Pathologies of Desire and Duty, Freud, Ricoeur, Castoriadis on Transforming Religious Culture

8/6/2019 Pathologies of Desire and Duty, Freud, Ricoeur, Castoriadis on Transforming Religious Culture

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O R I G I N A L P A P E R

Pathologies of Desire and Duty: Freud, Ricoeur,

and Castoriadis on Transforming Religious Culture

William H. Wahl

Published online: 3 June 2008 Government Employee 2008

Abstract This article emphasizes an underappreciated aspect of Freuds critique of

religion taken up in the writings of Ricoeur and Castoriadis: the degree to which pathol-

ogies of desire and duty imbue our relation to shared cultural forms, i.e., narratives, ideals,

and values. Both thinkers find in Freuds anti-religious polemic a valuable attempt to

address the intransigence, fanaticism, and violence that can result from an unreflected

affirmation of Tradition. Alongside developing a respect and acceptance of other cultures,

they argue for the need to establish a critical relation to sacredmeaning structures, onethat mirrors interpretive strategies within the psychoanalytic process. Ricoeur and Cas-

toriadis critique Freuds accentuation of neurosis while extending his thinking into

personal-philosophical and social-political contexts.

Keywords Freud Ricoeur Castoriadis Ethics Religion Psychoanalysis

Intransigence Culture

As a critique of western religious precepts, many regard The Future of an Illusion as a

severely reductive, even tendentious workparticularly those for whom religion remains

an important opponent of cruelty and human ignobility. In anticipation, Freud takes up

some of these potential accusations by means of a dialectical structure, through his

interlocutor. Yet, at times, the rhetorical zeal in these passages leads Freud into general-

izations that can easily be misconstrued if disconnected from his main intentions; such as

when he lays the entirety of these precepts upon the Procrustean bed of infantile wish-

fulfilment or compares religious instruction for children to a constricting bandage that

deforms natural curiosity (p. 47). Although these undoubtedly broad assertions can cause

offense, as readers, we too become overly reductive if we take them as a sign of Freudsactual view of religion. For how do we then explain his appreciation of its civilizing

influence, its efforts to attenuate the compulsiveness of human sexual and aggressive

W. H. Wahl (&)

Department for the Study of Religion, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada

e-mail: [email protected]

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DOI 10.1007/s10943-008-9180-3


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tendencies? What can we make of the coincidental aims he sees between psychoanalysis

and religion: cultivating the love of man and the decrease of suffering? Or, in what sense

is Freuds admitted antipathy towards religion only a temporary one and not irreconcil-

able (p. 54)? I can see no justification for characterizing these declarations as some sort of

compensatory bone-throwing to the opposition or as disingenuous. Given that the psy-choanalytic cure strives to make each side of a conflict conscious, rather than grant

supremacy to one side, Freud cannot possibly deny the value of restraining sexuality and

aggression along collective lines.1 His opposition to religion has no meaningful connection

with what it has wrought in terms of its aims. When we look at the full scope of Freuds

assessment, we can see that what he directs his antipathies towards are the means by which

religion instils and supports these cultural ambitions.

Consequently, we must contextualize the acuteness of his opposition to religious pre-

cepts within an intention to confront the psychological dishonesty of coercive,

metaphysically justified idealsrather than simply take it as an attempt to reject its

doctrines. In fact, we understand Freuds position rightly through his efforts to cultivate a

less compulsive relation towards religious, moral, and cultural values. This cultivation

necessitates that we do more than simply find a new set of idols for a psychoanalytic

faithful.2 The shift Freud proposes must be different in kind, precisely in relation to our

psychological investment in private and public ideals. Indeed, given the discord and

potential violence that an unreflective allegiance to inherited cultural values can foster, the

strength of Freuds antipathy towards religious illusions is perhaps not forceful enough.

His focus on the wishful aspect of its precepts, and the doctrines called upon to support

them, targets the way we go about the civilizing process. Freuds questions as to the

viability of existing forms of religion for the future must be taken in the context of thisoverarching objective: to instil greater autonomy and flexibility towards the humanitarian

aims religion has historically pursued. On this front, not only can we affirm that psy-

choanalysis and religion desire the same things, we can also see that the psychoanalytic

contribution to the aims of religion is substantial. To appreciate the significance of the

problem Freud addressesand, with the unapologetic fanaticism that is so rampant in our

own day, its continuing relevancewe need only note its extension in such thinkers as

Ricoeur and Castoriadis. Although both find deficiencies in Freuds considerations, they

strongly support these same objectives.

Appreciating Freuds contribution to fostering this new relation requires that we first

distinguish ideals as such from the emotional attachment that often governs their elevatedstatus. The frequent pathologies of duty Freud saw in his neurotic patients demonstrate

the degree to which our ties to cultural values are replete with compulsions and fixations.

The manner in which psychoanalysis actually contributes to religious ideals, therefore,

requires that we bear in mind both the qualitative differences in the nature of these

attachments and the means by which we might support these cultural objectives. In Freuds

view, traditional religions seek to fulfil their moral aspirations through directives linked to

parental love that, consequently, coexist with anxiety-inducing threats of its possible

removal. Although this method of taming childhood wishes and impulses may meet with

some success, religion tends to ignore the fact that its programme also cultivates an oftenexcessive or facile obedience. The presence of such urgency, whether applied to beliefs or

prescriptive ideals, betrays for Freud a motivation beyond conscious intentions. The

1 See Introductory Lectures, S.E., 16, p. 433.2 Here, the psychological substance ofLogos and Ananke must be appreciated. They imply the new relation

Freud wishes to establish, as I will outline in what follows.

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imperviousness of such perspectives to argumentation, the sensitivity that surrounds even

the possibility of their revision, further indicates the residues of emotional conflict. One

follows them not because of the strength of the reasons advanced in their favour. As Freud

sees it, they are supported out of an unconscious ambivalence to authoritative others, out of

a lingering desire to win our parents admiration, out of an archaic fear of their disapprovaland subsequent loss of their love and protection. In short, he sees in the qualitative

character of this relation to ideals, that is, the all or nothing mode of adherence, a clear

correspondence with latent Oedipal dynamics.

Freuds objections to religious morality, therefore, are not so much about what it seeks

as they are about fixated modes of attachment to these objectives, modes that arise largely

through the coercive methods by which they are instilled and enforced. From this per-

spective, his attempt to ground historical religious morality in rational explanations must

be understood as an attempt to bridge the gulf between religion and psychoanalysis in

terms of the relation to ethical objectives.3 In fact, significant therapeutic justifications

exist for thinking that Freud believed fixations and compulsions towards moral prescrip-

tions can and should be altered. DiCenso (1999) emphasizes this often disregarded aspect

of the psychoanalytic engagement with religious ideals, noting that Freuds invitation to

follow the gods Ananke and Logos assumes that the transformation of this relation to

cultural forms is possible. DiCenso argues that, within this view exists a supposition that

our development is not so much limited by immutable innate predispositions, as it is by

outmoded cultural structures and their formative influences (p. 35). In other words,

Freuds suspicions about religion are meant as a challenge to its overly restrictive cultural

horizon in relation to the individuals capacity for freedom of inquiry. Whether or not one

can attribute the reduced spontaneity that accompanies childhood development solely tothe conditioning of religious morality, as Freud contends, it is nevertheless clear that he

well understands the effects of cultural forces as they concern psychological maturation.

For these are familiar to the psychoanalytic process itself, especially insofar as advocating

an unquestioning loyalty to religious values comes at a cost to the emotional well-being of

the individual. On Freuds part, at least, this therapeutic connection enables us to see his

admission of coincidental aims between psychoanalysis and religion as a constructive

effort to resolve the roots of divisive social conflict.

With these formative issues in mind, I would now like to shift to the suggestions of

Ricoeur and Castoriadis, both of whom extend Freuds views on cultural ideals while

seeking the possibility of a less compulsive relation to them through the adoption of areflective attitude. As we shall see, in general, these thinkers share Freuds reticence

towards the threatening, coercive methods of traditional religious teachingsindeed, often

supporting and even furthering his hermeneutics of suspicion. Yet, each finds Freuds

tendency to dismiss the importance of meaningfulness somewhat impetuous if not insin-

cere. For these reasons, although pressing the implications of Freuds iconoclasm, they find

it necessary in different ways to supplement its original application.

Ricoeur engages Freud from a background in phenomenology and hermeneutics. Freud

and Philosophy, his most sustained investigation, argues for the epistemological unique-

ness of psychoanalysis while seeking to outline its proper conceptual home. Central toRicoeurs study is the significance of interpretation to this conception; more particularly,

he maintains that interpretative criteria within the psychoanalytic setting (not fully

3 In saying this I do not wish to give the impression that this meeting of minds could be easily realized. No

doubt, the more open relation to desire that psychoanalysis proposes would continue to raise objections from

the religious side.

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recognized in Freuds theories) serve as the conditions out of which its facts become

known. Some critics within science and philosophy have taken this position as an absolute

hermeneutics that fails to acknowledge the scientific or systematic side of Freuds

thought.4 Yet Ricoeur actually goes to great lengths to show that this is not the case, that in

fact we damage Freuds conception by a completely interpretive point of view. He sees theinventiveness of psychoanalysis as arising precisely from its combination of the real and

the ideal. We conceive psychoanalysis best, he contends, as a mixed discourse, with

neither clear distinctions between cause and intention nor between drive and meaning

(1970, p. 65). The worth and originality of this work, he argues, arises out of the unique

epistemological field it puts before usan irreducible amalgam Ricoeur emphasizes with

the phrase a semantics of desire. To eliminate either aspect would be to lose the essence

of what psychoanalysis alone is able to disclose. Ricoeur thus questions the justification of

seeking respectability for Freudian ideas by an impetuous conformity to the methods of

either academic psychology or observational science.

Most significant for the purposes of this paper is that this inclusion of both desire and

meaning must also take account of the social world, that is, how cultural values and moral

or ethical ideals impinge upon and give shape to our drives as they are introjected to form

the superego. One of the most important ways Ricoeur shows the need to address our

relation to these values is by distinguishing morality from ethics. On the one hand, like

Freud, he aligns morality with culturally enforced prescriptions for behaviour, prescrip-

tions that promote the value of social cohesion, yet without a great deal of consideration for

the desires and capabilities of the individual. On the other hand, he sees ethics as a capacity

for reflective engagement with these same ideals, thus personalizing them in relation to

ones own desire to be. Here, Ricoeur ties ethical reflection directly to psychologicaldevelopment. While retaining the importance of ideals, reflection necessitates a mitigation

of their authoritative status. One must interrogate their basis rather than acquiesce to their

eternal wisdom out of anxiety, fear or narcissistic satisfaction.

As I have argued, the dissension Freud shows towards religion as a social institution is

to some extent offset by a reciprocal appreciation for the significant role cultural forms

play in individual development. This appreciation in turn underscores the interpersonal

side of ego formation within psychoanalysis, which is not often at the forefront of Freuds

writings. Perhaps it is his own efforts to identify the universal aspects of psychological

formation that obscures what is undoubtedly one of Freuds central tenets: that, to develop,

the ego requires interaction with others. Ricoeur (1970) emphasizes this intersubjectiveaspect of the psychoanalytic perspective, noting its presence in the situations Freud speaks

of despite the tendency of his model towards solipsism (p. 61). In fact, in Ricoeurs

estimation, Freud never describes

instincts outside of an intersubjective context; if desire were not located within an

interhuman situation, there would be no such thing as repression, censorship, or

wish-fulfillment through fantasies; that the other and others are primarily bearers of

prohibitions is simply another way of saying that desire encounters another desire

an opposed desire. (p. 387)

Although we must recognize the narcissistic needs of other family members in such

opposed desires, to the extent that these are translations of the broader collective voice, a

greater portion of the prohibitions a child must negotiate are developmental tasks whose

source lies outside the immediate family. These may be thought of as pre-existing cultural

4 A good overview of these debates and misreadings can be found in Margaret Chernack Beaudoin (1992).

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desires or demands mediated through the conflicts of familial interactions. In the classic

Oedipal drama, for instance, the interdiction of parental authority carries within it a pre-

scription that requires children to defer impulsive desires for the benefit of the social order.

Although this formative enactment involves a transpositional participation by the parents,

it clearly enforces a wider mandate. Since such deferrals coincide with parental attach-ments on the one hand, and the potential loss of their protection on the other, it is clear how

the relation to cultural imperatives can be burdened with unconscious impulses. In fact,

because many of the crucial negotiations with opposing desires occur when children are as

yet incapable of reasoning their way through the demands of the Other, they must simply

adopt these codes as a way to relieve the conflict. More importantly, as in many traditional

religious societies, any questioning of these interdictions, once a childs intelligence has

grown capable of further reflection, is discouraged if not outlawed by religious and

political power structures. Given the historical and contemporary dominance of such

modes of acculturation, is it any wonder that accepting collective values uncritically is so

often at the centre of global conflicts? The intensity of their status as unimpeachable truths

is only matched by the hypersensitivity even to the possibility of rational questions con-

cerning their value or improvement. In response, Ricoeur underlines the current state of the

individuals encounter with the demands of culture as a pathology of duty. Entangled as

it is with the development of the superego, it is often only counterbalanced by a corre-

sponding pathology of desire (1970, p. 185).5

Yet, significantly, in addressing the

psychological well-being of the individual, he follows Freuds contention that what is most

often in need of attenuation is the duty side of the struggle.6

While this need to attenuate duty may be rooted in an a priori judgment, we must admit

that questioning it within religious beliefs and practices remains well within the psycho-analytic purview. Indeed, Ricoeur (1970) holds that Freuds own attitude towards religion

is not enough to prejudice the path of his forays into civilization. Despite his own self-

acknowledged status as a godless Jew, given Freuds claims that the relation of desire

and fear with religious ideas is something latent, Ricoeur contends that he succeeds in

keeping its deciphering process within an economics of desire. In his view, the Freudian

enterprise is consequently both legitimate and necessary; in conducting it psychoanalysis

does not act as a variety of rationalism but fulfills its proper function. The question remains

open for every man whether the destruction of idols is without remainder (p. 235).

Ricoeur thus sees the value of Freuds iconoclasm, perceiving something original and

fruitful in the connections psychoanalysis draws between meaning and desire. But we mustalso acknowledge the extent to which his agreement with the hermeneutics of suspicion

carries with it certain reservations. He endorses this perspective mainly insofar as it

supplies resources for his own related yet more far-reaching task: transforming our relation

to meaninga project that is only advanced by the freedom to call any foundational

standpoint into question. For, in Ricoeurs view, besides the need to alter the compul-

siveness of the relation to cultural forms is a need to go beyond the careless acceptance of

tradition more generally. In the wake of hermeneutic suspicion is the need to constitute

meaning through an ongoing self-interrogation. Ricoeur thus envisions a shift from the

5 Ricoeur (1970) expands on this complementarity in more detail, noting that while the Oedipal task centres

upon sexuality, the cultural demand requires the control of aggressive impulses (p. 307).6 Worth repeating here is Freuds intention never to give victory to one side or the other. As far as he is

concerned, the increase in ego strength and flexibility resulting from the psychoanalytic process does not

remove conflict. Rather, lifting repressions actually creates conscious conflict (when one side is uncon-

scious, symptoms exist instead) by altering the terms upon which the two sides are fought, i.e., a struggle on

the same psychological footing. See, e.g., Introductory Lectures, S.E., 16, p. 433.

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first faith of the simple soul, i.e., a faith accepted at face value, to a second, more

rational faith which, in contrast, is hard-won and rooted in unremitting reflection (p. 28).

It is in pursuit of such development that existing ego fixations to prescribed symbolic forms

must necessarily be displaced. The status of the philosophical ego and its possible alter-

ation are therefore crucial elements to Ricoeurs engagement with Freud.Seeking dispossession of the false Cogito and an expansion of consciousness, Ricoeur

enters the Freudian project through its dense metapsychology while characterizing these

theoretical writings as an adventure of reflection (1970, p. 439). Whether or not Freud

himself conceived his metapsychology in this way, it is undeniable that the psychoanalytic

process shares some of this perspective as it attempts to liberate the ego from its restricting

unconscious attachments. By the gradual lifting of the resistances that shield libidinal

fixations from consciousness, the patients relations to the world can become, if not more

rational, at least less compulsive. If we also consider the painful nature of this process,

Freud would no doubt agree with Ricoeur that, while the pleasure principle represents an

actual mode of functioning, the reality principle expresses an aim or task to be achieved (p.

267). Given that the attainment of this more realistic perspective requires a confrontation

with unconscious desires, however, the nature ofLogos and Ananke that Freud champions in

The Future of an Illusion cannot be understood as an identification with Stoic principles. On

the contrary, the resignation to reality, in Ricoeurs view, is a work of correction applied to

the very core of the libido, to the heart of narcissism. Consequently, the scientific world

view must be incorporated into a history of desire (1970, p. 332). This reform of narcissism

is experienced both as a loss and a threat since to accept the reality principle is to wound

ones narcissistic ideals. The ego therefore tends to resist such advancement, often moving

instead towards self-protective enclosure, preferring to remain within its own wishfulness.Seeking manoeuvres against these ego defenses, Ricoeur (1970) emphasizes the sig-

nificant changes to the egos status that occur in the transition to Freuds second

topographical model (pp. 11920). As a result of Freuds revised perspective, which

declares the unconscious as a psychological domain in its own right, objects now become

recipients of instinctual aims while the egos position is reduced by becoming one among

many such potential objectsthereby subordinated to instinctual aims within more sys-

temic interactions. In effect, the ego here moves from being the best-known aspect of the

psychic universe to the least known. Hence Ricoeur characterizes this shift as an epochein

reverse; that is, in contrast to Husserls phenomenological bracketing, which is intended as

a reduction to consciousness, the Freudian epoche is a reduction of consciousness (i.e., adecentering) (pp. 1212). Freuds epoche is antiphenomenological in its radical oppo-

sition to the assumptions of a Husserlian transcendental ego. At the same time, Ricoeur

insists that Freuds dislocation of the ego cannot be reduced to mere economics. Given

Freuds admission that the drives must be represented in a manner that makes them

accessible to consciousness to be knownthus becoming manifest within the world of

meaninginstinct must present itself in a way that allows interrogation and dialogue.

Ricoeur therefore contends that Freuds own theory clearly demonstrates that force cannot

exist without meaning (p. 144). Indeed, the often opaque manifestations found in dreams,

parapraxes, and symptoms make the need for interpretation almost inescapable. The egosrelation to such remote forms of meaning is what allows it, perhaps for the first time, to

become a problem to itself. No longer simply disclosed by an assumed transparency

stemming from the natural attitude, the symbolic representations of unconscious desire

necessitate a reflexive attitude for the uncovering of meaningfulness to occur.

Yet, precisely because a single adjustment of this kind cannot prevent the self-enclosing

tendency of the ego from recurring, Ricoeur (1970) cautions us against the inclination to

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end reflection by concretizing the unconscious as a source of transpersonal meaning. When

the place of meaning is displaced from consciousness towards the unconscious, he

argues, this place cannot be reified as a region of the world. . . . the first taskthe

displacementcannot be separated from the second taskthe recapture of meaning in

interpretation (pp. 4234). To forget the importance of interpretation is not only toneglect the potential alteration of the ego, it is also to make the unconscious into a false

idol. The need for certitude that this closure reflects is the same compliant relation to

meaning Ricoeur calls a first faith. In contrast to this is the hermeneutic richness made

available to an ego that remains free in its effort to exist, in its desire to be (p. 46). The

attainment of this more open-ended relation to meaning, however, would seem an even

more difficult task than the attenuation of narcissism sought by psychoanalysis insofar as

this unsettling of certitude is ongoing. Indeed, Ricoeur sees in this certitude a

false Cogito [that] interposes itself between us and reality; it blocks our relation to

the world, it prevents us from letting reality be as it is. If there is, as I believe, afundamental Cogito, it is first necessary to abandon the position of this screen-cogito,

of this resistance-cogito, in order to reach the Cogito that founds in proportion as it

lets be. (p. 278, n.33)

This fundamental Cogito, as a continuous openness to discovery, directs us to the nature

of Ricoeurs intended transformation in the relation to meaning. But in calling the natural

attitude into question, he also intends to mirror Freuds innovative hermeneutic per-

spective back to philosophy. Justifying the parallel in this case between the tasks of the

false Cogito and the narcissism of the Freudian ego, he challenges the assumptions that

have hitherto been characterized as reflective philosophy in Descartes and Kant.Regarding Descartes, Ricoeur (1970) acknowledges the truth of the Cogito as undeni-

able. Yet, as a mere apperception, he sees little that can be attributed to it. Since

apperception cannot be equated with any meaningful self-knowledge, what could it pos-

sibly signify (p. 44)? In terms of the reflexive meaning Ricoeur advocates, such a

foundation is utterly sterile. Moreover, when this, a mere intuition of consciousness,

becomes the basis of ethics, our ethics in turn become devoid of lived experience. Simi-

larly, Ricoeur finds that Kants practical philosophy is subordinated to the assumptions of

pure reason from his critical philosophy. Ethical reflection in this case is reduced to an

epistemological framework, outside the temporality and alienation of lived, social expe-

rience. As such, Kants categorical imperative is a pseudo-religious command that invitesloyalty and compliance rather than more substantive engagement. Since it provides an

a priori account of all possible conditions, nothing is left for the meaning made available

by means of an ongoing interrogation. In these restrictions, Ricoeur finds the philosophical

perspectives represented by Descartes and Kant inadequate for ethical life. One might say

that the dominance of the ego, the certitude of its place on the basis of mere apperception,

precludes the possibility of an ethical relation to others. In its place, he suggests that

reflection is not so much a justification of science and duty as a reappropriation of

our effort to exist; . . . we have to recover the act of existing. . . . Appropriation

signifies that the initial situation from which reflection proceeds is forgetfulness. Iam lost, led astray among objects and separated from the center of my existence,

just as I am separated from others and as an enemy is separated from all men. (p. 45)

Placing a transparent ego at the basis of their philosophies, both Descartes and Kant

foreclose the reflective distance required for what Ricoeur offers as a more inclusive

ethical existence. In contrast to the morality of ego-dominant perspectives, an ethics of

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reflection is inseparable from an ongoing interpretive relation to the world. Because it is far

from being immediate to consciousness, it requires an effort to recapture the [true] Ego of

the Ego Cogito in the mirror of its objects. . . . A reflective philosophy [thus] is the contrary

of a philosophy of the immediate (p. 43). The recovery of a true Ego as a process

emerges from interrogating presumptions of proximity too easily won. Thus, with a view todisplacing the limitations of nave philosophical belief, Ricoeurs sense of reflection adopts

the dispossession of the ego as announced in Freuds second topography. In his dismantling

of Cartesian and Kantian positions, whose foundations he reveals as screens and

resistances to the meaning-potential in the world, Ricoeur induces the same wounding of

these philosophical gratifications of certitude as does Freud with respect to the illusions of

the ego. The desire for conclusive truths, whether in Descartes, Kant, or in narcissism,

promotes a reliance upon the given that is inadequate to the possibilities of meaning within

existence.

It should not come as a complete surprise, then, to see Freuds suspicions towards the

ego mirrored in his own ethical views. Indeed, his opposition to the love command would

appear to be born of a similar discomfort with a priori reductions of moral life.7 In this

regard, DiCenso (1999) observes that a close analysis of these arguments shows that what

Freud is attacking are not ethical ideals as such, but overly abstracted, reified ideals

disconnected from the realities of human collective existence (p. 35). The psychoanalytic

process, in its recovery of early memory over and against compulsive obedience, seeks to

break through affect-laden relations with respect to ideals by reestablishing a connection

with their origins in the history of the patient. In this regard, Ricoeur recalls Freuds

observation that the superego, as the psychological enforcer of such imperatives, often

makes excessive demands on the ego, demands which nevertheless cannot effectivelychange the ego (1930, p. 279). This conclusion has considerable implications with respect

to the efficacy and psychological cost of instituting transcendently authorized cultural and

ethical directives. As well intentioned as religious morals may be our relation to them

becomes psychologically skewed to a large extent because they are instituted by means of

coercion. Considering the prominence of this mode of acculturation, is it hardly surprising

to find in Freud frequent mention of such relations; nor that he finds it a key part of analytic

practice, for therapeutic purposes, to oppose the superego, and [to] endeavour to lower its

demands (1930, p. 143).

Ricoeurs (1970) description of the psychoanalytic method by which this challenge to

the superego occurs is also highly instructive. The task entails that the ego attend to the realworld to draw libido to itself. Although this intends to counter the narcissistic tendency of

the ego to adhere to ideals out of compulsion, it describes the end of an extended process

wherein the analyst must first serve as the representative of the reality principle in flesh

and in act (p. 279). Central to this interaction is an ethical detachment on the part of the

analyst. This might be thought of as a second Freudian epoche wherein a complete

relinquishment of moral prescription and value judgments occurs. Through the patients

regard for the analysts education to reality, the neutrality shown by the analyst is turned

back upon the inner world so that the reality principle can gain control of the process of

becoming conscious (p. 280). That is to say, the familiar compulsive responses of theconscience are intentionally held in check so that the patient can begin to find his or her

7 We can also take Freuds well-known engagement with the Christian love command in Civilisation and

its Discontents as a critique of our relation to such forms. His difficulty with this command, when seen as

representing the relation to conscience, is motivated not only by its actual requirements but also by its

imperviousness to argumentation.

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own responses through reflection. Contrary to a forfeiture of ethics, for Ricoeur, this

process allows for a clearing of truthfulness, in which the lies of the ideals and idols are

brought to light and their occult role in the strategy of desire is unmasked.8 This truth-

fulness is undoubtedly not the whole of ethics, but at least it is the threshold (p. 280). As

this description of the psychoanalytic tempering of the superego makes clear, the psy-chological history of the patient plays a prominent role in the relation to ethical

imperatives. But Ricoeurs examination of this therapeutic strategy is not undertaken only

to emphasize the unconscious influence upon the relation to such ideals. More importantly,

it is done to show the manner by which the relation to wider cultural forms, such as we find

in religion, can be altered. Accordingly, we must examine more closely Freuds intentions

regarding the notion of an education to reality, as expressed by the gods Ananke and Logos.

A significant aspect of the psychoanalytic rupturing of the attachment to ideals is that

suggestion is renounced in favour of promoting the patients own reflective capacities. This

encouragement occurs by means of a neutral, supportive attitude on the part of the analyst,

as mediated through the transference. By withholding the authoritative directives and

prescriptive solutions typical of the religious installation of values, the analyst promotes a

revised relation to the patients desire. In this way, fixations to ideals are gradually replaced

by a less compulsive relation. If all goes well, the subject gradually develops the ability to

make ethical decisions on the basis of his or her own judgment.9 DiCenso (1999) under-

lines this often overlooked ethical element in the psychoanalytic process, recognizing a

shift to a more reflective mode of ethical consciousness in Freuds model of development,

a transition from irrational to rational morality (p. 35). This intended progression also

implies an increased creativity and responsibility on the part of the patient. The weight of

this demand for a more autonomous relation to values undoubtedly lies behind the variousresistances that emerge as part of the transference. But the continuing non-judgmental

support or Eros of the analyst is just as vital for its possibility. Therefore, once we turn to

the world beyond the consulting room, where this neutral Eros is no longer prominent, the

eternal struggle between Eros and Thanatos comes to the fore. Without the analysts

resources to help transform the relation to cultural forms, the collective resistance against a

more rational ethic is much more likely to falter. Since it must rely primarily on the

valuation of the intellect, which has lost much of its persuasive force in our mass-media

driven world, the entanglement with an obedient relation to ideals seems unlikely to be

overcome anytime soon.10

Ricoeur, however, seeks to overcome this impasse by invoking the notion of evil as thebasis for the relation to a mythopoetic core of the imagination. His study of evil shows it as

a phenomenon never expressed in the language of rational knowledge, nor as something

8 Ricoeur (1970) translates Freuds definition of conscience as the internal perception of the rejection of a

particular wish operating within us. The stress, however, is upon the fact that this rejection has no need to

appeal to anything else for support, that it is quite certain of itself (p. 204, n.46).9 Regarding the ethical aspects of psychoanalysis, Ricoeur (1970) notes that the analyst, more than

anyone, knows that man is always in an ethical situation; he presupposes this fact at every step; what he says

about the Oedipus complex forcefully attests to the moral destiny of man (p. 280).10

Freuds (1921) Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego suggests that the positive influence of apsychoanalyst can be embodied in great leaders. The difference in this regard between our own time and

Freuds can perhaps account for his optimism regarding the influence of the intellect in relation to the forces

ofEros and Thanatos. Near the end of The Future of An Illusion, he writes: We may insist as often as we

like that mans intellect is powerless in comparison with his instinctual life, and we may be right in this.

Nevertheless, there is something peculiar about this weakness. The voice of the intellect is a soft one, but it

does not rest until it has gained a hearing. Finally, after a countless succession of rebuffs, it succeeds (1927,

p. 53).

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that this knowledge can ever determine. Yet, since evil is also the ground from which

human reflection begins,11 he proposes a dialectic of symbolic forms that moves from a

first faith to a rational faith, which he calls a double illumination of a demystifying

interpretation that denounces its archaism and a restorative interpretation that places the

birth of evil in the mind or spirit itself (1970, p. 547). Although there is optimism herewith respect to the psychological maturation required for such a taskafter all, as we have

seen, culturally speaking, the analyst is unavailable to influence the disinclination to

confront ourselvesthere is little doubt that Ricoeurs dialectic expresses the defining

religious and ethical attitude necessary for more civilized human relations. Unfortunately,

in the all or nothing attitude that refuses to reflect upon ones own inherited values, evil is

too easily projected onto the other. Despite carrying the potential for ethical reflection, thus

far, it appears that evil has been an inadequate basis for repairing idolatrous relations to

cultural forms. Ricoeurs emphasis on the world of symbolic value and reflection, there-

fore, presents a view of subjectivity that may assume too much, both with respect to the

influences of culture on the individual and with respect to the social roles within which the

individual must live and support his or her existence. What good can such reflection do, for

example, when first faith social or religious structures predominate and use their power

to actively discourage or reproach independent thinking? Although the importance of

ethical intersubjectivity is clear, Ricoeurs dialectic does not attend sufficiently to the kind

of social structure necessary for its existence.

Thus, an additional consideration emerges with respect to the social conditions that could

support and encourage the reflection Ricoeur proposes. In relation to this wider issue, I find

Castoriadis thought particularly noteworthy. Castoriadis (19221997) may still be best

known academically as a political thinker with Leftist leanings.

12

Yet, his critical positiontowards Marx and Marxist-inspired philosophers shows that his support of Socialism is

neither simple nor straightforward. In fact, the ideal of freedom over and against all forms of

totalitarianism or banal conformism is what primarily drives Castoriadis thinking. The early

part of his life under the Metaxas fascists in Greece no doubt left an indelible mark in terms of

his rejection of social repression. But Castoriadis last quarter century as a practicing psy-

choanalyst in Paris allowed him to observe how independence enters into its therapeutic aims.

The principal concept in Castoriadis later writings that binds these two sides together is

autonomy, an idea that echoes Freuds cultural writings by cutting across individual and

social lines. At the individual level, autonomy is taken as a psychological achievement:

recognizing ones desires while accepting its limitations within a particular social context. Inother words, autonomy differs from the sort of narcissistic individualism that would affirm the

freedom to act on ones desires. In contrast, it entails a revised relation to desire through

knowledge and acceptance, which, of course, also places an ethical dimension squarely

within its scope. Importantly, this ethical aspect is not just the internalization of socially

sanctioned moral codes. As previously mentioned, internalization is tantamount to an

undeveloped or pathological superego structure dominated by repression (or suppression)

where little if any understanding of desire exists. Castoriadis ethic of individual autonomy is

a self-generated one that may or may not conform to that of others. Why this passion for moral

11 Cf. Freuds idea that sees all thinking as arising out of privation, as for example, in The Interpretation of

Dreams, where he tells us that thought is after all nothing but a substitute for a hallucinatory wish; and it is

self-evident that dreams must be wish-fulfilments, since nothing but a wish can set our mental apparatus at

work (p. 567).12 From the late forties to the mid-sixties Castoriadis (1975) was founder and co-editor (with Claude Lefort)

of the revolutionary French political journal Socialisme ou Barbarie. The Imaginary Institution of Society

contains his most significant political writings.

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conformity, he wonders, once we restrict desire according to its infringement on others? Such

unexamined orthodoxy brings into focus the need for autonomy at the political level. For if

one exists within overly oppressive and authoritarian social structures, a more autonomous

relation to desire in the individual has little opportunity for expression. Although psycho-

analysis cannot compel people to take up this political contest, one can clearly see thereinforcing relation between these two sides.

While there are parallels between Ricoeurs ethical reflection and Castoriadis autonomy,

Castoriadis draws our attention to the subject as citizen, the individual who participates in

the social reality of which he or she is a part. His version of reflection includes an autono-

mous creative will that also works to ensure the necessary social structures within which it

can flourish. In this way, Castoriadis counters the possibility that attending to superego

pathology at an individual level alone would reinforce, through neglect, oppressive political

structures. As we might expect, supplementing Ricoeurs two-stage dialectic (destruction-

reflection) entails giving more attention on the value of pre-existing cultural norms. Here,

Castoriadis finds great significance in the imagination (which he sees as the capacity to

envision what does not yet exist). Since he sees the creative imagination as a considerable,

though untheorized, element in Freuds writings, Castoriadis draws our attention to the

social political dimension by proposing significant transformations to his work. Although

not a complete departure from Freud (insofar as Freud actually wished for the demise of

traditional religious structures), his focus on the imagination clearly foregrounds the relation

to meaning. More precisely, it proposes that three crucial alterations to Freuds model are in

order: an assertion as to the primacy of meaning, a reconfiguration of the nature of the

unconscious, and a broader conception of institutional religiosity.

To support the call for these deviations, Castoriadis turns to the world of psychosis.With the assistance of Piera Aulagnier, he points to something more in psychotic

phantasy than mere manifestations of undecorated psychic activity. As Aulagniers work

suggests, a creation process exists in psychosis which, while it may begin as nonsensical to

both its subject and others, always contains a point at which it becomes something

meaningful for its subject (Castoriadis 1997, p. 198). Regardless of whether or not this

meaning extends to others, this process nonetheless reveals a project of reinterpretive

construction that exceeds biological functionality. Indeed, both this sort of defunctional-

ized representational pleasure and even immense unpleasure give way before the

imperative need to make sense, according to Castoriadis; such meaning making being

understood as the instauration of a certain sort of representational coherency (p. 199).Apart from any correspondence or lack thereof in relation to the meaning society has

constructed, before all else, he argues, the subject has to create a certain meaning for

himself (p. 201). Castoriadis further describes this as a three-tiered process founded upon

a fundamental image or pictogram built up from the infants relation to the primary

caregiver. Whether this pictogram is based on reality or phantasy is indeterminable. Yet it

provides the ground for all subsequent meaning the individual constructs. It is through this

image that the infant places itself most formatively in relation to the social world (p. 206).

If, for example, it is based on the introjection of parental hatred or hostility, the infant will

have severe dysfunction in its relation to the human world. Upon this starting point thesubject next makes meaning through phantasmatic production (p. 201). In other words,

the very character of a persons phantasies of meaning is constructed on the basis of this

initial pictogram. Only in the third stage is the thought and sense so necessary for the ego

added to these first two elements. As we might imagine, the second phantasy element as

well as later meaning can be short-circuited by a severely negative pictogram. The main

point of this process for my current purposes, however, is to show how the need to have a

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meaning precedes the particular form that that meaning takes. And, since the consistency

of thought required by the ego is dependent on the nature of two prior processes, rational

coherence and inner consistency cannot be the basis for what we deem to be real. This is

demonstrated by the fact that the psychotic can have a highly consistent picture of reality,

coherent on its own terms. From this, Castoriadis concludes that underlying all forms ofmeaning is a more primary creative flux, a radically unstable matrix out of which all

meanings emerge. When we apply this beyond individual meaning, we can say that, just as

the created meaning of the psychotic is rooted here, so too is the institution of society . . .

arbitrary (p. 201). The validity of one meaning over another is largely a matter of bringing

soundness and compliance together. The psychotics meaning is only suspect on the basis

of its disagreement with a wider consent. That of the social imaginary, on the other

hand, remains unquestioned simply by virtue of this same consent. Apart from this, it can

make no ultimate claim on reality.

Although these discoveries have further obvious consequences for the social world, they

initially suggest to Castoriadis that Freuds conception of the unconscious is inadequate (p.

179). In light of this evidence in psychosis, he finds the refusal to thematize the creative

imagination, and to see its rudimentary significance for existential orientation, no longer

acceptable. Because the primacy of meaning making precedes the pleasure principle, the

importance of its source as part of a prior imaginary must be taken into account.

Accordingly, Castoriadis modifies the unconscious, taking all signification as functionally

equivalentthat is, as a by-product of the human relation to a groundless, uncontainable

Chaos. Under this revised conception, all particular theoretical forms become secondary or

derivative of the invariable and prior need for coherence. At the same time, since this

coherence is part of each individuals history, the Abyss or Chaos does not imply tran-scendence, merely that there is

an unfathomable underside to everything, and this underside is not passive, simply

resistant, yielding or not yielding ground, to our efforts at understanding and mas-

tery. It is perpetual source, ever imminent alteration, origin which is not relegated

outside time, but rather is constantly present in and through time. It is literally

temporality [understood as a] time that is creation/destruction, time as alterity/

alteration. (1997, p. 322)

Thus, the notion of a fluid phantasmatic source gives rise to a dynamic unconscious that

seeks both structure and process. Time as creative flux becomes the means by whichparticular versions of truth are recognized in relation to relevance, while the passage of time

generates the distance necessary for reflection on claims of reality. In effect, Castoriadis is

arguing that the creation and destruction of social imaginary forms is what allows us to see

the limitations of each particular version of reality; and consequently, that this reality is both

relative and vital. While, as we might expect, the movement beyond the Freudian bound-

aries also entails an adjustment of the Oedipal dilemma along linguistic lines (thus showing

the influence of Lacan), ultimately, Castoriadis wishes to go beyond models of the Freudian

or Lacanian type. In so doing, he puts forward a radical new means for thinking not only

about the unconscious, but also about individual and social reality.Yet this radical transformation of individual and social conceptions will in turn require

new ideas of development. From the outset the individual, according to Castoriadis, will

have to progress

in a quite different manner. Through such development, the individual will have to

become capable on its own of entertaining another relationship with knowledge, a

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relationship for which there is no analogy in previous history. It is not simply a

question of developing the individuals faculties and capacities. Much more pro-

foundly, it is a matter of the individuals relation to authority, since knowledge is the

first sublimation of the desire for power and therefore of ones relationship to the

institution and everything that the institution represents as fixed and final point ofreference. All this is obviously inconceivable without an upheaval not only in

existing institutions but even in what we intend by institution. (1997, p. xvii)

Although these statements have a political context, the distinction between social imagi-

nary significations and their relation to the individual is evident. Indeed, to insist upon

maintaining a personal-social division would be to lose sight of a crucial aspect of Cas-

toriadis thought: that in the process of meaning making, the instauration of

significations follows the same path, whether in the individual or in institutions of civ-

ilization. From this identity, since the same phantasies provide the basis for personal and

collective meaning, social forms also have their basis in what he calls the Abyss.13

Thisdoes not mean, of course, that such forms can be reduced to mere phantasy. On the

contrary, in Castoriadis view, social imaginary significations constitute the most psy-

chologically significant aspect of human reality: its social dimensions.14 For as in the

individual, the creation of reality is born of psychological necessity. In other words, all

forms of signification contain a fundamental element of defense vis-a-vis the requisite flux

in its underside, the Abyss. As a result, each social imaginary that is instituted reflects a

necessary combination of creation and closure, or imagination and reality. Simply creating

a social form substantial enough to survive means that its constitution must close off this

Groundlessness to a certain extent.15 Thus, Castoriadis sees the closure of particular

institutions as simultaneously necessary and problematic. And yet, the ability to transformthis closureeither through direct interrogation or the eventual passage to time and the

dawning of a new perspectiveultimately requires that these institutions be understood as

having a contingent, that is, an imaginary ground. In an effort to convey this paradox,

Castoriadis refers to such structures as neither necessary nor contingent (1997), p. 330.

The groundless Abyss or Chaos at the core of Castoriadis conception of the psyche

creates an immutable psychological necessity for signification, which has a bearing on

religious ideals. For it gives rise to the compensatory need to attribute reality or being to

signification as such. Concerning the complex nature of this human relation, which

requires both expression and dissimulation, he argues that thepresentation/occultation of the Chaos by means of social signification can, in its

essence, be carried out in one way only: the Chaos itself, as such, has to be taken into

signification has to be significationand also, and in this way, it has to confer a

signification on the emergence and on the being of signification as such. Now this is

precisely what the institution of society always tries to affirm. It posits, in effect, that

being is signification and that social signification belongs to being. Such is the

13 Castoriadis sees the Abyss as a verbal, actively resisting, chaotic, source of creativity that the act of

creation itself brings about. No transcendence is implied. See Castoriadis (1997), p. 322.14 The only reality . . . is social reality, notes Castoriadis. When one speaks of the reality principle in

psychoanalysis, it is not physical reality, since even a psychotic does not doubt that he will be killed if he

should throw himself from the roof of a skyscraper. The reality he does not want to know about . . . is social

reality, filial relationships, ones relationship to objects of desire (1997), p. 191.15 This Groundless underside is, however, to be distinguished from psychotic phantasy or hallucination.

Castoriadis characterizes the nature of psychosis as analogous to totalized closure or heteronomy since it

subsumes alterity within pre-existing themes.

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meaning of the religious core of the institution of all known societies . . . (1997,

p. 316)

For institutional reality to function, societies must cover over the contingent character of

meaning by conferring being upon it and, at the same time, their own social meaning upon

being. Yet, while these same practices are taken to define the role of religion,16 they also

provide the basis for critique. Here, the failure to see the psychological ground of religious

truths becomes significant, since this leads to efforts at totalization, the widespread

closure that more accurately reflects Castoriadis cautionary position regarding these

religious impulses.

In his analysis of this totalization, Castoriadis (1997) argues that in order for a particular

religious signification to become effective, that is, for the collective to support its claims, it

must necessarily bind together the origins of the world with those of the society (p. 318). From

this perspective, what determines whether such ideals become problematic is attributing

transcendent (therefore immutable) legitimacy to what are, more accurately, imaginaryhuman creations. Also worth mentioning here is the broad sense of the term religious that

Castoriadis employs. While Western monotheistic religions have been among the greatest

conspirators against revealing the constructed nature of transcendent realms, by no means

does he restrict his critique of totalizing tendencies to these traditions. The adhesive holding

these bonds in place is not limited to mainstream religious cultures. Equally effective for this

task are rational doctrines as expressed in the laws of nature or the laws of history.

Thus, in a manner comparable to orthodox religions, many philosophical positions empha-

sizing the universality of reason have also entailed the covering back over of alterity and of

its source (p. 213). Similarly, modern science may become attached to its worldview such

that what exists beyond its particular way of seeing and describing the world may be dis-counted as either non-existent or of limited merit. In short, Castoriadis does not simply oppose

religion in the strict sense, but rather that which seeks to arrest the constantly changing nature

of significations that nonetheless hold society together within an imaginary matrix. The broad

scope of this intention with respect to the sacred is made clear not only in his consideration of

the primary importance of meaning. It is often stated in more direct terms, such as when he

contends that a believers cathexis in her Jehovah, her Christ, her Allah, an NSDAP

members cathexis in the Fuhrer, a CPSU members cathexis in the General Secretary, or a

scientists cathexis in the hereditary character of intelligence (leading him to doctor obser-

vational data) is not labile (p. 165). Which is to say, that whenever truth attempts tosubstitute itself above the ongoing creative/destructive movement of the imagination

therein denying the radical imaginary by putting in its place a particular imaginary creation

it can be considered sacred, or heteronomous. For Castoriadis, all signification ultimately

arises, and must be seen to arise, from the same imaginary source (p. 326).17

To admit this Chaos, however, is to face up to the realization that there is nothing

beyond the human domain, nothing at least which could be characterized as Being. In a

16 Interestingly, although Jung had a different view of psychotic phantasy material, he made this same case

for separation between phantasy as a meaning or reality function and its independence from the pleasure

principle to Freud directly in Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido, part 2 (c.1912). Cf. Symbols ofTransformation, pp. 134ff. Freuds rejection of this idea at that time could not have been more unequivocal.17 Such a way of stating it emphasizes the autonomous relation to signification. In more logical terms,

Castoriadis (1997) notes that, in order for something to have signification, it has to be situated on the near

side of absolute necessity as well as beyond absolute contingency. . . . This amounts to saying that social

signification . . . is elsewhere. It is at the same time metanecessary and metacontingent (p. 315). In effect,

Castoriadis is arguing that closing off the flux of possible meanings is required, but the ground of such

closed forms is and must ultimately remain contingent.

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way that is reminiscent of Ricoeurs warning against reifying the unconscious, Castoriadis

argues that to give this source a transcendental existence is psychologically regressive. It is

to enter into a wishful relation to other-worldliness that suggests the presence of an

Oedipal-based idolatry. In speaking of the emotional basis for such an attribution towards

the Abyss, he notes how the so-called

need for religion corresponds to the refusal on the part of human beings to recognize

absolute alterity, the limit of all established signification. . . . from its origins and

always, religion responds to human beings incapacity to accept what has been

poorly named transcendence; that is to say, they cannot stand up straight and

confront the Abyss. (1997, p. 324)

Such a confrontation with the Abyss requires facing ones own mortality and alienation

that the protective significations of religious symbols can never resolve. Thus, Castoriadis

extends his critique beyond religion and into the human relation with an unspeakable,

unstable imaginary that precedes and gives rise to meaning. In this relation, signification is

the only means by which we can respond to this Chaos, yet this existential flux makes all

meaning potentially religious or sacred. Eternalized significations remain a defensive

reaction for Castoriadis, although the assurances of less impulsive, rational intelligence

remain impermanent, revisable constructions. This implies that valuation is never absolute,

that it is ultimately of secondary importance behind the underlying processes out of which

meaning begins. The essential element, therefore, is that ones relation to these forms

remains tractable. This attitude effectively requires that the need for social forms is kept

distinct from the particular forms this need may manifest. On the other side, one must

acknowledge the inescapable anxiety that underlies every signification.Although the maturation required for such tasks echoes the Freudian project of ques-

tioning our relation to social structures, Castoriadis uses his reconception of the psyche and

the identity between individual and social worlds to pursue a more far-reaching correction.

To some degree, Castoriadis will follow Freuds thoughts regarding the religious indoc-

trination of children: Thus by the time the childs intellect awakens, the doctrines of

religion have already become unassailable (Freud, 1927, p. 48). As noted above, this line

of argumentation already assumes that the relation to such structures is open to alteration.

But Castoriadis sees the conditioning influences of the social environment in broader

terms. Unlike Freud, he does not restrict this conditioning to the orthodoxy of the religious

domain. In describing the scope of his position, Castoriadis (1997) observes that everynewborn baby in society has imposed upon it, via its socialization, a language. Now, a

language is not only a language; it is a world. The newborn infant also has imposed upon it

various forms of conduct and behaviour, feelings and repulsion, and so on (p. 84).

Following Lacan, these statements underline the prior point that the Oedipal drama is

shaped by particular cultural restrictions which, to a greater or lesser extent, are mediated

through parental relationships. Thus, the condition of a given social structure, that is,

whether it encourages or cuts short cross-examination, can affect the Oedipus complex.

Since the introjection of these forms (the socialization process) is ongoing, the political

world has both social and psychological import.

18

The internalization of these institutions

18 Castoriadis (1997) notes that the power of institutions cannot rely solely on coercion. It also requires at

least a minimum amount of voluntary compliance. The fact that such institutions are internalized by the

individual throughout his life underlines the magnitude of this challenge, while admitting that the ego can

only be disentangled from Oedipal dynamics to a certain extent (p. 134). Yet, as Castoriadis also notes,

nobody ever guaranteed us that we are entitled to a conflict-free inner life (p. 128).

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means that the possibility of creating individuals capable of questioning them goes hand-

in-hand with the nature and fitness of normative structures. For such interrogations are also

dependent upon the state of these organizations. The foregrounding of the psychological

difficulties involved in the relation to institutions, while obviously important, can also

serve to deflect this equally significant social dimension. Castoriadis therefore suggests apolitics of autonomy whereby cultural forms are assembled that, when internalized, are

able to enlarge rather than limit the capacity for interrogation. These forms would include

such elements as a predominance of equal rights, of human rights, and the promotion of

effective participation in all forms of power, among other things (p. 134). While the

relative dearth of such conditions historically is shown by Castoriadis contention that they

have only been approximated twicein the Golden Age of the Athenian polis and in

Western liberal democraciesthe potential for the attenuation of both psychological and

social oppression justifies its promotion over dictatorial political and religious forms.

Being respectful of other cultures does not necessitate that we passively acquiesce to their

coercive elements. In this way, Castoriadis issues a challenge towards all sacred insti-

tutions that seek to dissimulate their imaginary ground.

Since the nature of totalizing closure mirrors the certainty with which the authoritative

conscience oppresses the ego, Castoriadis sees the psychological and social domains as

intimately interconnected. As a result, the inner and outer worlds are perpetually inter-

twined in his thought. Yet, this analogy in turn becomes more than mere analogy. Rather, it

becomes descriptive of the ubiquitous expressions of the mechanical for-itself that

resides not only in each of the psychoanalytic Instances or agencies, but also in a variety

of cultural and political processes. In attempting to convey the entanglements of these

relations in psychoanalysis, Castoriadis points out that the encounter with existinginstitutions is the encounter with the concrete Ego of the patient. This Ego19 is largely a

social fabrication; it is designed to function in a given social setting and to preserve,

continue, and reproduce this settingthat is, the institutions that created it (p. 131).

Insofar as Castoriadis psychoanalytic objectives aim to correct this state of affairsthat

is, to depotentiate the magico-religious attachments between ego and superego within

this individual-social relationhe is anticipated by Freuds critique of religion. But to the

degree that Castoriadis wishes to emphasize the significance of objective relations to social

institutions, the Freudian emphasis on neurosis must be complemented by considerations

of the individual in a social world. Overcoming the sacred within the social imaginary

requires both the political freedom and the individual autonomy necessary to questionevery law that society creates.

References

Beaudoin, M. C. (1992). Ricoeurs contribution to psychoanalysis: A critique of his critics. The American

Imago, 49(1), 3562.

Castoriadis, C. (1975). The Imaginary Institution of Society (trans: Blamey, K.). Cambridge, Mass.: MIT

Press and Oxford: Polity Press.

Castoriadis, C. (1997). World in Fragments: Writings on Politics, Society, Psychoanalysis, and the Imag-

ination (trans & Ed: Curtis,D.A.). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.DiCenso, J. J. (1999). The Other Freud: Religion, Culture and Psychoanalysis. Routledge: London &

New York.

Freud, S. (1900). The interpretation of dreams. Standard Edition, 4.

19 The capitalization of Ego appears to be for the purpose of emphasizing its analogous composition with

social institutions and their corresponding resistances to interrogation.

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Freud, S. (19151917). Introductory lectures on psychoanalysis. Standard Edition, 1516.

Freud, S. (1921). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. Standard Edition, 18.

Freud, S. (1927). The future of an illusion. Standard Edition, 21.

Freud, S. (19531974). Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 24 vols,

(trans & Ed: Strachey, J.). London: Hogarth Press.

Ricoeur, P. (1970). Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation (trans: Savage, D.). New Haven &London: Yale University Press (1977).

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Pathologies of Desire and Duty, Freud, Ricoeur, Castoriadis on Transforming Religious Culture

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