Cuban digital identity: A summary of recent evidence

Authors:

Guy Baron and Gareth Hall, Aberystwyth University, UK

European Languages

Hugh Owen Building

Aberystwyth

SY23 3DY

gub@aber.ac.uk

1

Cuban digital identity: A summary of recent evidence

Abstract

With the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, many people predicted the imminent

collapse of the Cuban authoritative regime and some critics saw the Internet as playing a

major part in that collapse. But this has simply not been the case as Raúl Castro followed his

brother Fidel into power and the socialist system remains today. It is a widely held viewpoint

that Internet use in Cuba is restricted due to a number of factors and this paper intends to

examine those factors and asks to what extent the lack of access to the World Wide Web has

helped to maintain (with some evident changes) the socialist status quo on the island. The

article will also examine how the Internet is used to represent the nation externally and

ultimately argues that the Cuban government is negotiating a fine line between taking full

economic advantage of what the Internet can offer and hampering its use as a mechanism for

the subversion of the Revolution in the face of continued US aggression.

Keywords: Cuba, Internet, Identity, Technology, Digital, Revolution,

2

‘Secrets are over [...] We are facing the

most powerful weapon that has ever

existed, which is communication.’

(Castro, 2010)

With the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, many people predicted the imminent

collapse of the Cuban authoritative regime. As Bert Hoffmann (2003: 296) points out some

critics saw the Internet as playing a major part in that collapse. But this has simply not been

the case as Raúl Castro followed his brother Fidel into power and the socialist system

remains today. It is a widely held viewpoint that Internet use in Cuba is restricted due to a

number of factors and this paper intends to examine those factors factors and asks to what

extent the lack of access to the World Wide Web has helped to maintain (with some evident

changes) the socialist status quo on the island. The article will also examine (via an analysis

of a number of websites) how the Internet is used to represent the nation externally and

ultimately argues that the Cuban government is negotiating a fine line between taking full

economic advantage of what the Internet can offer and hampering its use as a mechanism for

the subversion of the Revolution in the face of continued US aggression.

The Cuban telecommunications industry was nationalised in August 1959 and ‘by the

end of 1960 the regime had effectively asserted control over print and broadcast media’

(Kalathil and Boas, 2001). As the Cuban Constitution says (quoted in Díaz Rodríguez and

Sokooh Valle, 2013: 66) the mass media forms part of ‘state or social property and cannot be

the object, under any circumstances, of private property,’ (author’s translation). Over the

course of the next 40 years a number of institutions were created to deal with

telecommunications and new technology (the Ministry of Communications-MINCOM-was

established in the early 1960s). In the 1970s the USSR agreed to help Cuba develop a

3

computer industry and the first computer assembly line produced 100 minicomputers in 1976

(Valdes and Rivera, 1999: 141). Cuba first engaged with the Internet in 1981, sending its first

email to the USSR with a primitive connection, but the Cuban government did not see

information technologies as important for developing the economy until the collapse of the

Soviet Union a decade later. It wasn’t until 1989 that Cuba made its first email contact with

another source outside the Soviet Union, making contact with Peacenet in Canada (Venegas,

1999). From the outset, however, even before the first network connection, Cuba realised that

the Internet would become an important phenomenon, that ‘it would have a profound impact

on individuals, organizations and society’ (Press, 2011). But since those early days Cuban

connectivity to the World Wide Web has not developed as many would have hoped.

The Cuban government’s Internet priorities have largely followed that of the UN

through UNESCO (United Nations Education, Science and Cultural Organization). As

Cristina Venegas (1999) points out, in 1997 UNESCO’s Executive Council discussed the

problems that face developing nations with respect to information technologies and agreed to

focus attention on ‘community programs and the strengthening of development sectors like

education, prior to wiring each individual home’, and Cuba’s Internet development has

largely followed this line of argument partly due to economic restraints – the obvious

difficulty in a developing country in getting everyone connected domestically.

As Hoffmann (2003: 299) points out Cuba was the leader of new technology in Latin

America before the Revolution with the most televisions per head of population, but after

1959 communications were not seen as part of national development, only as important for

national defence and security. For example, until 2000 the heads of MINCOM were always

members of the military. In 1996 Cuba decided to connect to the Internet, creating the

Ministry of Information and Communications [Ministerio de la Informática y las

Comunicaciones] (MIC) in 2000, from which the Programa Rector para la Informatización de

4

la Sociedad (PRIS) was implemented. According to López García (2013: 69) this was a state

policy to gain access to the benefits that derive from information and communications

technology. López García argues that Cuba recognises the potential of the Internet but that

connection to it privileges institutions and businesses that have the greatest impact on Cuban

society. But the combination of an ageing telecommunications infrastructure, much of it from

the 1940s, and the economic crisis beginning in 1989 made any technological advancement

extremely difficult and so Cuba began to lag behind other Latin American and Caribbean

nations in terms of Internet connectivity.

But the Cuban government has always been suspicious of the advancement of new

technologies and the effects that they may have on the maintenance of the socialist system,

especially when these technologies emanate from the US. As Venegas (1999) points out:

‘The Helms-Burton law of 1992 calls for the improvement of telecommunications

connections and information exchanges with Cuba, in order to increase the potential for

change.’ There has been a history of using communications to bring down the Cuban regime

and a certain amount of paranoia about new communications technology is entirely

understandable, resulting in the necessity to maintain some form of control over Internet use.

Previously, communications had been signalled as viable means for bringing about

the end to the Castro regime. In 1983, The Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act

established Radio Marti, followed by Public Law 101-246 in 1990 which created TV

Marti. Both Radio and TV Marti, ironically named after José Martí, Cuba’s greatest

hero of independence, broadcast anti-Castro propaganda funded by the US

government, with the goal of disrupting the social and political environment on the

island. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Torricelli, the emboldened senator from

New Jersey authored the Cuban Democracy Act (1992) which in addition to

5

tightening the embargo, called for improving telecommunications connections with

Cuba in order to force change. (Venegas, 1999).

So, for a number of reasons explained below, Internet use in Cuba is severely restricted at

domestic level.

RESTRICTIONS ON INTERNET USE IN CUBA

By 1996, the Cuban government decided that it would engage with the Internet and took

control of its use on the island. In their study of Internet use and control in China and Cuba

Kalathil and Boas quote Decree Law 209, passed in June 1996 to govern Cuba’s connection

to the Internet. The law: ‘stated that access would be selective and would be granted “in a

regulated manner […] giving priority to the entities and institutions most relevant to the

country’s life and development”’ (Kalathil and Boas, 2001). This can be read either as in line

with UNESCO’s policy as described above or as something more sinister; a desire and

intention to censor and restrict Internet use at the level of the individual citizen. As opposition

to the Cuban regime was already using the Internet by this time from the US to promote

counter-revolutionary activity, this type of reactive response was understandable. In their

study, Kalathil and Boas suggest that ‘authoritarian regimes are finding ways to control and

counter the political impact of Internet use’. In the case of Cuba, they argue that the

government has maintained state control of the Internet through both ‘reactive and proactive

strategies.’ Although Cuba has no central government agency involved in censorship of

Cuban media, the control of content is often left to editors who are tied to the power structure

and benefit from maintaining it – as Kalathil and Boas say, these people ‘share the

perspective of regime elites’.

6

According to Larry Press there are a number of limitations to Internet use in Cuba, not

just financial or lack of access to a computer. Cubans are allowed direct access to computers

at various sites, including hotels and recently instigated Internet cafes (although in both

places at around 4-5 CUC an hour with the average wage around 15 CUC a month, the cost is

often prohibitive). As del Valle (2013) recently reported in Juventud Rebelde, this service

was extended in June, 2013 at 118 ‘salas de navegación’ across the country. The price to

connect to the national intranet is only 60 cents per hour, but to surf the web costs around

4.50 CUC an hour. Recent developments also include a pay-as-you-go, universally available

internet access service, but again, the cost for the average citizen is prohibitive and of course

the service requires an internet-enabled device, again a costly product for the average Cuban.

But he says that the filtering of content and activity also limits Cuban’s access via what is

known as the AvilaLink ‘information management’ programme, apparently used in places

where multiple computers are in use (Press, 2011). Cuban users, Press argues, are fully aware

of the possibility that their Internet use is being monitored and so this would automatically

restrict their experience. Uxo (2009: 12.5), however, argues that this monitoring is both

‘erratic and arbitrary’, ‘dependent to a great extent on the administrator of each area, where

filters or controls governing one Internet connection may be completely lacking for others.’

As García Pérez et al (2006) say: ‘Internet policy has been one that has been heavily

regulated by the state.’ But the official argument for the lack of Internet access on a daily

basis in Cuba is that there are limited resources and technology to deliver it to everyone and

the official line is to not fear counter-revolutionary information being spread over the

Internet. Melchor Gil Morel, vice-minister of Informática y Telecomunicaciones has said:

‘No le tenemos miedo a la información contrarrevolucionaria. La información contrarrevolucionaria

se basa en mentiras’ (Hoffmann, 2003: 314).

7

Reactive strategies then are important for the Cuban regime to counter the huge amount

of subversive material that comes from outside the island, over which the regime has no

control. ‘The largest share of Cuba–related political information on the Internet emanates not

from domestic sources, but from foreign–based organizations trying to influence Cuban

politics and U.S. policy toward Cuba’ (Kalathil and Boas, 2001). Kalathil and Boas go further

to argue that the more subversive material that exists against the regime, the more the

position of the regime’s hardliners with respect to Internet control is strengthened, and so

anything regarded as a ‘tool of US aggression’ has heavier restrictions placed upon it.

Watchful of organisations that have external links, the Cuban government:

is undoubtedly concerned about the potential use of e–mail for logistical organization

among politically threatening CSOs [Civil Society Organisations]. As a result, it has

carefully meted out access among CSOs according to their political orientation.

Dissident and human rights organizations openly opposed to the regime have little hope

of gaining Internet access: most have their telephone calls regularly monitored, and

several have had computers confiscated by the authorities. (Kalathil and Boas, 2001).

Cuba is seen as an Internet enemy by Reporters Without Borders, the largest press freedom

organisation in the world. According to their 2009 report, although Cubans are allowed to

access the Internet in hotels for example, the cost of doing so is prohibitive. The report also

quotes Vice-Minister Boris Moreno: ‘The use of the Internet [must serve] to defend the

Revolution and the principles in which [Cuba] has believed for years’ (Reporters Without

Borders, 2011a). This defence has included, according to Reporters Without Borders, the

repeated arrest and interrogation of bloggers like Yoani Sánchez (the last time in October

2012), whose Generation Y blog is highly critical of the Cuban government. Other bloggers,

8

such as Luis Felipe Rojas, have been arrested several times and Cuban dissident and

cyberjournalist Guillermo Fariñas Hernández (“El Coco”), winner of the 2010 Sakharov Prize

for Freedom of Thought awarded by the European Parliament, was arrested three times in

less than 48 hours in January 2011. Punishments are apparently severe for online opposition

to the regime, although there are no journalists currently in prison on the island. The last one,

according to another report from Reporters Without Borders was Albert Santiago Du

Bouchet, who arrived in Spain in April, 2011, along with 36 other Cuban dissidents who were

released on condition that they agreed to go into exile (Reporters Without Borders, 2011b).

As is well known Cuba has a state interventionist model when it comes to the economy,

typical of socialist countries, the state becoming the owner of the means of production and

the distribution of goods and services. The same then applies to the Internet and the use of it

when globalisation becomes a central issue in the development of the economy. As

previously said, for Cuba the development of the Internet was not a priority in the 1990s due

to the forced austerity of the Special Period but such development is highly significant, as

Hoffmann points out, due to state monopoly of the media. He quotes Article 53 of the Cuban

Constitution:

Se reconoce a los ciudadanos libertad de palabra y prensa conforme a los fines de la

sociedad socialista. Las condiciones materiales para su ejercicio están dadas por el

hecho de que la prensa, la radio, la televisión, el cine y otros medios de difusión masiva

son de propiedad estatal o social y no pueden ser objeto, en ningún caso, de propiedad

privada, lo que asegura su uso al servicio exclusivo del pueblo trabajador y del interés

de la sociedad. (Hoffmann, 2003: 296).

9

So the Internet immediately poses a dilemma for the Cuban government in the potential for a

lack of control over such a mass medium, but at the same time its power as an economic,

social and political force must be recognised and harnessed. To this end a more proactive use

of the Internet developed as early as 1996 when the Cuban air force shot down two private

planes flown by an anti–Castro exile group. As Kalathil and Boas (2001) say: ‘the recently

established online edition of the state newspaper Granma Internacional was the only way for

foreign audiences to read the Cuban government’s version of events.’ So, as Kalathil and

Boas point out, in addition to the strategy of access restriction, ‘the state has also promoted

Internet development in areas it considers priorities. According to its “plan for

informatization of Cuban society,” the regime seeks to guide and channel the growth of the

Internet so that like other media its primary impact is to serve the political goals of the

revolution.’ Partly this has been as a defence against the regime’s negative image in

international media. There are a number of government–affiliated websites that offer official

perspectives on current events, with frequent criticism of the United States. For example the

recently established site cubavsbloqueo.cu (Cuba versus the blockade), for instance, rallies

opposition to the US embargo of Cuba and the international edition of the Communist Party’s

newspaper Granma can be read in six languages.

All of this seems to point towards a desire by the Cuban government to control Internet

use on the island and use the medium to promote Cuba’s socialist system. But an important

question to ask is whether the increasing use of the Internet at the level of civil society

actually promotes and encourages democratisation of authoritarian regimes? Corrales and

Westhoff (2006, 911) try to explain differing Internet use across nations and they find a

‘complex relationship between political liberties and Internet adoption’ in which ‘not all

authoritarian regimes discourage Internet use similarly [but]states that repress political and

economic rights [...] are less likely to adopt liberty-promoting new technologies,’ adding that

10

authoritarian regimes tend to encourage television use as it is relatively easily controlled, but

that they often discourage Internet use. They attempt to describe the type of Internet control

used by authoritarian regimes. ‘We suggest that there are three types of state policies to

control the Internet: blockage, access restrictions, and content control. They range from the

most to the least draconian. At the most extreme level, an authoritarian regime might seek to

block the Internet entirely. This is more likely to happen in the poorest authoritarian regimes,

where the state presumably has no interest in the economic gains afforded by the Internet, and

societal demand for the Internet is low’ (925). If any of this is true in Cuba it would appear

that access restriction is the main source of control over Internet use for the Cuban

government.

Cristina Venegas (1999) argues that simply equating technological freedom and access

to information with some kind of democratic change is teleologically naive. She cites Enrique

González-Manet, a professor of Communication at the University of Havana, who has been

one of the country's leading exponents of the uses and possible repercussions of technology

in developing nations. He sees the emergence of the Internet as a type of revolution that

cannot be stopped but warns that views of it as a great equalizer and force for democracy are

misleading since we must take into consideration that in the Third World, ‘75% of the

population barely has access to 10% of communications media, 6% of the telephones, 5% of

the computers, and 2% of the satellites.’ Kalathil and Boas (2001) agree and argue that

although most media commentators believe that the Internet is inevitably a force for

democracy, ‘no significant body of scholarly work has sought to address the widespread

popular belief that the Internet will undermine authoritarian rule.’

But it appears that there is some truth in the reasoning suggested by Corrales and

Westhoff that authoritarian regimes seek to somehow repress new communication

technologies. According to Larry Press (2011) there are three reasons for the lack of free and

11

open access to the Internet in Cuba: ‘the US embargo, the Cuban economy, and the

government's fear of information freedom’. The embargo has made it difficult for Cuba to

obtain the raw materials necessary to set up an Internet infrastructure (routers, modems etc

are extremely expensive and not freely available). Due to the collapse of the USSR (Cuba’s

main trading partner) and the subsequent Special Period in Peacetime that Cuba suffered, it is

understandable that those first tentative steps to Internet connectivity were delivered a

significant economic blow even before the project could really get off the ground. At that

time (early 1990s) Cuba was not as open to foreign investment as it is today and so the

development of such an expensive project was all but halted.

HOW DO CUBANS CONNECT TO THE INTERNET?

Many Cubans have a restricted connection to the Internet on a daily basis as the government

has been gradually developing networks in the workplace for this to happen; there were nine

of these in 1992 but dozens of public domestic networks and hundreds of “local”, “private”

networks today (Valdés and Rivera, 1999: 142). This access is in line with government policy

that regards the Internet from a ‘collectivist perspective’, as a ‘social tool controlled by the

state with a view to benefitting the community’ (Uxo, 2009: 12.6). The Internet in Cuba has

not been regarded from an individualistic perspective as it is in liberal democracies and so it

would not be politically or socially palatable to simply open it up to everyone. But perhaps

this is slowly changing. So most Cubans access the Internet in public companies and

institutions, or at school but according to Hoffmann: ‘Users have to sign a document that says

they must not look for content that violates national laws that are racist, pornographic or anti-

Cuban’ (Hoffmann, 2003: 315). He says that each company has someone responsible for

Internet security and websites are regularly checked. It is also worth pointing out that the

12

term ‘Internet connection’ does not mean the same thing to everyone. For Cuban officials it

can often mean simply sending emails or using the national intranet, rather than the liberal

democracy definition meaning to have the ability to surf the World Wide Web freely.

The limited connection that Cubans have gives them access to public services and

information and is organised according to a number of principles, according to (López

García, 2013: 71), such as:

The defence of security, sovereignty and technological independence.

The integration and interconnectivity of standards.

To share wherever possible the existing infrastructure.

To guarantee the visibility of content.

The bodies of the state central administration are responsible for the content and the

services provided.

But all this takes place under difficult economic circumstances and, as already observed,

there is a relatively low level of Internet penetration across the general public. In fact,

according to López García (72), only 15% of women and 12.6% of men regularly use

computers and 75% of men (70% of women) say that they never do. Resolution 73 from the

Ministry of Culture on 16 September, 2009 established the Law on the National Registry of

Websites (Reglamento del Registro Nacional de Sitios Web - RNSW). Under this law

websites are obliged to declare a thematic profile, objectives, potential users, and dates of

use, thus prohibiting the publication of content and services without the authorisation of a

state institution that becomes ultimately responsible for the site. This therefore severely limits

the creation and development of virtual communities as they need to search for state entities

to support them.

13

However, as Hoffmann (2003: 315) says some people access sites such as hotmail or

yahoo illegally at work. He uses as an example the Faculty of Literature at Havana university

which has a room with 20 computers ‘where the students can send emails and surf the web

with little interference (supervised however)’. But, although there are a number of networks,

private, individual access to the Internet is not easy in Cuba; such access is simply not a

priority for the Cuban government. As Kalathil and Boas (2001) say: ‘the Cuban government

has endeavoured to leverage the capabilities of the Internet to improve the social conditions

of the Cuban people.’ As such its principal effort in this area involves Infomed, a medical

information network operated by the Ministry of Public Health. Since its inception in 1992

Infomed has connected medical centres around the country to such services as electronic

journals and searchable databases. The system has been a boon for Cuba’s otherwise

struggling health system, which is plagued by shortages of paper and difficulty in distributing

information. Infomed has featured an international e–mail link since its beginning, and with

its connection to the Internet it helps to promote Cuba’s health system abroad and facilitate

relations between Cuban doctors and their foreign counterparts.

But it is well known that an increasing number of users manage to connect to the

Internet illegally from home, using passwords from their workplace or accounts acquired

through the black market or personal connections. According to García Pérez et al (2006):

‘Despite the efforts of the government and resources put in place obstructing any flow of

foreign information, more and more Cubans are managing to access information—sometimes

about Cuba—from sources outside the country. They do so for curiosity, entertainment

purposes, or looking for news about the outside world and also about their own country not

provided by the local media.’ But estimating precisely the extent of this underground Internet

use is impossible, although it is undoubtedly limited by the considerable expense and

difficulty of obtaining an Internet–capable computer. A study of 38,000 people by the Cuban

14

National Statistics Office (ONE) in 2009 illustrates that only around 2.9% of respondents had

had direct access to the Internet in the previous year (Dirección de Turismo, Comercio y

Servicios de Cuba, 2010). However, according to Andrea Rodríguez of Associated Press,

‘outside experts estimate the real figure is likely to be 5 to 10 percent accounting for black

market sales of dial-up minutes’ (Rodríguez, 2012).

The majority of access to the Internet in Cuba (around 60%) is done at school according

to the ONE survey, while access at home accounts for some 20%. Only around 20% of the

Cubans in this study accessed the Internet at least once a day while most said they connected

between once a week and once a month. In relative terms Internet use is expensive and slow

in Cuba and so Internet use is not as frequent as it is in developing nations, but this is only to

be expected. Table 1, taken from the ONE survey illustrates just how infrequent Internet use

really is in Cuba.

[Insert Table 1]

In terms of geographic location, in tune with government policy as a rule, Cuba’s Internet

provision is well dispersed nationally with the main internal networks (Infomed, serving the

health community and Tinored serving the NGOs for example) spread across the island in all

areas. Havana still has the largest percentage of Internet access but other areas are also

connected. Connecting externally is a continuous problem though as Cuba has to rely on

satellite connectivity and so connections are slow by comparison with the developed world.

The Internet is more than simply a technical tool and possesses huge potential to generate

transformative processes and, as Díaz Rodríguez and Sokooh Valle (2013) point out, can

provide for inclusive and productive dialogue between individuals and state institutions. But

currently Cubans are isolated from the World Wide Web in global terms and this implies a

15

type of social exclusion that might have detrimental long term effects on the island’s

population.

HOW DOES CUBA PRESENT ITSELF ON THE INTERNET?

In this section we examine how Cuba is presented to Internet users from around the world by

presenting a provisional snapshot of how Cuban society, culture, and politics is presented to

‘observers’ of Cuba through the medium of the Internet, but also to determine the interest in

and engagement with Cuban websites from Internet users. We conducted two analyses on

Cuban data, first using web analytic software of the most recurring and visible websites and

second, by performing a thematic analysis of Cuban website content.

To conduct our explorative pilot study, several domain names associated with Cuba

were used to inform our initial searches (e.g. .cu; cuba.com), but also specific key word

searches relating to Cuba. These domain names and keywords were generated through

examples from Deibert, Palfrey, Rohozinski & Zittrain (2008), as well as search strategies

used in media framing analysis (e.g., Giles & Shaw, 2009). The domain names were entered

into several search engines (Google, Yahoo, and Bing) and initial sites were recorded into a

database where any duplicates were noted, and dead / dummy sites removed.

In total we examined 256 websites between the period of August, 2012 and January,

2013 and through analytics software (Alexa) could only identify a limited number of websites

with an IP address located in Cuba including, for example, an official government website

and that of Havana University (see table 1 for list of websites). As such, we did not remove

websites based on geographical location of the IP address given that external hosting of

websites is not an uncommon practice; it might also be indicative of the lack of infrastructure

in Cuba to host websites.

16

Overview of results

In our analysis, the majority of websites were dedicated to promoting tourism or education

and current affairs and in this respect is similar to any other country that uses the Internet to

inform individuals about daily news, events and culture. In our first phase of analysis we

obtained descriptive statistical data about the Cuban websites through web analytic software

(Alexa) that provided data about the sites’ global ranking, number of pages visited, time spent

viewing the website, and its bounce rate (the percentage of visits to the site that consist of a

single page view). For illustration, an outline of the 20 most recurring websites obtained

across the search engines are provided in Table 2. Unlike other countries, data demonstrates

that despite these websites being some of the first to be found through search engines, and

therefore highly visible to Internet users, they attract very little attention in terms of length of

time and pages viewed by visitors. Visitors spent less than five minutes on each website and

this is also evident in each website’s low global rankings that show low popularity relative to

websites across the world. Some speculative conclusions for the limited time spent on each

website might be the relatively limited quality of the website and navigation where some

links and pages do not work or do not have any content. Paradoxically, the alternative might

be that visitors may have actually found the information they wanted quickly. However, the

former conclusion is likely given the very low global ranking of many of the websites, but

also in some instances little or no data was retrievable through web analytics suggesting

limited interest in Cuban websites. The only website to have visitors spend an average time of

more than five minutes was the site of the national ballet (http://www.balletcuba.cult.cu/)

and attracted visitors primarily from Mexico, Spain, the USA, and from individuals within

Cuba. For those websites with higher global rankings, a similar pattern emerged to less

popular websites regarding time spent on each website, further suggesting limited interest and

17

engagement with Cuban websites, and in some cases (e.g. http://www.cuba.cu/ ), from

Cuban citizens.

Despite low global rankings of Cuban websites, there are still hundreds of thousands

of individuals accessing these sites and often leaving very quickly, too. However, these

individuals are leaving with an impression of Cuba that may confirm stereotypes about

Cuban culture and society. In fact, in Psychology research, impressions about objects and

individuals can be made within 100ms of exposure and become particularly difficult to

change if they confirm an already held belief.

In our second analysis, we used qualitative methodology to examine how these

websites present an image and impression of Cuban society. In order to examine the websites

and generate common themes about Cuban society, culture, and politics, a thematic analysis

(TA) was performed using Braun & Clarke’s (2006) six step procedure. In general, TA is a

method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data that minimally

organise and describe any given data set.

Thematic analysis identified two core themes running through the Cuban websites. As

expected, there was a clear distinction between promoting Cuba for tourism, and Cuban

current affairs that usually focussed on Cuban political figures or US political news. In

general, the tourism websites naturally promote Cuba as a culturally rich, diverse, and

modern progressive society whilst emphasising its traditions. The current affairs pages often

discussed Cuban or US political affairs, but also promoted Cuba as a leader in the pursuit of

education and science. These two themes are discussed further below with examples.

[Insert Table 2]

18

Theme 1: Cuba as a modern, progressive and culturally rich country

Many of the websites that promoted Cuban culture were often aimed at tourism describing

Cuba as possessing a modern but diverse culture that is enriched through its traditions, sport,

landscape, and arts. However, some sites also target Cuban nationals, such as those related to

sport and the arts. Sport and tourism were primarily promoted through a growing ‘Cuban

Style’ and ‘Surfing Revolution’ surf scene (http://www.havanasurf-cuba.com/) promoting

Cuba to US travellers as a non-traditional location for surfing, giving advice on how to

prevent US immigration from knowing you had visited Cuba. Interestingly, this site also

promotes a growing female surf scene, aimed at young teenage female surfers rather than

adults. Baseball, Cuba’s national sport, has one website dedicated to promoting the sport in

Cuba and is more directed at Cuban nationals. Baseballdecuba.com provides information

about baseball teams in Cuba and the current league system and its players. This site also

incorporates some blogs although much of the site is difficult to load and not active. Directed

at both national and international visitors is Ballet Nacional de Cuba, which provides

information about learning ballet at the school for international students, as well as providing

touring dates and workshops. In terms of attracting specific tourists, one site is dedicated to

offering gay friendly holidays (http://gaytourguidecuba.com/). As part of the holiday, tourists

will benefit from a personalized tour of Havana and Cuba as well as suggested clubs and gay

friendly events and areas. However, specifically within sites directed at tourism, tradition is

emphasised specifically through images of the island. For example, Cuba’s cultural heritage

is typically displayed using photos of architecture, music, dance, and automobiles, as well as

beautiful resorts and beaches. Some websites also expand upon the heterogeneity of its

population in terms of ethnicity. For example, Cuba is described on one website

(http://www.hicuba.com/) as a ‘melting pot of cultural events’ brought by immigrants from

Spanish conquistadors, African slaves, French settlers from Haiti, as well as those from the

19

Iberian Peninsula, American, Swedish, Japanese, and Jewish settlers. Such a range of

ethnicity is further described on a TV production company site

(http://www.islandfilmcuba.com/) aimed at international film producers to persuade them to

come to Cuba to take advantage of specific locations. Their photo reel uses models of all

ethnicities.

Theme 2: Cuban current affairs

The second core theme to be identified related to current affairs, marked by political news

and reports about Cuban political figures and events. Across the websites identified, eight

featured critical news items about US politics and policies. For example, the website

cubasi.com, devoted columns critiquing US policies that included anti-terrorism laws to

policies allowing US citizens to take cruises to Cuba while Cuba is opening up travel to all its

citizens. A more diverse current affairs website, cuba.cu is a highly visible site in the search

engines that aims to promote Cuban culture and politics where articles and links were often

promoting the current political status (as well as reporting US politics), Cuban education, and

Cuban science, as well as Cuba as a destination for travel. The website also features links to

DVDs that provide an official account of Cuban history and politics, as well as portal links to

related sites that promote technology and science in Cuba. Perhaps the most anti-American

and pro-revolution website is cubasocialista.cu the site of the Central Committee of the

Communist Party. This website provides links to other anti-US sites, such as

antiterroristas.cu that give accounts of US actions and policies against Cuba, in particular the

injustice and inhumane treatment of the ‘Miami 5’ imprisoned 14 years ago. Many of the

images of both sites feature members of the Communist Party and Fidel Castro.

In summary, the presence of Cuban based websites on the Internet is very small in

comparison with other countries. What is available presents an image of Cuba as a

20

welcoming tourist destination with a unique identity of its own despite the on-going tensions

in their relationship with the US. Technologically, the websites are unsophisticated in

comparison with UK and US internet sites and the few that are translated well are unlikely to

be seen or read by those outside Cuba.

THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET IN CUBA

Since the announcement in 2007 of the laying of a fibre-optic cable between Venezuela and

Siboney in Cuba’s Eastern province, talk of fast and individual Internet connections has been

rife in Cuba. The project is called ALBA-1 and should have been completed in July 2011 at a

cost of $70 million, which includes a link from Cuba to Jamaica. However, news of this cable

recently has been extremely hard to come by. But, according to senior analyst at Renesys

Corporation, Doug Madory, Cuba has been using the cable service since January, 2013 (The

Gleaner, 2013) and the recent opening of the 118 ‘salas de navegación’ appears to confirm

that the cable may now be in operation. Andrea Rodríguez of Associated Press on the ground

in Cuba wrote in May 2012 that, although the cable has been laid, it is not even mentioned in

official reports, and nobody seems to have an official stance on what is happening to it.

However she says, ‘[p]eople talk quietly about embezzlement torpedoing the project and the

arrest of more than a half-dozen senior telecom officials’ (Rodríguez, 2012). The cable was

meant at first to enhance the networks of hospitals, universities and other official institutions

while the Cuban populace would have to wait, but a number of employees from official state

institutions have reported no improvement to their Internet connections. ‘Multiple attempts to

get Cuban and Venezuelan government officials to comment were unsuccessful’ (Rodríguez,

2012).

21

Obviously there is no logic to investing $70m in an undersea cable for it not to be used

but there has been speculation as to why the island has apparently not yet been properly

connected to it. Cuba’s network infrastructure is severely limited; computers and systems are

out of date. It may just be that the internal infrastructure needs to be updated in order to carry

the new service that the cable will eventually provide. This is backed up by comments from

the Deputy Minister of Informatics and Telecommunications, Jorge Luis Perdomo reported in

xinhuanet.com who says: ‘the arrival of the fibre-optic cable is not a “magic wand”. The

country still needs to develop domestic infrastructure of telephony and data, which cannot be

done overnight’ (Deng, 2011). But the intentions of the Cuban government towards Internet

access for its citizens are presented enigmatically at best. As Perdomo says: ‘There is total

commitment of the Cuban government to further develop the telecommunications sector in

terms of economic and social development of the country.’ Boris Moreno Cordovés, Vice-

Minister of MIC, spoke recently at the National Assembly saying: ‘we will continue to

intensify access [to the Internet] where it is necessary for the development of the country’

(Fontana Sábado, 2011). He commented that there did exist the will to improve Internet

services if and when economic resources allowed the necessary development of the

infrastructure to allow this to happen. He also made it clear that the US government had made

Cuba’s access to important content and tools on the Internet very difficult, these measures

forming part of the continued blockade of the island that makes it impossible for them to

participate in electronic commerce for example.

But what that means for day to day access for Cuban citizens is not clear. It is certainly

the case, according to a computer engineer who is part of a special government group that:

‘Priority will go to improve government, business and social service networks in health and

education’ (López, 2011) and that the Cuban people should not be expecting an Internet

revolution any time soon. But there are signs that access to the Internet in Cuba is improving,

22

as the recent opening of the ‘salas de navegación’ show. Recent news also hints at the

possibility of gaining Internet access on mobile phones in Cuba (although at a cost) (Café

Fuerte, 2014). Perhaps the Arab Spring has made the Cuban government think again about

allowing free and easy access to the World Wide Web, as Rodríguez (2012) suggests, and it

is well known that Raúl Castro has warned of a supposed plot by enemies of the Cuban state

in the United States to wage a cyber-war against the island. ‘In 2011, a Cuban court

sentenced US subcontractor Alan Gross to 15 years after convicting him of crimes against the

state for importing restricted communications equipment that he insists was only meant to

help the island's Jewish community gain better Internet access.’

CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to examine the use of the Internet in Cuba at a number of levels. It

has shown how diffusion of the Internet in Cuba is severely limited by a number of factors, as

Kalathil and Boas (2001) say: ‘including the country’s economic situation, the U.S. embargo,

and the regime’s strategy of controlling the Internet by limiting public access.’ This strategy

is obviously in place to limit any potential threat to the long-established socialist Revolution

and Internet use in Cuba is not regarded as an individual right but should form part of the

collectivist consciousness of the revolutionary process. But this is only part of the story.

There is an evident desire to foster Internet use in Cuba in order to benefit the country as a

whole; in terms of the Cuban economy the Internet will be vital for Cuba’s development in a

global arena, given that historically Cuba has been dependent on external factors to keep the

economic motors running. As Mauricio de Miranda Parrondo (2003: 17) says the role of the

state in the economic development of countries like South Korea, Israel, Taiwan and

Singapore has been fundamental. The Cuban state must play a similar role then in order to

23

improve the Cuban economy, and the Internet needs to play a significant part in that

development. When people speak of an ‘agricultural age’ or the ‘industrial age’, what they

really speak of is economic development that comes out of those ‘ages’ (land and industry in

these two cases) (Suaiden, 2013: 4). The ‘information age’ is no different; technology,

information and communications are at the heart of economic development today and for

Cuba to develop it must embrace this area. It is obvious then that the priority for the Cuban

government is Internet development at the level of the governmental and structural and not at

the level of the individual. But a new ‘literacy campaign’ at the level of civil society is also

necessary in Cuba as Díaz Rodríguez and Sokooh Valle (2013) say. A type of

‘tecnodeterminism’ (López García, 2013) seems to be developing in Cuba whereby, in

accordance with Marcus Leaning (2005), the way in which the Internet is used in Cuba has

more to do with the organisation of society than with the inherent nature of the technological

medium itself. This might prove to be highly restrictive being that for developing countries

the cultural dimension of ICT is extremely important for national development and the

creative use of technology such as the Internet by non-state bodies is essential, as López

García (2013) says. The Cuban government is treading a fine line between individual and

collective use of the Internet and there appears to be a move towards recognising that Cubans

must have more open access to the Internet at an individual level. But this implies a profound

change in the way that the Cuban government sees the development of the Internet and

perhaps it has no bigger internal challenge.

24

Table 1: Internet access frequency (percent)

Frequency Total Me

n

Women

At least once per day 22.6 23.1 22.1

At least once per week 35.6 34.9 36.3

At least once per month 30.8 32.1 29.6

Less than once per month 11.0 9.9 12.0

Dirección de Turismo, Comercio y Servicios de Cuba (2010).

25

Table 2:

Website Bounce rate (%)*

Number of pages viewed

by visitors

Time spent on website (mm:sec)

Origin of Main Visitors Global rank

1 http://www.cuba.cu/ 61 1.5 1:44 Cuba 118,1742 http://www.cubacreditunion.org/ 93 1 0:49 - 2,228,7063 http://www.cubana.cu 41.6 2.3 2:29 Mexico/Canada 263,9694 http://www.bc.gov.cu 42.3 1.5 2:22 Cuba 740,3395 http://www.cubatravel.cu/ - 1.3 1:22 - 3,743,6206 http://www.balletcuba.cult.cu/ 43.7 5.0 5:54 Cuba, Mexico,

Spain, USA37,274

7 http://www.insmet.cu/ - 1.2 2:10 - 3,199, 277

8 http://www.cubasocialista.cu/ - 2 - 3,189,0159 http://www.santiago.cu/ - 1 - - 2,535,47010 http://www.cubasi.cu/ 55.6 1.9 3:25 Cuba, Spain,

USA60,068

11 http://www.uh.cu/ 63.5 2.2 2:28 Cuba, Spain 245,42112 http://www.cuba.com/ - 2.0 1:56 - 1,778,71913 http://www.hicuba.com/ 47.3 3.1 3:47 Cuba, Mexico 158,55914 http://www.havanasurf-cuba.com/ - 5.00 2:54 - 9,462,648

15 http://www.floridita-cuba.com/ - 7.00 1:52 - 6,688,08816 http://www.acrosscuba.com/ - - - - -17 http://gaytourguidecuba.com/ - - - - -18 http://www.baseballdecuba.com/ 50 1.40 1:58 - 1,592,06019 http://www.islandfilmcuba.com/ - - - - -20 http://www.santiagoencuba.com/ - 1 - Spain 4,402,356*Bounce Rate (%) Percentage of visits to the site that consist of a single page view

26

References

Braun, V. and Clarke, V. (2006) ‘Using thematic analysis in psychology’. QualitativeResearch in Psychology 3 (2): 77-101.

Café Fuerte (2014), ‘Los cubanos podrán tener internet en sus celulares a partir de abril’[www document]. URLhttp://cafefuerte.com/cuba/11156-los-cubanos-podran-tener-internet-en-sus-celulares-a-partir-de-abril/27 enero [accessed 24 April 2014].

Castro, F. (2010) Fidel Castro speaking to Mexican daily La Jornada in an August 2010interview in which he hailed the Internet. Quoted in A. Rodríguez (2012), ‘In Cuba,mystery shrouds fate of Internet cable.’ Associated Press (May 21) [www document].URLhttp://bigstory.ap.org/content/cuba-mystery-shrouds-fate-Internet-cable [accessed 20July 12].

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (2010). The World Factbook [www document]. URLhttps://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cu.html [accessed31 August 2012).

Corrales, J. and Westhoff, F. (2006) ‘Information Technology Adoption and PoliticalRegimes’. International Studies Quarterly 50: 911–933.

Deibert, R.J., Palfrey, J.G., Rohozinski, R., and Zittrain, J. (2008). Access Denied: ThePractice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Del Valle, Amaury (2013) ‘Cuba amplía el servicio público de acceso a Internet’. JuventudRebelde, 27 mayo [www document]. URL http://www.juventudrebelde.cu/cuba/2013-05-27/cuba-amplia-el-servicio-publico-deacceso-a-internet/ [accessed 23 April 2014].

Deng, S. (2011) ‘Cuba to get High-Speed Internet via Venezuela’. Xinhua News Agency(February 7) [www document]. URL http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/sci/2011-02/08/c_13722293.htm [accessed 20July 2012].

Díaz Rodríguez, E. and Sokooh Valle, F. (2013) ‘Internet y las TIC en Cuba: notas para undebate sobre políticas públicas’. Temas 74 (April-June): 62-67 [www document].URL http://www.temas.cult.cu/sumario.php?numero=74&Submit.x=3&Submit.y=[accessed 22 August 2013].

Dirección de Turismo, Comercio y Servicios de Cuba (2010) ‘Tecnologías de la Informacióny las Comunicaciones. Uso y Acceso en Cuba’ [www document].

27

URLhttp://www.one.cu/publicaciones/06turismoycomercio/TIC/2009%20TIC%20Uso%20y%20Acceso% 0en%20Cuba.pdf [accessed 13 July 2012].

Fontana Sábado, Y. (2011) ‘Cuba continuará priorizando el acceso social a Internet’ [wwwdocument]. URL http://www.yohandry.com/index.php/component/content/article/57-yohandry/578-cuba-continuara-priorizando-el-acceso-social-a-Internet- [accessed 14 August 2012].

García-Pérez, A. Mitra, A. and Somoza-Moreno, A. (2006) ‘Imperatives of Free and OpenSource Software in Cuban Development’. Information Technologies and International Development 3 (1): 1-17.

Giles, D.C., & Shaw, R.L. (2009). The psychology of news influence and the development ofMedia Framing Analysis. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 3/4, 375-93.

Hoffmann, B. (2003) ‘El desarrollo cubano ante el reto de las nuevas tecnologías deinformación y comunicación (NTIC)’, in M. de Miranda Parrondo (ed.) Cuba:reestructuración económica y globalización. Centro Editorial Javeriano, Bogotá, 295-328.

Kalathil, S. and Boas, T. C. (2001) ‘The Internet and state control in authoritarian regimes:China, Cuba, and the counterrevolution’. First Monday 6 (8) [www document]. URLhttp://www.firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/viewArticle/876/785 [accessed 16 August 2012].

Leaning, M. (2005) ‘The Modal Nature of ICT: Challenging the Historical Interpretation ofthe Social Understanding and Appropriation of ICT’. The Journal of Community Informatics 2 (1) [www document]. URL http://www.ci-journal.net/index.php/ciej/article/view/278/230 [accessed 23 August 2013].

López García, H. (2013) ‘Cultura digital participativa y software libre en Cuba’. Temas 74:68-74.

López, V. (2011) ‘The Venezuelan-Cuban Fiber Optic Cable: A Connection to the World?’Focus on Cuba 138 [www document]. URLhttp://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FOCUS_Web/Issue138.htm [accessed 13 July 2012].

de Miranda Parrondo, M. (2003) ‘Estado y política económica para el desarrollo de laeconomía cubana en las condiciones de la globalización’, in M. de Miranda Parrondo (ed) Cuba: reestructuración económica y globalización. Centro Editorial Javeriano: Bogotá, 17-62.

Press, L. (2011) ‘The state of the Internet in Cuba’, Draft paper, California State UniversityDominguez Hills [www document]. URLsom.csudh.edu/fac/lpress/cuba/chapters/lpdraft2.docx [accessed 12 July 2012].

Reporters Without Borders (2011a) ‘Internet enemies: Cuba’ [www document]. URL http://en.rsf.org/Internet-enemie-cuba,39756.html [accessed 14 August 2012].

28

Reporters Without Borders (2011b) ‘No more journalists left in Cuban prisons afterdissidents flown to Spain’ [www document]. URL http://en.rsf.org/cuba-no-more-journalists-left-in-cuban-08-04-2011,39987.html [accessed 14 August 2012].

Rodríguez, A. (2012) ‘In Cuba, mystery shrouds fate of Internet cable’. Associated Press,(May 21) [www document]. URL http://bigstory.ap.org/content/cuba-mystery-shrouds-fate-internet-cable [accessed 20 July 2012].

Suaiden, E. (2013) ‘Sociedad de la información: un simposio’. Temas 74: 4-12 (4).

The Gleaner (2013) ‘Cuba Activates Fibre-Optic Cable Link With Jamaica’. May 23 [wwwdocument]. URLhttp://jamaicagleaner.com/gleaner/20130523/business/business3.html?goback=%2Egde_95247_member_243798061 [accessed 23 May 2013].

Uxo, Carlos (2009) ‘Internet Politics in Cuba’. Telecommunications Journal of Australia 60:1: 12.1-12.16.

Valdés, N. P. and Rivera, M. A. (1999) ‘The Political Economy of the Internet in Cuba’.Cuba in Transition 9: 141-154 [www document]. URLhttp://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/asce/cuba9/valdes.pdf [accessed 29 August 2012].

Venegas, C. (1999) ‘Will the Internet Spoil Fidel Castro's Cuba?’ MIT CommunicationsForum [www document]. URL http://web.mit.edu/comm-forum/papers/venegas.html [accessed 13 September 2010].

Willis, J., & Todorov, A. (2006). First Impressions: Making Up Your Mind After a 100-MsExposure to a Face Psychological Science, 17 (7), 592-598 DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01750.x

29