Psychosocial and relationship-based theories for child and family social work: political philosophy,...

Psychosocial and relationship-based theories for child andfamily social work: political philosophy, psychology andwelfare practice

David Howe

School of Social Work, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UK

The links between social work practice and the

political context of welfare are complex, but threads

of in¯uence, tracking in and out of policy, weaving

their way through and around the questions that

researchers ask, do a�ect what goes on between

practitioners and their clients. This paper explores

how political climates relate to changes in child and

family social work and the di�erent psychological

Child and Family Social Work 1997, 2, pp 161±169 # 1997 Blackwell Science Ltd161

ABSTRACT

Psychosocial perspectives on children's development are allied totheories that recognize the `self' as essentially a social entity. Thequality of relationships that children experience in their socialenvironment have a profound e�ect on their socio-emotionaldevelopment, personality formation and social competence. Tothis extent, psychosocial theories of children's development andwellbeing can provide child and family social workers with apowerful framework within which to analyse, assess and practise.However, it is also recognized that the character of child welfarepractices and policies are in¯uenced by prevailing politicalclimates. A simple dichotomy is described between politicalphilosophies of the right and left; libertarianism and communitar-ianism; individual freedom and collective action. It is argued thatthe present swing to libertarian individualism has brought aboutmajor changes in the policy and practice of much child and familysocial work, including a preference for theories that emphasizepeople's psychological independence, rationality and personalresponsibility. In such a climate, child and family social workbecomes more legalistic, orientated towards principles of justicerather than welfare, and towards rights and responsibilities ratherthan personal relationships and social competence. Psychosocialdevelopmental theories, with their emphasis on the importance ofsocial relationships and the emotional interconnectedness ofpeople in community, fare less well under the rigours ofpsychological individualism and free-market economics. Thepaper concludes that if children's psychosocial development andcompetence are a product of their social history, practices thatpsychologically `disembed' people from their relationship envir-onment are unable to consider children's needs within a coherent,well-grounded theoretical framework. If child and family socialwork is premised on helping children develop social under-standing and emotional wellbeing, theory and practice are bestserved by taking a psychosocial perspective.

Correspondence:

Professor David Howe,

School of Social Work,

University of East Anglia,

Norwich

NR4 7TJ, UK

Keywords: child and family social work,

children's development, political

philosophy, psychosocial theory

Accepted for publication: October 1996

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knowledge bases that are chosen to facilitate parti-

cular policies and practices.

However, the analysis is not neutral. The large

steps made in key branches of developmental

psychology over recent years point to the importance

of the social environment ± parents, siblings, peer

groups, cultural practices ± in understanding chil-

dren's social and emotional growth. If self and

personality arise within social relationships, then

social workers concerned with children's develop-

mental well-being implicitly back political philoso-

phies that emphasize the interconnectedness of

human experience. Political philosophies that see

the individual as a thoroughly social being stand in

marked contrast to neo-liberal outlooks, which regard

the individual as the only ontological reality, and

society as no more than the sum of the actions of

individual agents. In the UK and many other western

child welfare systems, the current political outlook

tends to favour practices based on libertarian

individualism, which concentrate on the legal, ad-

ministrative and economic aspects of social worker-

client relationships rather than on the psychological

qualities of the participants. We ®nd therefore that

there is something of a muddle, a tension even,

between social workers' traditional interest in devel-

opmental psychology that is concerned with the

quality of the child's social environment and social

workers' more recent enthusiasm to promote indivi-

dual rights and responsibilities. These moves towards

a psychological individualism have cut many social

workers o� from their historical interest in relation-

ships (e.g. Ferard & Hunnybun 1962; Hollis 1964).

And although these changes have sharpened practi-

tioners' political sensitivities, they have blunted their

competence in dealing with the emotional side of

social relationships.

The analysis begins with an outline of children's

development of self, personality and social under-

standing. We then consider moves in the phil-

osophy and practice of child and family social

work away from an interest in children's socio-

emotional development and towards an emphasis

on dealing with people as independent agents

presumed to be reasonable, responsible and ra-

tional. Re-emphasizing a developmental and relation-

ship-based outlook in child and family social work

entails more than recommending a balanced ap-

proach; it carries deep messages about the formation

of the self in social relationships and children's

psychosocial development in the context of family

and cultural life.

THE SOCIALNESS OF SEL F

The idea that we are `social selves' whose being and

personality form within social relationships is receiv-

ing renewed interest throughout the social sciences

(e.g. see Bakhurst & Sypnowich 1995; Mulhall &

Swift 1995). Within this perspective, the individual is

no longer seen as someone who enters the world as an

a priori psychologically discrete entity. Rather, the

self and personality form as the developing mind

engages with and tries to make sense of the world in

which it ®nds itself. In so doing, it takes on many of

the properties of the environment which it seeks to

understand. Such a conception of the self is opposed

to the Cartesian notion of the mind as a `self-

contained world of thoughts and experiences, essen-

tially independent of the ``external'' world of people

and things `outside' or `beyond' it' (Bakhurst &

Sypnowich 1995, p. 3). How we understand, think,

feel, see and conceptualize, though in¯uenced by our

biological inheritance and make-up, is shaped by our

social, cultural and linguistic experiences. Our con-

sciousness and ability to self-re¯ect are not natural

pre-givens. They emerge as the individual engages

with society. `Mind' and `self' form within the

`communicative activity of the group' and through

social experience (Mead 1934). Individuality is

socially based and personality forms as social under-

standing develops (Burkitt 1991, p. 2).

The psychological corollary of this line of thought

also means that the quality of a child's relationships

directly bears on her socio-emotional development.

The poorer the quality of a child's relationship

history, the less robust will be her psychological

make-up, emotional integrity and social competence.

` . . . it seems that the postulate that a lack of

continuity in loving committed parent-child rela-

tionships is central has received substantial sup-

port . . . What has stood the test of time most of

all has been the proposition that the qualities of

parent-child relationships constitute a central

aspect of parenting, that the development of social

relationships occupies a crucial role in personality

growth, and that abnormalities in relationships are

important in many types of psychopathology.'

(Rutter 1991, pp. 341, 361)

Therefore, the way di�erent personalities handle

current relationships is in large measure a product of

their past relationship experiences. There is also little

doubt that individuals bring to the social world a

number of inborn traits. These include such things as

Psychosocial and relationship-based theories D Howe

162 Child and Family Social Work 1997, 2, pp 161±169 # 1997 Blackwell Science Ltd

Paper 44 Disc

innate cheerfulness, optimism, a tendency to be either

inhibited or uninhibited, a good sense of humour,

argumentativeness, and shyness (e.g. see Kagan

1994). The type of social environment in which

children ®nd themselves will a�ect the display of

natural temperaments every bit as much as these

innate predispositions will a�ect the responses of

other people.

INTERNAL WORK ING MODELS

`What makes separate persons di�erent is their

di�erent perceptions, due partly to the fact that

their bodies have a di�erent history in time and

space.' (Hollis 1994, p. 178)

Di�erent types of personalities hint at the di�erent

ways in which people have tried to make sense of and

adjust to their relationship environment. Adverse

environments which lack love, mutuality and em-

pathy are less conducive to the formation of secure

and con®dent personalities. Children who lack

responsive, consistent and predictable relationships

®nd it more di�cult to handle anxiety and the

emotional stresses that life inevitably conjures. The

coherence of people's psychological organization

reveals the type of psychological adjustments that

they have had to make in order to cope with their

social environment.

In their struggle to understand what is happening

around them, babies create mental models and

cognitive structures to interpret the otherwise un-

di�erentiated din of experience. These `internal

working models' help babies make sense of the world

in which they ®nd themselves (Bowlby 1988; Belsky

& Cassidy 1994; Howe 1995). The models used to

represent relationships gradually become internalized

forming the basis of personality. The individual's

personality is judged by the characteristic ways in

which he or she makes sense of and handles social

relationships. In our development, what is on the

social outside therefore establishes itself on the

psychological inside as external relationships become

mentally internalized (Howe 1995, p. 24).

Of particular importance is the infant's ability to

understand the relationship she has with her prime

caregivers. As well as supplying comfort and safety,

attachment ®gures also provide the child with her ®rst

opportunities to be in a relationship. To be an e�ective

partner in the relationship, the child needs to make

sense of the attachment ®gure both psychologically

and socially. The infant needs to be able to in¯uence

her. In order to make sense of other people and social

relationships, infants generate inner mental represen-

tations ± internal working models ± of the self, others

and the relationship between them. Such mental

models help individuals organize their expectations

about other people's availability and responsiveness.

The models themselves arise out of earlier relation-

ship and caregiving experiences. Not only do they lay

down structures which in¯uence people's personality,

they also guide how they perceive, interpret and

respond to other people. Put very simply, the infant

has expectations about (i) whether or not at times of

stress and anxiety their caregiver is likely to be

available and respond with warmth and concern, and

(ii) whether or not they themselves are someone about

whom other people care and who are likely to respond

with love and attention.

If internal working models of the self, others and

the relationship between them develop within close

relationships, we can see that the quality of these

intimate relationships will in¯uence how children

view both themselves and other people. The more

open, full and accurate the communication between

mother and child, the more the child learns to

understand the mother, her own self and their shared

relationship. Such mutuality encourages reciprocity,

empathy, responsiveness, co-operation, regard and

respect. Here are the beginnings of social under-

standing. The more adverse the child's relationship

history and experience, the more insecure and

anxious she will feel in current relationships and the

more negative, de-valued and ine�ective she will view

herself. In this sense, external relationships become

mentally internalized. Social competence therefore is

not simply the result of some inborn trait but rather it

is `an emergent property of relationships' (Dunn

1993, p. 117). Past experiences, which the brain has

attempted to make sense of, in¯uence the way in

which present experiences are approached and under-

stood. During this process of making sense, the

infant's understanding of self develops.

Parents and their personalities produce the social

environments within which their children's socio-

emotional development takes shape (see Howe 1995).

Inconsistencies and distortions in the caregiver-child

relationship mean that the infant's attempts to model

interpersonal experience are more di�cult to achieve.

Not being able to make consistent or coherent sense

of experience is confusing and stressful. This

produces feelings of anxiety. Finding the interperso-

nal world unpredictable and seemingly beyond their

in¯uence or control, children are less able to learn



Paper 44 Disc

how to act and react to the daily demands of social

life. The more children are able to make sense of the

particular social world in which they ®nd themselves

and understand their own place within it, the more

adept, skilled and relaxed they can be in social

relationships. In turn, this improves their chances of

developing mutually rewarding friendships, entering

two-way intimate partnerships, and eventually be-

coming e�ective, caring parents themselves. Frith

(1989, p. 169) further reminds us that `the ability to

make sense of other people is also the ability to make

sense of one's self.' The more sensitive, empathic and

responsive communications are between children and

their carers, the more fully will they learn to

understand the nature and e�ect of their own mental

states on themselves and those around them. And the

more they are able to understand the basis of their

own thoughts and feelings, the more skilled they will

become at understanding and interacting with other

people. Children who develop good social empathy

are not only more accomplished at relating with

others, they are also more co-operative, considerate

and compassionate.

If parenting styles, family life, the social environ-

ment and the quality of relationships a�ect children's

psychosocial development and emotional understand-

ing, then the way children become socially competent

is of the utmost interest and relevance to social workers.

A PSYCHOSOCIAL PERSPECT IVE IN CH I LDAND FAMI LY SOCIAL WORK

In order to understand children's developmental

needs and social behaviour, practitioners need to

understand the relationship environment that parents

and children generate as they interact. Adverse

environments that damage children's social, emo-

tional and physical developments are those that trigger

the involvement of child welfare agents. The social

worker who practises with a psychosocial eye assesses

cases and makes sense of (i) the way people feel about

and view themselves, (ii) relationships between parents

as partners ± the principal generators of the relation-

ship environment in which children ®nd themselves,

(iii) relationships between parents and their children,

(iv) relationships between parents and the world

beyond their family, including their dealings with the

social worker herself, (v) relationships between children

and their siblings, and (vi) relationships between

children and the world beyond their family, including

peers, school and the many adult authority ®gures

with whom all children routinely come into contact.

To help children develop social understanding and

interpersonal competence, social workers need to

foster opportunities and promote environments that

allow children to be in secure, warm, consistent,

reciprocal, attentive, responsive, constructive and

sensitive relationships. Social workers should be able

to assess children's needs in relation to their current

social environment. Thorough assessments help

practitioners understand family relationships and

individual behaviour, decide on the kind of support

families and `children in need' require, plan the kind

of help and training parents want in order to establish

responsive relationships with their children, and

make decisions about whether or not to remove

children from their parents' care.

The political backdrop to psychosocial theories is

that the quality of relationships between people

matters, not just as congenial social experiences but

as a fundamental requirement in the formation of

individual selves who are psychologically coherent,

emotionally empathic and socially competent. Failure

on any one of these dimensions produces personal

distress and social concern. The more densely

textured, reciprocal and integrated are people's social

experiences, the more involved, skilled and socially

literate they will be. The most robust and able

personalities form when the individual is socially

embedded in relationships which sponsor mutual

interest and understanding. This is the politics of

communitarianism that recognizes the importance of

the community for personal identity, moral sensitiv-

ity and social adroitness (Bell 1993). Individuals ®nd

ful®lment in emotional interaction with others. Social

commitment is strongest amongst those who enjoy

the highest levels of psychological empathy. The

politics of attachment recognizes that people need

to belong.

Freedom, social order and political philosophy

However, according to Wagner (1994) the types of

social order in which the dialectical relationship

between psychological development and social struc-

ture take place periodically undergo major political

crises. Modernity has been de®ned by two con¯icting

pursuits or discourses: one of freedom or `liberation'

and the other of order or `discipline'. Under the

discourse of liberation, human beings began to see

themselves as free, autonomous, self-de®ning agents,

no longer bound by destiny or ®xed by social station.

The world could be explored and analysed, explained

and controlled. This unleashed the vast energy of



Paper 44 Disc

human independence and creativity. But having set

themselves free to determine their own fate, people

also became responsible for imposing order on

themselves, otherwise chaos and fragmentation would

reign. The discourse of discipline represented men's

and women's attempts to work out the principles by

which they might live together in peace, harmony and

co-operation. To this extent, discipline and order

restrain freedom and individuality. Liberation and

discipline therefore co-exist in a state of tension.

Societies oscillate between the two values that not

only sponsor di�erent political theories but also

encourage di�erent views of human nature and

personal psychology. The crises occur whenever

there is a profound reaction to what are seen as the

political excesses of either liberty/individualism or

discipline/collectivism. For example, nineteenth cen-

tury emphases on unregulated free-enterprise, the

unfettered pursuit of self-interest and the ideal of the

`self-made man' ironically also brought about great

misery, and a gross lack of freedom for the majority of

people. As a result social unrest increased. Reactions

to this state of a�airs saw the growth of the social

sciences (to study and understand the problems of

social life) and ushered in the beginnings of commu-

nal action and the welfare state (to do something

about the problems of social life).

The second crisis of modernity occurred in the

1960s and began to pick up pace throughout the

1980s. Here, the political reaction was in the opposite

direction. Collectivist welfare practices, though

bringing improvements in the lives of the majority

of citizens, also required increasing levels of social

order and engineering, state responsibility for what

went on in private family life, and restrictions on

personal freedom and choice. The welfare state,

according to its New Right critics, undermined

initiative, personal responsibility and the creative

drive that allows societies to prosper and become

successful. It failed to reward ambition and energy.

Moreover, in spite of all the costly e�orts of welfare

professionals, there was no demonstrable improvement

in reducing crime, increasing personal safety or solving

problem behaviour. Social work, for example, seemed

ine�ective in dealing with `juvenile delinquency' or

preventing child abuse (e.g. see Fischer 1976).

Neo-liberalism and the psychologically individual self

In reaction to the alleged failures of `discipline' (seen

as collectivist welfare policies and practices), there

was a cry for a return to modernity's other de®ning

principle ± personal freedom. In its wake followed a

whole raft of political and practical changes. Market

principles were not only revived, but introduced into

the previously no-go areas of welfare services, which

increasingly begin to be provided by the private

rather than state sector. Radical liberalism argued

that the individual should be as free as possible from

state interference. People should be self-determining

and personally responsible for the conduct and

content of their own lives ± the politics of libertarian

individualism. There was a growing emphasis on

rights. The neo-liberal believes that individuals are

essentially rational beings who operate best when

social constraints are removed. Swept along by these

major political tides, social workers too began to think

and practise within a neo-liberal perspective. The

principles of the free market and a rights-based

individualism began to be applied to the conception

and delivery of welfare services. Such services took on

the character of capital goods. They were priced and

given economic values; they became `commodi®ed.'

There was also an increasing emphasis on what

clients did and not on why they did it. In Cohen's

terms, increasing attention was paid to the act and not

the actor; external performances rather than internal

causes; well-doing rather well-being (Cohen 1985).

The management of relationships and the control of

performances were handled increasingly by legal and

contractual agreements between `partners.' The act

was handled and processed independent of the actor.

The actor was no longer the subject of enquiry or

concern. Rather, the client's acts became classi®ed

and categorized allowing the social worker to match

them to a set of pre-®gured administrative responses.

This approach does not encourage the worker to be

curious or interested in people's psychology or

experience so long as there are legal and adminis-

trative categories into which their behaviours can be

placed. The requirement is that clients change their

performance through compliance or rational agree-

ment. Hence the emphasis on tasks and outcomes.

Alongside moves to improve people's rights there

were parallel demands that they become more

independent and responsible for their own welfare.

Empowering people, one of those things with which it

seems impossible to disagree, allowed the New Right

to wrong foot the Old Left and to sweep in

fundamental changes in the political relationship

between the state and its citizens. To be empowered,

so the argument goes, is to be independent, which is

to say not dependent on the state. It is a formula that

favours the economically strong and the socially



Paper 44 Disc

uncommitted. It cleverly out-manoeuvres those con-

cerned to meet the needs of the weak, vulnerable and

socially less competent, for who can be against

independence, the rights of the consumer and the

empowerment of the individual?

To presume that reasonableness and rationality

alone drive human relationships denies or ignores the

possibility that human behaviour and experience can

be governed by non-rational forces. People who fail

to behave responsibly and rationally or co-operatively

and independently have to be judged and dealt with

in terms of the logic of the market place and the legal

contracts that support such economic relationships.

They forfeit their right to be involved as full

participants and equal partners. In e�ect, they are

seen to have `chosen' their situation, being personally

responsible for their behaviour. The new raison d'eÃtre

for social work is to restore or establish people as

politically willing participants.

Libertarian individualism views human beings as

autonomous, discrete, self-generating agents. Free

market economics relies on seeing men and women as

independent, rational, basically self-interested crea-

tures. Partnership, contractual and empowerment

models of practice imply that people operate ration-

ally and reasonably in the face of personal di�culty

and setback. We need therefore to consider the

ontological condition of men and women under

discourses of liberation and the type of psychological

theories and practices to which such a condition

points. In drawing out the main philosophical and

psychological features of this view of human nature,

it will become apparent that they encourage parti-

cular styles of practice in child and family social

work. Inevitably, these practices pose serious di�-

culties for those who wish to work with parents and

children using a developmental perspective based on

the social nature of self and the quality of close

relationships.

The independent, rational psychological self

The Cartesian notion of the individual subject is a

being who is at the centre of his or her own

experience. The individual is seen as the author of

his or her own actions, an authentic self with a private

identity. The human mind stands outside both nature

and culture, an independent observer. It exists prior

to and independent of its interaction with other

people. The self is therefore taken to be an asocial

phenomenon. The thoughts, feelings and minds of

others remain hidden and basically unknowable to us.

This `atomistic' view of the mind places human

reason centre stage. It is by the use of reason that

human beings can discover the `true' nature of things,

including a view of the self that is independent of and

una�ected by time and place, culture and society. In

this model, psychology regards the social environ-

ment as a source of contamination in its study of the

individual. The true object of psychology is `the

individual considered in abstraction from culture':

the `social' is something which has to be stripped away

to reveal this object (Ingleby 1986, p. 299). Human

beings are seen as autonomous, isolated egos; `unitary

individuals who carry their uniqueness deep inside

themselves' (Burkitt 1991, p. 1). There is therefore an

unbridgeable gap between the self and other people.

In social work, psychological theories that appeal to

clients' rational capacities and cognitive strengths

tend to adopt a problem solving approach. These

approaches are based on the belief that people with

problems can resolve them by the use of rational

thought, cognitive understanding and behavioural

advice. Practitioners work with clients in goal-

orientated, solution-focused partnerships. Typically,

the approach involves (i) the identi®cation, descrip-

tion and quanti®cation of the problem, (ii) analysis of

the factors, including the behaviour of other people,

that maintain the problem, (iii) the selection of goals

and solutions, and (iv) the identi®cation and im-

plementation of those actions that will achieve the

goals and resolve the problem. Based on an analysis of

present conditions, problem-solving approaches en-

courage clients to identify what steps they will need

to take if they wish to move themselves into a

problem-free future. Practice is often pragmatic, time

limited and task-centred. Indeed, it might be thought

that short-term, task-orientated, problem-targeted,

solution-focused, measurable and auditable practices

are in perfect sympathy with welfare services delivered

according to free-market principles. Products and

services are prede®ned. The organization's task

environment is dealt with in terms of need or problem

categories dissociated from the psychosocial character

of the category holder. It is in the agency's economic

interests to provide services that are targeted and brief.

Such psychological approaches also insist that

people are basically responsible for their own actions

and outcomes. Therefore relationships between prac-

titioners and users are conducted purposefully on the

assumption that all parties will behave reasonably and

rationally. Hence the use of behavioural objectives,

measured outcomes, agreements and legal-like con-

tracts to organize and manage social relationships.



Paper 44 Disc

And ìn research terms it means an exclusive focus on

the measured and measurable intervention to change

behaviours, and not understand the person. The

client's life becomes a response to a technique'

(Trinder 1996, p. 235).

To the extent that social work with children and

their families has been caught up in these discourses

of liberation and psychological individualism, it also

appears to have been `colonized' by the law. In this

outlook, rationality outbids emotionality, the court-

room (and conference) replaces the clinic, intention

ignores cause. `What we have experienced in recent

years,' observe King and Trowell (1992, p. 128) ìs

the emergence of law as the dominant institution for

the ordering of any intervention in relations between

parents and children, and the extension, through

Rules, Regulations and Guidelines, of legal concepts

and procedures to cover every aspect of child care and

protection.' By seeing people as responsible and

reasonable agents, failures in the relationship are

taken as evidence of uncooperativeness, unreason-

ableness or un®tness to participate. `Partnership

failures' are coded by the law thereby àvoiding the

necessity of undertaking the complex and lengthy

task of examining the intelligence, integrity and

personalities of the parents' (King 1995, p. 150).

The socially disembedded self

A heavy concentration on individualism removes

people, both psychologically and politically, from

the formative and steadying in¯uences of their social

context. This allows libertarians to argue that there is

no such thing as society, merely people acting

independently in pursuit of their own rational self-

interests. Although psychological individualism cred-

its the person with hugely increased amounts of

freedom, choice and opportunities for personal

creativity and responsibility, such an individual

remains psychologically alone and disconnected.

The thrilling aspects of freedom pull against the

security and emotional comfort of belonging. When

discourses of liberation are in the ascendency,

individuals become `socially disembedded' (Wagner

1994). They lose touch with their communities and

they pull apart from each other under the compelling

logic of psychological individualism.

Late twentieth century versions of unrestricted

liberalism have produced great demands on the

individual in terms of personal choice, freedom and

responsibility. It is a subtle, pervasive and deep-set

form of individualism. In knowledge and skills, jobs

and careers, roles and relationships, values and

beliefs, there is less permanence, less security, less

certainty. The self is expected to exist in a state of

continuous self-construction and reconstruction

(Howe 1996a, p. 94). Self-re¯exivity in terms of

who we are and what we do places great personal

responsibility on the individual. The welfare state

and collective responses to personal need retreat.

Once again, the self becomes `socially disconnected'

as roles, relationships, skills and careers dissolve and

lose their ability to contain and locate people in a

relatively secure social and interpersonal landscape. A

sense of belonging and commitment to other people

and situations becomes more di�use. Unbounded

freedom and autonomy release angst as well as

energy. As the social body becomes fragmented, so

the psychological coherence of the self dissolves. In

this contingent world, feelings of insecurity and

anxiety increase. The social fabric loses its density.

Relationships thin and become less capable of

providing people with emotional intimacy and sup-

port. Families under stress experience rising tension,

con¯ict and anxiety. There is less commitment to

social reciprocity; less opportunity to develop social

understanding.

Political philosophy and the choice of psychologicaltheory in child and family social work

It is at this point we must return to recent advances in

developmental psychology and the idea of the

`socialness of self'. The argument is that the

psychological coherence and social competence of

the individual depends on the quality of his or her

relationship history. Therefore, social workers who

are concerned about the social and emotional devel-

opment of children have to pay great attention to the

quality of their relationship experiences. The inter-

personal environment of children includes the quality

of relationships between parents as well as children's

relationships with their carers, siblings, other family

members and peers. But the political philosophies

and psychological models that are currently in¯uen-

cing much of child and family social work `disembed'

the individual self from his or her social and cultural

environment. An emphasis on individual rights and

responsibilities disconnects people from their social

context. This makes it di�cult for practices based on

psychological individualism, with its emphasis on the

rational, autonomous self, to understand and pursue

practices based on psychosocial models of develop-

ment and the concept of the `socialness of self.'



Paper 44 Disc

Whereas men and women seen primarily as rational

beings direct social workers to work with clients on a

legal and economic basis, men and women seen as

psychosocial beings encourage social workers to

analyse needs and behaviours in terms of people's

past and present relationship experiences.

If the developmental sciences are right to under-

stand the self as something that forms within relation-

ships and that human beings are social beings, then

psychologies and practices that deny the socialness of

self not only fail to understand the psychological

nature of social and personal problems, they also commit

an injustice by reacting to and dealing with people

entirely and always as independent, rational agents.

Parents and their families come to the notice of social

workers when there are failures of relationship,

problems with behaviour, or concerns about conduct.

The politics of justice (rather than welfare) become

particularly interesting and problematic for social

developmentalists in the case of children's rights. The

increasing trend towards crediting children with the

same kind of rights as adults also places an increased

burden of responsibility on young minds (see Fox

Harding 1996 for a discussion of children's rights).

By regarding children as rational, independent beings

we begin to separate and isolate them from the close

relationships that are fundamentally necessary for

their social and emotional development. The social

self in its growth and formation is adversely a�ected

if it begins to be distanced and disconnected from

those social relationships that help bring about its

formation. Asking children to assume too much

responsibility for the quality of their own experience

too soon can be developmentally demanding and

psychologically unhelpful. Emotional coherence, so-

cial competence and moral understanding emerge

within relationships and not outside them.

If the self is a social self, psychosocial theories of

personal development have the potential to provide

child and family social workers with a powerful and

coherent framework within which to organize both

thought and practice (for example, see Fahlberg 1991;

Howe 1995, 1996b). Much social work research and

practice in the ®eld of child and family welfare is

atheoretical and pragmatic (Trinder 1996). In many

cases both research projects and their ®ndings free-

¯oat, unanchored to either a political or theoretical

base. Practices that emphasize rational behaviour,

personal responsibility, the politics of partnerships

and individual rights miss too much of these basic

aspects of child and family social work. They

disembed and psychologically isolate the individual

from social relationships and so ®nd it di�cult to

sustain a consistent approach to working with parents

and meeting children's needs.

A psychosocial perspective helps social workers

understand the character and quality of relationships,

including client-worker relationships. The theory

allows practitioners to analyse parent-child relation-

ships and make sense of problem behaviour and poor

parenting. A psychosocial approach sharpens deci-

sion-making, particularly in the area of children's

needs and caregiving arrangements. It provides a

framework for understanding the importance and

success of family support and family centres, skills

training for parents, patterns of development and

outcome in adoption and fostering, the need for contact

between children and their non-custodial parents,

and the value of participation. Analyses of the quality

of relationships and social environments remain

fundamental if we are to understand and support

children's psychosocial development and wellbeing.

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