The Pennsylvania State University

The Graduate School

College of the Liberal Arts

POLICING CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: PHYSICAL INTERVENTION

PROTEST EVENTS AND STATE SOCIAL CONTROL

A Thesis in

Crime, Law and Justice

by

Cody W. Warner

© 2008 Cody W. Warner

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Master of Arts

August 2008

ii

The thesis of Cody W. Warner was reviewed and approved* by the following:

John D. McCarthy

Professor of Sociology

Thesis Adviser

Head of the Department of Sociology and Crime, Law and Justice

Michael Massoglia

Assistant Professor of Sociology and Crime, Law and Justice

Lee Ann Banaszak

Associate Professor of Political Science

*Signatures are on file in the Graduate School

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ABSTRACT

When groups of people gather to articulate a grievance, the police are often called upon

to do the complicated job of balancing competing interests. The job of the police is

further complicated, however, when protestors employ confrontational or radical tactics.

This study seeks to explore the state response to protest events that utilize a particular

form of civil disobedience characterized by physical intervention. Using a unique data

set of all protest events covered in the New York Times between 1960 and 1989, I find

that police are more likely to be preset at, and take action during, events identified as

involving civil disobedience. Further investigation suggests that police respond to

different characteristics at different types of protest. In some instances, particular targets

elicit repressive action, while at others police appear to respond to characteristics of the

protestors themselves. Results of this study are interpreted in relation to both policing

styles and theoretical approaches to protest policing.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables………………………………………………………………………….…v

Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION………………………………………………..……….…1

Chapter 2. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE…………….…………………………….…….…..5

Types of Civil Disobedience…….……………………………..…….…….……7

1. Sit-in………………………………………………………...........8

2. Blockade………………………………………………….……...9

3. Building Takeover……………………………………………....11

Comparison Group……………………………………………………………...12

Chapter 3. PROTEST POLICING……………………………………………………...13

Policing Styles………………………………………………………………….14

1. Escalated Force………………………………………………....14

2. Negotiated Management…………………………………….….16

Theoretical Explanations of Police Repression…………………………….…..18

1. Threat Approach……….………………………………….……19

2. Weakness Approach……………………………………….…....20

3. Interaction of Threat and Weakness……………………….…....22

Chapter 4. THE CURRENTY STUDY…………………………………………….…...25

Hypotheses………………………………………………………………….…..25

Data and Methods………………………………………………………….…...28

Selection Bias………………………………………………………………..….30

Independent Variables……………………………………………………….….32

Dependent Variables………………………………………………………..…...35

Control Variables…………………………………………………………..……36

Analytic Strategy…………………………………………………………..…….38

Chapter 5. RESULTS………………………………………………………………. …..40

Descriptive Statistics…………………………………………………….….…...40

Regression Models……………………………………………………….…..….44

1. Sit-ins…………………………………………….………… .…..47

2. Blockades……………………………………………….…….…49

3. Building Takeovers…………………………………….….…….50

Chapter 6. DISCUSSION…………………………………………………………….…53

Chapter 7. CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………….. 60

Chapter 8. TABLES...........................................................................................................61

REFERENCES……………………………………………………………………….....66

APPENDIX A. Forms and Activities…............................................................................70

APPENDIX B. Supplementary Tables…..……………………………………………...72

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: All Events and Selected Protest Events

Table 2. Police Response Regressed on Civil Disobedient Event

Table 3. Logistic Regression of Police Response to Sit-in Protest Events

Table 4. Logistic Regression of Police Response to Blockade Protest Events

Table 5. Logistic Regression of Police Response to Building Takeover Protest Events

Table B1. Correlation Matrix – Full Sample

Table B2. Logistic Regression of Police Response to March/Rally Protest Events

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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION

Police are often asked to balance the First Amendment right to free assembly with

their sworn duty to protect persons and property. For the most part, the police are able to

strike a balance between the two that allows for the expression of a collective voice while

still ensuring greater public safety. Sometimes, however, the police are unable to balance

these responsibilities and the outcomes are less peaceful:

Jackson, Miss., March 29 – Club-swinging police and two German Shepherd Dogs today

chased more than 100 Negroes from a courthouse where nine Negro students were

convicted for staging Mississippi‟s first sit-in demonstration. Several of the Negroes

were stuck by the clubs and at least one person was bitten by the dogs, held on leashes by

two policemen…The incident occurred shortly before the trial of the students under a

1960 law making it a misdemeanor to refuse policeman‟s order to disperse…Shortly

before court convened, the Negroes began clapping their hands and a policeman yelled,

“Move „em out.” Policemen, swinging nightsticks, and the dogs waded into the

scattering Negroes. (“Police and Dogs” 1961)

Confrontations such as these between protestors and police are, unfortunately, not

entirely uncommon. However, outside of notorious examples and isolated case studies,

there remains limited knowledge about public gatherings in the United States.

Furthermore, despite a variety of theoretical and philosophical work, there has been little

empirical investigation on the interactions between police and protestors who are

intentionally breaking the law, which often a key tactic for demonstrators. The analysis

that follows in the paper seeks to help fill this empirical gap.

Protest events, or performances, tend to be clustered and learned, while also

taking on an improvisational character as people interact to make and receive claims

(Tilly 2006). The clustering of events leads to the formation of social movement

repertoires. While these repertoires can vary from place to place and time to time, on the

whole people make collective claims within the limits of a repertoire established for their

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particular time and place (Tilly 2006). In this paper, I focus on a general repertoire of

protest that can be termed civil disobedience. More specifically, the empirical analysis

that follows explores the state response, in terms of protest policing, to a set of events, or

performances, within civil disobedience characterized by physical intervention.

Relying on detailed information on all protest events covered in the New York

Times between 1960 and 1989, I have isolated three types of protest that fall in the larger

category of civil disobedience: sit-ins, blockades, and building takeovers. Using protest

event activity codes I created groups of events that are pure, in the sense that there is no

overlap between the event types under consideration. While this may not be the case

during street level protests, conceptual clarity is necessary in order to reach conclusions

regarding the ways in which police respond to different types of protest.

Sit-ins, blockades, and building takeovers were picked for a couple of reasons.

First, as will be discussed below, civil disobedience entails a wide range of activities. To

collapse this range into a single variable would not do justice to the variety of protest

activities used during the 30 years under consideration. Second, these three activities

were used in sufficient numbers to allow for subsequent analysis of each specific event

type. In addition, as a comparison group, protest events that utilized marches and rallies

– considered here to be less confrontational protest activities – were also isolated within

the data. While all of the events under consideration fall into a larger realm of nonviolent

action (Sharp 1973), I argue that police respond differently to protestors who are

intentionally breaking the law.

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Thus there are two major aims of this paper. The first is to explore differences in

state response1 to less confrontational events versus events characterized by physical

intervention and the intentional violation of the law. Second, once these differences are

established, I will turn my attention to evaluating what characteristics of civil disobedient

events result in more repressive police response. It is unfortunate that much of what we

know about the use of force at public gatherings is based upon case studies of notorious

confrontations. However, a more systematic evaluation of the variability of police

response across diverse public gatherings is necessary for a more generalized

understanding of how police come to use force and disperse public gatherings (McCarthy

et al. 2007). Analysis presented here will focus on a variety of police behaviors in

response to public protest: presence at the event, police action, police force and use of

arrests. I find, in general, that police are much more likely to respond and take action at

the events characterized by physical intervention. In addition, it appears that police are

sensitive to different aspects of events, in that the predictors of police response vary

across protest types.

The paper proceeds as follows. First, I discuss the protest form commonly called

civil disobedience. I also define and give examples of the three types of civil

disobedience – sit-in, blockade, building takeover – that will become the focus of

empirical analysis. This is followed by a general discussion of protest policing, which

takes two forms. First, I discuss some major styles of policing that have been identified

in relation to public protest. Second, I outline a number of theoretical explanations of

1 Due to the nature of the data (newspaper reports), the focus here is on overt police behavior. This is not

to suggest that this is the only important arena to study policing. As noted by others (Earl et al 2003),

policing also occurs in much less public places and the police also rely on more covert actions such as

surveillance, disinformation campaigns, and the harassment of activist leaders.

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police presence and action at protest events. Based on prior findings regarding protest

policing, I develop a number of testable hypotheses that guide the analysis to come.

After a discussion of the data and methods, I present descriptive statistics on the three

specific forms of civil disobedience, as well as the less confrontational group of protests

(march and rally) to be used for comparison. This is followed by multivariate analysis

investigating the predictors of police response to the types of civil disobedience selected

for analysis.

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Chapter 2. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

Civil disobedience is part of a larger class of protest events involving nonviolent

action. Nonviolent action follows a basic political assumption:

When people refuse their cooperation, withhold their help, and persist in their

disobedience and defiance, they are denying their opponent the basic human

assistance and cooperation which any government or hierarchical system requires.

If they do this in sufficient numbers for long enough, that government or

hierarchical system will no longer have power. (Sharp 1973:64)

Justification for civil disobedience, in general, is “based on a conviction that obedience

would make one an accomplice to an immoral or unjust act or one which is seen to be, in

the last analysis, itself illegal” (Sharp 1973:316).

Unfortunately, most of the literature on civil disobedience has been largely

theoretic and philosophic, thus there does not seem to be a clear and consistent definition

of what constitutes this type of event. It has been noted that a single all-encompassing

definition of what constitutes civil disobedience is difficult, if not outright impossible

(LeGrande 1967). The basic spirit of civil disobedience is that there are times when

citizens have a moral responsibility to disobey “man-made” laws in obedience to

“higher” laws (Sharp 1973). At its most basic level, civil disobedience is deliberately

unlawful protest (Cohen 1971).

While one might be unable to identify an all-encompassing definition of civil

disobedience, certain common features of this type of event can be pieced together from

prior theoretical work: law violation, public action, and nonviolence. The most basic

feature of civil disobedience is deliberate law violation. If one does not break the law,

regardless of how radical or extraordinary the protest is, it cannot be considered

disobedient (Cohen 1971). The violation of the law can be either direct or indirect.

6

Direct action occurs when the civil disobeyer believes that the law is so unjust that as a

matter of conscience it cannot be obeyed (Anon 1968). Indirect action occurs when an

admittedly just law is violated in order to serve a greater good (Anon 1968).

Coupled with the intentional violation of the law, civil disobedients are said to

willingly accept the personal consequences of their action (Fortas 1968). One of the

potential consequences includes the violent response by state actors. However, to have

their best chance of success, it is suggested the nonviolent participants must stick with

their chosen technique, even in the face of a violent and repressive state response (Sharp

1973). Thus, those who choose nonviolence often find themselves in a vulnerable and

precarious position. This is especially true “where nonviolent actionists are few in

number and lack the support of majority opinion” (Sharp 1973:110).

A second core feature of civil disobedience is that the protest must be public.

This aspect goes back to Thoreau‟s original work, as he insisted that society must react to

an instance of civil disobedience (Herngren 1993, Thoreau 1969 [1849]). If the protest is

conducted in private, then there is no possibility for society to react. Only action that is

carried out in the public realm carries the possibility for societal reaction. A final key

aspect of civil disobedience is nonviolence. Most commentators on the subject are in

agreement that conduct which manifests itself in violence or in the substantial invasion of

the rights of others is not civil disobedience (Force 1968, LeGrande 1967, Katz 1985,

Fortas 1968, Herngren 1993, Cohen 1971). In addition, if the once nonviolent protestors

resort to violent action, they become even more exposed and vulnerable to repressive

state response (Sharp 1973).

7

Types of Civil Disobedience

Beyond the general nature of civil disobedience, it is important to move to one

more level of detail and explore different types of civil disobedience. As I will discuss,

there is fair amount of variety in civil disobedience, and this variety could impact the

ways in which authorities interpret and respond to the events. In general, nonviolent

methods tend to fall into one of three classes: nonviolent protest and persuasion,

nonviolent noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention. Protest and persuasion occurs

when the nonviolent group uses symbolic actions intended to help persuade the opponent,

or express the group‟s disapproval and dissent (Sharp 1973). Included in this class are

the two event types, marches and rallies, selected as the reference group. The second

class of nonviolence is noncooperation. This occurs when the nonviolent group acts by

withdrawal or the withholding of social, economic or political cooperation. Finally, the

third class of nonviolent methods is called nonviolent intervention. This occurs when the

protest group acts largely by direct intervention (Sharp 1973). The types of civil

disobedience selected for this study fall into this third class of nonviolent methods.

While important differences exist, the three classes should not be thought of as

mutually exclusive. For example, civil disobedience, as a whole, is most appropriately

placed within political noncooperation (Sharp 1973). However, specific types of civil

disobedience, especially those under consideration here, are more appropriately classified

as physical intervention. This does not appear to be problematic, as in “particular

circumstances one method may more correctly fall into a different category than the one

under which it is [originally] classified” (Shapr 1973:114). Furthermore, it has been

suggested that physical intervention typically includes civil disobedience (Sharp 1973).

8

Physical intervention differs from other types of protest in that the participants

intervene in the situation in some way. This type of action also poses more of a direct

and immediate challenge. If successful, a victory in this class of action is likely to come

quicker than by use of other methods “because the disruptive effects of the intervention

are harder to tolerate or withstand for a considerable period of time” (Sharp 1973:357-8).

However, just as victory may come quicker, repressive state response can also be very

quick and severe. There are a number of types of physical intervention, some of

correspond to the protest types under consideration here.

1. Sit-In

The sit-in is probably the best known type of physical intervention and civil

disobedience. During a sit-in, interventionists occupy certain facilities by sitting on

available chairs or on the floor for a limited or unlimited period, either in a single act or

in a series of acts, with the objective of disrupting the normal pattern of activities (Sharp

1973). The sit-in2 has been used widely in the United States to break down racial

discrimination at restaurants and lunch counters. During the civil rights movement, the

primary participants of sit-in events were white and black college students. According to

Fishman and Solomon (1968), the pattern of crisis in this type of demonstration typically

followed a similar pattern: The students aggressively cross the color line, and then

passively allow the consequences to rest on the cooperation of other like-minded people

and on the decisions of civic authorities in the dominant white majority (363).

2 There are several variations of the sit-in, that depend on the circumstances in which it is used. For

example, a stand-in occurs when actionists remain standing in an orderly manner seeking something that

has been denied to them (Sharp 1973). Or there is the wade-in, in which participants enter a pool or a

beach where their group is typically not allowed.

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For illustrative purposes, some examples from the New York Times help to

understand what sit-ins tended to look like. As noted by others (Sharp 1973; Fishman

and Solomon 1968), sit-ins often involve black and white students, as in this example:

STORRS, Conn., April 23 – After an all-night sit-in, 219 demonstrators, most of

them black and most students, were removed by the state police today from the

Wilbur Cross Library at the University of Connecticut, where they had encamped

to press for a black cultural center on campus, more financial aid for black

students, and other demands…The protesters arrived at the library just before the

midnight closing…and refused to leave, insisting on waiting until [university

president] Mr. Ferguson responded to their demands…The police began leading

them out…and taking them away in campus shuttle buses to Stafford Springs,

where all 219 were eventually booked for criminal trespass. Fifty troopers took

their time, spending two hours getting all the demonstrators out. Many had to be

handcuffed or carried out. (Fellows 1974)

Furthermore, sit-ins often involved the protest of private business segregation policies, as

in the following events that took place in Atlanta and New Orleans, respectively:

ATLANTA, Oct. 19 – Fifty-one demonstrators, including the Rev. Dr. Martin

Luther King Jr., were arrested here today during sit-in protests at downtown

stores. Fourteen Negroes, including Dr. King, refused to post bond and went to

jail. The demonstrators, mostly college students, sought service at lunch counters

in two department stores and eight variety stores…All arrests took place in Rich‟s

department store…The defendants pleaded not guilty to a charge of refusing to

leave private property when requested, based on a statue passed this year…The

arrests at Riche‟s occurred sporadically, mostly in the store‟s largest dining room.

(“14 Negroes Jailed” 1960)

NEW ORLEANS, Sept 9 – Five Negroes, accompanied by two white students, sat

down at a dime store lunch counter on the fringe of the French Quarter today and

six hours later the police arrested them. After the Negroes and the white students

had sat from morning until mid-afternoon without being served, the police

arrested them under a new state statute designed to prevent such demonstrations.

All seven demonstrators were members of the Congress of Racial Equality.

(“New Orleans Seizes 7” 1960)

2. Blockade

The second type of civil disobedience under consideration here is the blockade.

The blockade can best be understood by considering a few types of physical intervention.

First, the nonviolent interjection involves placing one‟s body between a person and the

10

objective of his work or activity (Sharp 1973). According to Sharp, the aim of nonviolent

interjection is to persuade or otherwise “induce the persons being impeded that they

should desist from the activity which the actionists regard as immoral or illegitimate, or

at least that they activity should not be continued at the price of imposing human

suffering on the people who have intervened to bring it to a halt” (1973:382). A related

protest type is the nonviolent obstruction. This is similar to the nonviolent interjection,

except that the human bodies are used not only for psychological intervention, but as a

physical obstruction. Such blocking occurs when the obstruction is undertaken by very

large numbers or when the obstructers are so placed that the activities cannot proceed

(Sharp 1973).

The following example from the New York Times portrays a blockade used as a

means of physical obstruction:

A thousand demonstrators protesting the renewed bombing of North Vietnam

poured into Times Square last night and disrupted traffic intermittently for nearly

two hours. Mounted policemen several times rode into the crowd, and foot

patrolmen struggled to keep the roadways clear as the protesters blocked traffic on

43rd

Street and Broadway. Fifteen persons were arrested. Organized by the

Vietnam Peace Parade Committee, a coalition of antiwar groups, most of the

demonstrators were finally jammed onto an island in mid-Broadway…adjacent to

a military recruiting station. (“Traffic Disrupted” 1972)

In addition, as the nonviolent interjection suggests, blockades can also be used to keep

someone from the objective of his or her work, as in this instance from 1969:

PRINCETON, N.J., April 23 – A band of 75 members of Students for a

Democratic Society at Princeton University blockaded the entrance to the

headquarters here of the Institute for Defense Analyses early this morning with

partial success…Shortly after, when the research staff members and other persons

employed in the institute walked up to the front steps and attempted to enter the

building, the S.D.S. youths closed their ranks and said they would let not one

pass. Several of the younger male employees of the institute barged into the

S.D.S. blockage. There was some shoving and scrambling and muttering but no

blows appeared to have been struck. Three carloads of Princeton municipal

11

police watched and waited to be called into action. No complaints were made by

the institute employees and the police remained immobile. (Johnston 1969)

3. Building Takeover

The final type of civil disobedience under consideration is the building takeover.

Again, this event falls under physical intervention in a couple of ways. First, in the

nonviolent raid, volunteers go to certain designated key points of symbolic or strategic

importance and demand possession (Sharp 1973). However, the nonviolent raid is not

necessarily conducted with the intent of gaining possession. Rather, it is intended more

as “a challenge to authority, a symbolic defiance of the established regime, and as a

means of bringing into use some of the psychological mechanisms associated with self

suffering” (Sharp 1973:380-1). A similar strategy is the nonviolent invasion, in which a

group of volunteers deliberately and openly enter a forbidden area to demonstrate their

refusal to recognize the controlling agency‟s control over the area or use it for a particular

purpose (Sharp 1973). Both the nonviolent raid and the nonviolent invasion entail,

according to Sharp (1973), civil disobedience and the risk of severe repression.

As with the other event types, some examples are helpful to understand what

building takeovers typically involve:

ITHACA, N.Y., April 19 – About 100 black students at Cornell University staged

a surprise raid on the student union building…They ran through the halls,

shouting “Fire!” and pounding on doors, and ousted 30 sleeping parents from

guest rooms. The invaders ordered the parents, and about 40 university

employees, to leave the building. Then they seized it, chaining the doors shut…A

group of about 15 white students, led by members of the Delta Upsilon fraternity,

attempted a counter-invasion at 10 A.M. They smashed a side window of the

building, scrambled inside, and got into a fists-flying encounter with the blacks.

Four students…where hurt in the fighting. At length, about 10 campus policemen

separated the whites and the blacks. The seizure came after months of tension

here over the university‟s attempts to discipline six black students involved in

demonstrations last December. Steven Muller, vice president for public affairs,

said the committee had decided that there would be no police action against the

students occupying the building. (Kifner 1969)

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PHILADELPHIA, Dec. 27 – Twenty-five antiwar demonstrators occupied the

Betsy Ross House here for an hour today in protest against continuation of the

war in Vietnam. All were arrested…The demonstrators, 23 men and two women,

most of them members of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, entered the

building at 11:15 A.M. and closed shutters on windows, tied doors with ropes and

jammed toothbrushes in handles to secure the doors from the inside…[P]olicemen

from the civil disobedience unit broke into the building shortly after noon and

removed all 25 protestors to the main police headquarters. (“25 War Protestors”

1971).

Comparison Group

In order to better understand the nature of police response to civil disobedience, a

comparison group of events, composed of marches and rallies, is also analyzed. Both of

these event types fit into the method of nonviolence termed protest and persuasion.

During a march, a group of people walk in an organized manner to a particular place;

with the target often having some sort of intrinsic significance to the issue involved

(Sharp 1973). A rally, which can also be thought of as an assembly of protest or support,

involves the public assembly of a group of people at an appropriate and agreed upon

point. Again, the target is typically related to the issue at hand (Sharp 1973).

As is evident in examples presented from the New York Times, there are a host of

outcomes that can stem from a public protest. Arrests were made at the sit-in that took

place at the University of Connecticut and the blockade in New York City. On the other

hand, while both the Cornell building takeover and the blockade and the Princeton

blockade involved some sort of physical confrontation, there were no arrests at either of

these events. Why were all 219 sit-in protestors booked at a police station while no

police action was taken against either the blacks or whites involved in “fists-flying

encounter” at Cornell? Answering this question requires a discussion of that nature of

protest policing.

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Chapter 3. PROTEST POLICING

The analysis that follows contributes to a growing body of literature on protest

policing (see della Porta, Peterson and Reiter 2006; della Porta and Reiter 1998). Protest

policing is one specific aspect of the state response to political dissent, and can be

broadly defined as the police handling of protest events (della Porta and Reiter 1998).

This is a deliberately neutral description for what is commonly referred to by protestors

as “repression” and by the state as “law and order” (della Porta and Reiter 1998).

However, it becomes a useful definition for the present purposes, as the systematic

analysis that follows deals with a variety of police responses to protest. Thus, I am not

only interested in why police respond with force, but also what makes them respond in

the first place.

The study of police response to protest is important, as della Porta (1995) has

noted, because we cannot understand protest repertoires and their evolution without

understanding the interaction between protestors and the police. Much recent research on

the relationship between repression and protest focuses on how repression affects

subsequent protest (Churchill 1994; Fantasia 1988; Hirsch 1990; Khawaja 1993;

Koopmans 1995; Kriesi et al. 1995; Lichbach 1987; McAdam 1982, 1988; Piven and

Cloward 1977). While this line of research adds to scholarship on the effects of

repression, it does little to tell us when and to what extent police repression of protest will

occur (Earl et al. 2003). Fewer studies consider these issues, even though questions of

when police repression will occur come logically prior to questions about the effects of

repression (Earl et al. 2003). However, there are two emerging strands of research that

cast actions by the police as the dependent variable, thereby attempting to explain

14

variation in repression either over time or across groups or countries. One approach

traces changes in police response over time in terms of policing styles. A second line of

research has examined which protest events or movements are more likely to face police

repression at a given time and across time.

Policing Styles

In modern democratic societies, the policing of protest events requires a difficult

balance between the protection of legal order on one hand and individual freedom on the

other. To this end, McPhail and colleagues (1998) identified five key dimensions3 of

protest policing.

These dimensions are (1) the extent of police concerns with the First Amendment

rights of protesters, and police obligations to respect and protect those rights; (2)

the extent of police tolerance for community disruption; (3) the nature of

communication between police and demonstrators; (4) the extent and manner of

arrests as a method of managing demonstrators; (5) the extent and manner of

using force in lieu of or in conjunction with arrests in order to control

demonstrators. (McPhail et al 1998:51, emphasis in original)

Based on these five dimensions of protest policing, the authors identify two distinct styles

of policing based on striking differences between U.S. protest policing practices in the

1960s (escalated force) and those in the 1980s and 1990s (negotiated management).

1. Escalated Force

For most of the twentieth century, police in the U.S. held an extremely negative

view of protestors and showed little tolerance for the community disruption associated

with political demonstrations (Noakes and Gillham 2006). During the protest wave of the

1960s, police often over-enforced the law as a means of harassing protestors and only

rarely communicated with protestors prior to demonstrations (Noakes and Gillham 2006).

3 The authors deliberately use the term “dimensions of protest policing” because each is a continuum along

which can be placed the policing practices of any particular policy agency regarding any particular

demonstration (McPhail et al 1998:51).

15

There was a general emphasis on using escalating levels of force until demonstration

ceased. This was justified by police as “upholding their sworn responsibilities to

maintain law and order by protecting property and person of protest targets” (McPhail

and McCarthy 2005:4). Civil disobedience was often equated with anarchy during this

period of protest policing (McPhail et al 1998).

In terms of the five dimensions of protest policing, First Amendment rights were

either ignored or disregarded for demonstrators during this period (McPhail and

McCarthy 2005). The right to protest was often denied and permits were not issued to

protestors (McPhail et al 1998). In addition, only those familiar and “comfortable” forms

of protest were tolerated (McPhail et al 1998). Furthermore, this period of policing was

characterized by minimal and problematic communication between police and protestors

(McPhail et al 1998). Arrests were often made quickly and forcefully during escalated

force policing (McCarthy and McPhail 1998). In addition, arrests were often used

strategically to target and remove “agitators” in a particular demonstration (McPhail et al

1998). Finally, as suggested, the use of force was considered the standard way of dealing

with demonstrators, and force was often used in lieu of arrests (McPhail et al 1998).

However, following the 1960s wave of protest, the escalated force approach was

causing considerable problems for police on and off the job. On the job, police began to

question the effectiveness of escalated force tactics (Noakes and Gillham 2006). In

addition, the use of force by police often became the focal point of protestor frustrations,

which escalated the risk for police and increased the extent of community disruption

caused by the protests (Noakes and Gillham 2006). Off the job, escalated force policing

was also coming under fire. The public image of the police can be severely damaged

16

when the media picks up on civilian injuries and death (McPhail and McCarthy 2005).

Furthermore, questions were being raised about the legality of escalated force procedures,

with critics connecting repressive police action with violence in America (Noakes and

Gillham 2006).

2. Negotiated Management

In response to growing violence at demonstrations during the era of escalated

force, a new doctrine termed negotiated management emerged based on greater

cooperation between police and demonstrators, as well as a general effort to avoid

violence (Vitale 2005; della Porta and Reiter 1998). Police responded to the increasing

legitimacy of once unconventional forms of protest with more tolerance. Even the once

anarchist, and still formally unlawful, civil disobedient protest form was greeted with

increased tolerance (McPhail et al. 1998).

In contrast to escalated force, the period of negotiated management saw the First

Amendment rights of protestors protected in equal importance to protecting property

(McPhail et al 1998). In addition, under the negotiated management style, an “acceptable

level of disruption” was seen by police as an inevitable by-product of demonstrator

efforts (McPhail et al 1998). The new emphasis on protecting First Amendment rights

while keeping disruption to acceptable levels required changes in protest policing tactics.

Probably the largest change occurred in terms of communication between police

and protestors. Under the negotiated management style, police believed that

communication with demonstrators was necessary if they were to successfully protect

First Amendment rights of protestors while keeping disruption under control (McPhail et

al 1998). Improvements in communication were largely accomplished through the legal

17

requirement that protest organizers give notice of their intent to demonstrate or obtain a

permit to protest. During this permit application process, “an opportunity [was] created,

if not required, for contact, interaction, and negotiation between police and protest

organizers regarding the purpose, the time, place, and manner of protest” (McPhail and

McCarthy 2005:5).

In addition to changes in the level of communication between police and

protestors, the negotiated management approach also brought about changes in the use of

arrests and force by police. Arrests began to be used only as a last resort. Arrests were

also to be used selectively, only against those who violated the law (McPhail et al. 1998).

Even among civil disobedient protesters – who by their very nature break the law – police

began to repeatedly inform the protestors they were breaking the law and gave them

every opportunity to desist (McPhail et al. 1998). In a similar fashion, force was only

used as a last resort, and only the most minimal amount of force was to be employed

(McPhail et al. 1998).

Demonstrations in which police used negotiated management tactics, according to

McPhail and colleagues (1998), were generally not as memorable as those in which

escalated force tactics were used because they were relatively uneventful. Indeed, the

period of negotiated management signaled a larger institutionalization of protest in the

United States4. The police began to seek cooperation from protestors by offering to

4 Some researchers have suggested that some new policing styles have emerged in recent years. For

example, Noakes and Gillham (2006) outline a strategic incapacitation approach. The central components

of this approach include: (1) police control of where protests are allowed to occur; (2) routine disruption of

safe spaces by police; (3) increased reliance on less-lethal weapons; (4) use of technological innovation;

and (5) use of arrests strategically to force protestors to alter their strategies. In addition, Vitale (2005) has

suggested an emerging “command and control” approach. The five general elements to this approach

include (1) aversion to disruption, (2) controlled access, (3) divide and conquer, (4) shock and awe, and (5)

zero tolerance. However, as these types of policing are said to emerge after 1990s, they will not be the

focus of this paper, which focuses on events between 1960 and 1989.

18

facilitate demonstrations (Waddington 1998) and began to cast protestors as citizens

attempting to exercise a constitutional right, rather than opponents of the state (Noakes

and Gillham 2006). At the same time, the percentage of events using outside tactics

(rallies demonstrations, marches, civil disobedience) decreased while the use of insider

tactics (lawsuits, press conferences, lobbying) increased (Soule and Earl 2005).

One feature of the increasing institutionalization of protest has been the

development of public order management systems (POMS). POMS can roughly be

described as institutionalized solutions to the recurring problem of protests that threaten

the domestic tranquility that police are responsible to maintain (McCarthy and McPhail

1998). POMS consist of (1) civilian and/or military police organizations, (2) the public

order policies of these organizations, (3) these organizations‟ programs for recruiting and

training personnel to enact these policies, (4) the actual practices of these policing

personnel, and (5) the technology and equipment used while carrying out these practices

(McPhail et al. 1998:64). However, one impact of the increasing institutionalized, and

therefore routinized, interactions between police and protestors has been a diminishing

impact of protest (McCarthy and McPhail 1998).

Theoretical Explanations of Police Repression

The police styles outline above portray what could be considered ideal types of

policing. However, the nature of real world policing most likely differs from these ideal

types. A second line of research that treats police repression as the dependent variable

examines which protests events or movements are more likely to face police repression at

a given time and/or over time (Earl et al. 2003). I will discuss three theories that are

applicable to the present study. These perspectives share the common assumption that

19

“police actions toward protest vary and that scholars must seek to understand the mix of

factors that affect the likelihood of different police action at different protest events”

(Earl et al. 2003:583).

1. Threat Approach

A number of scholars have suggested that a “threat” model is the dominant

approach to studying police response to protest events (Davenport 2000). Domestic

threat can be considered challenges made to existing authorities in the form of political

dissent or structural change of different types (Davenport 2000). Repression, on the other

hand, includes those tactics taken by authorities that result in the restriction of violations

of various political and civil liberties (Davenport 2000). According to the threat

approach, the larger the threat to political elites the greater and more severe should be the

expected repression (Earl et al. 2003). This approach suggests that authorities respond

proportionately to the threat that protests represent (McCarthy, Martin, McPhail 2007).

Research on the “threat” approach has received fairly strong support, especially in

the arena of protestor tactics. Davenport (2000) suggests that some tactics convey a

different degree of antagonism to political authorities. Thus, as long as behavior is taking

place within institutionalized mechanisms controlled by the government, there is a low

likelihood that it will be seen as threatening. Behavior that occurs outside of the realm of

government control, on the other hand, is more likely viewed as threatening (Davenport

2000). For example, the use of non-institutional and confrontational tactics, and the use

of multiple goals and targets has been found to be positively related to repressive police

responses (McAdam 1982). Furthermore, groups that pursue revolutionary or radical

20

goals tend to be repressed more strongly than more moderate groups (McAdam 1982;

Bromley and Shupe 1983).

Another aspect of protest events that has received empirical attention is protest

size. Larger numbers of mobilized individuals require more effort on the part of the state

in order to reestablish order or control (Davenport 2000). In addition, research has shown

that the increased size of a protest event is a strong predictor of both the likelihood that

police will show up and that they will use force to control civilians (Davenport 2000; Earl

et al. 2003; McCarthy et al. 2007).

Not only may police respond to potentially threatening protest events with

repression, but the interactions between individual protestors and state officials can also

lead to repressive police action. Work on demeanor and the police use of force (Garner,

Maxwell, and Heraux 2002) has distinguished two dimensions of disrespectful behavior:

disrespectful demeanor toward an officer and the use of physical force against an officer.

The display of either of these behaviors towards an officer has been found to increase the

likelihood that an officer will arrest and/or use force upon a suspect (Garner et al. 2002).

2. Weakness Approach

The weakness approach was first introduced by Gamson (1990), who suggested

that repression could be dangerous for power holders because they risk public ridicule if

repression attempts fail. Since states risk public embarrassment for failed repressive

attempts, they should have an interest in publicly repressing only insurgents who they

think they can defeat (Earl et al. 2003; Earl and Soule 2006). However, the weakness

approach was originally articulated in terms of protest movements, not particular events

21

(Gamson 1990). Recently, scholars have expanded this perspective to suggest how

weakness of a given protest event might be assessed, and reacted to, by authorities.

The “weakness-from-within” approach “highlights the relative (in)ability of

protesters to react to undue or severe uses of repressive force” (Earl et al. 2003:584).

According to this perspective, protest events composed of participants that lack

substantial access to government officials are “weaker” than those composed of

participants who have more regular access to government officials (Earl and Soule 2006).

This is so for two reasons. First, the lack of access and representation for “weak” groups

is expected to lower the costs of repression (Earl and Soule 2006). Second, “weak”

protestors, it is expected, will have fewer routes for redress in the wake of repressive

action, due to their overall lack of access5.

Strong movements or protest events should be able to react with ease to repressive

action, while weak movements or events would be expected to lack such a capacity.

Existing literature has identified a number of groups that would be considered “weak.”

For example, protests events that are composed of racial, ethnic, or religious minorities

and the poor (Piven and Cloward 1977) are perceived as being less able to resist

repression by the police (Earl et al. 2003). In addition, “resources and organizational

capacity could contribute to the relative ability of protesters to discourage and/or react to

repression” (Earl and Soule 2006:146). Thus, drawing on the resource mobilization

perspective (Earl et al. 2003), events with no social movement organization (SMO)

5 A “weakness-from-without” approach has also been developed, which calls attention to the willingness of

outside audiences to monitor and react to repression (Earl et al. 2003). According to this approach, weaker

protestors are said to hope that influential elites will monitor repression and contest overzealous repressive

action on their behalf (Earl and Soule 2006). To this end, an inverse relationship has been found between

level of media coverage and repression. However, as this view of weakness is contingent on media

coverage, it will not be addressed by the analysis of this paper. I only have data on covered protest events,

thus there is no way to compare those events that got covered with the larger population of all events during

a particular time period.

22

representation would be viewed as “weak” in the eyes of state actors. SMOs represent an

organizational vehicle available for pursuing repression-related grievances (Earl et al.

2003).

3. Interaction of Threat and Weakness

The above discussion should not imply that “threat” and “weakness” need to be

competing explanations of state repression, as it has also been suggested that severe

repression is more likely when a movement or protest event is both highly threatening

and composed primarily of “weak” groups (Earl et al. 2003). An interactive approach

differs from the previous two in that it “suggests that there is an interaction between

threat and weakness, which requires researchers to move beyond simply considering the

additive effects of threat and weakness” (Earl et al. 2003:584).

Earl and colleagues (2003) give the hypothetical example of a protest by poor

minorities (which would be considered weak according to the “weakness-from-within”

approach) who advocate Communism and use confrontational tactics (which would be

considered threatening). In this example, the goals of the protest are threatening, while

the protesters themselves are weak. There is some evidence of a relationship between

threat and weakness. For example, the premise behind the Freedom Summer campaign

was that it would be safer for affluent whites rather than blacks to engage in threatening

protest activities in Mississippi (McAdam 1988). A further example comes from the

study of the highly threatening HIV/AIDS movement, where Stockdill (1996) found that

protests predominately attended by people of color (who would be considered weak)

were frequently repressed.

23

In fact, this scenario is especially applicable to the events under consideration in

this paper. It has been noted that pioneering black sit-in participants, weak in the sense

considered here, popularized the extremely threatening tactic of the sit-in (Earl et al.

2003). In the analysis that follows, I restrict models to explore state response to the

specific protest types of interest. This will allow me to explore how threat and weakness

are related. Among the threatening and confrontational tactics – sit-ins, blockades, and

building takeovers – I will be able to explore if measures of weakness are significantly

related to repressive action. This answers the call of Earl and colleagues who noted that

“analytically separating these elements in an analysis can contribute to our understanding

of protest policing by helping to determine the relative importance of threat and weakness

to police response” (Earl et al. 2003:584).

While the articulation of policing styles and the theoretical development of protest

policing models6 has renewed interest in police repression, there remain problems in this

area of research. First, most research on repression of public protest makes few

distinctions among different types of police action (Earl et al. 2003). Thus, police

presence at an event is often taken as being indicative of police repression. A second,

and related problem, is that little research has examined why some protests draw extreme

responses from police, while other protests go seemingly unnoticed (Earl et al. 2003).

Finally, few researchers have tested competing explanations of variations in police

response, focusing instead on one or two central hypotheses (Earl et al. 2003).

6 Recently, a police-centered approach to protest policing has emerged, termed the “blue” approach. This

approach contains two primary elements. The first is institutional features of policing. In police agencies,

there is an emphasis on control and how control can be achieved and maintained (Earl and Soule 2006).

The second element is organizational variations between police agencies, including staffing levels and

professionalism (Earl and Soule 2006). Preliminary evidence suggests that the construction of threat in

police agencies is important for understand police response at protest events. However, with no

information on police agencies in the data set, I am unable to address this approach.

24

This paper seeks to help address these issues. First, the nature of the data allows

for a range of police responses to be studied simultaneously. Thus, not only will analysis

predict whether or not police are present at an event, but also what factors lead police to

move beyond presence and take some sort of action. In addition, the size of the data set

(N= 19,817), allows for the analysis of events that drew extreme police response

alongside those where police were not even present. Finally, sufficient information is

gathered on each protest event to allow for the testing of several competing hypotheses,

to which I now turn my attention.

25

Chapter 4. THE CURRENT STUDY

Hypotheses

In this section, I develop and discuss a number of hypotheses that will be tested

with the analysis that follows. The hypotheses stem from a combination of the nature of

the events under consideration, as well as prior research on protest policing. There is one

hypothesis that concerns the differences in how police are expected to respond to civil

disobedient protest events compared to events that are inherently less confrontational.

This is followed by a number of hypotheses that seek to test established findings from

protest policing literature on the repertoire of civil disobedience identified here. These

secondary hypotheses are useful in that they allow me to explore the characteristics that

police respond to across protest types.

I expect police to respond more severely to civil disobedient events than those

that are less confrontational for a couple of reasons. First, the threat approach to protest

policing suggests that events that utilize confrontational tactics are more likely to face a

repressive state response (Davenport 2000). Sit-ins, blockades and building takeovers,

which are characterized by physical intervention, are all inherently confrontational.

Second, Sharp‟s (1973) work on nonviolent action suggests that the methods of

nonviolent intervention, which often include civil disobedience, might be more likely to

experience repressive action by the police. For one, nonviolent action is designed to

operate against opponents who are able and willing to use violence. In addition, the

methods of nonviolent physical intervention pose an immediate and direct challenge,

which Sharp (1973:358) suggests could result in more severe repression. The effects of

26

methods of intervention are more difficult to tolerate or withstand for an extended period

of time, which could result in a quicker and more severe state response7.

H1: Compared to more inherently less confrontational protest forms, events

that utilize sit-ins, blockades, or building takeovers will be significantly

more likely to have police present and have police take action.

After the differences between civil disobedient and less confrontational protest

forms are established, I will then test a number of secondary hypotheses. This group of

hypotheses is largely concerned with the ways that police respond to characteristics that

vary across protest events and protestors. In addition, these expectations also test

established findings of protest policing outlined above to see if they also predict police

response to civil disobedient events characterized by physical intervention. First of all, it

has been found, in support of the threat approach, that protest size is a significant

predictor of state response. This general finding leads to a second hypothesis:

H2: Larger protest events will face a stronger state response compared to

smaller events.

The threat approach also suggests that there might be differences in police response based

on the target of the protest. The target of an event is typically related to the claim the

protestors are attempting to articulate. However, the amount of disruption should vary

based on the characteristics of the target. Some events target buildings or institutions that

are more public and threatening to day-to-day activities of public elites. This should be

the case for events that target government facilities or private businesses. Furthermore,

state targets have a higher repressive capacity, through its monopoly on the legitimate use

7 At the same time, Sharp also suggests that methods of physical intervention could result in a speedier

victory for protestors because of the disruption caused by these tactics. For example, “a sit-in at a lunch

counter disrupts more immediately and completely than would, say, picketing or a consumers‟ boycott,

though the objective of each of these actions be to end racial discrimination” (Sharp 1973:358). However,

as I am unable to measure successful protests, I rely on the more measureable area of police repression.

27

of violence, than other targets (Walker, Martin, and McCarthy, forthcoming). On the

other hand, protests that target educational institutions, especially universities, might be

less disruptive and less likely to become disorderly or unlawful (McCarthy et al. 2007).

This leads to the following expectation:

H3: Protest events that have as their primary target government facilities or

private businesses will face a stronger police response than events

targeting educational institutions.

The weakness approach, on the other hand, suggests that characteristics of the

protestors themselves should be related to police response. Existing research has found

that events composed of racial or ethnic minorities are perceived as less able to resist

police repression (Earl et al. 2003). In addition, there is a long history of racial prejudice

and discrimination towards ethnic minorities in this country. In particular, African-

Americans in this country have been subject to criminal mistreatment that stems largely

from slavery (Selling 1976; Hagan and Peterson 1995). Thus, the „weakness-from-

within‟ approach suggests the following hypothesis:

H4: Protest events that are initiated by blacks will be more likely to experience

police repression than events initiated by other groups.

The weakness approach also calls attention to the presence of social movement

organizations. SMOs represent organizational vehicles that are capable of pursuing

repression-related grievances. Events without a SMO present might be considered

“weak” in the eyes of state actors, leading to the following hypothesis:

H5: Events without a social movement organization (SMO) present will be

more likely to face repressive police action.

Hypotheses 4 and 5 will also allow me to explore some interactions between

threat and weakness. As noted, the second part of the analysis presented here focuses on

28

police response to the different types of civil disobedience. Thus the samples of events in

these models are all inherently threatening. Each event is coded for the presence of

certain characteristics or participants that would be considered, from the protest policing

standpoint, to be weak. Thus, I can compare if police respond differently to weak

elements of civil disobedient events differently than less confrontational ones.

In addition, the data allow me to partially test the existence of the ideal type

policing models – escalated force and negotiated management – discussed above. These

models of policing suggest that events in the 1960s and 1970s were policed much

differently than those that occurred in the 1980s. During the earlier waves of protest,

police held a generally negative view of protestors and showed little tolerance for the

community disruption associated with protest activity (Noakes and Gillham 2006). This

leads to a hypothesis regarding the decade in which the protest occurred:

H6: Protest events in the 1960s and 1970s will be more likely to have police

present and take action than events in the 1980s.

Two final hypotheses concern protester action at demonstrations8. If once

nonviolent protestors resort to violent action, they may become exposed and vulnerable

to repressive police action. Thus, two hypotheses will be tested in regards to protester

action.

H7: Protestor property damage will result in more repressive police response.

H8: Protestor violence will result in more repressive police response.

Data and Methods

The preceding hypotheses will be tested using information gathered on protest

events covered in the New York Times from the period of 1960 to 1989. A team of coders

8 I keep these actions separate from the threat approach, as there is a fair amount of debate of what these

actions actually represent to elites. It could be argued that police would respond to the illegality of violence

and property damage rather than to the threat of these activities (see discussion in Earl and Soule 2006).

29

utilized the New York Times Historical Digital Archive to identify the population of

protest events. Following Soule and Earl (2005), for a particular event to be included, it

had to meet three basic criteria. First, as the interest lies in collective action, there must

be more than one participant at the event. The second criterion for inclusion is that there

must be articulation of a claim9. Finally, the event must have happened in the public

sphere or have been open to the public to be included. This final criterion is especially

relevant to civil disobedience, as public action is a key component of this type of event.

The sample includes both “insider” and “outsider” tactics. Insider tactics involve

such activities as petitions, letter-writing campaigns and lawsuits. Outsider tactics, on the

other hand, include activities such as protest, demonstrations, civil disobedience, and

violence (Soule and Earl 2005). The primary focus of the analysis, then, will be on

outsider tactics, although the entire sample of events is used in the first part of the

analysis. In addition, a benefit of the dataset is that events are coded that are associated

with any claim or issue area (Walker et al., forthcoming). Thus, the data cuts across

movement boundaries. Finally, as the New York Times is a national newspaper, the

protest events in the data set occurred all over the U.S.

The original sample included information on 21,185 protest events covered from

1960 to 1990. However, some restrictions were placed on the data which decreased the

total sample size. First, any events reported to take place in 1990 or before 1960 were

removed, to allow for three full decades of information. This was done to provide a more

accurate test of the policing styles discussed earlier, which are said to vary over time

based loosely on the decade the event occurred. In addition, an equal number of years in

9 It should be noted that protestor target was not decomposed beyond the identification of the target(s).

Thus, it could involve “a grievance against some target or an expression of support of some target” (Soule

and Earl 2005:348).

30

each decade allows for comparisons to be made across decades. There were 18 events

that took place before 1960 and 465 that took place in 1990. Furthermore, events where a

protest year could not be identified were also removed from analysis. A very small

number of events were excluded for this reason. There were four sit-ins, two building

takeovers, one march, and 13 rallies that were deleted because an event year could not be

identified. There were no blockades that were missing event year information. Finally,

an additional 352 events that were initiated by institutionalized persons were removed

from analysis. This group of events is largely composed of protests by prison and jail

inmates. These events were removed because protests initiated by persons under state

control do not fit into the nature of public protest.

Selection Bias

One potential issue with the use of the New York Times is the differential selection

of events for news coverage. Newspaper coverage, especially the New York Times, is the

most widely used form of data used by social movement scholars ( Earl et al. 2004)

because it can be followed forward in time and provides the most complete account of

events for the widest geographic range (Olzak 1989). As such, there has emerged an

extensive literature that has attempted to uncover potential biases of this type of data (see

Earl et al. 2004). Bias is a particularly relevant issue for newspaper data because the

news media are not neutral unselective recorders of events (Oliver and Maney 2000).

Quite to the contrary, as Oliver and Maney (2000) point out, “the news media are part of

politics and part of protest, the three of them inextricably intertwined in ongoing events”

(464).

31

Media analysts have outlined a number of explanations for how story selections

are made from the vast amount of available information to fill a limited “newshole”

(McCarthy, McPhail and Smith 1996). One mechanism of selection bias is news

gathering routines. This mechanism includes the assignment of reporters to specific

locations, the reliance on “credible” official sources, deadlines, staffing, and the flow of

information (Kielbowitz and Scherer 1986; McCarthy et al. 1996). A second mechanism

of selection involves the search for newsworthy “pegs.” Events that are notorious

(famous faces or trendy actions), consequential (powerful actors), extraordinary (unusual

in terms of size or actions), or culturally relevant (widely familiar actors or actions) tend

to be considered “good news pegs” (McCarthy et al. 1996:480). Furthermore, as U.S.

news media is a profit-making institution, it has been argued that newspapers can be

expected to select and shape news events in ways that do not threaten their own or their

sponsor‟s interests (Gamson et al. 1992). A final selection mechanism is the media issue

attention cycle, which refers to the “sudden ascendance of an issue from previous

obscurity to a sustained prominence that dominates the news for a period of time before

once again fading from media attention” (McCarthy et al. 1996:481).

A number of factors have to found to lead to increased newspaper coverage.

McCarthy and colleagues (1996) found that, with few minor exceptions, the most

significant correlates of newspaper coverage are demonstration size and purpose, in terms

of where the events fit in with the current media attention cycle. In addition, events that

are located closer to the media source are more likely to be covered (McCarthy et al.

1996; Meyers and Caniglia 2004). The involvement of political and culture elites as well

as formalized social movement organizations also lead to increased coverage (Ortiz et al.

32

2005; Oliver and Maney 2000). Finally, a greater degree of dramatic conflict is related to

increased media coverage (Oliver and Meyers 1999).

Despite potential selection issues, the use of newspaper reports as a data source

has a long tradition in the social movement literature (see list in Earl et al. 2003). The

use of newspaper data has been justified in a couple different ways. For one, to the

extent that bias exists, national media sources, such as the New York Times, are likely to

have a fair amount of stability in that bias over time; especially compared to local media

sources (Walker et al., forthcoming). However, the stability of coverage remains a

concern, especially as the analysis is focused on specific types of events. This point will

be addressed further in the conclusion. Furthermore, as Davenport (2001) notes,

mainstream and moderate news sources are generally more attentive to state authorities

and their representative agents than are radical and alternative news sources. In addition,

the nature of the civil disobedient events under consideration should make them more

likely to receive media coverage. Civil disobedience is inherently dramatic, radical, and

carries a high degree of conflict. These characteristics have been found to be positive

correlates of media coverage.

Independent Variables: Event Types

In the three sections that follow, I describe the independent, dependent, and

control variables that are used in the analysis that follows. Table 1 displays information

for all variables used for empirical analysis. Percentages are given for the total sample,

as well as broken down for each specific event type, which will be discussed following

the outline of the relevant variables.

33

The independent variables used for analysis are the types of civil disobedience

characterized by physical intervention identified earlier. In addition, a reference category

was created that included those events that were identified as including either marches or

rallies. Events identified in the New York Times were classified in two ways: by event

form and by event activity (lists of forms and activities can be found in Appendix A).

Coders could select up to four forms and four activities for each event. This coding

scheme has the advantage of modeling the complexity inherent in many protest events.

For example, 3412 of the total events included two event forms, 507 included three, and

80 included four different forms. Furthermore, 7100 events were coded as having two

activities, 2575 included three activities, and an additional 887 included four activities.

Due to the complexity of protest events (multiple forms and activities) some

recoding was done to create event categories that were „pure.‟ This allows me to explore

the police response to a particular event activity on its own. At first, the activity codes

were recoded so that any mention of the event of interest in the four codes was taken to

indicate the presence of that event type. Thus, the presence of a sit-in on any of the four

activity codes would lead to that event being coded as a sit-in. Based on this coding

approach, there were 1125 sit-ins, 838 blockades, and 507 building takeovers identified

during the study period. This strategy, however, led to a fair amount of overlap between

the event types. For example, over 15-percent of the building takeovers were also

classified as sit-ins. The overlap was particularly problematic for the reference category.

Approximately 20-percent of the sit-ins, 40-percent of the blockades, and 25-percent of

the building takeovers were also coded as involving either a march or rally.

34

Thus, to supplement the efforts as conceptual exclusivity outlined earlier in the

paper, efforts were taken to make the event types mutually exclusive. In order to achieve

„pure‟ event categories, the data was further restricted so that only those events coded as

belonging to a particular category were included on the variable. For example, any sit-in

that also included the activity of the other events under consideration (blockade, building

takeover, march/rally) was excluded from the analysis. This strategy was applied to all of

the events of interest. This coding strategy resulted in mutually exclusive groups of sit-

ins (N = 816), blockades (N = 454), building takeovers (N = 300), and marches/rallies (N

= 5031).

It should be noted that one of the possible event forms coders could choose was

civil disobedience (identified for 3142 events across the four forms, and 2412 as the

primary form). However, rather than using this single indicator of civil disobedience, I

chose to utilize the event activity codes, as these provide more detailed information on

each protest event, and also allow me to analyze a range of civilly disobedient event

types. In addition, sit-ins, blockades, and building takeovers are usually associated with

civil disobedience (Sharp 1973). In fact, of the 816 sit-ins, 715 (87.6%) were coded as

civil disobedience, and there was a strong correlation between these measures (r = 0.408,

p ≤.001). In addition, 344 (75.8%) blockades and 242 building takeovers (80.7%) were

coded as civil disobedience. There were also significant correlations between the civil

disobedience measure and these event types (blockade: r = 0.251, p ≤ .001; building

takeover: r = 0.219, p ≤ .001). However, the civil disobedience form measure is not

without analytic possibilities, and I come back to this point in the discussion.

35

Dependent Variables: State Response

As noted earlier, one limitation of existing protest policing research is that state

response is typically captured by a single variable (Earl et al. 2003). This research aims

to improve on existing research by studying a range of police responses identified in the

coding procedure. Events in the New York Times were coded for five measures of police

response: presence at the event, action, physical force, violence, and use of arrests. These

police response variables form the dependent variables for the current study. First is

mere police presence, dummy coded 1 to indicate police were present at the event.

Events were then coded if police were reported to have taken action, again dummy coded

as 1. The third police response variable was physical force. If police were reported in

the article to have used physical force, the variable was coded as 1. In addition to

physical force, protest events were also coded for the presence of police violence. If

police were reported to use equipment on demonstrators, such as guns or tear gas, then

this variable was coded as 1. The final dependent variable, use of arrests, was created

using the actual and estimated number of arrests at the event. Since the interest here is in

predicting use of arrests, and not number, these variables were recoded to indicate the use

of arrests (coded as 1) at an event.

While it was originally planned to explore each of the types of police response, it

became immediately obvious that police did not often resort of violence. For example in

less than one percent of all sit-ins (8 of 815) did police use violence against protestors.

Thus, the analysis that follows focuses on four dependent variables: police presence,

police action, police use of physical force, and police use of arrests. However, I will

36

include summary statistics on this outcome, to see if it is used disproportionately on some

types of events.

Control Variables

My analysis also includes a number of theoretically and empirically important

control variables that will be used in two ways. First, these controls are included in initial

models comparing civil disobedient events with march and rally protest events. The

controls are used in this portion of the analysis to explore if the effects of the disruptive

civil disobedient events hold up in the presence of event characteristics found to be

related to police action. In the second part of the analysis, the event characteristics are

used as predictors of police presence for the specific event types.

Like the arrest variable, protest size was originally coded in two ways: estimated

and actual size. If the exact size was not reported, coders selected the most appropriate

estimated size from the following: small, few handful (1-9 people); group, committee

(10-49 people); large, gathering (50-99 people); hundreds, mass, mob (100-999 people);

thousands (1,000-9,999 people); and tens of thousands (10,000 or more people). In order

to have all protest events coded on the same size scale, events with exact numbers of

participants were recoded according to the estimated size range. Event size is the only

variable in the analysis that follows that is not coded as a dummy variable.

Protest year was identified using the reported event date in the newspaper article.

The year variable was transformed into three different dummy variables representing the

three decades of reporting data. Events were coded this way in order to test for

differences across decades in policing styles. Thus, there is a variable representing

37

events that took place in the 1960s (coded as 1), the 1970s (coded as 1) and the 1980s

(coded as 1 and used as the reference category for analysis).

Each protest event was dummy coded for the presence of two different groups:

social movement organizations (SMOs) and counterdemonstrators. In addition, two

variables capture disruptive action on the part of protestors: violence and property

damage. These are all dummy variables, with the presence of the group or action coded

as 1.

The main target of each event was also recorded. Coders selected among seven

different targets: government/state, private/business, university/school, foreign

government/state, medical facility/organization, ethnic/racial group, and other. Dummy

variables were created for government, private, and university/school targets. These

three targets consisted of the bulk of protestor targets across the study period. In

addition, all the remaining targets were collapsed into a variable for other target. This

group tended to be pretty small (accounting for less than a fifth of each of the civil

disobedient event types). The target of university/school was used as the reference

category in the analysis.

Protestor characteristics were identified using the initiating group for events.

Each event was coded for the characteristics of the identified initiating group, and each

event was allowed to have up to three initiating groups. These groups fell into a broad

range of categories: occupational, racial/ethnic, age/gender, ideological/religious, and

other. For the analysis, I rely on the primary characteristic of the first initiating group.

Dummy variables were created to capture a range of initiating groups: student, black,

worker, female, tenant, political, religious, SMO actor, and other. Furthermore, in

38

supplementary analysis some of the main initiating groups had to be collapsed into the

other category due to their infrequent occurrence. The black initiating group was used as

the reference category in analysis in order to make comparisons to that group.

Analytic Strategy

After presenting descriptive statistics and correlations among all of the variables,

the main analysis of this piece takes two forms: (1) estimating policing differences

between civil disobedient events and those that are less confrontational; and (2)

estimating predictors of police repression across event types. Each form of analysis

relies on logistic regression techniques. Logistic regression is used here because the

dependent variables are all dichotomous, which violates the OLS assumption that

outcome variables are normally distributed. Thus, the models predict the relative

probabilities of an event experiencing a particular police response, whether it be

presence, action, force, or use of arrests.

In the first stage of the analysis, I estimate the differences between police

response to the civil disobedient events compared to less confrontational event tactics.

Logistic regression is used here to predict the probability of police response to civil

disobedient events, with marches and rallies used as the comparison group. This strategy

required some addition recoding. Each civil disobedient event type was dummy recoded

so that events were the primary activity was a march or rally were coded as 0. This

allows me to make direct comparisons between the civil disobedient events and the less

confrontational events. Furthermore, event characteristics (year, SMO presence,

counterdemonstrators, violence and property damage, target, and initiating group) are

also included in models as mediators of the relationship between event types and police

39

response. Two regressions are run for each type of civil disobedience, a baseline model

with no controls and a full model with all relevant controls included.

In the second stage of analysis, which tests the remaining hypotheses, I conduct

analysis of subsamples of the full data set corresponding to each event type. During this

stage of analysis, logistic regression techniques are used to model the probability of

police response based on characteristics of the specific protest events. This allows me to

compare which elements of different protest events matter for repressive state action.

Some additional recoding was done for the subsamples of data to account for differences

in initiating group and target across types of events. For each type of event (sit-in,

blockade, building takeover, and march/rally), models are run for each type of police

response.

40

Chapter 5. RESULTS

In the sections that follow, I discuss the results and descriptive and regression

analyses. I begin with the descriptive statistics, presented for the entire sample and the

specific event types. Then, I discuss the results of the logistic regression models

predicting (1) differences between the policing of civil disobedient events and less

confrontational events, and (2) predictors of police repression across specific events.

Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for both the entire sample of events and

the subset of event types. In addition, Appendix B contains a correlation matrix for the

full data sample.

--------------Table 1 about here ---------------

For the entire sample of events, the most common event size is between 100 and

999 protestors. In addition, event size has a small positive correlation with each of the

police response variables. Furthermore, event frequency decreased across the three

decades under study. The most events occurred in the 1960s (over 40 percent), and just

over one quarter of the events occurred in the 1980s. Events in the 1960s are associated

with more counterdemonstrators (r = 0.11), property damage (r = 0.08) and violence (r =

0.07). However, the correlation matrix suggests that events in the 1960s are less likely to

have social movement legitimacy. There are negative correlations between events in this

decade and SMO presence (r = -0.03) and SMO initiated (r = -0.21). On the other hand,

the correlation between SMO initiated and events in the 1980s is significant and of

41

moderate strength (r = 0.20). Events in the 1960s are associated with greater minority

presence (correlation with black initiated events: r = 0.35).

Furthermore, the government was often the primary target, accounting for slightly

under half of all events. The correlation matrix suggests that workers, females,

residents/tenants, political groups and SMOs are more likely to target the government.

Private businesses, on the other hand, tended to be targeted by blacks and workers. Not

surprisingly, there is a strong positive correlation between student initiated events and

events targeting universities or schools (r = 0.38).

The most common initiating group across all the events was social movement

organizations (28.53%). Black protestors also accounted for a large share of events

across the entire data set (18.64%). In addition, events initiated by blacks were positively

associated with all of the police response variables. For the remaining initiating group

characteristics, on the other hand, there are almost universal negative relationships with

police response (there are non-significant negative relationships between student initiated

events and police action and physical force).

The police response variables decreased in frequency as the action became

increasingly repressive, with less than five percent of all events involving police violence.

In addition, arrests occurred in under one-fifth of all events. Interestingly, events in the

1960s are positively correlated with all of the police response variables, while those in

the 1970s and 1980s are negatively correlated with the policing variables. Not

surprisingly, all of the police response variables are highly correlated.

Almost half of the sit-in events were composed of 10 to 49 participants, and there

were few sit-ins that had over 1000 people, which is not surprising given the nature of

42

this type of event. As the sit-in was a key tactic of the civil rights movement, many of

the statistics on this type of event are not surprising. For example, the majority of sit-ins

took place in the 1960s (76.96%). In addition, sit-in events tended to target private

businesses (r = 0.15). Furthermore, about two-thirds of sit-ins were initiated by either

students (18.5%) or blacks (48.16%). Protestor reported violence and property damage

were used very infrequently by protestors utilizing the sit-in. Police were present at

almost half of the sit-ins, and took action most of the time they were present (43.63%).

Police used force 15 percent of the time, used violence at less than one percent of events,

and made arrests in 40 percent of these events. There is a positive correlation between

sit-in events and each of the police response variables.

Like sit-ins, the modal size category for blockades was 10-49 participants. While

there was a more even distribution across time for this type of event, the fewest again

occurred in the 1980s. The government was the target of over half of the reported

blockades, and the most frequent initiating group was a SMO actor. Police were present

and took action at over half of these events. Police violence occurred in the greatest

proportion at blockades (6.8%). In addition, physical force was used by police over 20

percent of the time, the highest percentage across the event types. As with sit-in events,

blockades are positively associated with all of the police response variables.

Building takeovers were used with the lowest frequency of the types of civil

disobedience. However, like sit-ins and blockades, the most frequent size category was a

group or committee. These events also tended to emerge later, with over half occurring

in the 1970s. In addition, universities/schools were the primary target for over half of the

building takeovers. Not surprising, then, is that students were the primary initiating

43

group in about 40 percent of these events. Police were present and took action at a lower

percentage of building takeovers, compared to the other types of civil disobedience.

Police force was used in less than five percent of building takeovers (3.7%). It comes as

no surprise, then, that there were only small positive correlations between building

takeovers and police presence and action. Police physical force and arrests were not

significantly related to building takeovers in either direction.

The final group of events, marches and rallies, tended to be larger, with over 40

percent comprised of over 100 participants. There is a moderate positive correlation

between event size and the march/rally event type (r = 0.31). The distribution of these

events across the three decades was very similar to that for the full sample. The

government was the target in over half of these events, and the most frequent initiating

group was SMO actors. Finally, the police response variables were similar to that of the

larger sample, with police being present slightly more often. There was a positive

association between marches/rallies and police presence, but no relationship between

these events and the other police response variables.

To review, the descriptive statistics presented here provide some preliminary

support for many of the hypotheses outlined above. For the most part, the civil

disobedient events were positively associated with more repressive police action. In

addition, there were small positive associations between size and police response. Events

targeting universities or schools were negatively related to police response. The

relationship between other types of targets (government or private businesses) is not

entirely clear. There is pretty strong support at this level for the hypothesis concerning

initiating group characteristics. There were moderate positive associations between

44

events initiated by blacks and the police response variables. There were, on the other

hand, consistent negative relationships between other initiating group characteristics and

police response. SMO presence is associated at this level with lower levels of police

response. Events in the 1960s were positively associated with police response, while

those in the 1970s and 1980s were negatively associated with police response, suggesting

the possibility of an escalated force approach to police during this time. Finally, violence

and property damage on the part of protesters is related to more repressive police action.

Regression Models

Table 2 displays the results of logistic regression models comparing the police

response to the civil disobedient event types with the response to marches and rallies. As

such, the table contains results for each of the four police responses (labeled as models 1

through 4) regressed on the specific event types. The results are presented in two ways.

First, the police response variables were regressed on only the event types, with marches

and rallies as the reference group in all cases. Second, the models were run a second time

with all of the controls outlined above included. This allows me to see if differences

between civil disobedient event types and the reference group hold with characteristics of

the events held constant.

---------------Table 2 about here----------------

The first three columns of table 2 display the estimates, standard errors, and odds

ratios of the baseline models predicting police response based only on event type.

Compared to marches and rallies, both sit-ins and blockades are significantly more likely

to have police present at an event. Based on the odds ratios, sit-ins are over twice as

likely (odds = 2.27) to have police present than events where marches or rallies are used.

45

Blockades are over three times as likely to have police present (odds = 3.13). There are

no significant differences in police response between building takeovers and the

reference category. Interestingly, when all of the controls are included (shown in the

final three columns of table 3), a small part of the sit-in effect is explained, but both

blockades and building takeovers show a suppressor effect, although the effect for

building takeovers is still not significant. After controlling for event characteristics,

blockades are over four times more likely than the reference category to have police

present (odds = 4.39).

The baseline models show that all three of the civil disobedient event types are

significantly more likely to be subjected to police action than events where marches or

rallies are used. In the full models, there is again a suppressor effect for blockades. After

controlling for event characteristics, blockades are over five times more likely than

marches and rallies to experience police action (odds = 5.10). Sit-ins are over twice as

likely to have police action after including all the controls (odds = 2.33). The effect of

building takeover, however, is no longer significant after taking event characteristics into

consideration.

When police physical force is the dependent variable, the effect of building

takeover becomes negative, suggesting that police are less likely to use force at these

events. However, this effect is not significant in either the baseline or full model. Again,

sit-ins and blockades are significantly more likely than marches and rallies to experience

physical force by the police. In addition, the suppressor effect remains for blockades,

with these events about 4.5 times more likely to have police use physical force than

46

marches and rallies. Sit-ins are 70-percent more likely to experience physical force than

the reference category.

Finally, the results for arrests again suggest that civil disobedient events are more

likely to experience repressive police action. In the baseline models, all three of the civil

disobedient event types are significantly more likely to experience at least one arrest.

With event characteristics controlled, the effect of sit-ins and blockades remains, as well

as the suppressor effect of blockades. The difference between building takeovers and

marches and rallies is no longer significant when event characteristics are taken into

account.

In sum, the results in table 2 provide partial support for the main hypothesis (H1)

under consideration. When event characteristics are held constant, both sit-ins and

blockades are significantly more likely than marches and rallies to have police present at

an event, have police take action, experience physical force on the part of the police, and

have police employ arrests. While there is some evidence that building takeovers are

subject to more repressive police action, controlling for relevant event characteristics

reduces the difference between building takeovers and the reference group to non-

significance. This could be partly due to the lower frequency of this event across the

study period (N = 300).

While the evidence so far suggests that civil disobedient events are subject to

more repressive police response than less disruptive and confrontational forms of protest,

the results of table 2 cannot speak to what specific characteristics of the events result in

increased or decreased police response. In order to address the remaining hypotheses

outlined above, I conduct separate logistic regression analyses on each of the civil

47

disobedient event types. Tables 3 through 6 display the results of logistic regression

models predicting police response to the specific event types. Each table contains four

models, corresponding to the four main dependent variables. In these models, all of the

control variables are included as predictors of police response, in order to explore

differences in how police respond across events. It should be noted that some additional

recoding of initiating groups was necessary here to take into account the infrequency of

some groups to use specific tactics. I address each table in turn, and then discuss some

general similarities and differences across the event groups.

1. Sit-ins

Table 3 presents the results of the police response variables regressed on the event

characteristics of sit-ins. In predicting police presence at sit-ins, there is a surprising

negative effect of event size. Each increase in the size scale decreases the odds that

police will be present by 17 percent (odds = 0.83). SMO presence increases the chances

that police will be present by just over 60 percent (odds = 1.61). In addition, the presence

of counterdemonstrators doubles the odds that police will be present at a sit-in event

(odds = 2.06). Finally, reported protestor violence significantly increases the odds of

police present at sit-ins (odds = 3.5).

------------Table 3 about here-------------

Furthermore, it appears that event target is more important for police presence

than are characteristics of initiating groups. Compared to black initiated groups, none of

the other groups showed significant differences in terms of police presence. However,

compared to sit-ins that target educational institutions, those that target government

buildings are almost 90 percent more likely to have police present (odds = 1.89). Not

48

surprisingly, sit-in events that target private businesses are almost three times more likely

to have police present than the reference category (odds = 2.89).

The results for police action are very similar to those for police presence. Again,

increased size decreases the probability that police will take action. SMO presence and

reported violence are positively related to police action, but the effect of

counterdemonstrators is no longer significant. Again, the target matters more than the

initiating groups, with events targeting private businesses over three times more likely

than the reference category to have police take action (odds = 3.28).

Concerning police force, size is no longer a significant predictor. SMO presence

continues to exert a positive effect, with the presence of a SMO leading to a 57 percent

increase in the odds of police using physical force. For the first time, one of the dummy

event year variables becomes significant. Compared to events in the 1980s, those that

took place in the 1960s are five times more likely to experience police force (odds =

5.14). The results for initiating group and target hold from the previous models.

Finally, size and reported violence are significantly related to police use of arrests.

Each increase in the size variable reduces the odds of arrest by 15 percent (odds = 0.85).

Sit-ins in which there is reported violence are over 3.5 times more likely to experience

arrests (odds = 3.56). Again, target matters more for this type of police response than

characteristics of the initiating group.

In sum, across the police response variables, larger sit-ins tend to experience less

repressive police action. In addition, rather than lending a sense of legitimacy, SMO

presence tends to increase the chances of repressive police action. Protestor reported

violence is also a fairly consistent predictor of police response. Furthermore,

49

characteristics of the protestors are less important than are characteristics of the target.

Sit-ins that target government facilities or private businesses are consistently more likely

to experience repressive police response than are sit-ins that target educational facilities.

Finally, sit-ins that took place in the 1960s were more likely to experience police force.

2. Blockades

Table 4 presents the results of logistic regression models predicting the police

response to blockade protest events. Of the event characteristics, only reported protestor

violence is significantly related to police presence. Blockades that include protestor

violence are nearly five times as likely to have police presence (odds = 4.81). Unlike sit-

ins, characteristics of the initiating group are important for police presence at blockades.

With black initiated events as the reference category, blockades initiated by students are

62 percent less likely to have police present. In addition, blockades initiated by workers

are 86 percent less likely and those initiated by residents/tenants 70 percent less likely

than black initiated blockades to have police present. Blockade targets do not

significantly predict police presence.

---------------Table 4 about here----------------

The results for police action are similar to those of police presence, with the

addition of significant effects of blockade target. Again, protestor violence is positively

related to police action. Events initiated by students, workers, and tenants are less likely

to experience police action, compared to events initiated by blacks. In this model,

blockade target becomes a significant predictor of police action. All targets, compared to

educational targets, are more likely to involve police action.

50

Exploring police force, size, for the first time, works in the hypothesized

direction. Each increase in the size variable increases the odds of police force by 35

percent (odds = 1.35) at blockades. Protestor violence is again a significant predictor of

police physical force. In addition, like the results for sit-ins, blockades in the 1960s were

over 2.5 times more likely than events in the 1980s to experience police force (odds =

2.63). As with police action, blockade target is an important predictor of police force.

Blockades with government targets are over three times as likely and private business

targets almost three times as likely then educational targets to experience police force.

There are only two significant predictors of arrest in the model. Worker initiated

blockades are 72 percent less likely than black initiated blockades to experience arrests

(odds = 0.28). However, SMO initiated events are over twice as likely as black initiated

blockades to experience arrests (odds = 2.41).

In sum, reported protestor violence is a fairly consistent predictor of repressive

police action at blockades. In addition, there is also evidence across the models of the

penalty paid by black initiated blockades in regards to police response. Furthermore,

blockade target is a significant predictor of general police action and police physical

force, but not police presence or use of arrests. Finally, like sit-ins, blockades in the

1960s tended to experience more force.

3. Building Takeovers

Table 5 displays the results of logistic regression models predicting police

response to civil disobedient events characterized by building takeovers.

-----------Table 5 about here------------

51

Of the variables included in the model, only SMO presence, protestor violence, and SMO

initiated are significantly related to police presence at building takeovers. The presence

of a SMO increases the odds of police presence by 78 percent. Building takeovers with

reported protestor violence are almost three times more likely to have police present

(odds = 2.95). Finally, building takeovers initiated by SMOs are well over three times

more likely than black initiated events to have police present (odds = 3.70).

The results for police action are quite similar, with the exception that SMO

presence is not significantly related to police action at building takeovers. Protestor

violence increases the odds of police action at building takeovers over four fold (odds =

4.54). In addition, SMO initiated building takeovers are over five times more likely than

black initiated building takeovers to experience police action.

Concerning police force, protestor violence is again a strong predictor that

building takeovers will experience physical force by the police (odds = 6.68).

Furthermore, while no initiating group characteristics are significant, building takeovers

that target government facilities are almost five times as likely than those targeting

educational institutions to experience police force (odds = 4.71).

Finally, protester violence is again a strong predictor of police use of arrests at

building takeovers (odds = 3.78). Furthermore, SMO initiated events are subjected to

increased use of arrests. Compared to black initiated building takeovers, those initiated

by SMOs are almost five times more likely to experience arrests (odds = 4.74).

In sum, the only consistent predictor of police response to building takeovers is

reported protestor violence. In addition, with the exception of police force, building

takeovers initiated by SMOs tend to experience more repressive police action. Finally,

52

besides the importance of government targets for police force, the target variables do not

consistently predict police response to building takeovers.

53

Chapter 6. DISCUSSION

The results of the regression analyses presented above can be interpreted

in relation to the discussions and hypothesis development of civil disobedience and

protest policing. The results from table 2 provide strong support that civil disobedient

protest events, particularly those characterized by physical intervention, face a more

repressive state response than less confrontational protest types. Sit-ins and blockades,

across the four policing variables, were significantly more likely than marches and rallies

to have police present, have police take some sort of action, experience physical force on

the part of the police, and have police use arrests at events. These results held even when

theoretically relevant control variables were included in models. In fact, controlling for

event characteristics, such as initiating group and primary target, suggested a suppressor

effect for blockade events. Once event characteristics were held constant, blockades

were typically between four and five times more likely than marches and rallies to

experience the range of police responses.

Sit-ins tended to be about twice as likely as marches and rallies to experience the

different police responses, and were almost three times as likely to experience an arrest

(odds = 2.79). Including the full set of controls did not drastically change the results for

sit-ins. Building takeovers, on the other hand, did not show consistent differences in

regards to police response. In baseline models (without controls), building takeovers

were significantly more likely than marches and rallies to have police take action and

experience arrest. However, once all of the relevant controls were included in the

models, the differences between building takeovers and the reference group were not

54

significant for any of the outcome variables. Thus, these initial results provided strong

support for hypothesis 1.

In addition, the differences between civil disobedient events and marches and

rallies provide some support for the threat approach, which suggests that the repression of

an event or movement depends on the threat to political elites (Davenport 2000). Sit-ins

and blockades are confrontational and disruptive, signaling a larger threat to political

elites. The threat approach was also used to test two hypotheses concerning variation in

repression across event types: protest size (H2) and protest target (H3). The effect of

protest size did not lend support to the threat approach. In only one instance was event

size predictive of police response: larger blockades were more likely to experience

physical force. In fact, the opposite relationship for size was frequently found. Size was

negatively related to all police response variables for sit-ins, and was also negatively

related to police action and arrests at marches and rallies (see table B2 in Appendix B).

Protest target, on the other hand, was a fairly consistent predictor of state

response, providing general support for the threat approach. A common theme across the

analyses, and especially in the analysis of sit-in events, is that government and private

business targets are policed differently than educational targets. For the sit-in events,

protestors who targeted private businesses were typically two to three times more likely

to experience the different police responses. In addition, protestor target was also a

significant predictor of police action and police force for blockades. For building

takeovers, target was only important for police use of force. Thus, it seems that,

compared to government facilities and private businesses, universities and schools are

interpreted as a less threatening target in the eyes of the state.

55

In the end, the evidence concerning the threat approach to civil disobedience can

be best described as mixed. The civil disobedient events themselves are much more

likely, with the exception of building takeovers after controlling for event characteristics,

than less confrontational events to experience a severe police response. However, the

actual characteristics of civil disobedient events were not consistent predictors of police

response. Protest size, one of the more established findings in support of the threat

approach (Davenport 2000; Earl et al. 2003; McCarthy et al. 2007), had fairly consistent

negative effects on police response. However, there was more support for the threat

approach in the arena of protest target.

The weakness approach, which argues that the state will repress only those events

or movements it feels it can successfully defeat, was used to test two hypotheses:

initiating group (H4) and SMO presence (H5). While it was expected that black initiated

events would experience repression across event types, the evidence from the analyses

here is not that clear. In three of the blockade models there were significant differences

between initiating group characteristics, with most groups being significantly less likely

than blacks to experience a particular police outcome. However, although blacks

accounted for nearly half of the sit-ins, there were no significant differences between

initiating groups in terms of police response at these events. Thus, the “weakness-from-

within” variant of the weakness approach was a fairly poor predictor of police response.

However, it should be noted that in supplementary analysis of the march and rally events

(table B2), all other initiating groups were consistently less likely than black initiated

events to experience any of the police response variables. It seems that police respond to

56

the disruptive nature of the civil disobedient events, while they may respond more to the

composition of less confrontational protest events.

The results concerning SMO involvement also provided mixed support for the

weakness approach. While it was expected that SMO involvement would lend a sense of

legitimacy to protest events, representing an organizational vehicle capable of pursuing

repression-related grievances, SMO presence was actually often associated with

increased probabilities of repressive action. Blockades that were initiated by SMOs were

more likely than black initiated blockades to experience arrests. In addition, in all models

except police force, SMO initiated building takeovers were more likely than black

initiated events to involve repressive police responses. These results could be the result

of the increasing institutionalization of protest. If SMOs were more likely to register

events with the police this could create more of an opportunity for police to be there and

take some sort of action.

The results also speak to the interaction of threat and weakness. Among the

threatening group of blockades, black initiated events (theoretically weak) seem to face

repressive police action. However, this does not hold for either sit-ins or building

takeovers. Furthermore, as noted, the findings suggest that SMO presence is associated

with increased, rather than decreased, repressive action for civil disobedience. This was

the case for all of the outcome variables except arrests for sit-ins. As noted, the results

for police presence and SMO involvement could be explained by the trend of requiring

protestors to get permits. However, results indicating increased police action when

SMOs are involved are surprising.

57

The second major line of protest policing research, policing styles (H5), received

some minor support. Of the civil disobedient types, the dummy variable for 1960s was

significant on two occasions. Both sit-ins and blockades in the 1960s were significantly

more likely than corresponding events in the 1980s to involve police physical force. In

fact, sit-ins during this time were over five times more likely than sit-ins in the 1980s to

involve police force (odds = 5.14). Furthermore, the supplementary analysis of marches

and rallies also provided some support for the policing styles models. Marches and

rallies in the 1960s were more likely to have police present, take action, and use physical

force. Thus, in support of the escalated force approach, there is some evidence that

events in the 1960s were more prone to the use of violence on the part of the police.

The final two hypotheses addressed protester action at events: property damage

(H7) and protester violence (H8). Property damage was not a significant predictor of

police response for any of the civil disobedient event types. This is probably due to the

infrequence of property damage at these events (see table 1). However, the analysis of

the march and rally group suggests that property damage was a significant positive

predictor across the outcome variables. Violence, on the other hand, was a consistent

predictor of police response. In nearly every model, the reported use of violence by

protestors increased the odds of repressive police action. This result also held in the

supplementary analysis of the march and rally group.

While the results here speak to the vulnerable position of protestors who use civil

disobedient tactics, this analysis is not without limitations. First, while the use of

newspaper data is common among social movement scholars, it must be kept in mind that

the data set used is subject to the reporting practices of the New York Times. A more

58

complete picture of protest events over the time period would also allow comparison of

events that enter the public sphere though media coverage with those that remain largely

outside of the public‟s knowledge.

Second, the analyses did not have too much to say about the police response at

building takeover events. This could be due to the relative infrequency of this event (N =

300) compared to others under consideration. Because of the smaller sample size, many

of the independent variable used to predict police response occurred very infrequently. In

addition, the coding of building takeovers could have resulted in a group of events that is

somewhat cloudy. A fair amount of building takeovers might have actually been sit-ins

or another similar event. Future research would be advised to unpack this variable to see

if this group really contains events that would be considered only building takeovers.

A final, and probably most pressing, limitation of the analysis concerns the protest

overlap. While considerable effort was taken to ensure that all of the events used in

analysis were exclusive from one another, there remains that possibility that other types

of events not controlled drove the results. In practice, protest events probably employ a

variety of tactics in hopes of successfully articulating claims. In addition, research has

shown the use of multiple tactics to be related to more severe state response (McAdam

1982). Thus, while all of the event types used here were made mutually exclusive, it

must be kept in mind that other aspects of protests that are common across events could

contribute to the ways in which police respond.

The overlap of protest types, and the general complex nature of protest events, is

an issue that future research should address. To grasp of the true effect of different types

of protest, a very restrictive approach was taken in this paper by excluding those events

59

that overlapped on the variables of interest. There are a number of other approaches that

could be taken to attempt to determine what combination of tactics or protest styles are

most likely to experience repression. One could model the data to explore the effect of

using both disruptive and non-disruptive event types. For example, what happens at

events that start as a march and culminate with a sit-in? Or a rally that evolves into a

blockade of either traffic or people attempting to get to or from their jobs?

Another approach would be to examine the impact of using multiple disruptive

tactics at events. For example, what happens when protestors attempt to both block

employees from entering their building for work, while other protesters sit-in at offices in

the building? In addition, there are other types of civil disobedience that were not

utilized in this analysis. For example, the withholding of obligations is a fairly common

type of activity (used 1150 times across the four activity codes). This type of civil

disobedience was not used in this analysis, as I placed an emphasis on protesters who

took some sort of direct and confrontational action.

Finally, the civil disobedience form identified in the data could be utilized in

future research. A great majority, but not all, of the civil disobedient activities were also

coded in the affirmative on the civil disobedient form measure. Thus, there could be

something about those events characterized, for example, as a sit-in, but not as civil

disobedience that drives police response. The original coding of the events was done in

such a manner as it is possible to accurately model the use of multiple tactics at an event,

and future research should take advantage of this coding scheme.

60

Chapter 7. CONCLUSION

Protestors who choose to employ tactics that fall outside of the realm of the

standard protest repertoire are subject to a more repressive response on the part of the

state, and its representative, the police. Thus, police seem less likely to give priority to

the First Amendment rights of protestors when their tactics include the intentional

violation of the law. In addition, beyond law violation, protestors who resort to violent

means are, not surprisingly, subject to some of the most severe responses by the police.

Beyond tactics used by protestors, police also appear to respond to different

elements of different protest types. During sit-ins, which typically focus on challenging

an established policy, such as segregation, police are sensitive to the target of protest.

For other types of events, especially blockades and less confrontational forms of protest,

police respond more to the characteristics of people at the event, rather than the target of

the event. In the end, it certainly appears that the relationship between protestors and

police is indeed very complex, and more research, on both quantitative and qualitative

fronts, is necessary to uncover some of the intricacies of this interaction.

61

Chapter 8. TABLES

N % N % N % N % N %

2.95 1.34 2.38 1.07 3.03 1.12 2.83 1.06 3.66 1.13

Few (1-9) 3188 16.09 157 19.24 25 5.51 23 7.67 126 2.50

Group (10-49) 5541 27.96 380 46.57 161 35.46 120 40.00 869 17.27

Large (50-99) 2918 14.72 108 13.24 82 18.06 51 17.00 807 16.04

Hundreds (100-999) 5784 29.19 151 18.51 149 32.82 99 33.00 2181 43.35

Thousands (1000-9999) 1938 9.78 20 2.45 34 7.49 6 2.00 875 17.39

Over 10,000 448 2.26 0 0.00 3 0.66 1 0.33 173 3.44

1960s 8147 41.11 628 76.96 168 37.00 84 28.00 2140 42.54

1970s 6710 33.86 125 15.32 174 38.33 158 52.67 1611 32.02

1980s 4960 25.03 63 7.72 112 24.67 58 19.33 1271 25.26

8618 43.49 247 30.27 152 33.48 116 38.67 2078 41.30

1002 5.06 51 6.25 20 4.41 11 3.67 433 8.61

1475 7.44 13 1.47 27 5.95 34 11.33 176 3.50

2947 14.87 29 3.55 63 13.88 48 16.00 405 8.05

Government 9047 45.65 217 26.59 235 51.76 88 29.33 2721 54.08

Private Business 2751 13.88 313 38.36 75 16.52 16 5.33 467 9.28

University/School 2679 13.52 208 25.49 69 15.20 153 51.00 548 10.89

Other 5340 26.95 78 9.56 75 16.52 43 14.33 1295 25.74

Student 2414 12.18 151 18.50 76 16.60 119 39.67 701 13.93

Black 3694 18.64 393 48.16 50 10.90 45 15.00 935 18.58

Worker 1346 6.79 11 1.25 61 13.30 4 1.33 199 3.96

Female 773 3.90 35 4.29 20 4.40 10 3.33 188 3.74

Tenant 1239 6.25 16 1.96 40 8.70 8 2.67 308 6.12

Political 723 3.65 17 2.08 12 2.60 3 1.00 132 2.62

Religious 629 3.17 9 1.10 7 1.50 6 2.00 128 2.54

SMO Actor 5653 28.53 102 12.50 130 28.30 45 15.00 1651 32.82

Other 3346 16.88 82 10.05 58 12.78 95 20.00 789 15.68

Present 5362 27.06 406 49.76 262 57.71 105 35.00 1527 30.35

Action 4263 21.51 356 43.63 239 52.64 88 29.33 1121 22.28

Physical Force 1761 8.89 126 15.44 104 22.91 19 6.33 449 8.92

Violence 644 3.20 8 0.98 31 6.80 11 3.70 189 3.80

Any Arrests 3345 16.88 327 40.07 198 43.61 65 21.67 823 16.36

N = 816 N = 454 N = 300 N = 5031

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics - All Events and Selected Protest Types

Initiating Group

Police Response

Blockade March/RallyAll Events Bld Takeover

Property Damage

Counterdemonstrators

N = 19,817

Sit-in

Target

Event Size (mean, std dev)

Year

SMO at Event

Violence by Protestors

62

B SE Exp(B) B SE Exp(B)

Sit-In 0.818*** 0.08 2.27 0.754*** 0.10 2.13

Blockade 1.141*** 0.10 3.13 1.480*** 0.12 4.39

Building Takeover 0.201 0.13 1.22 0.276 0.15 1.32

Sit-In 0.990*** 0.08 2.69 0.845*** 0.10 2.33

Blockade 1.355*** 0.10 3.88 1.629*** 0.12 5.10

Building Takeover 0.361** 0.13 1.43 0.302 0.16 1.35

Sit-In 0.614*** 0.11 1.85 0.530*** 0.15 1.70

Blockade 1.109*** 0.12 3.02 1.507*** 0.15 4.51

Building Takeover -0.378 0.24 0.69 -0.431 0.29 0.65

Sit-in 1.231*** 0.08 3.43 1.025*** 0.11 2.79

Blockade 1.375*** 0.10 3.96 1.551*** 0.12 4.72

Building Takeover 0.338* 0.15 1.40 0.226 0.17 1.25

b Controls include: event size, SMO presence, counterdemonstrators, year,

protestor violence, property damage, target, and initiating group

MODEL 1: Police Presence

MODEL 2: Police Action

MODEL 3: Police Physical Force

Event Type

Table 2. Police Response Regressed on Civil Disobedient Eventsa

No Controls All Controlsb

Event Type

*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05a The comparison group for each regression is march/rally.

Event Type

Event Type

MODEL 4: Any Arrest

63

Est SE Odds Est SE Odds Est SE Odds Est SE Odds

Variables

Size -0.188* 0.08 0.83 -0.162* 0.08 0.85 -0.108 0.10 0.90 -0.159* 0.08 0.85

SMO Present 0.475** 0.17 1.61 0.350* 0.17 1.42 0.452* 0.22 1.57 0.218 0.17 1.24

Counterdem. 0.724* 0.36 2.06 -0.032 0.32 0.97 -0.172 0.40 0.84 -0.331 0.33 0.72

Property Damage -0.440 0.74 0.64 -0.639 0.72 0.53 0.183 0.80 1.20 0.060 0.70 1.07

Violence 1.268* 0.57 3.55 1.391** 0.52 4.02 0.938 0.53 2.56 1.270** 0.48 3.56

Year - 1960sa0.404 0.33 1.50 0.548 0.34 1.73 1.637* 0.77 5.14 0.266 0.34 1.31

Year - 1970sa

0.337 0.36 1.40 0.514 0.37 1.67 0.778 0.84 2.18 0.345 0.37 1.41

Initiating Groupb

Student -0.345 0.26 0.71 -0.248 0.26 0.78 -0.737 0.45 0.48 -0.045 0.27 0.96

SMO Actor 0.454 0.27 1.57 0.487 0.27 1.63 0.275 0.34 1.32 0.339 0.27 1.40

Other Group -0.195 0.22 0.82 -0.255 0.22 0.78 -0.135 0.30 0.87 -0.168 0.23 0.85

Targetc

Government 0.634** 0.22 1.89 0.781*** 0.23 2.18 0.924* 0.36 2.52 0.696** 0.24 2.01

Private Business 1.062*** 0.23 2.89 1.187*** 0.24 3.28 1.016** 0.37 2.76 1.378*** 0.25 3.97

Other Target 0.469 0.30 1.60 0.580 0.31 1.79 0.230 0.53 1.26 0.492 0.32 1.64

Constant -0.730 0.30 0.48 -1.234** 0.44 0.29 -3.791*** 0.87 0.02 -1.180** 0.43 0.31

N 816 816 816 816

-2 log-likelihood 1029.986 1029.766 643.208 1019.592

*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05

a - Compared to 1980s

b - Compared to events initiated by blacks

c - Compared to events that target universities/schools

Table 3. Logistic Regression of Police Response To Sit-In Protest Events

Model 1 (Police Present)

Model 2 (Police Action)

Model 3 (Police Force)

Model 4 (Any Arrests)

64

Est SE Odds Est SE Odds Est SE Odds Est SE Odds

Variables

Size 0.149 0.10 1.16 0.132 0.10 1.14 0.301* 0.12 1.35 0.020 0.10 1.02

SMO Present -0.041 0.23 0.96 -0.082 0.23 0.92 0.246 0.27 1.28 -0.169 0.23 0.84

Counterdem. 0.294 0.56 1.34 0.042 0.52 1.04 0.859 0.51 2.36 0.114 0.49 1.12

Property Damage 1.116 0.77 3.05 0.853 0.64 2.35 0.289 0.56 1.34 0.966 0.53 2.63

Violence 1.570*** 0.47 4.81 1.236** 0.40 3.44 1.317*** 0.37 3.72 0.645 0.34 1.91

Year - 1960sa0.364 0.31 1.44 0.465 0.31 1.59 0.965** 0.36 2.63 -0.017 0.30 0.98

Year - 1970sa

0.434 0.30 1.54 0.309 0.29 1.36 -0.343 0.38 0.71 -0.317 0.29 0.73

Initiating Groupb

Student -0.967* 0.43 0.38 -0.881* 0.42 0.41 -0.941 0.49 0.39 -0.290 0.40 0.75

Worker -1.976***0.51 0.14 -1.857*** 0.51 0.16 -0.797 0.61 0.45 -1.281* 0.51 0.28

Tenent -1.194** 0.49 0.30 -1.449** 0.50 0.24 -0.854 0.62 0.43 -0.805 0.50 0.45

SMO Actor 0.074 0.44 1.08 0.209 0.42 1.23 -0.354 0.44 0.70 0.881* 0.39 2.41

Other Group -0.238 0.42 0.79 -0.471 0.41 0.62 -0.082 0.42 0.92 0.049 0.38 1.05

Targetc

Government 0.629 0.34 1.88 0.807* 0.34 2.24 1.245* 0.49 3.47 0.303 0.34 1.35

Private Business 0.700 0.40 2.01 1.131** 0.40 3.10 1.085** 0.53 2.96 0.559 0.39 1.75

Other Target 0.727 0.40 2.07 0.845* 0.40 2.33 1.572** 0.53 4.82 0.187 0.39 1.21

Constant -0.625 0.57 0.54 -0.930 0.56 0.40 -3.602*** 0.72 0.03 -0.590 0.54 0.55

N 454 454 454 454

-2 log-likelihood 528.287 538.458 398.870 551.013

*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05

a - Compared to 1980s

b - Compared to events initiated by blacks

c - Compared to events targeting universities/schools

Model 1 (Police Present)

Model 2 (Police Action)

Model 3 (Police Force)

Model 4 (Any Arrests)

Table 4. Logistic Regression of Police Response To Blockade Protest Events

65

Est SE Odds Est SE Odds Est SE Odds Est SE Odds

Variables

Size 0.012 0.13 1.01 -0.136 0.14 0.87 0.222 0.27 1.25 -0.245 0.16 0.78

SMO Present 0.577* 0.28 1.78 0.363 0.30 1.44 0.507 0.57 1.66 0.433 0.32 1.54

Counterdem. 0.718 0.73 2.05 0.802 0.76 2.23 1.271 1.10 3.56 0.778 0.77 2.18

Property Damage 0.901 0.56 2.46 0.345 0.55 1.41 0.364 0.80 1.44 -0.449 0.60 0.64

Violence 1.082* 0.48 2.95 1.514** 0.49 4.54 1.899* 0.80 6.68 1.330** 0.51 3.78

Year - 1960sa0.728 0.46 2.07 0.405 0.48 1.50 -0.943 0.87 0.39 0.963 0.54 2.62

Year - 1970sa

0.455 0.38 1.58 0.354 0.39 1.43 -0.797 0.70 0.45 0.743 0.45 2.10

Initiating Groupb

Student 0.564 0.46 1.76 0.607 0.50 1.84 0.445 0.77 1.56 0.427 0.53 1.53

Native American 0.196 0.67 1.22 0.207 0.71 1.23 -0.480 1.05 0.62 -0.116 0.78 0.89

SMO Actor 1.308* 0.55 3.70 1.680** 0.58 5.37 -1.011 1.04 0.36 1.555** 0.61 4.74

Other Group 0.602 0.51 2.91 0.934 0.54 2.54 -1.485 0.96 0.23 0.597 0.58 1.82

Targetc

Government 0.602 0.4 1.83 0.470 0.42 1.60 1.550* 0.76 4.71 0.595 0.45 1.81

Other Target 0.448 0.41 1.57 0.628 0.42 1.87 1.297 0.77 3.66 0.431 0.45 1.54

Constant -2.648*** 0.68 0.07 -2.376*** 0.71 0.09 -4.181*** 1.28 0.02 -2.603*** 0.78 0.07

N 300 300 300 300

-2 log-likelihood

*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05

a - Compared to 1980s

b - Compared to events initiated by blacks

c - Compared to events targeting universities/schools

Model 1 (Police Present)

Model 2 (Police Action)

Model 3 (Police Force)

Model 4 (Any Arrests)

Table 5. Logistic Regression of Police Response To Building Takeover Protest Events

333.375 308.582 114.510 273.353

66

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Comparative Perspective.” Pp. 117-140 in Policing Protest: The Control of Mass

Demonstrations in Western Democracies, Donatella della Porta and Herbert

Reiter (eds). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Walker, Edward T., Andrew W. Martin and John D. McCarthy. “Confronting the State,

the Corporation, and the Academy: The Influence of Institutional Targets on

Social Movement Repertoires.” Forthcoming.

Wisler, Dominique and Marco Giugni. (1999). “Under the Spotlight: The Impact of

Media Attention on Protest Policing.” Mobilization 4: 171-187.

70

APPENDIX A. Forms and Activities

Event Forms:

1. Rally/demonstration

2. March

3. Vigil

4. Picket

5. Civil disobedience

6. Ceremony

7. Dramaturgical demonstration

8. Motorcade

9. Information distribution

10. Symbolic display

11. Attack, by instigators

12. Riot, melee, mob violence

13. Strike / slow down / sick-ins

14. Boycott

15. Press conference/statement

16. Organization formation announcement or meeting

17. Conflict, attack, or clash

18. Lawsuit

19. Other (not on the list)

Activity Codes:

1=bannering

2=bell ringing

3=bicycling 4=candle-lighting, carrying, displaying, carrying candles

5=canvassing, asking for votes, signatures, money, opinions

6=cross carrying 7=dances; dancing in "celebration for peace"

8=debate 9=discussion -public and collective

10=dramaturgical presentation 11=fasting (hunger strike; identified by placards, banners, leaflets)

12=film showing

13=fireworks display 15=leafleting (distributing literature)

16=meditation

17=parading chariots 18=petitioning (both obtaining signatures and presentation of petitions, letters signature)

19=photo exhibiting 20=holding signs, picket line, placarding, human billboarding, informational picketing;

21=praying; prayers; prayer circle

22=procession 23=reading or recitation (e.g., reciting declaration of independence)

71

25=selling 26=silence, deliberate

27=speechmaking

28=sloganeering/chanting

29=vigiling 31=worshipping; church service format;

32=wreathing; wreath laying; placing floral wreaths or bouquets on statues, memorials

33=Displaying goods/Symbolic Display

34=Press Conference.

35=Dedicating or other ceremonial activity

36=Musical and/or Vocal Performance 37=Filming events at gathering/photographing

38=Recruiting,

39="Camping" or erecting tents overnight

40=Lobbying

41=Polling 42=Singing (collectively)

43=Torch-passing (or passing of other item in relay)

44=Bedracing

45=Civil Disobedience

46=Meeting candidates

48=Flag Waving

49=Distributing Goods

50=Describing Project

51=Drumming

52=Sit-ins

53=Bank-ins, Shop-ins, Penny-ins

54=Withholding obligations

55=Physical Attack

56=Verbal Attack or Threat

57=Blockade, blocking by protesters

58=Loud noise making (e.g. whistling)

59=Yelling/shouting

60=Building Take-Over (e.g. administration building)

61=Looting

62=Damaging Property

63=Kidnapping/Hostage Taking

64=Meeting Disruption

65=Walk Out (Not strikes, but walking out of meetings, graduation ceremonies, etc)

66=Letter writing campaign

97=Lawsuits (trial, filing brief, etc)

98=Other activity (not on list)

72

APPENDIX B. Supplementary Analysis

Variablea 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

1.Sit-In 1.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.12 -0.09 0.15 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06 0.01 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 0.15 0.07 -0.08 0.04 0.16 -0.04 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 -0.04 0.11 0.11 0.05 0.13

2. Blockade 1.00 -0.02 -0.09 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.02 -0.03 0.04 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.11

3. Building Takeover 1.00 -0.07 -0.01 -0.03 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 0.14 -0.04 0.10 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.02

4. March/Rally 1.00 0.31 0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.09 -0.09 -0.11 0.10 -0.08 -0.04 -0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.07 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 0.06 -0.02 0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.01

5. Size 1.00 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.08 -0.03 -0.07 0.09 -0.06 0.04 -0.09 0.12 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 0.09 0.06 0.11 0.02

6. Event decade 1960s 1.00 -0.60 -0.48 -0.03 0.11 0.08 0.07 -0.03 0.03 0.07 -0.04 0.07 0.35 -0.13 -0.04 -0.11 -0.02 -0.02 -0.21 0.04 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.12

7. Event decade 1970s 1.00 -0.41 0.04 -0.07 -0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.19 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.08 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 -0.07 -0.07 -0.09 -0.07

8. Event decade 1980s 1.00 -0.01 -0.05 -0.08 -0.09 0.00 0.00 -0.09 0.08 -0.07 -0.19 0.06 -0.04 0.07 -0.06 0.04 0.20 -0.03 -0.13 -0.10 -0.11 -0.07

9. SMO Present 1.00 0.03 -0.11 -0.15 0.09 0.01 -0.09 -0.05 -0.13 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.07 0.07 0.11 -0.01 -0.08 -0.10 -0.05 -0.08

10. Counterdem. 1.00 0.00 0.07 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.07 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.18 0.14 0.11 0.09

11. Property Damage 1.00 0.58 -0.09 -0.05 0.00 0.14 -0.01 0.08 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 0.09 0.26 0.26 0.23 0.23

12. Violence 1.00 -0.16 -0.08 -0.04 0.27 -0.02 0.10 -0.08 -0.06 -0.07 -0.04 -0.05 -0.08 0.18 0.37 0.38 0.34 0.31

13. Government target 1.00 -0.37 -0.36 -0.56 -0.12 -0.05 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.03 -0.02 0.11 -0.08 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.03

14. Private target 1.00 -0.16 -0.24 -0.09 0.09 0.04 0.00 0.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.03

15. School target 1.00 -0.24 0.38 0.02 -0.05 0.04 -0.06 -0.02 -0.05 -0.14 -0.09 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04

16. Other target 1.00 -0.09 -0.03 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.19 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.05

17. Student initiated 1.00 -0.18 -0.10 -0.08 -0.10 -0.07 -0.07 -0.24 -0.17 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02

18. Black initiated 1.00 -0.13 -0.10 -0.12 -0.09 -0.09 -0.30 -0.22 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.16

19. Worker initiated 1.00 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 -0.17 -0.12 -0.11 -0.10 -0.06 -0.09

20. Female intiated 1.00 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.13 -0.09 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05

21. Tenant initiated 1.00 -0.05 -0.05 -0.16 -0.12 -0.08 -0.08 -0.05 -0.07

22. Political initiated 1.00 -0.04 -0.12 -0.09 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03

23. Religious initiated 1.00 -0.11 -0.08 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04

24. SMO initiated 1.00 -0.28 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.02

25. Other initiated 1.00 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.04

26. Police Presence 1.00 0.86 0.51 0.68

27. Police Action 1.00 0.59 0.78

28. Police Force 1.00 0.52

29. Arrests 1.00

a Bolded correlations are significant at .01

Table B1. Correlation Matrxi (N=19,817)

73

Est SE Odds Est SE Odds Est SE Odds Est SE Odds

Variables

Size -0.036 0.03 0.97 -0.138*** 0.03 0.87 0.097 0.05 1.10 -0.193*** 0.04 0.82

SMO Present -0.021 0.07 0.98 -0.188* 0.08 0.82 -0.091 0.12 0.93 -0.128 0.09 0.88

Counterdem. 1.114*** 0.11 3.05 0.768*** 0.12 2.16 0.375* 0.16 1.46 0.340** 0.13 1.41

Property Damage 1.250*** 0.28 3.49 1.128*** 0.24 3.09 0.537* 0.21 1.71 0.824*** 0.20 2.78

Violence 2.436*** 0.17 11.43 2.456*** 0.15 11.66 2.553*** 0.16 12.85 2.047*** 0.14 7.75

Year - 1960sa0.413*** 0.10 1.51 0.267* 0.11 1.31 1.254*** 0.20 3.51 -0.024 0.12 0.98

Year - 1970sa

0.092 0.10 1.10 -0.053 0.11 0.95 0.216 0.21 1.24 -0.266* 0.12 0.77

Initiating Groupb

Student -1.138*** 0.13 0.32 -0.924*** 0.15 0.40 -1.139*** 0.20 0.32 -0.897*** 0.16 0.41

Worker -1.489*** 0.24 0.23 -1.294*** 0.27 0.27 -1.114** 0.42 0.33 -1.655*** 0.25 0.19

Female -0.920*** 0.20 0.40 -0.932*** 0.24 0.39 -1.866*** 0.53 0.16 -1.106*** 0.29 0.33

Tenent -1.057*** 0.18 0.35 -1.283*** 0.22 0.28 -1.607*** 0.42 0.20 -1.409*** 0.26 0.24

Political -0.712** 0.23 0.49 -0.789** 0.27 0.45 -1.211** 0.46 0.30 -0.635** 0.29 0.53

Religious -1.722*** 0.31 0.18 -1.546*** 0.36 0.21 -2.971** 1.03 0.05 -1.164*** 0.35 0.31

SMO Actor -0.448*** 0.10 0.64 -0.316** 0.11 0.73 -0.554*** 0.15 0.58 -0.232* 0.12 0.79

Other Group -0.524*** 0.16 0.59 -0.466*** 0.13 0.63 -0.860*** 0.18 0.43 -0.614*** 0.14 0.54

Targetc

Government 0.116 0.13 1.12 0.071 0.14 1.07 0.500* 0.21 1.65 0.200 0.16 1.22

Private Business 0.060 0.16 1.06 0.121 0.18 1.13 0.199 0.28 1.22 0.463* 0.19 1.59

Other Target 0.000 0.14 1.00 -0.114 0.15 0.89 0.247 0.24 1.28 0.039 0.17 1.04

Constant -0.766*** 0.19 0.47 -0.724*** 0.21 0.49 -3.691*** 0.33 0.03 -0.846*** 0.22 0.43

N 5031 5031 5031 5031

-2 log-likelihood

*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05

a - Compared to 1980s

b - Compared to events initiated by blacks

c - Compared to events targeting universities/schools

Table B2. Logistic Regression of Police Response To March/Rally Protest Events

Model 1 (Police Present)

Model 2 (Police Action)

Model 3 (Police Force)

Model 4 (Any Arrests)

5224.669 4466.489 2316.228 3889.407