ANSWER to Petition for Review w Cov Toc Toa POS Final_8!1!13

8/22/2019 ANSWER to Petition for Review w Cov Toc Toa POS Final_8!1!13

1/44

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

S212288

STUBBLEFIELD PROPERTIES, A CALIFORNIA GENERAL PARTNERSHIP

DBA MOUNTAIN SHADOWS MOBILE HOME COMMUNITY,

Petitioner,

v.

THE APPELLATE DIVISION OF

SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT,

Respondent.

BONNIE SHIPLEY,

Real Party in Interest.

AFTER SUMMARY DENIAL OF WRIT OF MANDATE OR OTHER

APPROPRIATE RELIEF BY THE COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH

APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION TWO, CASE NO. E058852

THE HONORABLE MANUAL A. RAMIREZ, JUDGE PRESIDING

AFTER ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF MANDATE IN THE FIRST

INSTANCE BY THE SUPERIOR COURT APPELLATE DIVISION FOR

THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO, CASE NO. CIVDS1302013,

THE HONORABLE GILBERT G. OCHOA, JUDGE PRESIDING

ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REVIEW

Nancy Duffy McCarron CBN 164780950 Roble LaneSanta Barbara, CA 93103

[email protected]

805-450-0450 fax 805-965-3492

Attorney for Real Party Bonnie Shipley
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


2/44

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I N TR O D U C TI O N TO A N SWER . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. 4

Q U ESTI O N PR ESEN TED FO R R EV I EW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 5

W H Y R E V I E W S H O U L D N O T B E G R A N T E D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

THE REAL FACTS AND REAL PROCEDURAL HISTORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

A. Real Facts ......................................................................................................................... 6B. Real Proceedings Leading up to Denial of Both Summary Judgment Motions ..... 9C. Shipleys Writ Petition to San Bernardino Appellate Division .................................. 12D. Petitioner Stubblefields Writ Petition to 4th Dist. Court of Appeal, Div. 2 ............. 13E. Further Appellate Division Proceedings After the Stay Was Issued ............. 13

LEGAL ARGUMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 13

ARGUMENT I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Appe llate Divis ion Corre ctly Inte rpret ed Civil 798.75(c) by applying

Supreme Court Directives on Statutory Interpretation, affirmed by

Appellate Courts Summary Denial of Stubblefields Writ Petit ion . . . 13

A. Appellate Division Applied the Plain Language in Civil 798.75 ......... 13B. Appellate Division 's Correct Interpretation of Civil 798.75(c)

Comports with Supreme Court Directives on Statutory Interpretation ............ 16

ARGUMENT II .............................................................................................................. 18

WHY STAY OF ALL PROCEEDINGS SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED ........... 18

A. Petitioner failed to explain any urgency as required by CRC 8.846(a)(7)(A).. 18

B. Writ will not issue where petitioner has plain, speedy, adequate remedy at law .. 18

C. PetitionerAdmits Malice in Prosecuting a Sham Complaint Against Shipley ..... 20


3/44

ii

ARGUMENT III ............................................................................................................. 21

PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES BELOW WERE FATAL TO WRIT PETITION ...... 1

A. Court Below Lacked Jurisdiction to Act on a Defective, Unverified Petition .... 21B. Petitioners Unappealed Motion for Summary Judgment Not Part of Writ ........ 25

ARGUMENT IV ................................................................................. .. 27

COURT MUST APPLY LEGISLATIVE INTENT ............................. 27

ARGUMENT V .................................................................................... 28

CRITERIA FOR CERTIORARI WAS NOT MET ............................. 28

GLOBAL CONSIDERATIONS ON CERTIORARI .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 28

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 29

CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT ..................................................................................... 30

PROOF OF SERVICE ................................................................................................................ 31

APPENDED EXHIBITS ............................................................................................................... 31

A. Palma Order Issued by Fourth District Court of Appeal, Div. 2 6/4/13 page 1B. Declaration of Maury Priest submitted with summary judgment pages 2-7C. Appellate Division fax of Williamsons verification on file in that court pages 8-9D. PE548 *newly manufactured declaration of Tom Parrish page 10


4/44

1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASESAARTS Productions, Inc. v. Crocker Natl Bank(1986) 179 CA.3d 1061,1065 ....................... 11

Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal(1941) 17 Cal.2d 280 ...................................................... 29

AFT v. Board of Education (1980) 107 C.A.3d 829, 835-836................................................... 17

Associationn Oil v. Supr. Ct(1955) 43 C2d 815, 82 ................................................................. 29

Benjamin Franklin B & L Corp. v. Schmidt (1933) 132 CA.39 ............................................... 21

Bishop v. Merging Capital(1996) 49 Cal.4th1803, 1809 ........................................................... 21

Blank v Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 331; Tidewater............................................................. 29

Burlington v. Sante Fe Ry Co (2004) 121 CA4th. 452, 462 ...................................................... 18

Burton v. Sec Pac Natl Bank(1988) 197 CA.3d 972, 978 ................................................. 11, 16

Chong Pong v. Harris (1918) 38 CA 214, 217 .......................................................................... 24

Citibank v. Tabalon (2012) 209 CA 4th. Supp.16, 21 ................................................................ 17

City of LA v. County of LA (1989) 216 CA.3d 916, 923 .......................................................... 17

Clutterham v. Coachmen (1985) 169 CA.3d 1223, 1227 .................................................... 11, 16

County of San Mateo v. W.C.A.B.(1981) 46 Cal. Comp. Cases 496 .......................................... 21

County of Santa Clara v. Supr Ct. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 545,553 .................................................... 18

Curle v. Supr. Ct(2001) 24 C4th. 1057 ..................................................................................... 21

Denham v Superior Court(1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566 ................................................................. 29

Denham ve. Supr. Ct. (1970) 2 C3d. 557, 564 ........................................................................... 18

Estate of Reed(1955) 132 CA2d. 732 ...................................................................................... 30

Eye Dog Found. v. State Bd. of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536 545 .............. 17

Fortman v. Hemco Inc. (1989) 211 CA 3d. 241, 257-260 ......................................................... 16

Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th.791, 800-801 ................................................................ 18

Gonzales v. Superior Court(1935) 3 Cal.2d 260 ................................................................ 16, 21

Gould v. Corinthian Colleges,Inc. (2011) 192 CA 4th

. 1176, 1181 .......................................... 29Hammer v. Zobelin (1876) 51 C.532 ........................................................................................... 9

Henriksen v. City of Rialto (1993) 20 CA. 4th 1612, 1617 n 2. [4th. Dist. Div 2] .................... 18

Henriksen v. City of Rialto (1993-4th Dist.-Div 2) 20 CA.4th 1612, 1625 .......................... 11, 16

Howard v. Superior Court(1944) 25 Cal.2d 784, 789 .............................................................. 18


5/44

2

Huber, Hunt, & Nichols v. Moore (1977) 67 CA 3d 278, 313 .................................................. 16

In re Marriage of Fink(1979) 25 Cal.3d 877, 887 .................................................................... 18

In re SA (21010) 183 CA 4th. 1128,1148 .................................................................................. 30

Jessup Farms v. Baldwin (1983) 33 Cal.3d 639, 660 ................................................................ 18Jones v. Superior Court(People) (1994) 26 CA.4th 92, 99-100 ............................................... 25

Keating v. Superior Court(1955) 45 C2d 440, 443 .................................................................. 29

Krueger v. Superior Court(Sec. Pac. Natl. Bank) (1979) 89 CA.3d 934, 936 ........................ 21

Lehto v. City of Oxnard(1985) 171 CA.3d 285, 293 [review denied December 5, 1985] ........ 14

Leslie G v. Perry & Assoc (1996) 43 CA 4th 472, 487; ............................................................ 22

Kuhn v. Dept Gen Svs (1994) 22 CA4th. 1627, 1632 ............................................................. 18

Mannheim v. Superior Court(1970) 3 Cal.3d 678, 683 ........................................................... 21

Marriage of Ditto (1988) 206 CA3d 643, 647 .......................................................................... 18

Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal. 3d. 604, 614 ............................................................................ 30

Melancon v. Superior Court(1954) 42 Cal.2d 698, 704 ........................................................... 28

Niles v. City of San Rafael(1974) 42 CA3d. 230, 243 .............................................................. 16

Omaha Indemnity v. Superior Court(Greinke) (1989) 209 CA 3d. 1266, 1269 ....................... 29

Otanez v.Blue Skies Mobilehome Park (1991) 1 CA.4th 1521 ................................................... 6

People v. Hull(1991) 1 Cal.4th 266, 272 .................................................................................. 17

People v. Superior Court(Laff) (2001) 25 Cal.4th 703, 727 ..................................................... 17

Perkins v. Onyett, 86 Cal. 348 ................................................................................................... 24

Phelan v Superior Court(1950) 35 Cal.2d 363 ......................................................................... 18

Power v. Fairbanks, 146 Cal. 611, 615; Davey v. So Pac Co., 116 Cal. 325, 330 .................... 18

Rancho Santa Paula Mobilehome Park v. Evans (1994) 26 CA 4th 1139 .................................. 7

Rodman v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.2d 262................................................................................. 29

Sanchez v. Swinerton & Walberg(1996) 47 CA 4th 1461, 1465- ............................................. 11

Sanchez v. Swinerton & Walberg(1996) 47 CA 4th 1461, 1465-1466 ..................................... 16

Sequoia Park Associates v. County of Sonoma (2009) 176 Cal. App. 4th 1270, 1282 .......... 29

Star Motor Imports v. Sp. Ct. (1979) 88 CA.3d 201 .................................................................. 21

Star Motor Imports v. Superior Court(1979) 88 CA3d 201, 203-204 ...................................... 22

Yarrow v.California (1960) 53 C.2d 427, 438 ........................................................................... 18


6/44

3

STATUTES

Article 7 of the MRL.................................................................................................................... 4

Civil Code:

798.......................................................................................................................................... 4

798.11............................................................................................................................. 14, 19

798.23.5................................................................................................................................ 19

798.25.5................................................................................................................................ 19

798.34............................................................................................................................... 7, 19

798.55........................................................................................................................ 4,5,19,28

798.55-57 .......................................................................................................................... 4,14

798.75 .............................................................................................. 4,5,8,9,10,13,14,15,20,21

798.77................................................................................................................................. 5, 6

798.88........................................................................................................................... 4,14,20

Code of Civil Procedure

437c(M)(1) ........................................................................................................................... 26

437c(m)(1). .......................................................................................................................... 25

446........................................................................................................................................ 22

904.3..................................................................................................................................... 28

1068...................................................................................................................................... 281069...................................................................................................................................... 21

1074...................................................................................................................................... 28

1086...................................................................................................................................... 21

1109...................................................................................................................................... 27

1160................................................................................................................................. 9, 10

1172................................................................................................................................... 9,10

2009...................................................................................................................................... 22

Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.809 ................................................................................................. 27

Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 56 ...................................................................................................... 21

Treatises5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Extraordinary Writs, 123, p. 3899 ........................... 21


7/44

4

TO: The Honorable Tani Gorre Cantil-Sakauye, Chief Justice Of California,

and The Honorable Associate Justices of the California Supreme Court:

INTRODUCTION TO ANSWER

In 1978 legislators enacted a comprehensive scheme to protect mobile home owners

whose homes were situated on mobile home park sites throughout California; i.e. the

Mobilehome Residency Law [MRL] at Civil Code 798 through 798.88.

Civil 798.55-798.57 provides unique protections for these residents. A park owner

may only terminate a residents tenancy on just cause for only 7 enumerated reasons,

following service of a 60-day written notice reciting thestatutoryjust cause reason.

Only a purchaser or transferee, who acquires a mobilehome and unlawfully occupies

it without executing a park lease, can besummarily evicted under Civil 798.75(c).Article 7 of MRL, governing ownership transfers, provides this limitedremedy to

protect park owners from unlawful occupants use of a lot space without paying rent.

The court erroneously expanded 798.75(c)s limitedscope by holding (c) applied

universally to anypark resident unilaterally labeled as unlawful occupant, despite an

uncontroverted affidavit from lobbyist Maury Priest supporting Shipleys summary

judgment motion. Priest testified he attended every 1987 legislative session and that

legislators intended to grant a limitedsummaryeviction remedyonly for purchasers and

transferees who unlawfully occupied without executing a lease. [Exhibit B-appended]

Thetrial courts orderabrogated all statutory protections against a parksarbitrary

eviction of mobile home residents without just cause and authorized those evictions

on 5-days notice by unilateral labeling a targetedresident as an unlawful occupant.

It put millions of poor, elderly and disabled residents at risk ofarbitrary evictions.

Appellate Division reversed this order contrary to legislative intent and public policy.

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Is the summary eviction remedy in Civil 798.75[c] limitedonly to purchasers and

transferees who occupy a mobile home without first executing a park owners lease?

YES. Trial court said NO. Appellate Division said YES. Court of Appeal affirmed.


8/44

5

WHY REVIEW SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED

In 1978 legislators expressed intent to prohibit arbitrary evictions in Civil 798.55:

(a) The Legislature finds and declares that, because of the high cost ofmoving mobilehomes, the potential for damage resulting therefrom, the

requirements relating to the installation of mobilehomes, and the cost oflandscaping or lot preparation, it is necessary that the owners of mobilehomesoccupied within mobilehome parks be provided with the unique protectionfrom actual or constructive eviction afforded by the provisions of thischapter.

(b) (1) The management may not terminate or refuse to renew a tenancy,except for a reason specified in this article and upon the giving of writtennotice to the homeowner, in the manner prescribed by Section 1162 of theCode of Civil Procedure, to sell or remove, at the homeowner's election, themobilehome from the park within a period of not less than 60 days,

which period shall be specified in the notice. Civil Code 798.55

Legislators reaffirmed their abhorrence ofarbitrary park evictions in 2012:

It is contrary to an expressed legislative goal to encourage owners to useinjunctive relief under Civil 798.88 rather than evict a resident for analleged park rule violation:

(Legislative intent: This three-year sunset will arguably provide theLegislature with the opportunity to re-evaluate this bill to ensure that thestated goal of encouraging a park owner to pursue a lesser remedy against a

resident of a mobilehome park instead of eviction is actually reached withoutnegative unintended consequences.) (Amended by Stats. 2012, Chap. 99 (AB2272, Wagner), eff. 1/1/2013)

The court held any park rule is enforceable by eviction, regardless of reasonableness,

disregarding Civil 798.77 which renders such rule void if it deprives a resident of any

right under MRL. The court found a triable issue as to whether a park rule was violated.

Even if summary eviction were authorized under 798.75(c) [it clearly is not] the order

bypassed two prerequisite issues; i.e. is the park rule constitutional andreasonable?

Both issues must be addressed before deciding ifa violation justified summary eviction.

The order allows summary eviction for violation ofany park rule, even if unreasonable,

which is contrary to the legislative protections afforded in Civil 798.55 and 798.88.

Fortunately, the Appellate Division reversed this devastating order, and the Court of

Appeal affirmed reversal by denying a petition below. This Petition should be denied.


9/44

6

THE REAL FACTS AND REAL PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. The Real FactsPetitioner continues a pattern of misrepresenting facts and law, which resulted

in a preemptory writ reversing the denial ofShipleys summary judgment motion.

Petitioner [@ page 6] misrepresents the Court and Appellate DivisionfoundShipley

occupies the mobile home under an unapproved lease/sublease with McCarron.

Petitioner also misrepresented this was an undisputed factin the writ petition below.

Not true. Shipley testified she executed a lease toshare the home. [1 PE, Exh.2, p.59]

Shipley produced her executed share occupancy agreement at her deposition.

Appellate Division found Shipley shares the home as McCarrons co-resident and

Stubblefield continued to accept monthly rent from McCarron, all utilities are in her

name, and she pays for them. Appellate Division Opinion excerpt recites as follows:

Pet. Exh.B, p.4

Petitioner misrepresents parkGuidelines require McCarron [the 55+ qualifying

resident] to at all times regularly occupy the home and that Shipley is an unlawful

occupant because McCarron does not regularly occupy the mobilehome (Petition, p. 6)

Not true. New Guidelines were not part of McCarrons 2005 lease and she never agreed

to be a prisoner within the confines of her home at all times to avoid summary eviction.

This unreasonable rule is void as it waives MRL rights under 798.77 as held in Otanez1

We hold that a tenant need not live in the

premises full-time in order to be a resident.

Secondly, retroactive anti-subleasing rules are unenforceable against a homeowner

who never agreed to such prohibition in her original park lease. Evans 2 Third, Civil Code

798.34 expressly authorizes any owner to share her home with a co-resident as her guest.

1 Otanez v.Blue Skies Mobilehome Park (1991) 1 CA.4

th1521

2 Rancho Santa Paula Mobilehome Park v. Evans (1994) 26 CA 4

th1139


10/44

7

Finally, petitioner misrepresents what itsposition was below; i.e. that Shipleys

occupancy was unlawful because McCarron does not occupy the home at all times.

The notice to Shipley identified her as apurchaserwho failed to execute the rental

agreement and the notice recited thepurchasershall not have any rights of tenancy:

1 PE, Exh.1, PE 8

It demanded Shipley surrender possession which she could not do as a non-owner.

A hybridunlawful detainer summons coupled with a forcible detainer claim was bizarre:

1 PE,Exh.1,PE 8

1 PE,Exh.1,PE 8

Petitioner was neverShipleys landlord--a prerequisite for any unlawful detaineraction.

No breach of contract claim lies where there is noprivity of contract with the defendant.

Possession of premises attorney fees and damages without privity was equally bizarre.


11/44

8

The sham complaint described Shipley aspurchaserwho entered into possession

of the premises and kept possession as described in MRL, Article 7 798.75(a)-(d):

1PE,Exh.1,PE 9

Petitioner prayed for an order to takepossession of premises knowing McCarron has

owned the home since 2005 and without joining heras a defendant in the sham action.

1PE,Exh.1,PE 10

Shipleys demur, motion to strike attorney fees and damages were denied, compelling

Shipley to answer asham complaint which mushroomed to 10 volumes, a 15-page docket

with 280 entries and 42 hearings-after a year of vitriolic litigation in 3 trial/appellate courts.

This case is not about Shipleys being 52 instead of 55+, or whether owner McCarron

regularly occupies space #333. This case is about a GOLIATH law firm trying to maintain

its top market share in representing wealthy park owners bybeing The Firm to carve out

a slick, speedy remedy for all park owners to filch homes via summary eviction. The Firm

converts the homes into cash cow rentals. Stubblefield already filched 200 of 360 homes in

the subject Mountain Shadows Mobile Home Community because poor, elder and disabled

homeowners cannot afford to hire attorneys to save their homes. With $1,000-$1,300/month

space rent, rising annually due to no rent control, the prohibition against co-residents forces

owners to abandon homes as they cannot make skyrocketing rents alone. The Firm asks this

court to expand 798.75(c) to facilitate filching of homes on a paltry 5-days notice.


12/44

9

B. The Real ProceedingsLeading up to Denial of Both Summary Judgment Motions

On 12/26/12 Shipley moved for Judgment on the Pleadings as plaintiff did not allege,

and could not allege, the statutory elements of aforcible detainerclaim. see CCP 1160.

Plaintiff could not negate herstatutory affirmative defense; i.e. McCarron had been the sole

occupant in possession more than a year. Plaintiff had burden of proof at trial. CCP 1172.

Both statutes codified forcible detainer elements this court set in 1876 [1 PE:Exh.2:PE40]

Hammer v. Zobelin (1876) 51 C.532. It is so ancient counsel had to upload it from archives.

This court never overruledHammer. Although not in published databases it is codified.

Judge Alvarez denied Shipleys Motion for Judgment on Pleadings & motion to compel

production of secret videos/written reports of McCarron/Shipleys alleged rule violations.

Although both were clearly discoverable Alvarez denied Shipleys timely motion to compel.

Alvarez ruled against the law for Stubblefield on each motion and never ruled for Shipley.

This is because Alvarez is up for reelection in 2014 and fears Stubblefield will bankroll a

judicial challenger who may defeat Alvarez based on his negative judicial ethics record.3

Stubblefield has a 50-yr reputation for blackmailing candidates and posting billboards all

over San Bernardino County to defeat public officials who do not comply with his demands.

Tax collector resigned upon conviction for $ laundering:http://www.cp-dr.com/node/2945

Neil Derrybillboard @ Mountain Shadows Mobile Home Park

3Judge Alvarez was placed on 3 years judicial probation for failing to report a DUI arrest.

Because Alvarez fears Stubblefields power he refuses to rule against the wealthy developer.
http://www.cp-dr.com/node/2945http://www.cp-dr.com/node/2945http://www.cp-dr.com/node/2945http://www.cp-dr.com/node/2945


13/44

10

Shipley filed Summary Judgment 1/23/13 [1 PE,Exh.2:29-140]. Petitioner moved for

summary judgment also. Both motions were denied 1/14/13 [3 PE, Exh.11:560-583].

The court manufactured a triable issue: whether McCarron regularly occupied the home.

2 PE Exh.2:327. This issue had nothing to do with whether plaintiff could prove the

elements of forcible detainer at trial [CCP 1160, 1172]---the only claim alleged in the

sham complaint and vigorously litigated for a year. Plaintiff never amended to add a

claim for declaratory or injunctive relief. It was bizarre for a court to transmute one

claim to anotherclaim [never alleged] with no pending motion from plaintiff to amend.

The court should only have considered whether Shipley proffered evidence to negate

any element of forcible detainer (the only claim pleaded) or any evidence to prove any

affirmative defense, and whether plaintiff could counter the evidence she had presented.Shipley submitted Maury Priests affidavit (a lawyer/lobbyist for mobilehome owners)

who had attended every 1987 legislative session when our legislators added the limited

summary eviction remedy [subdivision [c] [d] of 798.75] for purchasers/transferees.

Priest testified at length on what happened 26 years ago during the 1987 sessions.4

Priest testified that legislators intended to authorize summary evictions only against

purchasers and transferees who occupied homes without executing leases, and not

against an owners coresident already paying rent to the park under an existing lease.5

Stubblefield failed to file any affidavit in opposition to Maury Priests testimony.

The court erred in disregarding Priests affidavit with no contra affidavit on file.

A court cannot resolve credibility on summary judgment.6

Adopting Stubblefields

counsels conjecture and speculation on what he thought legislators intended in 1987,

instead ofPriests testimony on personal knowledge, showed prejudicial judicial bias.

Assertions on conjecture or speculation are insufficient to avoid summary judgment. 7

4 Exhibit 2 appendedto this Opposition; Opposition file below; 1 PE Exh. 2:PE 455 Shipleys Exh.1 filed w/Opposition to Writ Petition bel.,1 PE Exh.2:PE 46,9-10

6AARTS Productions, Inc. v. Crocker Natl Bank(1986) 179 CA.3d 1061,1065Henriksen v. City of Rialto (1993-4

thDist.-Div 2) 20 CA.4th 1612, 1625

7Burton v. Sec Pac Natl Bank(1988) 197 CA.3d 972, 978; Clutterham v. Coachmen (1985)169 CA.3d 1223, 1227; Sanchez v. Swinerton & Walberg(1996) 47 CA 4th 1461, 1465-1466
http://login.findlaw.com/scripts/callaw?dest=ca/calapp3d/179/1061.htmlhttp://login.findlaw.com/scripts/callaw?dest=ca/calapp3d/179/1061.html


14/44

11

Before the court heard the two summary judgment motions it set an OSC on 1/22/13

sua sponte forplaintiff to show cause why it moved for summary judgment before the

court had ruled onplaintiffs Motion to Compel deposition responses set for1/27/13.

The court stepped out of its role as judicial officer into a role of Stubblefields advocate,

even questioning the wisdom of Stubblefields counsels setting MSJ prematurely? 8

Transcript 1/22/13, p.1:20

Transcript recites like senior partner querying newbie associate to avoid bungling a case.

Transcript 1/22/13 p.3:1

Transcript 1/22/13 p.4:9

McCarron tells court she has the smoking gun-Priests affidavit on 1987 legislative intent:

Transcript 1/22/13 P 8:21

Transcript 1/22/13 P 9:7

8Shipleys Exh.2 filed w/Opposition to Writ Petition below; p.2.12-2.27; @ p.2.13


15/44

12

Shipley filed a separate statement of four undisputed facts. [1PE, Exh.2, PE 43].

Stubblefields attorney admitted facts were undisputed. [Transcript 1/22/13; p.2:5].

The Appellate Division found The facts are not in dispute. [Petition, Exh. B, p.5]

Pet,Exh.B p.5

Undisputed facts are: 1) owner has a valid lease; 2) Community Rules [2000] were

incorporated in her lease; 3) MRL governs; 4) owner was in continuous possession of

the premises for 8 years and Stubblefield continues to collect monthly rent from her.

Shipley and McCarron filed affidavits reciting that McCarron regularly occupied the

home and that Shipley executed a shared occupancy lease with homeowner McCarron.

Stubblefield failed to file any affidavits opposing Shipley, McCarron or Priest.

Despitepetitioners failure to file a statement ofdisputedfacts in opposition, or any

contra affidavits to Shipley, Priest orMcCarron affidavits, and petitioners attorneys

admission that material facts were undisputed,the court denied Shipleys motion.

C. Shipleys Writ Petition to San Bernardino Appellate DivisionShipley filed a writ petition in the Appellate Division on 2/27/13. On 3/5/13

the Appellate Division issued a stay of all proceedings below. [2 PE, Exh.3, PE 329].

Stubblefield barraged the Appellate Division with over 1000 sheets of paper, none of

which were relevant because Shipley had already filed all summary judgment papers.

The Appellate Division ignored Stubblefields irrelevant papers and denied him relief.

On 3/26/13 the Appellate Division invited the trial court to vacate its 2/14/13 order

denying summary judgment and issue a new order granting the motion (Palma order).

On 5/6/13 the Appellate Division issued its Opinion, finding 798,75(c) applied only

to purchasers and transferees----not to Shipley. Appellate Division opined 798.75(c)s

language recited surrender of the mobilehome site and only a mobilehome owner

has the legal authority and power to surrender a mobilehome site orremove a

mobilehome from the mobilehome site. [Petition, Exh.B; or 4PE, Exh 17:943-953]


16/44

13

D. Petitioner Stubblefields Writ Petition to 4th Dist. Court of Appeal, Div. 2On 6/3/13 petitioner filed a writ petition in 4

thDistrict Court of Appeal, Division 2

with 4 volumes of exhibits. [over 1000 sheets]. Petitioner sought a stay of all proceedings.

In itsPalma notice the Court of Appeal invited Shipley to respond to the petition by

6/24/13 to address procedural/substantive issues that could affect determination

"whether or not to exercise its discretion to entertain writ review." The Court of Appeal

further ordered that "[u]nless good cause is shown, the court may issue a peremptory writ."

[see Exhibit A] Shipley appends Exhibit A because Stubblefield artfully omitted thatorder

in his petition although he was required to append it. CRC 8.486(b)(1)(C). It was omitted

so that petitioner could artfully argue that the Court of Appeal gave short shrift to his

petition; thus this court should review it; when in fact this was not true. Exhibit A shows the

Court of Appeal read the petition immediately, granted a stay the next day and issued the

order shown in Exhibit A. The petition was denied only after reading Shipleys opposition.

E. Further Appellate Division Proceedings After the Stay Was IssuedOn 7/22/13 the Appellate Division issued a Remittitur to the trial court and

issued a certified Writ of Mandate which was served on both court and petitioner.

LEGAL ARGUMENTS

ARGUMENT I

Appell ate Divisi on Corre ctly Inte rprete d Civil 798.75(c) by applying

Supreme Court Directives on Statutory Interpretation, affirmed by

Appellate Courts Summary Denial of Stubblefields Writ Petit ion

A. Appellate Division Applied the Plain Language in Civil 798.75Statutes must be given a reasonable construction which conforms to the apparent

purpose and intent of the lawmakers. Various parts of the statutory enactment must be

harmonized by considering the particular clause in the context of the whole statute."

Lehto9

Civ. 798.75 must be harmonized with 798.55-57 providing unique protections

to park residents by prohibiting arbitrary evictions without just cause and due process.

9Lehto v. City of Oxnard(1985) 171 CA.3d 285, 293 [review denied December 5, 1985]


17/44

14

If legislators intended to revoke protections they would have repealed 798.55-57.

The MRL is divided into 8 Articles separated by subject area as shown below:

Mobilehome Residency LawArticle 1 GeneralArticle 2 Rental Agreement

Article 3 Rules and RegulationsArticle 3.5 Fees and ChargesArticle 4 UtilitiesArticle 4.5 Rent ControlArticle 5 Homeowner Communications and MeetingsArticle 5.5 Homeowners Meetings with ManagementArticle 6 Termination of Tenancy

Article 7 Transfer of Mobilehome or Mobilehome Park

Article 8 Actions, Proceedings, and Penalties

Article 1 General contains MRL definitions. For example, a residentis defined as a

homeowner orother person lawfully occupying a mobile home. Civil Code 798.11.

Stubblefield could have sought declaratory relief on definition ofunlawful occupant.

Article 8 Actions, Proceedings, and Penalties contains 798.88 authorizing park owners

to apply for injunctions to enforce rules. 798.88 gives park owners a hearing in 15 days

after seeking relief. Rather than seek court relief petitioner prosecuted asham complaint

praying to evict a coresidentof a paying tenant, without any existing privity of contract.

Article 7 governs Transfers of Mobilehomes relating only to transfers of ownership.

798.75(c) authorizes a park owner to summarily evict only a purchaser or transferee who

occupies a mobilehome without first executing a park lease. It cannot be expanded to

evict a co-resident of a tenant who is paying rent to the park under an existing park lease.

UnderLehto the particular clause, subdivision (c) in this case, must be considered in

the context of the entire statute. For a year petitioner has misrepresented to the trial court,

Appellate Division, Court of Appeal, and this court that 798.75 (c) applies universally to

any occupant unilaterally labeled as an unlawful occupantauthorizing arbitrary eviction.

Petitioner misrepresented the import of subsection (c) by always citing it in total isolation.

The trial court erred by reciting subdivision (c) in isolation exactly as petitioner had done.

Shipley cited Supreme Court cases directing lower courts to consider that placement of a

statute within an Article limits its scope to only the subject area covered in that Article.10

102 PE, Exh. 2, page PE 321 [numbered 12.289 at bottom right of page]


18/44

15

The court must consider subdivision (c) within the context of the entire statute as follows:

Civil Code 798.75. Attachment of rental agreement or statement

(a) An escrow, sale, or transfer agreement involving a mobilehome located in apark at the time of the sale, where the mobilehome is to remain in the park, shallcontain a copy of either a fully executed rental agreement or a statement signed

by the park's management and the prospective homeowner that the parties haveagreed to the terms and conditions of a rental agreement.(b) In the event the purchaser fails to execute the rental agreement, thepurchaser shall not have any rights of tenancy.(c) In the event that an occupant of a mobilehome has no rights of tenancy andis not otherwise entitled to occupy the mobilehome pursuant to this chapter, theoccupant is considered an unlawful occupant if, after a demand is made for thesurrender of the mobilehome park site, for a period of five days, the occupantrefuses to surrender the site to the mobilehome park management. In the eventthe unlawful occupant fails to comply with the demand, the unlawful occupant

shall be subject to the proceedings set forth in Chapter 4 (commencing withSection 1159) of Title 3 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure.(d) The occupant of the mobilehome shall not be considered an unlawfuloccupant and shall not be subject to the provisions of subdivision (c) if all of thefollowing conditions are present:

(1) The occupant is the registered owner of the mobilehome.(2) The management has determined that the occupant has the financial

ability to pay the rent and charges of the park; will comply with the rules andregulations of the park, based on the occupant's prior tenancies; and will complywith this article.

(3) The management failed or refused to offer the occupant a rental agreement.

It was not necessary forany court below, orthis court, to speculate about legislators

intent when they amended 798.75 in 1987 to add subdivision (c)s summary eviction

remedy limited to use only against new purchasers and transferees of mobilehomes.

Maury Priest attended every 1987 legislative session and testified about what he saw

and heard during those sessions. [Exhibit B-appended]. Maury Priests declaration was

based on personal knowledge and Stubblefield failed to file any affidavit opposing it.

As explained above (ANSWER, page7) a court cannot resolve credibility on a summary

judgment motion.11 Assertions on conjecture or speculation are insufficient to avoid

summary judgment.12

11 Henriksen v. City of Rialto (1993-4

thDist.-Div 2) 20 CA.4th 1612, 1625

12 Burton v. Sec Pac Natl Bank(1988) 197 CA.3d 972, 978; Clutterham v. Coachmen (1985)


19/44

16

Petitioner will argue Priests affidavit was opinion. Where an expert opines on a

matter within his personal knowledge, and no other expert controverts, his opinion is

conclusive and may not be disregarded. Huber13

A court must disregard all contrary

arguments. Fortman14

Whether the court finds Priest a percipient or expert witness

Shipley prevails either way. Notwithstanding Maury Priests testimony about what

legislators intended in 1987, a court must affirm the decision below onstare decisis.

B. Appellate Division's Correct Interpretation of Civil 798.75(c)Comports with Supreme Court Directives on Statutory Interpretation

In 1935 this court guided us on statutory interpretation, holding lower courts must

give considerable weight to Chapter & Section headings. Gonzales15

It is an elementary

rule of construction that chapter and section headings are entitled to considerable weight

in interpreting the various sections and should be given effect according to their import,

to the same extent as though they were included in thebody of the law. Gonzalezwas

affirmed in AFT16

holding that if a section is contained within a Chapter it applies only

in the context of that chapter. Gonzales andAFTwere followed in City of Los Angeles.17

In 1991 this court revisited the issue of statutory interpretation, reaffirming Gonzalezand

AFT inPeople v. Hull.18

In 2001 this court announced inLaff19

that its long-standing

1935 rule of construction concerning sections within chapters was elementary."It is an elementary rule of construction that chapter and section headingsin the codes are entitled to considerable weight in interpreting the varioussections and should be given effect according to their import, to the sameextent as though they were included in the body of the lawchapter and

section headings properly may be considered in determining legislativeintentour opinion states: "That such a remedial section should exist

may be conceded but arguments based on such a premise are moreproperly addressed to the legislature than to the courts."

169 CA.3d 1223, 1227; Sanchez v. Swinerton & Walberg(1996) 47 CA 4th 1461, 1465-146613

Huber, Hunt, & Nichols v. Moore (1977) 67 CA 3d 278, 31314

Fortman v. Hemco Inc. (1989) 211 CA 3d. 241, 257-260. (uncontroverted opinion)Niles v. City of San Rafael(1974) 42 CA3d. 230, 243 (uncontroverted expert opinion)

15Gonzales v. Superior Court(1935) 3 Cal.2d 260

16 AFT v. Board of Education (1980) 107 C.A.3d 829, 835-83617

City of LA v. County of LA (1989) 216 CA.3d 916, 92318

People v. Hull(1991) 1 Cal.4th 266, 27219

People v. Superior Court(Laff) (2001) 25 Cal.4th 703, 727


20/44

17

InLaffthis court held a court may not carve out a new remedyfrom subsection text

because such right to a remedy must be addressed to the legislature not the courts.

The trial court had no right to play super legislator by carving a remedy for Stubblefield

despite his fears that Stubblefiled will fund a challenger in his 2014 reelection campaign.

In re Mark B (2007) 149 CA.4th 61,75 held a court must look to where the section

was placed in Chapter & Section Headings giving considerable weight toplacement to

determine whether it applies specifically or generally. Article 7 of the MRL applies only

to transfers and sales of mobile homes. Appellate Division gave considerable weight to

798.75s placement within Article 7, Sales & Transfers, following this courts directive.

Under separation of powers neither trial nor appellate courts are authorized to 'review'

legislative determinations. The only function of courts is to determine if the exercise oflegislative power exceeded constitutional limitations."Eye Dog

20 It is the prerogative

of the Legislature, not the courts, to correct any flaws in a statutory scheme.21

Appellate Divisions order is presumed to be correct.Power22

The rule applies regardless

of whether findings are expressed or implied. Burlington23 Unless appellant can show

there was no evidence to support the order alleged lack of evidence is waived. Fink24

The court must disregard speculation, conjecture and defer to courtLesley; Kuhn25

When the sole issue is whether a ruling on a legal issue was erroneous, the court need

not address whether any triable issues of fact existed. Henricksen26Ghirardo27

All ambiguities must be resolved in favor of affirming the decision below. Denham28

20 Eye Dog Found. v. State Bd. of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536 545

21 Citibank v. Tabalon (2012) 209 CA 4

th. Supp.16, 21

22 Power v. Fairbanks, 146 Cal. 611, 615; Davey v. So Pac Co., 116 Cal. 325, 330;

Yarrow v.California (1960) 53 C.2d 427, 438; County of Santa Clara v. Supr Ct.

(1971) 4 Cal.3d 545,55323

Burlington v. Sante Fe Ry Co (2004) 121 CA4th. 452, 462;Marriage of Ditto(1988) 206 CA3d 643, 647

24 In re Marriage of Fink(1979) 25 Cal.3d 877, 88725

Leslie G v. Perry & Assoc (1996) 43 CA 4th

472, 487; Kuhn v. Dept Gen Svs (1994)22 CA4th. 1627, 1632

26 Henriksen v. City of Rialto (1993) 20 CA. 4th 1612, 1617 n 2. [4th. Dist. Div 2]

27 Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4

th.791, 800-801

28 Denham ve. Supr. Ct. (1970) 2 C3d. 557, 564
http://login.findlaw.com/scripts/callaw?dest=ca/cal3d/25/877.htmlhttp://login.findlaw.com/scripts/callaw?dest=ca/cal3d/25/877.html


21/44

18

The court must give the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolve all conflicts in

favorof affirmance''Jessup29 If there is some showing in support of the lower court's

action, the quantum of proof cannot be considered or weighed on certiorari. Howard30

Petitioners failure to file a statement of disputed facts or counter declarations to Shipleys

statement of undisputed facts and affidavits [Maury Priest, Bonnie Shipley and McCarron]

was fatal to Stubblefields opposition and he must accept the consequences of such failure.

ARGUMENT II

WHY STAY OF ALL PROCEEDINGS SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED

A Petitioner failed to explain any urgency as required by CRC 8.846(a)(7)(A)

B. Writ will not issue where petitioner has plain, speedy, adequate remedy at law

Although the statute does not expressly forbid the issuance of the writ ifanother adequate remedy exists, it has long been established as a generalrule that the writ will not be issued if another such remedy was availableto petitioner.{cites}Phelan v Superior Court(1950) 35 Cal.2d 363

Appellate Division recited one available plain, speedy remedy. [Petition, Exh B, p.8-9]:

Pet.Exh B, p.8

In addition to the plain, speedy and adequate remedy Appellate Division recited in its

Opinion [Pet., Exh B, p. 8-9] petitioner has the following 10 speedy, adequate remedies:

29Jessup Farms v. Baldwin (1983) 33 Cal.3d 639, 660

30Howard v. Superior Court(1944) 25 Cal.2d 784, 789


22/44

19

REMEDY 1: MRL Article 1 General Provisions [ Civil 798.11] defines resident.

Stubblefield can seekdeclaratory relief to clarify the definition of resident under MRL

and to decide if a Shipley is an unlawful occupant.

REMEDY 2: MRL Article 3 Rules and Regulations [Civil 798.23.5] defines sub-

leasing rules. Stubblefield can seek declaratory relief to clarify whether the homeowners

alleged subleasing to Shipley violated any park rule.

REMEDY 3: MRL Article 3 Rules & Regulations [Civ 798.25.5] defines regulations.

Stubblefield can seek declaratory relief to clarify whether a rule is void or valid.

REMEDY 4: MRL Article 3.5 Fees and Charges [Civil 798.34] defines rules on

guests. Stubblefield can seek declaratory relief to determine if Shipley is a guest.

REMEDY 5: MRL Article 3.5 Fees and Charges [Civil 798.34] defines family

members. Stubblefield can seek declaratory relief to decide if Shipley is family.

REMEDY 6: MRL Article 6 Termination of Tenancy [Civil 798.55;798.56] recites

7 authorized justifications to evict including subsection (d) for failure to comply with a

reasonable park rule. Stubblefield can try to evict McCarron for alleged rule violation.

REMEDY 7: MRL Article 8 Actions, Proceedings & Penalties [Civil 798. 88]

provides for injunctive relief. Stubblefield can move to enjoin any owner for violation

of a reasonable rule. Stubblefield can move to enjoin McCarron from violating a rule.

Legislators expressed a stated goal to encourage injunction rather than eviction:

(Legislative intent: This three-year sunset will arguably provide theLegislature with the opportunity to re-evaluate this bill to ensure that thestated goal of encouraging a park owner to pursue a lesser remedyagainst a resident of a mobilehome park instead of eviction is actuallyreached without negative unintended consequences.) Civil 798.88

In addition to 7 statutory remedies Stubblefield has 3 common law remedies of

trespass, nuisance, and ejectment. Because he has 10 available remedies, and Civil

798.88 provides a hearing within 15 days there is no justification to grant certiorari

to even consider carving out a new remedy abrogating all protections for poor, elderly

and disabled citizens from the wrath of greedy park owners trying to filch their homes

to convert them to cash cow rentals, rendering those citizens homeless and helpless.

There is no justification to grant a stay of proceedings with 10 other plain, speedy, and

adequate remedies available, including a hearing in 15 days on a petition for injunction.


23/44

20

C. Petitioner Admits Malice in Prosecuting a Sham Complaint Against Shipley

In the Petition for Review, at page 16, Stubblefield admits having no justification for

prosecuting a sham compliant to evict co-resident Shipley. Under a heading entitled,

The Appellate Division's Interpretation of Section 798.75(c) Limits

The Statute's Application In A Way Not Contemplated By The Statute'sExpress Language And Which Can Cause Grave Consequences Pet, p.12

Stubblefield argues that limiting Civil 798.75 [c]s summary eviction remedy to only

purchasers and transferees would result in grave consequences recited as follows:

.. Stubblefield's remedy under the Mobilehome Residency Law isto proceed against the homeowner in accordance with Civil Code section798.56, subdivision (d) for 'failure of the homeowner or resident tocomply with a reasonable rule or regulation of the park that is part of therental agreement or any amendment thereto." [4 PE, Exh.17:951] Pet,p.16

The problem with this unprecedented "remedy" is it would be theequivalent of no remedy at all. it could not quickly evict underageoccupants in a senior park where the "purchaser" parents never takepossession or sign a rental agreement, or when violent gangmembers..wreak havoc on the lawful park residents by playing loudmusic a caregiver could continue living in a mobilehome park after thedeath of the mobilehome owner for months without paying rent Pet,p.16

Stubblefields potpourri of imaginary miscreants recited above [violent gang

members, parents of adult children who buy a home and move children in instead, and

caregivers who remain after the owner dies] is the only purported justification he could

concoct to support a lame argument to carve a new remedy out of an isolated subsection,

which this court has expressly prohibited since 1935 in Gonzales31 and its progeny.

Under Article III only the legislature can expand the limited scope of Civil 798.75[c].

Shipley is not a violent gang member, adult child of a buyer, or a lingering caregiver.

This impliedly admits filing asham complaint could only have been motivated by malice.

Courts may not render advisory opinions.Bishop32

It is the corresponding duty

of reviewing courts to decline to decide issues not properly before them.Id Reversing

a valid order to provide a remedy for hypothetical miscreants is an absurd argument.

31 Gonzales v. Superior Court(1935) 3 Cal.2d 260

32Bishop v. Merging Capital(1996) 49 Cal.4

th1803, 1809


24/44

21

ARGUMENT III

PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES BELOW WERE FATAL TO THE WRIT PETITION

A. Court Below Lacked Jurisdiction to Act on a Defective, Unverified PetitionOnly a party may file a petition Curle

33and must verify it. CCP 1069. If unverified it

must be dismissed. 34 It is improper for attorney to appear or verify a petition.Mannheim35

It secondarily raises the issue of a petitioner's right to relief by prerogative writ upona defectively verified petition we discharge the writ without reaching the legal issues

Krueger v. Superior Court(Sec. Pac. Natl. Bank) (1979) 89 CA.3d 934, 936

Petitioners' petition for prerogative writ is fatally defective in form as well asin substance. A petition for writ of mandate must be verified. (Code Civ.Proc., 1086; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 56.)A fatally defective verification"is treated as a failure to verify." (3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971)Pleading, 356, p. 2020.). While prerogative writs are commonly described

as granted or denied at the discretion of the court (5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure(2d ed. 1971) Extraordinary Writs, 123, p. 3899), we view the discretion asone that must, to the extent possible, be exercised so that similarly situatedlitigants be given equal treatment. To permit petitioners to proceed on theirpetition for prerogative writ which is: 1. defectively verified in a fatalrespect would be to afford petitioners preferred treatment denied to otherlitigants. The petition for peremptory writ is denied. Krueger@ 939-940

In Star Motors36

a writ petition verified by counsel was dismissed as improper.

But our subsequent and closer examination of the writ application revealed that

as to all of its allegations, the "verification" required by Code of Civil Proceduresection 1086 was made by counsel "under penalty of perjury, ..." "verification"is an affidavit verifying the truth of the matters covered by it. (Code Civ. Proc.,2009; {..cites} "Its object is to assure good faith in the averments orstatements of a party" to litigation. {..cites}

We have not overlooked the provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 446This provision, insofar as it purports to permit verification on "informationor belief," palpably refers to pleadings that join issues, such as the commoncomplaint and answer of a lawsuit. {cites} Where the verification, oraffidavit, is to be "used as evidence" of facts, " Section 446 [Code Civ. Proc.]

does not apply." {cites} Star Motor Imports @ 204-205

33Curle v. Supr. Ct(2001) 24 C4th. 105734

Benjamin Franklin B & L Corp. v. Schmidt (1933) 132 CA.39; Star Motor Imports v. Sp.Ct. (1979) 88 CA.3d 201; County of San Mateo v. W.C.A.B.(1981) 46 Cal. Comp. Cases 49635

Mannheim v. Superior Court(1970) 3 Cal.3d 678, 68336

Star Motor Imports v. Superior Court(1979) 88 CA3d 201, 203-204


25/44

22

On April 9, 2013 Stubblefield filed an Opposition to Shipleys petition

which was not verified by real party Stubblefield Properties, a CA General

Partnership. [appended Exh.C, p.9]. Robert Williamson, real partys atto rney

verified the Opposition on information and belief. It was fatally defective.

Verification is required because relief is based only on genuine factual need.

UnderKrueger, Star Motors and Mannheim cited above, Appellate Division

had no duty to consider a defective Opposition and could have stricken it.

Shipley objected to the defect in her Reply. Her writ petition was granted.

On June 3, 2013 Attorney Williamson again verified a petition to the

Fourth District Court of Appeal, Div. 2--- instead of petitioner Stubblefield.

Realizing Shipley would object again to this second defective verification,

he removed the defective verification (with his signature) from his file copy,

and replaced it with a newly manufactured, back-dated verification signed by

Tom Parrish as authorized agent for Stubblefield Proper ties--a pa rtnership.

Williamson then submitted his fraudulently altered Opposition verification

as an Exhibit to Stubblefie ld s peti tion to the Court of Appeal, testifying

under oath that each document included as an Exhibit was a true copy of

the document as filed in the Appellate Division below .

Exhibit C-appended, p 8-9 is a fax from the Appellate Division containing

the only verification on file, which matched the verification served on Shipley.

Exhibit D-appended, p.10 is the manufactured Tom Parrish verification which

counsel represented as the same verification filed in the Appellate Division.

Williamson switched the verification page to create a pretext to the Court of

Appeal that Parrish verification was the document filed in Appellate Division.

Williamson knew Shipley would argue that the Court must affirm the order

because a defect ive return is no return at all so Shipley won by default.

This fraud on the court was intentionally perpetrated to gain an advantage

in the Court of appeal. Shipley believes the Court issued a summary denial,

in part, because the court did not approve of unethical sw it ching maneuvers.


26/44

23

Williamson compounded the fraud below by misleading this court.

Under CRC 8.848 (b)(1)(C) counsel was required to attach al l documents

necessary for a complete understanding of the case and the ruling below.

Conspicuous by its absence is the Court of Appeals 6/4/13 Palma notice.

Shipley appended it herein as Exhibit A. Only one day after receiving

Stubblefields writ petition the Court of Appeal issued a STAY of all the

proceedings below, including issuance of a remitt itur by Appel late Divi sion.

The court invited Shipley to file a response by June 24, 2013 which she did.

This order proves the Court of Appeal read his petition and immediately

acted upon it by granting STAY relief and issuing a Palma notice reciting,

unless good cause is shown, the court may issue a preemptory writ.

Once the court reviewed Shipleys response and discovered that counsel had:

misrepresented the facts, the law, omitted Maury Priests affidavit , and even

altered a verification before submitting the document as the record to gain

a strategic advantage, the Court of Appeal denied the petition.

Counsels artful omission of the Palma notice should not be ignored.

This was yet another unethical maneuver to gain a strategic advantage.

Petitioner omitted the Palma notice to create a pretext that the court below

issued a summary denial without considering the merits, so he could arg ue

thiscourt should grant certiorari to review merits not considered below.

This is why counsel failed to explain in the brief why he did not request

a rehearing below before filing a petition in this court. CRC 8.504(b)(3).

Even if the court ignored counsels fraud on the court, and accepted

the newly manufactured verification of Tom Parrish as genuine, it would

not cure the fatal defect because Tom Parrish is not a Stubblefield partner.

Only a partner can verify or testify for a partnership . Where plaintiff is a

partnership only a partners affidavit is admissible as evidence. Chong Pong37

37 Chong Pong v. Harris (1918) 38 CA 214, 217


27/44

24

"An affidavit on behalf of a partnership, therefore, should be sworn to by

one of the partners,the affidavit states that the partnership was sworn,

and it nowhere appears that the affidavit was sworn to by one of the

partnersthe affidavit purports to be made by one incompetent to make

it seePerkins v. Onyett, 86 Cal. 348 Chong Pong @ 217

Even if Tom Parrish were a partner [he is not], and were authorized to sign and bind

the other partners [he was not] the newly manufactured, back-dated verification is still

defective as he verified on information and belief---not under penalty of perjury.

This useless fodder has zero evidentiary value on a petition based onfactual need.

Accordingly, Stubblefield defaulted to Shipleys writ petition in the Appellate

Division and filed a defective writ petition in the Court of Appeal. Accordingly, relief

should have been granted based on Stubblefields default by failing to verify a response.

Counsel is trying to pull a rabbit out of a hat by arguing this court should entertain

a statutory analysis after an affiant testified about what legislators intended in 1987.

Counsels speculation and conjecture about what legislators intended is irrelevant.

Counsel violated rulesby failing to discuss Priests testimony as admonished inJones:38

Without disclosure of the omitted facts, inclusion of any reporter's

transcripts or resort to a crystal ball, we had no way of divining the real issue-

whether the court properly exercised its discretionWhen transcripts are not

available, rule 56 requires that counsel include along with the petition a

declaration "fairly summarizing the proceedings ... and the basis of the trial

court's decision ...." As an officer of the court and member of the bar,the

lawyer is obligated to use only such means as are consistent with truth:

he may not seek to mislead a judge by artifice or suppress evidence he

has a legal obligation to reveal. (Rules Prof. Conduct, rules 5-220, 5-

200(A), (B).) In the final analysis, we cannot accept the notion that a

selective recitation of facts satisfies the rules: half the truth in this case is

just as misleading as a complete fabrication.

With artful omissions and altered documents this court should distrust the arguments.

This court must question why the petition for review here was not verified by counsel or

petitioner, and why no Stubblefield partner ever verified any pleading filed at any level.

38Jones v. Superior Court(People) (1994) 26 CA.4th 92, 99-100


28/44

25

B. Petitioners unappealed MSJ, Lis Pendens & Injunction Were Not Part of WritOne of the most important procedural issues the court must grasp is that although both

Shipley and Stubblefields summary judgment motions were heard the same day they

were not cross-motions. They were separately denied on 2/14/13. [3PE, Exh.11, PE572].

Shipley appealed denial within 20 days . CCP 437c(m)(1). Stubblefield failed to appeal.

Shipley filed a 300-page appendix including all documents on both sides forhermotion.

No papers were filed on Stubblefields motion because he elected not to appeal his denial.

When Appellate Division issued aPalma order [RP Exh. 6.50] Stubblefield tried to

transmute Shipleys unilateral petition to a cross-writ petition to considerhis denial.

Counsel nestled his own petition in an Oppositionto Shipleys petition [2PE 523-PE 551].

Williamson believed he could cure his failure to timely appeal by illegal bootstrapping.

It was the 3rd time he nestled request for reliefinside Opposition to Shipleys motion,

even after the trial court admonished this tactic as shown below. Counsel repeated this

unethical tactic in the Fourth District Court of Appeal---again filing over 1000 sheets of

paper to obfuscate and confuse the court. Counsel has the audacity to employ this same

improper tactic for the fourth time in this court. This court must understand that

arguments presented in this writ petition that relate to denial ofStubblefields summary

judgment motion in the trial court are not properly at issue here because he neverappealed the courts denial ofhis motion for summary judgment. There is no code or

case authorizing any court to transmute one writ proceeding into a cross-writ proceeding.

Shipley objected to counsels third attempt at this improper tactic [4 PE 905-PE 925]:

In an order entered March 26, 2013 this court issued a Palma notice torespondent and real party inviting opposition to the writ. The court did notauthorize real party to nestle its de facto writ petition inside opposition topetitioners unilateral writ petition. In a footnote on page 2 real party argued thatbecause the court below considered plaintiff & defendants summary judgment

motions as cross motions heard on the same day, this court should transmute thisunilateral proceeding into a joint cross-writ proceeding, without citing anyauthority for such an anomaly. Two counter summary judgment motions werefiled separately in the court below and were heard on the same court day. Eachparty filed a statement of undisputed facts and proffered its own arguments as towhy the court should grant summary judgment. The court denied both motionsand entered two separate minute orders denying plaintiffs motion anddefendants motion.


29/44

26

Real party elected not to appeal its denial within 20 days by writ.CCP 437c(M)(1)Petitioner filed a timely writ. Real party waived right to appeal by not timely filing.There is no court rule, statute, or reported case authorizing an appellate court totransmute a unilateral writ proceeding into a cross-writ proceeding simply becausereal party nestles a counter writ petition inside its opposition in petitionersunilateral writ proceeding. This is the third time real party tried through an

anomaly to tweak court rules.Real party nestled its first summary judgment motion in an opposition to

plaintiffs Motion for Judgment on Pleadings. After plaintiff objected to theanomoly the court below rejected the novel trick, holding real party must file itsown motion and pay the fees. As shown in an excerpt from a 1/10/13 transcriptthe court admonished such conduct.

Transcr.1/10/13 13:1

Real party used the nestling technique again in trying to lift a stay imposed bythis court on March 26, 2013-by labeling what should have called a motion-as anapplication. Instead of filing preliminary opposition to unilateral writ petitionreal party applied to the court to lift the stay. The court denied real partys

second attempt to nestle a request for relief without complying with mandatorymotion procedures. CRC 8.809; CCP 1109

For the third time real party nestled relief requests within its opposition to thiswrit. Petitioner asks the court to strike real partys improper request to consider

irrelevant exhibits related to denial of real partys summary judgment--which isnot part ofthis writ. Petitioner filed all papers related to denial ofhermotion forsummary judgment and writ.Petitioner was not required to file papers related toreal partys motion it did not appeal. Real party tries to cure its failure to appealby asking the court to transmute this unilateral writ petition into a cross-writpetition praying for relief as if it had filed a writ. Cross-writ petitions are notauthorized by any court rule, statute, or reported state case. Real party cavalierlyprays for relief [leave to file a first amended complaint, order lifting the stay, andan order to set a trial date below]. A writ petition is required to seek relief


30/44

27

The court below lacked jurisdiction to transmute Stubblefields writ petition for

review of an Appellate Division order into a bootstrapped cross-writ petition.

There is no such anomaly under the law and there is no jurisdiction to create such

anomaly. Counsel dumped over 1000 sheets of paper at the Appellate Court intake

window, just like he dumped 1000 sheets at this courts intake window, all

designed to confuse, obfuscate and divert the courts attention from the SOLE

ISSUE ON THE WRIT! The other 1000 sheets of paper dumped at the Appellate

Division all related to non-issues. Shipley objected to counsels improper tactic

below [2 PE PE 502-PE 511]

These same objections Shipley made below are reasserted here. There simply is

no jurisdiction to transmute one partys appellate writproceeding into a cross-writ

proceeding whereby an opponents issues are considered as ifhehadfiled a writ.

Stubblefield must live with the reality that his counsel never appealed his denial.

This mistake cannot be cured by bootstrapping hisissues into Shipleys writ case.

ARGUMENT IV

COURT MUST APPLY LEGISLATIVE INTENT

Legislators expressed their stated goal to encourage injunction rather than evictions:

(Legislative intent: This three-year sunset will arguably provide theLegislature with the opportunity to re-evaluate this bill to ensure that thestated goal of encouraging a park owner to pursue a lesser remedy against aresident of a mobilehome park instead of eviction is actually reached withoutnegative unintended consequences.) Civil Code 798.88

The court has a duty to apply expressed legislative intent, not only in

798.88 but also its general abhorrence to summary eviction of the poor,

elderly, and disabled residents from mobilehomes situated inside parks.

(a) The Legislature finds and declares that, because of the high cost ofmoving mobilehomes, the potential for damage resulting therefrom, therequirements relating to the installation of mobilehomes, and the cost oflandscaping or lot preparation, it is necessary that the owners ofmobilehomes occupied within mobilehome parks be provided with the

unique protection from actual or constructive eviction afforded by theprovisions of this chapter.(b) (1) The management may not terminate or refuse to renew a tenancy,except for a reason specified in this article and upon the giving of writtennotice to the homeowner, in the manner prescribed by Section 1162 ofthe Code of Civil Procedure, to sell or remove, at the homeowner'selection, the mobilehome from the park within a period of not less than60 days, which period shall be specified in the notice. Civil798.55


31/44

28

ARGUMENT V

CRITERIA FOR CERTIORARI WAS NOT MET

Petitioners statutory right to review was limited under CCP 904.3 which

is one reason why the petition below was denied. CCP 1074. The court could only

assure the Division pursued its regularauthority,39 and did not exceed its jurisdiction.

CCP 1068. The Court of Appeal was not at liberty to alter a decision from the Appellate

Division based on a belief that it could render a better decision. It could only reverse

if the ruling below exceeds the bounds of all reason.40

Petitioner did not prove a

manifest injustice would occur absent reversal of the order below.Blank41

InAbelleira 42

this court pronounced the standard of review on certiorari is excess of jurisdiction:

In our own recent decision, Rodman v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.2d 262,

we said: "... some confusion exists with reference to what constitutes an excess,and what constitutes an error, in the exercise of jurisdiction. However, it seemswell settled (and there appears to be no case holding to the contrary) that whena statute authorizes prescribed procedure, and the court acts contrary to theauthority thus conferred, it has exceeded its jurisdiction, and certiorari will lieto correct such excess."...

Neither court below exceeded jurisdiction. Even if the review standard were error

rather than excess of jurisdiction on an appeal from a limited jurisdiction court, there was

no error. Moreover, even if there were error it must be prejudicial to warrant reversal.43

Petitioner failed to provide any evidence of prejudice or lack of remedies.

GLOBAL CONSIDERATIONS ON CERTIORARI

As the Sequioa court held, "the state has a long-standing involvement with mobile

home regulation, the extent of which involvement is, by any standard, considerable."44

The courts role is to protect an underrepresented class of poor, elderly and disabled

citizens from losing their homes without just cause---not to carve out new remedies

for park owners tofast trackconversion of homes into proprietary cash cow rentals.

39 Melancon v. Superior Court(1954) 42 Cal.2d 698, 70440 Denham v Superior Court(1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 56641

Blank v Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 331; TidewaterAssn Oil v. Supr. Ct(1955)43 C2d 815, 820;Keating v. Superior Court(1955) 45 C2d 440, 44342

Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal(1941) 17 Cal.2d 28043

Gould v. Corinthian Colleges,Inc. (2011) 192 CA 4th. 1176, 1181

44 Sequoia Park Associates v. County of Sonoma (2009) 176 Cal. App. 4th 1270, 1282
http://login.findlaw.com/scripts/callaw?dest=ca/cal2d/13/262.htmlhttp://login.findlaw.com/scripts/callaw?dest=ca/cal2d/17/280.htmlhttp://login.findlaw.com/scripts/callaw?dest=ca/cal2d/17/280.htmlhttp://login.findlaw.com/scripts/callaw?dest=ca/cal2d/13/262.html


32/44

29

CONCLUSION

Petitioner failed to show entitlement to certiorari or satisfy all Omaha factors45

to warrant reversal of the very well-reasoned Appellate Division Opinion below; i.e.

1) beneficial interest; 2) no adequate remedy at law; 3) irreparable injury to petitioner

with no injury to real party. Petitioner failed to show there is any disagreement among

courts on Civil 798.75 because that statute has always been used only against new

purchasers or transferees who move into a mobile home without executing a park lease.

Maury Priest provided uncontroverted evidence of exactly what legislators intended

in 1987 when they revised 798.75; i.e. to limiting the scope to purchasers or transferees.

One witness testimony is substantial evidence to support affirmance of the order46

To discount a witnesss testimony there must be physical impossibility, or the testimony

is patently false without resorting to inference or deduction,47

or testimony must be

contrary to scientific knowledge. 48 There is no evidence Priests testimony is incredible.

Accordingly, there is no need for this court to entertain a statutory analysis to guess at

legislative intent in 1987 when we have a witness who heard and observed legislators by

attending every session as a lobbyist when 798.75 was revised to add subdivision [c]-[d].

Legislators had every opportunity to revise 798.75, as recently as 2012 when they

stated a goal of encouraging park owners to pursue lesser remedies of injunctions under

Civil 798.88 rather than evicting the residents:

(Legislative intent: This three-year sunset will arguably provide theLegislature with the opportunity to re-evaluate this bill to ensure that the

stated goal of encouraging a park owner to pursue a lesser remedy

against a resident of a mobilehome park instead of eviction is actuallyreached without negative unintended consequences.) (Amended by Stats.2012, Chap. 99 (AB 2272, Wagner), eff. 1/1/2013)

Shipley prays this honorable court will deny the petition and award her costs and fees.

Evil prevails when good men [and women] do nothing. Edmund Burke. [18th

century]

45 Omaha Indemnity v. Superior Court(Greinke) (1989) 209 CA 3d. 1266, 1269

46Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal. 3d. 604, 61447

Estate of Reed(1955) 132 CA2d. 73248

In re SA (21010) 183 CA 4th

. 1128,1148


33/44

CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUN T[California Rules of Court, Rule 8. 20 4( ~) (1 )]

Answer has 8 ,3 77 words counted by MS Word 2007 used to compose it.

- APPENDED EXHIBITSA. Palma Order Issued by Fourth District Cowt of Appeal, Div. 2 6/4/13 Page 1B. Declaration of M aury Priest submittedwith summary judgment pages 2-7C. Appellate Division fax of Williamson's verification on file in that court pages 8-9D. PE548 * - newly manufactured declaration of Tom Parrish page 10

* Williamson replaced his inadrmssible verification [Exh.Cy age 91with anewly m anufactured declaration signed by Tom Parrish and artfully substituted itfor Williamson's verification on$le in the Appellate Division before submission.

Williamson verified under oath that all exhibits he filed with thePetition to the C ourt of Appeal were "true copies of original documentsonfile with Respondent Appellate Division." [see Pet. to Court of Appeal, p. 51

This was a knowing misrepresentation to the Court of Appeal becauseWilliamson knew he had altered the document, by sw itching the verificationpage at the end of the O pposition [his verification] to a newly manufacturedverification by T om P arrish---before copying it and submitting the documentto the Court of Appeal as a "true copy" of an "original docum ent on file withRespondent Appellate Division" and verified it was a "true copy" under oath.Williamson's inadmissible verification filed below, was artfully replaced withthe new ly manufactured P arrish verification before subm itting copies to theCourt of Appeal (a s genuine Exhibits authenticated under oath by Williamson]to gain a strategic advantage by creating a pretext the opposition had beenproperly verified in the Appellate Division. For this reason alone the court shoulddeny this petition to send a clear message that this court will not tolerate fraud onthe court by subm itting altered documents to gain a strategic advantage on appeal.


34/44

COUIt2,1'OF API'EN, -- STATEUF CALIFORNIAF0tJRTf-I DISTRICT

THE APPELLATE DlWSZON OF THE Thc County ofSm BcrnardinaSU13ERIORCOURTOF SAXBEW.4RDrrJO COLW"rr.Respandent;

THE COtJRTGoad cause appearing Iherefor,Rral Party in Interest is Invited to file a responsc ta the petition for writ ufrnotldatc on iic hcrcin an crr bcfare June 24.2013, Tlilu response. if 'any. may address

any procedural or substantive issuc that may affcel this court's dctcrmination whether urnot to cxercjsr it s discretion to entertain writ review of this~natter. Unless goad cause issilown. court may isrue a peremptory writ.

Procccdimlgs in the superior caurt, as well as the appellate division, incltndiilg tileissuance of a rcmittit~u.me STAY ED pending fllrtller order arthis coun.

CE: SCCi l t % a ~ h ~ dist


35/44

Nancy Duffy McCarron, CBN 164780950 Roble LaneSanta Barbara, CA 93 03805-450-0450 ax 805-965-3492nancyduffysb yahoo.comBeal Estate rokerLic. #00853086Attorney for Defendan t Bonnie ShipleySUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIACOUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

11 / k b aMountain Shadows ~ o b i l ; 1 DECLARATION OFMAURICE A PFUESTome C ommunityPlaintiff,

v.Defendant.

15

18 I, MAURICE A . PRIEST. declare:

SUPPORTNG DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARJUDGMENT& OPPOSING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FORSUMMARY JUDGMENT; iled with Separate StatemenUndisputed Facts Declarations: NancyDuffy McCarronBonnie Shipley; To be considered with D's Request forJudicial Notice filed Dec. 26 , 2012 (with MJOP)Date: January 28,2013Time: 8:30 a.m.Dept. S-32 Honorable Donald Alvarez

19 1 .1. I am an attorney over 18, not a party, and make these statements based on personal knowledge.20 1 2. 1make these statements in support of defendant's motion for sum mary judgment and opposing21 1 plain tiffs mo tion for summ ary judgment. My statements relate to the parties' dispute concerning22 I legislative intent in enacting Civil Code 5798.75 in 1987. Attorney McCarron provided me with s23 1 copy of " Pla intif fs Supplemental Request for Judicial Notice" filed for a January 10,2 013 hearin24 1 (with attached Exhibits I -N). I have attached the relevant Exhibits L, M, and N addressed below25 1 3. From 1980 to 2008 I was a registered lobbyist at the State Capitol representing Golden State26 1 Mobilehome Owners League, Inc. (GSMOL) GSMOL opposed the bill which created Civil Code27 I Section 798.75 and requested specific amendments to the bill which were made to the legislation28 before it was passed and enacted by Civil Code Section 798.75. I was personally present during ahearings on the bill and 1 have personal~~~~wledge,~of,the,gislative process as I represented- - 0 -

DECLARATION OFMAURICE A. PRIEST SUPPORTING DEPENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT& OPPOSING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY UDGMENT


36/44

GSMOL and the interes ts of mobilehome owners in their opposition to the legislation. (see attachecExhibit M (center of page M) reciting my name [Maury Priest] under "opposed").

4. This declaration is filed to clarifjl the legislative intent of the legislation based upon the eventswhich occurred dur ing the legislative process.

5. The reasons for my opposition to the enactment as originally presented are explained below mycomments concerning the import of the recitations contained in the attached ExhibitaL,M, N.

6. EXHIBIT L: (Assembly Bill No. 556) Introduced by Assembly Mem ber Lewis February 10,1987Bill 556 recited that it was "An act to amend Section 798.75 of the C ivil Code, and to addSection 17403.4 to the Financial Code, relating to mobilehomes." (see Exhibit L -first line).Financial Code 317403.4 is part of a section governing escrow ag ents (curren t statute recited below)FlNCNCLAL CODEDMtlOn6 E r a O W MontsChapler3 Escrow Rogulalionrfi \7403.4. Rsquirsmsnllorsll m a n scrow i n s h d o n $

Allwrinm escrow i&uc&us sad . P e s a o w ~ran&tted&cWnicdlyovaIbelntanuumdcdbyebrrycra~,pvhcbaprepndbyapasonsd,ieatotbisdivisionorbyapasonexemptbtbisdivioioarmdaSbctioa 7 0 0 6 . & l 4 r ~ m r c d h ~ k r r I h a10qxh *pc wbicb sbdl Pcbde the kaue nane and the 1~ of& d e p ~ e n t ~h:karrc ~Ptbnitymdaartjcbtkpcnmk~ . T h i r ~ c l i o a f b r f l n o t a p p l y t o c r p p k m e a t a l c a a o w ~ a r ~ t o u c r o w n a m c t i o n r .

7.FC tj17403.4 requires written escrow instructions executed by a buyer or seller to include the licensename of the escrow agent involved in the sale or transfer, so as identify the involved escrow agent.

8. Bill 556 also was intended to prohibit any escrow agent from accepting "any escrow instructioninvolving the sale or transfer of a mobilehome, if the mobilehome is to remain in the park,unless the instruction includes a copy of a fully executed rental agreemen t.

9. The intent was to protect park ow ners from escrow agents who would complete a sale or transfer ofownership without requiring an executed copy of a rental agreem ent, which would resuIt in a newoccupant of the home (by sale or transfer) moving into the newly acquired home w ithout firstexecutinga rental agreemen t with the park managers. For example, a violent crimina l could move in

10. The authority to use CC $798.75, specifically $798.75 [c] against a hom eownerlresident who has rpre-existing long-term rental agreement with the park owner, and has elected to exercise his or herstatutory or contract right to have a co-resident share hish er home as a guest was not intended.

11. The Mobile Home Residency Law ("MRL") is divided into Articles governing specific facetsconcerning the rights and duties of park owners, residents and occupants of mobile home parks.--

- 1 -DECLARATION OF MAURICE A. PRIEST SUPPORTING DEFENDANT'SMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT& OPPOSING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY llDGMENT


37/44

Article 7 relates to "Transfer of Mobilehome,or ~ o b i l eh o m e ark" and Civil Cod e 8798.75relates specifically to the requirement of escrow agents to attach a copy of a rental agreement:

CIVIL CODEDivision2 ProperlyPart2 Real or lmmovable PropertyTitle 2Estates in Real PropertyChapter2.5Mobilehome Resldency LawArticle 7Transfer of Mobilehome or Mobilehome Park3 798.75. Attachment of rental agreement or statement

798.75. Attachment of rental agreement or statement(a) An escrow, sale, or transfer agreement involving a mobilehome located i n a park atthe time of the sale, where the mobilehome is to remain in the park, shall contain a copyof either a fully executed rental agreement or a statement signed by the park'smanagement and the prospective hom eowner that the parties have agreed to the termsandconditions of a rental agreement.(b) In the even t the purchaser fails to execu te the rental agreement, th e purchaser shallnot have any rights of tenancy.(c) In the event that an occupant of a mobilehome has no rights of tenancy and is nototherwise entitled to occupy the mobilehome pursuant to this chapter, the occupant isconsidered an unlawful occupant if, after a demand is made for the surrender of themobilehome park site, for a period o f five days, the occupant refhses to surrender the siteto the mobilehome park management. In the event the unlawful occupant

ANSWER to Petition for Review w Cov Toc Toa POS Final_8!1!13

Documents

Transcript of ANSWER to Petition for Review w Cov Toc Toa POS Final_8!1!13