Right and Center-Right in Contemporary Argentina: The PRO Party Case

Sergio Morresi

University of General Sarmiento

National Council of Scientific and Technological Research (Argentina)

Contact: smorresi@ungs.edu.ar

Paper presented at XXIInd. World Congress of Political Science,

Research Committee 23: Elections, Citizens and Parties,

Madrid, July 8 to 12, 2012

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to show some results from a large and collective researchthat focuses on the roots and the structure of “Commitment for Change - RepublicanProposal” party (now called PRO), a relatively newcomer in the Argentine politicalscenario. The PRO party was born in 2003 as a center-right alternative to the 2001economic and political crisis. After four years have passed, it obtained the mayorshipof Buenos Aires, the capital district of Argentina. Since then, despite PRO leadersheld a mainly conservative and neoliberal speech, they have not advanced in a clas-sical right-wing agenda. This paper presents a brief history of the ideological placethat the PRO party occupies today, an exploration of its leader’s education, socializa-tion and recruitment spaces and it includes some notes about their relationships withtraditional Argentine parties (Radical Civic Party and Peronism).

1. Introduction

Despite a sad history of coups, authoritarian governments and restricted political par-ticipation, in recent decades, the Argentine party system has shown a surprisingvitality. In the 1980s, in the so-called “transition to democracy”, it managed to survivethe military and corporate pressures (de Riz 1990). In the early 1990s it withstoodthe challenges of different sectors that questioned the adequacy of parties to steer(or face) the wave of neo-liberal reforms (Adrogué and Armesto 2001). The systemeven got rearticulated following the deep crisis of 2001, when low and middle sectorsof the major Argentine cities pushed the end of the Government of President Fernan-do De la Rua and the representative system as a whole with the cry of war "all mustbe gone!" (Pousadela 2006).

Two years after the popular explosion against the elites in general and, particu-larly, against the political parties, new presidential elections were held and the resultswere surprising, because the six candidates who obtained more votes came from thetraditional parties: the Radical Civic Party (UCR) and the Justicialist Party (PJ). Inthis regard, may be noted that despite its fragmentation, low institutionality andfragility (Leiras 2007; Cheresky and Pousadela 2004), the Argentine party system isdemonstrating a remarkable fortress (Sánchez 2005). However, neither the survivalof political figures of the traditional parties nor the renewed confidence of the elec-torate in the representative system should lead to think that the crisis of 2001 has nothad consequences. In more than one sense, that crisis can (and should) be regard-ed as a milestone that closed certain recurrent forms of Argentine politics at thesame time that brought a number of developments which should not be ignored.Among these developments there is one on which we wish to speak at length here:the emergence of a new party located in the “center-right of the political spectrum”(Sagar 1980, 17-19) with the will and chances of access to power: “Commitment forChange”, CPC, which then became “Republican Proposal” (and it is now known bythe shortened advertising form of “PRO” for its name in Spanish).

Research on the PRO party is interesting for three main reasons. The first is tocollaborate building a broad perspective on the developments in the Argentine politi-cal system after the crisis of early XXIst century. The second is to contribute to theknowledge of Latin American right-forces. Finally, the third is to implement certaintheoretical approaches on parties and assess their heuristic potential for the Argen-tine case. On this last point, it should be noted that we have opted for the “social net-work” approach originally proposed by Michel Offerlé (1987) and developed by Mil-dred Schwartz (1990), Frédéric Sawicki (1997) and Bernard Pudal (1989). This typeof approach is characterized by the choice of a middle path between the societal andorganizational analysis and the focus in the localized study of cadres’ trajectories,behaviors, attitudes and aptitudes and the analyses of political and social resourcesavailable to them.

To carry out this work, a survey (hereafter, Survey 2011) by questionnaire toPRO “leading cadres”1 with current office or legislative positions in the Autonomous1 There are not cadres in the PRO Central Office without Public Office positions (see bellow, 4.1).

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City of Buenos Aires was conducted. The questionnaire included closed-ended ques-tions, half closed-ended questions and half open-ended questions that covered citylegislators, district representatives, and officials of the municipality, from Ministers toundersecretaries- between 1st May and 10th December 2011 (date in which a newperiod of Government began). Of the total universe of identified cases (U=76), 52were surveyed (N=52), meaning 68.4% of the universe. To avoid the over-represen-tation of certain posts, the presence of at least two cases in each Ministerial Unit wasguaranteed and at least 60% of each of the types of posts was covered. On the otherhand, gender and age were taken into consideration in the representativeness of thesample. The sample was formed by 6 Ministers (on existing 9), 3 Secretaries (out of5), 22 undersecretaries (out of 31), 4 national representatives (out of 7) and 17 legis-lators of the city (out of 24). In terms of areas of responsibility, 44.2% of the samplebelongs to the political area, 28.8% to the area of social and human rights policies,11.1% to economic and human resources areas, 7.7% to infrastructure area, whichis the same percentage than security and justice. Together with the survey, 18 in-de-pth interviews were conducted in selected cases.

Below (2) it is provided a historical overview of the right-wing political forces inArgentina and the place of the PRO party in that framework. Later, (3) it is presentedthe main social and political characteristics of the leading cadres of PRO party and itis offered a working hypothesis considering the distinction between its different “polit-ical generations”. Finally (4), some considerations regarding the PRO party classifi-cation are offered.

2. The Argentine Right-forces

The presence of a strong right-wing has been a constant in the history of Argentina,not only under the many dictatorships suffered by the country, but also during demo-cratic years. However, Argentine right-wing should not be analyzed as a monolithicideological force, but as a plurality of voices with objectives and strategies thatchange constantly.

In this section (2.1) a quick review of the history of Argentine right-forces is of-fered. Later, (2.2) an explanation of which factors allow to -a priori- locate the PROparty inside a political right-framework is advanced.

2.1. A short historical overview

In the early twentieth century, Argentina was ruled by an alliance between liberal andconservative elites that mobilized low classes “from top to down” as part of a politicalstrategy aimed to maintain an orderly society oriented toward economic development(Gallo and Cortés Conde 1986). This “conservative order” (Botana 1985) finishedwith the enforcement of the Sáenz Peña Act (guaranteeing secret and compulsory

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ballot for adult males) that opened the door to an unstoppable advance of UCR. Inthe new scenario, the traditional elites could not fulfill their expectations to make amodern right-wing party with chances to curb the UCR. On one side, the ProgressiveDemocratic Party (PDP) was too liberal to the eyes of traditional Argentine elites, but,on the other side, the more conservative National Autonomist Party (PAN), was un-able to win elections under conditions of universal suffrage (Malamud 1995). Exclud-ed from the Executive branch in a strongly presidential country, the elite’s alliancewas forced to watch as its territorial strongholds were taken by UCR and eventuallybroke-up between federalistas (a conservative network of local parties which werestrong in some Argentine provinces, like Corrientes, Tucumán and Salta) and lib-erales (elite cadres with predicament in Buenos Aires, see Gibson 1996)).

Figure 1: Argentina Political Timeline, 1880-1955 (from the “Conservative Order” to the fall of Peronism

At first, the displaced elites continued commited to constitutional rule. However, inthe late twenties, a frustration feeling between their ranks arose due to the inabilityto beat UCR. Thus, an anti-liberal, nationalist, reactionary and mostly clerical right-wing was born, characterized by a deep contempt for the masses (McGee Deutsch2005). This anti-popular right-forces were the core elements in the first coup sufferedby Argentina in 1930 that started the so called “infamous decade” (1930-1943). Thisperiod was characterized by the institutionalization of repressive measures andfraudulent elections. The nationalist right forces and the liberal-conservatives set upa tense alliance that broke-up frequently. Anyway, for most of the period, the right-wing field was leaded not by the nationalists, but by the traditional liberal-conserva-tive elites that proclaimed their attachment to liberal republicanism even while prac-ticing fraud and bribery.

The emergence of Peronism in mid-forties redefined political identities in Ar-gentina. On one side, Peronism seemed to share the objectives of nationalist right-

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forces (such as the formation of a “Christian order” that allowed the harmony be-tween classes) but the regime did not abjure of liberal and republican principles nei-ther advanced in the pursuit of ultramontane or anti-semitic path. On the other side,while second rank conservative forces were co-opted by Peronism, a majority of fed-eralistas and liberales became the backbone of a fierce opposition (to the point of al-lying up even with communism in his attempt to stop the advance of Perón). Thishigh level of challenge to Peronism must be traced in two fronts: firstly, the fact thatPerón built his movement confronting explicitly with the liberal-conservative sectors -labeled as “antipatrias”- and, secondly, in the form of state-centralized popular mobi-lization leaded by Perón which precluded any territorial political work by other parties(Aboy Carlés 2001).

Figure 2: Argentina Political Timeline, 1955-1982 (from “Post-Peronist Stalemate” to last military Dictatorship)

The coup that displaced Perón in 1955 gave rise to a fourth political right-force: theright-wing peronists trade-unions. During the exile of Perón (1955-1973), the unionswere mobilized from the right with a combination of authoritarianism and representa-tion in strange but clear collusion with liberal-conservatives and nationalists in orderto stop the growth of a Peronist left-force. Despite differences in many issues, theanti-leftism identity of these three groups allowed them to act together in bizarrecombinations (Senkman 2001).

The joint between the post-Peronist political right-forces broke-up with 1976’coup. The military dictatorship, with civil supporters between federalistas and lib-erales, looked to “refound the republic”, to make a fresh start involving the destruc-tion of Peronism’s populist legacy (Palermo and Novaro 2003). This project broke-down after the Argentine invasion to Malvinas/Falkland Islands. Then, in 1982, Ál-varo Alsogaray, traditional leading figure of the Buenos Aires’ liberales, founded a

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new political party: the United Democratic Center (UCeDe). The new party sharedsome leading cadres and political agenda with the moribund military regime, but triednot to appear openly linked to it. Indeed, UCeDe criticized the authoritarian govern-ment for being insufficiently liberal in economics (Mansilla 1983).

Between 1983 and 1989 the UCeDe underwent a systematic progress and by1987 was consolidated as the third political force in Argentina with a neoliberal agen-da. This unexpected success allowed the Buenos Aires’ liberales to hegemonize theright field. That was a strange outcome, because (differently from federalistas that al-ways aimed to become an important electoral force) the liberales have generallylooked to forming minority-parties (in the form of cadres-party) that had acted as win-dow dressing to increase the exposure of their main leaders and to increase theirchances of being summited by majoritarian parties to act in public offices (Gibson1996; Rock 2001).

Figure 3: Argentina Political Timeline, 1983-2001 (from the Democratic Transition to the last Crisis)

Partially, the electoral rise of the UCeDe in early 80s must be tracked at the entranceof a growing number of young university constituents that formed a powerful militantcore prepared to leave back the party traditional tactics of access to positions ofpower only through contacts with the major parties (Doman and Olivera 1989). How-ever, the party’s ‘historic’ leaders (i.e., its founders and some federalistas leaders)strongly resisted the swift rise of the newcomers (Gutierrez 1992). Also, the tradition-al leaders did not welcome the arrival of political practices far from its tradition, suchas rallies, professionalized activism or grassroots mobilization. Anyway, the founderssucceeded in retaining control of the party and standed firm in their path to offer theircadres as available actors for a government that would like to add them as allies.That moment came, unexpectedly, as a result of the ideological shift of the peronist

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president Carlos Menem (Fraga and Malacrida 1990).The entry of UCeDe’s leadingfigures in the peronist government had mixed results. On one side, Menem’s admin-istration did carried neoliberal issues; on the other, peronist success produced anelectoral debacle of UCeDe, because its constituents started to watch the PJ as a vi-able option.

Between 1993 and 1997, the political liberal-conservative right force was sub-sumed within Peronism. But in 1997, Menem's former economy minister, DomingoCavallo, founded his own party, Action for the Republic (AR), in the hope of turning itinto a new UCeDe. Cavallo defended the neoliberal agenda of Menem’s governmentbut accused the PJ to be unable to carry-it without corruption (Cavallo 1997). In part-nership with other parties (such as New Leadership, Federalist Party and PDP) ARquickly became the third political force in Argentina. This allowed some liberal-con-servative leaders to dream of a competitive right force that could not be “eated” bythe major parties, unlike what had happened to the Alsogaray’s party (Morresi andVommaro 2011). However, that dream was not fulfilled, largely because Cavallo, themain leader of the party, then joined the government of the ALLIANCE UCR-FREPA-SO (Front for a Country in Solidarity) and was blamed for the debacle of 2001.

2.2. The Birth of the PRO Party

In 2001, a few months before the collapse of De la Rua’s government, a group of po-litical an social activists that later became the founding core founder of the PRO par-ty began to meet at the “Believe and Grow Foundation”. The Foundation had beenfounded by an entrepreneur who ventured into the political career: Francisco deNarváez, but was headed by the Buenos Aires businessman Mauricio Macri 2. Macriis the heir to one of the largest fortunes in Argentina (his father was the head ofSOCMA enterprises), by that time he was president of Boca Juniors Football club(one of the two most popular soccer teams in Argentina) and had been anticipatingan interest in entering politics since the mid-nineties. The 2001 crisis and the politicaland social fragmentation that followed served as accelerators to the delayed leap tothe political arena (Cerruti 2010). Thus, at the end of 2002 Macri's candidacy formayor of Buenos Aires City was publicly presented.

In 2003, the year Néstor Kirchner was elected president with only 22% of thevote, the UCeDe (for that time, a residual party) supported the candidacy of formerMinister of Economy of the ALLIANCE UCR-FREPASO, Ricardo López Murphy, whopresented an openly neoliberal program. AR, the party of disgraced Domingo Caval-

2 The alliance between Macri and De Narváez was dissolved soon after by differences in politicalstrategies: while the latter sought forge alliances with Peronism to try a quick leap to national politics,the former chose to prioritize both the autonomy of the new space and the local contest in the Au-tonomous City of Buenos Aires (federal district and main city of Argentina) and then start from therethe road to the presidency. In the 2003 presidential elections, De Narvaez was one of the mainfinanciers of the candidacy of Carlos Menem (PJ), while Macri remained independent. Later in 2009,the roads of Macri and De Narváez reunited for a brief period when transiently allied under the banner“Unión PRO”, with which they competed in the legislative elections of that year.

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lo, supported the ticket headed by Menem. The forces led by Macri were devoted tostrengthening their electoral gamble in the city of Buenos Aires through the labelCommitment for Change (CPC). This group, which is the seed from which the PROhas sprouted , was formed, in part, by an alliance with some of the federalistas par-ties, former members of the UCeDe and important leaders of Buenos Aires liberalismthat had played major roles in the last dictatorship. But the new party also attractedPeronist and Radical Civic political groups; a set of professional businessmen (large-ly from SOCMA); and young professionals who came from foundations linked to pub-lic and social policies, especially the “Grupo Sophia”, a think tank created in the 90sby Horacio Rodríguez Larreta, one of the main leaders of CPC. Led by Macri, thecore founders of the new political group were not aimed to become a testimonial ormarginal party. On the contrary, their goal was to gain an immediate access to muni-cipal power to serve as a solid springboard to the national stage. Although the firstelection in which they were presented was not as successful as planned, the newparty persisted in their attempts3. In 2005, Mauricio Macri was the candidate to Na-tional Deputy for Buenos Aires in alliance with the party “Re-Create Argentina” (lead-ed by López Murphy). Thus, the Republican Proposal Alliance which later would be-come PRO, was born.

Figure 4: Argentina Political Timeline, since 2001

3 The candidate from FREPASO, Aníbal Ibarra, has been elected by the Alliance UCR-FREPASO in1999 and was supported by the new President Néstor Kirchner (from FPV) to stand for reelection. Al-though CPC won the first round (obtained 37% of the vote, against 33.7% of Ibarra), in the secondround Ibarra won with over 53% of the vote (regarding 2003 elections, see Mauro 2005; for an analy-sis of the FREPASO, see Abal Medina 2009).

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In 2007, even though the peronist “Front for the Victory” (FPV, a center-left alliancehegemonized by the PJ) won at the national level, the PRO reached a sweeping vic-tory in elections for the mayorship of Buenos Aires. After this victory, the project grewin other electoral districts (including the provinces of Buenos Aires, Salta and SantaFe), but so far, it has repeatedly suspended the announced “leap” to dispute for thenational executive.

In both 2003 and 2007, the party headed by Macri presented a political dis-course that included common topics of liberal-conservatives (similar to those thatUCeDe had flagged, such as “efficiency”, “serious economy” -i.e., market-oriented-,“silly and ineffective state”, etc.). These topics resumed the moral question put inplay in the 90s by AR, and tapped into a new vein of social sensitivity (such as “uni-versal social security” and “integration of lower classes”, commonplaces in post-cri-sis political discourse across all political spectrum). As shown in a study based onecological regression, it is clear that Macri’s party inherited the votes from theUCeDe an AR (Alessandro 2009). However, the same study shows that it also drewvotes from the then fragmented traditional parties (UCR and PJ). Certainly, the PROsuccess is due to many factors that must be analyzed in detail (see, e.g., Gallo2008b). However, two features of the new party which favored their ability to winelections can be noted here. First, the PRO has a vocation to be a “party of power”and pretends not to remain relegated as a platform that may show and offer cadresto majoritarian parties. Second, the PRO expresses the abandonment of one of thekey identifying characteristic of precedent liberal-conservative forces: their persistentanti-populism (i.e., the PRO, like AR and later UCeDe is not an anti-Peronist party,but see Ostiguy 2009).

Considering the differences between the PRO and the prior right-wing parties,is it correct to say that PRO is a right-wing party? Answering to this question requiresthe analysis of empirical data (data collected in our survey although its analysis hasnot been finished yet). However, there are some indicators that, in the meantime, al-low us to a priori place the PRO at the right of political spectrum. In the first place,the PRO quickly allied with traditional rightist parties, as the Democratic Party (Mor-resi and Vommaro 2011). Secondly, PRO’s core constituents previously voted forright and center-right parties (like UCeDe and AR, see Alessandro 2009). Thirdly, thePRO is an affiliated member of the conservative-oriented International DemocratUnion and a prospective membert of the Centrist Democrat International (Sagar1980). Then, the analysis of PRO’s political-electoral discourse is compatible withright-wing parties (Morresi and Vommaro 2012). In the fifth place, as is shown below(3.1 and 3.2), PRO cadres belong to the upper and upper-middle classes of Argenti-na (like former right and center-right Argentina parties, Gibson 1996). Finally, it mustbe noticed the fact that leaders of the major political parties (UCR and PJ) locatedthe PRO as a right-wing competitor (so as noted by scholars as Gallo 2008b, 2008a;Calvo 2005).

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3. The PRO Party and its Political Generation

This section uses the already mentioned field study (see p. 2) in order to (3.1) pro-vide some general considerations and (3.2) to show the heuristic potential of takinginto account the different political generations of the PRO’s cadres. Then, (3.3) itshows the characteristics of political paths of each of these generations and (3.4)their different forms of political participation. Finally, (3.5) some comments on the so-cial environment are offered.

3.1. Basic Characterization

According to our study (see some selected data in Table 1), PRO leading cadres aremostly men (79% vs. 21% women) with an average age of 47 ½ years, and a highproportion (67%) with 50 years or less. All of them started college (only 8% did notobtained a college degree) an more than half (52%) obtained advanced degrees.This elevated proportion of highly educated cadres is striking in the Argentinecontext.

The social membership of PRO’s leading cadres can be built based on a set ofindicators: 61% were born in the city of Buenos Aires, 17% in the province of BuenosAires (mostly in the suburbs of the city) and 15% in medium to large cities in otherprovinces. A majority (77%) reside in the city of Buenos Aires and 11% in the north-ern and western upper middle class suburbs. Regarding the occupation of their par-ents (a reliable indicator of social backgrounds) highlights the professional (8% of at-torneys, 23% from other professions), traders (21%), employers (17%), seniorpositions in the State or in enterprises (11%); below, other occupations (like profes-sors, teachers and self-employed) appears. Thus, PRO’s cadres come mostly fromfamilies with usual occupations of upper middle class. Therefore, it could be saidthat, although the common picture of the party presented by its electoral adversaries,PRO’s cadres are not the children of the “big bourgeoisie” (except for their mainleader Macri, of course) as it has been usual in the traditional rightist Argentina par-ties (Gibson 1996). Its social and cultural distance on the district's population is gen-erally not far from being a global phenomenon, which removes the elites of the vot-ers and breaks with the theory of political representation as a mirror (Offerlé 2011).

3.2. The Political Generations

Interesting differences between what could be called the PRO’s “political genera-tions” emerge from the available data. The concept of political generation does notrefer to the chronological age of PRO’s cadres, but to the periods which saw its entryinto the political arena. For purposes of this work three events that function as wa-tersheds have been selected: the end of the Malvinas/Falklands War in 1982, Carlos

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Menem's victory in the presidential elections of 1989 and the months immediatelypreceding the 2001 crisis. Respondents were asked about their entering in politics ina widely sense and were allocated in one of the following four political generations:

❖. First (or “old politicians”): the one that entered politics before the democrat-ic transition, i.e. until 1981 inclusive.

❖. Second (or the “transition’s generation”): the one that began involving inpolitics from the last part of the military dictatorship to the end of UCR’sgovernment led by Raul Alfonsín, i.e. until 1989 inclusive.

❖. Third (or “the 90s generation”): the one that entered in politics during theMenem’s Peronist government, that is, from 1990 until 200 inclusive.

❖. Fourth (or the “the newcomers”): the one that started political activity afterthe founding of the PRO.

Table 1: Political Generations (selected data)

Generation

Characteristics

1st(until 1981)

Old Politicians

2nd(1982-1989)Transition

3th(1990-2000)

90s Gen.

4th(since 2001)Newcomers

Totals

% in the sample 19,2% 34,6% 21,2% 23,1% 100%

Average Age (in years) 57 44,88 42,9 47,83 47,52

% women 30% 11,1% 26,4% 16,6% 21,2%

% cadres with post-graduatestudies

40% 55,6% 45,5% 58,3% 51,9%

% cadres assisted religious and private universities

30,2% 6,2% 9,1% 41,7% 20%

Source: Survey 2011.

In Table 1 some peculiarities of PRO’s political generations can be noted. First, theaverage age seems not to be relevant in the generational membership (with the un-derstandable exception of the old politicians). It is noteworthy that the generation ofnewcomers is chronologically older than the 90s and transition generation.

The percentage of women in each generation does not seem striking. However,from in-depth interviews that we conducted, it has been possible to perceive thatnewcomer women have had major difficulties to reconcile their decision to enter inpolitics with their personal life. These difficulties appeared not mentioned in the inter-views to women of previous generations (including the transition’s generation thathas the lowest feminine presence), but it would be risky to make any generalizationabout this without a larger study of the subject that we hope to undertake later.

Regarding educational level, is noticeable that 70% of PRO’s leading cadres at-tended public universities, especially the University of Buenos Aires, while 20% went

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to religious private universities and only 10% has studied at non-religious private uni-versities (numbers are not different than those of upper middle-class in Argentina).However, it is remarkable the overall weight of private education at elementary andhigh school level (50% and 45% respectively), especially in religious establishments,which links the PRO’s cadres with the Catholic culture universe. Also is noteworthythat newcomers are more educated and that their assistance at public institutions islower than the average. Thus, the newcomers appear to have the socio-cultural ac-cumulation strategies closest to the Argentine upper classes (Tiramonti, Ziegler andGessaghi 2008).

As for the type of qualifications, is noticeabe the high proportion of degrees inSocial Sciences and Humanities (22%, but with higher relative weight in the first twogenerations), only second to Legal education (31%) and above the studies of Eco-nomics and Finance (20%). However, looking at the issue from the generational per-spective, can be noted that in older generations Law Studies have more weight thanin the younger ones that prefer the Economics’ degrees. This can be linked to thethesis of Brian Garth and Yves Dezalay (2002) on the transformation of Latin Ameri-can elites and the “triumph” of the economists on the lawyers.

In postgraduate education, specializing in economics, business and finance isthe highest (34%), followed by those related to governance and policy (14%). Thistype of qualifications are important in the 90s generation, as many of its membersmade a career at foundations and NGOs linked to public policies, such as GrupoSophia; however, the newcomers are those who tended more to this kind of training.

Thus, overall, we can differentiate between the older and younger generations.There are the latter who give to the PRO a refreshing aspect (young profile, with highlevel of education and professional careers and social trajectories that are differentfrom those of the traditional politicians). However, these generations are also thoseclosest to the features of the upper classes traditionally identified with Argentineright-wing.

3.3. Political Socialization and Trajectories

In terms of family political socialization, 52% of the PRO’s cadres can be seen as thefirst generation of politicians, which means that for the other half of the sample, politi-cal activity is part of the “family inheritance”. Those who have family political tradi-tion, are also experienced in associative and corporate participation (charity, RotaryClub, professional and business chambers). As might be expected, the early familiar-ity with the political activity is higher among older generations.

Generally, PRO’s cadres political entrance is made in three ways: by traditionalpolitical channels (either through a party or, as is usual in the Argentina upper-middleclass, through university politics), through NGOs and foundations or, directly, throughpartisan or managerial position at party or government. The first path (the classical“political career” ranging from grassroots militancy to top positions) is the most com-mon in the first and second generations. The second one (that implies a certainknowledge of governance issues, mostly acquired at think tanks or NGOs) is the nor-

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mal path of 90s generation. Finally, the direct access to political positions is the wayof newcomers (92% of them obtained a position in only a year of political activity,while the old politicians took eight years in average).

The differences in career starting points and political trajectories originated atension inside the party between newcomers and old politicians. Sometimes, thistension has exploded in public, as occurred within the Buenos Aires city PRO’s blocin 2003, when two groups formed: “Festilindo” (newcomers and 90s generation) and“Nogaró” (old politicians and transition generations). The first name functioned as adisqualification for the newcomers who are viewed as inexperienced and poorly qual-ified for serious political activity (“Festilindo” was the title of a children’s TV show inthe 80s). The other name referred to a hotel in downtown Buenos Aires where thetraditional politicians used to meet (the Hotel “Nogaro” is located a few yards fromBuenos Aires Mayor’s Office).

Table 2: Political Socialization and entering in politics (selected data)

Generation

Characteristics

1st(until 1981)

Old Politicians

2nd(1982-1989)Transition

3th(1990-2000)

90s Gen.

4th(since 2001)Newcomers

Totals

% Parents with political activity 70% 55,6% 36,4% 33,3%

48,1%

% Entering in politics through NGOs, think tanks and Foundations

10% 0% 27,3% 25% 13,5%

% Entering in politics through student political activity

50% 44% 9,1% 0% 26,9%

% Entering the PRO is per-ceived as personal life change

50% 33,4% 63,7% 75% 53,9%

% Cadres that obtained his first political position in 1 year or less

25% 44,4% 54,5% 91,7% 51,9%

Source: Data collected in survey made in 2011

Despite the disputes between the two groups, it is clear that PRO party is a meetingplace for different political generations. As a congresswoman said in one of our inter-views: “Here, at the PRO, there is space for everyone”. Indeed, the party's fast elec-toral growth allowed the leader Macri to offer members of different generations op-portunities of quick access to the “high politics” (52% of the sample obtained its firstelective position or its first office appointment in only one year). For newcomers, thisrepresented a personal “change of life” opportunity, while for the 90s generation, theentrance in PRO is linked to a professional career advance. For old politicians, as forthe members of transition’s generation, the coming to PRO was an opportunity for

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political advancement, because they obtained positions that could not be obtained intheir former parties (see Table 2).

3.4. Partisan Participation and Linkage

In Argentina, formal party membership does not involve making a financial contribu-tion; moreover, since the “Open an Mandatory Primary Act” has passed in 2010, nei-ther is a necessary condition to participate in primary elections4. Meanwhile, formalmembership is mandatory in order to become partisan authority and it is customaryin majoritarian parties for all cadres to be affiliated. The PRO’s case (with 40% of itsleading cadres not affiliated and about 20% maintaining their previous affiliation toUCR or PJ) is a rara avis in Argentina’s political scenario.

Table 3: Participation an linkage (selected data)

Generation

Characteristics

1st(until 1981)

Old Politicians

2nd(1982-1989)Transition

3th(1990-2000)

90s Gen.

4th(since 2001)Newcomers

Totals

Affiliated to PRO 30% 50% 90,9% 75% 59,6%

Cadres with other activities 50% 72,2% 36,4% 25% 50%

Cadres who has signed petitions 40% 38,9% 18,2% 8,3% 26,9%

Involvement in voluntary work 50% 50% 81,8% 91,7% 67,3%

Involvement in intra-party politics 70% 61,1% 18,2% 33,3% 46,1%

Source: Data collected in survey made in 2011

The PRO was founded (as CPC) between 2002 and 2003 by a core of leadingcadres from third and fourth generations and a few old politicians from traditionalright parties. Those arrived after that moment were not compelled to formalize theirlinkage to the PRO. Thus, differently from what happens in traditional left-parties(Pudal 1989) and in new right-parties (Lafont 2001) that demand a “total commit-ment”, PRO seems to be an open and porous organization. This feature of PRO is

4 The Open an Mandatory Primary Act (Ley Nacional de Primarias Abiertas y Obligatorias) requiresall parties to celebrate open (not only for members) and simultaneous primary elections in order to al-low its candidates to participate in national elections. In 2011, most of the parties (including the PRO)din not present different candidates to the constituents (anyway, by law, PRO was forced to present itscandidates at the primary elections).

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magnified in the volatile, fragmented and lowly institutionalized party system of Ar-gentina (Coppedge 1998; Freidenberg and Levitsky 2007).

However, the lability of the linkages inside the PRO party is not homogeneous.As can be seen in Table 3, 90% of 90’s generation and 75% of newcomers are affili-ated to the PRO, against 50% of the transition’s generation and only 30% of oldpoliticians. Similarly, the cadres from third and fourth generations who are not officialmembers of the PRO are not affiliated to other parties, but in the first and secondgenerations, those who are not affiliated to the PRO tended to be members of otherparties (86% of old politicians and 56% of the transition generation). Thus, the partyis formed with cadres with unequal commitments: the younger generations are theones with stronger linkages and the feel that they owe everything to the PRO, due totheir minor political capital by virtue of their short political career. In contrast, the old-er generations, with a firm political background, are able to maintain weaker linkageswith the party. Nevertheless, also must be noted that the younger generations arethe ones who have more cultural capital and best possibilities to develop a professio-nal career outside politics; for them, the PRO’s success is not the only alternative tomaintain their privileged social position.

The differences between generations can also be noted analyzing the mostcommon type of government and partisan tasks of each one. Among the newcomers,66% have executive positions (in the areas of economy and infrastructure) and only33% are legislators. In contrast, in the first two generations, 50% do legislative workin the National Congress or the Legislature of Buenos Aires. In the case of the thirdgeneration, they have executive positions (in areas of social policy, human rights andenvironment) in similar proportion to legislative ones. The 90’s generation also havethe majority of the institutional party positions (Party in Central Office, Katz and Mair2002), while the older generations have a limited insertion in intra-party politics(though, when they do, they reach senior positions) and newcomers tend to occupyposts related to the raising and the administration of funds. Thus, the “division of la-bor” inside the PRO seems to reserve “management” tasks and economic control tothe most committed cadres (the newcomers) while letting the “social-sensitive”dimension of the government and the institutional aspects to the 90s generation. Onthe other hand, the development of political activities and the accumulation and con-trol of political resources are assigned to the old politicians and to the transitiongeneration.

The PRO’s political generations differ also in the type of political and partisanactivities that they are accustomed to undertake beside their formal position. Amongthe older ones, the classical practices of political players (such as signing petitions,participating in political rallies, and party internal elections) are the most common ac-tivities. In contrast, for younger generations, practices associated with non-politicalorganizations (such as voluntary social work and charity activities that are closer tothe NGOs and religious sociabilities) are more frequent. Thus, “do politics” meanssomething different for each of the PRO’s generations.

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3.5. Social Embeddeness

From the social networks theoretical perspective that is being used in this study, it isimportant to position the political parties in the sociability spaces of its membersrather than treating them as if they were organizations completely detached from so-ciety. In this regard it is relevant to analyze if the partisan activity and the govern-ment work appear as a shared activity with their social environment (Zuckerman2005; Haegel 2009). Our study shows that a high percentage of the leading cadreshave at least some friends who participate in politics inside the PRO (90%). The oldpoliticians and transition’s generation have a greater share of their friends inside thePRO, partly due to their entering into the party as a collective strategy (minor partiesallied to the PRO, traditional party groups who took the collective decision to changetheir allegiance). Meanwhile, newcomers and 90s generation’s cadres have muchfewer friends at the PRO. Regarding the participation of the social environment inother parties, the overall proportion of cadres with at least some of their friends in po-litical activities is still high (61%), but has important differences between generations.Among the transition’s generation, only 28% reported having no close person to par-ticipate in another party, but this number rises to 75% in the case of newcomers.Thus, we see again that “enter in politics” is an individual choice for the youngerones, but is part of a shared social practice for the older ones.

In connection with other social activities, a 90% of the PRO cadres participates(or has participated) in civil associations. A part of this participations can be ex-plained through the PRO’s cadres activities in associations formally linked to the par-ty (such as the “Think Foundation”, heiress of the “Believe and Growth Foundation”and “Grupo Sophia ” that preceded the PRO). However, the PRO’s cadres high parti-cipation in political students groups, commercial chambers, religious congregationsand social and sports clubs, bar associations and other professional institutions iscertainly remarkable. That leads to seriously consider the application of the “partisanenvironment” notion coined by Sawicki (1997; 2006).

4. Classifying the PRO

PRO party classification is not just an academic issue, it is also a matter of partisanstruggles over definitions. PRO leaders like to show the party as “new” (that is,formed by young people that enters in politics for the first time and thus is not yet co-opted by the traditional politician’s practices) and also as a “managerial” organization(that is, an organization formed by professionals who look for efficiency and probity,without partisan or ideological blinders). In contrast, opposition leaders of majoritari-an Argentina’s parties like UCR and PJ prefer to portrait the PRO as a “right-winger”party (because of both the presence of old right-wing politicians and young cadresfrom upper-middle class) and firmly biased to neoliberal policies (because the PROmain leader, Mauricio Macri, openly supports some issues of the neoliberal reformagenda and shows his rejection of Peronist and Radical Civic traditional goals for be-

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ing “populist”). As we have seen, all this characterizations are true to some extent.The PRO is a “new” party and formed partly by younger newcomers, although up tohalf of the PRO cadres have previous political experience (some of them in tradition-al Argentina right-forces). In the same sense, the PRO cadres do not come from up-per-classes only, but must be noted that the younger generations have socio-eco-nomic backgrounds close to them (such as traditional Argentina right-wing parties).Likewise, the PRO is a “managerial” party, but in the Argentine context, this featurelinks it to the neoliberal agenda, instead of showing the PRO as a non-ideologicalparty (Campbell 2001).

The partisan debate about the PRO classification is interesting and should notbe left out of the general analysis because the repertoire of labels that it implies is anuseful tool that can help to a deeper understanding of the party (Offerlé 1999). How-ever, what kind of party is PRO? Is it a cartel-party? Is it different from other Argen-tine right-wing parties? In which sense? The data analyzed in this paper does not al-low to properly answer all these questions though it means a starting point to beginresponding some of them.

4.1. Is the PRO a Cartel Party?

As stated by Katz and Mair (1995), the cartel party represents a major depart fromprevious models (as the elite party, (Ostrogorski 1902), masses-party, (Duverger1954) and the catch-all party, (Kirchheimer 1966)) but shares some traits with theprofessional-electoral model (Panebianco 1982). The Katz and Mair thesis points to“the interpenetration of party and state and by a tendency towards inter-party collu-sion”, so that “the goals of politics become self-referential, professional, and techno-cratic”, and “substantive inter-party competition becomes focused on the efficientand effective management of the polity” (Katz and Mair 2009, 755). But the cartelparty model is an ideal type that can be disentangled in a group of points (or, betteryet, a conjunct of empirical observations) divided in two analytical levels: the intra-party and the party-system (see the Table 4 for a comparative list of characteristicsbetween the catch-all party model and the cartel party model).

As shown in Table 4, the PRO party seems to accomplish some of the cartelparty model conditions at a party-level (system level cannot be analyzed with theavailable data, but see Szusterman 2007; Scherlis 2009). In the first place, the bal-ance of power between the “three faces” of the party (Katz and Mair 2002) is clearlyinclined toward the preeminence of the Party in Public Office (Mattina 2012, butmore on this below). Secondly, as showed above (see 3.4), rights and obligations ofthe members are de-emphasized, even to the extent that 40% of leading cadres arenot affiliated to the party and 20% is affiliated to other political parties. Finally, in thecase of PRO, the level of institutionalization is very low: although the party complieswith the formalities to which it is bound by law, the in-depth interviews reveals thatthe actual running of the party is commanded in a personalistic way by its leader,Mauricio Macri (see note 6, bellow).

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Table 4: Two Party Models and PRO classification

Type of Party

Traits

Catch-all Cartel Level PROcase

Principal goals of politics Social Amelioration Politics as a profession System

Basis of party competition

Policy effectiveness, accomplish-ment of an agenda

Managerial skills, efficiency ineconomic sense System

Ideological differen-tiation between parties

Low Very Low System

Party campaigning Labour (militant) and capitalintensive

Capital Intensive (professionalcampaigning) Party Both

Party organizational “faces” balance of power

Conflict between party on theground, party in the central office

and party in the public office

Clear Preeminence of party inthe public office Party Cartel

Main party’s resorurces

Contributions from different sourcesParty (militants, donations,

subventions)State Subventions Party Catch-

all

Selection of Candi-dates and relations between party mem-bers and party elite

Hierarchy, Top Down Stratarchy Party Both

MembershipOpen and heterogeneous member-ship (rights emphasized, de-empha-

sized obligations)

Rights and obligations de-emphasized; distinctions of

members and not-members be-come blurred; individual contri-

butions spotlighted

PartyCartel

Level of cadres professionalization

Medium: multi-positioned cadresand professional cadres

High: party career is separatedfrom professional track Party Both

Party institutionalization Medium Weak Party Cartel

Source: Adapted from Bolleyer 2009; Katz and Mair 2009. Last column is extracted from Survey 2011 and Gallo 2008b, 2008a; Mauro 2009a, 2005; Mattina 2012.

However, also must be noted that the PRO does not fulfill all the stipulations of thecartel party thesis. First: PRO party does campaigns in a professional way (Gallo2008a; Mauro 2009b) and uses capital intensive methods, but at the same time itmakes militant campaigning (i.e., it is based partly on traditional territorial militancy).Second: the PRO party main resources for campaigning are not the state subven-tions, but private donations mostly for their own candidates as in the elite party mod-el5. Third: regarding level of professionalization, the PRO case is ambiguous, be-

5 Data can be found in reports of the Transparency International Argentina’s Chapter (Poder Ciu-dadano 2007, see also the website http://dineroypolitica.org for unpublished reports). This can beexplained because its leader and some of its allies are millionaires that financially backed the party.

Morresi - 18

cause while some of the political generations come closer to the cartel partystipulation, other tend to the catch-all party model. Fourth: even if members-leadersrelationship is inclined toward stratarchy as in the cartel party model, the candidateselection and the crucial decisions are made in the top levels of the party by a smallgroup firmly led by Macri6. This trait is compatible with the high power of the Party inPublic Office (PPO), noticed above. Yet, something must be stated about the PPOpreeminence in the PRO case: the small number of formal and informal members,the thin structure of the Party in Central Office (PCO) and the intermittent work of theParty on the Ground (POG) causes, both, a complete overlap between the PCO andthe PPO and a partial overlap between PPO and the POG.

Figure 5: The three “faces” of PRO

In a sense, the ambiguities of the PRO case can be explained as a consequence ofa “transition” moment, a period in which the old party system is endangered, but thenew party model still did not finished to conform. However, as explained by Sawicki(2011), these ambiguities can be better and more productively explored from a socio-logical approach focused in the “party environment” (like the one that we intended inthe third section of this article)7.

4.2. The PRO as an Open Environmen

In the introduction it was said that (in virtue of the data available) the PRO allegianceto the right-wing forces only could be assumed a priori. However we already stated

PPO!

POG!

PCO!

6 In the in-depth interviews the top-down hierarchy appears clearly: “The important decisions aremade by a small group, a troika, formed by [the Mayor of Buenos Aires, Mauricio] Macri, [the chief ofstaff, Horacio] Rodríguez Larreta, Marquitos [Marcos Peña, Secretary General of the Government]and [the campaign consultant Jaime] Durán Barba... we can give opinions, but that’s all”. Regardingcandidate selection, a National Congress deputy told us in another interview: “I would like to remain inthis office, but Macri decided that it’s better to present my candidacy for other [higher] position, and I’llwould never consider doing otherwise”. In the same sense, selection of PRO’s candidates from otherdistricts (as Santa Fe) also was made directly by Macri (Clarin 2010). 7 The study of a political party at a local level is mandatory to understand its implantation in a givensociety (as in the case of the PRO in contemporary Argentina). Approaching as close as possible tothe ground, made easier to found that a party rests in relational networks which are based on sharedvalues and interests and are fed through interactions in several places of sociability (associations,NGOs, clubs, trade unions, etc.). This relational networks form (in the terminology advanced by Saw-icki, 2011) a “party environment”. A matching research proposal can be found in Katz and Mair (2009).

Morresi - 19

that there are many clues that make this assumption plausible (see p. 9). In case ourassumption is true, some traits of the PRO can imply a comparative advantage re-spect traditional Argentina right-wing parties. This advantageous characteristics are:the PRO opens a pluralistic model, in on hand, and its commitment with the electoralpath, in the other.

The multiple social networks that converge at the PRO show that the party (atleast for now) is an open and pluralistic environment. This characteristic allows thePRO to be a party that can give shelter to multiple groups and actors, each one withhis own values and interests. This contrasts sharply with the UCeDe case (see 2.1),in which the traditional leaders and founders intended to close the party to newcom-ers and generated public struggles for the control of the organization and its ideologi-cal identity. In a sense, to the extent that the main leaders of the PRO maintain theinternal tolerance that they have shown until now, and outline a general agenda thatdo not clash directly with the values and interests of the different groups that formthe party, its continuity appears assured.

In virtue of its “openness”, the PRO party can undertake diverse political strate-gies at the same time. In one hand, the more politically experienced members of thePRO can continue with traditional political practices (as popular rallies and territorialmilitancy) that in a fractured society like Argentina are still important in order to gainsupport in lower social sectors. In the other hand, the newcomers, who have a moretechnical inclination, can dedicate to other kind of political campaigning (fundraising,participation in media) oriented to middle and upper classes. This is a novelty com-pared with the AR and UCeDe parties, that only embarked in the latter form of parti-san activity.

In order to maintain its open and pluralistic environment, the PRO resists theclassical ideological right-left cleavage. While other Argentina right-wing parties tend-ed to position themselves at “the center-right” of the political spectrum, the PRO re-jects this kind of classification. Two things must be pointed respect this rejection.First, it is shared by the Argentina traditional majoritarian parties (that have alwayspreferred to present themselves as “republican center”, “third position”, etc.). Andsecond, it is strongly encouraged by the party leaders. In a booklet titled “Questionsand Answers” distributed between party cadres in 2011 that was aimed to serve as aguide to answer citizens and journalists, it is stated:

Question: Is the PRO a right-wing party?

Answer: Continue cataloging political proposals as pertaining to the right or the left is ap-plying to the present categories of the past, that confuses rather than explain. Thereare different ways of considering politics: some are old and some are modern. Ac-cording to the old perspective, politics is struggle and ideology, while according to themodern one, it is management and service to the citizen. The PRO maintains this lat-ter conception and seeks to promote national development through the search forconsensus and unity. The voter is not concerned about classifications of right and left,he only wants honest rulers who work seriously in the solution of problems and in thegeneration of conditions of development for all (PRO 2011, 30).

This quotation (in which ideological traditional identities are assimilated with sterileand old-fashioned struggles, while the “modern” identity is considered closer to hon-esty and serious and efficient management) is remarkable, because it shows clearly

Morresi - 20

the post-ideological orientation intended by the PRO leaders. Certainly, is matter ofdiscussion if this trait is only a logical consequence of the advancement of the cartel-party system (Katz and Mair 2009) or if it is also linked to a neoliberal agenda (Mor-resi 2008). Anyway, the noticeably point of the rejection of the right/left classificationis that it allows to maintain open the ideological boundaries of the organization andto avoid that certain actors exit to the left or to the right of the party8.

To the extent the party can accommodate actors with diverse values and inter-ests, certain paths to power that has been customary in traditional right-wing partiesdoes not appear as attractive alternatives to the PRO. This trait is of remarkable im-portance not only to the PRO party itself, but it is also fundamental to the still youngand unstable Argentina's democratic system.

Contrastingly with UCeDe, AR and other old liberales’ parties, the PRO is notan organization aimed to offer their cadres or policy proposals to other politicalforces. Its goal is to be in the Public Office, not to insert some men and women inanother party’s government. In fact, this elitist approach is not logical for the PRO,due to its internal diversity.

Also, differently from some center-right political parties of Argentina’s provinces(like Liberal Autonomist Party from Corrientes an other old federalistas’ parties) thePRO is not aimed to remain as a one-district party. Even if (until now) the PRO hasput on hold the leap to the presidential competition, their national aspirations are ob-vious. The chances of success of the PRO in presidential elections are unclear, butthe Survey 2011 shows a clear intention to pursue this course of action in the nearfuture.

Finally, the issue that differentiates more clearly the PRO from the majority ofthe previous Argentina right-parties, is its commitment with the liberal-democraticsystem. Even if a not insignificant amount of PRO cadres have had clear and directlinks to the last military dictatorship, the conjunction of the time passed (these cadresare the closer to retirement) and the PRO inclination to the electoral path, points to aremarkable and auspicious conclusion: as long ago was predicted and hoped by po-litical analysts (Di Tella 1971), Argentina finally has obtained a democratic right-partywith actual chances to access Public Office in clean elections. Obviously, this matterleads to new questions: will the right-wing commitment with democracy be lasting,even if the Peronism remains in office and continues to apply populist policies?; isthe PRO capable of generating new leaderships in case its actual leader resulted de-feated?; Will the PRO collude with its present adversaries if the system’s carteliza-tion advances? Will PRO be tempted to implement clientelistic and/or populist poli-cies and practices in case it resulted triumphant at a national level? Answering thesequestions requires not only further analysis but also the pass of time.

8 In this respect is interesting to point to the PRO internal debate that arose while Macri decided notto appeal the Buenos Aires's court injunction that prevented same-sex couples to marry in 2009. Infront of protest of the PRO cadres linked to the traditional right and the catholic church, Macri wasforced to accord with a more conservative approach (Rosemberg 2009). Eventually the issue becameabstract when a national law allowing gay matrimony was advanced by Peronism and approved bythe Congress in 2010.

Morresi - 21

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