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    http://the.sagepub.com/Thesis Eleven

    http://the.sagepub.com/content/20/1/5.citationThe online version of this article can be found at:

    DOI: 10.1177/072551368802000102

    1988 20: 5Thesis Eleven

    Corneius CastoriadisThe Gorbachev Interlude

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    What is This?

    - Jan 1, 1988Version of Record>>

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    The Gorbachev Interlude

    Corne ius Castoriadis

    &dquo;Among aii industrialized coaa~r~trics9 Russia remains the prime candi-date for a social revolution&dquo;. What I was writing ten years ago fullyretains, to my mind, its relevance. It is the contention of this paperthat there are only very narrow margins within which the Gorbachevattempts to &dquo;reform&dquo; Russian society can make some substantial dif-ference without unleashing a grand social, ethnic and political crisisand/or without inducing (in response to or m anticipation of such acrisis) a backlash from the military and the Party establishment leadingeither to an emasculation of the &dquo;reforms&dquo;, or to the appointment ofMr. Gorbachev to some hydro-electric plant of the Lena region. To put

    it in a nutshell: either the people will remain (as they do up to now)passive-and the possible effects of the Gorbachevchina will be narrowlylimited; or the people will start moving, m which case either things willget out of hand or a (pre-emptive or corrective reaction-not necessar-ily successful) will take place-as in China, four times running. TheGorbachev illusion is the idea (predominant today in the West, possiblyshared by Gorbachev himself) that substantive reforms, in a counirylike todaY8 ~~.ss~~, can be introduced strictly from above, that ~ru canorder people to be self-active whilst restraining themselves within somevague and undefined (therefore, more threatening) limits, that you canretain the absolutist power of bureaucracy whilst dismantling the socialand economic bases of this power-in brief, that, like Descartes God,you can send society moving with a fi-ilip and that you can change the

    system without changing it.There have bc~~j to be sure, societies and historical periods when

    a, PhaJ:&dquo;a.oh, ;!. .~~ C&dquo;~~~R~,~.h e~.991, a Roman Emperor, a Peter the Great or aCathenne could introduce, by fiat, substantive changes in important as-

    pects of the legislation and organization of society. End of 20th centuryRussia does not appear to lend itself to such a treatment-both because

    it is Russia and because this is the end of the 20th century. Because it------------

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    is Russia the present mess is too big, the cumulative remains of Russianhistory are so many obstacles to any important peaceful reform fromabove. Because this is the end of the 20th century: nobody, even in

    Russia, will kiss the attache-case Czars sandals, whispering: so let,itbe, since such is your desire.

    ~ ~ ~

    Any discussion about the present &dquo;reforms&dquo; in Russia entails a fan-tastic host of theoretical preconceptions. Many of these are put to test

    by the current events. In contradistinction to journalistic and impres-sionistic writing, we should spell them out. In a paper of the present-and of any ~~~ctic~bl~-di~e~sio~s, this can only be done in part.

    The social regime of Russia, as it developed after the 1917 Revo-lution and the subsequent seizure of absolute power by the bolshevikparty, is a total and totalitarian bureaucratic c~,pit~,lis~.2 This con-cept should not be confused with the current versions of the conceptof totalitarianism, which present an a-historical essence, both indiffer-ent to &dquo;geographical&dquo; differences (e.g. as between East Germany andCuba, Czechoslovakia and Ethiopia, Russia and China), and immune tochange. Like any other social-historical regime, and whatever its ownaims, the regime is subject to historical change, in the strong and deepsense of the word. Thus, the Khrushchev period expressed an attemptby elements of the Party and the bureaucracy to &dquo;reform&dquo; the systemwhilst keeping intact its main character, above all the centralized ruleof the Party. The &dquo;reform&dquo; had some effects-it is thanks to it, afterall, that the regime became &dquo;viable&dquo; after the wholesale madness of theStalin period-but in substance failed. It is needless to emphasize how

    heavily the Khrushchev case must weigh, not so much as a &dquo;precedent&dquo;for the attempt to analyze the current situation, but as a real factor inthe minds of

    everybodyin Russia. The overthrow of Khrushchev and

    the Brezhnev period opened the way to what I have called the rise of~~~~~~~r~~~.~ This concept never meant that a military dictatorship wasimminent, or that the marshals, admirals and generals were governing,or &dquo;truly ruling&dquo;, Russia. It meant:

    - that the Party had failed in its attempts to &dquo;reform&dquo; itself and

    to &dquo;modernize&dquo; Russian society, that its ideology was dead (the use ofideology for export is another matter), that it was henceforth void ofany historical project, and facing an historical impasse;

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    - that the military (the military- industrial complex, with its &dquo;sep-arated&dquo; economy) was the only really 66fl~~~tloFH.~.~1~79 and &dquo;modernized&dquo;sector of society (which means that the chaos in Russian military or-ganization and the malfunctioning of Russian military equipment arecomparable to theAmerican 3nes---the same noi being true for non-military

    organizationand proc

    uction);- that the overall orientation of society was in fact determined bythe needs and the objectives of the military sub-society;

    - that the military were becoming the only ones capable of carryingout the expansionary policies of the regime, at a time when &dquo;commu-nist&dquo; ideology was progressive}; losing its appeal abroad, when centrifu-gal tendencies were becoming strong and manifest in other communistcountries and when, in the Third World, the imposition and conser-vation of communist regimes had to be carried out, more and more,through some form of direct Russian involvement.

    This view was based on massive positive facts, principally: the &dquo;sep-aration&dquo; of military and non-military enterprises in Russia and the re-

    suiting huge difference in the quality of the resulting outputs (RussianH-bombs being exportable, Russian clothes not); the enormous part( circa 15 percent) of national output devoted to military expenditures;the &dquo;sk~~~i~~7 of the best cadres and workers and their co-opting inthe military sub-society; the persistent rise in Great Russian national-ism and chauvinism, making up for the decomposition of communist

    ideology. But it was also based, negatively, on an analysis of the factorsmaking it nearly impossible (not strictly impossible, this is not math-ematics or physics) for the Party to truly revive itself and to imposesuccessfully from above a &dquo;modernizing&dquo; reform of society. To avoidrepetition, I will discuss these factors below, in connection with thecurrent &dquo;reform&dquo; process.

    It is in this context that I wrote, seven years ago: &dquo;In Russia, noting

    is done, nothing h~~r~ea~s ... Against this grey background, the onlystriking events are the advances in military technology, the deploymentand accumulation of weapons, and the international policy moves&dquo;. 4 Forthe period 1964-1985, this was just stating facts.

    Now today things are happening in Russia. (The idea that it is alla trick to deceive the West or even that the moves are only cosmeticdoes not deserve a momenta consideration.) The question thereforearises: what, and why, The two are more than intimately linked. I

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    will rapidly come to the why, but before that a provisional characteri-zation of the what is indispensible.A group of high-level bureaucrats,organized and animated by an indisputably clever and able leader, Gor-bachev, has risen to power and launched a &dquo;reform process&dquo; (up to now,mostly in the form of declarations of intent-but more on this later)-The

    proclaimed aimof

    the processcan

    be summed up witi-ithe term

    &dquo;modernization&dquo; (certainly not &dquo;democratization&dquo;). its means remainvague, but two points are clear. One is the reestablishment of detenteand a halt to the arms race. The other is the attempt to introduce a

    degree of &dquo;liberaiization&dquo; (mostly cultural), and an undefined dose of&dquo;market correctives&dquo; into the centralized command economy.

    Now, given the facts of Russian king-making, it is certain that thisgroup and Gorbachev could not have gained power without in somecases, strong support, in others, favourable neutrality, in others still,prudent wait and see, on the part of the main depositories of actualpower in Russia: the military, the KGB and the highest Party appa-ratus. Parenthetically the rise of Gorbachev indicates, once again, theemptiness of the &dquo;interest groups&dquo; theory concerning Russian bureau-

    cracy. Bureaucratic grouping (and m-~ghtmg) hasin all impor-tant cases, transversal, cutting across Party,Army, KGB and otherapparatuses. In the present case also, no division along &dquo;sectoral~ linesis apparent, but between &dquo;inoderiiizers&dquo; and &dquo;conservatives&dquo;-―and this,only at the very thin top of the hierarchy.

    Indeed, despite Gorbachevs accession to power, the seeming consol-idation of his position and the implementation of some measures cer-

    tainly most distasteful and disturbing for the conservatives, the basisof his group does not appear to be very large or very solid.And thishelps to account for the slow and cautious pace of Gorbachevs moves.The elements composing his group belong to the upper crust of the bu-reaucracy, and to this alone. (Moscow intelligentsia will be dealt withbelow.) No sign is forthcoming of any active support from the largerParty. Even the Central Committee has been able up to now to opposeor to delay successfully some of Gorbachevs proposals. The moderniz-ers among the bureaucracy look like an isolated collective EnlightenedDespot. My guess is that for the time being their most warm supportersmust come from the military, who certainly have no vested interest inthe stagnation of the Russian economy, rather the contrary; and thattheir potential constituency lies with parts of the &dquo;tech-Aio-scientific&dquo;bureaucracy all over the country.

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    Still, the fact remains tha&dquo;~--..cor~trary to what appeared and I my-self thought virtually impossible in 1981~―-a group of modernizers has

    emerged, and that they have been able to capture the direction of theParty and the State. Why?

    External and internal factors have obviously been intimately linkedin

    bringingabout this result. The external factors seem to have been

    paramount in this case-as in most, if not all, cases of reform from abovein Russian history. By external factors I mean the pressure which theirworld power position, as they see it (&dquo;perceive&dquo; is the current word,6ia~~.a~ine&dquo; is the correct one), exerts on the Russian leadership. Polandhas been in ta~ra~aoii___~,~d the other Eastern European countries can be

    taken less and less for ~~~.~ted. _~~~h~~ist~.ra turned out to be a half-defeat with, on balance, adverse effects on Russias international posi-tion. (Had the Polish people kept quiet since 1979 and had theAfghansaccepted the Quisling regime developments in Russia may have been

    different.) The overseas satellites have proven an increasing burden.

    (Russian aid to Nicaragua was stingy even before the present detente.)TheAmerican rearmament may well be, as Edward Luttwak has called

    it,a &dquo;cultural&dquo; rather than a

    strategicphenomenon; SDI may ~reii be

    a technological dream and a waste of money. We are not dealing withreality, but with &dquo;perceived&dquo; reality, that is, with images, and there isno reason to think that the Russian brass are less prone to technologicaldelusion-the new gimmick that will solve any and every problem -thantheirAmerican counterparts and models. They obviously entertained a

    strong belief, if not in the total feasibility of SDI at least in some effectsof it, and particularly in its possible partial fallo~ats.

    The significance of all these facts can be summed up in one word:over-extension. (One may remember that the US military experts, whotwenty yea.rs ago were boasting that they were able to fight two anda half wars, had to cut subsequently their estimate to one and a half

    wars, and in fact were unable to prove that they were able to fighta

    q~a~~c~r ofa

    war.) Given the internal Russian situation,to which

    Ishall revert presently, the &dquo;rational&dquo; answer was to cut down commit-ments, reduce the extreme strain on resources and buy time to catch

    up on technological and industrial inferiority by means of some internal&dquo;reconstruction&dquo; .

    This part of the Gorbachev strategy is straightforward, probablythe least opposed internally, and has been carried out, up to now, ef-

    fectively and brilliantly. It is needless to comment at length on what

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    is-or should be-~~11 known about the political and diplomatic gainsreaped thereby: not only the new image of &dquo;peace loving Russia&dquo;, butthe renewed strains within the WesternAlliance, where the spectre ofanAmerican retreat from Europe looms larger everyday. Less clearlyunderstood is the net gain for Russia of the currently negotiated agree-ments. To

    sum

    up the position: 1) There is no elimination of the risk of anuclear holocaust. Even if the &dquo;strategic&dquo; arsenals of the two Superpow-ers were cut, not by 50 percent but by 95 percent, the remainder wouldsuffice to reduce the Northern Hemisphere to a moonscape. 2) If allnuclear arms were eliminated, Russia would emerge as the undisputedmilitary dominant power over the Eurasian landmass. 3) Therefore nu-clear deterrence will remain the basis of the world balance of powerfor the foreseeable future. 4) In the labyrinth of madness which is theessence of todays 6Cstr~te gc&dquo; situation, the existence of &dquo;intermediate&dquo;nuclear weapons contains in germ the very high probability of escala-tion if they start being used; in this sense, they are adding an epsilonto deterrence. Their elimination would leave, in case of acute crisis, theUS facing the dilemma: total nuclear war or retreat to &dquo;fortressAmer-

    ica&dquo;. If our brains were not sufficient, we have the word of Nixon andKissinger for that: noAmerican President would risk the annihilationof New York in order to save Bonn,Amsterdam or Paris. On balance,the negotiated agreements increase the potential of Russian pressure onthe Europeans-and make it possible to halt the rise in Russian mil-

    itary expenditures and/or to restructure these in favour of increasedsophistication of the &dquo;conventional&dquo; weapons.

    The external policies of the Gorbachev group embody the realiza-tion that Russias overall resources were out of proportion with herover-extended commitments (the same is true forAmerica), that whathad been sufficient up to now-the development of an efficient militaryindustry by means of a strict organizational separation of military plantsfrom the rest, the skimming of the best human and material resources,and of devoting to this industry a large share of the national output---was not sufficient anymore, and that with a virtually stagnant economyand very low standards of living for the working population, furtherincreases in the resources absorbed by the military sector were becom-

    ing difficult, This obviously must also have been the reasoning whichcarried most weight among the heads of the military establishment.A temporary &dquo;truce&dquo;-or &dquo;correction of the front&dquo; --was becoming

    more and more ~,d~ris~,ble. This can be easily understood if one is clear

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    about the whole &dquo;scheme1 and tempo of Russian expansion. This wasnever a one-year affair. (Marx: &dquo;Woe! The Russians are advancingwestward at the rate of a hundred miles per century&dquo;. One among hisfew diagnoses which the 20th century has fully born out.) Westernersare prone to judge Russian policies by their own temporal yardsticks―

    bywhich a

    4-year continuityin

    policies looksa miracle. It is

    perfectlywithin the logic of the Russian regime to cai-m down things for 10, 20 or30 years, if it is necessary and if it can afford it. This is not due to any

    super-intelligent long-term pianning: it is-and has been for centuries--the Russian construction of social-historical time, supported in the fieldof external relations the geo-strategical position and advantages ofRussia.

    So, the &dquo;external&dquo; condition for the Gorbachev turn is the increasingdifficulty for the Russian economy to continue to support, on an ever-expanding scale, the aggressive powerof the 1965--1985 period.But this factor, taken by itself, is insufficient tothe whole gamutof policy measures implemented, proposed; hinted at or vaguely talkedabout. The external turn could have been. negotiated without attemptsat interne change―cy with much more trivial

    ones. True enough, thedetente and the bait of the arms race would at any rate give to Russianindustry a much needed breathing space; they would not, in themselves,alter the fundamental position, the weakness and backwardness of theoverall Russian industrial base.A rnodernizatior; of industry, especiallyin the face of rapidly accelerating technological &dquo;progress&dquo; abroad; ap-pearedand ;nore necessary. But the modernizers obviously aim atlargei7, even if it remains vague. Otherwise it would not belmdenJtfiJndable why they embarked upon liberalization&dquo; measures,however limited and hesitant these may be.

    To this> an &dquo;&dquo;ir.t~tri-izgl&dquo; iact.oi can give the answer-and thisinternal factor,~s not to be sought in any ((social pressures&dquo; inRussia, It. is to be sought in the group of modernizers themselves. TheF&dquo;:-.e obviously &dquo;under ----under Western influence.They are the part of the dominant oligarchy (whether Party,Army orother) 7xhicig strongly wishes for R~sr;i6, to become &dquo;like&dquo; a Westerncountry. They iva,n:; Russia e2,i.e-, the das of (civilized&dquo; naUons―

    though of e0urse they wru-id accept this formulation. This goeffrom ~ocd ma?mei-s to ~ncoura.g:Hg rocL- music tcle-eatinor modernf-.orn Ca,~-di.~i 3 and Saint

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    ~ir~,cle-the European social, historical, political, cultural polyphony.The recurrent attempts at reform from above in Russia have always

    succeeded in modernizing the military apparatus, and basically failedfor the rest. (The 1850-1914 period is the only one where social change,of course Western-influenced but nevertheless endogenous and separatedfrom the ~t~.te, starts taking place.) Their almost permanent character(with, as main exception, the ill-fated attempts of Stolypin) has beenthe tendency to prevent the formation of a &dquo;political civil society&dquo;, of

    any &dquo;intermediary&dquo; social force able to play an independent politicalrole. Russian absolutism has always wanted to have its cake and eatit too: the programme has been, persistently, to reform society withoutsociety. This is neither &dquo;racial&dquo; nor &dquo;ethnic&dquo;, and the &dquo;Slav soul&dquo; hasnothing to do with it. It is a heavy social-historical legacy, permanentlyreproducing itself in the &dquo;Russian individu~l9 as a social-historical prod-uct, ~.nd it can be overcome only by a social-historical creaiion---whichentails a radical break with this legacy.

    Now we have a country where everything independent of the Party-State has been

    systematically destroyedand

    uprootedfor seventy years--

    and a group of enlightened bureaucrats attempting to modernize thecountry by using theAbsolute Party-State, the main obstacle to theirproclaimed aims. order you to behave spontaneously. This is theessential antinomy of the Gorbachevchina.

    ; * *

    I revert now to the discussion of the factors which, in my opinion,make it nearly impossible for a .~ae~~~~ra~a~d reform from above to succeed.

    Any such reform would require 2deas, and Kew ideas at that, asto what and how to reform. (Renewed tinkering with centralization-decentralization, endemic since the Khrushchev years, would not lead

    very far.) No such ideas have been forthcoming up to now.And ideasare never just &dquo;ideas&dquo;. Ideas are th more or less deary expressiblepart of a magma of social imaginary significations. Not the slightestindex of a process of creation of such significations transpires from Gor-bachevs rhetoric. All there is, is an eclectic poor mans soup fromwhich one can fish, within a diluted &dquo;marxist-leninist&dquo; liquid, chunksof advocacy of &dquo;demcr~,cy99, of &dquo;market&dquo; ideology, of unspecified criti-cisms of the past, of appeals to responsibility and discipline-the whole

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    under the catch-all name of &dquo;reconstruction&dquo;. Reconstruction of what

    exactly-toward exactly wkai?.-especially when one limits oneself tothe &dquo;narrow&dquo; economic iield―-which is, in fact, not narrow at all, sinceyou cannot juxtapose any economic system to any social and politicalsystem: the economy is not a &dquo;determinant&dquo; but an organic part of any

    social regime. It is impossible to see what these ideas could amount to.! will come to this at length later.

    Socially and historically, a substantial reform is not and cannot bea list of measures on paper. The idea that you can sit at your desk, de-cide &dquo;rational&dquo; reforms and have them carried out without further ado

    is a typical autocratic-bureaucratic delusion (largely shared also by theWestern establishment in their case with some excuse). For a reform tohave substantive and real effects, even considering things from a nar-row, &dquo;administrative&dquo; point of view, would require in the case of Russiathat a very important proportion of the bureaucracy, say of the orderof 50 percent, actively and enthusiastically support, implement, com-plement, concretize on the battlefield the decisions taken at the top.But we must see the question in a broader perspective. There is no

    ~ccM~A~oWc~ mo~~e?~ in Russia today supporting the &dquo;reforms&dquo;:no substantial, numerically important groups of people, with a mod-icum of existing social links (of whatever nature: economic, religious,&dquo;ideological&dquo;, cultural etc.), ready to fight for reform and invent forthe innumerable life situations whatever is necessary for their successful

    implementation. The only exception is a part of the group which is upto now the only beneficiary of the internal &dquo;libcra.liza.tion&dquo;: the intel-ligentsia and the &dquo;cultural&dquo; circles. I will come to this later. For the-rest, all the evidence-starting from Gorbachev~ speeches-poin-bsto a deep, stubborn resistance among the bureaucracy) except the verytop. Given the nature of the system and the conceivable &dquo;tasks&dquo; ofthe reform, this resistance takes the most effective form: passive resis-

    tance, inertia. In the same way, one cannot detect the

    slightest sign of popular support.The reasons for this behaviour only need a summary recalling. Most

    of the bureaucrats can see very well what they stand to lose through anysubstantive reform of the system; very few canwhat they could

    gain. The same is true for the overwhelming proportion of wage andsalary earners. Most of them have managed over the years to entrenchthemselves into positions where a slow rhythm of work and lackadaisicalperformance, plus black or grey work of various shades, compensate for

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    their miserable levels of pay. Gorbachevs slogan directed to them is:more discipline, more productivity. Anyone; even faintly familiar withthe working class movement and with industrial relations, knows before-hand what the reactions of a workers collective to such a rhetoric-and

    even more, to actual measures tending to implement it-would be. (Es-

    tablishment students of industrial relations have euphemistically calledthis &dquo;workers resistance ~o technical change,&dquo;.) Workers have always re-

    sponded to this type of management efforts by following the well-knownproverb, &dquo;better the devil you know t,han the one you dont&dquo;; and theyhave excellent reasons for doing so. The only exception to this may bethe peasants, about whom later.

    But there is much more than security of tenure and material inter-ests involved. (I~.~. In the case of the threatened bureaucrats it is notonly &dquo;material interests&dquo;, it is their whole social existence which is at

    stake.) All social-historical movements have been, and are by neces-sity, defined and held together by a new magma of social imaginarysignifications, created by and creating the movement. (Think againof the proto-bourgeoisie or the &dquo;classical&dquo; bourgeoisie, of the workersmovement-or even of the dedicated bureaucracies, mostly of bourgeoisorigin, surrounding &dquo;enlightened despots&dquo; in the 18th century.) Whatis called &dquo;ideology&dquo; is only the &dquo;rational&dquo; and rationali~~,ble dimensionof these significations. There is nothing in todays Russia giving theslightest hint that the process of constitution of such a movement andof the creation of new significations is under way. The whole enterprise,in this respect, consists in a renewed and stale attempt to prostitutethe term democracy-without giving it the slightest content. At thesame time all the verbal hangovers of &dquo;socialism&dquo;) &dquo;marxism&dquo;, &dquo;lenin-ism&dquo; persist, and nobody dares to take a stand in relation to it. Whatis to be done with this monstrously inflated ~e--editio~ of the Augeanstables: &dquo;soalism1 j 1B1arx, Lenin, the &dquo;kulaks&dquo;, the Trials, the Gulag,the subjugated nations, the Eastern European countries etc.? Emptysloganeering, abundant double-talk and materialized hypocrisy: this isall the leaders can offer. How could a. quasi-autccrat, surrounded bysecond-yank autocrats, be believed (I -rnear., ~ly, Russia; there are, ofcourse) enough Jerry Houghs this side of the ~a~~l~ ~sa,E~ to &dquo;believe&dquo; him)when he ~e~.lk~i about &dquo;democracy&dquo; and even abont a~~d~~~Ec~~~ (&dquo;publicity&dquo;rather than &dquo;tr~,r~spa~e.~c~&dquo;~~ Not only can one not detect the slight-est capacity to produce anything new; the basic duplicity and ~~~~L~~~,characterizing the regime since at least Stalin, have only taken on a new

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    form.

    In fact even posing the question seems outlandish. In a period ofworld history where all ideas are in a shambles, all &dquo;values&dquo; devalued-except that contradictory couple: well-being and the Nation-wheremarxism is an unburied corpse and liberalism a grinning automated

    skeleton haunting the Stock Exchanges, can one seriously expect thata bunch of attache-case modernized communist executives could cre-

    ate the ideas, the feelings and the passion capable of shaking out oflethargy a society which has undergone what the peoples of Russia haveundergone for the last eighty-five y~~rs~ More narrowly: how and whycould Russia &dquo;modernize&dquo;, when &dquo;modernization&dquo; is in crisis all overthe world and only goes on where it had already taken place, by virtueof its acquired, autonomous momentum? What meaning can one giveto the sentence: &dquo;Russia will create a modern industry&dquo;-when coun-tries like France, Britain, and even the United States are undergoing atremendous process of ~~-i~d~stPi~,li~~tio~a?

    Let us again narrow the scope of the discussion and focus on this,

    supposedly,more easily definable

    problem:the economy. What are the

    ideas? Where is the blue-print? How does one go about &dquo;modernizing&dquo;the Russian economy?

    For a long time, ~nPC~c~.t~~at ex-fellow travellers and other well-wishers have been pointing to the &dquo;Hungarian model&dquo;. This is to forgetthat a) the &dquo;Hungarian model&dquo; is now in full crisis in its country oforigin; b) it has been abundantly financed by the West (what would bethe scale of required financing for Russia?And would the capitalists,pace Mr. Samuel Pisar, be willing to provide the rope?); c) above ~.11,the ultimate guarantee that the Hungarian process would not get outof hand were the Russian divisions in Hungary and the additional ones

    immediately available. That the RussianArmy and the KGB are the

    guarantors of last resort for the Russian regime as well is without do~bt.

    But if a process of &dquo;reforms&dquo; were to get out of hand-and assumingtheArmy remained totally immune to what might stir the society-would theArmy be content with preserving Gorbachevs and his groupsplaces?

    Let us look at the question afresh.All the micro-measures taken upto now, the intentions proclaimed, point to an attempt to introduce adose of &dquo;market mechanisms? into the functioning of the Russian econ-

    omy. One has to go down to fundamentals, and ask: irrespective of

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    the current rhetoric, and beyond minor concessions (such as the partiallegalization of the &dquo;black&dquo; ~cor~omy), what would these &dquo;market mech-anisms&dquo; comprise, and up to what point would their introduction becompatible with social and political stability? ~ill deal with only afew of the numerous points these questions raise.

    To &dquo;rationalize&dquo; Russian industrial and similar

    enterprises bymeans

    of &dquo;market mechanisms, i.e. by allowing firms to compete among them-selves, would entails giving the firms management the right to hire andfire labour. From all we know, we may safely say that an enormousproportion of workers in Russian industry is potentially &dquo;redundant&dquo;.

    (A significant proportion of workers in the West is now steadily becom-ing &dquo;redundant&dquo;, year in year out.) To increase productivity means,t~,utolo~ic~,lly, to have the same output produced by a lesser number ofhands. This is much more dramatically true today, when &dquo;moderniza-tion&dquo; of a plant means mostly ~,~~to~~t~o~-th~.t is, massive redundancyof the existing labour force. Supposing that such a measure were intro-duced tomorrow, a huge army of unemployed would start building up.Would these people keep quiet, waiting for the reform to produce its&dquo;beneficial&dquo;

    effects?It may be argued that the dismissed workers would be rapidly re-

    employed elsewhere. This would require additional equipment. Now itis well known that Russian industry is characterized both by a hungerfor (modern) capital goods and by a redundancy of (obsolescent) capitalgoods. This means that re-~~ployrr~e~t of the fired workers would bepossible mostly on obsolescent equipment, thus lowering rather than, asaimed at, raising overall productivity.All this does not mean that thereis not ample room for decreasing the maladjustment between equipmentand labour.8 It means that this can only be done, if at all, by a pro-tracted and very painful process. In the meantime (and/or failing that),some extra ~f~ort may be extracted from the Russian workers, with thestick of possible firing and the carrot o increased wage differentiation--provided there are no reactions on their part.

    Second, a relative &dquo;rationalization&dquo; of Russian production and allo-cation of resources would entail an unimaginable upheaval of the wholestructure of the price system. This structure is violently absurd byany conceivable standards-a fact repeatedly recognized and exposedby the economists of the regime even before Gorbachev, and, recently,by Gorbachev himself. But it is characteristic that Gorbachev limited

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    himself to the prices of a few basic food items.9 The real problem, ofcourse, is not to raise the o~clal price of bread and meat, or even rents

    (I am leaving aside the possible social and political effects: cfa Poland.)It is to have the forms, throughout the economy, fix their selling pricesand bargain for their procurement prices. If such a measure were to beapplied

    overnight,or even over a relatively short period of time, chaos

    would be the result. And it is in the nature of the case that, wereits application to be spread over a long period, this would only replacesome of the existing absurdities of the price system by some others. Themeasure would of course, render practically superfluous the Gosplan andthe &dquo;Economic&dquo; Ministries in their present size--that is, it would entailthe dismissal of a huge part of the State and the Party bureaucracy. Itwould also almost certainly induce a strong upward adjustment of theprice level-how else can you eliminate queues?-and thus again pre-supposes that a large part of the population, which would, at least inthe medium term, bear the brunt of the adjustment through even lowerstandards of living, would keep quiet, meditating on the virtues of the&dquo;market mechanisms&dquo; and possibly studying F. von Hayek, translatedat

    longlast in Russian.

    In macro-economic terms, the translation of all this is as follows:

    during an undetermined, but certainly lengthy period, a huge redistri-bution of income and re-allocation of resources would have to take place,severely hurting (through unemployment and higher prices) many strataof the working population and bringing to large parts of the non-militarybureaucracy loss of economic, social and political privale~~-r~ay, evenloss of identity.And this in an already overstrained country, where thereare no reserves whatsoever (in the most general sense of the word). Theonly margin available, on paper, would be a decrease in military ex-

    penditures. (As already noted, the wish to avoid an increase in theseexpenditures has certainly been a strong motivation for ~rb~.cl~e~sdetente policies.) But how far could such a reduction go--that is, how

    far could Gorbachev take along with him on this road the military sub-sector-and what difference could it make; how rapidly, if at all, couldSS-20s be changed into ploughshares and laser-guided weapons into tex-tile machines, these questions remain widely open. Here too, one cansee masses of losers, and hardly any winners.

    Allowing firms to fix levels of employment, output and prices wouldentail practically, as I said, the dismantling of 6c~rDta~.l plar~nan~&dquo;---tha~,is (for there never was any real &dquo;planning&dquo; in Russia), ending central

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    decisions about allocation of productive resources and, to a large extent,uses of output. This would raise problems for the separate militarysub-sector of the economy (and society). To be sure, a Government canraise through taxes or otherwise 15 percent or even 45 percent of thenational income and spend it on theArmy. But it is hardly conceivable

    that the would accept the dismantlement of the large sectorof production they control, and smilingly adopt &dquo;market procurement&dquo;procedures. The peaceful co-existence between the &dquo;closed&dquo; (military)and the &dquo;open&dquo; (non-military) sectors of the economy is not easy tovisualize under the hypothetical new con dit ions-esp eci ally if the non-military firms become able to compete successfully in the markets withthe military sector for skilled and technical labour, machinery and rarematerials, as should be the case if the &dquo;reforms&dquo; were to be effective.

    Before going further, two important qualifications have to be stressed,lest the reader draws the erroneous conclusion that I am defending an&dquo;an or nothing&dquo; position.

    First, the almost total unlikelihood of a successful substantial globalreform does not entail that numerous measures which would have some

    effect cannot be taken.As Vassili Gondicas has repeatedly pointed outto me, the extent of chaos and waste in Russia is such that even &dquo;second

    ordei&dquo;? , fragmentary measures--provided they are not contradictory---may make an important difference. I had discussed myself, in Devantlay ~erre~ the obvious exaraple of increasing the &dquo;private&dquo; plots of thepeasants (note that though harmless to the system, such a measure wasnot even envisaged),

    Second, agriculture is obviously a sector where, the absurdities ofthe existing system being probably the greatest, there is room for im-portant changes. Certainly the increases in agricultural outputwould be of immediate and obvious political benefit. among allthe sections of the

    bureaucracy,the

    agrarian bureaucracyis

    politicallythe most expendable. is, however, remarkable that, up to new, onlyvery limited measures seem to have been taiken in this field (letting thepeasants have a personal stake in increased kolkhoz production a.iJ >e~kr.sto be in &dquo;,-xperi~Tent?~l&dquo; application in. a. few parts of the country). Be-yond that. one may ask if there are in the fl,74&sic~n (as opposed,e.g. tc- the Chinese) framework, seme racher riar,~:cw p

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    ampler supply of manufactured goods (the old NEP problem)? And,last but not least, could any such measures stop and reverse what hasbeen for years now the plight of Russian agriculture-the abandonmentof the land by the peasants moving to the cities?

    I come back to the central economic problem. One can draw onpaper-I have been told that W. Brus used frequently to engage inthis solitaire ~amc---~, scheme of apparently consistent transformations.State property- &dquo;peoples property&dquo; -would be retained for &dquo;big&dquo; enter-prises-~anployin~ above X people, or &dquo;capitalized&dquo; at more than Y rou-bles. Managerial staff, and even wage-earners, would be given a sharein &dquo;net profits&dquo;. &dquo;Market mechanisms&dquo; would be allowed to take careof the rest.A Central Bank and a Finance Ministry would control over-all equilibrium through interest and taxation rates. Various InvestmentBanks would fund long-term investment projects, with profitability thesole (or the main) criterion. Prices and wages would be left to clear themarkets for goods and labour. The State would raise through taxationwhatever revenue it needed for general administration, &dquo;public services&dquo;and

    military expenditures.Note that the economy would

    need,for a

    very long period, to be shielded from international competition-Leothe only form of competition which today retains some meaning-and,since the elimination of central economic controls would entail the elim-

    ination of the State monopoly of foreign trade, the scheme must beaccompanied by a huge devaluation of the rouble and/or a high tariffwall.

    If the dreaming economist is completely doped by &dquo;economic theory&dquo;(e.g. by ~.co-x~.eo-cl~,ssic~.l &dquo;economics&dquo;), he may even mdulge in somecalculus to prove that there must exist a &dquo;s~otl~&dquo; and &dquo;optima&dquo; path,leading from here to there, from actual Russia to the Russia of hisscheme. In fact, abstracting irons all non- &dquo;economic&dquo; ~i.~. from all real)factors, this fictitious situation could only be reached after long years of

    high unemployment, reduced real incomes for most of the population,and social-geographic dislocation. But even the final dreamland, oncereached, would not prove to be much of a dream. One sees no reasonwhy, in such circumstances, Russian unemployment would not fluctuatebetween 6 percent (US rate) and l to 12 percent (EEC average)--andrather beyond thelatter;. nor why the Russian Central Bank and Finance

    Ministry would be more successful than their Western colleagues infighting -inflation. Once again, the mythology of the market and theprevalence of the &dquo;liberal&dquo; rhetoric over the last ten years make people

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    forget that the &dquo;rnazket rraechanisrns&dquo;-thou~h undoubtedly much lesswasteful than the bureaucratic command economy-are themselves in

    a big mess. Just look around.But the benevolent economists pipe dream suffers from other more

    important, indeed fatal, flaws. It is politically and sociologically in-coherent and inconsistent. Not only would the envisioned process, assoon as it started materializing, unite against it almost everybody-the quasi-totality of the bureaucracy and most of the wage and salaryearners. It is impossible to see in what kind of society, and what typeof political structure, it could be fitted in. This brings me to the lastaspect of Gorbachevchina: the steps toward a cultural and &dquo;political&dquo;liberalization.

    * * *

    In this field, the situation is certainly in flux at the time I am writ-ing (mid-October 1987). Every week, there is some news referring toliberalization measures―and at least one step backwards. A typicalcase: editors of &dquo;samizdat&dquo; papers are not harassed anymore (or lessthan in the past)-~out the last &dquo;issue&dquo; (10 copies!) of GrigoryantsGlasnost was confiscated and two persons connected with it arrested.&dquo;

    1

    A Pan-Union Trade Union Congress voted, a year ago, for a resolutionapproving &dquo;democratic reforms&dquo; and Gorbachev by a ... 100 percentmajority- National activists are sometimes allowed to demonstrate-tobe arrested or harassed immediately afterwards. After the demonstra-

    tion in Riga, the 14th of June 1987, commemorating the victims ofthe massive deportations which followed the 1941 annexation of Latvia,eleven demonstrators were arrested.12 One could go on for pages.

    ~erf~~:ir~ly, most. of these cases express the &dquo;lower echelon&dquo; bureau-

    cra.eys stubborn resistance to Gorbachevs measures. But the measuresthemselves have an

    extremelynarrow

    scope.Freedom of discussion and

    the possibility of publication are always the monopoly of the author-ities; any measure of departure from. this monopoly is granted and hotand regulated by them. Everybody in the West is frantically discussingthe possibility for Jews to emigrate, and demanding it. Fair enough.But, what. about the Russians them8elves? It seems to go without say-

    ing to the Western &dquo;lilie-rals&dquo; that the Russian State is proprietor of its

    citizens> body and souL &dquo;.. 0 we have declared that, whoever among theAtbeni,3,i18 would desire once he has reached his civic maturity and

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    has seen the public life of the polis and known us, the laws, has the right,taking with him his possessions, to depart and go where he likes.Andno one among us, the laws, puts an obstacle to that neither forbids that,if anybody among you wants to settle in a colony if he dislikes us andthe polis, or emigrate to any other place, he can go any place he wants towith his belongings&dquo;. That is what theAthenian laws remind Socratesas self-evident--and which remains unthinkable in todays Russia. 13

    No doubt also, the comical ring of appeal to &dquo;dc~-~ocr~,cy99 comingfrom a man appointed to quasi-dictatorial powers by a self-coopted oli-garchy and who could only be removed by this same oligarchy, remindsthem that double-talk is always there, and encourages them to suspectthat any seed of &dquo;change&dquo; in the Gorbachev movement is already rottenbefore it is planted. But also, what would happen if people all overthe country started demanding real freedom of speech? If workers andemployees attempted somewhere to establish an independent union? Ifcitizens tried to organize politically, even in camouflaged forms-as &dquo;cor-respondence committees&dquo;, &dquo;societies of f~~~~(~~~ or &dquo;He1zen circles&dquo;? Ifgroups from all the dominated

    n~tio~~lities-~a~ltics, Ukrainians,Cau-

    casians,Asian Muslims-started openly formulating demands for moreextended rights, decentralization, internal autonomy, home rule-or in-dependence ? The main guarantee for Gorbachev that this will not hap-pen is the widespread apathy among the population (though not amongnon-Russian national activists), an apathy certainly enhanced by theknowledge that nothing that is happening is irreversible and by the fearof a backlash. But it is precisely this apathy which would have to beovercome, if the &dquo;reform&dquo; attempts were to have more than marginaleffect.As s~,id before, this is the core of the internal antinomy in theGorbachev enterprise.

    I ~ri~i start the discussion of the third point with an apparently urn-related remark. Quite likely, 9 ~d~~~~s~ is also a weapon in Gorbachevs

    hands against his political enemies within the bureaucracy-against thecd~s~r~r~.ti~~s. But in this case more than all the others, Gorbachevseems to be under the illusion that he can unleash a &dquo;research for the

    tr~ah&dquo;, and control it or stop it where he chooses. Would it -ever bepossible, under the present ~~~~~.e9 to start discussing the true historyof k~,~.~~si~, over the last seve-nty ~years? is the real question whetherStalin killedthirty rather than twenty R~r sixty million people-or is ithow and why Stalin could exercise such a power, and. what the hell wasthe &dquo;c~~~~~~,ist9 ~ ~.r ~,~r doing during this period?And does the story

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    stop with ~t~.li~-or have we to fear that some crazy historian maycome up with Kronstadt, Makhno, the terror against Menshevik andsocialist-revolutionaries from 1918 onwards, the 1920-1923 events in the

    Caucasian region?And what about the Hitler-Stalin pact, what aboutthe invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 etc. etc.? Why are our divisions

    in

    Afghanistan?What if economists and

    sociologistsstart

    talkingabout

    income distribution, social grcups and classes, etc.? Would ~, philoso-pher be allowed to write that M aierialism and Empiriocriticism is justsilly? This last is an ethereal, and really uninteresting question. Buthere comes comrade Gorbachev and declares in Prague: &dquo;no party holds

    the monopoly of the truth&dquo; . Really? Then why not many different par-ties ?

    .

    Here again, the potentialities of the situation are deeply ambiguous.At present, most of the population probably would not give a kopek tolearn if the terror started with Stalin or with Lenin. But no one can

    neglect the virulence of ideas if they start circulating-and particularlyso, in a period of tension and increasing material difficulties. Comrade

    Ligachev, in his warnings, has a very strong point indeed.

    This consideration is particularly relevant in relation to thc nation-alities within &dquo;USSR&dquo; on the one hand, and to the Eastern Europeansatellite countries on the other. What is the &dquo;reform&dquo; to do, whatcould it do in respect to the oppressed nationalities within the Empire?How could glasnost and freedom of expression be reconciled with the

    increasing aspiration of many among these towards autonomy? Whatwould the reactions of the military establishment be if the Baltics, theUl~r~.i~ia~s, the Caucasians, theAsian Muslims started lo~~d3,~r claim-ing a status different from the present one? As to Eastern %lurope--where the chaotic impact of the Gorbachevchina is already obvious-the

    prospects are even more somber. The &dquo;opposition&dquo; in these countries is

    already using intensively Gorbachevs calls to fight the ruling Commu-nist Parties. This is indeed the only part of the wider Empire where the

    Gorbachev rhetoric is amplified by social r~so~m~c~, and for obvious rea-sons.An additional factor of tension here is that the proclaimed aim of

    the Russians to &dquo;marketize&dquo; the Comecon seems calculated io extract

    additional economic advantages from these countries. The variety ofnational circumstances (from Rumania at the one end to Hungary andPoland on the other) is such as to precludes any general statement aboutthe situation and the prospects. However, first, it is here that the impactof the Russian &dquo;reform&dquo; risks more being destabilizing- and therefore

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    also likely, in anticipation, to put strict limits to the &dquo;liberalization&dquo;process in Russia. Second, the presence of Russian divisions in Poland,Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary is certainly somethingnot negotiable for the Russian military (nor, indeed, for the &dquo;national&dquo;communist parties of the countries considered, Rumania being a case

    apart). Thus, the impact ofthe

    Gorbachevchinarisks

    inducinga

    grad-ually increasing divergence between Gorbachev and the views of theRussian Grand Headquarters.

    * * *

    The questions I have discussed up to now-and which should beinsistently put to anybody talking about the Gorbachev reforms-aresimple. Who would do it? What exactly would he do? ~~ur? Supportedby av~~~,e? With what impact on Russian society, on the dominatednationalities, on Eastern European countries?

    I have left to the end the political question properly speaking, towhich I now turn briefly. Whatever the extent of the economic &dquo;reforms&dquo;

    and of the cultural thaw, the political dimension is simply ignored in allthe rhetoric about &dquo;restructuring&dquo; or &dquo;reconstruction&dquo;. Indeed, noth-ing is changing and nothing is supposed to change: the same people (atthis level, we are not interested in the musical chairs among the rulingoligarchy), the same organs, the same institutions are called upon andsupposed to behave henceforth &dquo;d~~crat~cally99 The absolute powerof the Establishment, and, within the Establishment, of a tiny oligarchynot only remains in place: it is taken for granted, and granted for ever.It is very difficult to see the ruling oligarchy divesting itself, willinglyand peacefully, from its total power, by allowing the creation of inde-pendent political organizations or even of &dquo;tendencies&dquo; (legally permit-ted fractions) within the Party. Gorbachev has taken the precautionof warning that &dquo;~ar~is~-~er~i~is~~9 remains the limit of ~~~~n~s~. In

    his Newspeak, 6S~lea~~~~~FLd~~Hg3kka9~k9? means the power monopoly of theParty and the &dquo;cA~~g~tralkzcd9 organization of the Party itself.~~

    A success, even partial, of the &dquo;reform&dquo; would in this case also con-tain the germs of new contradictions. Its effect would be that some

    important groups-managerial and t~ch~~-scieriti~kc personnel, skilledworkers, part of the peasantry and the intelligentsia-would rise to vis-ible social existence, would experience an increase in economic power,welfare and social role, whilst deprived of any possibility for political

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    expression. In the absence of democratic institutions and motes thiswould call for an increased, not a lessened, power at the top--lest thewhole edifice starts disintegrating.

    The real question lies at a deeper level. It is the question of whatMax Weber has called the legitimation of political domination and whatI call, with a broader meaning, the social imaginary significations hold-ing a society together. The manifest content of this, under Stalin, con-tained one-fifth ideology, one-fifth social promotion, and three-fifths ofterror and repression. Under Brezhnev, the blend changed: one-fifthrepression, one-fifth nationalism, and three-fifths of apathy and cyni-cism. This was, of course, a totally novel historical experience: how

    long can a society dominated by cynicism and apathy go on function-

    ing ? (For the Westerners: de te fabula narratur also.) The Gorbacheventerprise intensifies the existing disarray and chaos. It eliminates, po-tentially, whatever remained of &dquo;communist&dquo; ideology--even as a codedlanguage for the bureaucracy. It tends to destroy the myth of the Com-munist Partys history. It risks (if cultural &dquo;liberalization&dquo; is left torun its course) destroying the myth of Russian history itself-Russian

    historyafter 1917. The

    resultingwounds may well prove as

    grievous---though of course of a different nature-as those of the German peoplecaused by the Nazi period. Who are we? We are the nation which, ina ten-century history, managed to get some freedom only for five shortmonths (February to October 1917).And what is offered now is morethan incoherent. We believe in market mechanisms; then why &dquo;social-ism&dquo; ? We believe in &dquo;democracy&dquo;; then why the dictatorship of a small

    group? If th~ central idea is going to be: ~~a~i~hi~s~,z~~u.~, and the pro-claimed means to that end the same as those used by theAmericans,the Japanese and the Western ~u~~peans--thcn why call the country&dquo;Union of Socialist Soviet Republics&dquo;? It is next to impossible to envi-sion a coherent complex of signiii.cations holding the country together,Ianimating institutions and the activities of people and &dquo;legitimizing&dquo; its

    political regime.One may remark that the situation is not all that different from thispoint of view in the West. Sure. But Western societies are themselvesin a state of historical crisis-and in their case, privatization and ap-athy are &dquo;supported&dquo; by the standards of living and the consumeristderivation.15And here one can imagine, theoretically, a very narrowpass for the Gorbachev movement: if the &dquo;reforms&dquo; could bring somerapid and substantive results and/or if the population remains quiet,

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    there would be for the regime a non-zero chance of transforming sur-vival apathy into acquisitive apathy.

    The Western mythology has it that each and every country will,sooner or later, reach the marvelous &dquo;natural state of &dquo;market&dquo; econ-omy plus &dquo;liberai&dquo; institutions. To its holders, this stage seems so natu-ral indeed that they think it could and should be reached whatever theways taken-e.g. through &dquo;reform&dquo; from above. The only element ofreality in this myth, is that Western history has exerted for centuries anunprecedented influence all over the world-which, however, has not atall implied that the Western &dquo;model&dquo; was adopted everywhere; on thecontrary, the places where it reigns represent a small minority amongthe worlds population.As I said before, in todays Russia the &dquo;West-ern&dquo; influence is very strong-but, as is also the case elsewhere this is

    not the West of 1776 and 1789, of 1848 and 1871, of 1936 and 1968. Itis the West of gimmick and gadgets, easy living and privatization, rockstars and TV politicians. With some luck, Gorbachev may lead Russiato a low grade equivalent of a TV society under absolutist rule.

    It is indeed possible, even likely, that for some time the Gorbachevgroup will be able to trad a very narrow &dquo;Neo-NEP&dquo; path- -legalizingmore or less the &dquo;p~~~,llel9 economy, relaxing the grip of the State overthe peasantry, eliminating some of the more blatant absurdities fromthe functioning of the economy, &dquo;libe~~li~i~~9 information and culture.Present-day China shows that some such accommodation is perfectlycompatible with the absolute rule of the dominant apparatus-though,on innumerable counts, the conditions for such a process are much more

    adverse in, Russia. Some real differences may result both as to levels of

    output and as to the general conditions of life of the people. It will be,nice, while it lasts. But it cannot last very long, without destabilizingthe very conditions which made the process possible.

    The idea of the &dquo;reform&dquo; is to introduce substantial

    changesinto the

    system, which would make it more functional (&dquo;modernized&dquo;), while

    leaving its essence unaltered. What is the essence of the system? Itis not &dquo;communist ideology?, to be sure. It is what holds togetherthe dominant groups, the institutional and social mechanisms wherebythese groups keep their power and channel the societys resources (mostof the &dquo;surplus&dquo;) toward their &dquo;ends&dquo;. And what are these &dquo;ends&dquo;,9beyond the self-conservation and self-preservation of these groups? It isthe accumulation of Force in view of external expansion-or: Russia as a

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    dominant world power.Anything which might endanger the pursuanceof this aim or its conditions would trigger mechanisms bringing thesystem back to a new vacant of its old ways.

    Beyond the short-term horizon, I can see only three possible out-comes :

    - Either the Gorbachev group pushes on with more substantial reforms-and; at some point in time, the reacts and deposes him andhis partisins.- Or they are gradually forced, by the reactions of the bureaucracy andthe stubborn facts phrase), to water down, more and more,their &dquo;reforms&dquo;.,- finally, at a certain stage, break, a rupture, a crisis explodes, thesocial forces break loose and the population enters the stage.An openintervention of the military becomes then a quasi-certainty; beyond thatpoint, reasonable discussion stops.

    New Yor~ ~April -14 October 1987

    * * * o ;y

    NOTES

    * The main ideas of this text wereat a colloquium on "Changes inRussia and Eastern Europe" organized by the New School for Social Researchin New York,April 24, 1987. The present paper has been much expandedand, of course, takes into account the intervening developments.

    1. "The Socialof Russia" (1977), reprinted now in my Domainesde lhommeLes Carrefours du labyrinthe II (Paris, Le Seuil, 1986),pp. 174-209.A (very poor) translation of the text appeared in Telos38 (Winter 1978-1979), pp. 32-47. The sentence quoted can be foundon pages 186 and 38, respectively.

    2.have developed this point of view since 1946 in numerous texts, themost important of which are now appearing in English in my Socialand Political Writings (University of Minnesota Press; forthcoming).

    A compact summary is given in "The Socialof Russia.3. See my book Devant la guerre (Paris, Fayard, The gist of the

    argument, whichshall not repeat here, is available in English in "TheDestinies of Totalitarianism", Salmagundi60 (Spring-Summer 1983),pp. 107-122 and in the (very inadequate) translation of the first chapterof Devant la guerre,"Facing the War" in Telos 46 (Winter 1980-1981),pp. 43-61.

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    4. Devant la guerre, p. 216,

    5. Ibid, p. 160.6. E.N. Luttwak, "Le navalisme dans la politique de defense du President

    Reagan" in Stratgie Navale et dissuasion (Paris, Editions du CNRS,1985). Michael Howard, of Oxford University: "A great deal ofAmer-ican military capability is irrelevant to the requirements ofAmericanPolicy" (International Herald Tribune (henceforth quoted as IHT) (Oc-tober 9, 1987). A "senior French policy maker" is quoted in the samearticle ofIHTas saying: "The US and the Soviet Union have in commonhigh performance military industries operating in troubled economies".The Reagan rearmament has been indeed, for a good part, not only a

    strategic, but an economic bluff (of which SDI forms the climax).7. Good old Leon Davidovitch was perfectly clear about that. Despite an

    attempt to dissociate himself from the "liberal" historian Miliukov (whohad committed the unpardonable sin of writing "in Russia it is not theclasses the produce the State it is the State that produces the classes"),the first 50 pages of 1905 show that cities and bourgeoisie (other thanmerchants) were in Russia, admimistrative ad hoc constructs of Gov-ernment action, and that up to the mid-19th century the only drivingforce behind whatever industrialization there was, was the military con-frontation with the technologically much more advanced Europeans.

    8. It would of course also entail that the workers thus hired would be paida sub-standard wageor that the firms hiring them would accept alower profitability, contrary to what is supposed to be the whole spiritof the "reform". One can see in an article by one of the leading economic

    "theoreticians" of the Gorbachevmovement, Nicolay Schelyov, in NovyMir (important excerpts of which can be found in the mainAmericannewspapers of July 3, and in the IHT of July 4-5, 1987) the solemnrehabilitation and glorification of the "profit motive", similar to thesilliest analogous pronouncements by Western neo-liberals, in which notthe slightest mention is made of the impact of the actual functioningof the "profit" mechanisms on prices, employment, public goods, theenvironment etc.

    9. Murmansk speech of October 1, IHT, October 3, pp. 1-3. It is aisocharacteristic that in this very same speech Gorbachev alluded to acompensation for the planned rise in (State- controlled) food prices inthe form of increased health and education servicesi.e. of State-

    dependent and bureaucratically managed services. It did not cross themind of this new enthusiastic adept, of "market philosophy" that this"compensation" could take other forms, allowing the consumers to de-cide what they would like to spend the money on. Obviously, a rise infood prices accompanied by an increase in "public services" like health

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    and education would diminish the effectively disposable income of thepopulation, and therefore the demand for manufactured goods.

    10. Op. cit., pp. 156-158.11. It is certainly no accident that the confiscated "issue" was dealing with

    the question of Rationalities in the "USSR".

    12. Le Monde (July 5-6, 1987).13. Plato, Crito 51 d-e. It is noteworthy that when in 1935 the Russian Gov-ernment, reneging on its promises, retained in Russia, against his will,Peter Kapitza, during one of his up to then regular trips from Cam-bridge to Moscow, all the British establishment (-physicists, lawyersand politicians) took it for granted that it could retain at will any-one of his citizens. See Lawrence Badash, Kapitza, Rutherford and theKremlin (Yale University Press, 1985). So much for the "resorption" ofthe individual by the "State" in the democratic Greek polis.

    14. IHT (October 2, 1987). The meeting took place the 30th of September,in a packed theatre. The questions to the podium have been alwaysposed through slips of paper, nobody of course daring to stand upand speak out. And the anti-anti-semitic writer, Vosnessensky, lost his

    temper when questions about anti-semitism were raised. No questionseems to have been

    putabout the role of the

    Partyorthe

    legitimacyof Gorbachev himself.

    15. The latest Gorbachev speech in Leningrad (October 13, Le Monde, Oc-tober 15,1987), p. 4 amply corroborated this. Amidst the renewedaccusations against the inertia of the bureaucracy everywhere, Gor-bachev declared: "Unprecedented efforts must be deployed in order to

    mobilized all creative forces. This only our Party, the Marxist-Leninist

    Party, can do".16. See my texts "Modern Capitalism and Revolution" in Social and Po-

    litical Writings and "La crise des socits occidentales" (1982); English(poor) version in Telos 53 (Fall 1982).