Process Safety & Reliability Group PSM FORUM...pressure vessels ♦ Determining the representative...

PSM FORUM

“PSM ENFORCEMENT AND REGULATORY UPDATE FOR OSHA”

January 31, 2013

Mark S. Dreux, Esq. Arent Fox LLP

1717 K Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036

202-857-6405 (o) 703-628-6742 (c)

E-mail: [email protected] © Mark S. Dreux 2013

mailto:[email protected]

2

OVERVIEW

♦ CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS CRITICIZING OSHA ♦ OSHA’S RESPONSE TO CRITICISM – TWO NEP’S ♦ REFINING NEP ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS ♦ CHEMICAL NEP

♦ Overview ♦ Unit Selection ♦ Role of Employees

♦ CHEMICAL NEP ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS ♦ INDUSTRY STANDARDS CITED MOST FREQUENTLY ♦ RECOMMENDATIONS ♦ REGULATORY UPDATE

3

CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS ON BP DISASTER – MARCH 22, 2007

♦ Chairman Miller ♦ Is OSHA doing its job? ♦ OSHA has failed to protect workers ♦ BP is the story of the failure of OSHA ♦ OSHA’s penalty structure is ineffective

♦ Congressman Holt ♦ “OSHA is the lap dog of the industry”

4

KEY WITNESS AT THE CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS

♦ Carolyn Meritt – Chairperson of CSB ♦ OSHA’s regulatory oversight was

ineffective ♦ Rigorous enforcement of PSM would have

prevented this incident ♦ OSHA has few trained inspectors.

♦ All witnesses agreed Chemical Industry and Refining Industry have similar safety issues.

5

OSHA’S RESPONSE TO THE CRITICISM

♦ Two National Emphasis Programs ♦ Released in June 2007 – Refining NEP ♦ Released in July 2009 – Pilot Chemical NEP ♦ Released in November 2011 – Chemical NEP

♦ Interpretation letters pulled from OSHA’s website ♦ New interpretation letters and aggressive

enforcement to expand PSM coverage ♦ More PSM trained compliance officers

6

REFINING NEP ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS

♦ Based on the 65 NEP citations:

♦ Total Citations 1,542

♦ PSM 1088 ♦ Non-PSM 454

♦ Total Fines $9,401,472.00

7

REFINING NEP CHARACTERIZATION OF THE CITATIONS

Serious 1335 87%

OTS 77 5%

Willful/Unclassified

92 8%

Repeat

38

Total 1,542 100%

8


♦ Most Citations 93 (88 PSM)

♦ Fewest Citations 1 (0 PSM)

♦ Highest Penalty $3,042,000

♦ Lowest Penalty $1,125

♦ Average 24 citations $144,638 penalty

9

Mechanical Integrity 202 Process Safety Information 189 Process Hazard Analysis 188 Operating Procedures 184 Management of Change 92 Incident Investigation 71 Compliance Audits 47 Contractors 33 Training 29

REFINING NEP PSM ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS (65 NEP Citations Issued as of 3/14/11)

855 79%

10

Emergency Planning and Response 17 Employee Participation 15 Pre-Startup Safety Review 13 Hot Work Permits 8 Trade Secrets 0 Total PSM Citations

1088

REFINING NEP PSM ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS

(65 NEP Citations Issued as of 3/14/11) (cont’d)

11

REFINING NEP ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS MECHANICAL INTEGRITY

J(1) Process equipment 0

J(2) Written procedures 37 J(3) Training 3

J(4) Inspection and testing 0

J(4)(i) Inspection and testing 29

J(4)(ii) Engineering practices 22

J(4)(iii) Frequency 23

J(4)(iv) Documentation 14

J(5) Equipment deficiencies 61

J(6)(i) Quality assurance 0

J(6)(ii) Inspections 9

J(6)(iii) Materials and spare parts 4

TOTAL 202

88

12

♦ J-2 Mechanical Integrity Program ♦ No Procedures for:

♦ Pressure vessels with integrally bonded liners ♦ Corrosion under insulation inspections for pressure

vessels and piping ♦ Addressing anomalous readings pertaining to metal

thickness ♦ Determining thickness measurement frequency for

pressure vessels ♦ Determining the representative number of thickness

measurements


13

♦ J-4 Testing and Inspections ♦ Failure to follow own scheduled T/I

♦ Visual inspections ♦ Ultra sound ♦ Internal corrosion ♦ TML’s ♦ Vibration analysis

♦ Failure to follow RAGAGEP ♦ Testing of wrong locations ♦ Testing of wrong frequency ♦ Insufficient number of tests

♦ Failure to document the T/I results


14

♦ 119(J)(5) Equipment Deficiencies ♦ TML’s below recommended thickness ♦ H2S, HF & LEL detectors not working ♦ Temperature gauge broken ♦ Chains for operating valves missing ♦ Relieve valve set at 270 PSI when

MAWP was 150 PSI


15


PROCESS SAFETY INFORMATION (PSI)

D Schedule/Prioritization 2 D(1) Information re: Hazards 0 D(2) Technological Information 17 D(3) Equipment Information 170

Total

189

16

REFINING NEP ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS PROCESS SAFETY INFORMATION (PSI)

D(3)(i) Information on Equipment 5 D(3)(i)(A) Materials of Construction 5 D(3)(i)(B) P&ID’s 38 D(3)(i)(C) Electrical Classification 7 D(3)(i)(D) Relief System Design and Design Basis 27 D(3)(i)(E) Ventilation System Design 2 D(3)(i)(F) Design Codes and Standards 9 D(3)(i)(H) Safety Systems 1 D(3)(ii) Document Equipment complies with

RAGAGEP 72

D(3)(iii) Equipment Designed on a Code no Longer in General Use

4

Total 170

17

♦ P&ID’s ♦ Inaccurate info on P&ID’s

♦ Vessel or pump out of service ♦ Wrong pressure or temperature ♦ Lines mislabeled

♦ Omissions from P&ID’s ♦ Temperature indicator ♦ Sight glass ♦ By-pass line ♦ New equipment ♦ New lines


18


♦ 119(d)(3)(i)(D) – Relief System Design and Design Basis ♦ Blowdowns/Atmospheric Discharge

♦ Lack of technical data to show safe release to atmosphere

♦ Relief Systems – ♦ Adequacy following changes especially

changes in thru-put ♦ Design basis – lack of technical support

19


♦ 119(d)(3)(ii) – Equipment with RAGAGEP ♦ Facility Siting – NFPA 496 and API 752 ♦ Electrical classifications—API 500 ♦ Trailers – API 753 ♦ Relief Valves and Design – ASME & API 520

♦ Adequacy and sizing of valves ♦ No PSV’s ♦ Intervening valves

20

REFINING NEP ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS

E(1) Appropriate PHA/Prioritization 12 E(2) Methodologies 0 E(3) PHA addresses 0 E(3)(i) Hazards 15 E(3)(ii) Incidents 10 E(3)(iii) E and A Controls 15 E(3)(iv) Failure of Controls 11 E(3)(v) Facility siting 31 E(3)(vi) Human factors 23 E(3)(vii) Qualitative evaluation 2 E(4) Team of Experts 0 E(5) Findings/recommendations 53 E(6) Revalidation 15 E(7) Revalidation records 1

TOTAL 188

107

21

♦ 119(e) PHA’s ♦ PHA

♦ Failure to consider all scenarios ♦ Loss of utilities or control rooms ♦ Fires and releases of HHC’s

♦ Failure to consider near misses ♦ Propane leaks ♦ Oil Spills ♦ Fires

♦ Failure to adequately consider ♦ Facility Siting ♦ Human factors


22

♦ Failure to address findings – ♦ Ranged 2-15 years ♦ Complexity – gravity – time (citation factors)

♦ Failure to document corrective measures


23


OPERATING PROCEDURES

F(1) Written procedures 18 F(1)(i) Operating phases 65 F(1)(ii) Operating limits 26 F(1)(iii) Safety and health 12 F(1)(iv) Safety systems 9 F(2) Access 3 F(3) Certification 23 F(4) Safe work practices 28

TOTAL 184

130

24

♦ SOP’s ♦ Lack operating limits or consequences

of deviation ♦ Missing essential step in procedure ♦ Referring to outdated equipment, step

or specific manager ♦ Error with locks or carseals on valves

for startup


25

♦ Safe Work Practices ♦ Procedures/practices for controlling

motorized vehicles in process areas ♦ OSHA relies electrical classification

drawings to show a “hazard”


26

REFINING NEP ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE

L(1) Written procedures 40 L(2) Considerations 2 L(2)(i) Technical basis 3 L(2)(ii) Impact of change 9 L(2)(iii) Operating procedures 1 L(2)(iv) Time Period 3 L(2)(v) Authorization requirements 2 L(3) Employee training 4 L(4) Update PSI 22 L(5) Revise operating procedures 6

TOTAL 92

60

32

27


♦ MOC’s ♦ Failure to do MOC’s (adequacy)

♦ Throughput increases ♦ Changing startup pressures ♦ Rerating boilers ♦ Removing column, quench water

♦ Failure to do related updates ♦ PSI ♦ Procedures ♦ Training

28

Summary of OSHA’s Chemical NEP

♦ Pilot Program has ended.

♦ National Program has started.

♦ Applies to chemical plants subject to PSM.

♦ Applies nationwide to all OSHA regions and state plans.

♦ State plans must implement the chemical NEP within 6 months or develop one that is “at least as effective.”

29

Chemical NEP Programmed and Unprogrammed Inspections

♦ Programmed inspections under this NEP shall be randomly selected sites from the Region’s revised lists

♦ 3-5 programmed inspections per Area Office per year (52 Area Offices)

♦ Unprogrammed inspections: other triggers for a Chemical NEP inspection: ♦ Accident ♦ Catastrophe ♦ Complaint ♦ Referral ♦ Site-specific targeting plan

30

Chemical NEP Dynamic Lists

♦ “CSHO’s should verify the implementation of PSM elements to ensure that the employer’s actual program is consistent with their written program.”

♦ Three OSHA inspection protocols called “Dynamic Lists”:

♦ PSM General

♦ Ammonia Refrigeration

♦ Chemical Processing

♦ These lists will be periodically updated and are not available for public review

31

Chemical NEP Scope of Inspections

♦ Inspect host employer and contract employers

♦ Review employer’s history of OSHA inspections and any abatement verifications submitted for citations

♦ Verify abatement of previous PSM citations

32

Chemical NEP Prior PSM Citations: Abatement Requirement

♦ “During the course of the inspection, the CSHO shall review abatement for all PSM citations issued within the previous 6 years to determine whether the hazard still exists.”

♦ “If a hazard exists, the CSHO shall determine whether there has been a failure to abate in accordance with CPL 02-00-148-FOM, and issue a notice for failure to abate as appropriate.”

♦ FTA penalties can be up to $7,000 per day per violation.

33

Chemical NEP Initial Walkaround of Units Covered by PSM

♦ Gather information on basic facility operations ♦ Observe potential hazards

♦ Piping - corrosion - leaks ♦ Control room siting ♦ Trailer sites ♦ Relief devices that vent to atmosphere

♦ Solicit input from workers on potential PSM deficiencies

34

Chemical Unit Selection ♦ NEP criteria “…to identify the most hazardous

process unit …” ♦ Nature of and quantity of chemicals ♦ Incident history of unit, near misses, emergency shut-

downs ♦ Age of process unit ♦ Lead operator input ♦ Union input ♦ Compliance audits and open items ♦ Current hot work, repair and inspect records

♦ Compliance officers have usually chosen just one unit but have authority to select more.

35

Chemical NEP Staffing and Duration of Inspection

♦ Usually 1-2 compliance officers

♦ Inspectors must take specialized PSM training classes

♦ 134 man hours for Chemical NEP inspection (includes preparation, opening, site work and drafting citations and reports)

♦ 25 man hours for average OSHA inspection

♦ 1000 man hours for Refining NEP inspection

36

Chemical NEP Employees’ and Union’s Role

♦ NEP states “solicit input from workers and their representatives … concerning potential PSM program deficiencies”

♦ Seek information from lead operators and worker representatives concerning most hazardous process, incidents, near misses, emergency shut downs.

♦ Issue – Do the Employees and/or Union think that the facility is basically a safe workplace?

♦ Collective bargaining agreement ♦ Timing for Renewal ♦ Role in Inspections

37

♦ CHEM NEP data from May 1, 2009 to Nov. 9, 2012 Total Inspections..........................................536 Unprogrammed.................................. 215 Programmed......................................321

♦ CHEM NEP Violations (Federal only).....2,339

Current Inspection Data for Chemical NEP

38

♦ New system still being implemented ♦ Current Statistical Breakdown for Top

Violations 119(j)(2) MI Procedures 74 119(d)(3)(ii) Equipment & RAGAGEP 73 119(j)(5) Equipment Deficiencies 41 119(l)(1) MOC’s 41 119(d)(3)(1)(B) P & ID’s 40 119(e)(5) PHA Findings 38 119(j)(4)(i) Testing/Inspections 37 119(o)(1) Audits 32 119(e)(3)(i) PHA’s 28

OSHA – New Citation Data Tabulation System

39

119(j)(4)(iii) Frequency of Testing 27 119(f)(1) SOP’s 26 119(f)(3) Annual Certifications 25 23(c)(1) Opened Sided Platform 24 119(e)(1) PHA’s 22 151(c) Eye Washes 22 119(j)(4)(ii) T/I and RAGAGEP 21 5(a)(1) General Duty Clause 20 TOTAL 591

OSHA – New Citation Data Tabulation System cont.

♦ OSHA inspecting many smaller companies with varying S&H programs

40

CHEMICAL NEP ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS (Based on Sample of 98 Citations)

♦ Based on the 98 NEP citations sampled:

♦ Total Citations 1031

♦ PSM 678 ♦ Non-PSM 353

♦ Total Fines $4,147,267.50

41

CHEMICAL NEP CHARACTERIZATION OF THE CITATIONS

Serious 856 83%

OTS 153 15%

Willful/Unclassified

7 2%

Repeat

15

Total 1031 100%

42

CHEMICAL NEP ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS

♦ Most Citations 49 (25 PSM)

♦ Fewest Citations 1 ( 0 PSM)

♦ Highest Penalty $441,000

♦ Lowest Penalty $ 0

♦ Average 11 citations $42,300 penalty

♦ Approximately 20 Facilities with No Citations (No PSM Process)

43

Mechanical Integrity 156 Process Safety Information 140 Operating Procedures 114 Process Hazard Analysis 106 Management of Change 44 Compliance Audits 35 Training 21 Incident Investigation 19 Employee Participation 16

CHEMICAL NEP PSM ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS (98 NEP Citations Sampled)

516 76%

44

Contractors 14 Emergency Planning and Response 7 Pre-Startup Safety Review 5 Hot Work Permits 1 Trade Secrets 0 Total PSM Citations

678

CHEMICAL NEP PSM ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS (98 NEP Citations Sampled)

45

CHEMICAL NEP ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS MECHANICAL INTEGRITY

J(1) Process equipment 0

J(2) Written procedures 41 J(3) Training 5

J(4) Inspection and testing 0

J(4)(i) Inspection and testing 28

J(4)(ii) Engineering practices 11

J(4)(iii) Frequency 21

J(4)(iv) Documentation 10

J(5) Equipment deficiencies 28

J(6)(i) Quality assurance 2

J(6)(ii) Inspections 6

J(6)(iii) Materials and spare parts 4

TOTAL 156

70

46

♦ J-2 Mechanical Integrity Program ♦ No procedures for mechanical integrity

♦ Written procedures contained no reference to applicable RAGAGEP

♦ No procedures in place for piping or valves showing signs of degradation or rust

♦ The employer’s critical equipment list did not include certain storage tanks and air compressors

♦ Procedures did not specify the necessary torque for flange bolts


47

♦ J-4 Testing and Inspections ♦ Employer did not conduct inspections per IIAR Bulletin 110 or its

equivalent ♦ Employer did not conduct inspections per IIAR Bulletin 109 or its

equivalent ♦ Pressure relief valves had not been inspected every 5 years to

comply with ASHRAE-15 ♦ Inspections were not done on storage tanks for anhydrous

ammonia, liquid chlorine, and sulfur dioxide ♦ Inspections were not done on pre-existing TML locations ♦ Inspection and NDE were not done on process equipment per

RAGAGEP such as API 570, API RP 575, and ASME/ANSI B31.3 ♦ Obviously damaged equipment had not been inspected to

determine its mechanical integrity ♦ Fitness-for-service assessment per API 579 was not done after a

tank underwent repairs ♦ Inspection checklists did not include needed information (date

inspection occurred, name of employee doing inspection, etc.)


48

♦ 119(J)(5) Equipment Deficiencies ♦ Poor condition of paint/external coating was not

addressed ♦ Rusted, pitted, and corroded piping were in use ♦ Valves were missing handles and could not be operated ♦ TML’s below recommended thickness ♦ Emergency exhaust and relief discharge piping were

undersized


49


PROCESS SAFETY INFORMATION (PSI)

D Schedule/Prioritization 4 D(1) Information re: Hazards 0 D(2) Technological Information 21 D(3) Equipment Information 115

Total

140

50

CHEMICAL NEP ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS PROCESS SAFETY INFORMATION (PSI)

D(3)(i) Information on Equipment 7 D(3)(i)(A) Materials of Construction 2 D(3)(i)(B) P&ID’s 26 D(3)(i)(C) Electrical Classification 5 D(3)(i)(D) Relief System Design and Design Basis 11 D(3)(i)(E) Ventilation System Design 6 D(3)(i)(F) Design Codes and Standards 7 D(3)(i)(G) Material and Energy Balance 1 D(3)(i)(H) Safety Systems 3 D(3)(ii) Document Equipment complies with

RAGAGEP 43

D(3)(iii) Equipment Designed on a Code no Longer in General Use

4

Total 115

51

♦ P&ID’s ♦ Current P&IDs were not available

♦ Two valve tags were reversed

♦ Pressure indicators were missing in the field

♦ Pipe sizes were labeled improperly and valves were missing or in the wrong place

♦ P&ID did not include information required by RAGAGEP, ANSI/ISA S5.1 Code


52


♦ 119(d)(3)(i)(D) – Relief System Design and Design Basis ♦ No worst case scenario had been developed

♦ No information for the relief system was available

♦ No documentation for design basis for the relief system for tanks and vessels

♦ No documentation of compliance with RAGAGEP when employer failed to document that a burst rupture disc would not cause a spark

♦ Inlet pressure exceeded 3% of set point

♦ Set pressure of rupture disk exceeded MAWP

53

CHEMICAL NEP ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS ♦ 119(d)(3)(ii) – Equipment with RAGAGEP

♦ No documentation of compliance with the HFIPI Guideline for the Bulk Storage of Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride

♦ No documentation of compliance with IIAR Bulletin 110 where relief valves could relieve to an unsafe location

♦ No documentation that relief valves complied with IIAR Bulletin 114 ♦ No documentation of compliance with RAGAGEP where a vessel’s U-1 had

not been maintained ♦ Failure to document compliance with API 520 for relief systems ♦ Missing documentation of RAGAGEP where a pressure vessel’s U-3 had

not been maintained ♦ Co-location of equipment using combustion air and equipment containing

refrigerant did not comply with ANSI/ASHRAE 15 ♦ Location of discharge for pressure relief devices did not comply with

ANSI/IIAR 2-2008 ♦ No documentation of compliance with ASME BPVC UG-135 where employer

had no program in place to control stop valves upstream or downstream of PRVs

♦ Relief systems not located properly ♦ Pipes and valves not labeled properly

54

CHEMICAL NEP ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS

E(1) Appropriate PHA/Prioritization 10 E(2) Methodologies 1 E(3) PHA addresses 1 E(3)(i) Hazards 17 E(3)(ii) Incidents 4 E(3)(iii) E and A Controls 9 E(3)(iv) Failure of Controls 6 E(3)(v) Facility siting 11 E(3)(vi) Human factors 9 E(3)(vii) Qualitative evaluation 0 E(4) Team of Experts 1 E(5) Findings/recommendations 26 E(6) Revalidation 10 E(7) Revalidation records 1

TOTAL 106

57

55

♦ 119(e) PHA’s ♦ Failure to conduct an initial PHA on a covered process ♦ Failure to consider all scenarios

♦ Loss of power ♦ Maintenance procedures could result in an ammonia release ♦ Hazards associated with combustible dust ♦ Outdoor environmental factors affecting the safe operation of

process equipment ♦ Failure of pressure relief devices ♦ Damage that may result from employees stepping over

anhydrous ammonia pipes to access a building ♦ Specific incident that occurred at the plant (either before the

PHA was done or after) ♦ Failure to adequately consider

♦ Facility Siting ♦ Human Factors


56

♦ 119(e) PHA’s (cont’d) ♦ Failure to address findings

♦ Employer could not verify that recommendations from a 1998 PHA were resolved

♦ Failure to establish a “system” to address recommendations ♦ Failure to document the reasons an alternative resolution was

adopted rather than that recommended by the PHA team ♦ Failure to communicate resolutions of PHA recommendations

to affected employees ♦ Complexity – gravity – time (citation factors)

♦ Failure to re-do or revalidate a PHA within 5 years


57


OPERATING PROCEDURES

F(1) Written procedures 21 F(1)(i) Operating phases 38 F(1)(ii) Operating limits 10 F(1)(iii) Safety and health 14 F(1)(iv) Safety systems 6 F(2) Access 2 F(3) Certification 17 F(4) Safe work practices 6

TOTAL 114

89

58

♦ SOP’s ♦ Operating procedures were not being implemented

by employees ♦ Procedure referenced equipment that was not

present or not labeled in the process ♦ Steps were unclear ♦ Employer had no procedure to address

communications and other activities involving shift changes

♦ Procedures did not address which employees were authorized to perform the various steps

♦ Procedures had not been developed for each phase of operating the process


59

♦ Annual Certification of Operating Procedures ♦ Certification was not done ♦ Certification was not valid because procedures

were not accurate

♦ Safe Work Practices ♦ Failure to account for workers in process units

where employees failed to sign in and out ♦ Procedures for opening equipment had not been

fully implemented, leading to an injury ♦ Employer did not ensure that contract employees

followed safe work practices


60

CHEMICAL NEP ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS ♦ Management of Change (44 Citations)

♦ Failure to do MOC ♦ Throughput changes ♦ Change in PPE for employees opening a vessel ♦ Following revision of required bolt torque on flange

gaskets ♦ Change in TML location ♦ MOC was not completed before the equipment

change occurred ♦ Failure to evaluate

♦ Impact of the change on safety and health ♦ Failure to do related updates

♦ PSI ♦ Procedures ♦ Training

61


♦ Compliance audits (35 Citations) ♦ Audit was not done or was done late ♦ Audit did not address elements of PSM

♦ Mechanical Integrity Procedures ♦ Contractor Safety Program

♦ Failure to address audit findings/document how findings were addressed

♦ Training (21 Citations) ♦ Failure to determine whether employees understood the

training ♦ Failure to consult with employees as to the necessary

frequency of refresher training ♦ Refresher training was not provided at least every 3 years

62


♦ Incident Investigations (19 Citations) ♦ Failure to investigate incident or near miss ♦ Failure to begin the incident investigation within 48 hours ♦ Failure to identify factors that led to the incident ♦ Failure to document resolution of recommendations from

the report ♦ Failure to review incident investigation report with

employees

63

CHEMICAL NEP ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS FACILITY SITING

♦ 119(d)(3)(ii) – Equipment complies with RAGAGEP ♦ Control rooms – not complying with NFPA 496 and

API 752 ♦ We have not seen this citation in the Chemical NEP

yet, but it was common in the refining NEP

♦ 119(e)(3)(v) – “PHA...shall…address facility siting” ♦ PHA inadequately addressed facility siting

♦ Approximately 13% of facilities received facility siting citations

64

LESSONS LEARNED FROM CITATION PATTERNS

♦ OSHA’s aggressive interpretations of PSM standard

♦ OSHA’s selective interpretations of RAGAGEP

♦ OSHA demands documentation for PHA, audit and incident investigation findings.

♦ Citation patterns show OSHA’s priorities

65

OSHA’s Aggressive Use of RAGAGEP

♦ API 752 ♦ Management of Hazards Associated with Location of

Process Plant Permanent Buildings ♦ API 570

♦ Piping Inspection Code: In-Service Inspection, Rating, Repair, and Alteration of Piping

♦ API 510 ♦ Pressure Vessel Inspection Code: In-Service Inspection,

Rating, Repair, and Alteration ♦ API 521

♦ Pressure-Relieving and Depressuring Systems

Most Frequently Referenced RAGAGEPs

66

OSHA’s Aggressive Use of RAGAGEP

♦ API 574 ♦ Inspection Practices for Piping System Components

♦ API 520 ♦ Sizing, Selection, and Installation of Pressure-relieving

Devices in Refineries ♦ API 753

♦ Management of Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Portable Buildings

♦ ANSI/ISA S.84.01 ♦ Functional Safety: Safety Instrumented Systems for the

Process Industry Sector

67

CHEMICAL NEP NON-PSM CITATIONS Standard No. Citations Electrical 40 Recordkeeping 35 Subpart Z (Toxic and Hazardous Substances) 35 Respirators 33 HAZWOPER (Incident Command) 32 Lockout/Tagout 31 Subpart D - Walking/Working Surfaces 29 Machine Guarding 27 PPE (Other Than Respirators) 17 Subpart E – Exit Routes, Emergency Action Plans 12 Eye Washes 10 General Duty Clause 10 Flammable Liquids 5 Subpart L – Fire Protection 5 Miscellaneous 32 TOTAL 353

294

83%

68

NON-PSM CITATIONS ♦ Electrical

♦ Working space around equipment was not kept clear ♦ Covers for electrical installations were not secured/all

unused openings were not effectively closed ♦ Improper grounding ♦ Flexible cords and cables were used as a substitute for fixed

wiring ♦ Unclassified electrical equipment was used in a classified

area ♦ Defective electrical equipment was not removed from service ♦ Proper electrical protective equipment was not provided

where necessary (FR clothing, face shields, NFPA 70E considerations for arc flash)

69

NON-PSM CITATIONS ♦ Recordkeeping

♦ Failure to maintain the OSHA 300 log ♦ Failure to record injury on the OSHA 300 where an employee

experienced a Standard Threshold Shift in hearing ♦ Failure to follow directions in Column F of OSHA 300: “Describe injury or illness, parts of body affected, and

object/substance that directly injured or made person ill (e.g., Second degree burns on right forearm from acetylene torch)”

♦ Total number of days away from work was incorrectly tallied ♦ Failure to complete the OSHA 300A, the yearly summary ♦ OSHA 300 did not contain a certification from a company executive

that the information was accurate ♦ Employer took more than 4 hours to provide OSHA with a copy of

the OSHA 300 log

70

NON-PSM CITATIONS ♦ Subpart Z – Toxic and Hazardous Substances

♦ Employees were exposed to chemicals at concentrations greater than the PEL for: ♦ Iron Oxide Dust ♦ Chromium (VI) ♦ Cadmium ♦ Methylene Chloride

♦ Failure to determine the 8 hour TWA for hazardous chemicals to which employees were exposed

♦ Failure to determine whether employees could be exposed to hazardous chemicals above the action level

♦ Failure to certify that employees were trained as to the hazards of the chemicals to which they were exposed

♦ Signs were not posted at the entrance to rooms where potentially asbestos containing material was located

♦ Air monitoring results demonstrating employee exposures were not maintained for at least 30 years

♦ HAZCOM training did not include: ♦ Operations in the work area where hazardous chemicals were present ♦ The methods used to detect the presence or release of a hazardous chemical ♦ The physical hazards associated with chemicals in the workplace

71

NON-PSM CITATIONS ♦ Respirators

♦ Employer failed to determine a reasonable estimate of employee exposure to respiratory hazards

♦ Written respiratory protection program was not in place when respirators were necessary

♦ Medical evaluations were not provided before employees were fit-tested or required to use respirators

♦ Fit-testing was not provided prior to initial use of the respirator

♦ Employees did not receive training before being allowed to use tight-fitting respirators

♦ Respirators were not cleaned and disinfected as often as necessary to be maintained in a sanitary condition

72

NON-PSM CITATIONS ♦ HAZWOPER (Incident Command)

♦ An emergency response plan was not developed to handle anticipated emergencies

♦ The emergency response plan did not address: ♦ Personnel roles, lines of authority, and communications ♦ Decontamination procedures ♦ Emergency medical treatment and first aid

♦ In response to a particular emergency, the Incident Commander did not adequately implement the emergency response plan, per 1910.120(q)(3)

♦ Employees who were expected to participate in emergency response had not received adequate training for their expected duties

♦ Members of the emergency response team did not receive annual medical evaluations

73

NON-PSM CITATIONS ♦ Lockout/Tagout

♦ Failure to develop, document, and utilize written lockout procedures for specifically identified equipment

♦ Lockout/tagout devices did not meet the requirements of 1910.147(c)(5) – identify employee, tagouts must be non-reusable, etc.

♦ Periodic inspections of the lockout/tagout procedures were not completed

♦ Lockout/tagout training was deficient where each employee had his own way of locking out

♦ Lockout/tagout procedures were not implemented as required – employees failed to follow the procedures

♦ In group lockout scenarios, each employee failed to affix his own lockout device

74

NON-PSM CITATIONS ♦ Subpart D – Walking/Working Surfaces

♦ Ladderways and platforms were not adequately guarded ♦ Wall openings over 4 feet from the level below were not

adequately guarded ♦ Open-sided floors and platforms over 4 feet from the level

below were not adequately guarded

♦ Machine Guarding ♦ Inadequate guarding for:

♦ Drill presses ♦ Augers ♦ Conveyors ♦ Lathes ♦ Milling machines

♦ Fans ♦ Saws ♦ Grinders ♦ Shafts and shaft ends ♦ Chains and belts

75

RECOMMENDATIONS

♦ First Recommendation: ♦ Review prior citations for PSM violations ♦ Go to osha.gov – Check OSHA’s records

on citations for PSM violations ♦ Gather documents to show abated ♦ Audit to ensure not recurring

♦ Second Recommendation: ♦ Do the Unit selection analysis for the

“most hazardous process”

76

RECOMMENDATIONS (cont’d)

♦ Third Recommendation – Conduct an Audit of Selected Unit

77


♦ Traditional Safety Focus – include in Unit audit

♦ Consider whether you want to do audit under privilege. See case where we successfully defended a claim of attorney privilege for a gap analysis under Refining NEP.

Electrical LOTO PPE Guarding Record-

keeping HAZWOPER

78


♦ Fourth recommendation: ♦ Train a team to manage the inspection

♦ Fifth recommendation: ♦ Interview disgruntled employees

79

Regulatory Update ♦ PSM Interpretation on TQ’s ♦ Incentive Programs and Employee Discipline ♦ Rulemaking – all still proposed

♦ I2P2 ♦ Reporting to OSHA ♦ Combustible Dust ♦ MSD’s ♦ Silica

♦ Chemical Safety Board

80

♦ Question: Is the total mass of a mixture consisting of a fine, non-soluble, non-combustible solid combined with a flammable liquid considered when determining if a threshold quantity (TQ) is present in a process?

♦ Rationale: If the mixture as a whole meets the 29 CFR 1910.1200(c)(iii) definition of a flammable liquid, then the total amount of flammable liquid is 10,000 pounds, even if some components(s) of the mixture alone would not meet the required flash point.

♦ Answer: Because the mixture in question meets the definition of a liquid and has a flashpoint of less than 100°F, it is a flammable liquid. A process containing 10,000 pounds or more of the mixture would be covered under the PSM standard.

Regulatory Update: May 21, 2009 Kaster Letter PSM - Calculating TQ’s

81

♦ Section 11(c) of OSH Act “No person shall discharge or ... discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint....”

♦ C.F.R. 1904.36 “Section 11(c) of the Act prohibits you from discriminating against an employee for reporting a work related fatality, injury or illness.”

March 12, 2012 Memo by Richard Fairfax, Deputy Assistant Secretary

♦ Policy: reporting a work related injury/illness is a core employee right. potential for discrimination when management bonuses are linked to lower injury rates.

Regulatory Update: Incentive Programs and Employee Discipline

82

1. A policy of disciplining all injured employees regardless of fault violates Section 11(c).

2. Discipline for non reporting an injury or illness in the manner and time required by employer may violate Section 11(c). Employer’s rule must be reasonable and proportional.

3. Discipline for violating a safety rule may violate Section 11(c). Is discipline a pretext? Is discipline consistently applied? Clarity/specifity of safety rule?

4. Incentives programs may discourage reporting of injury/illness so they might violate. No prizes for low injury rates. Incentive program that encourage safe behaviors – audits, training – are permissible.

Regulatory Update: Four Examples Listed in Fairfax Memo

83

Regulatory Update: I2P2 Rulemaking

♦ Urges employers to identify and fix hazards before an incident occurs. ♦ OSHA urges a performance standard with the following essential

elements: ♦ Manager Leadership ♦ Worker Participation ♦ Hazard Identification ♦ Hazard Prevention and Control ♦ Education and Training; and ♦ Program Evaluation and Improvement

No draft rule available Enforcement

♦ programmatic vs. comprehensive ♦ duplicative citations

♦ According to OSHA, a proposed rule will be published for public comment in December 2013.

84

1) Reporting all work related hospitalizations within 8 hours an of in-patient hospitalization.

2) Reporting all work related amputations within 24 hours.

Amputation includes loss of limb or external body part, generally includes loss of bone.

Regulatory Update: Proposed Changes to Reporting to OSHA

85

♦ OSHA has moved it from its long term agenda to the regulatory agenda.

♦ Draft NFPA 652 entitled “Standard on Combustible Dust” is out for comments; goal is 2015 edition.

♦ Concern is that OSHA will track draft NFPA 652.

♦ Leadership within OSHA see combustible dust rule as a priority.

♦ OSHA plans to start the SBREFA process in October 2013.

Regulatory Update: Combustible Dust Rulemaking

86

♦ Require work-related musculoskeletal disorders to be identified on 300 Form

♦ Defines MSD:

[D]isorders of the muscles, nerves, tendons, ligaments, joints, cartilage and spinal discs. MSDs DO NOT include disorders caused by slips, trips, falls, motor vehicle accidents, or other similar accidents. Examples of MSDs include: Carpal tunnel syndrome, Rotator Cuff syndrome, De Quervain’s disease, Trigger finger, Tarsal tunnel syndrome, Sciatica, Epicondylitis, Tendinitis, Raynaud ‘s phenomenon, Carpet layers knee, Herniated spinal disc, and low back pain.

Regulatory Update: Recordkeeping and MSD Rulemaking

87

♦ NPRM – January 2010 Final rule originally expected July 2010

♦ FY2012 Budget rider – prohibition on developing the Rule

♦ OSHA moved the MSD recordkeeping to its long term agenda.

Regulatory Update: Recordkeeping and MSD Rulemaking

88

♦ OSHA submitted a proposed rule to OMB for review in February 2011 and it is still there.

♦ OSHA has evidence that exposure to crystalline silica at the current PEL causes silicosis and other diseases.

♦ OSHA’s Regulatory Agenda states that proposed Rule will issue in May 2013

♦ Proposed rule would apply to general industry, construction, and maritime.

Regulatory Update: Silica Rulemaking

89

♦ Silica can be found in refineries and chemical plants ♦ Cement

♦ Catalyst

♦ Grout

♦ Some paints

♦ Sandblasting

Regulatory Update: Silica Rulemaking

90

Chemical Safety Board on Role of Experts When Using Contractors to Dispose of Unspent Munitions

♦ Employers should engage experts with knowledge of how to safely dispose of unused munitions when selecting vendors to properly handle, store, and dispose of explosive hazardous materials, including fireworks.

♦ Employers should engage experts to ensure that the work done by contractors is being conducted safely.

91

Nomination of Richard J. Engler to Chemical Safety Board

♦ On December 15, 2012, President Obama renominated Richard J. Engler to become a member of CSB for a term of five years.

♦ Engler is expected to be aggressive on safety and union friendly.

♦ He has spent the majority of his career working with union safety issues and the organization he founded and directs, the New Jersey Work Environment Council, is the oldest statewide coalition of workers, unions, environmentalists, and community leaders.

92

Chemical Safety Board’s 5-Year Plan

♦ Goal 1: Conduct incident investigations and safety studies concerning releases of hazardous chemical substances.

♦ Goal 2: Improve safety and environmental protection by ensuring that CSB recommendations are implemented and by broadly disseminating CSB findings through advocacy and outreach.

93

♦ Richmond’s city council has pressed Chevron to use pipes recommended by CSB when rebuilding its refinery.

♦ The city council passed a resolution urging Chevron to use the best technology available when rebuilding the damaged refinery.

♦ The approval followed the City Manager’s receipt of a letter from CSB which questioned the type of material Chevron planned to use in the replacement of the damaged pipes.

♦ Part of the resolution permits the city to disassemble the replacement pipes selected by Chevron if the piping recommended by CSB is not used.

♦ CSB issued a subpoena to Chevron on December 7th requesting more information about its plan to replace the pipes and seeking an explanation should the company choose not to utilize the stainless steel piping that CSB recommended.

Chemical Safety Board’s Participation in Rebuild of Chevron’s Richmond Refinery Unit

Process Safety & Reliability Group PSM FORUM...pressure vessels ♦ Determining the representative...

Documents

Transcript of Process Safety & Reliability Group PSM FORUM...pressure vessels ♦ Determining the representative...