Reply Brief Appellant Final w Toc Toa 2-27-16

7/24/2019 Reply Brief Appellant Final w Toc Toa 2-27-16

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/reply-brief-appellant-final-w-toc-toa-2-27-16 1/16

1

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

APPELLATE DIVISION

Appellate Division: ASIAS1500049

SBSC: UDDS1204130

APPEAL FROM AN ORDER in San Bernardino Superior Court, Dept. S-29

Staying Enforcement of Attorney Fee Judgment Without Posting a BondHon. Janet M. Frangie

_________________________________________________

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF ________________________________________________

Nancy Duffy McCarron #164780

950 Roble Lane

Santa Barbara, CA 93103805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492

[email protected]

Attorney for Appellant, Bonnie Shipley

STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, et alPlaintiff/Respondent

v.

BONNIE SHIPLEY,

Defendant/Appellant

mailto:[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]



2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................... 3-4

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 5

ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................... 6

I. Order is Not Presumed Correct When it Ignores Supreme Court Mandate ..................... 6

II. Sanction Request is Procedurally Deficient and Factually Unwarranted ............................12

Global Effect of Enjoining Enforcement Without a Bond .............................................14

CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................................14

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ..................................................................................15

Filed Under Separate Cover; i.e. Request to take Judicial Notice

RJN A-Unanimous Jury Verdict for McCarron on Second Frivolous Evictionafter losing First Frivolous Eviction against Bonnie Shipley via MSJ

RJN B-Fraudulent Request for Judicial Notice Filed in typical Fraudulent Eviction

PROOF OF SERVICE ..................................................................................................... Last



3

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 .................................... 6, 9

Bank of San Pedro v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th. 797 .......................................... 5, passim

Behniwal v. Mix (2007)147 Cal.App.4th 62, 624 ..................................................................... 10

Bono v Clark (2002, 6th Dist) 103 CA 4th 1409 ...................................................................... 12

Chamberlin v. Dale's R.V. Rentals, Inc. (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 356 ........................................ 6

Chapala Management Corp. v. Stanton (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th

. 337 .................................. 6

Grant v. Superior Court (1990) 25 C.A.3d 929, 934 ................................................................ 14

Leung v. Verdugo Hills Hospital (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 205, 211 – 212 ................................ 14

Nielsen v. Stumbos (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 301 ......................................................................... 6

O’Grady v. Superior Court (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1021 .......................................................... 12

Pecsok v. Black (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 456, 461 ....................................................................... 11

Simon v Bemis Bros. Bag Co. (1955, 2nd Dist) 131 CA. 2d 378 ............................................. 12

Vadas v. Sosnowski (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 471, 473 ................................................................ 7

Webster v. Superior Court (1988) 46 Cal.3d 338, 344 ............................................................... 8



4

STATUTES

CCP §916 ......................................................................................................................... 6, 9, 11

CCP §917.1 .................................................................................................................... 6, passim

CCP §1033.5 ........................................................................................................................ 6, 11

Penal Codes §132 and §134 ...................................................................................................... 13

OTHER AUTHORITIES

AB 58 ................................................................................................................................ 8, 9, 11



5

INTRODUCTION

Respondent’s Brief is riddled with misrepresentations of the facts and the law.

It woefully fails to address the sole issue recited in Appellant’s Opening Brief:

Did the court err by ignoring a Supreme Court directive to

distinguish attorney fees as a non-routine cost--requiring

an undertaking to stay enforcement pending appeal?

There is no case, code or appellate rule authorizing a respondent to paraphrase

or intentionally distort the issue presented in an Appellant’s Opening Brief as follows:

“Did the Trial Court err in finding that an Order solely awarding

attorneys’ fees as costs, unaccompanied by a money judgment,

is automatically stayed on appeal under Code of Civil Procedure

section 917.1(d) without the necessity of posting a bond.”

Stubblefield employs his regular, unfair litigation tactic of paraphrasing to lead

this Panel down a primrose path to error---just as he did with Judge Sachs in 2014.

Respondent inserted the words “or resident” into the original judgment in this case,

delivered the tweaked judgment directly to chambers, without serving it on counsel,

to hoodwink Judge Sachs into signing a judgment authorizing Stubblefield to directly

evict Shipley--contrary to a clear directive in a previously issued writ of mandate.

Shipley had to appeal her own victory to invoke a Panel to correct the judgment.

Respondent’s unfair tactic resulted in a 2-year delay in awarding Shipley attorney fees.

Respondent filed a frivolous appeal of the same fee award solely to delay paying it.

Then respondent led the trial court below down the same primrose path to clear error, by misrepresenting facts and artfully omitting controlling Supreme Court authority.

1

1 Bank of San Pedro v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4

th. 797



6

I. Order is Not Presumed Correct When it Ignores Supreme Court Mandates

Respondent’s paraphrasing of the issue on appeal bypasses the entire point!

It is not whether attorney fees are recoverable under CCP §1033.5 as a routine cost

[stayed on appeal by CCP §916] -- but whether those fees are an extraordinary cost

[not stayed on appeal by CCP §916 unless the losing party posts a security bond].

AOB explained how our Supreme Court resolved appellate conflicts by hearing

Bank of San Pedro in 1992; how our legislators amended CCP §917.1 to codify it;

and how subsequent conflicts arose after Chapala Management Corp. v. Stanton

(2010) 186 Cal.App.4th

. 337 refused to apply Bank of San Pedro to attorney fees.

There are no published cases following Chapala Management ’s contrary findings.

The trial court breached a duty to apply Bank of San Pedro’s controlling authority.2

The High Court found an attorney fee award is an extraordinary cost --- and was

not a routine cost as defined in CCP §1033.5 -- automatically stayed by CCP §916.

It expressly approved Chamberlin’s finding that an attorney fee award is “an order

for the payment of money” as defined in CCP §917.1 (a)(1) --- exempt from the

automatic stay in CCP §916 and expressly disapproved contrary holdings:

In Chamberlin v. Dale's R.V. Rentals, Inc. (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 356, …. court concluded the then-existing rule that costs were not included

for such purpose did not extend to the award of attorney fees. Unlike the

costs involved in the early cases, such attorney fees are in the nature of

a directly litigated issue rather than merely incidental to the

judgment. Further, attorney fees are not the type of costs involved in

virtually every case. Attorney fees are awarded only in limited

situations....A different Court of Appeal, however, subsequently held that

where a party recovers no money damages but only a judgment for costs,

including an award of attorney fees under Civil Code section 1717, no

undertaking is required for a stay of judgment on appeal. ( Nielsen v.

Stumbos (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 301) San Pedro @ 801-802

2 Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455

http://login.findlaw.com/scripts/callaw?dest=ca/calapp3d/188/356.html






7

...The Court of Appeal in this case, however, held that Vadas ,

supra, 210 Cal.App.3d 471, which involved only routine costs, is

distinguishable from the present case. The Court of Appeal relied

instead on Chamberlin v. Dale's R.V. Rentals, Inc., supra, 188

Cal.App.3d 356, for the principle that non-routine costs must be

treated differently from routine costs. The Court of Appeal furtherconcluded that expert witness fees awarded under section 998,

subdivision (c) are not routine costs We agree with both conclusions

San Pedro @ 802

"The perfecting of an appeal shall not stay enforcement of the

judgment or order in the trial court if the judgment or order is for

money or directs the payment of money, whether consisting of a

special fund or not, and whether payable by the appellant or another

party to the action, unless an undertaking is given."…The questionin this case is whether the order awarding expert witness fees under

section 998, subdivision (c) is an order that "directs the payment of

money" within the meaning of section 917.1, subdivision (a).

[1a] On its face the order directs the payment of money-$116,184.05-by

plaintiff to defendant, and is therefore within the literal language of

section 917.1, subdivision (a). Bank of San Pedro @ 800

…. "A judgment for costs is not the judgment directing the payment of

money contemplated by section 942. If such were the fact, a stay bond

would be required in almost every conceivable case…

…The exception in section 917.1 to the automatic stay provision of

section 916 would cease to be an exception; it would subsume the

general rule. Such a result could not have been consistent with the

Legislature's intent. Bank of San Pedro @ 801

…. We therefore have held that a judgment for costs alone was

not a judgment directing the payment of money within the

meaning of former section 942 (now section 917.1, subdivision (a))

and was therefore stayed without the need for an undertaking

[…cites…] This rule has become well established. (See, e.g.,Vadas

v. Sosnowski (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 471, 473. San Pedro @ 801











8

The Court of Appeal in this case correctly explained that, "Expert witness

fees, like attorneys' fees, are not ordinarily a part of costs awarded at

trial. Further, the award of expert witness fees (1) is not the type of cost

included in virtually every case and (2) was a directly litigated issue, as

opposed to being an incidental matter. Specifically, the record reflects that

two separate hearings were conducted, involving two motions. Id @ 803

We must not lose sight of the fact that we are dealing with a statutoryquestion and that we must attempt to reach a result comporting with theLegislature's intent. (Webster v. Superior Court (1988) 46 Cal.3d 338, 344[250 Cal.Rptr. 268) The Court of Appeal's decision in this case achievesthis goal in several respects. Bank of San Pedro @ 803-804

Bank of San Pedro (1992) was codified 1993 legislative sessions as follows:

Documents associated with AB 58 in the Session Status 612 bytes

History-2529 bytes Chaptered-09/27/93Enrolled-08/27/93 Introduced-12/22/92ASSEMBLY FLOOR: VOTES-ROLL CALL MEASURE: AB58AUTHOR: Peace TOPIC: Actions and proceedings.DATE: 09/02/93 LOCATION: ASM. FLOOR MOTION: AB58PEACE SPEC. CONSENT CALENDAR SECOND DAYCONCURRENCE (AYES 77. NOES 0.) (PASS)Senate Floor: VOTES - ROLL CALL MEASURE: AB58

AUTHOR: Peace TOPIC: Actions and proceedings.DATE: 08/27/93 LOCATION: SEN. FLOOR MOTION:CONSENT CALENDAR (AYES 37. NOES 0.) (PASS)

BILL ANALYSISCONSENT AB 58 Peace (D) 8/16//93 in Senate 21 67-0, p. 2110,5/28/93 (Passed Assembly on Consent)SUBJECT: Civil procedure SOURCE: State Bar

Existing law specifies the circumstances under which an undertakingis required in order to stay the enforcement of a judgment or order on

appeal. This bill would codify case law and require an undertaking or abond to be filed for a stay of enforcement of an order for extraordinary

costs awarded pursuant to specified Code of Civil Procedure sections.

It would also grant the court discretion to condition a stay of an award

of costs in other cases upon the filing of an undertaking.RJG:ctl 8/19/93 Senate Floor Analyses

http://login.findlaw.com/scripts/callaw?dest=ca/cal3d/46/338.html

http://login.findlaw.com/scripts/callaw?dest=ca/cal3d/46/338.html



9

BILL ANALYSISSENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY Bill Lockyer, Chairman1993-94 Regular Session AB 58 (Peace)As amended: August 16 Hearing date: August 17, 1993Code of Civil Procedure GWW:RF CIVIL PROCEDURE HISTORYSource: Irwin Nowick; State Bar Prior Legislation:

AB 2616 (1992) - Chaptered)Support: California Judges Association Opposition: No knownAssembly Floor vote: Ayes 67 - Noes 0

SHOULD AN UNDERTAKING OR BOND BE REQUIRED TO STAY

ON APPEAL THE ENFORCEMENT OF AN ORDER FOR

EXTRAORDINARY COSTS?

The Supreme Court in Bank of San Pedro v. Superior Court, (1992)

3 Cal.4th 797, held that costs which have been awarded pursuant to

C.C.P. 998 (failure of a party to accept fair compromise offer) or C.C.P.

1141.21 (a judgment in a trial de novo that is less favorable then thearbitration award) are extraordinary costs. Thus, a bond or undertaking

must be filed in order to stay enforcement of those orders.

AB 58 would codify the San Pedro case. It would also give to trial courts

the discretion to condition a stay of an award of cost in all other cases

upon the filing of a sufficient bond or undertaking.

http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgibin/postquery?bill_number=ab_58&sess=9394&house=B&author=assembly_member_peace

The High Court held an award for extraordinary costs (such as attorney fees andexpert witness fees) must be distinguished from routine costs stayed by CCP §916.

It held orders “directing the payment of money” are excepted under §917.1(a)(1).

Inferior courts must follow Supreme Court mandates.3 The Chapala Management

v. Stanton Panel erred by failing to follow mandates recited in Bank of San Pedro.

In 6 years no published cases have ever followed Chapala Management (2010).

At http://www.calattorneysfees.com/cases_undertaking an attorney fees web author noted:

BLOG UNDERVIEW--The fees only undertaking issue is not as cleanas one might think. See the reasoning of the Fourth District, Division 3 in

Behniwal v. Mix, also discussed in our August 1, 2010 post on Chapala

Management, which seems to go the other way on this issue.

3 Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455

http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgibin/postquery?bill_number=ab_58&sess=%209394&house=B&author=assembly_member_peace



http://www.calattorneysfees.com/cases_undertaking








10

In Behniwal v. Mix, the Panel cited Bank of San Pedro, supra as follows:

[1] After canvassing the relevant authorities, particularly Isaac, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th 586 and Bank of San Pedro v.

Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 797 [attorney fees awarded

pursuant to contract are not truly "incidental" to judgment]

Behniwal v. Mix (2007)147 Cal.App.4th 62, 624

Nor can, as we soon show, such an award be characterized as an"incident" of the specific performance judgment on the theory thatthe attorney fee provision is a mere "cost" authorized by statute.The logic for such a result goes like this: Attorney fees recoverableunder contract are deemed "costs" under Civil Code section 1717and Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5; Dennis shows that"costs" awarded in a suit may be offset against the purchase pricein a specific performance decree; ergo, attorney fees awarded

under contract may be deducted from the purchase price in aspecific performance decree. Behniwal v. Mix @ 624

The logic breaks down because, as we will soon show, under Bank

of San Pedro, supra, 3 Cal.4th 797, contractual attorney fee awardsreally aren't the sort of "routine" costs that the Dennis court dealtwith in passing. Rather, they are a separately litigated issue. Id

However, the Supreme Court held otherwise, making three pointsthat, as it turns out, are applicable to the case before us now. First,

the court said expert witness fees -- and in the process lumpedattorney fees into the same category -- are not "routine" costs .They are a directly litigated issue. fn. 8 Second, expert witness

fees (and surely, we can add, attorney fees) are always a matterof trial court discretion, even if awarded as a matter of right .fn. 9 ….

We recognize, of course, that the present case is not aboutwhether a bond is required for an attorney fee award included in a judgment, but the Supreme Court's resolution of the expert fee

matter in Bank of San Pedro renders the buyers' logic hereuntenable: In light of Bank of San Pedro, they cannot claim thattheir attorney fee award is merely a "routine cost" included in the judgment, deductible from the purchase price the same way thatthe costs of duplication of reply briefs were deductible in Dennis.

Behniwal v. Mix @ 633-634

http://login.findlaw.com/scripts/callaw?dest=ca/caapp4th/66/586.html

http://login.findlaw.com/scripts/callaw?dest=ca/cal4th/3/797.html


http://login.findlaw.com/scripts/callaw?dest=ca/caapp4th/147/621.html#B0008









11

We need only add that, in distinguishing directly litigated issues

(like expert witness fees and attorney fees) from "routine"

costs, the Bank of San Pedro decision validated a distinctionimpliedly drawn by the Kamper v. Mark Hopkins, Inc., supra, 78Cal.App.2d 885 decision. Behniwal v. Mix @ 635

It cannot be disputed that our Supreme Court in Bank of San Pedro, supra

expressly held attorney fee and expert witness fee awards, are not “routine costs”

automatically stayed under CCP §916, but are directly litigated issues--classified

as extraordinary costs excepted from stay by CCP §917.1(a)(1).

It cannot be disputed that our legislators codified Bank of San Pedro in AB58,

which expressly recited their specific intent to codify Bank of San Pedro, supra.

It cannot be disputed that trial courts are not authorized to ignore controllingauthority simply because they disagree with it. Auto Equity, supra.

It cannot be disputed the trial court below erred as a matter of law--not only by

misinterpreting CCP §§916 and 917.1, but also by following an inferior court’s

erroneous holding [which no other published case has followed in 6 years] instead

of following Supreme Court controlling authority as required in Auto Equity, supra.

Finally, and most importantly, the High Court in Bank of San Pedro, supra

expressly overruled Pecsok v. Black (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 456 in fn 4 as follows:

FN 4. In Pecsok v. Black (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 456, 461,

the Court of Appeal noted our grant of review in the present

case but rejected any distinction between routine and

nonroutine costs. We disapprove Pecsok to the extent it is

contrary to our decision in the present case.

It cannot be disputed the High Court in Bank of San Pedro disapproved of

any court who rejected its distinction between routine and non-routine costs.

Shipley filed 3 Memoranda of Costs (under CCP §1033.5) within 15 days of

prevailing on the writ of mandate, and respondent’s two appeals of the writ.

Those were the “routine costs” incident to judgment recited in CCP §1033.5.

Attorney fee award was our extraordinary cost which must be distinguished.




http://login.findlaw.com/scripts/callaw?dest=ca/cal4th/3/797.html#A0306



http://login.findlaw.com/scripts/callaw?dest=ca/cal4th/3/797.html#A0306






12

Appellant’s reliance on O’ Grady v. Superior Court (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th

1021

was not prohibited. Appellant’s AOB disclosed, at footnote 10 [page 10], that a

rehearing was granted, but then cancelled due to subsequent settlement of the case.

The case was never ordered “depublished.” After the case settled counsel never

followed up to correct the heading reciting a rehearing had been scheduled, which

never occurred due to the settlement. The O’Grady panel provided an extensive

analysis of the rationale used by our Supreme Court in Bank of San Pedro, supra.

II. Sanctions Request is Procedurally Deficient and Factually Unwarranted

Respondent’s Sanctions Request is procedurally deficient as Stubblefield failed

to request sanctions by a separate motion as required under CRC, Rule 8.276 (e):

Party required to defend a civil action on appeal failed to properlyrequest sanctions against plaintiff for bringing a frivolous appeal;defendant failed to make its request by separate motion, as required byformer Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 26(e) (see now Cal. Rules of Court,Rules 27 and 29.7). Bono v Clark (2002, 6th Dist) 103 CA 4th 1409

Even if respondent had complied with the prerequisite of filing a separate motion

prior to seeking sanctions, there is no basis in fact to request sanctions in this case.

An appeal is not frivolous where proof introduced by appellant is substantial and

persuasive, and is presented in a courteous and gracious manner . Simon v Bemis Bros.

Bag Co. (1955, 2nd Dist) 131 CA. 2d 378. Each appeal must be evaluated on its merits.

Respondent continues to hark back to a comment about Judge Sachs in a 2014 appeal,

which was resolved in Shipley’s favor in 2014. Appellant’s opening brief here was

professional and did not make one disparaging remark about the court or respondent.

AOB recited a professional outline of conflicts in the Appellate Districts prior to 1992,

analyzed the Supreme Court’s 1992 holdings in Bank of San Pedro; analyzed the 1993

legislative revisions to CCP §917.1 codifying Bank of San Pedro; and lastly explained

how the Chapala Management case generated further appellate conflicts.



13

The only party deserving sanctions is respondent. Despite a unanimous jury verdict

for McCarron, after a 4-week trial on a second frivolous eviction [see RJN – Exh. A],

judgment for Shipley on the first frivolous eviction, a mysterious fire at space 333,

the Hart\King firm continues a campaign of frivolous evictions to filch mobilehomes.

[see RJN – Exh. B] which is Hart\King’s filing in an Anaheim-Orange County Court.

It asks the court to take Judicial Notice of a f raudulent “legislative intent” purporting to

support a 5-day Notice to Surrender Possession as a valid instrument to evict occupants.

The firm continues to use the fraudulent instrument to filch homes from occupants who

are not “purchasers or transferees” and are not in privity of contract with the parkowner.

The Hart\King firm was served with a writ of mandate from this court explaining

how the notice could not be used to evict persons who are not purchasers or transferees and who are not in privity of contract with the park owner. The firm appealed the order

and lost at the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Div. 4 and California Supreme Court.

The firm lost both appeals. Accordingly the firm knows the instrument they continue

to use to filch homes on behalf of greedy park owners is invalid and totally fraudulent.

Not only is the firm’s continued use of the invalid 5-day notice to steal mobilehomes

a violation of Penal Codes §132 and §134 (knowingly filing fraudulent documents in

court for an illegal purpose) but also constitutes a conspiracy to commit grand theft of

personal property whose value exceeds $5,000. Shipley asks this court to notify the

Anaheim Court Judge, and all other state Judges of this firm’s racketeering enterprise

and its unethical attorneys who prosecute fraudulent evictions to steal mobilehomes.

(see RJN – Exh. B).

The court should not allow Hart|King to continue filching homes from poor, elderly

and disabled residents---to enrich wealthy park owners who pay their legal fees to filch

homes via fraudulent evictions based on invalid 5-day Notices to Surrender Possession.



14

GLOBAL EFFECT OF ENJOINING ENRCEMENT WITHOUT A BOND

Enjoining enforcement without requiring a bond will result in a tsunami of appeals.

There is no incentive not to “roll the dice” on appeal, where appellant is given an entire

year, or several years in protracted appeals, to liquidate assets and transfer funds out of

the country to avoid satisfying a judgment. It is an abuse of discretion for a court to

leave a prevailing party unprotected and without security pending the loser’s appeal.

Shipley asks the Panel to direct the trial court to reverse its ruling authorizing the

loser’s appeal without posting a bond---as required under CCP §917.1(a)(1) and

controlling Supreme Court authority in Bank of San Pedro, supra. Shipley asks

this Panel to award all costs and attorney fees she is entitled to under the law.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of the undertaking requirement is ‘to protect the judgment won

in the trial court from becoming uncollectible while the judgment is subjected to

appellate review. A successful litigant will have an assured source of funds to meet

the amount of the money judgment, costs and post-judgment interest after postponing

enjoyment of a trial court victory. Grant v. Superior Court (1990) 25 C.A.3d 929, 934

In implementing this purpose, section 917.1 does not tailor the amount of the

undertaking to the peculiarities of the judgment. To the contrary, it is rigidly

formulaic: ‘The undertaking shall be for double the amount of the judgment or order

unless given by an admitted surety insurer in which event it shall be for one and one-

half times the amount of the judgment or order.’ (§ 917.1, subd. (b) . . . .).”

Leung v. Verdugo Hills Hospital (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 205, 211 – 212.

A trial court lacks power to stay enforcement of the money judgment pending

appeal without the undertaking required by section 917.1, unless the statutory

exception applies. (See Sharifpour v. Le (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 730, 733

[“section 917.1, subdivision (a)(1) requires the giving of an undertaking to stay

enforcement” of a money judgment.].)



Nor does it appear that the court had discretion to order an amount less than that set

forth in the statute, absen t the exception. Leung, supra , 168 Cal.App .4th at p. 212.

Stubblefield failed to provide a scintilla of evidence to show irrepa rable harm would

occur if he had to post a bond pending appeal. Stubblefield is a wealthy developer who

can afford a bond for 197,857.50. Stubblefield could have written off the cost of a

bond a s a regular business expense. The court did not even consider the irreparable harm

to Shipley in denying her security to collect a fee award. Stubblefield has many months

to transfer assets and money into any one of his sham entities to avoid paying his debt

[ 197,857.50 + lo % interest when a mandatory attorney fee award is affirmed on appeal]

court is required to w eigh the benefits and burdens before issuing an injunction.

There are no burdens to Stubblefield and severe burdens to Shipley as there is no

security to collect her award. There are only benefits to Stubblefield in that he can delay

paying the judgment and transfer assets over the next year to avoid paying. Shipley has

no bond to cover risks of a potentially significant loss. There are no benefits to Shipley.

The trial court clearly erred in failing to apply sta re decisis (Bank of San Pedro),

following an inferior court's erroneous decision , and in failing to balance equ ities

between the parties, as required before issuing an injunc tion.

Respectfully subm itted 2127116

CERTIFICATE OF COM PLIANCE

The undersigned certifies Appe llant's

REPLY Brief consists of 4,307 words as shown

in Microsoft Word 201 0 used to produce the brief in T imes Rom an Fon t, 13 points

yit

the TOC and TOA. The undersigned cer ti fiw h is is true under penalty of perjury.

Executed on 2127116

~ a n m u f f y ' f v l c ~ a r r o n ,ttorney for Shipley



PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CA LIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

Stubblefield

v

Shipley ASIAS1500049 UDFS 1204130

Undersigned is counsel for Bonnie Shipley: 950 Roble Ln, Santa Barbara, CA 93 103

cell 805-450-0450 tellfax 805-965-3492

The undersigned served respondent plaintiff with the following documents:

APPEL LANT S REPLY BRIEF- Appeal Issue STAY

without

a BOND

[

] (By Personal Delivery)

[ ] (By Fax) The fax m achine used complied with Rule 2003 (3) and no error was

reported by m achine, pursuant to R ule CRC, 2008 [c](4) I caused the machine to

maintain a record o f same.

[ ] (By Electronic) to address below (agreement) [email protected]

rwilliamson@hartkinglaw com

[XI(By US Mail) 1013a , 20 15.5 CCP. I deposited docum ents in a pre-paid

stamped envelope to:

Robert G Williamson, A ttorney for Appe lleePlaintiff

HART

\KING

4 Hutton Center Drive, Suite 900

Santa Ana, CA 92707

I am familiar with mail collection in [ ] San Bernardino [XI Santa Barbara.

I

deposited the envelope in a US mailbox located in [ ] San Berna rdino [x] Santa

Barbara, CA. I am aware on a motion of the party served , service is presumed

invalid if postal cancellation date is more than one day after deposit date on affidavit.

[XI (STA TE) I declare under penalty of perjury and California law the above is true.

Execu ted in Santa Barbara, CA on the da te indicated below.

V w

~ a n b ~u f f h c ~ a r r o n , ttorney for Appellant

Reply Brief Appellant Final w Toc Toa 2-27-16

Documents

Transcript of Reply Brief Appellant Final w Toc Toa 2-27-16