Power: An Examination Of Its Origins,

Limitations And Links With The Law As

Well As The Role Of Command Within

Societies.

A contextual review of selected chapters of Bertrand de Jouvenel’s book “On Power”

Prepared By:

Mathias Royce [ID3915]

Doctoral Candidate in Political Economy

Swiss Management Center University

Prepared For: Prof. Kurt R. Leube

Swiss Management Center University

April 12th, 2010

Introduction

Sovereignty, widely regarded as one of the most central topics of political philosophy, stems

from the Vulgar Latin term superanus and connotes an entity in exercise of the highest and

permanent rule, expressed as authority over others through the use power. The preamble of

sovereignty is hence, the right to political independence through self-governance, void of

interference from foreign entities. Thus, if self-governance – regardless of it being exercised

in e.g. autocratic, plutocratic or democratic societies then is the method of political

statesmanship, power thence must correlate to be one of the associated instruments to achieve

this goal of sovereignty. This authority, that is vested in entities such as kings, rulers,

parliaments and others alike, is therefore central and at the heart of political theory and

philosophy. A detailed contextual digression of this topic would be far beyond the scope of

this essay: nonetheless, an attempt is made to link sovereign power to its origins and to draw-

up its limitations in perspective of law and the importance and implications of command that

is put into effect by these authoritarian entities.

The Origins Of Power:

One of the chief questions that are heavily discussed in political science is the question of

origins of power: where does power come from and through which means and for what

reasons has it been bestowed upon us? One of the prevalent theories is the natural theory of

propagation of power through procreation, e.g. paternalistic (and to a much smaller instinct

uterine and matriarchic) societies, as such opposed throughout history by political theorists

like Hobbes in Leviathan or Locke in his magnum opus. “Two Treatises of Government”,

who believed largely in the individual freedom of man. This freedom - according to Locke, is

non-negotiable and consequently does not subscribe to the idea of man being inherently a

subject to the person who begets him. Neither, for instance, do supporters of the social

contract theory that has been advocated by Rousseau or Rawls endorse paternalistic thought

and rule out its dominion, primarily on aspects that are confrontational with regards to a

socially engineered civic society. But paternalistic dominion is not the only form of power

outlined by de Jouvenel. He explains this by exemplifying tribalism – in the wider sense, the

distinction needs to be made between tribal leaders through paternal dominion and tribal

leaders whose power has been bequeathed upon them by some form of superior authority,

such as a God-like totem of central and communal worship. De Jouvenel attributes rightly in

my opinion, for the former, a resemblance of the Athenian Society under Aristotle, where the

state as a sovereign authority of governance resembles the extension of the family a tribe /

primitive society) and for the latter, he correlates the perception that power indeed is magical

in the way it came upon sovereign entities, to the point that its appearance and the adherence

of the subjects subscribing to this precise power cannot be rationally explained. The

Hobbesian categorisation of power into – amongst other categories, but a) the natural

dominion or power of man, encompassing physical strength, prudence and eloquence which

secures personal well-being to attain a future desirability of some sort, and b) the

instrumentalisation of power, which foresees above all to attain more power and influence,

thus the quest of command over the power of others and c) the relative character of power in

the sense that power is only relative to the powers exercised or held by others, finds

unequivocal interest by de Jouvenel, who sees power in evolution from natural individual

dominion to instrumentalised power of states and their governments. In the chapter “The

Coming of the Warrior” de Jouvenel, in my opinion indirectly, highlights the dangers

associated with the Hobbesian view of sovereignty that subjects itself to the unconditional

and unrestricted power of the absolute – an authority that positions itself above the rule and

whose rules and laws are binding and to be obeyed, not because they sprung from consent or

rationally, but because these were devised by this absolute authority. He outlines the ‘warlike

spirit’ of power, or rather of those possessing power, that is driven and enhanced by ethics

and morals, or rather the absence thereof, resulting in greed and man’s desire of continuous

enrichment in life’s conveniences and commodities sought by society to reduce inequalities

and required for the establishment of central public authority.

Command

Command can be seen as the real meaning, the essence of power. De Jouvenel describes

power and its inherent dangerousness as an autarchic creature, being self-sufficient and self-

sustaining and hence removed from the distinct political order and composition of any nation.

Power – seen as creature, then is endowed with enough sustenance for reasons purely to

achieve its own survival through commanding for itself, and will as such do anything and all

it can to keep itself alive, whether its actions have foundations in legality or are considered

illegal, immoral and unethical. It depicts power’s natural urge and desire of self-preservation.

Power – seen in the institutionalised sense, would consequently encompass an understanding

that exercising command for its subjects is inherently linked with the admission to concede

public demands to society. De Jouvenel sees the relational character of the exposure of power

to authority as an important fact, considering his view of authority that fundamentally

recognises authority as applied persuasion – thus, a ruling entity embodying authoritarian

qualities would employ if not exploit exactly this precise authoritarian qualities to attain an

objective through the authority of a dux, e.g. the state taking authority on redistributive

politics. In consequence, according to de Jouvenel, governmental authority and command

structure can therefore been seen as necessary in ordered societies or states. He defends his

view by arguing that governments do not possess authority and command innately or by

default – just because a government is a government, but the government would have

authority and the right to command conferred upon itself as a result of unanimous and

common consent by a governed society that is free of any form of coercion. Then and only

then, authoritarian command would be established, as in any other form of exercised coercion

through the state, the same command in effect must result in the use of power, rather than

authority.

The Limitations of Power and the Influence of Law

Another rather central topic of de Jouvenel’s theory of authority and command within the

state are the artificial limitations that are put in place to prevent the state from exercising

power? Locke in 1689 saw the answer to restricting state powers in constitutionalism.

Rousseau developed Locke’s theory and declared in his work “Lè Contrat Social” that a

republic - in his eyes, was the only legitimate form of government. In such, the people alone

as a sovereign would mandate laws that are coherent with the communal consent of society

(la volonté genérale) rather than being coherent with the requirements of an individual

(volonté particulière) and hence, the government would be reduced to individual,

institutionalised organs that execute only upon orders of its subjects. Advocating an enforced,

mandatory separation of state powers by decree of law is, as such, not foreign to the theory of

de Jouvenel, but he outlines without hesitation one of the apparent paradoxes of this

separation. Its weakness lies within the system of internal checks. If the state is composed out

of organs that represent the people, the people must assemble regularly to express their

volonté genérale. In a separation of powers, only the executive would have the power to call

for a valid legislative assembly but by itself the executive is bound and restricted to form: the

form to call for an assembly is restricted by laws that have been mandated by the legislative.

Thus, control of the individual government organs is limited, albeit being institutionally

separated from the people in a logical way, but the government remains part of the people in

a physical way. Von Hayek is known to speak rather fondly of de Jouvenel’s book “On

Power”. He remarks, that power in recent history has fallen into the hands of “the great mass

of people” and this triggered the “thought that no more restrictions of power were

necessary”.“Power”, so von Hayek, “has an inherent tendency to expand and where there are

no effective limitations, it will grow without bounds, whether it is exercised in the name of

the people or in the name of a few (Hayek, 1992)” He agrees with de Jouvenel, as outlined in

chapter XV/5, on the absence of the power of a few in favour of the power of many,

considering the latter as ultimately more dangerous and destructive for society. He states

explicitly, that:” Power cannot ... be limited by the mere dismemberment of the imperium into

constituent parts each with its own distinct organ. For limitation of this kind to succeed, ... a

system of law which is independent enough to arbitrate their clashes and escape from being

the instrument of the central command (must also exist) (Jouvenel, 1948)”. De Jouvenel

outlines that this system of law hence would require to be essentially positivistic (man-made)

rather than being of naturalistic origin since the law in order to be effective must be situated

above power and must contain the possibility to be appealed against or in circumstances of an

underlying social movement, it would need to show the capability to adapt itself to trends,

e.g. through means of constitutional changes, if necessary.

Conclusion

De Jouvenel outlines in a striking accord the dangerousness of ostensibly uncontrolled power

and its effect it has on societies in transformation. As such, he analyses the dangers of power

exercised in the name of the people and draws conclusions about societies that have evolved

from an environment where power was largely controlled and administered by minorities or

individual sovereigns into plutocratic and democratic states where the people are sovereign

and sovereign power has become decentralised and its expansion and growth naturally have

become unrestrained and uninhibited. Of pivotal importance is de Jouvenel’s conclusion, that

power has the innate desire to expand – regardless if power is put into effect by many or by a

few; the limitations of controlling power will enable precisely this power to extend

insidiously and destructively – when it is put into effect by many.

Bibliography Hayek, v. F. (1992). The Fortunes of Liberalism (Volume IV). Chicago: University of Chicago.

Jouvenel, d. B. (1948). On Power. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc.