Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR [J

The War Department

STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR COALITION WARFARE

1943-1944

by

Mawire Malloff

CENTER OF MIL/TAR!' !-I/STOR!'

UNITED STA TES A RNIl'

WASHING TON, D.C. , 1991

Foreword

Within a generation the attitude and policy of the United States towardalliances have undergone a revolutionary reversal. The nation has passedfrom its traditional suspicion and fear of "entangling alliances" to a policythat heavily stakes its security and interests on the co-operation of otherpowers. In World War I the U.S. Government cautiously defined its rela-tionship with the powers allied against Germany as that of an AssociatedPower. In World War II, though last to join the Grand Alliance, it virtu-ally integrated its resources with those of the British Commonwealth andco-ordinated its strategy and war aims with the British and the USSR inthe most powerful wartime partnership ever forged. Since 1945 it hasemerged as the leader in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)and has diligently sought allies and built up alliances all over the troubledworld. The climax of its most intensive experience with coalition strategycame in the phase of World War II described in this volume, which shouldtherefore have a special interest for all who are concerned with the impli-cations of the revolution in U.S. foreign policy that has taken place in thetwentieth century.

R. W. STEPHENSMaj. Gen., U. S. A.Chief of Mili tary History

30 April 1958Washington, D. C.

The Author

Dr. Maurice Matloff, graduate of Columbia College, holds M.A. andPh.D. degrees in History from Harvard University. A member of Phi BetaKappa and the American Historical Association's Committee on the His-torian and the Federal Government, he has taught History at BrooklynCollege and the University of Maryland and has presented papers and lec-tured on military strategy and international affairs before the Army WarCollege, the Navy War College, and the American Historical Association.While in the Army during World War II, he studied the Russian area andlanguage at Yale and served as an instructor in intelligence and as a historianin the AAF. In 1946 he joined the Operations Division historical projectin the War Department General Staff as a civilian member, becoming in1949 the Chief of the Strategic Plans Section, Office of the Chief of MilitaryHistory. Dr. Matloff is coauthor of Strategic Planning for Coalition War-fare: 1941-1942, and his articles and reviews on modern strategy and state-craft have frequently appeared in various service and professional journals.

Preface

This volume, like its predecessor, Strategic Planning for Coalition War-fare, 1941-1942, is a contribution to the study of wartime national planningand military strategy. The 1941-42 volume, of which the present authorwas coauthor, told the story of plans and decisions as they affected themissions and dispositions of the U.S. Army in the defensive phase of coali-tion warfare, when the Grand Alliance was still in its formative stage.

The present volume deals with strategic planning in the midwar erafrom January 1943 through the summer of 1944. This is the story of thehopes, fears, struggles, frustrations, and triumphs of the Army strategicplanners coming to grips with the problems of the offensive phase of coali-tion warfare. Basic to this story is the account of planning by GeneralGeorge C. Marshall and his advisers in the great debate on European strategywhich followed the Allied landings in North Africa and continued to thepenetration of the German frontier in September 1944. During this periodthe great international conferences from Casablanca in January 1943 to thesecond Quebec in September 1944 were held and the Allies formulated thegrand strategy of military victory. The volume follows the plans, issues,and decisions to the end of the summer of 1944, when the problems ofwinning the war began to come up against the challenges of victory andpeace, and a new era was beginning for the Army Chief of Staff and hisadvisers.

The presentation utilizes both the narrative and the analytical approach.It sets forth the principal steps in the development of the American strategiccase, and seeks the raison d'tre behind that case. It attempts to view,through the eyes of the Washington high command, the war as a whole andin its main component parts. The method is to trace the plans, concepts,and ideas of the planners up through the different levelsArmy, jointstaff (Army and Navy), Joint Chiefs of Staff, the meetings of the Americanstaff with the President, and of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the plenarysessions with President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister WinstonS. Churchill. The chronological and structural framework for the studyis provided by the big conferences, Casablanca (January 1943), TRIDENT(Washington, May 1943), Quebec (August 1943), Cairo-Tehran (Novem-ber-December 1943), and the second Quebec (September 1944). The pe-riods between the conferences are generally divided into chapters treatingthe planning for the war against Germany and that against Japan separ-ately and topically. At the conferences themselves, where the Allied

planning threads converge and new syntheses emerge from the debates,compromises, decisions, and revisions, the focus is placed on the advocates ofthe American military caseespecially on General Marshall.

The purpose of this volume is to add to the literature available for thestudy of U.S. strategic planning. Related objects are to shed light on theAmerican contributions to and experience in a great wartime coalition andon the art of strategy, the art of the calculated risk, as it developed in WorldWar II. No attempt has been made to cover in full the position of otherpartners in the Grand Alliance. That of the British and other English-speaking allies is being disclosed in accounts that they are publishing.Whether the Russians and Chinese will ever publish full, definitive ac-counts of their strategy is problematical. Considerable information aboutAmerican strategy is contained in books that have been written about theUnited States in World War II, but much of it lies scattered in accountsof important decisions, theaters, and campaigns. And unfortunately, despitea flood of personal recollections of World War II, of the two principal actorson the American side, President Roosevelt did not leave any memoirs andGeneral Marshall has yet to write his. It is hoped that this account, infilling some of the gaps in the available literature, will help those readersespecially in need of organized information in this fieldstaff officers, civilofficers, diplomatic historians, and political scientists.

In writing this volume the author acknowledges most gratefully assistancefrom many of the persons mentioned in the Preface to the preceding volume,notably his former colleagues, Dr. Ray S. Cline, author of WashingtonCommand Post: The Operations Division, who introduced him to this field,and, along with Lt. Col. Darrie H. Richards, bequeathed a legacy of ideasand information; Mr. Edwin M. Snell, his collaborator on the 1941-42volume, who provided stimulating discussions during the processes of plan-ning and composition and offered valuable suggestions upon reading thetext in manuscript; and Miss Alice M. Miller and Mrs. Helen McShaneBailey who gave unstinted help with wartime planning documents.

The author owes a great debt to Mr. Walter G. Hermes, whose assistancehas been invaluable. Mr. Hermes investigated many topics essential to thecompletion of the volume, particularly in the field of strategy and planningin the conflict with Japan. He assembled and analyzed much statisticalinformation, reviewed for the author countless passages and references, andhis broad knowledge and precise understanding of the records kept by theArmy are reflected throughout the volume.

A great measure of thanks is due to Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, whogave unstintingly of his time, counsel, and scholarly craftsmanship. Othersin the Office of the Chief of Military History who were especially helpfulwere Drs. Stetson Conn and Louis Morton, Colonels George G. O'Connorand Ridgway P. Smith, Jr., Drs. Richard M. Leighton and Robert W.Coakley, and Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland. He is especiallyindebted to Miss Mary Ann Bacon, who gave the volume a sympathetic,perceptive, and watchful editing throughout and shepherded it skillfully

x

through the various stages to publication. For their generous help hewishes to thank the many records experts who aided himnotably MissWava Phillips, Mrs. Hazel Ward, Mr. Israel Wice and his assistants, andMr. Herman Kahn and his staff at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.Copy editing was done by Mrs. Marion P. Grimes, selection of picturesby Miss Margaret E. Tackley, and indexing by Virginia C. Leighton. Creditfor maintaining a correct text of the manuscript through repeated revisionsis due particularly to two highly capable secretariesMrs. Ella May Ablahatand Mrs. Edna W. Salsbury.

The author is also obliged to those others who read all or parts of thetext in manuscriptto Professors William L. Langer and Charles H.Taylor of Harvard University; to Professor Samuel F. Bemis of. YaleUniversity; to Professor Wesley F. Craven of Princeton University, coeditorof the series, The Army Air Forces in World War II; to Dr. Harvey A. DeWeerd of the Rand Corporation; to Maj. Gen. Frank N. Roberts, whoencouraged the author in th i s undertaking from the beginning; to GeneralAlbert C. Wedemeyer, USA (Ret.); to Maj. Gen. Richard C. Lindsay, USAF;to Cols. William W. Bessell, Jr., George A. Lincoln, Edward M. Harris,William H. Baumer; and to other officers that figured, some of them promi-nently, in the events set forth.

A special category of thanks is reserved to my wife, Gertrude GlicklerMatloff, for her constant encouragement and understanding.

In no way does the recognition of individuals for the assistance theyhave so generously given imply that they have endorsed or approved theinterpretations presented herein. For these, as well as the rest of the book,I must bear the responsibility.

MAURICE MATLOFF

30 April 1958Washington, D.C.

Contents

Chapter PageINTRODUCTION: THE BASIS OF STRATEGY . . . . 1

T h e Grand Alliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1The "Europe First" Decision . . . . . . . . . . 9The Search for a Strategic Plan: 1941-42 . . . . . . 10

I. CASABLANCA-BEGINNING OF AN ERA: JANUARY1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8

T h e W a r Against Germany . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8The War Against Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . 30The "Unconditional Surrender" Announcement . . . . 37Casablanca i n Retrospect . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8

II. ADVANCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: JANUARY-M A Y 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3

Critical Shortages and the Battle of the Atlantic . . . . 43Windup of the African Campaign . . . . . . . . 50Rearming t h e French . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4Commitments to the Middle East . . . . . . . . . 58Command Changes: USAFIME, NATO, and ETO . . 60The Problem of the Neutrals: Spain and Turkey ... 63

III. THE SEARCH FOR A FORMULA . . . . . . . . . 68Role o f Airpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 0Limiting the Mediterranean Advance . . . . . . . . 72

IV. MOUNTING PRESSURES IN THE PACIFIC AND FAREAST: JANUARY-MAY 1943 . . . . . . . . . . 7 7

Stalemate i n Burma . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8T h e Three Demands . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2The Clash o f Personalities . . . . . . . . . . . 84Victory Through Airpower? . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7Planning f o r Pacific Operations . . . . . . . . . 8 8System of Command of Joint Operations . . . . . . 102

V. THE NEW LOOK IN STRATEGIC PLANNING . . . . 106Reorienting Staff Planning . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 6Strategy and the Manpower Problem . . . . . . . . 111Preparations and Rehearsal for TRIDENT . . . . . 120

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Chapter PageVI. THE TRIDENT CONFERENCE-NEW PATTERNS: MAY

1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 6Cross-Channel and Mediterranean Operations . . . . 126The Pacific and Far East . . . . . . . . . . . . 135T h e Balance Sheet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 3

VII. FROM HUSKY TO AVALANCHE: MAY-MID-AUGUST1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 6

Launching HUSKY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 6Planning Post-HUSKY Operations . . . . . . . . . 1 5 2

VIII. CROSSROADS IN THE EUROPEAN WAR . . . . . . 162Search for the Formula Continued . . . . . . . . 162Strategy, Production, and Manpower . . . . . . . . 179

IX. CURRENT PLANS AND FUTURE OPERATIONS INTHE WAR AGAINST JAPAN: JUNE-AUGUST 1943 185

Launching the Central Pacific Thrust . . . . . . . 185The SWPA Approach to the Philippines . . . . . . . 193Anticlimax a t Kiska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9 5T h e Assam Bottleneck . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9 6Air Operations and Command Problems in the CBI . . . 198Origins of the Southeast Asia Command . . . . . . . 201Sino-British Attitudes and Policies . . . . . . . . . 203Planning the Over-all War Against Japan . . . . . . 205

X. QUADRANT-SHAPING THE PATTERNS: AUGUST1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 1

Staff Planning and the President's Position . . . . . 211T h e Conferees Assemble . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 7Debating the Issues in the War Against Germany . . . 220Discussion on the War Against Japan . . . . . . . 230Emerging Strategic Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 0

XI. "THE MEDITERRANEAN AGAIN": AUGUST-NOVEMBER 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 4

Invasion o f Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 5Rome Versus Rhodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249The Balkans and Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . 259Mediterranean Build-up Versus OVERLORD . . . . . 262

XII. STRATEGY AND COMMAND IN THE WAR AGAINSTGERMANY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7 0

The Problem of Command Organization . . . . . . 270The Problem of Selecting a Supreme Commander forOVERLORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7 4

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Chapter PageXIII. BRITISH-AMERICAN PLANS AND SOVIET EXPECTA-

TIONS: AUGUST-NOVEMBER 1943 . . . . . . . 2 8 0The USSR in British-American Planning . . . . . . 281Establishment of the U.S. Military Mission to the USSR . 289T h e Moscow Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 9 1"Fish o r Cu t Bait" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303

XIV. STRATEGIC STRANDS IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN:AUGUST-NOVEMBER 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . 3 0 7

The Quest for Short Cuts . . . . . . . . . . . . 308The Progress of Pacific Operations . . . . . . . . 312Shipping, Deployment, and Rotation . . . . . . . . 317Build-up i n Burma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 1New Techniques and Weapons in the War Against Japan . 326

XV. FINAL REHEARSALS EN ROUTE TO CAIRO . . . . 334The JCS Re-examine Plans Against Japan . . . . . 335T h e President Reviews t h e Issues . . . . . . . . . 3 3 8

XVI. CAIRO-TEHRAN-A GOAL IS REACHED:NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1943 . . . . . . . . . . 3 4 7

Opening Skirmish at Cairo: 2226 November . . . . 347Climax at Tehran: 28 November-1 December 1943 . . 356Mop-up at Cairo: 3-7 December . . . . . . . . 369Staff Planning and the significance of SEXTANT . . . 383

XVII. STRATEGIC INVENTORY: DECEMBER 1943 . . . . 388Growth of the U.S. Army: 1943 . . . . . . . . . 388Expansion of the Army Overseas . . . . . . . . . 390T h e Tally Sheet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 9 7

XVIII. CONCENTRATION FOR THE BIG BLOW: JANUARY-M A Y 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0 2

Preparations f o r OVERLORD . . . . . . . . . . 4 0 3OVERLORD Planning and Mediterranean Options . . 412OVERLORD and the Unconditional Surrender Formula . 428

XIX. THE SECOND FRONT AND THE SECONDARY WAR-T H E CBI: JANUARY-MAY 1944 . . . . . . . . 4 3 3

T h e Consequences o f SEXTANT . . . . . . . . . 4 3 3The Fate o f SEAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437

The Mounting of the B-29 Offensive . . . . . . . 442T h e Battle o f t h e A i r Transports . . . . . . . . . 4 4 7T h e Decline o f t h e C B I . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4 9

XX. THE SECOND FRONT AND THE SECONDARY WAR-T H E PACIFIC: JANUARY-MAY 1944 . . . . . . . 4 5 1

T h e American Preserve . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5 1

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Chapter PageOptions in the Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . 453E n d o f a Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5 9O f Troops a n d Transports . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6 1E v e o f OVERLORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6 4

XXI. THE PROMISE OF MILITARY VICTORY: D DAY TOSEPTEMBER 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6 6

ANVIL-The Last Rounds . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6 6CBI-The Asiatic Holding Theater . . . . . . . . 475Target-Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7 9Strangulation o r Invasion? . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8 7

XXII. POLITICAL SHADOWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 9 0T h e Anglo-American Coalition . . . . . . . . . . 4 9 0T h e Soviet Ally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 9 7T h e French Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 0 1Relations With Other Nations . . . . . . . . . . 5 0 4

XXIII. OCTAGON-END O F A N E R A . . . . . . . . . . 5 0 8T h e Second Quebec Conference . . . . . . . . . 5 0 8Expansion and Distribution of U.S. Military Power . . . 518T h e Status o f Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 1

EPILOGUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3 2Completing the Strategic Patterns . . . . . . . . . 532The Challenges of Victory and Peace . . . . . . . . 538

Appendix

A. Staff Summary of Current and Projected Deployment of Ameri-can Versus British Forces, Prepared for the Cairo Conference . 541

B. SEXTANT and the Postwar Political Balance in AsiaA Reflection . 544C. Principals at the International ConferencesJanuary 1943-Sep-

tember 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4 6D. Shipment of Divisions OverseasJanuary 1942-September 1944 . 550E. Deployment to Principal Theaters31 December 1942-30 Sep-

tember 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5 5

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE AND GUIDE TO FOOTNOTES . . . 556

GLOSSARY O F ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6 4

GLOSSARY O F CODE NAMES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6 9

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7 5

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TablesNo. Page

I Tentative Schedule for Operations Against Japan, 1943-44 . . . 2072. Planning Schedule of Operations, 1944 . . . . . . . . . . 3773. Planners' Deployment Estimates of March 1943 and Actual Deploy-

ment of Forces 31 December 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . 3914. Army Overseas Deployment: 31 December 1942-31 December 1943 3925. U.S. Overseas Deployment: 31 December 1943 . . . . . . . . 398

Illustrations

The Anfa Hotel on the Outskirts of Casablanca . . . . . . . . . 19British and American Leaders a t Casablanca . . . . . . . . . . 22Generals Henri Giraud and Charles de Gaulle. . . . . . . . . . 38High-Ranking Trio in New Delhi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80The Federal Reserve Building, Washington, D.C. . . . . . . . . 127General Dwight D. Eisenhower and General Marshall . . . . . . . 154Lt . Gen. John E . Hull . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165Chteau Frontenac, Overlooking the St. Lawrence River . . . . . . 218Top Military Planners a t Quebec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219Members of U.S. and British Staffs, Quebec, 23 August 1943 . . . . . 222Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and General Marshall . . . . . 231General Arnold With Lord Louis Mountbatten . . . . . . . . . 237Roosevelt's Concept of Postwar Occupation Zones for Germany ... 341Aboard t h e President's Plane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4 5Mena House, Cairo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4 8T h e Pyramids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4 9Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Madame Chiang . . . . . . . 351The Big Three in Portico of the Soviet Legation, Tehran . . . . . 358The Combined Staffs Meeting in Mena House, 4 December 1943 . . . 368Ismet Inonu, the President o f Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . 379Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force . . . . . . . . 4 0 5General Marshall With General Douglas MacArthur . . . . . . . 454Visitors a t Normandy Beachhead, 12 June 1944 . . . . . . . . . 468President Roosevelt During Pearl Harbor Conference . . . . . . . 4 8 3Guard of Honor on Review at The Citadel . . . . . . . . . . 509Members o f Joint Planning Staff a t OCTAGON . . . . . . . . . . 517

All pictures in this volume are from Department of Defense files.

xvii

STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR

COALITION WARFARE

1943 -1944

INTRODUCTION

The Basis of Strategy

In the harried, gray days of December1942, just a year after the Japanese attackon Pearl Harbor, General George C.Marshall and his planning assistants inWashington were in a dilemma.1 Thewar was progressing well, but the Allieshad not yet worked out a strategy forvictory. They had checked the victorioussweeps of the Axis Powers in Europe andin the far Pacific and had themselvestaken the offensive. North Africa, Gua-dalcanal, Stalingradall pointed to aturning of the tide. The war between thetwo coalitions had reached a state ofstrategic equilibrium and, in a sense,both sides would be starting afresh andon more nearly equal terms. In the areaof strategic planning, the two close allies,Great Britain and the United States,would also have to begin anew. After afull year of war, the weight of U.S. forceswas beginning to be felt in the theaters.President Franklin D. Roosevelt andPrime Minister Winston S. Churchillhad turned down the one big militaryoperational idea advanced in 1942theWar Department proposal to forego op-portunities for immediate operations forthe sake of building up forces for anearly, direct, massive assault on Germany.

All signs pointed to the beginning of anew phase of global and coalition war-fare for the strategic planners. Clearly itwas time for taking stock.

The Grand Alliance

The year following Pearl Harbor, asthe United States geared itself to thewar it had not wanted, had been hectic,full of surprises and changes. Graduallythe planners, along with the rest of thenation, recovered from the initial shockof the Japanese attack. Pearl Harbor ex-posed weaknesses in America's peacetimepreparations for war, but it did not im-pair the major part of the planners' ad-vance work.2 The initial Japanese suc-cesses left unaffected the fundamentalprinciple already accepted in U.S. mili-tary policy that the European theater wasto be the decisive one in the global effort.They provided further support for the

1 General Marshall had been ordered to Washing-ton to serve as Assistant Chief of Staff, War PlansDivision in July 1938, and in October 1938 becameDeputy Chief of Staff. He was appointed Chiefof Staff in September 1939.

2 The fullest account of peacetime military pre-parations is contained in Mark Skinner Watson,Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations,UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II(Washington, Government Printing Office, 1950)(hereafter cited as Prewar Plans and Preparations).See also: (1) Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell,Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 19411942,UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II(Washington, Government Printing Office, 1953)(hereafter cited as Matloff and Snell, Strategic Plan-ning: 1941-1942), Chs. IIV; and (2) Maurice Mat-loff, "Prewar Military Plans and Preparations, 1939-41," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol.79, No. 7 (July 1953).

2 STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR COALITION WARFARE

basic political decision underlying U.S.strategic planning throughout WorldWar IIthat the war was to be waged asa coalition effort. Despite the criticalsituation in the Pacific, it remained theAmerican view that the basis of strategymust be collaboration among the powersat war with Germany, with the primaryobject of defeating Germany.

The Grand Alliance, forged in warand essentially for war purposes, emergedin 1941-42. The alliance was a warmarriage, a "marriage of expediency."3 Acommon bond of danger drew the UnitedStates, the United Kingdom, and theSoviet Union together in 1941, but eachmember of the Grand Alliance, as a re-sult of differing traditions, policies, inter-ests, geography, and resources, looked atthe European war through a separatepair of spectacles.

Great Britain

Great Britain, the island empire de-pendent upon sea lanes for its very exist-ence and situated precariously on theedge of Adolf Hitler's Festung Europa,was the first of the three partners to enterthe war against Germany. For centuriesit had put its faith in the balance ofpower. Great Britain could be expectedto seek to revive and rally the smallernations and to continue to throw itsweight against any strong power thatthreatened to upset the balance on theContinent. It could also be expected tointervene actively in the Mediterraneanand the Middle East, through which ranits life line to its empire in the Orient.Its economy, while highly industrialized,was, in comparison with that of the

United States, small scale. In any globalwar Great Britain's resources would bestretched thin. Britain was anxious toavoid a repetition of its heavy manpowerlosses in the land battles of World WarI. By necessity and choice, its leaders puttheir faith in the Navy, the Air Force,and mechanized and armored forcesrather than in huge armies of infantry.Experienced in war, diplomacy, and em-pire, Great Britain had a long history ofalliances with European powers, and itsmilitary leaders were accustomed toworking closely with its politicians anddiplomats. Even though Britain wasfighting with its back to the wall whenthe United States entered the war,British military strategy and politicalstrategy paralleled each other whereverpossible.

Reduced to their fundamentals,British political aims toward occupiedEurope were twofold and, as it turnedout, somewhat contradictory. For the im-mediate future the British sought to en-courage resistance and rebellion; but, inthe long run, once the cancer of Hitler-ism had been excised from the Euro-pean body politic, the British hoped fora general return, with appropriate re-forms, to the status quo ante bellum.

The Soviet Union

The USSR, second of the three part-ners to become involved in the struggleagainst Germany, was a land power withcompletely internal lines of communi-cation. Though it possessed an enormouspopulation and great resources, its in-dustrial development was still incom-plete. Lacking air and naval traditions,it put its faith in geography, in the en-durance and loyalty of its people, and in

3 John R. Deane, The Strange Alliance (NewYork, The Viking Press, 1947), pp. 319-20.

THE BASIS OF STRATEGY 3

the massive Red Army in the desperatebattle of survival.

The Soviet Union represented a new,restless, and dynamic force, devoted to apolitical and economic ideology differentfrom that of its Western partners. InWestern eyes, the Soviet Government,born in revolution and come to powerduring a civil and foreign war, had de-veloped into a baffling hybrida combi-nation of Russian National Socialism,Marxist concepts, and policies and prac-tices lingering from czarist days. Dedi-cated to the proposition that war wasinevitable in capitalist society until theworld revolution ushered in a new mil-lenial order, Bolshevism lived in an un-declared state of war with the capitalistworld.

Today, as we get more perspective onthe role of the Soviet Union in WorldWar II, it becomes evident that theperiod of Soviet defensive struggleagainst Germany was merely a pause intwin drives for security and expansion.Both drives appear to have been at workin its war with Finland, and even in theuneasy period of its nonaggression pactwith Hitler. One of the main reasons forthe break with the Fuehrer was the ag-gressive action of the Soviet Union inpushing farther west in Europein as-serting its claims on the Balkansa movethat Hitler, confronted with a stubbornBritain on the west, considered toodangerous to countenance. Until theRussians were attacked by Hitler inJune 1941, therefore, their military effortcan be characterized as warfare in pur-suit of aggrandizement. The German in-vasion simply reinforced Russia's historicdesire to strengthen its position in easternEurope, an objective that it never lostsight of in World War II. However, for

almost two years after the German at-tack, the Soviet Union was engaged in afight for its very existence and, whilepolitical and territorial ambitions wereby no means absent, military considera-tions were more immediately paramount.Still fearful of capitalist encirclement,suspicious of friend and foe alike, itwould occupy an uneasy position in thepartnership that Maj. Gen. John R.Deane so fittingly entitled "The StrangeAlliance."

The United States

And then there was the United Statesyoung, impatient, rich in resources,highly industrialized, the country withthe technical "know-how." It was to haveits greatest experience in coalition war-fare. This was the country whose wholehabit in war had been first to declare,then to prepare. Traditionally opposedto becoming involved in Europeanquarrels, the United States neverthelesshad strong bonds of culture, language,and tradition with western Europe, espe-cially with England. The American ap-proach to European war, based on itsexperience in World War I, seemed tobe to hold off as long as possible, enteronly long enough to give the bully orbullies who started it a sound thrashing,get the boys home, and then try to re-main as uninvolved as before. To mostAmericans war was an aberration, anunwelcome disturber of normalcy.

The American disillusionment withthe outcome of World War I in Europehad had its effects. Between World WarI and World War II the national policywas deeply influenced by popular beliefsthat the United States should neitherenter military alliances nor maintain


forces capable of offensive action. Thetwenty lean years of economy betweenthe wars sapped the strength of the Mili-tary Establishment. Yet the legalistic-moral strain that, historically, has so in-fluenced the American approach toforeign affairs remained strong. If onlythe nations of the world would subscribeto principles of justice and morality,agree to disarm, and outlaw war, allwould be well with the world. This ideal-istic strain, reflected in Wilsonianpolicies toward Europe during and afterWorld War I, became imbedded in thepragmatism of President Roosevelt andwas to emerge in his foreign policies inWorld War II.

Between 1939 and 1941 the country,under the leadership of President Roose-velt, gradually awakened to the dangersfrom without. Mobilization of manpowerand resources was begun. In 1940 theSelective Service Act was passed. Aid toBritain became official national policy inthe same year. Lend-lease was extendedto Britain and to other friendly powersin 1941. The strategic planners in Wash-ington, laying aside their earlier aca-demic exercises, widened their horizonsand began to think in terms of globaland coalition warfareto take into ac-count the rising danger of war withJapan and the reassertion of Germanimperialist aims.4

In the uneasy transition from peace towarperhaps the most difficult of all

periods for strategic plannersthe plan-ning staffs were faced with myriad un-knowns. There was uncertainty aboutthe future temper and will of the Ameri-can people toward war. There was adearth of accurate and comprehensiveintelligence not only concerning poten-tial enemies but even with reference tofriendly powersGreat Britain, France,and the USSR. Little, for example, wasknown about the Soviet Union's capabili-ties and intentions in 1941a conditionthat was to obtain throughout the war.In fact, on the eve of Pearl Harbor, theU.S. military staff seriously doubted theability of the Russians to continue as anactive participant in the war againstGermany.

The staffsin accord with their tradi-tionskept aloof in the prewar periodfrom controversies over national policies,even though they did not always agreewith the President's words and actions.The President, on his part, in 1939, 1940,and 1941 broadened his knowledge ofmilitary affairs to include Army and Airplans, as well as Navy strategy with whichhe had been more familiar in the past.But he did not commit himself irrevoc-ably to the planners' war plans, nor didhe immediately seek to influence thestrategic ideas of the staffs. The dissocia-tion of war plans from the President'spolicy limited their immediate practicalvalue, but in the long run there wereimportant advantages in the loose rela-tionship. It permitted the military plan-ners a good deal of freedom to discusswith British officers the possible ways ofusing U.S. forces in coalition strategywithout seriously committing the admin-istration. For the first time in its history,the United States entered a war consider-ably advanced in its military planning.

4 For a discussion of American prewar strategicplanning culminating in the evolution of the RAIN-BOW plans, see: (1) Matloff and Snell, StrategicPlanning: 1941-42, Chs. I-III; (2) Watson, PrewarPlans and Preparations, Ch. IV; (3) Stetson Connand Byron Fairchild, The Framework of HemisphereDefense, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLDWAR II (Washington, Government Printing Office,1959).


By successive stages the nation madethe transition from the status of majorsupplier or "arsenal of democracy" tooutright military collaboration withGreat Britain. As a result, when Japanattacked Pearl Harbor, the entry of theUnited States into the war, in Europe aswell as in the Pacific, was a natural stepfor which both Great Britain and theUnited States were more or less ready.But because of the attack on Pearl Har-bor, Japan appeared to many Americansto be the more natural enemy. TheUnited States had extensive interests inthe Far East and a tradition of helpingChina. Even neutralist sentiment wasready to tolerate a war against Japan.Throughout World War II the UnitedStates military staff and the Presidentcould never neglect the war in the East.This compulsion must be kept in mind,for it was to play an important part inthe relations among the Big Three andin the strategy for the defeat of Germany.Given its domestic politics, and theadded pressure of the war with Japan,it did not seem that the United Statescould fight a long war in Europe. AsGeneral Marshall once succinctly put it,"a democracy cannot fight a Seven Years'War."5

The Big Three

These, then, were the three powersthat gradually, under the necessity ofwar, came together. The inner web oftheir alliance was the close relationshipbetween the United States and GreatBritain. The Soviet Union's part in de-veloping and directing the combined

strategy of the war was to be relativelysmall for at least two reasons. Despite itsimportant role in defeating Germany, itsstrategic problem was simple when com-pared with the world-wide demands fac-ing the United States and Great Britain.Unlike the Western partners, the USSRwould be at war on only one front at atime and that front far distant from itsallies. The Russians had but to pushwestward and destroy the enemy. Theirrelationship with the United States andGreat Britain consisted of demandingand receiving material aid and of pres-sure against the common enemy. Col-laboration, even in these limited fields,was to prove difficult. Normally, theUnited States and Great Britain trans-mitted their strategic decisions in gen-eral terms to the Soviet Union. TheRussians were to take formal part in de-cisions only at the international confer-ences at Moscow, Tehran, Yalta, andPotsdam. From time to time proposalswere put forward for a "United Chiefsof Staff" to include the USSRbut noth-ing came of them. The Russians re-mained outside the combined staff sys-tem, developed for the co-ordination ofthe Western effort in the global war.From the start these conditions, addedto the legacy of suspicion, made genuineunderstanding between the Soviet Unionand the Western Allies difficult. A curi-ous arms-length war partnership was theresult.

As has already been suggested, thebasis for close military association be-tween the two Western Powers was laidwell before Pearl Harbor. To concerttheir plans and war-making machinerybecame a necessity for the United Statesand Great Britain immediately after theJapanese attack. Just a few days before

5 Interv, Dr. Sidney Mathews, Maj Roy Lamson,and Maj David Hamilton with Gen Marshall, 25Jul 49, OCMH files.


Christmas 1941, Prime Minister Church-ill and his principal military advisers ar-rived in Washington for the first of theirgreat wartime conferences with thePresident and his staff. Out of this con-ferenceknown by its code name AR-CADIAcame the establishment in Wash-ington, in January 1942, of the Com-bined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) system-thepermanent machinery for day-to-daymanagement of the war and for hammer-ing out Allied strategy.6

It was partly to supply "opposite num-bers" to British colleagues for member-ship in the combined organization thatthe U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) andthe U.S. joint planning system came intobeing in 1942. As finally constituted, theJCS was composed of the President'schief of staff and the senior officers of theArmy, Navy, and Army Air Forces(AAF). Admiral William D. Leahy wasappointed as the chief of staff for thePresident; the other members were Gen-eral Marshall, Army Chief of Staff,Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of NavalOperations, and General Henry H.Arnold, Commanding General, ArmyAir Forces.7 These men served both asU.S. members of the Combined Chiefsand as the President's chief military ad-visers.

Since the three principal British mili-tary officersmembers of the BritishChiefs of Staff Committeenormally hadto direct the operations of their servicesfrom London, they sent high-rankingrepresentatives to Washington to func-tion for them in the CCS. Field MarshalSir John Dill, head of the British JointStaff Mission, sat as the fourth and seniorBritish member of the CCS organizationin Washington.8

The CCS soon became a truly remark-able organization in which decisionswere reached by common agreement; novotes were taken. Here, subject to the ap-proval of the President and Prime Mini-ster, policies and plans were concerted;strategies outlined; the timing of opera-tions discussed; broad programs of warrequirements, allocations of munitions,and requirements for transportation ap-proved; and objectives measured againstresources.

Over and above the CCS system werethe Prime Minister and the President,responsible for all military decisions.These extremely active leaders each woretwo hatsone military, the other politi-cal. As political leaders they sometimeshad more in common with each otherthan with their respective staffs. Advis-ing Mr. Churchill at the summit of theBritish system of intragovernmentalplanning was a War Cabinet (includingthe Foreign Secretary, the Minister ofProduction, and the civilian cabinet of-ficers in charge of the War Office, theAdmiralty, and the Air Ministry). The

6 The ARCADIA Conference is discussed at lengthin Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-42, Ch.V. At the conference a fixed distinction between theterms "Joint" and "Combined" was adopted. Hence-forth "Joint" applied to interservice affairs in theUnited Kingdom or the United States, and "Com-bined" to British-American collaboration.

7 Admiral Leahy had served as governor of PuertoRico and ambassador to France after his retirementas Chief of Naval Operations in 1939. In 1942 thePresident appointed him Chief of Staff to theCommander in Chief. Admiral King had becomeCommander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, in December 1941and in 1942 was also designated Chief of NavalOperations. General Arnold became Chief of the

Air Corps in 1938, Deputy Chief of Staff (Air) in1940, and Commanding General, Army Air Forces,in 1942.

8 Field Marshal Dill had served as Chief of theImperial General Staff in 194041. In 1941 he be-came head of the British Joint Staff Mission inWashington.


Chiefs of Staff Committee sat with it. Lt.Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay, chief of staffto Mr. Churchill in his capacity of Min-ister of Defence, regularly attended theChiefs of Staff meetings and also insuredclose liaison between British politicaland military leadership. While Mr.Roosevelt could and did draw on theassistance of the war-born joint staffsystem, he never established anythingremotely resembling the British WarCabinet, and the U.S. politico-militarygovernmental machinery in World WarII never became as closely knit as that ofthe British. The differences between thetwo systems were sometimes strikinglyillustrated at the international war con-ferences.

The full-dress wartime Anglo-Ameri-can conferences usually came about whenplanning had matured to a point wheretop-level decisions on major issues ofAllied strategy and policy were necessary.The conferences and the CCS system pro-vided the framework for the main Euro-pean and Asiatic decisions. At the con-ferences the JCS, who were early giventhe responsibility for the Pacific war,submitted their decisions on plans andoperations against Japan and normallyreceived a stamp of approval from theCombined Chiefs as a routine matter.

Other Partners

The burden of making major policydecisions was borne by the Westernpartners, but there were other nationsbesides the Soviet Union that had to betaken into consideration. Among thosealso involved to varying degrees in re-sisting the Axis Powers were China,France, Poland, the Netherlands, Can-ada, Australia, and New Zealand. Like

the Soviet Union, they were on the peri-phery of the British-American coalition.Like the Soviet Union, they too partici-pated in a limited partnership. Most im-portant among them, in political if notin military terms, were China andFrance.

China, ancient in civilization andenigmatic to most occidentals, had beenin a state of undeclared war with Japansince 1931. In contrast to the other majorpowers, China was not a modern nationstate. Nominally a republic, China re-sembled a weak feudal kingdom of theMiddle Ages. Its leader, Chiang Kai-shek, exercised only paper control over agreat part of unoccupied China. Thesemiautonomous warlords co-operated orremained neutral at will. To confuse thepolitical scene further, the Chinese Com-munists hovered on the outskirts await-ing an opportunity to advance their posi-tion. The complex internal situationpermitted free play to domestic powerpolitics and worked against any strongcentral direction of the Chinese wareffort.

Even under ideal conditions, China'scontribution could have only beenlimited. Its industry was undeveloped, itsagriculture primitive, its apparent wealthin manpower illusory. Oddly reminiscentof Russia in 1914, China required moremanpower than its allies to provide thebasic essentials. Lacking any naval powerand airpower to speak of, China hadorganized a huge and unwieldy army ofvery uneven quality. Poorly equipped,poorly fed, and poorly led, the Chineseground forces seldom offered more thantoken resistance to the enemy. With theJapanese dominating its most produc-tive and most heavily populated areas onthe seaboard and in Manchuria, China


was all but cut off from its allies. Fromearly 1942 only the difficult and tenuousair route over the mountains from Indiapermitted a thin trickle of supplies toreach China.

Faced with an uncertain struggle forsurvival, China sought all possible aidfrom its most sympathetic ally, theUnited States. In addition, it lookedto the United States to act as its cham-pion vis-a-vis the Russians and British,whose past interference in Chinese in-ternal affairs laid their motives open tosuspicion. Considerable time would passbefore the real impotence of the Chinesewar effort would become clear to theUnited States. Like the Russians, theChinese were engaged against only one ofthe enemies in the global conflict. Atonly one of the international confer-ences (Cairo) did Generalissimo ChiangKai-shek confer with the WesternPowers. The Chinese problem presenteda tangled skein in Anglo-American warcouncils.

France, still smarting from its humili-ating defeat by the Germans in 1940,presented a delicate problem. TheFrench, proud of their past and sensitiveof their national honor, were a dividedpeople. The Germans occupied half thecountry and the Vichy collaborators con-trolled the rest. With its industry andmanpower closely watched by the enemy,France's capacity to resist was confinedto underground groups at home and tothe Free French under General Charlesde Gaulle in North Africa. In spite of itsinability to become a major partner or tocontribute decisively to the defeat of theAxis Powers, France was accorded anhonorary place of importance for politi-cal reasons. In the case of the Americans,sympathy for France, dating back to the

American Revolution, helped to ration-alize the position. Both the British andthe Americans wished to see a friendlyFrance re-established on the Continent,though their methods and means ofeffecting the restoration might differ.Down to the invasion of North Africa,the Americans chose to maintain rela-tions with the Vichy Government; theBritish to deal with General de Gaulle.The Russians appeared to be indifferentso long as the other partners supportedFrance from their own resources and didnot attempt to foist France on the USSRas a first class power. The task of reconcil-ing the fiction of France as a great powerwith the fact of its internal division andweakness required all the diplomacy andtact that the Anglo-Americans couldmuster.

Poland and the Netherlands, operatingunder governments-in-exile, were bothworking under British direction and fol-lowed the British lead for the most part.Forced to rely on British support andBritish supplies and equipment, theycould only hope for the day when Axisdefeat would permit them to return tothe status quo ante bellum. Only incircumstances where decisions affectingthis status were pending did they seekto gain acceptance of their own views.

The other main allies, Canada, Aus-tralia, and New Zealandmembers of theBritish Commonwealth of Nationsingeneral permitted the British to repre-sent them in the higher councils of war.The intimate and friendly relations be-tween the United States and Canada, onthe one hand, and the close wartime co-operation of the United States withAustralia and New Zealand in the fightagainst Japan, on the other, served tocounterbalance British influence among


the three and tended to establish anatmosphere of reliance and good faithbetween these allies and the two chiefWestern partners.

The "Europe First" Decision

Even though much of the discussionat the ARCADIA Conference revolvedaround the problems created by the criti-cal situation in the Pacific, the Britishand American representatives agreed thatthe first and major objective of Anglo-American grand strategy must be the de-feat of Germany. The principle of"Europe First" had been accepted byboth sides at the American-British Con-versations (ABC) held in Washingtonearly in 1941. Out of those exploratorystaff talks had emerged an importantdocumentABC-1which laid down theprinciples of Anglo-American co-opera-tion should the United States have toresort to war.9 On the basis of the beliefthat Germany was the predominantmember of the hostile coalition, themain Anglo-American effort was to bemade in the Atlantic and Europeanarea. Should Japan enter the war, mili-tary strategy in the Far East would bedefensive. ABC-1 was a conditionalunderstanding; the United States wasstill not at war. Nevertheless, when wardid come the over-all strategy adopted,despite the initial Japanese successes,was essentially that of ABC-1.

For the Americans, political expedi-ency reinforced geography and logistics.Against Germany, British and Sovietpower was close at hand. Great Britainoffered a base for massing Western land

and airpower on Germany's threshold;in the Mediterranean operations couldbe undertaken against the Germans justas soon as the United States could landtroops on its shores. Before the UnitedStates could come to grips with Japandecisively, its naval striking power lostat Pearl Harbor would have to be re-stored, ships built, and extensive pre-liminary operations undertaken to se-cure advance bases and lines of com-munications across the far Pacific. Fur-thermore, the Soviet Union and Britain,hard pressed in the European struggle,simply could not wait for a decision inthe war against Japan. It followed, there-fore, that the defeat of Germany shouldbe the first major objective and that inthe meantime the Japanese should becontained until the Allies could assembleenough strength to take the offensive inthe Pacific. Thus emerged perhaps thesingle most important controlling deci-sion in all British-American war policiesin World War II.

Although the basic decision of "EuropeFirst" held throughout the war, thequestion of how it was to be interpretedand applied arose early in the conflictand remained almost to the end. One ofthe most persistent questions through-out concerned the division of resourcesbetween the war in Europe and the waragainst Japan. This problem reflected acertain divergence of political as well asmilitary factors in Anglo-Americanstrategy. For Britain, with predominantinterests in the Mediterranean, theMiddle East, and on the Continent, thewar against Japan tended to be a sideshow. For the United States, Japan wasin many ways the politically preferableobjective and the United States wasearly given the major responsibility for

9 For accounts of ABC Conference and ABC-1,see: (1) Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations,Ch. XII; and (2) Matloff and Snell, Strategic Plan-ning: 1941-42, Ch. III.


the Pacific war. As a result, differencesfrom time to time arose between the twoallies over the distribution of resourcesbetween the two wars. Britain tended toemphasize the effort in Europe at theexpense of the Pacific. Although theUnited States more than met its com-mitments in Europe, it insisted on amargin of safety in the Pacific.

The Search for a Strategic Plan1941-42

Close as the United States and theUnited Kingdom had been drawn byPearl Harbor, and agreed as they wereon the need to defeat Germany first, theyhad no specific plan for defeating Ger-many and liberating Europe. 1941-42saw the emergence of divergent Britishand American concepts in strategictheory. The British concept for defeatingGermany early became apparent. Evenat the ABC meetings before the UnitedStates entered the war, the British hadadvanced the idea that the proper lineof attack on Germany was through Italyand the Mediterranean. In the summerof 1941 during the Atlantic Conference,the British Chiefs had further spelledout their ideas. They proposed relianceon blockade, bombing, subversive activ-ities, and propaganda to weaken Ger-many's will and ability to resist. Localpatriots would be secretly armed andequipped to revolt. The emphasis in of-fensive action would be on mobile, hard-hitting armored forces operating on theperiphery of German-controlled terri-tory and eventually striking into Ger-many itself, rather than on large-scaleground action to meet the full power ofthe German military machine. No vastarmies of infantry such as those used in

World War I would be needed. At theARCADIA Conference Churchill furtherelaborated on these ideas for the Presi-dent.

The whole approach was in accordwith the Churchillian theory of wagingwar on the Continentwhat may becalled the peripheral strategya concepthe had developed after the British ex-perience in World War I. The emphasiswould be on swift campaigns of speedand maneuver, on probing soft spots, ona war of attrition. Though the so-calledsoft underbelly part of the peripheralthesis has received great attention, itmust not be forgotten that Norway wasalways one of Churchill's favorite opera-tional objectives during World War II.Variations on the concept as applied tothe Mediterranean involved entering theMediterranean via North Africa andthen proceeding by way of Italy and theBalkanseither to the north Balkans orto Greeceto Germany. From the begin-ning, the British envisaged a cross-Chan-nel operation in force only as the lastblow against a Germany already in pro-cess of collapse. These two ideas of theBritishemphasis on the Mediterraneanand the cross-Channel operation as acoup de grcelingered until the timeof the invasion of Normandy. TheBritish concept was a compound of mili-tary and political factors, of caution re-sulting from experiences of the last warand Dunkerque, and of the Prime Min-ister's predilections. It was tailored tosuit scattered interests, a small-scaleeconomy, and limited manpower forground armies.

American ideas were quite different.As far back as November 1940, the Chiefof Naval Operations, Admiral HaroldR. Stark, had concluded that large-scale


land operations would be needed to beatGermany. In the summer of 1941 theArmy strategic planners, studying the re-quirements of a global war for the initialVictory Program, concluded that sooneror later "we must prepare to fight Ger-many by actually coming to grips withand defeating her ground forces anddefinitely breaking her will to com-bat."10 They assumed that the way wouldhave to be paved by achieving over-whelming air superiority in Europe.11

Vague as they were about preliminarypreparations, the Army planners werealready disposed to think in terms ofmeeting the German Army head on. Towin, they envisaged the need of a U.S.Army of approximately 215 divisions.

Here was the kernel of the Americantheory of a war of mass and concentra-tionof a decisive war leading to thedefeat of the enemies' armies. It reflectedAmerican optimism and confidence inthe industrial machine to produce themilitary hardware and the faith of themilitary in the ability to raise, equip,train, and lead a large citizen army foroffensive purposes.

The Americans and the British eachjustified their theories and plans in termsof relieving the pressure upon the Rus-sians. Neither side could readily win theother to its concept of strategy and thelong debate that ensued led to a delicaterelationship with the Soviet Union. Fromthe beginning the Russians, locked in adeath struggle on the Eastern Front, hadno doubts about the proper Westernstrategy. They wanted a second front;they wanted it soon; and they wanted itin the West. Each Anglo-American post-ponement of this second front added fuelto the fire.

The first round of debate on strategycame in 1942 over the British desire foran invasion of North Africathe TORCHoperationversus the American desirefor an early cross-Channel attacktheBolero-Roundup plan.12 A number of

10 Chart, "Ultimate RequirementsGroundForces," App II, Pt II, Sec 1, JB 355, ser 707.

The Victory Program is discussed in (1) Watson,Prewar Plans and Preparations, Ch. XI; (2) RichardM. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logis-tics and Strategy, 1940-1943, UNITED STATESARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, Gov-ernment Printing Office, 1955), Ch. V. See alsoWilliam L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, TheUndeclared War (New York, Harper & Brothers,1953), pp. 735-42.

11 For the initial Victory Program estimates, thenewly established Air War Plans Division prepareda plan known as AWPD/1. This plan, calling forover 2,000,000 men and some 60,000 combat planes,contained the blueprint of AAF wartime expansionand embodied its strategic faith. In the opinion ofthe air planners, it was doubtful if a large-scale in-vasion of Europe could be launched before thespring of 1944. The invasion would coincide withthe climax of the bombing offensive. The air plan-ners went further and expressed the belief that ifthe air offensive were successful, a land offensivemight not be necessary. Even though these viewswere not entirely consistent with those of the WarDepartment, General Marshall and the Army plan-ners approved AWPD/1, which became the "bible"of air planners. (For a detailed discussion ofAWPD/1, see Wesley Frank Craven and James LeaCate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War 11,I, Plans and Early OperationsJanuary 1939 toAugust 1942 (Chicago, The University of ChicagoPress, 1948) (hereafter cited as Craven and Cate,AAF I), 131-32, 146-47, 149-50, 594, 599-600.)

12 For an elaboration of the points that follow,including the evolution of the BOLERO-ROUNDUPplan, the consequent Anglo-American debate, andthe eventual decision to launch TORCH, see: (1)Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-42, Chs.VIII, XII and XIII; (2) Robert E. Sherwood, Roose-velt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (rev. ed.)(New York, Harper & Brothers, 1950), Chs. XXIIIand XXV; (3) Henry L. Stimson and McGeorgeBundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (NewYork, Harper & Brothers, 1948), Ch. XVII; (4) Win-ston S. Churchill, The Second World War: TheHinge of Fate (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company,1950), Book I, Chs. 18 and 22, and Book II, Ch. 2;and (5) Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe(London, Collins, 1952), Ch. V.


steps led up to the evolution of theBOLERO-ROUNDUP plan, the brainchildof the U.S. Army. At the ARCADIA Con-ference the Americans and British hadagreed that a first essential in the waragainst Germany was to preserve thelines of communications across the NorthAtlantic between the United States andthe fortress in the British Isles, and that,as an immediate step in that direction,U.S. forces should be dispatched to GreatBritain. The agreement did not includeany strategic concept or plan for usingthat fortress as a base for invasion of theContinent. In the early months of 1942the need for such a concept and plan be-gan to be keenly felt in the U.S. War De-partment. Secretary of War Henry L.Stimson, General Marshall, and theArmy planners became increasingly dis-turbed over the dispersion of troops,ships, and supplies to meet immediatecrises in non-European parts of the globeAfrica, the Middle East, the Far East,and the Pacific.13 To these demands wereadded the desperate pleas of the Russiansand Chinese for more aid. Practically allthe forces that the Army and Navy hadready in the first six months after PearlHarbor had to be sent to the Pacific.Unless the trend toward dissipation werechecked, the planners realized, theUnited States would eventually be de-prived of the power to exercise decisiveweight and influence in coalitionstrategy. The thinking of the Army staffwas sharply reflected in a notation madeon 22 January 1942 by Brig. Gen.Dwight D. Eisenhower, then the chiefWar Department operations officer for

the Pacific: "The struggle to secureadoption by all concerned of a commonconcept of strategical objectives is wear-ing me down. . . . We've got to go toEurope and fight. . . . We've got to beginslugging with air at West Europe; to befollowed by a land attack as soon aspossible."14

In February and March the War De-partment planners, under General Eisen-hower's guidance, and the Joint StaffPlanners studied the whole problem ofPacific deployment in the context ofglobal strategy. Clearly, limits wouldhave to be set for subsequent movementsof Army forces to the Pacific, but that initself would not solve the problem of de-feating Germany. As a solution, the JointChiefs adopted the concept of invadingEurope in force from the United King-dom with a fixed target date. This plan,as proposed by General Marshall, calledfor forces to be assembled immediately(BOLERO) for a cross-Channel invasion

in the spring of 1943 (ROUNDUP). ToBOLERO-ROUNDUP was added a subsidiaryplan, SLEDGEHAMMER, providing for anemergency small-scale landing in theautumn of 1942 should either Germanyor the USSR seem on the verge ofcollapse.

On 1 April the President accepted theplan and dispatched Marshall and HarryHopkins to London to secure British ap-proval. The British approved "in prin-ciple," and BOLERO received top priority.The relief felt by General Marshall and

13 Secretary Stimson had been Secretary of War in1911-13; Governor-General of the Philippines in1927-29; and Secretary of State in 1929-33. In July1940 he again became Secretary of War.

14 Notations by Eisenhower, 22 Jan 42 entry, Item3, OPD Hist Unit File.

General Eisenhower had served as assistant to themilitary adviser of the Philippine Islands from 1935to 1940. In June 1941 he became chief of staff ofthe Third Army. He joined the War Plans Divisionof the War Department in December 1941 and be-came chief of that division in February 1942.


his staff found expression, when Marshallreturned from London, in a notation byMaj. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, thenChief, Operations Division, War De-partment General Staff (OPD, WDGS):". . . at long last, and after months ofstruggle, ... we are all definitely com-mitted to one concept of fighting! If wecan agree on major purposes and objec-tives, our efforts will begin to fall in lineand we won't just be thrashing aroundin the dark."15 The agreement lasted lessthan three months. Obviously, neitherthe President nor the Prime Ministerhad been fully persuaded.

To the American staff, BOLERO-ROUND-UP was especially desirable for a numberof reasons. It offered, in their opinion,the soundest basis of strategy for theEuropean waran all-out bombing offen-sive against Germany and an attack onthe northwest coast of France, using theBritish Isles as the base. BOLERO repre-sented the shortest route from theUnited States to the heart of Germany.In the British Isles, the United Statescould safely land its ground forces with-out the aid of carrier-based air cover andcould safely develop air superiority overnorthern France. The route of attackinto Germany via the Low Countries wasconsidered easier than any other. Theplan would meet the Soviet demand fora second front. It promised to furnisha definite long-range strategic goal for

industrial and manpower mobilization.Above all, it promised decisive action bya definite dateearly 1943and offereda long-range plan that would fulfill theprinciple of concentration. For a whileplans went ahead for the second front.General Eisenhower arrived in Englandon 24 June 1942 to assume command ofthe European Theater of Operations(ETO), and U.S. forces began to land inconsiderable numbers.

But the tide soon turned against theAmerican plan. In June the Prime Min-ister came to Washington and supporteda North African operationas he had atARCADIA. So disturbed was the Americanstaff over the evident British intentionto scuttle BOLERO-ROUNDUP that in Julythe Joint Chiefs even considered threat-ening the British with an all-out offen-sive in the Pacificthe so-called Pacificalternativea threat the President re-fused to allow them to make. In JulyHopkins, Marshall, and King went toLondon for further discussions. Out ofthese came the decision to launch aNorth African attack in the autumn of1942. TORCH replaced BOLERO-ROUNDUP.The American staff had lost out, thePresident overruling it.

The TORCH decision resulted fromtwo basic factorsPresident Roosevelt'sinsistence on action by U.S. groundforces against Germany in 1942, and thecategoric refusal of Churchill and hisstaff to accept the notion of a 1942 cross-Channel operation. The need to relievethe critical British situation in theMiddle East undoubtedly influencedChurchill. There were also some posi-tive advantages that all sides recognizedcould result from a successful TORCHoperation. The shipping situation wasso tight that all possible measures had to

15 Notations by Eisenhower, 20 Apr 42 entry, Item3, OPD Hist Unit File. For the evolution of theOperations Division into General Marshall's globalcommand post in World War II, see Ray S. Cline,Washington Command Post: The Operations Divi-sion, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WARII (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951)(hereafter cited as Cline, Washington CommandPost).

Eisenhower had been promoted to the rank ofmajor general on 27 March 1942.


be taken to get more ships. A saving ofover 200 ships per month could beeffected if Allied convoys to the MiddleEast and India could go through theMediterranean instead of around theCape of Good Hope. There were, it mustbe recognized, serious questions concern-ing the feasibility of launching the cross-Channel operation in 1942, or even inthe spring of 1943. Practical considera-tions played an important part. Therewere resources for TORCH; those for thecross-Channel undertaking were moredoubtful.

To Marshall and Stimson the TORCHdecision was a bitter pill. To them itmeant the adoption of a strategy of en-circlement, of periphery-pecking, andof what Maj. Gen. Thomas T. Handylater termed "scatterization."16 It meantinevitable postponement of a definitelyscheduled direct thrust against Ger-many.

What are some of the strategic lessonsof the BOLERO versus TORCH controversyof 1942? The BOLERO-ROUNDUP plan, aconcept generated by the War Depart-mentoutside the regular JCS-CCSsystemmiscarried. In retrospect the planseems to have been premature. Neitherthe British nor the forces and the meansto cross the Channel appeared to beready. But forces in being have a way ofgenerating a strategy of their own, andthe impatience and pressure of politicalleaders for action may override thestrategy of the military, however soundit may appear to the latter. There wereenough forces and means to undertake

TORCH. The Western Allies undertookTORCH.

The TORCH decision, which so disap-pointed American military hopes, alsocomplicated relations with the SovietUnion. Churchill felt the full weight ofMarshal Joseph Stalin's disapproval in astormy interview in Moscow in mid-August. Sensitive as the Western Allieswere to Soviet reactions, they tried tocompensate for the immediate effects ofTORCH on aid to the Russians by suchfriendly gestures as offering direct mili-tary assistance in the Caucasus, develop-ment of the Persian Gulf delivery route,and a build-up of the Alaska-Siberia airferry route.17 These efforts meant littleto Stalin. The Western Allies were be-ginning to learn that there was no bank-ing good will with the Soviet Union.They could expect no real improvementin military relations with the USSR ex-cept where collaboration would clearlycontribute to the one common interest-the early defeat of Germany.

The Pacific was also diverting powerfrom the American resources on whichthe Army planners could count for "beat-ing Germany" first. In 1942 demands inthe Pacific were exigent and heavy. Thefirst year of the war in the Pacific waslargely spent by the United States armedforces in establishing and protectingsupply lines and bases from which offen-sives might later be undertaken againstJapan. The War Department had triedto keep the forces and means allotted tothe Pacific to a minimum, but it had notfully anticipated the great need for airand ground service units for Australia

16 After serving in the War Plans Division from1936 to 1940, General Handy returned in 1941 andserved as Chief of the Strategy and Policy Groupuntil he succeeded Eisenhower in June 1942 as As-sistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division.

17 For the effects of TORCH on postponing convoysailings to the USSR along the northern route, seeMatloff and Snell, Strategic Planning: 1941-42, Ch.XIV.


and Pacific island bases and had to makesuccessive ad hoc increases in the allot-ment of Army troops. Air deploymentto the Pacific conflicted with the determi-nation of the AAF to initiate large-scalebombardment to western Europe.

By mid-1942 the diversion of men andresources to the Pacific had begun toproduce results, but the rebuff to theJapanese forces at the battles of CoralSea (May 1942) and Midway (June1942) by no means slowed Army deploy-ment to the Pacific. That deployment,in the new phase of the Pacific war, wasno longer confined to garrisoning a"line" of bases to support a harassingnaval defensive, but was being calculatedin terms of tactical offensive moves be-yond that line. A series of limited offen-sives was plotted and begun with the in-vasion of Guadalcanal in August 1942.The new policy required emergency re-inforcements in the fall for both Guadal-canal and the Papua Campaign. Beforethe close of the year some of the troopstrength originally built up in theCentral Pacific was being transferred tosupport these local offensives, and it wasclear that still more Army troops wouldbe needed to complete these tasks.

For the Pacific theater as a whole, thetotal number of Army forces deployed atthe end of 1942 (approximately 350,000)was about equal to the total number ofArmy forces deployed in the UnitedKingdom and North Africa (approxi-mately 347,000). Nine of the 17 divisionsoverseas and 17 of the 72 air combatgroups overseas were in the Pacific.

In the China-Burma-India (CBI)theater early limitations on Army de-ployment had been maintained far moresuccessfully, but the problems presentedby the CBI theater had by no means been

resolved by the close of 1942. In theCBI, as in the Middle East, the UnitedStates was drawn into highly complicatedjurisdictional, strategic, and logisticalproblems. Basic strategic considerations,as well as limited Allied resources formounting major attacks on the Asiaticmainland and pressing immediate needsof other theaters, combined to keep theCBI theater, throughout 1942, low onthe list of priorities set by the CCS foroverseas deployment. For the UnitedStates, the object of strategic policy to-ward China since the very beginning ofthe war had been to keep that countryactively in the war without a major in-vestment of U.S. forces. To carry outthis policy Maj. Gen. Joseph W. Stil-well's mission to China had been in-structed in February 1942 to increaseboth the effectiveness of American as-sistance to the Chinese Government andthe combat efficiency of the ChineseArmy.18 After the Burma Road was cutby the Japanese in late April, the prob-lems facing Stilwell's mission became farmore difficult. For the U.S. Army, how-ever, the CBI remainedas did theMiddle Eastessentially an air and sup-ply theater. A year after Pearl Harborabout 17,000 U.S. troops were presentin or en route to the China-Burma-Indiaarea.

The Middle East was an area of Britishstrategic responsibility and one in whichthe United States preferred not to be-come deeply involved. But events in

18 General Stilwell had commanded the III Corpsin California in December 1941 and in early 1942took part in the preliminary planning for a NorthAfrican operation. In February 1942 he was ap-pointed Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces inthe Chinese Theater of Operations, Burma and In-dia. Stilwell was promoted to lieutenant general on25 February 1942.


1942 had forced successive modificationsin the plans for the use of Army forcesin the area. At the end of December1942 about 30,000 troops were presentin or en route to the Middle Eastpri-marily air and service troops. This en-larged commitment reflected, in part, in-creased operational air activities byUnited States forces in support of British-American offensive action in the Medi-terranean. In part, it reflected the greaterneed for service units required to con-struct, operate, and maintain the PersianGulf supply route for shipments of sup-plies to the Soviet Union.

All in all, by 31 December 1942 slight-ly more than half of the divisions andabout a third of the air combat groupsoverseas were deployed in the waragainst Japan. The remaining divisionsoverseas and over one half of the aircombat groups overseas were deployed inthe war against Germany. The rest of theair combat groups overseas were dis-tributed among Latin American andSouth Atlantic bases. The total U.S.Army forces then deployed in the waragainst Japan exceeded by over 85,000the total U.S. Army forces deployed inthe war against Germany.19 The scatter-ing of men and planes was paralleled bythe parcelling out of shipping to moveand maintain troops overseas. Through-out 1942 shortagesespecially of escortvessels and landing craftimbalancesbetween available troop and cargo ship-

ping, and the heavy rate of sinkings madeshipping the limiting factor in Armyplanning for overseas deployment.20

With the launching of TORCH at theend of 1942, the first stage in the searchfor a strategic plan against Germanycame to an end. 1941-42 had been theperiod of defensive strategy and astrategy of scarcity. The basic fear wasthe fear of defeat; the great concern, thesurvival of the Soviet Union. By the closeof 1942 it had become apparent that,though the Western Allies were still notagreed on strategy, their plans were tiedto the outcome of the struggle on theEastern Front. But Stalin had turneddown the offer of Roosevelt and Church-ill to send an Anglo-American air forceto support the Soviet forces in the Cau-casus. He made it unmistakably clearthat Western military forces were notwanted in Soviet territory to fight besideSoviet soldiers.21 From the West Stalinwanted only more lend-lease and a secondfront.

The two approaches to war had hadtheir first conflict and British opportun-ism or peripheral strategy had scored thefirst victory. However, the issue was notyet squarely joined. That British notionsof strategy had tended to prevail was notsurprising. British forces had been earliermobilized and were in the theaters in fargreater numbers than were those of theAmericans. The United States was still

19 Figures based on: (1) USAF Statistical Digest,1947, pp. 2-12; (2) STM-30, 1 Jan 48; and (3)OPD Weekly Status Map, 31 Dec 42. According tothe STM30 computation, total forces deployed inthe war against Japanincluding Alaska and CBIamounted to 464,868. Forces deployed against theEuropean Axis Powersincluding Africa, the Mid-dle East, and the Persian Gulf Service Command-numbered 377,644.

20 For the impact of shipping and other logisticalfactors on Army planning and the constant struggleto match ends and means in 1942, see Leighton andCoakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-43.

21 Stalin's position evidently represented a changeof mind, since in September 1941 he had asked fortwenty-five to thirty divisions to be sent from GreatBritain to Archangel or through Iran to the south-ern front in the USSR. See Winston S. Churchill,The Second World War: The Grand Alliance (Bos-ton, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), pp. 462-63.


mobilizing its manpower and resources.It had taken the better part of the yearafter Pearl Harbor for U.S. forces to haveany appreciable effect in the theaters.Strategic planning in 1942 had beenlargely short run, hand to mouth, andopportunistic. Its scope had been in con-siderable measure determined by criticalshortages in shipping and munitions.Troops had been parcelled out piecemealto meet immediate threats, crises, andneeds in the primarily defensive andgarrisoning phase of the war. New to theart of military diplomacy and negotia-tion, the Americans were still thinkingin "either-or" termsthis operation orthat one. The one scheme to put Alliedplanning on an orderly, long-range basisand to achieve the principles of mass andconcentration in which the Americanshad put their faith had failed. An effec-tive formula for halting the continueddissipation of forces and materiel in whatthey regarded as secondary ventures stilleluded them.

The transition to the strategic initia-tive introduced many new and complexproblems for the American militarystaff. Active and passive fronts were nowestablished all over the world. TheTORCH decision had thrown all Allied

strategic planning into a state of uncer-tainty and flux. The old issues of en-circlement versus concentration and At-lantic versus Pacific deployment, whichthe Army staff hoped had been settledonce and for all by the British-Americanagreement in the spring of 1942 onBOLERO-ROUNDUP, were being debatedanew. The basic strategic question forthe planners was how to limit operationsin subsidiary theaters and carry the wardecisively to the Axis Powers.

As the strategists groped their way to-ward agreement on an answer to thequestion during 1943 and 1944, theyoften found themselves engaged in con-sideration of possibilities of action thatbecame academic before a decision onthem could be reached. The positive as-pect of their planning was governed bythe growing inevitability of a large-scaleinvasion of northwestern Europe, evenas the War Department had envisaged itin the spring of 1942, together with thedevelopment of essentially comparablemeans to defeat Japan. Subordinate tothis was the attempt to guide the inter-mediate operations required to preparethe way for the main offensives. To pre-sent the story of that strategic planningis the purpose of the pages that follow.

CHAPTER I

Casablanca Beginning of an Era

January 1943

In 1943 the debate over Europeanstrategy entered a new stage. Thoughthe strategic ideas of each partner in theAllied coalition remained essentially thesame as in 1942, the circumstances oftheir application changed. The midwarperiodroughly from January 1943 tothe establishment of a foothold in Nor-mandy in the summer of 1944was theperiod of increasing plenty. The powerto call the turn on strategy and to choosethe time and place to do battle passedto the Allies. The United States, alongwith its partners, had to come to gripswith the offensive phase of the coalitionwar. U.S. troops and supplies flowed outin ever-increasing numbers, and the fullimpact of American mobilization andproduction was felt not only in thetheaters but also in Allied councils. Simi-larly, the ability of the Russians not onlyto survive the German assault but alsoto launch a series of counteroffensiveslent weight to Soviet ideas on Alliedstrategy. The balance of power withinthe coalition steadily shifted to theUnited States and the Soviet Union.

As the new year opened, the WesternPowers and the Soviet Union were stilllinked by the bond of danger, but hadnot yet found a common ground ofagreement. Between the United States

and the United Kingdom, fundamentalwar strategy and planning for the im-mediate future were unsettled. Into thisvacuum and state of uncertainty thePresident, at the Casablanca Conferencein January 1943, introduced the prin-ciple of unconditional surrendera con-cept that was to have important conse-quences for the Allied coalition as wellas for the American military staff for theremainder of the war.

The War Against Germany

The President took off on 11 Januaryfrom Miami, Florida, for his fourth of-ficial meeting with Prime MinisterChurchill and the first of a series of greatmidwar international conferences. It wasa historic occasion, marking a doublefirst for the President: the first time thata U.S. president had flown while in of-fice and the first time that a U.S. presi-dent had left the country in time of war.Roosevelt's departure and his destina-tion were carefully guarded secrets. Thescene of the conference lay 5,000 milesacross the hazardous Atlantic at theNorth African port of Casablanca. There,on the outskirts, in a large hotel on avilla-studded hill overlooking the ocean,the President and his military advisers

CASABLANCA-BEGINNING OF AN ERA 19

THE ANFA HOTEL ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF CASABLANCA, site of the first midwar inter-national conference.

met with Mr. Churchill and the Britishmilitary staff. General Marshall and hisstaff, Admiral King, and General Arnoldhad arrived ahead of the President. Theyhad been quartered at the Anfa Hotelwith the other members of the Com-bined Chiefs of Staff. Surrounded bypalm trees, bougainvillaea, and orangegroves and with sunny skies overhead,the ten-day conference opened on 14January. That the palm trees were pro-tected by barbed wire entanglements,that heavily armed infantrymen andSecret Service men roamed constantlyamong the bougainvillaea and orangegroves, and that the blue skies were filledby patrolling fighter squadrons did notseem incongruous in the wartime atmo-sphere.

In this lush but martial atmosphere,the British and American leaders con-vened to review questions at issue inglobal strategy and to find a new basisof agreement. Over luncheon and dinnertables they carried on informal discus-sions that sometimes lasted into the earlyhours of the morning. In addition, therewere several plenary meetings and aseries of Combined Chiefs of Staff con-ferences. In the absence of AdmiralLeahy, who had become ill en route,General Marshall, Admiral King, andLt. Gen. Henry H. Arnold representedthe Joint Chiefs of Staff. Their Britishcounterparts, Field Marshal Sir AlanBrooke, Chief of the Imperial GeneralStaff, Admiral of the Fleet Sir DudleyPound, First Sea Lord, and Air Chief


Marshal Sir Charles F. A. Portal, Chiefof the Air Staff, were ably assisted byField Marshal Sir John Dill, Chief of theBritish Joint Staff Mission in Washing-ton.1 On the fringes of the conferencehovered the two contending leaders ofthe French, General Henri Giraud,High Commissioner of French Africa,and General Charles de Gaulle, leaderof the Fighting French forces. Generalis-simo Stalin had turned down the Anglo-American invitation to participate on theground that the critical situation at Stal-ingrad demanded his full attention.2

What to do after completing the con-quest of North Africa was the crucialquestion in Allied strategy. Any plansfor post-Torch operations were directlyrelated to the course of the African cam-paign. The practical reason for meetingat Casablanca was to provide an oppor-tunity to canvass possibilities directlywith the commanders. British andAmerican hopes for a quick victory in theNorth African campaign had been dis-appointed. Though most of NorthAfrica already had been won, a hardstruggle for Tunisia loomed ahead, andthe uncertainty as to when the campaignwould end complicated and unsettledall British-American military planningfor the future.

The uncertainty was reflected in theintelligence estimates drawn up by the

British and Americans before the con-ference. Both agreed that the SovietUnion would be the chief preoccupa-tion of Germany in the months aheadthough Hitler would do his utmost tointensify the war upon Allied shipping.There was also agreement that Germanywould do its best to maintain its foot-hold in North Africa and to keep Italyin the war. On the other hand, theBritish felt that if Italy collapsed, theGermans would concentrate on theBalkans and leave Italy to its fate, whilethe Americans predicted that Hitlerwould step in if Italy showed signs ofcollapse and would defend the Italianpeninsula. The Americans were also lesssanguine than their British colleaguesover the prospects of German collapsein the near future. The Americansbelieved that, despite severe losses to thearmies and air forces, the German armedforces were still formidable and thatGerman morale and economic position,through deteriorating, showed no con-clusive signs of impending collapse.3

While British and American strategyhad had much in common since early inthe war, the question of next moves wassusceptible to very different answers. Onthe answer given would very largely de-pend the disposition of British andAmerican forces in 1943. The PrimeMinister had no doubt what the correctcourse of Allied action for 1943 shouldbe. In November 1942 he had cabledthe President that the "paramount task"before the United States and the UnitedKingdom was, first, to conquer North

1 General Brooke had commanded the British 2Corps in France in 1940; he became commander ofthe British Home Forces in 1940 and Chief of theImperial General Staff in 1941. Admiral Pound wasnamed First Sea Lord and chief of the British navalstaff in May 1939 and became Admiral of the Fleetin July 1939. Air Chief Marshal Portal had servedon the Air Council and as Air Officer, Command-ing-in-chief, Bomber Command; he was appointedChief of the Air Staff, Royal Air Force, in October1940.

2 Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 662ff.

3 (1) Report by JIC Sub-committee (Br), 3 Dec42, title: German Strategy in 1943. (2) Commentsby G-2 WDGS, on Br JIC paper-German Strategy,1943, n. d. Both in Casablanca Books, Vol. I (1May 43), Exec 6.

CASABLANCA-BEGINNING OF AN ERA 21

Africa and open the Mediterranean tomilitary traffic and, second, to use thebases on the African shore "to strike atthe underbelly of the Axis ... in theshortest time."4 This remained Church-ill's opinion in January 1943. As he sawit, it was the obvious immediate objec-tive for consideration at the conference.

The British brought to the conferencea full staff and carefully prepared plansand positions. The Americans came witha small staff and with preparations in-complete.5 Before the conference an un-satisfactory exchange of views had takenplace between the American and Britishstaffs. Neither the U.S. and British Chiefsof Staff nor their planners had been ableto agree on a course of action subsequentto TORCH. Nor was there complete agree-ment or understanding between the JCSand their planners or between the Presi-dent and his military staff. GeneralMarshall's own planning staff had at firstbeen so reluctant to accept the TORCHconcept and had afterwards been so en-grossed in carrying out the decision thatthey had had only a few weeks in whichto face the situation it had created. Onthe eve of Casablanca the President's at-titude on the critical issue of cross-Chan-nel versus Mediterranean operations wasto wait and see. He favored building upU.S. forces in both the United Kingdomand North Africa and postponing a deci-sion for a month or two. Such circum-stances hardly offered encouragement to

General Marshall to try at once to unitethe U.S. representatives on a revisedversion of the plan to concentrate forcesin the British Isles, but Marshall did feelobliged to fight a strong rear-guard actionin defense of the plan. His course wouldserve notice on all that concentrating fora major cross-Channel operation wasstill a cardinal objective in Americanstrategic planning.

Cross-Channel VersusMediterranean

At the conference General Marshallled the JCS in a last stand for a majorcross-Channel operation in 1943. Earlyin the conference he stated that the basicquestion was the extent to which theassociated powers had to adhere to thegeneral concept embodied in the BOLEROplan and the extent to which they couldundertake diversions to help the USSR,improve the shipping situation, andmaintain the momentum against theAxis.6 It was extremely important forthe American and British leaders to de-cide on the "main plot." "Every diver-sion or side issue from the main plot,"he added, "acts as a 'suction pump.' "7

The previous shifts from GYMNAST toBOLERO and from BOLERO to TORCH had,he observed, complicated U.S. programsof production and troop mobilization.8

American naval construction schedulesin particular had been upset by thenecessity of producing landing craft forBOLERO. It was Marshall's belief that inthe diversion to TORCH the UnitedStates and Great Britain had been "ab-

4 (1) Msg, Prime Minister to President, 18 Nov42, No. 195. (No copy in WD files.) This messagewas circulated as JCS 153, 18 Nov 42, title: Plansand Operations in the Mediterranean, Middle East,and Near East. (2) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hop-kins, p. 674.

5 For a description of the American staff prepara-tions, see: (1) Cline, Washington Command Post,pp. 215-17; and (2) Matloff and Snell, StrategicPlanning: 1941-42, Ch. XVII.

6 Min, 55th mtg CCS, 14 Jan 43.7 Min, 58th mtg CCS, 16 Jan 43.8 GYMNAST was the code name for an operation

against North Africa under British and Americanconsideration in late 1941 and early 1942.


BRITISH AND AMERICAN LEADERS AT CASABLANCA. Seated: President Franklin D.Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill. Standing from left: Lt. Gen.Henry H. Arnold, Admiral Ernest J. King, General George C. Marshall, Admiralof the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, and Air ChiefMarshal Sir Charles F. A. Portal.

normally fortunate." He still favored amain British-American effort againstGermany in the form of a cross-Channeloperation aimed at northern France.

Reviewing all the old arguments theAmerican staff had advanced since thespring of

Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944

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