Pippa Norris the Concept of Electoral Integrity Forthcoming in Electoral Studies

8/13/2019 Pippa Norris the Concept of Electoral Integrity Forthcoming in Electoral Studies

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Revised10May2013

Symposium:

TheConceptofElectoralIntegrity

PippaNorris

McGuireLecturerinComparativePolitics ProfessorofGovernment&IRKennedySchoolofGovernment TheUniversityofSydney

HarvardUniversity

Department

of

Government

&

IR

Cambridge,MA02138,USA NSW,2006

[email protected] Australia

www.pippanorris.com www.electoralintegrityproject.com

Abstract:A rapidlygrowingbodyof researchby scholars and applied policy analysts is beginning to

explore threequestions:whendoelectionsmeet international standardsofelectoral integrity?When

dotheyfailtodoso?Andwhatcanbedonetomitigatetheseproblems?Toaddresstheseissues,PartI

in this introductoryessayoutlines the conceptofelectoral integrity,proposing a comprehensive and

broaddefinition foundeduponglobalnormsand internationalconventions.Part II identifies foursub

fieldscontributing

towards

understanding

electoral

integrity

and

malpractices,

including

the

study

of

:(i)

publicsectormanagement(analyzingproblemsofelectoralmaladministration intheUnitedStatesand

otherestablisheddemocracies);(ii)politicalculture(examiningwhethercitizensconfidenceinelectoralproceduresaffects institutionaltrust,supportfordemocracyandfeelingsofpolitical legitimacy,voting

behavior and political participation); (iii) comparative institutions (focusing on comparing types of

electoral systems, hybrid regimes, and electoral processes of democratization); and (iv) peace and

conflict (determining the triggersofelectoralviolence). Theemerging subfieldofelectoral integrity,

cuttingacrosstheseconventionaldisciplinaryboundaries,ischaracterizedbyitsproblemorientedfocusandglobalcomparativeframework,aswellasbyitsuseofpluralisticmethodsandanalyticaltechniques.

Part III summarizes the particular contributionmade towards this research agenda by each of thestudiesincludedinthisspecialsymposiumofElectoralStudies.

Keywords:elections,voting,electoralintegrity,democracyanddemocratization,fraud,corruption


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Countries around theworld share challenges inmeeting international standards of electoral

integrity. Firstorder malpractices, used by many repressive rulers, include imprisoning dissidents,

harassingadversaries,coercingvoters,voteriggingcounts,and finally, if losing,blatantlydisregarding

thepeopleschoice. SuchproblemsareexemplifiedbyvotingirregularitiesinPutinsRussia,repression

of opposition parties in Nazarbayevs Kazakhstan, widespread complaints of fraud in Karsais

Afghanistan, and repression used by the security forces and ZANUPF supporters in Mugabes

Zimbabwe. Themost egregious and overt cases, violating human rights and undermining electoral

credibility, are usually widely condemned by domestic observers and the international community

(Donno 2010, Kelley 2012). Countries free of these problems can still experience secondorder

malpractices, however, exemplified by inaccurate voter registers,maladministration of polling, vote

buying,clientalisticpolitics,progovernmentmedia,erroneouscounts, campaignsawashwithmoney,

and

excessively

high

legal

barriers

to

elected

office.

Second

order

malpractices

can

occur

everywhere,

even in longestablisheddemocracies,exemplifiedby thenotorioushanging chads in Florida in2000

(Hasen 2012), more recent accusations of voter suppression through overzealous identification

requirementsduringtheObamaRomneycontest (JonesandSimons2012),andsecurityvulnerabilities

inUKpostalballots(Buckley2011).

As illustratedby the contributions towards this symposium, interest inproblemsofelectoral

integrityhasincreasinglyflourishedontheresearchagendaamongboththeacademicandpolicymaking

communities. Comparativistshaveexploredthecausesofelectoralmalpractice(Birch2011)aswellas

the impactofflawedcontests,notablyforregimeclassificationsandthepersistenceofautocracy,and

forelectoral transitions (Lindberg2006,2009,BunceandWolchik2006,Brownlee2007,Levitskyand

Way2010).Conflictstudieshaveanalyzedtherootcausesofproblemsofelectoralviolence(Basedau,

ErdmanandMehler2007,CollierandVicente2011,Bekoe2012,Frazer andGyimahBoadi2011,Global

Commission2012). Behavioristshaveexaminedcitizens lackofconfidence inelections todetermine

whetherthishasinfluencedfeelingsofpoliticallegitimacyandpoliticalbehavior(Birch2008,2010,Rose

and Mishler 2009, McAllister and White 2011). Studies in public administration have highlighted

problemsof

voter

registration

processes,

the

security

of

convenience

voting,

and

the

performance

of

electionmanagementbodies (EMBs) (AlvarezandHall2008,Alvarez,AtkesonandHall2012,Hamner

2009). Policy analysts have sought to evaluate the effectiveness of remedies designed to dealwith

malpractices, including monitoring by electoral observers, strengthening the capacity of electoral

officials, improvingdisputeresolutionmechanisms,auditingEMBs,andreformingthe legalframework

regulatingvoter registration,party finance and campaignbroadcasting (Bjornlund2004,GoodwinGill


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incommonwhetherflawsandirregularities inelectoraladministrationin longstandingdemocracies,

citizenslackofconfidenceinelectoralinstitutions, electoralmalpracticesrestrictingpartycompetition

inhybridregimes,oroutbreaksofdeadlyelectoralviolencecommonlyreportedinmanypartsofAfrica

andAsia?

Theoverarchingconceptofelectoralintegrityhelpstounifyourunderstandingofthesediverse

phenomena.Whenelectoralobserversofferpositiveassessmentsofelections,echoingthelanguageof

the1948UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,theyfrequentlydescribetheoutcomeasreflectingthe

genuinewillof thepeopleormore simply and conventionally as free and fair. By contrast,when

election problems arise, these are often described as fraudulent, malpractices, manipulated

elections, or violations of democratic principles and human rights (Kelley 2012, Donno 2010, Hyde

2011).This softand foggy language servesdiplomaticpurposeswell,avoidinghardand sharpcutting

edges.But

for

this

very

reason,

it

fails

to

provide

sufficient

conceptual

clarity

for

scholars

seeking

to

operationalize andmeasure this phenomenon (Elklit and Svensson 1997, Bjornlund 2004, Elklit and

Reynolds2005).

Alternative definitions of electoral integrity are common in the research literature. Hence

lawyerscommonlyemphasizeviolationsofdomesticelectoral laws,especiallyfraudulentmanipulation

ofpolling and tabulation (Young2009,VickeryandShein2012,Alvarez,Hall andHyde2008).This is

useful for practical guidance in the courts. Scholars of public sector management draw upon the

language

of

electoral

maladministration,

emphasizing

technical

capacity

of

electoral

procedures

and

processes(AlvarezandHall2006,Alvarez,AtkesonandHall2012).Democratictheorists,drawingupon

ideas of liberal democracy, usually emphasize the failure of electoral procedures to meet certain

normativevalues,suchasthoseofaccountability,inclusiveness,andtransparency(Birch2011).Eachof

these approachesprovidesuseful insights into this complexphenomenon,but, as argued later, they

provideanincompleteunderstanding.

Asconceptualizedanddefinedbythissymposium,theoverarchingnotionofelectoralintegrity

isunderstoodtorefertoagreedinternationalconventionsandglobalnorms,applyinguniversallytoall

countries worldwide throughout the electoral cycle, including during the preelectoral period, the

campaign,onpollingday,anditsaftermath. Conversely,electoralmalpracticeisusedtorefertofirst

andsecondorderviolationsoftheseglobalnorms.

This conceptualization emphasizes four distinct features: (i) global norms are grounded in

multilateral agreements, international conventions, treaties and international laws (rather than the


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principles of liberal democracy or Western normative values); (ii) a distinction between first and

secondorder malpractices, according to the severity of their potential consequences; (iii) shared

standardsapplyinguniversallytoallcountriesandtypesofregimes(notsimplyaproblemconfinedto

electoralautocracies);and(iv) thenotionofanelectoralcycle,wherearangeofelectoralmalpractices

occur at any stage in a sequential process (not limited to fraudulent acts on polling day and its

aftermath).Letusunpacktheseideas.

(i)Globalnorms

Thefirstpartofthisdefinitionseeselectoralintegrityascontestsreflectingglobalnorms,where

contestsareevaluatedaslegitimateiftheyrespectagreedinternationalconventionsandstandards.This

approachisfirmlygroundedininternationaltreatieswhichtheworldsgovernmentshaveendorsedfor

morethanhalfacentury.Globalnormsareuniversalstandardswhichreflectabroadconsensusaround

theworld(FinnemoreandSikking1998,Simmons2009).Thediffusionofglobalnormsmeansthat it is

nolongeracceptableforagovernmenttomakesovereigntyclaimsinresponsetotheabuseofelectoral

integrity (Donno2010,Hyde2011). Thisapproachavoidsarbitraryjudgments.Althoughglobalnorms

arepowerfullyshapedbyprominentstates,endorsementbytheinternationalcommunityweakensthe

chargeofapplyingculturallybound(WesternorAmerican)valueswhichdonottranslateaslegitimate

standardsinregionsandsocietieswithotherhistoricalpoliticaltraditions.Overtime,globalnormshave

become accepted as the appropriate international and domestic yardsticks tojudge the quality of

electoral

procedures.

Empirical

evidence

suggesting

the

existence

of

widely

shared

global

norms

of

electoral integrity, indicated by congruence between expert evaluations and public assessments, is

examinedlater(Norristhisissue)

The foundationforglobalnormsofelectoral integrityrestsuponArticle21(3) intheUniversal

Declaration of Human Rights (1948), which constitutes the legal basis and the core principles

legitimatinginternationalsupporttoelectionsandelectoralassistance.Article21(3)specifiesthatThe

willofthepeopleshallbethebasisoftheauthorityofgovernment;thiswillshallbeexpressedinperiodic

andgenuineelectionswhichshallbebyuniversalandequalsuffrageandshallbeheldbysecretvoteor

byequivalentfreevotingprocedures. While the language remainsabstractand imprecise,especially

thephrase willof thepeople, certain rights andprinciples are clear in this statement,notably that

governmentauthorityflowsfromcontestsheldatperiodic intervals,withuniversalandequalsuffrage,

whereballotsareconfidentialandsecure.


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Agreementabouttheglobalnormswhichshouldgoverntheconductofelectionswerefurther

expanded inArticle25of theUN InternationalCovenant forCivilandPoliticalRights (ICCPRof1966),

specifyingtheneedfor:1)periodicelectionsatregularintervals;2)universalsuffragewhichincludesall

sectorsofsociety;3)equalsuffrage,intheideaofoneperson,onevote;4)therighttostandforpublic

officeand contestelections;5) the rightsofalleligibleelectors tovote;6) theuseofa secretballot

process;7)genuineelections;8)andthatelectionsshouldreflectthefreeexpressionofthewillofthe

people.1Thesestandardsarealsounderstoodasembodyingrightstoselfdetermination,afterArticle

1(1). Since the ICCPRCovenant came into force in1976, ithas createdpressureof compliance from

globalnormsoflegitimacyandbindinglegalobligationsforthe167memberstateswhichendorsedthe

treaty,includingcountrieswheremanyofelectoralrightsarelacking,suchasChina,Russia,Cuba,Togo,

EquatorialGuinea, Iran,Syria,andTajikistan.Therearealsomoral, ifnot legal,obligations for states

which

have

not

yet

endorsed

the

treaty,

including

Singapore,

Saudi

Arabia,

UAE,

and

Myanmar.

2

Insubsequentdecades,globalnormshavebeenhammeredoutbytheinternationalcommunity

and endorsed in a series of human rights instruments, conventions, legal instruments, and more

detailedworkingstandards(Young2009).Standardshavebeendevelopedinthepracticalguidelinesfor

electoral observers issued by regional intergovernmental organizations, exemplified by the OSCE

ElectionObservationHandbook(6thedition)(OSCE2010). Similar guidelineshavebeenpublishedbythe

AfricanUnion,theEuropeanUnion,andtheOrganizationofAmericanStates(Donno2010).TheCarter

Center compiled a comprehensive Database of GlobalObligations to assess the quality of electoral

processesagainsthumanrightsconventionswhichmemberstateshaveendorsed.3

Globalnormsreflectabroadconsensuswithintheinternationalcommunityabouttheprinciples

whichshouldguideminimalstandardsofelectoralprocesseswithinstates, includingtheneedforequal

anduniversal suffrage,equalopportunities for candidates andparties to run forelectedoffices, and

unfettered rights to freedomofexpressionandassembly (Bjornlund2004, IDEA2002).Theseprovide

theinternationallegalmandateforelectoralactivitiesbyintergovernmentalorganizations,includingthe

deploymentofobservermissionsevaluatingthequalityofelections,aswellastheguiding framework

forUnited

Nations

agencies

and

international

NGOs

when

providing

electoral

assistance

for

member

states. ThemostsuccinctstatementofthesenormsisprovidedintheUNGeneralAssemblyresolution

64/155(8thMarch2010)StrengtheningtheroleoftheUnitedNationsinenhancingperiodicandgenuine

electionsandthepromotionofdemocratization.Thisversionreflectsandextendssimilarstatementsof

principleendorsedregularlybytheUnitedNationssince1991.


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Neverthelessmanyglobalnormswhicharealmostuniversallyendorsedasabstractprinciples

havenotyetbeentranslatedandcodifiedintopracticalstandards.Inthissense,globalnormsestablish

onlyminimal standards of electoral integrity. A range of advocates human rights NGOs, regional

organizations,andreformmovements seektoextendtheboundaries.

Political finance illustrates the limits of global norms. This issue has generated considerable

scholarly interest in recentyears,especially comparisonsof financial regulations in theUnitedStates

andother longestablishedWesterndemocracies (CasesZamora2004,Nassmacher2009,Lessig2011,

Boatright2011,Koss2011).Corruption ingeneral iswidelycondemned, includingelectionbribery.The

valuesof transparency andaccountability arealsowidely recognized in generalasessential forgood

governance. The United Nations recognizes certain minimal provisions governing political finance

standards. Article7(3)intheUNConventionagainstCorruptionadoptedin2003specifiestheneedfor

transparency,in

accordance

with

domestic

law,

when

funding

candidates

for

elected

public

office

and

funding political parties.4 The Council of Europe has gone further in securing agreement on these

mattersamongitsmemberstates. SimilarlytheOrganizationofAmericanStateshaspublisheddetailed

guidelinesforstandardsofpartyfinanceandelectioncampaigns.5ReportsbyseveralprominentNGOs

including IFES, International IDEA, and Global Integrity, compare information about national legal

regulations and enforcement mechanisms for the disclosure, spending limits, and party subsidies

governing political finance (IDEA 2004,hman and Zainulbhai 2011).Nevertheless the international

communityhasnot yet endorsed broader global norms andmore detailedworking standards about

thesematters.Despitetheobviousimportanceofcampaignfinanceforstandardsofelectoralintegrity,

it remains difficult to establish a legitimate international yardstick to evaluate financial practices on

issuessuchascontributionandspendinglimits(Young2009).

Similarly,globalnormsalsoremainminimalist intermsofcampaigncommunications. There is

widespreadagreementaboutthebasicprinciplesoffreedomofexpressionand informationwhichare

universallyrecognizedrights,reflectedinArticle19oftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights(1948).

Theworsttransgressions,throughstatecensorship,theintimidationorimprisonmentofreporters,and

restrictionson

the

independence

of

newspapers

and

broadcasters,

are

widely

regarded

as

violating

fundamentalhumanrights.Atamorepractical level,however,globalnormsprovideminimalguidance

about the principles which should be followed in regulating campaign communications and the

appropriateroleofpublicservicebroadcastingduringelections.


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No internationallyagreedconventionsspecifymoredetailedprinciplesformediacoverage,for

exampleby recognizing thatpublic servicebroadcasters shouldprovidebalanced, inclusive, impartial

andequitablecoverageofallpartiesandcandidates,orthatpaidpoliticaladvertisingonTVandradio

should be regulated fairly and equitably. Leading advocates are seeking to expand the normative

standards in thisarea, forexampleobservermissionsby theOSCEandotherscommonlymonitor the

role of the newsmedia during campaigns, and theOrganization of American States has developed

principles andmethodswhich their observers use for this purpose.6 UNESCOsMediaDevelopment

Indicators(2008)provideanotherbroadnormativeframeworkwherethe internationalcommunityhas

endorsed the general principles of media pluralism and access. Nevertheless as yet no general

conventionsorprotocolshaveoutlinedtheprincipleswhichshouldgovernlegalregulationofmassand

socialmediaduringelectioncampaigns. Thusglobalnormsarepowerfulmechanismsforinternational

and

domestic

pressure

but

they

establish

only

minimalist

standards.

The

abstract

language

in

internationalhumanrightsconventionsalsoallowsconsiderableroomforinterpretationaboutthemore

specificmechanismswhicharemosteffectiveforimplementingelectoralintegrity.

(iii)Firstandsecondordermalpractices

Althoughglobalnormsareuniversal,itisappropriatetodistinguishtypesofmalpracticesbased

onthepotentialseverityoftheirconsequences.Eastoniannotionsofsystemsupportareconventionally

understoodas involvingmultiple levels includingsupport for theauthorities, forregime institutions,

and

for

the

nation

state

(Norris

1999,

2011).

Similarly,

the

over

arching

concept

of

global

norms

of

electoralintegritycanbeusefullydividedintofirstorderandsecond orderlevels.Thepreciseboundary

between these levels remains tobedetermined. But firstorderproblems canbe looselydefined as

those which involve deadly violence and major violations of fundamental human rights, whether

instigated by state security forces, governing or opposition parties, communal leaders, or any other

actor, all ofwhich pose fundamental challenges to regime stability. These actsmay trigger reform

concessions;furtherstaterepression,oraperiodofrevolutionaryupheavalandsocialturmoilseekingto

overturntheregime.

Secondorder problems, by contrast, can be broadly understood as those characteristically

involvemoremundane issuesofmaladministration, lackof technical capacity,orhumanerrorwhich

undermine the integrity of the electoral process. Feelings of system support is conventionally

understoodtorangefromsupportforspecificactorsandauthorities,suchastrustinelectedleaders,to

more diffuse confidence in regime institutions, approval of regime performance, support for regime


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principles,andfeelingsof identificationwiththenationstate,atthemostabstract level(Norris1999).

Inlongestablisheddemocracies,wherefeelingsoflegitimacyarederivedfromrepeatedexperienceofa

successionofpopularelections,evenifoneparticularcontestisflawedbysecondorderproblems,this

maynotnecessarilyundermineconfidenceinregimeinstitutions,ormoreabstractanddiffusefeelings

ofsystemsupport,suchassatisfactionwiththeoverallperformanceofdemocracy. Instateswith less

experienceofcompetitiveelections,however,suchasinKenya,evenminorsecondorder irregularities

may spread to catalyze firstorderproblems. In this context,where channels forpeacefulprotestare

limited,minorelectoraldisputesandsmallirregularities(suchasashortdelayinannouncingtheofficial

results)maytriggermassviolenceinvolvingciviliancasualtiesorfatalities,intercommunalriots,andthe

destructionofpropertythroughlootingandarson.Moreoverautocraticregimescanalsobeexpectedto

bemorewilling to use the techniques of domestic repression against their own citizens to reduce

dissent

and

suppress

protests,

such

as

using

physical

coercion,

intimidation,

and

outright

violence

by

the

securityforcesandgangsofarmedsupporters(Davenport2007,GandhiandLustOkar2009).Electoral

malpracticesmay therefore arise from intentional restrictions on democratic human rights, such as

whereautocraticrulesseektomanipulateelectoralrulesunfairlytolimitopposition,buttheymayalso

becausedbysecondordermaladministrationand lackofgovernancecapacity,suchasadministrative

errorsinregistrationrolls,orthestateslackofcapacitytomaintainsecurity.

(iii)Shareduniversalstandardsandtheglobalcomparativeframework

The

third

component

of

this

conceptualization

understands

global

norms

of

electoral

integrity

as

universally applicable, where violations of shared principles and standards have the capacity to

underminethequalityofelectionsineverysociety,includinginlongestablisheddemocracies.Themost

egregiousviolatorsofelectoralrightsinplacessuchasBelarus,AfghanistanandUkrainearecommonly

highlighted by dramatic news headlines. Yet our understanding is too narrow andpartial if scholars

simply focusupon theworst firstorder casesofovertmalpractices involving repression inelectoral

autocracies.Firstordermalpracticesinautocraticstatesgeneratewidespreadinternationalconcern.But

secondorder challenges of electoral integrity reflect universal problems which may damage the

legitimacyof

electoral

contests

in

any

country

including

in

Anglo

American

democracies

such

as

the

United States, Britain and Canada.7 Malpractices, from this perspective, may be manipulated or

accidental, legally sanctioned or illicit, arising from violations of democratic rights or from lack of

technicalcapacity,orindeedalloftheabove.


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An important reason for adopting this broader conceptualization is a historical perspective:

issuesofelectoralintegrityhavelongbeenofconcerninWesterndemocracies,exemplifiedbyproblems

ofendemicbriberyandtreatingduringnineteenthcenturyBritain(OLeary1962),progressiveattempts

to clean upmachine politics in TammanyHall (Gosnell 1968) and fraud at the ballot box (Campbell

2006), restrictionson the electoral franchise forwomen and theworking class in Europe (Romanelli

1998),practicesofvotersuppressionandracialdiscrimination intheUnitedStates(Keyssar2009),and

the introductionofcompulsoryvotingand thesecretballot inAustralia (Sawer2001). Norare these

issues simply historical curiosities in established democracies; contemporary challenges in American

elections are exemplified by the notorious problem of hanging chads and faulty votingmachines in

Florida,thesubstitutionofvotesfordollarsbysuperPACs,andincreasinglyrestrictivevoterregistration

laws and identification requirements (Overton 2006,Minnite 2010, Lessig 2011). Evenwheremany

basic

conditions

are

met,

expectations

of

electoral

integrity

are

not

frozen

in

time;

instead

new

challengescontinuetoarise.Abroadconsensussurroundsmanyofthebasicnutsandboltsconditions

required toachieveminimalstandardsofelectoral integrity, suchas the requirementsofan inclusive

adult franchise, honest and accurate vote tabulations, and the use of secret ballots. But debate

continuesaboutthemostappropriateresponsetocomplexnewchallenges,includinggrowingdemands

for gender equality andminority representation, the deployment of digital voting technologies and

online balloting, demands for convenience polling, and the appropriate regulatory framework

governingpoliticalfinance,campaignbroadcasting,andpoliticaladvertising.

Secondorderproblemofelectoralintegritycanariseanywhere,althoughtheconsequencesare

expected to bemost serious in states lacking lengthy historical experiences of competitive electoral

processes.Longestablisheddemocraciesareexpectedtohaveadeep reservoirofdiffusesupport for

democraticprinciplesandpracticesaccumulatedfromexperienceacquiredovermanydecadesoreven

centuries. Many, although not all, established democracies have developed independent election

management bodies capable of administering contests according to professional standards of

impartiality,efficiencyandtransparency(IDEA2006).Legalchannelsresolvedisputespeacefullythrough

thecourts.

The

consequences

of

any

second

order

electoral

irregularities

can

be

expected

to

prove

more corrosive of regime legitimacy, and thus potentially destabilizing, in countries lacking these

conditions.Inparticular,citizenslivingindeeplydividedsocietieswithrecentexperienceofdeeprooted

conflictcanbeexpectedtodisplayminimaltrustandconfidence instateauthorities, legal institutions,

andelectoralprocesses,and tohave low reservoirsofsocialtrustandtolerance. In thissituation,the

potentialdangersofelectoralviolationsarealsoexpectedtobeheightenedbywinnertakeallcontests


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whichraisethestakes,suchasthe2011presidentialelections intheDemocraticRepublicofCongo in

2011 and the 2010 presidential contests in Afghanistan. In this context, secondorder problems of

popularunrest and violencemaybe triggeredor reignitedwhere losingparties seizeonevenminor

technicalinfringements,suchasthelackofofficialballotpapersinafewpollingstationsorsomeclerical

errors in electoral registration lists, to challenge the legitimacy of the outcome (Kalandadze and

Orenstein2009).

(iv)Theelectoralcycle

Lastly,muchattention inthenewsmediaand intheresearch literaturehas focuseduponthe

problemof fraudulentballots and vote countmalpractices, acts at the endof the electoralprocess.

HencetheU.S.heateddebateaboutvoterfraudversusvotersuppressiononpollingday(Hasen2012),

with less attention to the deeper structural problems of American elections, such as the role of

campaigns floodedmoneyorthestaterestrictionsonballotaccessforthirdpartycandidates.Butthe

international community has moved towards understanding that electoral assistance and electoral

observationshouldnotbe focusedpurelyuponelectionday,orevenon theshorttermperiodofthe

official campaign. Instead,elections shouldbe seen as a sequentialprocessor cycle involving a long

seriesofsteps(OSCE2007).AstheACEprojectsuggests,thecycle involvesallstages intheprocessof

elections:from thedesignanddraftingof legislation, the recruitmentand trainingofelectoral staff,

electoralplanning,voterregistration,theregistrationofpoliticalparties,thenominationofpartiesand

candidates,

the

electoral

campaign,

polling,

counting,

the

tabulation

of

results,

the

declaration

of

results, the resolution of electoral disputes, reporting, auditing and archiving. After the end of one

electoralprocess,itisdesirableforworkonthenexttobegin:thewholeprocesscanbedescribedasthe

electoralcycle.8

[Figure1abouthere]

Figure1 illustrates themain stages in thiselectoral cycle.Themost visible typesofelectoral

malpracticeinvolveillegalactsonpollingdayorimmediatelyafterwards,suchasvotetabulationfraud,

carousel

voting,

or

ballot

stuffing.

In

fact,

however,

problems

can

occur

at

any

stage

in

the

electoral

cycle.AsemphasizedbyBirch(2012),themoretechnicalandsubtleformsofmalpractice,throughthe

strategicmanipulationofthelegalframeworkgoverningelections,occurwellinadvanceofpollingday,

and thesemay alsobe the least visible toobservers. This can includedesigningoverly restrictiveor

cumbersomenomination requirements forgainingballotaccess,patronageappointmentseroding the

independence of broadcasting regulatory bodies and themanagement of statecontrolled television


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channels,thepartisangerrymanderingofconstituencyboundariestofavor incumbents,orthepassage

ofrestrictivevoterregistration laws,discouragingturnout.Thesetypesof legalstrategiesarealso less

likely to incurcriticalmediaheadlines, internationalcondemnation,anddomesticprotests thanmore

overtformsofintimidationandcorruptionattheballotboxonpollingday.Theideaofanelectoralcycle

is also similar to theway thatAndreas Schedler (2002) understands thenotion, as he suggests that

problems of democratic elections involve a menu ofmanipulationwhich ranges sequentially from

restrictionsontherangeofelectoralofficesthroughtheformationandexpressionofpreferencestothe

consequencesofvotingchoices.Ifconceivedinthisway,breakinganysinglelinkinthechainiscapable

ofunderminingthelegitimacyofelections.

Alternativeconceptualizations:domesticlaws,maladministration,anddemocraticprinciples

Severaldisciplinesofferalternativeapproachestoconceptualizingtheideaofelectoralintegrity

andidentifyingaframeworkofnormativestandards,includingthosebasedmorenarrowlyondomestic

laws,administrativecriteria,anddemocraticvalues.Thesecanbemostusefulforestablishingpractical

guidelines for specific elections. Each has certain important limitations, however,making them less

suitable for comparative studies than a more comprehensive overarching framework derived from

globalnorms.

Legalconceptionsofelectoralfraud

Perhaps themostcommon legalisticapproach to integrityhas focuseduponelectoral fraud,

implyingillegalacts,especiallythoseassociatedwiththefinalactofcastingandcountingballots(Young

2009,Donsanto2008,Alvarez,HallandHyde2008,Minnite2010,VickeryandShein2012).Thisframing

isparticularlypopularwith activistgroups such as True theVote in theUnited States.9 In its strict

usage, fraud refers to interferencewith the electoral processwhich violates domestic laws, usually

perpetrated intentionallybygovernments, incumbentofficeholders,electoralofficials,partyworkers,

orcitizens.Fraudcanbedefinedasattemptsatwrongdoing,exemplifiedbyvoterintimidation,bribery,

andballotstuffing(Donsanto2008).Alegalisticandculturallybounddefinitionofintegrityfocusesupon

those

acts

which

are

in

accordance

with

domestic

statutes

and

judicial

rulings

within

each

state.

Where

actorsclearlytransgressagainstdomesticelectoral lawsandregulations ineachcountry,thiscanhave

seriousrepercussionsfor integrity.Legaltexts,proceduralregulations,andcourtcases incommon law

provideaconcreteandpracticalnationalstandardopentointerpretationsbylawyersandthejudiciary.

This is attractive for electionmanagement bodies seeking to stamp out blatantly illicit acts, such as

forgingvotercards,votebuying,orballotstuffing.


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Thisapproach isunsatisfactoryforcomparativestudies,however;elections inautocraticstates

can be conducted according to domestic legal standards but still violatewidelyendorsed normative

standards. Forexample,certainactsoncewidely toleratedareuniversallycondemned today,suchas

practices of bribery and treating (plying electorswith food, drink, or entertainment) in 18th century

British rottenboroughs (OLeary 1962),or the systematicdiscrimination experiencedbyblack voters

until the1965CivilRightsAct in theUnitedStates (Keyssar2009).Similarly,as illustratedbyTan (this

issue)with thecaseofSingapore,electoral lawscanviolatebasic conditionsessential fordemocratic

contests, forexampleby incorporatingexcessivelyhighvote thresholds for candidatesandparties to

qualify for seats, by gerrymandering constituency boundaries, or by excessively difficult hurdles

discouragingballotaccessforthirdpartyoroppositioncandidates. Electoral lawsandregulationsalso

varyfromonesocietytoanother,includinginmanyfederalstatesamongprovincesandregionswithin

countries.

It

is

therefore

problematic

to

use

domestic

laws

to

compare

integrity

across

nations

on

a

consistent basis. Indeed countrieswith stricter cultural norms could be expected to generatemore

rigorous legalstandardsandmoreactiveprosecutionsofelectoralmalpractice,whereassocietieswith

greatertoleranceofcorruption,baksheesh, and clientalisticpolitics coulddemonstrateamorelaxlegal

record. Thusviolationsofdomestic legal standards,whileone formofmalpractice,donotprovidea

consistentyardstickofelectoralintegrityforcomparativeanalysis.

Electoralmaladministration

For

those

concerned

with

public

sector

management,

problems

at

the

polls

can

also

be

framed

aselectoralmaladministration,atermconventionallyreferringtomoreroutineflawsandunintended

mishaps by election officials. These problems can arise from managerial failures, inefficiency, and

incompetence,and lackofbureaucraticcapacity,exemplifiedbytheexistenceofexcessively long lines

at polling stations, inaccurate or dated electoral registers, the lack of security ink, the insufficient

provisionofballotpapers,themisplacementofballotboxes,thebreakdownortechnical inaccuracyof

electronic voting machines, or mathematical errors during the vote count. Maladministration is

exemplifiedbymany commonproblems arising from thedecentralizedandhighlypartisannatureof

Americanelectoral

administration,

where

local

officials

are

responsible

for

many

aspects

of

the

registration and voting process. The poor and confusing design of ballot papers in Broward County,

Florida in2000waswidelyattributedto incompetencyandhumanerrorby localofficials,forexample,

rather thanany intention todefraudelectorsof their rights,although theseproblemswere rooted in


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14

largerstructuralflaws,suchasthedecentralizedandpartisannatureofAmericanelectoralmanagement

bodies(AlvarezandHall2006,Alvarez,AtkesonandHall2012,Hallthisissue).

Theconceptofmaladministrationisusefulbutalsorelativelynarrowanditwouldbestretched

too far if applied to first order problems of electoral malpractice, such as those occurring under

authoritarian states with the imprisonment of dissidents or opposition leaders, disqualifications for

ballotaccessforpresidentialcandidates,ortheintentionalandsystematicdisenfranchisementofmajor

groupsofcitizens.Maladministrationalsoassignsprimaryresponsibilityforanyproblemswithelectoral

officials,ratherthanotheractors,suchastheleadersofpoliticalpartiesorcommunitygroupswhouse

heightenedrhetoricandclaimsof fraudtriggeringelectoralviolence,privatecorporationswhichbribe

politicians or provide onesided TV broadcasts, or repressive acts conducted by the security forces.

Moreover in many cases it remains difficult to distinguish between genuine human error and

intentionallyfraudulent

acts,

for

example

where

certain

names

are

missing

from

electoral

registries,

or

where theuseof insecureabsenteeballots facilitatesduplicatenames. Equally importantly,perhaps,

thereareno internationallyagreedstandardsof maladministrationwhichwouldallow thequalityof

electionstobebenchmarked,comparedandevaluated.ThuswhilesomeElectionManagementBodies

preferpaperballots,onthegroundsofefficiency,transparency,andsecurity,othersoptforelectronic

votingmachines,advancingthesamereasons(IDEA2006).Somestudiesassumethattheindependence

ofElectionManagementBodiesfromexecutiveagenciesisimportantfortheirimpartiality(IDEA2006),

while others suggest that pluralistic partisan composition can prove equally effective (Birch 2011).

Performance standards are starting to be developed and implemented by several national electoral

managementbodies(seeJamesthisissue)butthesehavenotyetbeenstandardizedcrossnationallyas

internationalinstruments.

Democraticvaluesandprinciples

Lastly,perhapsthestrongestchallengetotheconceptualizationofferedinthisstudyarisesfrom

political philosophy and from alternative definitions derived from theories and principles of liberal

democracy. Thus elections which fail to reflect the values of transparency, inclusiveness and

participationcanbeseenaslackingintegrity.ThemostambitiousapproachhasbeenproposedbyBirch

(2011),whodefineselectoralmalpracticesasthemanipulationofelectoralprocessesandoutcomesso

that personal or partisan benefits are substituted for the public interest. Birch develops a

comprehensivetheoreticalframeworkwhichproposesthatelectionsmeetdemocraticprincipleswhere

they are inclusive, facilitating policydirected voting, and allowing effective aggregation. Contests


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15

involvingmalpracticesareunderstoodbyBirchtoviolatetheseprinciplesthroughthemanipulationof

institutions (such as gerrymandered electoral lawsbiased towards incumbents), vote choice (such as

through limiting campaignactivitiesand information),and thevotingact (suchas throughballotbox

stuffing).

The frameworkprovidesperhaps themost sophisticated theorywhichhasattempted to root

theconceptofelectoralmalpracticeinthecorevaluesofliberaldemocracy.Theapproachisattractive

byprovidingafarbroaderandmorecoherentframeworkthantheminimalistcriteriaindorsedbyglobal

norms and international conventions. Nevertheless this general approach suffers from several

limitations. Inparticular,there isnosinglecanonicalsource for interpretingdemocratictheory;where

classicalphilosophersdiscusseddetailedprinciplesandaspectsofelectoral integrityandmalpractice,

theyoftendifferedsharplyintheirunderstandingofthesematters.Duringthecontemporaryera,Dahls

notionof

polyarchy

provides

the

overarching

framework

used

to

understand

conventional

notions

of

liberaldemocracy,coveringmanyabstractgeneralprinciples.Butthecoreprinciplesofpolyarchyalso

provideonly limitedguidancewhenitcomestointerpretingthelegitimacyofmanydetailedstandards

of electoral integrity andmalpractices.MoreoverBirch (2012) favors the classic mandate theoryof

democraticelections,wherebypoliticalpartiesshouldoffervotersclearpolicyplatformsandprograms,

avoidingmoreclentalisticappealsbasedonthedeliveryofmaterialbenefitstogroupsofsupporters.In

many countries, however, clientalism can also be regarded as another legitimate form of political

representation,whereelectedofficialsdeliverpublicgoodsandservicestolocalareasandconstituents

(KitscheltandWilkinson2007).Thusscholarsdonotagreeuponasingleunderstandingofdemocratic

principlesandvalueswhichcouldprovideacommonoruniversalstandardforevaluatingthequalityof

elections around the world. In addition, even if scholars could hammer out a cohesive and

comprehensive theoretical framework, rooted in contemporarydemocraticprinciplesandvalues, this

still would not be regarded as imposing legitimate, authoritative or binding obligations by the

internationalcommunity. International lawrequiresrightsandobligationswhicharediscussed,coded,

and endorsed by governments in member states through multilateral conventions and regional

organizationguidelines,

not

philosophical

principles.

There

is

ahierarchy

of

conceptualizations,

from

the

specific practical administrative guidelines used by electoral management bodies to abstract

philosophicalideals.Butglobalnormsofelectoralintegrityarenotnecessarilydeeplyrootedinidealized

andabstractdemocratictheories,norcantheybereducedtotheseprinciples.


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16

II:Theemergingsubfieldstudyingelectoralintegrityandmalpractices

During the last decade, the subfield of research analyzing issues of electoral integrity and

malpracticeshasemergedwiththepromisetoenrichandtransformtheconventionalstudyofelectoral

systems, campaigns, and votingbehavior.Recentlyvaried strandsof researchdeveloped initially in

separate intellectualsiloswithinthesubfieldsofpublicsectormanagement,comparative institutions,

political behavior, and conflict studies have started to coalesce and crossfertilize each other (see

Figure2).Thisprocessisgeneratinganimportantandinnovativeresearchagendawiththepotentialto

upend many taken for granted assumptions rooted in the traditional microlevel study of voting

behavior and the macrolevel study of electoral systems. While still somewhat fragmented across

disparateprofessional sectionsandareasof specialization, linksamong thesediversephenomenaare

increasinglybecomingrecognized.Theemergingresearchagendastudyingtheseissuesdisplaysseveral

distinctivecharacteristics,

including

its

problem

oriented

focus

and

global

comparative

framework

cuttingacrossconventionaldisciplinarysubfields,aswellastheadoptionofpluralistictoolkitsandnew

datasets. The problems range in severity, including those which can be regarded as administrative

challenges in public sector management and problems of civic engagement in political behavior,

restricted party competition in hybrid regimes, and arguably themost severe problems of violence,

instability,andcivilwarsinfragilestates.

Publicsectormanagement:problemsofelectoraladministration

Therelevance

of

electoral

integrity

for

countries

around

the

world

is

easily

grasped

by

glancing

at the news headlines. Problems of electoral administration are evident inmany long established

democracies.IntheUnitedStates,eversinceFloridain2000,claimsofvoterfraud(byRepublicans)and

votersuppression(byDemocrats)havebecomebitterly litigious,fought instate legislaturesandcourt

battles (Fife 2010, Scher 2010, Minnite 2010, Hasen 2012, Hanmer 2009). Since 2000, antiquated

American votingmachines have beenmothballed in favor ofmodern technologies, but antiquated

administrative arrangements remain unreformed (see Hall this issue, Jones and Simons 2012).

Moreover,the2010U.S.SupremeCourtdecisiononCitizensUnitedopenedthefloodgatesofcampaign

spending (Lessig 2011, Boatright 2011).While possibly exceptional in the problematic nature of its

electoral administration, the United States is far from alone in this regard. In Britain, the Election

Commissionwasestablished in2000 in the attempt to raiseperformance standards (see James, this

issue), but still claims of ballotrigging, registration fraud, and irregularities in postal ballots have

heightened concernaboutelectoral security (Buckley2011).Schaffer (2008)documents theway that


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17

many other established democracies have sought to reform administrative processes in elections,

includingbyexpandingtheroleandcapacityofprofessionalelectoralmanagementbodies,switchingto

electronic voting machines, improving the accuracy and security of electoral registers, increasing

citizenshipeducationprogramsforyoungpeopleandminorities,andimplementingconveniencepolling

facilities. The effect of these varied initiatives, and their unintended consequences, remain under

debate.Administrativechallengesindevelopingcountriesareevenmoreproblematic,includingthelack

ofcapacityandindependenceofElectionManagementBodies(MozaffarandSchedler2002,IDEA2006).

Politicalculture:electoralmalpractices,institutionaltrust,andpoliticalbehavior

Problemsofelectoraladministrationare intrinsically importantsubjects for researchand they

havealsobeen found tohavesignificantconsequences formicrolevelelectoralbehaviorandpolitical

participationamongordinary citizens. Inparticular, the contextofelectoral integrity isexpected to

shapepublicconfidence inelectoral institutionsand satisfactionwith theperformanceofdemocracy,

patternsofvotingturnoutandprotestpolitics,therangeofpartyandpolicychoicesavailabletocitizens,

and theaccountabilityand responsivenessofelected representatives.Comparative researchandcase

studiesusingmasssurveysarestartingtounpacksomeoftheseconsequences(Birch2008,Birch2010,

Rose and Mishler 2009, McAllister and White 2011). Hence Carreras and Irepoglu (this issue)

demonstratethatcitizenswhobelievethatelectionsareunfairare lesslikelytocastaballot,although

converselyvotebuying inLatinAmericahas theoppositeeffect.SimilarlyNorris (2012)demonstrates

that

where

elections

are

seen

as

unfair,

corrupt,

or

flawed,

this

strengthens

public

perceptions

of

electoral malpractices, undermines feelings of political legitimacy, dampens voter turnout, and

encourages protest politics. By contrast, where elections meet international standards of electoral

integrity,contestsarewidely regardedas legitimateby thegeneralpublic,encouraging civicactivism

andreducingprotestpolitics.

Comparative institutions: Electoral systems, hybrid regimes and opportunities for

democratization

Problems

of

electoral

integrity

are

also

central

to

understanding

and

comparing

the

effects

of

electoral institutions and the stabilityofmany socalled hybrid regimes.The central issue formuch

recentworkiswhethermanipulatedmultipartyelectionswhichrestrictpartycompetitionstillprovidea

figleafof legitimacywhich reinforces the controlofgoverningpartieswithinautocraciesorwhether

suchcontests,evenifdeeplyflawed,providegenuineopportunitiesfordemocratization(Lindberg2006,

Lindberg 2009, Gandhi and LustOkar 2009). Hybrid cases are understood as regimes stranded


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18

somewhereinthegreyzonelocatedbetweenthehandfulofresidualabsoluteautocracieswithoutany

competitive multiparty national elections (such as Saudi Arabia, China, or Cuba) and younger

democracieswhichhavesuccessfullyheldasuccessionofpopularcontestsduringrecentdecades(such

as Ghana, Chile, or Latvia). Hybrid regimes hold flawed elections for national office which are

characterizedbyseriousrestrictionsoffundamentalhumanrightsandpartycompetition.Thesedefining

featureshavebeenclassifiedascompetitiveauthoritarianregimes(LevitskyandWay2011)orelectoral

authoritarianism(Schedler2006). Electoralobserverscommonlyreportincidentsarisingatanystagein

theelectoral cycle (Hyde 2011,Birch2011,Kelley2012).This includes violations arising from grossly

unfairelectorallawsandofficialregulations(seeTanthisissue);thelackofalevelplayingfieldinmedia,

staff,orfinancialresourcesduringthecampaign;bribery, intimidation,votingorcounting irregularities

onpollingday(seeCarrerasandIrepogluthisvolume);andviolenceandrepressionofopponentsinits

aftermath

(see

Bhasin

and

Gandhi

this

volume).

Numerous

recent

examples

can

be

cited.

In

Russia,

for

example, the December 2011 State Duma andMarch 2012 Presidential elections triggeredmassive

demonstrations protesting alleged vote stealing and ballotstuffing (Volkov 2012), following flaws

repeatedlyobserved inaseriesofRussiancontests(White2011).Inresponsetotheoutcry,theDuma

passedmorerestrictivelawscrackingdownonpublicprotests.InMexicoCity,aswell,followingtheJuly

2012presidentialelections, tensof thousandsmarched through the streets followingallegations that

PRIdistributionofgroceryprepaidgiftcardsbuyingmillionsofballots.ThelonghistoryofPRIelectoral

fraud bequeathed a legacy of deep mistrust in the electoral process (Magaloni 2006, Ugues 2010,

Carrerasand

Irepoglu

this

issue).

Conflictstudies:Electoralviolence,politicalinstability,andcivilwars

Peacefulprotestscanturnintoelectoralviolence,whichmayoccuratanystageoftheelectoral

cycle.Thisproblemsignalsperhapsthemostobviousbreakdownofdemocraticprinciplesandcausefor

concernasapotentialcatalystofsocialinstabilityandcivilwars.Conflictmaybetriggeredbyagentsof

the governing party using techniques of state repression to violate human rights, or else by losing

parties and supporters refusing to accept the legitimacy of the process and outcome bymobilizing

violentuprisings,

inter

communal

conflict,

and

riots,

or

else

by

tit

for

tat

coercion

used

by

leading

supportersondifferentsidesofanelectoralcontest.Themostseriousfirstorderchallengestoelectoral

integrityhavethecapacitytogeneratepopularuprisings,todestabilizeregimes,andtogeneratefatal

outbreaks of violence. These difficulties are exemplified by the case of Kenya, a country with an

emerging economy which once appeared to be steadily on the path towards democratization and


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19

development,leadingtheregion,butwhichwassuddenlyderailedbysocialinstability,riots,anddeadly

conflict following the2007elections (Smith 2009,Boone 2011,Dercon andGutierrezRomero2012).

Thedisputetriggeredmonthsofurbanriotsandintercommunalconflict;theUNHighCommissionerfor

Human Rights (2008) estimated that after this contest,more than 1,200were killed and thousands

injured, includingcasesofsexualviolence,about42,000housesandmanybusinesseswere lootedor

destroyed,withmorethan300,000peopledisplaced,costingthecountrymorethanonebilliondollars

anddeterringpotentialinvestors(Kiai2008,Chege2008).Estimatessuggestthattheseproblemsarefar

fromisolatedorsporadic;deadlyriotseruptedduringorimmediatelyafterelectionsafflictedaboutone

fifthofcontests inSubSaharanAfrica,suchas inNigeria,KenyaandCotedIvoire,aswellas inmany

Asian countries such as the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Pakistan (UNDP 2011, Global Commission

2012). Opposition protests following claims of stolen and fraudulent elections are thought to have

triggered

several

color

revolutions,

such

as

in

Serbia

and

Ukraine

(Kuntz

and

Thompson

2009).

Pluralisticmethodologicaltoolkitsandnewdatasets

Toaddressallthese issues,thestudyofelectoral integrity is intheprocessofdevelopingvalid

and robustmetricsusingdiversemethodologicalapproaches,datasets,and techniques.Scholarshave

helpedtosharpentheconceptualizationanddelineationofthenormativestandardsunderpinningthe

concept of electoral integrity (Elklit and Svensson 1997, Elklit and Reynolds 2005, Lehoucq 2003,

Schedler 2002, Bjornlund 2004, Birch 2011). To operationalize these concepts, systematic empirical

evidence

to

monitor

standards

and

identify

failing

elections

has

employed

multiple

methods.

This

includes theuseof thestatistical techniquesofelectoral forensics (forexample,Myagkov,Ordeshook

and Shakin 2009,Breunig andGoerres 2011,Mebane 2012); analysisofnaturalor randomized field

experiments (for example, Donno 2010;Marcus and Johannes 2009, Ichino and Schuendeln 2012);

crossnational and timeseries datasets drawing upon content analysis of international electoral

observersandhumanrightsreports (Hyde2011,Kelley2012,Birch2011);historicalstudiesdescribing

electoral fraud,theexpansionof the franchise,andvotersuppression (Campbell2006,Keyssar2009);

legalanalysisofspecific lawsandcourtcasesofelectoralmalpractices (Bjornlund2004,GoodwinGill

2006,Young

2009);

event

analysis

of

electoral

violence

or

protests

(Bhasin

and

Gandhi

this

issue);

the

use of administrative performance indicators and postelection ballot audits developed by election

managementbodies(AlvarezandHall2008b;Alvarez,AtkesonandHall2012);andmasssurveysofthe

general public (Bratton 2008, Birch 2008, Birch 2010, Rose andMishler 2009,McAllister andWhite

2011). The electoral use of socialmedia, crowdsourcing and big data analysis from Twitter feeds,


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20

Google searches, and similar sites are also a potentially valuable new source for data.As discussed

earlier, typologies classifying the manipulation of electoral processes have been operationalized to

identify hybrid regimes (Brownlee 2007, Levitsky andWay 2010).Moreover evaluation studies have

analyzed several policy interventions, particularly the effect of deploying international observers to

monitor malpractices (Hyde 2011, Kelley 2012). For a phenomenon thought hard to measure,

comparisonssuggestthat infactthecrossnationalmetricswhichhavebeendeveloped independently

byseveralrecentstudiesareactuallyremarkablyrobust(Norristhisissue).

Analysts have therefore used multiple tools and pluralistic research designs to understand

problems of electoralmalpractices (seeNorris, this issue). Studies often combinemultiplemethods,

datasets,andtechniques,meldingtogetherparticipantobservationandelite interviews,expert indices

and mass surveys, content and event analysis, electoral forensics, game theory, randomized field

experiments,and

qualitative

case

studies.

By

emphasizing

how

citizens

and

elites

make

choices

within

institutionalcontexts,studiesalsocommonlyemploymultilevelanalysis.Individualpoliticalbehaviorby

citizens and elites is understood to operate within the broader framework of institutional rules,

constraining and structuring opportunities for action. Several new datasets have recently become

available inthepublicdomain forsecondaryanalysistoquantifyandmeasurethequalityofelections

(Birch 2011, Hyde andMarinov 2011, Kelley 2010). On issues such as electoral violence, the legal

frameworkforelectoralintegrity,andexpertandpublicperceptionsofelectoralintegrity,furtherwork

is currently underway. Just like the issue of corruption prior to the 1995 launch of Transparency

Internationals Corruption Perception Index, problems of electoralmalpractices, once thought to be

immeasurable, are starting to be gauged systematically using crossnational timeseries indicators.

Independentmeasuresdevelopedbydifferentprojects,usingdifferentconceptualframeworks,sources,

and techniques,display remarkable robustness, strengtheningconfidence in these indices (Norris this

issue).Publicperceptions arealsomonitored in several surveys althoughoftenwithonlyoneor two

items. Unfortunatelyunidimensionalindicesofintegritymayfailtocapturethefullcomplexitiesofwhy

electionsfailandvarietiesofmalpracticescanbeidentified,whetherrelativelyminorproceduralerrors

oradministrative

short

comings,

(exemplified

by

out

of

date

voter

registers

or

administrative

errors

in

particularpollingstations),problemsofvotebuyingandgerrymandering,andmajorviolationsofbasic

human rights, such as the coercion and intimidationofvoters,party supporters and candidates,and

incitementtointercommunalconflict.Researchisalsostartingtopioneerinnovativetechniquessuchas

electoralforensicsandrandomizedcontrolfieldexperiments,todetectthedistributionandanalyzethe


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causesandconsequencesofelectoralmalpractice(Alvarez,HallandHyde2008a,Myagkov,Ordeshook

andShakin2009).

As illustratedby the studies included in this symposium, thenew research agendamarks an

importantdeparture from the standard approachwhichpredominates in the contemporary studyof

elections, campaigns, and voting behavior. In particular, the subfield adopts an explicitly problem

oriented approach and policyrelevant normative framework. Studies identify challenges where

electionsfailtomeetcertaindomestic laws,democraticprinciples,orinternationalstandards,whether

through overt state repression, manipulated electoral laws, votebuying and fraud, or failures of

electoraladministration.Researchershavealsosoughttoevaluatetheeffectivenessofpolicyremedies

designed to deal with malpractices, including electoral observation monitoring, strengthening the

capacityofelectoralmanagementbodies,improvingdisputeresolutionmechanismsthroughthecourts,

andreforming

the

legal

framework

regulating

political

finance

and

campaign

broadcasting

(Goodwin

Gill

2006,Young2009).Workonelectoral integrity thereforeoftenseeks to link theconcernsofscholars

with practitioners and organizations in the international community, combining pure research and

appliedconsultancywork.This includesdevelopingdata, indices,andevidencemeasuringthescopeof

problems,analyzingtheunderlyingdriversofelectoralmalpracticesandexaminingtheirconsequences,

identifyingpotentialpolicy solutions to realworldproblems,andevaluatingprogrammatic initiatives.

Moreoveranothercharacteristicofthesubfieldisthatthishasthepotentialtoprovideaunifiedglobal

comparative perspective which covers problems of elections occurring in all regions and types of

regimesworldwide,rangingfromissuesofelectoraladministrationandcampaignfinanceinestablished

democraciestoproblemsofrestrictedelectoralcompetitionandviolationsofhumanrightsinelectoral

autocracies.Henceonepopularstream intheresearch literaturehasexploredthepotential impactof

flawed contests inelectoralautocracies,notably for thepersistenceofautocracy, regime transitions,

andprocessesofdemocratizationbyelections(Lindberg2006,Schedler2006,Brownlee2007,Lindberg

2009,LevitskyandWay2010).

III:Overviewofthespecialissue

The papers which form the basis of this symposium were first discussed at the inaugural

workshopof the Electoral Integrity Project inMadrid in July 2012. They span a range of issues and

countries. Bhasin and Gandhi (this issue) examine the timing and targeting of state repression in

authoritarianelections. Autocratsfaceafundamentaltension:howtomakeelectionsappearcredible

(and thusmaintain legitimacy)without losingcontrolover theiroutcomes (and thus losingpower). In


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22

this context, the authors claim that incumbents choose the timing and targets of state repression

strategically.Theytheorizethatbeforeelections,regimeswillmoderatetheiruseofviolencedirectedat

ordinary citizens, while simultaneously directing statesponsored repression at opposition elites. If

ordinarycitizensaretargetedbythestate,weexpectthattheywillexperiencerepressiononlyafterthe

election.Section2reviewstherelevant literatureonelectionsandrepression.Section3discussesthe

unique eventsbased data thatwe use to analyze the timing and targeting of electoral repression.

Section4comparestheresultsofanalyzingallpresidentialelectionsinauthoritarianregimesfrom1990

to2008.Theevidence confirms that in themonthsprior andduring theelection,opposition leaders

experiencegreaterratesofrepressionthanvoters.

ThenextpaperbyTan(this issue)turnstounderstandinghowelectoral lawsaremanipulated,

examiningthecaseofSingapore.Theliteratureonelectoralauthoritarianismhasdrawnattentiontothe

useof

electoral

institutions

for

undemocratic

outcomes.

This

paper

adds

to

this

body

of

work

by

showing how a sophisticated hegemonic party manipulated its majoritarian electoral system to

manufacture its legislativesupermajority.Bymeasuring thepsychologicalandmechanicaleffectsof

electoralreformsinSingapore,Tanclaimsthattheseriesofchangestotherulesofthegameinthelate

1980sboostedtheincumbentslegislativedominancedespiteitsdecliningvoteshares.Thestudyoffers

newevidencetodemonstratethatelectoralmanipulation,orselectivetweakingofelectoralrules,can

entrenchanunevenplayingfieldthatsystematicallydisadvantagesoppositionparties.

Carreras and Irepoglu (this issue) turn to the impact ofmalpracticeson voting participation.

Theyarguethatalthoughnationalelections inLatinAmericaarenowdescribedasreasonablyfreeand

fairbyinternationalobservationsteams,electoralprocessesarestillaffectedbyaseriesofmalpractices

(such asunequal access to themedia andpublic resources, registrationproblems, and votebuying).

Theseirregularitiesreducecitizenstrustinelections. Thispaperanalyzestheconsequencesoftrustin

electionsandexposuretovotebuyingpracticesonelectoralparticipation inLatinAmerica.Usingdata

from the lastwaveof LAPOP surveys (2010), the study finds thatperceiving that a contest isunfair

reduces thewillingness toparticipate.Nevertheless receivingmaterial incentivesduringthecampaign

(votebuying)

has

the

opposite

effect,

by

increasing

voter

turnout.

James (this issue)considers theproblemoferrors inelectoraladministrationby localofficials

whichhaveraisedconcerninmanycountriesinrecentyears.Thisarticlearguesthatkeyprincipalagent

relationships inelectoraladministrationcanbemanagedbyadoptingappropriatepolicy instruments.

Jamesprovidesacase study in theuseofperformancebenchmarking schemes in theUK20082010.


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23

Semistructured interviews were undertaken with 74 local election officials from 41 organizations

subject to newly devised performance indicators. The research demonstrates that performance

benchmarking can encourage learning amongst local electoral officials and strengthen control for

principals. Thepersonal reputationsofofficialsprovideda strong incentive for them to complywith

centrallydefinedstandards,astheydidnotwishtobeassociatedwithfailure.

Lastly Hall (this issue) continues the theme of electoral maladministration, turning to

developments in the United States. The 2000 U.S. elections triggered concern about the voter

registrationprocess.Since then, twomain reformshavebeenattempted inAmerica: theuseofstate

(topdown)voterregistersandtheuseofElectionDayRegistration. Whathasbeentheeffectofthese

initiatives?Whichwouldprovethemostcosteffectivereform?Section2describesthebackgroundto

thesereforms.Section3discussestheevidenceavailabletoevaluatetheireffects.Usingdatafromthe

2000and

2008

U.S.

Census

Current

Population

Survey

Voter

Supplements,

it

is

possible

to

compare

and

determinewhich initiative ismoreeffective. Section4presents the resultsof theanalysis.Section5

summarizestheconclusionsandimplications.Thestudyconcludesthatthefederalgovernmentinvested

hundreds of billions of dollars on new state registers. This produced a modest effect on voter

registration.Asanalternativestrategy, ifthe federalgovernmenthadrequiredthatstatesmovetheir

voterregistrationclosedateto15days,therewouldhavebeenamodestbutsignificantreductioninthe

percentageofcitizensnotvotingbecauseofregistrationproblems. IfCongresshadmandatedElection

Dayregistration,theimprovementwouldhavebeenevenmorepronounced.

The conclusion (Norris, this issue) turns to the next steps in the research agenda and the

evidencewhichisbeginningtoemerge.Inparticular,thisstudyfocusesuponmeasuringmassandelite

perceptionsofelectoral integrity to seewhether there are shared globalnorms.When international

observers criticize the quality of elections, do their evaluations reflect Western/American values?

Alternativelyaretheresharedevaluationsofelectoralintegrityandmalpracticebyexpertsandordinary

peoplelivingindiversecultures,suggestingtheexistenceofglobalnorms?Toconsidertheseissues,this

studycomparesmassandeliteindicators,includinganewbatteryofnineitemscarriedinthe6thwave

ofthe

World

Values

Survey

(WVS

6)

2010

12.

The

results

confirm

the

strong

and

significant

correlation

betweenmassandelitemeasures;itseemsthatpublicandelitejudgmentslargelycoincide,suggesting

the existenceof sharednorms. The indices and datasetswhichhave been developed independently

differ in theirdesign, conceptualizationandmeasurement,butnevertheless the resultsappear tobe


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relativelyrobust.Theconclusionsummarizesthemainfindingsandconsiderstheir implicationsforthe

futureresearchagenda.


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Figure1:Cyclicalstagesofelectoralintegrityandmalpractices

Stagesof

electoralintegrityandmalpractices

Preelection

Electoral laws

Voter,partyandcandidateregistration

Boundarydelimitation

Campaign

Politicalfinanceregulations

Campaigncommunicationsregulations

Pollingday

Pollingfacilities

Ballotcount

Voredeclaration

Afterelection

Disputeresolution

mechanisms

RoleofEMB


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Figure2:Subfieldsinthestudyofelectoralintegrity

Publicsectormanagement

Comparativeinstitutions

Politicalculture

Peaceandconflictstudies


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Acknowledgments:ThisstudyhasbeensupportedbytheAustralianResearchCouncilLaureateaward

and it is part of a larger research project on Electoral Integrity based at the University of Sydney.

www.electoralintegrityproject.com

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9

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