28BAUTISTA - BISNAR - BOMBALES - FORTES - KUNG - MAGSUMBOL - PAJA - TABAG - YAP

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW

ARTICLE VI The Legislative Department

Section 1

A. Non-delegability

1. Rubi v. Provincial Board - BAUTISTA

Facts: Rubi and various other Manguianes, who are commonly known as Mangyans, in the province of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to change their dwellings from their native habitat. They were told to establish themselves on a reservation in Tigbao, which is actually still in the province of Mindoro, and to remain there. Non compliance would mean that they would be punished by imprisonment. The Mangyans had been ordered to live in the reservation to be cultivated, as the Mangyans were viewed as a non-Christian tribe of a very low culture.One of the Mangyans named Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but was later caught and placed in prison at Calapan, for the sole reason that he escaped from the reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on his behalf by Rubi and other Mangyans of the province. They allege that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code was challenged; it states:With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board.Issue: 1. Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code constitutes undue delegation. 2. Whether or not the Manguianes are being deprived of their liberty.Held:1. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this section of the Administrative Code. Under the doctrine of necessity, who else was in a better position to determine whether or not to execute the law but the provincial governor. It falls upon the discretion of the provincial governor to execute the law as circumstances may arise. Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class legislation. One cannot say that the liberty of the citizen was unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Mangyans is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws: there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class. The public policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The Mangyans, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be confined for a time, for their own good and the good of the country.2. Among other things, the term non-christian should not be given a literal meaning or a religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term non-christian it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. In this case, the Mangyans were being brought to the reservation to promote peace and to put their seminomadic lifestyle to rest.

2. Pelaez v. Auditor General - BISNAR

From Sept. 4 to October 29, 1964, the President, claiming to act in accordance with Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued several Executive Orders that led to the creation of 33 municipalities. Sec. 68: The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovinces, separate any political division other than a province, into such portions as may be required, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so created, and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require: Provided, That the authorization of the (Philippine Legislature) Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When action by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines, with the recommendation and advice of the head of the Department having executive control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several officers affected and assign such officers to the new districts so formed.

Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the foregoing authority, an equitable distribution of the funds and obligations of the divisions thereby affected shall be made in such manner as may be recommended by the (Insular Auditor) Auditor General and approved by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines.

Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President, instituted an action against the Auditor General to restrain him from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities. He argued that the power of the President to create municipalities under Sec. 68 amounts to undue delegation of legislative power.

Issue: Whether Sec. 68 was a valid delegation of power?

Ruling: No. The power to create a municipal corporation is strictly a legislative function. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: 1. Be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate; and 2. Fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. Under the last clause of the first sentence of Section 68, the President:... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require. The phrase "as the public welfare may require" qualified, not the clauses preceding the one just quoted, but only the place to which the seat of the government may be transferred. This fact becomes more apparent when we consider that said Section 68 was originally Section 1 of Act No. 1748,3 which provided that, "whenever in the judgment of the Governor-General the public welfare requires, he may, by executive order," effect the changes enumerated therein (as in said section 68), including the change of the seat of the government "to such place ... as the public interest requires." It is also important to note that the executive orders in question were issued after the legislative bills for the creation of the municipalities involved in this case had failed to pass Congress. Section 10 (1) of Article VII: The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act Within the scope of their authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he vote, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may be. He may not even suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board. Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of its officials, by creating a new municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official concerned resides, for his office would thereby become vacant.6 Thus, by merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if he had it), without actually creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of control denied to him by the Constitution.

3. Cebu Oxygen v. Drilon - BOMBALESFacts: Petitioner and the union of its rank and file employees, Cebu Oxygen, Acetylene and Central Visayas Employees Association (COAVEA) entered into a CBA covering 1986-1988 Pursuant thereto, the management gave salary increases However, CBA also provides that this clause:o xxxx THAT THIS PAY INCREASE SHALL BE CREDITED AS PAYMENT TO ANY MANDATED GOVERNMENT WAGE ADJUSTMENT OR ALLOWANCE INCREASES WHICH MAY BE ISSUED BY WAY OF LEGISLATION, DECREE OR PRESIDENTIAL EDICT COUNTED FROM THE ABOVE DATE TO THE NEXT INCREASE.xxxxIF THE WAGE ADJUSTMENT OF ALLOWANCE INCREASES DECREED BY LAW, LEGISLATION OR PRESIDENTIAL EDICT IN ANY PARTICULAR YEAR SHALL BE HIGHER THAN THE FOREGOING INCREASES IN THAT PARTICULAR YEAR, THEN THE COMPANY SHALL PAY THE DIFFERENCE. On December 14, 1987, Republic Act No. 6640 was passed increasing the minimum wage. Section 8 of the implementing rules however prohibits the employer from crediting anniversary wage increases negotiated under a collective bargaining agreement against such wage increases mandated by Republic Act No. 6640. On February 22, 1988, a DOLE Officer, commenced a routine inspection of petitioner's establishment and based on payrolls and other records, he found that petitioner committed violations of the law (UNDERPAYMENT OF BASIC WAGE) Petitioner protested claiming that Section 8 of the rules implementing the provisions of Republic Act No. 6640 particularly the provision excluding anniversary wage increases from being credited to the wage increase provided by said law is null and void on the ground that the same unduly expands the provisions of the said law.

Issue: Whether or not an Implementing Order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) can provide for a prohibition not contemplated by the law it seeks to implement.

Ruling: NO

It is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add or detract from the provisions of law it is designed to implement. The provisions of Republic Act No. 6640, do not prohibit the crediting of CBA anniversary wage increases for purposes of compliance with Republic Act No. 6640. The implementing rules cannot provide for such a prohibition not contemplated by the law. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. The law itself cannot be expanded by such regulations. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.

4. Chiongbian v. Orbos - FORTES - LEUNGCongressman Chiongbian v. Exec. Secretary Orbos (1992) Pursuant to the Constitution, Congress passed a law creating the ARMM composed of the 4 provinces which through a plebiscite expressed their votes that they wanted to be included in the said region. A total of 13 provinces and 9 cities participated in the plebiscite (as mentioned only 4 provinces voted to be included in the ARMM). As the said law that created ARMM also allowed the President (Aquino) to merge the provinces who voted NOT to be included in the ARMM to be merged into existing regions, EO 429 was issued transferring certain provinces to other regions. The transfer of these provinces was questioned, they alleged that Art. XIX, 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because 1) it unduly delegates legislative power to the President by authorizing him to "merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" or at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the power delegated and 2) the power granted is not expressed in the title of the law. ISSUES:

whether the power to "merge" administrative regions is legislative or executive in character? - EXECUTIVE whether Art. XIX, 13 is invalid because it contains no standard to guide the President's discretion - to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economic development and to improve the service in the transaction of the public business. HELD:First issue: Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972. PD 742 restructured the regional organization of Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi PD 773 further restructured the regional organization of Mindanao PD 1555 transferred the regional center of Region IX from Jolo to Zamboanga City. The choice of the President as delegate is logical The division of the country intended to facilitate administration of local governments, direction of executive departments which the law requires should have regional offices. In Abbas, we said that power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution BUT it is a power traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments [see Art. X, 4 of the Constitution]." Regions not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but a "mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes." "administrative in nature" Second issue: Legislative standard may be expressed or implied Need not be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged legislation. As regards the questioned law, the standard is found in another law - R.A. No. 5435 (Original Law or Organic Law creating the ARMM) of the power to reorganize the Executive Department States that: standard is "to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economic development and to improve the service in the transaction of the public business." Therefore, while non-assenting provinces and cities are to remain in the regions as designated upon the creation of the Autonomous Region, they may nevertheless be regrouped with contiguous provinces forming other regions as the exigency of administration may require

5. US v. Ang Tang Ho - KUNGFACTS The Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, which authorized the Governor-General, for any cause, or conditions resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate, with the consent of the Council of State, temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. Governor-General issued Executive Order No. 53, fixing the price at which rice should be sold at Php0.63 per ganta. A complaint was filed against Ang Tang Ho for the violation of EO No. 53, for having sold to one Pedro Trinidad 1 ganta of rice for Php0.80. TC: found Ang Tang Ho guilty and sentenced to 5 months imprisonment and to pay Php500. Issue: W/N Act No. 2868 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power Held: Yes. This question involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be sold. It will be noted that section 1 authorizes the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued for any cause, and leaves the question as to what is any cause to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says: For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn. The Legislature does not specify or define what is an extraordinary rise. That is also left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says that the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, is authorized to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of this Act. It does not specify or define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect. That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or defined any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole judgment and discretion of the Governor-General to say what is or what is not a cause, and what is or what is not an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, and as to what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure for the carrying out the purposes of the Act. Under this state of facts, if the law is valid and the Governor-General issues a proclamation fixing the minimum price at which rice should be sold, any dealer who, with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There may not have been any cause, and the price may not have been extraordinary, and there may not have been an emergency, but, if the Governor-General found the existence of such facts and issued a proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller commits a crime. A law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch of the government, and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event. The law says that the Governor-General may fix the maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant may demand. The law is a general law and not a local or special law. The proclamation undertakes to fix one price for rice in Manila and other and different prices in other and different provinces in the Philippine Islands, and delegates the power to determine the other and different prices to provincial treasurers and their deputies. Here, then, you would have a delegation of legislative power to the Governor-General, and a delegation by him of that power to provincial treasurers and their deputies, who are hereby directed to communicate with, and execute all instructions emanating from the Director of Commerce and Industry, for the most effective and proper enforcement of the above regulations in their respective localities. The issuance of the proclamation by the Governor-General was the exercise of the delegation of a delegated power, and was even a sub delegation of that power. When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not any cause for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define what was any cause, or what was an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn, Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. The act or proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or qualities of rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive order No. 53. Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorized the Governor-General in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void. 6. Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority - MAGSUMBOLFACTS: In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong the Court held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid down by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. It was there also observed that even the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission. The judgment became final and executory on August 6, 1990.

Subsequently, there are people complaining that they were stopped for alleged traffic violations and their drivers licenses were confiscated by traffic enforcers in QC and Mandaluyong and one in Makati by a police officer. Hence, the Caloocan-Manila Drivers and Operators Association sent a letter to the Court asking who should enforce the decision in the above-mentioned case, whether they could seek damages for confiscation of their driver's licenses, and where they should file their complaints. A lawyer also complained of the removal of his license plate by a MMA officer and of the confiscation of his license by a police officer.

The people complained of have the following defense: One invoked Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, of Mandaluyong, authorizing the confiscation of driver's licenses and the removal of license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations. One said he confiscated Trieste's driver's license pursuant to a memorandum dated February 27, 1991, from the District Commander of the Western Traffic District of the Philippine National Police, authorizing such sanction under certain conditions. One argued that the Gonong decision prohibited only the removal of license plates and not the confiscation of driver's licenses. The MMA issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself "to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila."

The Court issued the following resolution:The attention of the Court has been called to the enactment by the Metropolitan Manila Authority of Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, providing inter alia that:Section2. Authority to Detach Plate/Tow and Impound. The Metropolitan Manila Authority, thru the Traffic Operation Center, is authorized to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila.

The provision appears to be in conflict with the decision of the Court in the case at bar (as reported in 187 SCRA 432), where it was held that the license plates of motor vehicles may not be detached except only under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43.

MMA defended the said ordinance on the ground that it was adopted pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by EO 392. It particularly cited Section 2 thereof vesting in the Council (its governing body) the responsibility among others of:1. Formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination or consolidation for the Authority; and2. Promulgation of resolutions and other issuances of metropolitan wide application, approval of a code of basic services requiring coordination, and exercise of its rule-making powers. (Emphasis supplied)

The Authority argued that there was no conflict between the decision and the ordinance because the latter was meant to supplement and not supplant the latter. It stressed that the decision itself said that the confiscation of license plates was invalid in the absence of a valid law or ordinance, which was why Ordinance No. 11 was enacted. The Authority also pointed out that the ordinance could not be attacked collaterally but only in a direct action challenging its validity.

ISSUE: W/N there was a valid exercise of a delegated legislative power?

HELD: No.

The MMA sustains Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, under the specific authority conferred upon it by EO 392, while Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, is justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied in the Local Government Code. It is not disputed that both measures were enacted to promote the comfort and convenience of the public and to alleviate the worsening traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila due in large part to violations of traffic rules.

The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such measures, it appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites are. 1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2) the presence of a sufficient standard.

Under the first requirement, the statute must leave the legislature complete in all its terms and provisions such that all the delegate will have to do when the statute reaches it is to implement it. What only can be delegated is not the discretion to determine what the law shall be but the discretion to determine how the law shall be enforced. This has been done in the case at bar.

As a second requirement, the enforcement may be effected only in accordance with a sufficient standard, the function of which is to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and thus "prevent the delegation from running riot." This requirement has also been met. It is settled that the "convenience and welfare" of the public, particularly the motorists and passengers in the case at bar, is an acceptable sufficient standard to delimit the delegate's authority.

But the problem before us is not the validity of the delegation of legislative power. The question we must resolve is the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.

The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the national legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of their principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now before us, we apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal corporations.According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy.

A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the provisions of the decree authorizing the MMA to impose such sanctions. In fact, the above provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was allowed to "impose fines and otherwise discipline" traffic violators only "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed," that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that "in case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to the MMA and all other local political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including the Municipality of Mandaluyong.

The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.

The self-serving language of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance is worth noting. Curiously, it is the measure itself, which was enacted by the Metropolitan Manila Authority, that authorizes the Metropolitan Manila Authority to impose the questioned sanction. The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits. In so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in effect partially repeal the law.

At any rate, the fact is that there is no statutory authority for and indeed there is a statutory prohibition against the imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area. Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be imposed by the challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers.

It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not to impose such sanctions, either directly through a statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect to the local governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without such action, PD 1605 remains effective and continues prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.

7. People v. Dacuycuy - PAJA DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: It is not for the courts to fix the term of imprisonment where no points of reference have been provided by the legislature. What valid delegation presupposes and sanctions is an exercise of discretion to fix the length of service of a term of imprisonment that must be encompassed within specific or designated limits provided by law. The absence of designated limits will constitute an undue delegation, if not an outright intrusion into or assumption, of legislative power. Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an indeterminable period of imprisonment, with neither a minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by the legislative authority. The courts are thus given too much latitude in its discretion to fix the term of imprisonment. Without the benefit of any sufficient standard, a judge may be allowed to fix the duration within the range of one minute to the life span of the accused. Thus, Section 32 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers was declared unconstitutional (without prejudice to other constitutional provisions). Nature of the case: criminal case F: Private respondents were charged for violating Republic Act No. 4670 otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Private respondents alleged, among others, that Section 32 of said law, is unconstitutional as it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of the penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were the legislative department of the Government. The disputed section of Republic Act No. 4670 provides:Sec. 32. Penal Provision. ___ A person who shall willfully interfere with, restrain or coerce any teacher in the exercise of his rights guaranteed by this Act or who shall in any other manner commit any act to defeat any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. (Italics supplied). I: Whether or not a law that gives the court the discretion to impose a sentence of imprisonment without limits is a valid delegation of legislative power? H: NO R: An apparent exception to the general rule forbidding the delegation of legislative authority to the courts exists in cases where discretion is conferred upon said courts. It is clear, however, that when the courts are to exercise discretion, it must be a mere legal discretion, which is exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law and which, when discerned, it is the duty of the court to follow. So it was held by the Supreme Court of the United States that the principle of separation of powers is not violated by vesting in courts discretion as to the length of sentence or the amount of fine between designated limits in sentencing persons convicted of a crime. In the case under consideration, the respondent judge erronneously assumed that since the penalty of imprisonment has been provided for by the legislature, the court is endowed with the discretion to ascertain the term or period of imprisonment. We cannot agree with this postulate. It is not for the courts to fix the term of imprisonment where no points of reference have been provided by the legislature. What valid delegation presupposes and sanctions is an exercise of discretion to fix the length of service of a term of imprisonment which must be encompassed within specific or designated limits provided by law, the absence of which designated limits will constitute such exercise as an undue delegation, if not an outright intrusion into or assumption, of legislative power.Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an indeterminable period of imprisonment, with neither a minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by the legislative authority. The courts are thus given a wide latitude of discretion to fix the term of imprisonment, without even the benefit of any sufficient standard, such that the duration thereof may range, in the words of respondent judge, from one minute to the life span of the accused. Irremissibly, this cannot be allowed. It vests in the courts a power and a duty essentially legislative in nature and which, as applied to this case, does violence to the rules on separation of powers as well as the non-delegability of legislative powers. This time, the presumption of constitutionality has to yield. On the foregoing considerations, and by virtue of the separability clause in Section 34 of Republic Act No. 4670, the penalty of imprisonment provided in Section 32 thereof should be, as it is hereby, declared unconstitutional.

8. Abakada v. Executive Secretary - TABAG

FACTS: On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or the VAT Reform Act. Before the law took effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a TRO enjoining government from implementing the law in response to a slew of petitions for certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the new law.

The challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and 6: That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to 12%, after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:

(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%);

or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1%)

Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the President to increase the VAT rate is an abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such delegation is not covered by Section 28 (2), Article VI Consti. They argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and services which cant be included within the purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the government and usually imposed on imported/exported goods. They also said that the President has powers to cause, influence or create the conditions provided by law to bring about the conditions precedent. Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are made by law as to how the Secretary of Finance will make the recommendation.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power? NO.

HELD: The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly, or inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power which can never be delegated is the authority to make a complete law- complete as to the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable, and to determine the expediency of its enactment. It is the nature of the power and not the liability of its use or the manner of its exercise which determines the validity of its delegation. The exceptions are: (a) delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution (b) delegation of emergency powers to President under Constitution (c) delegation to the people at large (d) delegation to local governments (e) delegation to administrative bodies For the delegation to be valid, it must be complete and it must fix a standard. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power BUT a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive. No discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the word SHALL is used in the common proviso. The use of the word SHALL connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion. Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty, which cannot be evaded by the President. It is a clear directive to impose the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are present. Congress just granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the existence of a fact--- whether by December 31, 2005, the VAT collection as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 2 4/5 % or the national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and 1%. If either of these two instances has occurred, the Secretary of Finance, by legislative mandate, must submit such information to the President. In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the law.

Note: Section 1 focuses on Non-delegability, but this case has several procedural and substantive issue. Just in case, these issue include: (Procedural) Violation of exclusive orgination of revenue bills (from Congress) - no violaiton (Procedural) Violation of non-ammendment rule in transmitting bills from Congress to Senate - no violation, changes introduced by the bicameral conference commitee were only meant to reconcile disagreeing provisions in the bill (Substantial) Uniformity and equitability of taxation - VAT even if anti-thesis of progressive taxation is valid because the mandate to Congress is NOT to prescribe to EVOLVE a progressive system of taxation (Substantial) Violation of due process and equal protection clause reflected in the provision on input and output taxes - provision is valid, State has power to make reasonable and nautral classificaitons

9. Belgica v. Executive Secretary - YAPFacts: There were 6 whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging 5 lawmakers for Plunder, and 3 other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of 3 implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles. Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO. Several Petitions has been lodge to declare the Pork Barrel unconstitutional Petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork Barrel among others, the 2013 PDAF Article "wrecks the assignment of responsibilities between the political branches" as it is designed to allow individual legislators to interfere "way past the time it should have ceased" or, particularly, "after the GAA is passed." Respondents counter that the separations of powers principle has not been violated since the President maintains "ultimate authority to control the execution of the GAA and that he "retains the final discretion to reject" the legislators proposals.

Issue: WON there was undue delegation of legislative powers.

Ruling: YES. The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function both constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the Executive branch of government. Congress enters the picture when it deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President. Thereafter, Congress, "in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom, formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by law. Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress law -making role necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executives role of implementing the national budget begins. So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries between them, Congress must "not concern it self with details for implementation by the Executive. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be construed from the import of Special Provisions 1 to 3 as well as the second paragraph of Special Provision 4.o Special Provision 1 - allows individual legislators to identify PDAF projects for as long as the identified project falls under a general program listed in the said menuo Special Provision 2 - implementing agencies shall, within 90 days from the GAA is passed, submit to Congress a more detailed priority list, standard or design prepared and submitted by implementing agencies from which the legislator may make his choice. It also authorizes legislators to identify PDAF projects outside his district for as long as the representative of the district concerned concurs in writingo Special provision 3 - PDAF projects refer to "projects to be identified by legislators" and thereunder provides the allocation limit for the total amount of projects identified by each legislatoro par 2 of Special Provision 4 requires that any modification and revision of the project identification "shall be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be." Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Furthermore, respondents admitted that the identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement before his PDAF can be tapped as a funding source, thereby highlighting the indispensability of the said act to the entire budget execution process, hence not merely recommendatory.

Section 3A. Imposition of other qualifications10. Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board - BAUTISTA

Facts: In 2002, Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was implemented. Section 36 requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain offenses. In December 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a candidate for re-election in the May elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486. According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator. Issue: Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 and Resolution 6486 are constitutional. Held: 1. No. Pimentels contention is valid. Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform. No act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution; whatever limits it imposes must be observed. The provision which states that no person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test is not valid as it expands the qualifications. COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet this additional qualification, the COMELEC is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be challenged by unnecessary requirements which are not specified in the Constitution.

Section 5A. Apportionment

11. Mariano, Jr. v. Comelec - BISNAR

RA 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be Knowns as the City of Makati) was enacted, Sec. 52, Art. X of which provides: Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. Upon its conversion into a highly-urbanized city, Makati shall thereafter have at least two (2) legislative districts that shall initially correspond to the two (2) existing districts created under Section 3(a) of Republic Act. No. 7166 as implemented by the Commission on Elections to commence at the next national elections to be held after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes, Dasmarias and Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieu of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second district. Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the law arguing that: 1. It increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3) years following the return of every census;2. the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000; and3. the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill.

Issue: Whether RA 7854 is constitutional?

Ruling: RA 7854 is constitutional. 1. In the earlier case of Tobias v. Abalos, it has already been ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. To hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty.2. The Constitution provides that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000).3. Finally there is no merit in the contention that the creation of an additional legislative district in Makati should have been expressly stated in the title of the bill. The Court favors a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule so as not to impede legislation. The Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. It is sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject."

12. Montejo v. Comelec - BOMBALES Facts: Province of Leyte is composed of 5 districts:

In 1959, RA 2141 was enacted and Biliran made its sub-province: Almeria, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and all the territories comprised therein In 1992, when LGC took effect, the sub province of Biliran become a regular province It was as approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held As a consequence: 3rd district was reduced to 5 municipalities only. Clubian, Leyte, San Isidro, Tabango and Villaba with a total population of only 145,067. To remedy the inequality On December 29, 1994, it promulgated Resolution No. 2736 it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the 2nd District and the municipality of Palompon of the 4th District to the 3rd District of Leyte Petitioner, representing the First District of Leyte, prays for the annulment of Sec1 of Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC, on the ground that it violates the principle of equality of representation. To remedy the alleged inequity, petitioner seeks to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from his district to the 2nd of the province. Intervenor Apostol, representing the 2nd District, opposed the inclusion ofTolosa in his district. Respondent Commission denied the motion ruling that: (1) its adjustment of municipalities involved the least disruption of the territorial composition of each district; and (2) said adjustment complied with the constitutional requirement that each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Petitioner however insists that Sec1of Resolution No. 2736 violates the principle of equality of representation ordained in the Constitution. Citing Wesberry v. Sanders, he argues that respondent COMELEC violated "the constitutional precept that as much as practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's." The Solicitor General, in his Comment, concurred with the views of the petitioner. The intervenor, however, opposed the petition on two (2) grounds: (1) COMELEC has no jurisdiction to promulgate Resolution No. 2736; and (2) assuming it has jurisdiction, said Resolution is in accord with the Constitution. Respondent COMELEC filed its own Comment alleging that it acted within the parameters of the Constitution.

Issue: W/N the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative power of redistricting and reapportionment?Ruling:NO, Sec1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it transferred the municipality of Capoocan Palompon the 3rd District of the province of Leyte, is annulled and set aside. Records reveal that this issue was resolved by the Constitutional Commission which denied to the COMELEC the major power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only empowered the COMELEC "to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment herein made."

Accordingly, minor adjustments would mean: the authority conferred would be on minor corrections or amendments, meaning to say, for instance, that we may have forgotten an intervening municipality in the enumeration, which ought to be included in one district. That we shall consider a minor amendment. Clearly, the excerpts from the discussion provides that: o THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Romulo). Commissioner de Castro is recognized.o MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.o I was about to ask the committee the meaning of minor adjustment. Can it be possible that one municipality in a district be transferred to another district and call it a minor adjustment?o MR. DAVIDE. That cannot be done, Mr. Presiding Officer. Minor, meaning, that there should be no change in the allocations per district. However, it may happen that we have forgotten a municipality in between which is still in the territory of one assigned district, or there may be an error in the correct name of a particular municipality because of changes made by the interim Batasang Pambansa and the Regular Batasang Pambansa. There were many batas pambansa enacted by both the interim and the Regular Batasang Pambansa changing the names of municipalities.o MR. DE CASTRO. So, the minor adjustment may be made only if one of the municipalities is not mentioned in the ordinance appended to, and it will be up for the COMELEC now to adjust or to put such municipality to a certain district.o MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer. For instance, we may not have the data regarding a division of a municipality by the interim Batasang Pambansa or the Regular Batasang Pambansa into two municipalities, meaning, a mother municipality and the new municipality, but still actually these are within the geographical district area.o MR. DE CASTRO. So the minor adjustment which the COMELEC cannot do is that, if, for example, my municipality is in the First District of Laguna, they cannot put that in any other district.o MR. DAVIDE. That is not even a minor correction. It is a substantive one.Lastly,consistent with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments, Section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district. The power granted by Section 3 to the respondent COMELEC is to adjust the number of members (not municipalities)

13. Aldaba v. Comelec - FORTES - LEUNG Doctrine: A city which has reached 250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district only in the immediately following election after the attainment of the 250,000 population. Therefore, not as soon as it attains the 250K population.

Note: Each province, irrespective of number of inhabitants is entitled to at least 1 representative FACTS: Original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional RA 9591 RA 9591 created a legislative district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan petition alleged RA violated the minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city. Congress relied on a certification issued by a Regional Director of NSO Projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000 OSG contended that Congress use of projected population is non-justiciable as it involves a determination on the wisdom of the standard adopted by the legislature to determine compliance with a constitutional requirement ISSUES: WON RA 9591 creating a separate legislative district of Malolos City is constitutional - NO Whether the City of Malolos has a population of at least 250,000, whether actual or projected, for the purpose of creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos in time for the 10 May 2010 elections? -NO HELD: RA 9591 is unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district it must have a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic projections, is without legal effect because Regional Director Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification. The certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are declared official by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB). Certifications based on demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer. Intercensal population projections must be as of the middle of every year. As the Certification of Regional Director Miranda does not state that the demographic projections he certified have been declared official by the NSCB. Records also do not also show that the Certification of Regional Director Miranda is based on demographic projections declared official by the NSCB. The Certification, which states that the population of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010, violates the requirement that intercensal demographic projections shall be as of the middle of every year. In addition, there is no showing that Regional Director Miranda has been designated by the NSO Administrator as a certifying officer for demographic projections in Region III. In the absence of such official designation, only the certification of the NSO Administrator can be given credence by this Court.

B. Party List System

14. BANAT v. Comelec - KUNGIn July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules:1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats this is pursuant to the2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if it garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the HELD portion of this digest).On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.ISSUES:I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.IV. How are party-list seats allocated?V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.HELD:I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to Party-List RepresentativesHence,(220 0.80) x (0.20) = 55II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling meaning, the number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat, and not qualified. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.How is this done?Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining number of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for the party list but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.Example:In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional seatHence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the party-list elections as the word party was not qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in the party-list elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution and the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate the party-list system. 15. Atong Paglaum v. Comelec - MAGSUMBOLFACTS: These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.

Guys, I cannot put everything kasi 54 resolutions siya but here are some of the reasons why their registrations were cancelled: The "artists" sector is not considered marginalized and underrepresented; Failure to prove track record Failure of the nominees to qualify under RA 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani. A non-stock savings and loan association cannot be considered marginalized and underrepresented; and The first and second nominees are not teachers by profession. Failure to establish that its nominees are members of the indigenous people in the Mindanao and Cordilleras sector that the party seeks to represent; The sector it represents is a specifically defined group which may not be allowed registration under the party-list system; and

ISSUES:1. W/N the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations? NO2. W/N the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections? NO

HELD:

1. We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.

2. The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply put, the party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives.The voter elects two representatives in the House of Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and another for his or her party-list group or organization of choice.

For the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, we must now impose and mandate the party-list system actually envisioned and authorized under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.

In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As discussed above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.

Present petitions were remanded to the COMELEC.

Section 6

A. Residence qualification

16. Romualdez - Marcos v. Comelec - PAJA

1. Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995 DOCTRINE + APPLICATION: Residence, for election purposes, is used synonymously with domicile. Domicile includes the twin elements of the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently. Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. If a persons intent is to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. Thus, it is perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency qualification requirement. The Supreme Court reiterated the following from Larena vs. Teves: First, a minor follows the domicile of his parents. Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 1) an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; 2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and 3) acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. In this case, the Supreme Court held that the following facts did not constitute intent to abandon her original domicile or at least proved that she had chosen her original domicile as her present domicile: 1) having been a registered voter for several years in the past in San Juan, Manila; 2) having different residences in Metro Manila, Ilocos, etc.; and 3) Mrs. Marcos marriage to Mr. Marcos.

Nature of the case: election case F: Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. The pertinent entries are as follows: 7.RESIDENCE (complete Address):Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte 8.RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ Years and SevenMonths. Based on the above the incumbent representative of the First District of Leyte filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification with the Commission on Elections alleging that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitutions one-year residency requirement for candidates to the House of Representatives. In that same petition, it was also alleged that Mrs. Marcos had been a registered voter in San Juan, Manila and resided in different locations with her late husband for several years in the past. Mrs. Marcos filed a petition to Amend/Correct Certificate of Candidacy but the same was denied by the Commission on Elections for being filed out of time. In her Answer to the Petition for Disqualification, Mrs. Marcos alleged that her entry of the word seven was the result of an honest misinterpretation. She alleges that her interpretation of the provision was that it asked for the time she had lived in her actual residence and not how long she had been domiciled in the district where she seeks to be elected. COMELEC disagreed and granted the disqualification. Having garnered the most votes, she filed a petition on certiorari with the Supreme Court. I: Whether or not the petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of at least one year as provided by Article VI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution? H: YES R: The Supreme Court ruled that the Commission on Elections had confused the concepts of domicile and residence in election law. Residence, for election purposes, is used synonymously with domicile. So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile. Domicile includes the twin elements of the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country.The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a persons intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice.It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting down the word seven in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First District, which was since childhood in the space provided. Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioners claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her actual residence in a space which required her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicilecoupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioners registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.In Larena vs. Teves, we stressed:First, a minor follows the domicile of his parents; and Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in