POLITICAL CASE DIGESTS.pdf

7/24/2019 POLITICAL CASE DIGESTS.pdf

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SLAYING THE

DRAGON

Constitutional Law Digests*Note: These digests all have Justice V. V. Mendoza as their ponente.

Mu Kappa Phi National Law Exclusive Law Fraternity and Sorority

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CONSTITUTION!!"#I$%STS

&UN#M%NT! 'O"%(S O& T)% STT%

%propriation

Republic of the Philippines v. Salem Investment CorporationG.R. No. 108824 September 14, 1994

&CTS:A law was passed authorizing the expropriation of a parcel of land. Before expropriationproceedings commenced, the original owner sold the land to buyer partial payment was made.Note that at this point, expropriation proceeding had not yet begun. Buyer filed for specificperformance to compel original owner to transfer title.

While the specific performance case was pending, the government instituted expropriationproceedings pursuant to the aforementioned law. Buyer filed a motion for intervention allegingthat the property had been sold to him and that he had already filed a case for specificperformance.

ISSU%:Whether ust compensation should be paid to buyer or original owner.

)%!#:!ust compensation should be paid to the buyer. "etermination of this issue hinges onwhether the original owner had already been divested of title and therefore without authority todispose of the land when it entered into a contract with buyer. #he $% held that since ustcompensation has not yet been paid, title remained with original owner, vesting him with powerto exercise acts of ownership. &ence, original owner validly transferred title to buyer whichma'es the buyer the rightful recipient of ust compensation.

Macawiwili Gold Mining and Dev. Co., et al v. Court of ppeals

G.R. No. 115104 October 12, 1998

&CTS:#he $upreme %ourt recognized the possessory right of (acawiwili and )mico overmining claims in Benguet as against *hilex (ining %orp. )n the surface of these mining claims,*hilex owned improvements consisting of roads, facilities, and bun'houses that were used by*hilex in its other mining claims. *hilex sought to expropriate the surface of the area wherethese improvements were located pursuant to $ection + of *" -/.)%!#: #he land cannot be expropriated. 0xpropriation demands that the land be private land.When the $upreme %ourt awarded the possessory rights over the land to (acawiwili and)mico, it stripped the land of its private character and gave it its public character to be utilizedfor mining operations. *roperty already devoted to public use may be expropriated only if done

directly by the national legislature or under a specific grant of authority to the delegate. #heauthority granted by *" -/ is merely general and will not suffice.

Philippine !eterans "an# v. Court of ppealsG.R. No. 132767 January 18, 2000

&CTS: #he "epartment of Agrarian 1eform expropriated four parcels of land owned bypetitioner. *etitioner argues that "A1 adudicators have no urisdiction to determine ustcompensation for the ta'ing of lands under the %A1* because such urisdiction is vested in the1#%.

)%!#: As an administrative agency, the "A1 has primary urisdiction to determine in apreliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid for lands ta'en under the %A1* inadministrative proceedings. &owever, such determination is subect to challenge in the courts in

udicial proceedings. #here is thus no conflict between the urisdiction of the "A1 and that ofthe 1#%s.

Manila v. SerranoG.R. No. 142304. June 20, 2001

&CTS:After filing a complaint for expropriation and ma'ing a deposit, the %ity of (anilaobtained an order from the 1#% directing the issuance of a writ of possession over the$errano2s property in its favor.

3pon a motion by the $erranos, the %A issued an inunction enoining the %ity of (anila fromproceeding with expropriation proceedings because there was no showing that the %ity of

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(anila attempted the other modes of ac4uisition as re4uired in 55678 of 1.A. No. 9:9.

ISSU%; Whether the %A was correct in enoining expropriation proceedings because of the lac'of showing of conformity with the law regarding other modes of ac4uisition.

)%!#; No. )nce a proper complaint for expropriation is filed and a sufficient deposit is made,the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial.

Whether the %ity of (anila has complied with the re4uirement of other modes of ac4uisitionre4uires the presentation of evidence something that is done in the expropriation proceedings.

0xpropriation proceedings consist of two stages; first, condemnation of the property after it isdetermined that its ac4uisition will be for a public purpose or public use and, second, thedetermination of ust compensation to be paid for the ta'ing of private property which is made bythe court with the assistance of not more than three commissioners.

$slaban v. !da. de %norio.G.R. No. 146062. June 28, 2001.

&CTS:


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&CTS: #he accused confessed to the crime of murder to a policeman while the two wereeating in a store. &e now claims that the confession was inadmissible, because he was notwarned of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel.

)%!#: #he (iranda rights are applicable only when the suspect has been ta'en into custody orhas otherwise been deprived of his freedom in a substantial way. ?n this case, the accused was

not in custody when he confessed. #herefore, the right is not applicable.

&reedo, O- %pression

!iel

!as)ue' v. Court of ppealsG.R. No. 118971 September 15, 1999

&CTS: ?n an interview published in a newspaper, aw of 79 which prohibits mass media from selling orgiving print space and air time for campaign or other political purposes, except to the%)(0>0%.

)%!#: #he law is valid. #here is no total ad ban nor a restriction on the content of the speech,but merely a regulation of the period and place for campaigning. #he exercise of the regulatorypower of the state is ustified by the valid governmental obective of promoting e4uality ofopportunity in the use of mass media for political advertising. Any restriction on speech is onlyincidental, and it is no more than is necessary to achieve this purpose. ?t is reasonable becauseit applies only to the election period and because the %)(0>0% is mandated to procure printspace and air time for the purposes of the candidates.

elecom and "roadcast ttorne(s of the Philippines v. C%M$+$CG.R. No. 132922 pr!" 21, 1998

&CTS:*etitioners #elecom and Broadcast Attorneys of the *hilippines and C(A 9 4uestionthe validity of $ection : of the )mnibus 0lection %ode which re4uires that television and radiotime be given free of charge to the %)(0>0%.)%!#: #he law is valid. #he airwaves are given by the Covernment as a franchise. A franchiseis a privilege that is subect to amendment by %ongress when the common good so re4uires.

#here is no violation of the e4ual protection of the laws even if the %ourt decided in ('!". (re$$)n$t!tute *. +O&-+ that the use of the print media by the %)(0>0% should be

compensated. #here are substantial distinctions between print and broadcast media that ustifythe difference in treatment.

S-S v. C%M$+$CG.R. No. 147571. &ay 5, 2001

&CTS; #he %)(0>0% issued a regulation enoining the publication of election surveys 7+D9days before nationalDlocal elections. $ocial Weather $tation and the publisher of the (anila$tandard challenge the regulation as violative of the freedom of expression.ISSU%; Whether the %)(0>0% can enoin the publication of election survey results.)%!#:No. #he regulation is a prior restraint on speech, which has a heavy presumption againstits validity. #he $% also applied the following rules; government regulation is ustified @7 if it iswithin the constitutional power of the CovernmentE @: if it furthers an important or substantial

government interestE @/ if the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of free

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expressionE and @- if the incidental restriction on the freedom of expression is no greater thanessential to the furtherance of the interest.#he regulation fails rule F7 since there is a causal connection between expression and theasserted government interest. ?t also fails rule F: since it could have been more narrowly drawnEprohibited speech such as erroneous, libelous or misleading surveys could have been punishedinstead of suppressing all surveys.

(ight To Travel

Imelda Marcos v. Sandiganba(an.G.R. No. -%115132%34. u#u$t 9, 1995.

&CTS; After her conviction in the $andiganbayan and while her motion for reconsideration waspending, ?melda (arcos2s filed various motions for leave to travel abroad for medical diagnosisand treatmentE letters from various physicians supported her re4uest. )n its own instance, the$andiganbayan sought the opinion of independent doctors and decided that it was notabsolutely necessary that (arcos see' medical treatment abroad.

)%!#:(arcos did not have an absolute right to leave the country and the burden was on her toprove that because of danger to health if not to her life there was necessity to see' medical

treatment in foreign countries. Whether the accused should be permitted to leave the urisdictionfor humanitarian reasons is a matter of the courtGs sound discretion.

#he active intervention of respondent *residing !ustice in the trial of the case, by consulting withindependent doctors, was ustified by the fact that the subect with which the court was dealingwas a highly technical one and he wanted to clarify for himself a number of medical 4uestions.

#he proper method of determination of necessity of travel is by forming a oint panel composedof representatives from both the defendant and the prosecution whereby the consensusreached by them will be the guide of the court.

CITI/%NS)I'Mercado v. Man'ano

G.R. No. 135036 &ay 26, 1999

&CTS:An opponent and a voter sought 0du (anzano2s dis4ualification as candidate for vicemayor on the ground that he was a dual citizen.

)%!#: ?t is dual allegiance, not dual citizenship that is a ground for dis4ualification from runningfor public office. Hor candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough if, upon the filing of theircertificates of candidacy, they elect *hilippine citizenship to terminate their status as dualcitizens.

!%$IS!TIV% #%'(TM%NT

Non0Oservance o- Internal (ules

o#er P. rro(o, et al v. ose De !enecia, et alG.R. No. 127255 June 20, 1998

&CTS: #he (aority >eader of the &ouse moved for the approval of a conference committeereport. #he %hair as'ed if there was any obection to the motion. 1ep. !o'er Arroyo as'ed,IWhat is that, (r. $pea'erJK #he %hair declared the report approved without paying attention to

Arroyo. *etitioners claim that Arroyo2s 4uestion was a privileged 4uestion or a point of orderwhich under the rules of the house has precedence over other matters.

)%!#:Arroyo2s 4uestion was neither a privileged 4uestion nor a point of order. A privileged4uestion is one affecting the duties, conduct, rights, privileges, dignity, integrity or reputation ofthe &ouse or its members. A point of order is used to re4uire the &ouse or any of its membersto observe its own rules. ?n this case, there was no violation of rules because it is anestablished practice in the approval of a conference committee report for the %hair simply to as'if there are obections to the motion for approval of the report. #he law cannot be invalidatedsimply because of an alleged non6observance of internal rules of the &ouse.

JU#ICI! #%'(TM%NT

!egal Standing

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/ilosba(an v. MoratoG.R. No. 118910 Ju"y 17, 1995

&CTS: ?n !"o$bayan *. Gu!n#ona the %ourt invalidated the %ontract of >ease between the*%$) and the *C(% on the ground that it had been made in violation of the charter of the

*%$). As a result, the parties entered into a new 04uipment >ease Agreement @0>A.*etitioners again sought to declare the 0>A invalid.

)%!#: *etitioners have neither standing to bring this suit nor substantial interest to ma'e themreal parties in interest within the meaning of 1ule / 5: of the 1ules of %ourt. !ustice (endozaratiocinated that issues arising from the "eclaration of *rinciples are N)# constitutional issuesenough for purposes of standing since they were merely guidelines for congressional action,guidelines which, until given flesh by legislation, were not sources of constitutional rights.

"eclaration of *rinciples does not offer basis for affirmative relief nor for stri'ing downofficial actions unless it spea's of a right conferred.

#o establish standing, the parties must be able to show that they are in immediatedanger of sustaining direct inury in this case, no such potential inury is shown.

#he previous case cannot be considered $tare /ec!$!$ because it was a departure formthe settled rule on standing.

#ela1 in 'rosecution o- Cases2d,inistrative Sanctions

"ala(o v. "uban r..&. No. RJ%99%1477 September 9, 1999

&CTS: Balayo filed a complaint against !udge Buban for ta'ing almost three years to decide

his case. &e also charged !udge Buban with falsification of public documents, violation of theAnti6Craft and %orrupt *ractices Act, and gross ignorance of the law in rendering the decision.

)%!#: Hor his failure to render the decision within the reglementary period, !udge Bubanshould be fined *+,888. &owever, the criminal and administrative charges against him shouldbe dismissed for being premature, since an appeal of the 4uestioned decision is still pendingbefore the %ourt of Appeals. 1esort to udicial remedies, as well as entry of udgment in thecorresponding action or proceeding is a prere4uisite for the ta'ing of administrative, civil, orcriminal actions against the udges concerned.

ppellate Jusrisdiction O- The SC Ma1 Not +e Increased "ithout Its Consent

0irst +epanto v. CG.R. No. 110571. October 7, 1994

&CTS:Article : or the 79 )mnibus ?nvestments %ode provided for direct appeals to the$upreme %ourt from decisions and final orders of the B)? this was done without theconcurrence of the $upreme %ourt.

)%!#: $ince Article : increased the appellate urisdiction of the $upreme %ourt without itsadvice and concurrence, such article never became effective and the original appellate body,the %ourt of Appeals, retain its urisdiction.

CONSTITUTION! COMMISSIONS

Co,,ission on udit

0ranco v. Commission on uditG.R. No. 128001 September 22, 1999

&CTS: #he "irector of the *""%* as'ed for authority from the "ept. of Budget and(anagement @"B( to grant incentive awards to its employees. #he "B( did not act on there4uest. #hus, the %ommission on Audit disallowed the disbursement for want of authority fromthe "B(.

)%!#: #here is no 4uestion that prior authority from the "B( is needed for the use of savingsfor the payment of incentive awards. &owever, in this case, the %)A should not havedisallowed the disbursement while the re4uest for such authority was still pending with the "B(.

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Civil Service Co,,ission

1moso v. CSC.G.R. No. 110276. Ju"y 29, 1994

&CTS:3moso was appointed as $upervising %ivil 0ngineer by the $ecretary of *ublic Wor's

and &ighways. %aronan filed a protest and the complaints committee recommended that he beappointed instead, with 3moso filling his vacated position. #he $ecretary lent his approval.

3moso filed a petition claiming that he is the Inext6in6ran',K that his appointment was endorsed,and the recommendation was approved by the 1egional "irector.

ISSU%:Whether the $ecretary could appoint %aronan despite 3moso2s status as next in lineand the approval of his appointment by the 1egional "irector.

)%!#:=es. ?t has been declared time and again that even if petitioner occupies a Lnext6in6ran'Lposition, that fact alone does not impose on the appointing authority the duty to appointpetitioner.

Also, appointing power is vested in the "epartment $ecretary, and such power, however, may

be delegated to the 1egional "irector subect, however, to the approval, revision, modificationand reversal of the "epartment $ecretary.

+a'o v. Civil Service Commission.G.R. No. 108824. September 14, 1994

&CTS:#he %$%, acting on a tip, chec'ed its records and verified the eligibility exam scores of>azo. #he rechec'ing disclosed that petitioner2s actual score was well below the minimumre4uirement. ?t issued a resolution revo'ing his eligibility for being null and void.

>azo now 4uestions the revocation for being without due process.

ISSU%:Whether the %$% can revo'e eligibility for being null and void, without notice and

hearing.)%!#:?n this case, yes. #his case is an exception to the general rule re4uiring notice andhearing because all it re4uired was the reevaluation of documents. No evidentiary hearing wasre4uired.

#he %$%2s power to issue a certificate of eligibility carries with it the power to revo'e acertificate for being null and void.

Cuevas v. "acalG.R. No. 139382. ecember 6, 2000

&CTS; 1amos appointed Bacal, a civil servant with the ran' of %0$) ???, to the post of %hief

*ublic Attorney, *ublic Attorney2s )ffice, a post which re4uires the ran' of %0$) ? herappointment was later confirmed.

0strada later appointed "emaisip to the same office and appointed Bacal to the post of1egional "irector, *ublic Attorney2s )ffice, a post which re4uires the ran' of %0$) ???.

Bacal filed a petition for uo arranto4uestioning her replacement the %ourt of Appeals heldthat Bacal was lawfully entitled to the position in dispute.

ISSU%; Whether the transfer of an appointment of a civil servant to a position for which he orshe is not 4ualified can be considered permanent.

)%!#:No, it is settled that a permanent appointment can be issued only to a person who meetsall the re4uirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriateeligibility prescribed. Bacal2s appointment to an office re4uiring a higher ran' can be consideredonly to be in acting capacity and not permanent. &ence, "emaisip2s appointment is valid.

%ntiveros v. CG.R. No. 145401. &ay 7, 2001

&CTS:"uring the subsistence of the *rovisional %onstitution, )ntiveros was dismissed fromthe civil service for inefficiency, incompetence, and unauthorized absences. &is appeal with the%$% was deniedE the ruling stating that urisdiction over the appeal was vested in the 1eview%ommittee created under 0)79.

ISSU%; Whether the %$% had urisdiction over the appeal from the dismissal.

)%!#; No. #he *rovisional %onstitution provided for the summary nature of dismissal re4uiredby post6revolutionary government reorganization. 0)79 was promulgated to limit the broad

authority given to administrative agencies pursuant to the *rovisional %onstitution. Because ofthe prevailing circumstances, ordinary %ivil $ervice rules and procedures were inapplicable.

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'reventive Suspension Not a 'enalt1

lon'o v. Capulong.G.R. No. 110590. &ay 10, 1995.

&CTS; Haardo was preventively suspended from her post at the *ag6ibig Hund Houndation.

#he decision for her preventive suspension was based on a recommendation by *ag6ibig2s legaldepartment, which found a prima facie case after investigating the circumstances surrounding aletter sent to the %0) of *ag6ibig by a contractor complaining of improper conduct on Haardo2spart.

Haardo claims she was deprived of due process for being suspended on the basis of anunverified letter and not being allowed to give her side.

)%!#:?t is now settled that the preventive suspension of a civil service employee or officer canbe ordered even without a hearing because such suspension is not a penalty but only apreliminary step in an administrative investigation. #he purpose is to prevent the accused fromusing his position or office to influence prospective witnesses or tamper with the records whichmay be vital in the prosecution of the case against him.

'C$$

Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganba(anG.R. No. 115906. September 29, 1994.

&CTS; #he *%CC, acting upon an order of the *resident, through the (inister of !ustice,conducted an in4uiry similar to a preliminary investigation to determine whether to proceed withan unexplained wealth case against a former mayor.

#he $andiganbayan, acting on a motion by the respondents, dismissed the case because therewas no allegation that the unexplained wealth was accumulated by reason of a closeassociation with (arcos or his cronies.

ISSU%; Whether the power of the *%CC to conduct investigations is limited only to cases wherethe ill6gotten wealth was obtained by (arcos or through association with him or his relatives.

)%!#; No. #he law is clear @0xecutive )rder No. 7 dated Hebruary :, 7. #he *%CC ischarged with the tas' of assisting the *resident in the recovery of ill6gotten wealth accumulated;@7 by or in connection with (arcos and @: any other cases of graft and corruption as thepresident may assign to it.

NTION! %CONOM3 N# 'T(IMON3

Ti,er !icense gree,ents

C2M imber Corp. v. ngel C. lcala et. alG.R. No. 111088 June 13, 1997

&CTS: #>A No. 78 was issued to petitioner %M( in 79:. ?n 7/, #>A No. 78 wascancelled because of a presidential directive imposing a log ban. ?n 7-, #>A /8 covering thesame area was issued to H>"%. ?n 7, #>A No. /8 was cancelled because of violation byH>"% of its terms. 3pon learning of this cancellation, *etitioner sought the revalidation of #>ANo. 78. $ecretary Hactoran !r. ruled that #>A No. 78 was of no force and effect.

)%!#: #here is no merit in petitioner2s contention that the cancellation of the #>A impairedcontractual obligations. A #>A is a mere privilege granted by the $tate and does not vest in thegrantee a permanent or irrevocable right to the concession area. #>As are not contracts andmay therefore be amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the %hief 0xecutive whennational interests so re4uire.

%#UCTION

cade,ic -reedo, o- 4institutions o- higher learning5

1P "oard of Regents v. Court of ppealsG.R. No. 134625 u#u$t 31, 1999

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&CTS: After conducting several investigations, the 3* Board of 1egents found that privaterespondent had committed plagiarism in her dissertation. #he Board withdrew her doctroraldegree. *rivate respondent filed a petition for mandamus to compel 3* to restore her degree.

)%!#: #he writ of mandamus is not available to restrain 3* from the exercise of its academicfreedom. Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through

fraud, a university has the right to revo'e or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thusconferred. *rivate respondent was not denied due process because she was given notice andthe chance to be heard in the investigations conducted by the Board.

#MINIST(TIV%!"

(%MOV! O& !IC%NS% (%6UI(%M%NT

ssn. of Phil. Coconut Desiccators v. Phil. Coconut uthorit(G.R. No. 110526 ebruary 10, 1998

&CTS: #he *hil. %oconut Authority @*%A issued a resolution in which it declared that it wouldno longer re4uire those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply for a license or permit.*ursuant to the resolution, the *%A would be limited to monitoring the volumes of productionand 4uality standards of the processors.

)%!#: #he resolution is null and void. ?t is an abdication of the power granted by the 1evised%oconut %ode to the *%A to formulate and adopt a general program of development for thecoconut industry in a regulatory context. Any change in policy must be made by the legislativedepartment of the government. #he regulatory system has been set up by law, and it is beyondthe power of an administrative agency to dismantle it.

&I7IN$ O& &%%S 2 SU+O(#INT% !%$IS!TION

Phil. Interisland Shipping ssn. of the Phil et al v. Court of ppealsG.R. No$. 100481, 103716%17 107720 January 22, 1997

&CTS: *res. (arcos issued 0) 78, increasing the rates of pilotage fees fixed by the *hil.*orts Authority @**A. #he **A refused to enforce the 0) and fixed lower pilotage fees. #he**A later issued an )rder allowing the contracting parties to agree upon their rates. *etitionerscontend that 0) 78 was merely an administrative issuance, which could be superseded by anorder of the **A. #hey argue that to consider 0)78 a statute would deprive the **A of itspower under its charter to fix pilotage rates.

)%!#: #he orders issued by the **A were in the nature of subordinate legislation, and as such,

these could only be amended or revised by law. Although the power to fix rates for pilotage hadbeen delegated to the **A, it became necessary to rationalize the rates fixed by it through theimposition of uniform rates. #hat is what the *resident did in promulgating 0) 78. As the*resident could delegate the rate ma'ing power to the **A, so could he exercise it in specificinstances without thereby withdrawing the power vested by the charter of the **A.

SU&&ICI%NT STN#(# T%ST

Chiongbian v. %rbos.G.R. No. 96754. June 22, 1995.

&CTS: *etitioners challenged the power of the *resident to merge, by administrativedetermination, the remaining regions after the establishment of the Autonomous 1egion. #hepower, which was granted by law, is challenged as being a derogation of legislative power andfor not having a sufficient standard.

ISSU%; Whether the provision granting the *resident the power to merge regions, byadministrative determination, is valid.

)%!#:=es. %ongress did not grant the *resident power to merge or reorganize for politicalrepresentation or territorial subdivision, but only for purposes of administration, which has beentraditionally within the scope of the executive department. #here is also a sufficient standardimposed by %ongress for the exercise of the power; Ito promote simplicity, economy andefficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals foraccelerated social and economic development and to improve the service in the transaction ofthe public business.K

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+O!IS)M%NT O& O($NI/TION

Isabelo Crisostomo v. C, et alG.R. No. 106296 Ju"y 5, 1996

&CTS: *etitioner was appointed *resident of the *hilippine %ollege of %ommerce @*%%.$everal administrative and criminal complaints were filed against him, and he was preventivelysuspended. *ending resolution of the cases, *res. (arcos issued *" 7/-7 converting the *%%into a *olytechnic 3niversity. When all of the charges were dismissed, *etitioner soughtreinstatement and payment of his salaries and benefits during the period of suspension.

)%!#: ?t is incorrect to say that *etitioner cannot be reinstated because the *%% had beenabolished by *"7/-7. *"7/-7 did not abolish the *%% because this intent was not explicitlystated. When the purpose of the law is to abolish an organization and to replace it with anotherone, the lawma'ing authority must explicitly say so. &owever, *etitioner cannot be reinstatedbecause *" 7-/9 fixes the term of office of presidents of state universities and colleges at sixyears, renewable for another six years, and authorizes the *resident of the *hilippines toterminate the terms of incumbents who were not reappointed. *etitioner is entitled only topayment of his salaries during the period of suspension.

%7)USTION O& #MINIST(TIV% (%M%#I%S

D( v. Court of ppealsG.R. No. 121587 &arc' 9, 1999

&CTS: #he "0N1 seized and forfeited two vehicles and pieces of illegally cut lumber. #womonths after the forfeiture, petitioner filed a suit for replevin in the 1#%. #he 1#% issued thewrit.

)%!#: #he replevin suit was premature. Before a party may be allowed to see' the interventionof the court, he must first exhaust available administrative remedies. ?n this case, the forfeitedtruc's and lumber were under the custody of the "0N1, and all actions see'ing to recoverpossession should first be directed to that agency.

"%I$)T O& #MINIST(TIV% #%CISIONS

Misamis %riental ssociation of Coco raders, Inc. v. "IRG.R. No. 108524. No*ember 10, 1994

&CTS:*rior to the interpretative rule of


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of the agreement. &owever, as such, the petition is premature. #here had not even been aninvestigation only a recommendation for one to be conducted.Jur!$/!ct!ona" !$$ue; #he $tate also raised the issue that the court issued theinunctionDprohibition in violation of the law that no court shall issue an inunction againstadministrative acts or controversies which involve facts or exercise of discretion in technicalcases this was not discussed by the $% for being not ripe for determination, it being decided

that the inunction was premature.

%!%CTION!"

'O"%( O& COM%!%C TO '(OS%CUT% %!%CTION O&&%NS%S

C%M$+$C v. +oren'o R. Silva, et alG.R. No 129417 ebruary 10, 1998

&CTS: #he %)(0>0% charged private respondents with election offenses. 1espondents fileda oint I)mnibus (otion for 0xamination of 0vidence to "etermine the 0xistence of *robable

%auseE $uspension of ?ssuance of Warrant of ArrestE and "ismissal of the %ases.K #he $tate*rosecutor who had been designated by the %)(0>0% to prosecute the cases filed a comment

oining in the private respondents2 re4uest. #he #rial %ourt dismissed the cases. #he%)(0>0% appealed to the %ourt of Appeals but was denied on the ground that the *rivate*rosecutor had earlier ta'en a contrary stand against the %)(0>0%.

)%!#: #he authority to decide whether or not to appeal the dismissal belongs to the%)(0>0%. #he %onstitution empowers the %)(0>0% to prosecute election offenses and toconduct preliminary investigations in these cases in order to help the !udge determine probablecause and to file an information in court. #his power is exclusive with %)(0>0%. &avingmerely been deputized by the %)(0>0%, the $tate *rosecutor acted beyond his power whenhe left the determination of probable cause to the courts and agreed to the dismissal of the

cases.

(%6UI(%M%NT O& #U% '(OC%SS

ngelia v. C%M$+$CG.R. No. 135468. &ay 31, 2000

&CTS; #an received four votes less than Angelia, denying him a slot in the $angguniangBayan. &e filed a petition to annul the proclamation of Angelia, attaching a copy of the electionreturns showing a miscount. #he %)(0>0% annulled the proclamation of Angelia and, basedon a verification of the results, proclaimed #an. Angelia now 4uestions the actions of the%)(0>0% for being done without notice and hearing.ISSU%; Whether the %)(0>0%2s annulment of the proclamation and the subse4uent

proclamation of another candidate violated due process.)%!#; =es. #he %)(0>0% rules of procedure dictate that the proper procedure was toreconvene and, after notice and hearing to the parties, to effect the necessary corrections onthe certificate of canvass and proclaim the winning candidate or candidates on the basisthereof.

N%C%SSIT3 O& MOTION &O( (%CONSI#%(TION

)uiles 1. Re(es v. RC of %riental MindoroG.R. No. 108886 &ay 5, 1995

&CTS: #he 1#% annulled *etitioner2s proclamation as councilor. *etitioner appealed to the%)(0>0%. #he %)(0>0%Gs Hirst "ivision dismissed the appeal on the ground that he hadfailed to pay the appeal fee within the prescribed period. *etitioner went to the $upreme %ourton certiorari.)%!#: )nly decisions of the %)(0>0% en banc may be brought to the $upreme %ourt oncertiorari. A basic condition for this action is that the petitioner must first file a motion forreconsideration. *etitioner2s failure to do so is fatal to this action. )n the merits, the %)(0>0%correctly ruled that the appeal fee must be paid within the period to perfect the appeal.

JU(IS#ICTION O& )(%T

Pere' v. C%M$+$CG.R. No. 133944 October 28, 1999

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&CTS: *etitioner filed in the %)(0>0% a petition for the dis4ualification of private respondentas a candidate for the &ouse of 1epresentatives on the ground that he had not been a residentof the district for at least one year immediately before the day of the elections. #he %)(0>0%dismissed the petition. *rivate respondent was subse4uently elected, proclaimed, and sworn inoffice. *etitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the %)(0>0% decision, which was

denied.

)%!#: #he %)(0>0% has no more urisdiction over the case since private respondent hadalready been proclaimed. ?t is the &10# that has exclusive original urisdiction over the petitionfor the declaration of private respondent2s ineligibility. )n the merits, the fact that a person waspreviously registered as a voter in one district is not proof that he is not domiciled in anotherdistrict.

JU(IS#ICTION OV%( S8 %!%CTIONS

Rafael M. lunan III, et al v. Robert Mirasol, et al

G.R. No. 108399 Ju"y 31, 1997

&CTS: #he %)(0>0% issued a resolution providing guidelines for the holding of the $elections. #he $ guidelines placed the elections under the direct control and supervision ofthe "?>C. #he "?>C $ecretary issued a resolution exempting the %ity of (anila from holding the$, in accordance with the >ocal Covernment %ode, which provides that where abataangBarangay elections were previously held, these would ta'e the place of the first $ elections.*rivate respondents argue that the "?>C $ecretary had no power to amend the resolutions ofthe %)(0>0%, which call for the conduct of the $ elections.

)%!#: #he $ elections are under the direct supervision of the "?>C and not of the %)(0>0%.#his does not contravene the constitutional provision that the %)(0>0% shall have the powerto enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. #heauthority of the "?>C secretary to supervise the conduct of $ elections includes the authority todetermine which barangay would not be included in the 7: elections. ?n doing this, the "?>C$ecretary acts merely as the agent of the legislative department. #here was no unduedelegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law.

SU''!%TO(3 %&&%CT O& (U!%S O& COU(T ON %!%CTION CS%S

&estor C. +im v. C%M$+$C et alG.R. No. 129040 No*ember 17, 1997

&CTS: A losing candidate filed an election protest against petitioner. *etitioner filed acounterprotest. #he trial court held that the counterprotest was filed out of time. *etitionerargues that the 1ules of %ourt, rather than those of the %)(0>0%, govern the periods forpleading in election contests cognizable by the 1egional #rial %ourts.

)%!#: #he %)(0>0% has the power to prescribe the procedure for election contests filed inthe 1#%s and (#%s. #he timeliness of petitionerGs protest must therefore be determined inaccordance with the rules of the %)(0>0%. #he provisions of the 1ules of %ourt aresuppletory to the provisions of the 0lection >aw. &ence a motion for extension of time to fileanswer to the election protest should be filed before the expiration of the five6day reglementaryperiod to answer, otherwise a general denial shall be deemed to have been entered against theprotestee.

'(%0'(OC!MTION CONT(OV%(SI%S 2 %!%CTION '(OT%STS

&icolas Castroma(or v. Commission on $lections et alG.R. No. 120428 No*ember 23, 1995

&CTS: *etitioner was proclaimed the eighth member of the $angguniang Bayan. #hefollowing day, the chair of the (unicipal Board of %anvassers discovered that the candidate inninth place actually had more votes than petitioner. #he (B% %hair as'ed the %)(0>0% forpermission to reconvene to correct the error. #he %)(0>0% issued a resolution directing the(B% to reconvene to annul the proclamation of petitioner and to proclaim the other candidate.*etitioner complains that the %)(0>0% en banc issued the resolution in 4uestion withoutnotice and hearing, solely on the basis of a letter of the (B%.

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)%!#: What the %)(0>0% contemplated was not the outright nullification of petitioner2sproclamation but a hearing before the (B% after which the proclamation of petitioner may beset aside, if proper. #hese proceedings before the (B% should be summary and may beappealed to the %)(0>0% en banc. #here is no need to file an election protest because wherea proclamation is null and void, the proclaimed candidateGs assumption of office cannot deprivethe %)(0>0% of the power to annul the proclamation.

Cipriano ". Pe*aflorida et al v. C%M$+$C et alG.R. No. 122013 &arc' 26, 1997

&CTS: *etitioners were candidates for mayor and vice mayor in the (ay 7+ elections. #heysought a nullification of the canvass on the ground that the board of canvassers had beenillegally constituted and the canvass irregularly conducted. #he Board of %anvassers did notact on the petition, so the petitioners appealed with the %)(0>0%.A month later, the case wasdeclared terminated in an )mnibus 1esolution of the %)(0>0% in view of the beginning of theterm of office of elective officials the next day. *etitioners claim that the %)(0>0% abused itsdiscretion when it deliberately sat on the petition to render it moot and academic.

)%!#: #he %)(0>0% issued the resolution not to render moot and academic pending pre6proclamation contests but to prevent many offices from having no incumbents at the beginningof the term of office. *etitioners have not shown that the %)(0>0% deliberately sat on theirprotest. ?f the %)(0>0% had in fact done so, petitioners should have filed for mandamus tocompel it to resolve the case on time. At any rate, they can file an election protest and provetheir claim in the appropriate forum.

ose C. Ramire' v. C%M$+$C, et alG.R. No. 122013, &arc' 26, 1997

&CTS: *etitioner was proclaimed winner in the 7+ election for vice mayor by the (unicipalBoard of %anvassers @(B%. *rivate respondent filed in the %)(0>0% a petition for the

correction of manifest errors in the addition of his votes in the $tatement of 0% en banc issued : resolutions directing the (B% to reconvene and recompute thevotes in the $tatement of 0% acted without

urisdiction because it resolved the case without it first having been acted upon by one of itsdivisions, and @: the (B% had already made a correction of the manifest errors in the$tatement of 0% toorder a re6computation of votes.

)%!#:

(1) #he 1ules of the %)(0>0% expressly provides that pre6proclamation controversiesinvolving manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying of the results may be filed directly

with the %)(0>0%.(2) %orrections should be made either by inserting the corrections in the $tatement of


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Dagloc v. C%M$+$CG.R. No. 138969 ecember 17, 1999

&CTS: *rivate respondent filed a *0#?#?)N #) "0%>A10 A HA?>310 )H 0>0%#?)NAN"D)1 ANN3> #&0 0>0%#?)N 10$3>#$. $everal wee's later, private respondent also filedan election protest. *etitioner sought the dismissal of the election protest on the ground that it

was filed more than 78 days from the date of proclamation.

)%!#: #he election protest was filed out of time. #he 0lection %ode provides that the filing of apre6proclamation controversy suspends the running of the reglementary period for filing anelection protest. &owever, the earlier petition to declare a failure of election filed by privaterespondent was not in the nature of a pre6proclamation controversy. #herefore, it did notsuspend the running of the period for filing the election protest.

#IS6U!I&ICTION O& "INNIN$ CN#I#T%

Renato 1. Re(es v. Commission on $lections, et alG.R. No. 120905 &arc' 7, 1996

&CTS: *etitioner 1eyes obtained the most number of votes but was dis4ualified as candidatefor mayor. #he second placer claims that he should be proclaimed winner.

)%!#: #he candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimedwinner in case the winning candidate is dis4ualified.

S'U(IOUS +!!OTS

"en3amin R. $rni v. Commission on $lections, et alG.R. No. 116246 pr!" 27, 1995

&CTS: After conducting an investigation in connection with an election protest, #he Hirst"ivision of the %)(0>0% invalidated several votes in favor of petitioner and nullified hisproclamation. *etitioner claims that there should have been a technical examination of theballots and that he was denied due process when he was not allowed to participate in theinvestigation to verify the signatures of the personnel who conducted the examination of ballots.

)%!#: #he %ommission itself can ma'e the determination of whether the ballots are spuriouswithout the need of calling handwriting experts. *etitioner was not denied due process when hewas not allowed to participate in the investigation of signatures of the personnel who examinedthe ballots. #his was not part of the decision6ma'ing process in which *etitioner was entitled toparticipate but an internal procedure designed to ascertain the integrity of persons under thesupervision and control of the %)(0>0%.

#%&%CTS IN %!%CTION (%TU(N

Patora( v. C%M$+$C.G.R. No. 120823. October 24, 1995.

&CTS:#here were discrepancies between the ItarasK and the written figures in 0lection 1eturnIA.K 0lection 1eturn IB,K on the other hand, was incomplete in the sense that it lac'ed data as toprovincial and congressional candidates. #he %)(0>0% ordered the exclusion of both 0lection1eturns A and B.

ISSU%: Whether the %)(0>0% was correct in ordering the exclusion of the two electionreturns.

)%!#:A was properly excluded, B was not.

&owever, pursuant to the 0lectoral 1eforms >aw of 79, the %)(0>0% should haveused the %ertificate of


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'%(IO# TO &O(M (%C!! SS%M+!3

Claudio v. C%M$+$CG.R. No. 140560. &ay 4, 2000

&CTS: Within the one6year period after *asay %ity (ayor %laudio assumed office, severalbarangay chairs convened a *reparatory 1ecall Assembly and discussed the possibility of filinga petition for recall against him. )ne day after the one6year period of his assumption to office

elapsed, the petition was filed.%laudio 4uestions the validity of the petition alleging that the *1A convened prior to theexpiration of the one6year statutory prohibition. %laudio alleges that there is a prohibition that norecall shall be conducted within one year from a regularDlocal election where local electionincludes the entire election period.ISSU%: Whether the one6year post6assumption prohibition includes the convening of the *1A,and whether the term of the one6year pre6election prohibition includes the entire election period.)%!#: No to both. As long as the election is held outside the one6year period, the preliminaryproceedings to initiate a recall can be held even before the end of the first year in office of alocal official. #he law is unambiguous in providing that no recall shall ta'e place within one yearimmediately preceding a regular local election. &ad %ongress intended this limitation to refer tothe campaign period, which period is defined in the )mnibus 0lection %ode, it could have

expressly said so.

T(NS&%( O& %M'!O3%%S #U(IN$ %!%CTION '%(IO#

Regalado v. Court of ppealsG.R. No. 115962. ebruary 15, 2000

&CTS; 1egalado was appointed as )?%6(ayor, since the incumbent mayor decided to run inthe upcoming elections where 1egalado2s brother was also a candidate. Hour days after1egalado2s brother won, and still within the election period, 1egalado, the )?%6(ayor, effectedthe transfer of a certain Barba from her post as a permanent Nursing Attendant in the office ofthe mayor to a very remote barangay, without %)(0>0% clearance.ISSU%:Whether )?%6(ayor 1egalado2s act of transferring Barba was legal.)%!#:No. 3nder the )mnibus 0lection %ode, it is a prohibited act for any public official to

transfer any officer or civil service employee within the election period except upon priorapproval of the %)(0>0%.

'U+!ICO&&IC%(S

V!I#IT3 O& #%CISION

!irginia Manalo v. +uisito Re(es et alG.R. No. 117618 &arc' 29, 1996

&CTS: #he $anggunian *anlalawigan found the (ayor guilty of the charges in anadministrative complaint. #his was embodied in a IdecisionK signed by only one member.$ubse4uently, the $anggunian ac4uitted the (ayor in a "ecision signed by all members whovoted. *etitioner contends that the $anggunian had no power to render another decision sincethe first decision was already final and executory.

)%!#: #he first decision was not a decision because it did not contain the signatures of themembers who voted. ?n order to render a valid decision in administrative cases involvingelective local officials, the decision of the $anggunian must be in writing stating clearly anddistinctly the facts and the reasons for such decision. ?t was the second decision, which wassigned by all of the members, that was properly a decision.

an v. %ffice of the %mbudsman, et alG.R. No. 114895 September 10, 1998

&CTS: *etitioner Annie #an tried to register her truc' with the >#). *rior to this, a certain Angel#an re4uested the )?% of the >#) branch to defer the registration of the truc' because it wasmortgaged by Annie #an to him. #he )?% advised Annie #an to settle her accounts with Angel#an before registering the vehicle. Annie #an filed a complaint against the )?% for violation ofthe Anti6Craft and %orrupt *ractices Act for unduly delaying the registration of the vehicle.

)%!#:#he )?% did not violate the Anti6Craft and %orrupt *ractices Act. &e acted properly inadvising Annie #an to settle the matter with Angel #an first. ?f he had allowed the registration ofthe vehicle, he would have instead caused undue inury to Angel #an or given materialadvantage to Annie #an since the petitioner was apparently orchestrating a scheme to defraudher creditor.

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T)(%%0T%(M !IMIT

"or3a r. v. C%M$+$C, et alG.R. No. 133495 September 3, 1998

&CTS: "uring %apco2s term as vice6mayor, he became mayor by operation of law upon thedeath of the incumbent mayor. &e was later elected mayor for two consecutive terms. &e ranfor re6election for the third time. *etitioner sought %apco2s dis4ualification on the ground that hehad already served for three consecutive terms.

)%!#: #he three6term limit on local elective officials applies only to those terms of office towhich one may have been elected. ?t does not apply to those terms that are served byautomatic succession. &ence, %apco can run for re6elections for the third time.

''OINTM%NT IN CS% O& VCNC3

Rodolfo 0ari*as et al v. ngelo M. "arba, et alG.R. No. 116763 pr!" 19, 1996

&CTS: A member of the $angguniang Bayan resigned. #o fill the vacancy, the (ayorrecommended to the Covernor the appointment of *alafox. #he $angguniang Bayan made thesame recommendation addressed to the mayor. )n the other hand, the $angguniang*anlalawigan recommended Nacino to the Covernor. #he Covernor appointed Nacino. )n thesame day, the (ayor appointed *alafox. #he Covernor and Nacino filed a petition for uoarrantoagainst *alafox.

)%!#: ?n case the permanent vacancy is caused by a member of the $angguniang Bayan whodoes not belong to any political party, the governor shall, upon recommendation of the$angguniang Bayan, appoint a 4ualified person to fill the vacancy. #he recommendation by the$angguniang Bayan is a condition sine 4ua non for the validity of the appointment. ?n this case,neither of the two nominations complied with these re4uirements. #he petition for 4uo warrantoshould thus be dismissed.

'U+!ICCO('O(TIONS

&O(MTION O& MUNICI'!ITI%S

Municipalit( of imene' v. 4on. !icente . "a' r., et alG.R. No. 105746 ecember 2, 1995

&CTS: #he (unicipality of $inacaban was created by 0) :+ of *resident Ouirino.$inacaban laid claim to certain barangays, based on the technical description of its territory in0) :+. #he (unicipality of !imenez asserted urisdiction over these areas based on a1esolution of the *rovincial Board, fixing the common boundary of the municipalities. #he #rial%ourt ordered the conduct of a relocation survey. !imenez 4uestions @7 whether $inacaban,having been created by an 0), has legal personalityE and @: whether it is the boundaryprovided for in 0) :+ or that adopted by the *rovincial Board that should govern.

)%!#:

@7 $inacaban had at least /e acto legal personality because its legal existence had beenrecognized and ac4uiesced publicly and officially. With the effectivity of the >ocal Covernment

%ode, it ac4uired /e ure personality because the >C% provides that municipal districtsorganized pursuant to presidential issuances or 0)s at the time of the effectivity of the >C%shall be considered as regular municipalities. #here is no need to conform with the plebiscitere4uirement in the creation of new municipalities since $inacaban was created before theeffectivity of the 79 %onstitution.

@: #he technical description containing the metes and bounds of the territory of a municipality iscontrolling. #hus, the 1#% correctly ordered a relocation survey as the means of determiningthe boundaries of the municipality.

)%(IN$S9 'U+!ICTION9 'OSTIN$ O& O(#INNC%S

0iguerres v. Court of ppeals

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G.R. No. 119172 &arc' 25, 1999

&CTS: #he %ity of (andaluyong promulgated several ordinances revising the schedule of fairmar'et values of real property in the city and the assessment levels applicable thereto.*etitioner 4uestions the validity of the ordinances on the ground that they were allegedlyadopted without public hearing and prior publication or posting.

)%!#: *ublic hearings are re4uired before the enactment of an ordinance imposing realproperty taxes. >i'ewise, the publication or posting of such ordinance and of the proposedschedule of fair mar'et values of real property is re4uired. &owever, petitioner has notpresented evidence to show non6compliance with these re4uirements and has therefore failedto rebut the presumption of validity in favor of the ordinances.

C(%TION O& OT)%( +(N$3 'OSITIONS

Cesar G. !iola v. Rafael lunan III, et alG.R. No. 115844 u#u$t 15, 1997

&CTS: *etitioner challenges the validity of Art. ???, 5576: of the 1evised ?mplementing 1ulesand Cuidelines for the Ceneral 0lections of the >iga ng mga Barangay )fficers, which providesfor the election of first, second and third vice presidents and for auditors for the National >iga ngmga Barangay and its chapters. *etitioner argues that these positions are in excess of thoseprovided in the >ocal Covernment %ode.

)%!#:#he rules are valid. #he >ocal Covernment %ode authorizes the board of directors toLcreate such other positions as it may deem necessary for the management of the chapter.K#his is a valid delegation of power by %ongress with a fairly intelligible standard.

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