choosing confidantes who are family members (p <.001) or non-kin others (p < .001) over the husband. Older womenare more likely (p < .05) to turn to someone besides the husband foremotional support. Better educated women are less likely (p < .05)to talk about problems with kin rather than the husband, but educa-tion is not significantly associated with the choice of others. Havinga surviving mother or an adult child is associated with a preferencefor kin over husband (p < .001). The availability of these relatives isunrelated to the choice of others over the spouse. Mobility is associ-ated with a lower likelihood of favoring relatives (but not others)over the husband for emotional support (< .001).

At the country level, parity in household chores was relevant for thechoice of household helper, but it is not significantly related to the preference

TREAS: THE DILEMMA OF GENDER SPECIALIZATION 275

Table 3. Odds Ratios of Turning to Kin and Other versus Husband forEmotional Support: Married Women, 18–65, in 26 Countries, 2001

Variables Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2

Kin vs. Husband Kin vs. Husband Other vs. Husband

Intercept 0.421*** 0.416*** 0.410*** 0.464*** 0.464*** 0.462***Individual-level

Full-time work 0.740*** 0.747*** 1.082 1.082Part-time work 0.850 0.859 1.262* 1.260*Children 1.352*** 1.348*** 1.309*** 1.310***Age 1.010* 1.010* 1.011* 1.011*Education (logged) 0.716* 0.741* 0.878 0.875Mother living 1.372*** 1.376*** 1.010 1.009Adult child living 1.415*** 1.406*** 1.091 1.093Mobility 0.782*** 0.780*** 0.986 0.986

Country-levelHousehold task parity 0.783 0.876Liberal attitudes 0.493*** 0.758*

Variance ComponentsIntercept variance 0.263*** 0.232*** 0.135*** 0.157*** 0.166*** 0.161***Variance explained 12% 42% 0% 3%

Significance level (one-tail): * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001, N = 7823

for emotional supporter. More liberal public opinion on gender roles,however, translates into weaker preference for emotional support from kin(p < .001), but also from others (p < .05), as compared to the husband. Forkin versus husband, the country-level variables explain a substantial share(42%) of the variance between the countries after individual-level factorsare controlled. In contrast to household help, the variance componentsshow that the model accounts for little of the preference to turn to non-kinothers rather than the husband for emotional help.

Conclusion

The downside of gender specialization in the household is that the laborof husbands and wives is not completely interchangeable. Partners can-not always substitute for one another, nor can they readily augment oneanother’s labor. Couples where the wife works for pay deviate from theextreme gender specialization of separate spheres. As hypothesized,wives’ full-time paid employment is associated with a lower likelihoodthat women will rely on kin instead of their husband for help around thehouse. Although we lack individual-level measures of the husband’shousehold work to parallel the wife’s market work, the results arelargely consistent with the argument that specialization in the householddivision of labor reduces the substitutability of labor. Other individual-level variables known to be associated with specialization also predict towhom a woman will turn. Couples with minor children, for example, areknown to take on more conventional (i.e., specialized) gender roles. Ouranalysis shows that women living with minor children are, indeed, morelikely to favor their kin over their husband for household help as well asemotional support.

Country-level characteristics matter more than do individual onessuch as the woman’s labor force status, as shown by the variance com-ponents for macro-level and micro-level variables. Just living in a coun-try where public opinion and predominant household practices rejectstrict gender specialization is associated with a significantly lower like-lihood that women will favor kin or others over the husband for helparound the house. Of course, low household specialization may wellreflect a country-level labor demand for gender substitution (say, as evi-denced by women’s high levels of education, employment, and repre-sentation in traditionally male occupations).

Overall, the husband is the generally preferred provider when assis-tance is needed. In 25 of 26 countries studied, women look first to their

276 RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 20(3)

husband to help out around the house when they are sick. In 17 countries,they look first to their mate for emotional support. Wanting a spouse’sassistance is consistent with the “hierarchical compensatory model,”which posits ordered preferences for caregivers based on the primacy ofthe relationship (Cantor 1979). It also squares with the “task-specific”model, which assumes particular tasks favor helpers whose characteris-tics map to the demands of the task itself (Litwak 1985; Messeri,Silverstein and Litwak 1993). The task-specific model explicitly recog-nizes that tasks requiring a high level of technical knowledge and a com-plex division of labor argue against informal supports like family andfriends (Messeri, Silverstein and Litwak 1993). Our analysis of house-hold gender specialization—with its implications for skill sets and per-formance motivations—suggests that staffing dilemmas can also beposed even by low-tech tasks with only a two-person division of labor.

Strict gender specialization in marriage partitions skill sets and moti-vations of husbands and wives and, thus, favors reliance on same-sex kinand others. Because strict gender specialization has been on the decline,the gains to specialization are no doubt declining. In the U.S., marriedwomen’s labor force participation is now so common that women areincreasingly selected into marriage based on their wages (Sweeney2002). Married men have increased the time they spend in householdchores (Gershuny 2000). Men may now be selected into marriage basedon their potential contributions to housework, rather than merely ontheir earning power (Press 2004). Of course, gender complementaritiesmay well be increasing, as Becker speculated (1981). Men spend morehours in childcare than they used to (Bianchi and Mattingly 2004). Thisimplies that greater complementarities (that is, labor inputs from bothparents) are now required to raise children.

Gender specialization also flounders on the modern ideal of the com-panionate marriage, which holds that marital satisfaction depends onshared leisure time, joint decision-making, and a break-down of thesharply gendered division in domestic labor (Kalmijn and Bernasco2001). In an era of individualistic reflexivity, the distinction betweeninstrumental males and expressive females is outmoded (Parsons 1954).Emotional work, once a largely feminine skill, is increasingly demandedof husbands, because the intimacy of mutual disclosure is said to be thehallmark of satisfied couples in “pure relationships” (Giddens 1992). Amarried woman’s happiness is found to depend not merely on her house-hold division of labor, but also on her satisfaction with the affection andunderstanding her husband shows her (Sanchez and Kane 1996; Wrightand Acquilino 1998; Wilcox and Nock 2006). Emotional intimacy makes

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extreme gender specialization problematic, not because partners mustsubstitute for one another’s labor, but rather because contemporary normsfor marriage call on them to reciprocate one another’s efforts in kind.

Acknowledgments

This research was supported by National Science Foundation grant # SES-0350814. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the ICS LustrumSymposium “Rational Choice Research: Empirical Insights, TheoreticalAdvances and Current Controversies,” Groningen, the Netherlands,November 10–11, 2006. The research assistance of Tsui-o Tai is gratefullyacknowledged. The paper also benefited from comments of Jacques Siegersand the reviewers of this journal, but errors and omissions are my own.

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JUDITH TREAS is Professor of Sociology at the University ofCalifornia, Irvine, where she directs the Center for Demographic andSocial Analysis. Her research, which focuses on the organization andmanagement of married and cohabiting unions, has critically examinedthe rational underpinnings of couples’ banking practices, sexual exclu-sivity, and outsourcing of domestic services. Her cross-nationalresearch on the division of household labor is supported by the NationalScience Foundation. With Jacqueline Scott and Martin Richards, sheedited The Blackwell Companion to the Sociology of the Family. She isPresident of the Pacific Sociological Association.

ADDRESS: Judith Treas, University of California, Irvine, SocialScience Plaza B 4291, Irvine, CA, 92617, USA [[email protected]].

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