Overcoming Financial Barriers for Exporters- SEMINAR STIINTIFIC

7/31/2019 Overcoming Financial Barriers for Exporters- SEMINAR STIINTIFIC

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CAPITOLUL I

OVERCOMING FINANCIAL

BARRIERS FOR EXPORTERS INAUSTRALIA

1.Documentary credit guaranteesAs an exporter, a documentary credit guarantee from EFIC enables you to rely on your

bank in Australia for payment, rather than your buyers bank overseas. A documentary crediguarantee can help both protect your export revenue and finance your export activity.

If your bank is unwilling to take the risk on your buyers bank for payments due to youunder a documentary credit (also known as a documentary letter of credit), EFIC can providedocumentary credit guarantee to your bank and assume the credit risk on your buyers bank. AEFICs guarantee secures payment under the documentary credit issued by your buyers bank, itenables your bank to confirm that it will make payments to you.

A documentary credit guarantee can help protect your export contract payments. It givesyou increased confidence that if you provide your bank with the documents required by thedocumentary credit, you will receive payments due to you.

In addition, if youre unable to obtain working capital to finance an export contract because your bank wont confirm a documentary credit, a documentary credit guarantee fromEFIC may help. If your bank is comfortable with your ability to meet your performance

obligations under an export contract, the guarantee from EFIC can enable your bank to confirmthe documentary credit, discount the payments under it and make working capital available toyou.

What are the benefits?

Gives you increased confidence that if you comply with the terms of the documentacredit, you will receive payment

There is no recourse to you if the buyers bank doesnt pay your bank May enable your bank to advance working capital to you

How does the document credit guarantee work?1. You enter into an export contract with your overseas buyer 2. Your buyer instructs their bank to issue a documentary credit (also known as a documenta

letter of credit) to your bank to make export contract payments to you3. Your buyers bank issues the documentary credit to your bank4. EFIC issues a documentary credit guarantee to your bank, securing payment on t

documentary credit by the buyers bank

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5. Your bank confirms the documentary credit. When you have performed your contractuobligations, you deliver to your bank the documents stipulated in the documentary credit

6. Your bank makes payments to you.

Documentary credit guarantees

Terms and conditions

Terms and conditions will be negotiated during the application process. The followinguidelines provide an indication of typical requirements:

Eligibility

You should be an Australian exporter producing goods or services for export which havsubstantial Australian content.

Generally, the export contract to be supported by the guarantee will have a value of betwe$1 million and $10 million.

Maximum value

The guarantee is normally for up to 100% of the amount of the underlying documentacredit, which is generally limited to 85% of the export contract value.

Term

The guarantee will apply for the duration of the underlying documentary credit.

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Fees & charges

Fees and charges vary depending upon a number of factors including EFICs risassessment, term and security.

Security

No security is required from the Australian exporter.

NOTE: The information provided, including on terms and conditions, is supplied as a gener guideline only. EFICs compliance with legislation and OECD guidelines, together with its credassessment and other policies, influence the actual terms and conditions that may be applicable tany eventual transaction with EFIC.

The information provided does not comprise advice or a recommendation and EFIC makes nrepresentation or warranty relating to it. To the maximum extent permitted by law, EFIC will nobe liable for any direct or indirect loss or damage incurred by any person on the basis of thisinformation.1

2. Medium term export payments insuranceIn general, the longer the payment period in your export contract, the higher the risk of no

payment by overseas buyers and the greater the pressure on your working capital.

If your export contract has a payment period of more than two years, export paymeninsurance from EFIC can protect you against the risk of non-payment due to defined commercand political events. Commercial events may include your buyers insolvency or their wrong

breach of contract payment obligations. Political events may include war, civil war and riot, application of foreign laws that interfere with the contract and the inability to convert local curreor to transfer currency out of your buyers country.


Helps to protect your export payment stream by reducing your financial risk Provides up to 100% cover against non-payment due to defined political risks Provides up to 90% cover against non-payment due to defined commercial risks Enables you to offer buyers extended payment terms, making you more competitive.

How does export payments insurance work?

1. You enter into an export contract with your overseas buyer which gives your buyer extend payment terms

2. EFIC provides export payments insurance to you, covering you against the risk of no payment by your buyer due to defined commercial or political events.

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Medium term export payments insurance


Terms and conditions will be negotiated during the application process. The followinguidelines provide an indication of typical requirements:

Eligibility

You should be an Australian exporter producing capital goods or services for export which hasubstantial Australian content.

Generally, the export contract to be covered by the insurance policy will have a minimumvalue of $500,000.

Level of cover

The level of indemnity is generally up to 100% for any loss resulting from defined politicevents and 90% for defined commercial risks.

Maximum Amount

Generally limited to 85% of the export contract value.

Term

The export payment period will normally be a minimum of two years and a maximumfive years.

Fees & charges

Fees and charges vary depending upon a number of factors including EFICs risassessment and the term of the policy.

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Security

No security is required.

Exclusions

Exclusions will be set out in the policy. NOTE: The information provided, including on terms and conditions, is supplied as a gener guideline only. EFICs compliance with legislation and OECD guidelines, together with its credassessment and other policies, influence the actual terms and conditions that may be applicable tany eventual transaction with EFIC.

The information provided does not comprise advice or a recommendation and EFIC makes nrepresentation or warranty relating to it. To the maximum extent permitted by law, EFIC will nobe liable for any direct or indirect loss or damage incurred by any person on the basis of thisinformation.

3. Foreign exchange facility guaranteeFor exporters, adverse movements in exchange rates are an inherent risk of doing busines

in international markets. For example, if you pay your suppliers in Australian dollars but receiv payment for your exports in US dollars, unfavourable shifts in the exchange rate of the currenciemay affect your profit margin.

A foreign exchange facility can help you protect your export profits from exchange ratefluctuations by locking in exchange rates and allowing you to hedge your currency exposure. Thmore of your export contracts you can hedge, the greater your control over foreign exchange risk

With a foreign exchange facility guarantee from EFIC, participating foreign exchangespecialists can increase the trading limit on the foreign exchange facility they offer. For exportersthis means you can extend your hedging program to more of your export contracts and better protect your export profits.

Generally, you dont need to provide security for a foreign exchange facility guaranteefrom EFIC. This can help to free up your working capital to take on further export contracts.


Hedge more of your export contracts which can help to better protect your export profits In most cases, EFIC does not require security for the guarantee, which can help to free u

your working capital No additional fee is payable by you for the guarantee.

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How does the foreign exchange facility guarantee work?

1. You have or have approval for a foreign exchange facility with a participating foreignexchange specialist

2. You request from your foreign exchange specialist an EFIC foreign exchange facilityguarantee to increase the trading limit on your facility

3. If EFIC approves the application, it provides a foreign exchange facility guarantee to youforeign exchange specialist

4. The foreign exchange specialist increases your trading limit, enabling you to hedge morof your export contracts.


Terms and conditions are subject to negotiation. The following guidelines are typical

requirements.Eligibility

You should be an Australian exporter and:

have or have approval for a foreign exchange facility with a participating foreignexchange specialist which relates to foreign exchange forward contracts (and, for eligiblecustomers, option contracts) for hedging purposes only

in the last 12 months, have exported goods or services to at least the value of the foreignexchange facility guarantee.

Amount of guarantee

For eligible customers, the guarantee can, depending on your specific circumstances, facilitatean additional trading limit of up to $2.5 million.

Term

The term of theforeign exchange facility guarantee may be up to 12 months.

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Fees & charges

You pay no additional fees or charges to obtain a foreign exchange facility guarantee.

Security

Generally, EFIC does not require additional security from you for the foreign exchangefacility guar antee that it provides to your foreign exchange specialist.

NOTE: Information on terms and conditions is supplied as a guideline only. EFICs compliancwith legislation and OECD guidelines, together with its credit assessment and other policiesinfluence the actual terms and conditions that may be applicable to any eventual transaction wit EFIC.

The information provided does not comprise advice or a recommendation and EFIC makes nrepresentation or warranty relating to it. To the maximum extent permitted by law, EFIC will no

be liable for any direct or indirect loss or damage incurred by any person on the basis of thisinformation.

4.a) Political risk insurance for investors When you embark on an overseas investment or project, you accept that it will involv

commercial risk. However, your investment may be located in a country with an unstable politienvironment. Because of the unique nature of political risks and their potential for significant impactan investment or project, you may wish to consider taking out political risk insurance (PRI) with EFIChelp protect against financial losses caused by political events.

EFICs PRI Investor policy is available for investments in new overseas companies and projects ,new capital injections to existing investments and projects, and expansions of existing investments provides cover against losses due to political events specified in the policy, which may include:

expropriation for example, nationalisation or confiscation of your investment or projec by the government of the host country

war damage political violence inability to convert local currency or transfer currency out of the host country deprivation for example, the host government cancelling an approval to export from

the host country the output of the investment or project, permanently preventing it fromoperating

forced abandonment abandonment of your investment or project on the advice of the Australian government.

In certain circumstances, cover can also be provided for other political events, such asselective discrimination or default of an arbitral award by the host government following a breacof contract.

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The PRI Investor policy covers loss of:

investment in the form of direct equity in or shareholder loans to an overseas company, orguarantees given on third party loans made to the overseas company

return on investment, such as dividends and retained earnings from an investment in theoverseas company.


Helps protect your overseas investment or project from financial loss caused by specified political events.

Can give you greater confidence to undertake a major overseas investment or project in anemerging or developing market.

How does political risk insurance work?

1. You invest in an overseas company or project.2. EFIC provides political risk insurance to help protect you from losses on your oversea

investment due to specified political events.


Terms and conditions will be negotiated during the application process. The followingguidelines provide an indication of typical requirements:

Eligibility

You should be a company carrying on business in Australia (or its subsidiary) that is investingin an overseas company or project.

Before undertaking the investment, you must have given EFIC written notice of your intentioto enter into a PRI contract with EFIC.

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Level of cover

EFIC can indemnify you for up to 90% of the loss insured.

Term

A policy can have an extended term, reflecting the nature of the investment. The maximumterm is 10 years.

Fees & charges

EFICs premium depends on factors including the location and type of the investment or project, the term of the policy and the risks insured.

NOTE: Information on terms and conditions is supplied as a guideline only. EFICs compliancwith legislation and OECD guidelines, together with its risk assessment and other policiesinfluence the actual terms and conditions that may be applicable to any eventual transaction wit EFIC.

4.b) Political risk insurance for contractorsWhen you participate in an overseas project as a contractor or investor, you accept

that it will involve commercial risk. However, the project in which your plant and equipment i

used may be located in a country with an unstable political environment. Because of the uniqunature of political risks and their potential for significant impact on your assets, you mayconsider taking out political risk insurance (PRI) with EFIC.

EFICs PRI Plant and Equipment policy can protect you against financial loss due to lossof use or possession, damage to or destruction of your plant and equipment caused by politicaevents specified in the insurance policy. The political events may include:

expropriation for example, confiscation of your plant and equipment by the governmenof the host country

war damage political violence

deprivation for example, refusal by the host government to issue a licence to export you plant and equipment from the host country (if that licence could have been obtained at thestart of the policy)

forced abandonment abandonment of your plant and equipment on the advice of theAustralian government.

PRI is available for plant and equipment that you own. It can also cover leased plant andequipment, depending on the type of lease arrangement.

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Helps protect you from financial loss if specified political events affect your plant andequipment located overseas.

Can give you greater confidence to participate as a contractor or investor in an oversea project located in an emerging or developing market.


1. You invest in or deploy plant and equipment for a project located overseas.2. EFIC provides political risk insurance to help protect you from financial loss due to loss o

use or possession, damage to or destruction of your plant and equipment caused byspecified political events.



Eligibility

You should be a company carrying on business in Australia (or its subsidiary) that is investingin or deploying plant and equipment for use in an overseas project.

Level of cover

Up to 90% of the loss insured, or up to 100% if you (the insured) assum a first lossamount.

Term

The policy term can match the contract term, the term of deployment of the plant andequipment or, for leased assets, the term of the lease. The maximum term is 10 years.

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Fees & charges

EFICs premium depends on factors such as the location and type of the investment or projec period of insurance and type of cover.

NOTE: Information on terms and conditions is supplied as a guideline only. EFICs compliance

with legislation and OECD guidelines, together with its risk assessment and other policies,influence the actual terms and conditions that may be applicable to any eventual transaction with EFIC.

4.c) Political risk insurance for financiersWhen a financial institution makes a loan to an overseas project or investment involvi

an Australian investor or sponsor, or provides a hedge facility to the project or investmentconnection with such a loan, the financial institution accepts that the project or investment winvolve commercial risk.

However, the project or investment may be located in a country with an unstable politicenvironment. Political events can cause significant difficulties for a project, including preventthose involved from meeting their financial commitments. As a result, the financial institutiwhether acting as a lender or hedge provider, may consider taking out political risk insuran(PRI) with EFIC to protect it from financial loss caused by particular political events.

EFICs PRI Lender policy can insure a lender against the borrower defaulting onscheduled loan payments due to a specified political event.

EFICs PRI Hedge Bank policy can insure a hedge bank against a hedge counterpartys:

non-payment of an amount when due or non-delivery of an agreed quantity and quality of a commodity (such as gold or copper)

under a hedge facility due to a specified political event.

A PRI Hedge Bank policy is typically issued with a PRI Lender policy, when a projectfinance loan requires that a hedge facility be in place. In that case, the borrower under the loanfacility is also the company to which the hedge bank is providing the hedge facility (the hedgcounterparty).

PRI for lenders or hedge providers covers financial loss due to political events specified in the policy, which may include:

expropriation for example, nationalisation or confiscation of the investment or project bythe government of the host country

war damage political violence inability to convert local currency or transfer currency out of the host country deprivation for example, the host government cancelling a licence to export the output o

the investment or project, permanently preventing it from operating

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forced abandonment abandonment of an overseas company or project on the advice othe Australian government.

In certain circumstances, cover can also be provided for other political events, such selective discrimination or default by the host government of an arbitral award following a breof contract.

PRI cover for lenders and hedge banks is available for investments in both new and existicompanies and projects.


Helps protect the lender or hedge bank from financial loss due to specified politicalevents.

Can give the financial institution more confidence to finance a project or investment in anemerging or developing market.


1. A financial institution provides a loan to an Australian investor for its participation in anoverseas company or project and/or a hedge facility in relation to the loan.

2. The Australian investor makes an investment in the overseas company or project.3. EFIC provides political risk insurance to help protect the financial institution from

financial losses due to specified political events.



Eligibility

You should be a financial institution (or its subsidiary) carrying on business in Australia that i providing either or both of:

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a loan to an overseas project or company or a hedge facility associated with a loan to an overseas project or company.

The construction or operation of the project or company must involve an Australian sponsor oAustralian-sourced goods or services.

Level of cover

Up to 100% of the loss insured.

Term

The policy term usually matches the term of the underlying loan agreement or hedge facility.The maximum term is 10 years.

Fees & charges

EFICs premium depends on factors such as the location and type of the investment or projecthe term of the policy and the risks insured.

NOTE: Information on terms and conditions is supplied as a guideline only. EFICs compliancewith legislation and OECD guidelines, together with its risk assessments and other policies,influence the actual terms and conditions that may be applicable to any eventual transaction with EFIC.

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CAPITOLUL II

DEPASIREA BARIERELOR FINANCIAREPENTRU EXPORTATORI IN

AUSTRALIA traducerea capitolului I

1.GARANTII DE CREDIT PE DOCUMENTE sauGARANTIILE CREDITULUI DOCUMENTAR

Ca i exportator, o garanie de credit documentar de la EFIC v permite s v bazai banca din Australia pentru plata, mai degrab dect pe banca cumprtorului dvs. din strainatatgaranie de credit documentar poate ajuta att pentru a proteja veniturile de export c t i pentru a

finana activitatea de export.Dac banca dvs. nu este dispus s ii asume riscul pentru plile cumprtorului dvs. cadrul unui credit documentar (de asemenea cunoscut ca o scrisoare de credit documentar), EF poate oferi o garanie de credit documentar ctre banca dvs. i s i asume riscul de credit pendvs.. Garania protejat de EFIC asigur plata creditului documentar emis de banca cumprtordumneavoastra, consimand bncii dvs. c acesta va face plile ctre dumneavoastr

O garanie de credit documentar poate ajuta la protejarea plilor contractului dexport. Acesta v ofer o ncredere sporit c, dac banca v garanteaz cu documentcerute (si necesare )de credit documentar vei primi plile datorate pentru dvs..

n plus, dac suntei n imposibilitatea de a obine capital de lucru pentru a finana ucontract de export, deoarece banca nu v confirm un credit documentar, o garanie de cre

documentar din EFIC poate ajuta. Dac banca dvs. accepta abilitatea dvs. de a obine profit diun contract de export, garania de la EFIC poate permite bncii dvs. s confirme credidocumentar, efectuarea de pli n temeiul acestuia, oferindu-v capital de lucru disponibil pendvs..

Care sunt avantajele?

V d o ncredere sporit c, dac suntei de acord si dac respectai termenii de creditdocumentar, vei primi plata

Nu exist nici un regres pentru dvs., dac banca cumprtorului nu pltete bancii dvs. Permite bncii dvs. s v pun la dispoziie capital de lucru .

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Cum va garanteaza creditul documentar afacerea - munca?

1. Intri ntr-un contract de export cu cump r torul dvs. din str intate2. Cump r torul dvs. instruiete banca lui de a emite un document de

credit (de asemenea cunoscut ca un scrisoare documentara de credit)la banca dumneavoastr pentru a face pl i in cadrul contractului de export pentru dumneavoastr

3. Banca cump r torului dvs. emite credit documentar c tre banca dvs.4. EFIC garanteaz un document de credit b ncii dvs., asigurnd plata

creditului documentar al bancii cump r torului 5. Banca dvs. confirm creditul documentar. Cnd i-ai realizat obliga iile

contractuale, vei livra c tre banca dvs. documentele prev zute n credit documentar

6. Banca dvs. face pl ile c tre tine.

Termeni si conditii

Termenii i condiiile vor fi negociate n timpul procesului de aplicare. Urmtoarele orientofer o indicaie a cerinelor tipice:

Eligibilitate

Ar trebui s fii un exportator australian productor de bunuri sau servicii pentru export, carau coninut substanial australian.

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EXPORTATOR

AUSTRALIAN

CUMPARATOR

STRAIN

Contract deexport

BANCA

CUMPARATORULUISTRAIN

BANCAEXPORTATORULUIAUSTRALIAN

EFIC

Documente necesarept. creditul

Garantiilecreditului

Platile contractuluide export

Termenii - clauzelecredituluiInstructiuni de aplicare a

termenilor creditului


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n general, pentru a fi susinut de garanie contractul de export va avea o valoare de ntre 1milion i 10 milioane dolari.

Valoarea maxim

Garania este n mod normal, de pn la 100% din valoarea creditului documentar de baz, caeste n general limitat la 85% din valoarea contractului de export.

Termen

Garania se va aplica pe durata creditului documentar de baz.

Taxe i tarife

Taxele i tarifele variaz n funcie de o serie de factori, inclusiv evaluarea riscurilor EFIC, petermen lung i termenilor de solvabilitate.

Securitate

Nu este necesara nici o garanie de la exportatorul australian.

NOT: Informaiile furnizate, inclusiv cu privire la termenii i condiiile, sunt furnizate numca un ghid general. Respectarea EFIC a legislaiei i a orientrilor OCDE, mpreun cu evaluareade credit i alte politici, influeneaz termenii i condiiile reale care pot fi aplicabile pentru orictranzacie cu o eventual EFIC.

Informaiile furnizate nu cuprind un sfat sau o recomandare i EFIC nu face nici o reprezentar

sau garanie cu privire la aceasta. Pentru o limita maxim permis de lege, EFIC nu va firspunztor pentru orice pierderi directe sau indirecte sau daune suportate de ctre orice persoan, pe baza acestor informaii.

2.CADRUL DE EXPORT ASIGURAT PENTRUPLATILE LA TERMEN

n general, cu ct este mai lung perioada de plat din contract pentru exportul dvs., este mmare riscul de neplat de ctre cumprtorii din strintate i este mai mare presiunea asupcapitalului de lucru.

n cazul n care contractul de export, are o perioad de plat mai mare de doi anasigurrile plailor de export oferite de EFIC v pot proteja mpotriva riscului de neplat din caunor evenimente comerciale i politice. Evenimente comerciale pot include insolvabilitacumprtorului dvs. sau nclcarea abuziv a obligaiilor de plat contractuale. Eveniment politice pot include rzboi, rzboi civil i de revolt, aplicarea legilor strine care interfereazacontractul i incapacitatea de a converti moneda local sau de a schimba n moned din acumprtorului dumneavoastr.

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Ajut pentru a proteja fluxul de plat de export prin reducerea riscului financiar

Ofer acoperire de de pn la 100% fa de non-plata din cauza riscurilor politice definite

Ofer acoperire de pn la 90% impotriva non-pl ii ca urmare ariscurilor definite comerciale Permite a oferi cumprtorilor termene de plat prelungite, fcnd produsele m

competitive.

Cum garantarea platii exportului iti garanteaz munca?

1. Faci parte dintr-un contract de export cu un cump r tor str in, care d cump r torului dvs. posibilitatea de termene de plat prelungite

2. EFIC prevede asigurarea pl ii exportului pentru tine, care garanteaz mpotriva riscului de neplat de c tre cump r torul dvs. din cauza unor evenimente definite comerciale sau politice .

Termeni si conditii

Termenii i condiiile vor fi negociate n timpul procesului de aplicare. Urmtoarele orientriofer o indicaie a cerinelor tipice:

EligibilitateAr trebui s fii un exportator australian productor de bunuri de capital sau servicii pent

export, care au coninut substanial australian.n general, contractual de export care urmeaz s fie acoperit de polia de asigurare va

avea o valoare minim de 500.000 de dolari.

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EFIC

EXPORTATORAUSTRALIAN

CUMPARATORSTRAIN

Contract deexport

Asigurarea platilor


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Nivelul de acoperire

Nivelul indemnizaiei este n general de pn la 100% pentru orice pierdere rezultat devenimente politice definite i 90% pentru riscurile definite comerciale.

Suma maxim

n general, limitat la 85% din valoarea contractului de export.

Termen

Perioada de plata a exportului va fi n mod normal un minim de doi ani i unmaxim de cinci ani.

Taxe i tarife

Taxele i tarifele variaz n funcie de o serie de factori, inclusiv evaluarea riscurilor EFIC pe termen lung a politicii.

Securitate

Nu se solicit garanii.

Excluderi

Excluderile vor fi stabilite n contract.


Informaiile furnizate nu cuprind un sfat sau o recomandare i EFIC nu face nici o reprezentar sau garanie cu privire la aceasta. Pentru o limita maxim permis de lege, EFIC nu va firspunztor pentru orice pierderi directe sau indirecte sau daune suportate de ctre orice persoan, pe baza acestor informaii.

3.Facilitatea de garantare a schimbului valutar

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Pentru exportatori, micrile nefavorabile ale ratelor de schimb sunt un risc inerent de a faafaceri pe pieele internaionale. De exemplu, dac pltii furnizorii dvs. n dolari australieni, primii plata pentru exporturile de dvs., n dolari SUA, schimbrile nefavorabile ale cursude schimb dintre monede pot afecta marja de profit a dumneavoastr.

O facilitate de schimb valutar v poate ajuta s v protejai profiturile de export dfluctuaiile cursului de schimb de pierderi n ratele de schimb, permindu-v a v acop

expunerea monetar. Mai mult i poate acoperi i variaiile speculative ale cursului schimb, avnd un mai mare control asupra riscului de schimb valutar.Facilitate de schimb garantat de EFIC, i participarea unor specialiti de schim

valutar pot crete limita de tranzacionare pentru facilitate de schimb valutar. Pentexportatori, acest lucru nseamn c putei prelungi programul de acoperire pentru mai mucontracte de export i pentru a va proteja mai bine profiturile din export

n general, nu trebuie s oferi garanii pentru facilitatea de schimb de la EFIC. Acest lu poate ajuta pentru a elibera capital de lucru pentru a susine contracte de export suplimentare


Acoperi mai multe contracte de export, care v pot ajuta pentru a proteja mai bine profiturde export n majoritatea cazurilor, EFIC nu are nevoie de securitate pentru garanie, care poate aju

pentru a elibera capital de lucru Nici o tax suplimentar nu este pltit de dumneavoastr pentru garanie.

Cum facilitate de garantare a schimbului valutar iti garanteaza munca?

1. Ave i sau a i avut aprobare pentru o facilitate de schimb valutar cu un specialist de schimb valutar

2. Putei solicita de la specialitii de schimb valutar o garanie de facilitate de schimb pentrcrete limita de tranzactionare a facilitaii dvs.

3. Dac EFIC aprob cererea, aceasta ofer o facilitate de garan ie de schimb pentru specialistul dvs. n schimb valutar

4. Specialistul n schimb valutar poate crete limita de tranzac ionare, permi ndu-v acoperirea mai multor contracte de export .

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EXPORTATOR

AUSTRALIAN

SPECIALIST INSCHIMB VALUTAR

EFIC

Facilitateapriv.garantareaschimbului

Aplicatiile pentrucrestereaexportul

Garantareaschimbului

Cresterealimitelor


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Termeni si conditii

Termenii i condiii sunt subiecte de negociere. Urmtoarele orientri sunt cerinele tipice:

Eligibilitate Ar trebui s fii un exportator australian i:

sa obii aprobare pentru o facilitate de schimb valutar cu un specialist de schimb valutacare se refer la contractele de schimb valutar forward (i, pentru consumatorii eligibcontracte de opiuni) pentru scopuri de acoperire mpotriva riscurilor doar

n ultimele 12 luni, s-au exportat bunuri sau servicii la cel puin valoarea a garanieiexterne pentru facilitatea de schimb.

Suma de garanie Pentru clienii eligibili, garania poate, fi n funcie de circumstanele specifice

contractului, pentru a facilita o limit de tranzacionare suplimentar de pn la $ 2,5 milioane.

Termen Termenul de garanie al facilitii de schimb poate fi de pn la 12 luni.

Taxe i tarife Nu se pltesc taxe suplimentare sau taxe pentru a obine garania facilitii de schimb.

Securitate n general, EFIC nu are nevoie de garanii suplimentare de la exportatori pentru facilitate

de garantare de schimb valutar, care este expres prevazut specialistului dumneavoastr de schimvalutar.


Informaiile furnizate nu cuprind un sfat sau o recomandare i EFIC nu face nici o reprezentar sau garanie cu privire la aceasta. Pentru o limita maxim permis de lege, EFIC nu va firspunztor pentru orice pierderi directe sau indirecte sau daune suportate de ctre orice persoan, pe baza acestor informaii.

4.a) Facilitatea de garantare a riscului politic pentruinvestitori

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Cnd te lansezi ntr-o investiie n strintate sau un proiect, suntei de acord c seva implica un risc comercial. Cu toate acestea, investiia poate fi situat ntr-o ar cu un medi politic instabil. Datorit naturii unice a riscurilor politice i potenialului lor pentru unimpact semnificativ asupra unei investiii sau unui proiect, ai putea dori s se ia nconsiderare o garanie de risc politic (PRI), i EFIC s v garanteze mpotriva pierderilo

financiare cauzate de evenimentele politice.Politica EFIC privind garantarea riscului politic pentru investitori se aplica investiiilorn societi i proiecte noi din strintate, se aplica pentru injecii de capital pentruinvestiii i proiecte existente, precum i pentru extinderi de investiii existente. Aceasta prevede acoperirea pierderilor cauzate de evenimente politice, care pot include:

expropriere - de exemplu, naionalizarea sau confiscarea de investiii sau proiecte de ctreguvernul rii gazd;

daune de rzboi; violene politice; incapacitatea de a converti moneda local sau de a transfera moneda din ara gazd;

privarea - de exemplu, guvernul gazd anuleaza o aprobare de a exporta din ara gazd dtransferare a investiiilor sau a proiectului, mpiedicnd operarea permanent; abandonarea forat - abandonarea investiiilor sau proiectului la sfatul guvernului

australian.

n anumite circumstane cauzele pot fi, de asemenea, determinate de alte evenimente politice, cum ar fi discriminarea selectiv sau implicit a unei sentine arbitrale de ctre guvernugazd dup o nclcare a contractului.

Politica PRI acopera pierderea de:

- investiii n form de capitaluri directe proprii sau credite actionari la o companie dinstrintate, sau garaniile acordate la creditele tere efectuate la firma

- randamentul investiiilor, cum ar fi dividendele i rezultatul reportat de la o investiie ncadrul companiei din strintate.


- Ajuta a v proteja investiia din strintate sau proiectul de la pierderi financiare cauzate devenimentele politice specifice.- Pot s dea o mai mare ncredere de a efectua o investiie ori proiect major ntr-o pia

emergent sau n curs de dezvoltare.

Cum functioneaza facilitatea de garantare a riscului politicpentru investitori?

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EFICINVESTITORAUSTRALIAN

O COMPANIE SAUUN PROIECT INSTRAINATATE

INVESTIT

ASIGURAREA DE RISC


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1 . Putei investi ntr-o companie ( sau proiect ) din strintate .2. EFIC ofer garantia de risc politic pentru a v proteja de pierderi din investiii de peste hotar

din cauza evenimentelor politice menionate.

Termeni si conditii

Termenii i condiiile vor fi negociate n timpul procesului de aplicare. Urmtoareleorientri ofer o indicaie a cerinelor tipice:

Eligibilitate

Ar trebui s fie o companie care desfoar afaceri n Australia (sau filiala acesteia) carinvesteste ntr-o companie sau un proiect din strintate .

nainte de a efectua investiii, trebuie s fie notificat n scris EFIC de intenia

dumneavoastr de a semna ntr-un contract de facilitate a GARANTARII RISCULUI POLITICoferita de EFIC.


EFIC poate compensa pn la 90% din pierderea asigurat.

Termen

O poli poate avea un termen extins, reflectnd natura investiiei.Termenul maxim este d

10 de ani.Taxe si tarife

Prima EFIC depinde de mai muli factori, inclusiv locaia i tipul de investiii sau proiect, de termenul poliei i de riscurile asigurate.

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4.b)Facilitatea de garantare a riscului politic pentruantreprenori

Atunci cnd participi la un proiect, o afacere n strintate n calitate de antreprenor sauinvestitor, suntei de acord c se va implica i un risc comercial. Cu toate acestea, proiectul n carte implici i investeti n echipament poate fi ntr-o ar cu un mediu politic instabil. Datoritnaturii unice a riscurilor politice i potenialului lor pentru un impact semnificativ asupra activelodumneavoastr, vi se poate lua n considerare o garantie de risc politic ( tip PRI), de catreEFIC.

Politica EFIC privind garantarea investiiei i a echipamentului v poate proteja mpotriv pierderii financiare datorate pierderii de utilizare sau deinere, deteriorarea sau distrugerea dinstalaii i echipamente cauzate de evenimentele politice specificate, prin polia de asigurare.

Evenimentele politice pot include:

expropriere - de exemplu, naionalizarea sau confiscarea ecipamentelor de ctre guvernulrii gazd;

daune de rzboi; violene politice; privarea de echipamente- de exemplu, refuzul guvernului gazd s emit o licen de

export a echipamentelor din ara gazd (n cazul n care licena ar fi putut fi obinuta dla nceputul poliei);

abandonarea forat - abandonarea de instalaii i echipamente la sfatul guvernuluiaustralian.

Facilitatea de garantare a riscului politic pentru antreprenori este disponibila pentru instalaiechipamente pe care le deinei. Aceasta poate acoperi, de asemenea, instalaii i echipamente nchiriat, n funcie de tipul de aranjament de leasing.


- V protejeaz de pierderi financiare n cazul n care evenimentele politice specifice afecteazinstalaiile i echipamentele aflate n strintate;- Poate s v dea o mai mare ncredere s participai n calitate de antreprenor sau investitontr-un proiect din strinatate situat ntr-o pia emergent sau n curs de dezvoltare.

Cum functioneaza facilitatea de garantare a riscului politic pentru antreprenori?

1. Putei investi sau implementa instalaii i echipamente pentru un proiect amplasat nstrintate.

2. EFIC ofer garanii de risc politic pentru a v proteja de pierderi financiare ca urmare a pierderii utilizarii sau deinerii, deteriorarii sau distrugerii de instalaii i echipamente cauzate danumite evenimente politice.

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4.c)Facilitatea de garantare a riscului politic pentruinvestitori financiari

Atunci cnd o instituie financiar face un mprumut pentru un proiect - afacere dinstrintate sau pentru altfel de investiii care implic un investitor australian sau sponsor, saofer o facilitate de garantare a proiectului sau investiiilor n legtur cu un astfel de mprumuinstituia financiar accept faptul c proiectul sau investiiile sunt implicate intr-unrisc comercial .

Cu toate acestea, proiectul sau investiiile pot fi situate ntr-o ar cu un mediu politicinstabil. Evenimentele politice pot provoca dificulti semnificative pentru un proiect, inclusiv prevenirea celor implicai de la ndeplinirea angajamentelor lor financiare. Ca urmare, instituifinanciar, dac acioneaz n calitate de creditor sau furnizor de acoperire, poate lua nconsiderare o garantare de risc politic (PRI), cu EFIC pentru a o proteja de pierderi financiarcauzate de anumite evenimente politice.

Politica privind garantarea riscului politic pentru investitori ( creditori ) a EFIC poateasigura un creditor mpotriva obligaiilor debitorului privind plile de mprumut neonorate dincauza unui eveniment politic specificat.

Politica privind garantarea riscului politic pentru Banci a EFIC poate asigura o bancde acoperire de risc financiar fa de un partener:

non-plata unei sume datorate sau non-livrarea unei cantiti convenite i de calitate a unui produs ( cum ar fi aurul sau

cupru) din cauza unui eveniment politic specificat.

Polia privind garantarea riscului politic pentru Banci a EFIC este de obicei emisa ca poli de Creditor PRI, atunci cnd un mprumut de finanare a proiectelor care necesit oacoperire de tip speculativ. n acest caz, n cadrul facilitii de mprumut este, de asemenea partener, compania la care banca este furnizoarea de facilitatea de acoperire mpotrivariscurilor (hedge partenerul contractual).

PRI pentru creditori sau furnizori se refer la pierderi financiare din cauza evenimentelo politice specificate n politic, care pot include:

expropriere - de exemplu, naionalizarea sau confiscarea a proiectului de investiii sau dctre guvernul rii gazd

daune de rzboi

violenei politice

incapacitatea de a converti moneda local sau moneda de transfer din ara gazd

privarea - de exemplu, guvernul gazd anuleaz permisul de export a produciei deinvestiii sau a proiectului, permanent, mpiedicnd de operare

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abandonarea forat - abandonarea de o companie de peste mri sau a unui proiect privindavizul de guvernul australian.

n anumite circumstane, garania poate fi, de asemenea, prevzut pentru alte eveniment politice, cum ar fi discriminarea selectiv sau implicit emiterea de ctre guvernul gazd a unsentine arbitrale n urma unei nclcri a contractului.

Garania PRI pentru creditori i bnci acopera investiiile n compani i noi, ct i incele existente, i proiecte.


Ajut la protejarea creditorului sau bancii mpotriva pierderii financiare ca urmare aevenimentelor politice menionate .

Poate da mai mult ncredere instituiilor financiare pentru a finana un proiect deinvestiii ntr-o pia emergent sau n curs de dezvoltare.

Cum functioneaza facilitatea de garantare a riscului politicpentru investitori?

1. O instituie financiar ofer un mprumut pentru un investitor australian pentru participarea sla o companie din strintate sau proiect

2. Investitor australian face o investiie n cadrul companiei din strintate sau intr-un proiect.

3. EFIC ofer asigurri de risc politic pentru a ajuta la protejarea instituie financiare de pierderile financiare cauzate de anu mite evenimente politice.

Termeni si conditii

Termeni i condiiile vor fi negociate n timpul procesului de aplicare. Urmtoareleorientri ofer o indicaie a cerinelor tipice:

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EFICINSTITUTIIFINANCIARE( BANCI)

INVESTITOR SAUSPONSORAUSTRALIAN

PROIECT SAUCOMPANIE DINSTRAINATATE

ASIGURAREA DE RISC

INVESTITIA

FACILITATEA DE


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Eligibilitate

Ar trebui s fie o instituie financiar (sau filiala acesteia), care desfoar afaceri nAustralia, care este furnizoarea de una sau ambele:

- un mprumut pentru un proiect din strainatate sau pentru o companie,

- acoperire mpotriva riscurilor asociate cu un mprumut sau pentru un proiect dinstrintate sau pentru o companie.

De implementarea sau de funcionare a proiectului sau companiei trebuie s se implice uninvestitor australian sau bunuri de provenien australian sau de servicii.


Pn la 100% din pierderile asigurate.

Termen

Poliele ca termen coincid, de obicei, cu termenul acordului de mprumut de baz sau cutermenul facilitatii de garantare.Termenul maxim este de 10 de ani.

Taxe si tarife

Prima EFIC depinde de factori cum ar fi localizarea i tipul de investiii sau proiectul, de termenul poliei i a riscurilor asigurate.

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CAPITOLUL III

COMENTARIU SI RETINERI DESPRE TEXT

Operaiunile de export sunt printre cele mai solicitante i riscante pentru companii n sensc utilizeaz resursele financiare pe care le au la dispoziie, pe de o parte, iar pe de alt paimplic, datorit distanelor i a termenelor de plat incheiate cu clienii riscul de neplat.

Riscul de neplat din partea clientului se poate concretiza n mai multe moduri: falimentul debitorului clientului; nclcarea abuziv a obligaiilor contractuale; evenimente politice, rzboi, revolte, naionalizri etc.; evenimente legislative prin aplicarea legilor strine care interfereaz cu contractul ; incapacitatea de a converti moneda local sau de schimb n moneda exportului.

In cazul analizat i anume Australia pentru a proteja exportatorii de riscurile coneactivitii de export a fost creeat E.F.I.C. ca instituie specializat n garantarea i sprijinirexportatorului Australian. Aceast instituie se interpune practic ntre exportator client b pentru a prelua i asigura riscul de neplat din partea clienilor externi, asigurarea de lichiditi forma de credite n baza contractelor pentru exportatori prin creditarea anticipat de ctre bancexportului.

Important de reinut este ca statul Australian, prin protecia pe care o ofer exportatorilo prin intermediul E.F.I.C.( Export Finance & Insurance Corporation ), nu risca aproape nimdeoarece se garanteaz i despgubeste circa 85 90 % din valoarea exporturilor, iar procent

conform statisticilor doar circa 10-15% din sumele asigurate sunt pierderi.Statul Australian catig astfel din impozitarea forei de munc aferent bunurilor

serviciilor exportate, din impozit pe profitul firmelor, impozite i taxe asupra proprietiexportatorilor. Este un exemplu elocvent de intervenie a statului prin instituii la bunul merseconomiei.

Ca instrumente de garantare si asigurare distingem:

creditul documentar garanii de credit pe documente; asigurarea ncasarilor de la export pentru plaile le termen;

facilitate de garantare a schimbului valutar; facilitate de garantare a riscului politic pentru investitori; facilitate de garantare a riscului politic pentru antreprenori; facilitate de garantare a riscului politic pentru investitorii financiari.

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CAPITOLUL IV

Financial risk and regulation: do we need more Europeor less?

Lord Turner

27 Apr 2012

Speech by Adair Turner, FSA ( Financial Services Authority ) Chairman, at theCentral Bank of Ireland Conference on Financial Regulation: The Response to theCrisis, Dublin

My title asks whether, in response to the financial crisis, we need more Europe or lessmore integration or more national autonomy in financial regulation.

I posed that question first in my review of the causes of the financial crisis published

April 2009.1

It was not the central issue in that review the inadequacies of the global bank capitand liquidity regimes were far more important. But I highlighted it because the crisis had reveamajor problems in the operation of the European single market in retail banking.

Retail banks from any country in the European Union, and indeed in the wider EuropeEconomic Area, are entitled to operate in other countries as branches, supervised by their hocountry, with the host country having minimal influence over the quality of that supervision or adequacy of capital solvency. Icelandic banks were therefore able to raise deposits in Britain, subject to FSA supervision. But when they went bankrupt, Iceland could not afford to bail them or to compensate depositors the banks were simply too large relative to Icelandic GDP, too bigsave.

The UK government could have let UK depositors suffer loss. But faced with the extrem

fragility of autumn 2008, the danger of a loss of confidence in the whole banking system, it chnot to and the British tax payer bailed out the retail depositors. Clearly that posed the questihow to ensure that never happened again and whether the answer was more Europe or leEurope. Should we head towards more European integration to enforce a common prudenregime which would guard against such failures; or towards less Europe, with banks from othcountries having to operate as subsidiaries, and subject to the capital and liquidity requirementseach country?

The regulatory answer has been largely more Europe the establishment of the EuropeBanking Authority and the European Systemic Risk Board, rather than a removal of cross-bor

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branching rights. But on the ground, in terms of what banks actually do, the trend has been ratthe other way the role of cross-border retail branches is less important than before, in pa probably because depositors have become more aware that if a bank branch fails they cannot rely bailout being repeated, and will be dependent on the deposit insurance scheme of the home coun

But the issue of more Europe or less Europe certainly has not gone away indeed, it h become more complex and pressing as the financial crisis of 2007-08 has morphed into t

eurozone travails of 2010-12.So its on this issue that Ill concentrate my remarks this afternoon. It is certainly not tonly important issue. The title of this conference is Financial Regulation: The Response to Crisis. And that response has involved many aspects which are not European specific the desand implementation of the new Basel III capital and liquidity standard: and progress on fixing big to fail ensuring that all banks can be resolved without taxpayers support. And lookforward there is much to be done, at global and European level, to ensure we have adequataddressed the dangers of shadow banking, which played a major role in the crisis of 2007 to 08, could re-emerge as we tighten regulation on the formal banking sector.But the epicentre of current concerns about the global financial system is Europe, and in particuthe eurozone, and it is therefore on European-specific challenges that I will focus.

Do we need more Europe or less Europe?My answer will be a mix of both more integration on some dimensions, strong nation powers on others, and with the balance quite different between countries within the Eurozone athose outside.

To make that argument, I start with the question: do current account imbalances mattwithin a single currency system? That may seem a tangential way into the issues of financstability and regulation but the answer to that question helps illustrate the essential problems twe face within the eurozone financial system.

When the monetary union was launched, conventional wisdom assumed that current accouimbalances between Eurozone countries would cease to matter. The European Commissions OMarket, One Money Report of 1990 argued that A major effect of EMU is that balance

payments constraints will disappear Private markets will finance all viable businesses, asavings and investments balances will no longer be constraints at national level.2 The single currency was therefore seen as a further deepening of the single market: and teconomic proposition advanced in its favour was one of market completion that a more compand efficient market necessarily produces better results.

That philosophy seemed to reflect the lessons of the USAs single currency systemStatisticians do not work out and economists do not refer to the balance of payments surplusdeficit of California, Illinois or Texas. And it is assumed that banks will continue to finance a wrun company that happens to be headquartered in, say, Illinois, even if there are doubts about creditworthiness of Illinois state. States, corporates, and households are largely seen as separcounterparties with little apparent value in aggregating their debt positions on either a balance shstock or current account flow basis. Many US companies indeed have credit ratings higher thanstate in which they happen to be located.

So the current account imbalances of states within a currency union dont seem to matterand discussion of state level current balances is almost entirely absent from US economic poldebates. And, indeed, if we did measure current account balances for US states, we would probahave seen some significant deficits year after year Florida in the 1950s to 80s for instanrunning current account deficits as business and household capital flowed into a previously lighdeveloped state.

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But even in US states, current account imbalances might matter or rather they might indicators of potentially harmful financial developments.

If a state is subject to a credit and real estate boom, perhaps financed in part by credit flofrom other states, that can drive a construction boom which results in increased wage potentially making other sectors of the economy less competitive with other states. As

result when the boom busts, unemployment will emerge. And when the boom turns to bust, state revenue may be hit by falling property and saltaxes, putting pressure on state finances, and requiring cut backs in state expenditure whimay harm the economic prospects and creditworthiness of local households and companie

Local banks meanwhile will face loan losses which might impair their ability to make neloans, further depressing real estate prices, household expenditure and state finances.

Regional credit and asset price booms have therefore in the past caused significant economharm in specific states Texas in the mid 1980s, New England in the early 1990s. And at the cof these crises were two factors which contradict the European Commissions 1990 optimism.

First that the supply and demand for credit in the upswing may not be driven by foresightanalysis of long-term business or household viability, but by self-reinforcing confidenceffects driven in particular by rising real estate prices.

Second that the economic prospects of individuals, corporates and the local state may notfully separable but significantly correlated.

In a barrier-less single market, credit can in fact flow in a perverse fashion, misallocatiresources: and the consequence of a regional bust may be increased by the economic interelationship between local companies, households, banks and the state.

These factors apply within the eurozone, but to a far greater extent, making current accou

imbalances more relevant than between US states, for three reasons:3

First because of the different balance of responsibility between federal (i.e., European) astate (i.e., national) level. US states tax and spend about 10 to 15% of GDP on average: federal US government another 15 to 20%. European states tax and spend 35-50% of GDthe European Union level is responsible for a few percentage points of GDP only. Eurotherefore lacks the federal level automatic stabilisers and transfers which reduce tcorrelation between the creditworthiness of households, companies and the local state.

Second, because the European banking system is still more regionally segmented than tUSs, which over the last 30 years (though not before) has developed pan-US bankinnetworks whose prospects are not closely linked to a specific state or region.

Thirdly because European banks hold as liquid assets large portfolios of local sovereigdebt in a way which would be considered dangerous in the US. Nobody would think igood idea if Illinois banks held their liquid asset buffers in large undiversified portfolios Illinois state debt. That would be seen as regionally concentrated wrong way risk. BSpanish banks have large holdings of Spanish government debt, and Italian banks bholdings of Italian government debt.

As a result the economic prospects and creditworthiness of the households, companies and t banks within one country, and of the national government, are more closely correlated witEurozone countries than within US states. A correlation made worse if, as was the case in Irela

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the governments tax base was heavily skewed toward precisely those sectors, in particu property, most likely to be subject to boom and bust effects. Patrick Honohans report of May 20showing how cyclical taxes which vary strongly with the domestic economic cycle, increasfrom 8% of Irish government revenues in 1987 to 30% in 2006.4

The eurozone is therefore inherently more susceptible than the US to developments whiwould contradict the conventional wisdom that current account imbalances do not matter withi

single currency zone. And is clear that some of the troubled eurozone economies such as Spainow face problems of aggregate economic competitiveness, as well as of fiscal sustainabilitSpain, and to a lesser degree Ireland, face the challenge of restoring competitiveness in tradsectors left with too high wages as a result of construction booms: an inherently difficult challenwithin a fixed exchange rate regime.

So contrary to the pre-crisis conventional wisdom, current account balances can still matteBut they are, I suggest, best understood in a slightly different way than the standard language ofsuggests, and in a way which stresses the centrality of the financial system, capital flows, andcredit creation processes as the key initial drivers. Thus (slide 1):

A standard analysis of unsustainable current account imbalances tends to go as follows: country suffers a gradual decline in competitiveness as a result of unit labour cost increasrelative to competitors, which creates a current account deficit and a financing need, whithe market for a time is willing to satisfy, before imposing a sudden stop. This is sequence in which finance is seen as being required to fund an emerging deficit.

But a more insightful analysis of what actually occurred in the eurozone, might rather gofollows (slide 2) . Free flow of credit and the freedom of the banking system to creamoney and credit induced property and construction booms, which drove real wages abosustainable levels in the traded sectors of some economies, which subsequently createcompetitiveness problem when the property booms bust.

At the core of the imbalances within the eurozone was therefore the very ease of credit flowand the very completion and deepening of the internal financial market, which were seen as ovand positive objectives both of single market completion and of the single currency itself.

Such a conclusion would of course be impossible if we could assume that credit only ever floto finance long-term viable investment projects. But if it can flow to support unsustainable restate booms, greater freedom of credit flow and greater freedom to create additional credit canharmful not beneficial.

Private credit creation was therefore essential to the origins of the eurozone crisis. And whilesome cases credit booms created significant current account deficits, credit booms can cause haeven absent current account effects.

Ireland has suffered current account deterioration as a result of the property booms effect traded sector real wages, and must now address a competitiveness problem. But the scale ofcurrent account imbalance is far less than that in Spain, and Ireland is already on route towacurrent account surplus.

But Irelands small pre-crisis reliance on net credit flows from abroad didnt protect it from teffects of its primarily domestically created credit boom. Indeed, credit booms can create ma problems even in a closed economy, or even in an economy running a continued current accosurplus as was the case in Japan in the years both before and after the early 1990s property buJapans credit boom and bust left it with a corporate debt overhang which, as Richard Kdescribes,5 condemned Japan to a balance sheet recession of continued corporate deleveraging acontinued offsetting fiscal deficits fiscal deficits which, in Koos analysis, were essential

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maintain demand, but which resulted in a relentless rise in Japans government debt to GDIreland has gone through a similar cycle but with another crucial Eurozone specific difference countries within the eurozone have fewer degrees of freedom to run large fiscal deficits than Jap precisely because they are no longer fiat currency issuing powers, able if necessary to devalue tcurrency and/or to monetise their debt.6

So to answer my question, yes it is clear that current account balances within the eurozone c

matter: and that several countries now face important competitiveness as well as fiscal challengBut we should also recognise that in some eurozone countries and in particular in Ireland aSpain, the underlying problems were those created by private capital flows and private crecreation, interfacing with fiscal and banking systems whose structural characteristics increased correlation between corporate, household, banking system and sovereign risk.

Because of these structural vulnerabilities, any micro-level benefits of deeper single markcompletion arising from the move to a single currency have been overwhelmed by advemacroeconomic consequences. And as a result we are left now with the fundamental problem otoxic inter-relationship between bank and sovereign credit risk.

Market perceptions of bank creditworthiness undermined by concerns about sovereignswhose debt banks hold. And sovereign creditworthiness already undermined or potentially challenged by the cos

of bank bail out.

Given this analysis of past vulnerabilities, what policy mix is needed now both to deal withcurrent problems and to create a sounder system for the future? And in particular, within that policy mix do we need more Europe, or more national autonomy? The answer is a mix of bothand a different mix for euro ins and outs.

A sounder system needs to be different from the past in three ways:

i. First, there are strong arguments that the eurozone system will not work well without somgreater degree of fiscal integration, and a role for jointly issued Eurobonds7That is for two reasons.

o First because a single currency zone requires some federal level automatic stabiliseto offset regional depressions. Without some fiscal stabilisers in the US federtax revenues for instance falling in a state suffering economic depression region banking crises such as that of Texas in the mid 1990s would have been more seveand long lasting. As the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne put it laJuly, there is a remorseless logic that a successful monetary union will requirgreater fiscal integration.

o

But second, and the point I would like to stress here at a conference on financistability and regulation, because we cannot permanently cut the toxic link betweeeurozone bank and sovereign credit risks, as long as banks hold as their liquid asselarge undiversified portfolios of their own sovereigns debt. Those holdings creacorrelated wrong way risk, and the national debt of countries within the eurozoncannot be considered risk free. Fixing this problem is almost certain to requirthe creation within the eurozone of a true risk-free asset such as Eurobond playing the same role within the eurozone banking system that T Bonds plain the US and gilts within the UK.

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It is therefore essential, as the European Systemic Risk Board has recently madclear, that the forthcoming CRD4 directive and regulation leaves appropriatdiscretion at national level.10

Even within the eurozone, therefore, the steps needed to break the current link betwe

sovereign/bank credit risk, and to build a more stable system for the future, are likely to inclu both some which entail more integration and some which reinforce the ability of national authorito pull national levers. The pre-crisis system was structurally flawed:

It increased the potential risk of interconnected sovereign and bank credit risk. And it left countries ill equipped to offset the excess credit booms which made that potent

risk a reality.

As the IMF has argued in its latest GFSR, even if the path to a better system is inevitabilitylong one, the eurozone needs to set out a road map which leads to a sounder long-term design. Tsounder design will need in some ways to be more integrated, but in some ways not.

And that balance of more Europe and strong national levers, also has to be different for iand outs. In 2009 the UK accepted the case for European Supervisory Authorities: we need themensure the enforcement across Europe of a common prudential rule book, helping guard hcountries against the dangers created by inter-country branching freedoms. In addition the UK a very strong national interest in the Eurozone taking the steps required to make the overall systmore stable for the future. But the UK will not join the eurozone in any foreseeable future: and logic which the IMF has advanced in favour of greater eurozone integration of resolution funds deposit insurance, is not applicable to a country which remains outside the euro. A fact which IMFs GFSR clearly recognises in its stress on the logic of euro area integration.

At the European Union level we will therefore have to find ways forward both in the areof overall macroeconomic coordination and of financial stability which achieve requir

integration within the euro area, which do not seek to apply unnecessary integration to non-eumembers, but which also maintain the level playing field of an EU 27 single market. Achievthat balance will be difficult, requiring careful institutional design: but success is essential.

This conference considers financial regulation in response to the crisis. I have chosen focus on specific issues of eurozone design. That focus is justified given the centrality of eurozone to current global fragility concerns. But let me end by placing the eurozone flaws iwider context.

Proponents of the single currency argued that it would make the single market morcomplete, and more efficient, easing the flow of capital, improving its allocation. That was a clamicroeconomic argument. But the design was flawed because it ignored crucial macvulnerabilities the potential for self-fulfilling credit booms unrelated to the financing of long-teviable businesses, and the central importance of banking system dynamics and risks.

That excessive focus on micro efficiency and inadequate attention to macro instabilithowever, was not restricted to the eurozone it was part of a global conventional wisdom whderived effective financial regulation across the world. US and global developments of shad banking the alphabet soup of structured credit and credit derivatives, the packaging of produand their complex multi-step distribution were lauded because it was said they would complmore markets and thus support more efficient dispersion of risk and allocation of capital. But macro-stability risks created by a more opaque, complex and interconnected global financial syswere largely ignored.

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One crucial lesson we have learned in the wake of the crisis is that the harm produced bmacro-instability the losses to wealth and employment induced by financial crises and subsequrecessions massively outweigh any micro-efficiency benefits available from making financmarkets marginally more complete and efficient. That lesson should inform our redesign effort both European and global level.

CAPITOLUL V

Reglementarea riscului financiar: avem nevoie de maimult sau mai puina reglementare in Europa?

Domnul Turner - 27 aprilie 2012

Discursul lui Adair Turner, preedinte FSA CA, de la Banca Central a Irlandei n cadrConferinei privind "Regulamentul financiar ca rspuns la criz", Dublin .

Discursul meu caut un raspuns la criza financiar, daca avem nevoie de mai mult sau m puina integrare n Europa sau mai mult autonomie naional n reglementarile financiare.

Mi-am pus aceast ntrebare, n prima mea revizuire a cauzelor crizei financiare, publicn aprilie 20091. Nu a fost problema central n aceast revizuire -. Inadvertenele din capitalu bancar la nivel mondial i a regimurilor de lichiditate au fost mult mai importante. Dar am sublic aceast criz a relevat probleme majore n funcionarea pieei unice europene n sectorul bande retail.

Bncile de retail din orice ar din Uniunea European, n cadrul Spaiului EconomEuropean , au dreptul s lucreze n alte ri, sa deschid sucursale, supravegheate de ctre ara loorigine, tara gazd avnd o influen minim asupra supravegherii si adecvarii capitalului solvabilitate. Bncile islandeze au fost, prin urmare, n msur s creasc depozitele din MaBritanie, ele nu fac obiectul supravegherii FSA. Dar, atunci cnd au avut probleme de lichiditateimininena strii de faliment, Islanda nu i-a putut permite sa le salveze sau s compensedeponenii bancile erau pur i simplu prea mari pentru PIB ul Islandez prea mare pentrsalva.

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Guvernul britanic i-ar fi putut lsa pe deponenii din Marea Britanie s sufere pierderi. Dconfruntandu-se cu fragilitatea extrem a sistemului financiar din toamna anului 2008 n f pericolului de pierdere a ncrederii n ntregul sistem bancar a ales s susin deponenii- persofizice, n dauna contribuabilului britanic. n mod clar s-a pus ntrebarea, cum s se asigure c nuva mai ntmpla din nou - i dac raspunsul ar fi fost mai mult sau mai puin integrare EuropeaAr trebui s ne ndreptm spre mai mult integrare european prin care s pun n aplicare

regim comun prudenial, ceea ce ar putea proteja mpotriva unor astfel de eecuri, sau mai puintegrare European, cu bnci din alte ri care ar funciona ca filiale, i sub rezerva cerinelorcapital i lichiditate din fiecare ar?

Rspunsul a fost n mare msur de reglementare "mai mult Europ" - nfiinarAutoritatiii Bancare Europene i Consiliul european pentru riscuri sistemice, mai degrab decndeprtare a drepturilor transfrontaliere. Dar pe teren, n ceea ce fac de fapt bncile, tendina a mai degrab in mod opus - rolul transfrontalier de unitati retail este mai puin important denainte, n parte, probabil, pentru c deponenii au devenit mult mai contieni de faptul c, dacsucursal de banca va da faliment ei nu se pot baza pe planuri repetate de salvare , i vordependeni de schemele de asigurari financiare a depozitelor din ara de origine.

Dar problema de "mai mult sau mai puin Europa ", cu siguran nu a disprut - nadevr, aceasta a devenit mult mai complex i mai pregnant pe msur ce criza financiar 2007- 2008 s-a extins i n zona euro din 2010-2012.

Deci, pe aceast chestiune voi concentra comentariile mele n aceast dup-amiaz. Estesiguran o problem important, dar nu singura. Titlul acestei conferinte este RegulamenFinanciar: Rspunsul la criz. i c rspunsul a implicat mai multe aspecte care nu sunt specieuropene - proiectarea i punerea n aplicare a Basel III, noul standar de capital si de lichiditate progresul privind stabilirea "prea mari pentru a eua" - asigurarea faptului c toate bncile posalvate fr sprijinul contribuabililor. i privind mai departe sunt foarte multe de facut, la niv

european i mondial, pentru a ne asigura c au fost eliminate pericolele din umbra sistemu bancar, pericole care au jucat un rol major n criza din 2007 - 2008, i care ar putea reaparesectorul bancar .

Dar epicentrul a preocuprilor actuale legate de sistemul financiar global este Europai, n special zona euro, i este, prin urmare, european provocarea specific pe care mavoi concentra.

Avem nevoie de mai mult sau mai puin Europa?

Rspunsul meu va fi un amestec din amandoua - integrare mai mult pe unele dimensiuni,

puteri naionale sporite, i cu echilibru destul de diferit ntre rile din zona euro i cele din afeuroznei.Pentru a face acest argument, am ncepe cu ntrebarea: conteaz dezechilibrele de cont

curent n cadrul unui sistem de moned unic? Aceasta poate prea o modalitate tangeniala problemele legate de stabilitatea financiar i de regulament -, dar rspunsul la aceast ntrebareajut sa ilustram problemele eseniale cu care ne confruntm n cadrul sistemului financiar din zeuro.

Atunci cnd uniunea monetar a fost lansat , nelepciunea conventionala presupune cdezechilibrele de cont curent ntre rile din zona euro ar nceta s mai conteze. Raportul din 199Comisiei Europene ", o pia, o moneda" a afirmat c "Un efect major al UEM este faptul

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constrngerile privind balana de pli va disprea ... pieele private vor finana toate afaceviabile, i de economii i fondurile de investiii nu vor mai fi restricionate la nivel naional ".2 Moneda unic a fost, prin urmare, vzut ca o aprofundarea n continuare a pieei unice: propunerea economic avansat n favoarea sa a fost una de finalitate de pia - faptul c o pmult mai complet i eficient produce n mod necesar rezultate mai bune.

Aceasta filosofie prea s reflecte lecia sistemului SUA de moned unic. Statisticienii

lucreaz n afara sistemului i economitii nu se refer la balana de pli, excedent sau deficit California, Illinois sau Texas. i se presupune c bncile vor continua s finaneze o companie bcondus, care se ntmpl s aib sediul n, s zicem, Illinois chiar dac exist ndoieli cu priviresolvabilitatea statului Illinois. Statele, persoane juridice, i gospodriile sunt n mare msur vzca i contrapartide separate, cu o valoare aparent mic n agregarea poziiei lor de crean, fie pestoc de bilan sau de baza fluxului de cont curent. Multe companii americane au, ntr-adevratinguri de credit mai mari dect statul n care se ntmpl s fie amplasate.

Astfel, dezechilibrele de cont curent ale statelor n cadrul unei uniuni moned nu par conteze - i discuia soldurilor la nivel de stat este aproape n ntregime absent de la dezbaterile politic economic din Statele Unite. i, ntr-adevr, dac am msura balantele de cont curent state din SUA, am fi vzut, probabil, unele deficite semnificative an dup an - Florida, din 1950

anii '80, de exemplu, cu deficite de cont curent in afaceri i capital care cretea uor de la an la aDar chiar i n state din SUA, dezechilibrele de cont curent ar putea conta - sau mai degrab putea fi posibili indicatori ai dezvoltarii financiare nesntoase.

Dac un stat este supus la un boom imobiliar de credit , probabil, finanat n mare partefluxurile de capital din alte state, care pot conduce la un boom al sectorului de construc punnd presiune pe creterea salariilor, ceea ce face potenial ca alte sectoare ale economsa devin mai puin competitive cu alte state. Ca urmare n momentul n care boom- dispare, omajul va aprea.

i cnd boom-ul se transform n faliment, veniturile statului pe proprietate, n care ncadreaz i taxele de vnzare scad, punnd presiune asupra finanelor de stat, i neces

tieri n cheltuielile de stat care ar putea afecta perspectivele economice i solvabilitat populaiei locale i companiilor. ntre timp, bncile locale se vor confrunta cu pierderi din credite, care ar putea afec

capacitatea lor de a face noi mprumuturi, diminund preurile reale imobiliare, cheltuielde uz casnic i finanele de stat.

Creditele regionale i exploziile preurilor activelor , prin urmare, n trecut, au cauzat prejudisemnificative economice n anumite state - Texas, la mijlocul anilor 1980, New England nceputul anilor 1990. i n centrul acestor crize au fost doi factori care contrazic optimismComisiei Europene din 1990 .

n primul rnd c cererea i oferta de credite n ascensiune nu poate fi determinat de analdin afar a afacerlor pe termen lung sau de viabilitatea consumului casnic, dar consolideaz pe efectele determinate n special de creterea preurilor la imobiliare.

n al doilea rnd faptul c perspectivele economice ale persoanelor fizice si ntreprinderilor locale nu pot fi complet separate, dar n mod semnificativ corelate.

ntr-o pia fara bariere, fluxul de credit produce efecte perverse prin alocarea greitresurselor: i n consecinta riscul unui faliment regional poate fi crescut de ctre relatiile inteconomice dintre companii locale, gospodrii, bnci i stat.

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Aceti factori se aplic n zona euro, ci ntr-o msur mult mai mare, fcnd dezechilibrelecont curent mult mai relevante dect ntre state din SUA, pentru trei motive:3

n primul rnd, din cauza echilibrului diferit de responsabilitate ntre "federal" (de exempEuropean) i stat (de exemplu, naional). Taxele statelor din SUA absorb n medie de la pn la 15% din PIB: guvernul federal american absorb un alt 15% pana la 20% din P

Taxele statelor europene absorb 35-50% din PIB. Uniunea Europen , este responsabil doar pentru cteva puncte procentuale din PIB. Europa nu are, prin urmare, stabilizatori automla nivel federal de transferuri, care sa reduc diferenele i s coreleze bonitateagospodriilor, companiilor locale i de stat din diverse zone ale U.E. .

n al doilea rnd, pentru c sistemul bancar european este n continuare la nivel regional msegmentat dect cel din SUA, i care n ultimii 30 de ani a dezvoltat reelele bancare paSUA ale cror perspective nu sunt strns legate de o anumit stare sau regiune.

n al treilea rnd pentru c bncile europene dein ca active lichide portofolii mari de datosuverane locale ntr-un mod n care ar putea fi considerate periculoase n Statele Uni Nimeni nu ar crede ca este o idee bun n cazul n care bncile lor de Illinois au ca tampde lichiditi n portofoliile lor datorii de stat Illinois. Care ar fi vzut ca "un mod greit

risc", la nivel regional concentrat. Dar bncile spaniole au expuneri mari fa de datorguvernului spaniol, i bncile italiene dein datoriile mari ale guvernului italian.

Ca urmare a perspectivelor economice i solvabilitatea populaiei, companiilor i bncilor i guvernelor naionale, sunt mult mai strns corelate n cadrul rilor din zona euro dect n state SUA. O corelare care a fcut mai ru a fost cazul n Irlandei, unde guvernul a nclinat puternic bde impozitare n special pe sectorul de proprietate, fiind supus cel mai probabil la efecteleboom and bust. Raportul lui Patrick Honohan din mai 2010 care arat cum taxe ciclice, vari puternic cu ciclul economic intern, a crescut de la 8% din veniturile guvernului irlandez, n 19830% n 2006.4

Prin urmare, zona euro este n mod inerent mai sensibil decat SUA la evoluiile care

contrazice ntelepciunea convenional c dezechilibrele de cont curent nu conteaz ntr-o zonmonedei unice. i este clar c unele dintre economiile din zona euro cu probleme - cum ar fi Spa- acum se confrunt cu probleme de competitivitate economic global, precum i a sustenabilitfiscale. Spania, i ntr-o msur mai mic, Irlanda, se confrunt cu provocarea de restabilirecompetitivitii n sectoarele tranzacionate rmase cu salarii prea mari, ca urmare a unui boomconstrucii: o provocare dificil n mod inerent ntr-un regim cu rat de schimb fix

Deci, spre deosebire de ideea de pre-criz convenionala, balanele de cont curent pot conn continuare. Dar ele sunt, eu sugerez, cel mai bine nelese ntr-un mod uor diferit dect asa ceste sugerat prin limbajul standard, i ntr-un mod care subliniaz centralitatea sistemului financfluxurilor de capital, i a proceselor de creare de credit . Astfel:

O analiz standard de dezechilibre nesustenabile de cont curent tinde s mearg, dup cuurmeaz: "o ar sufer o scdere treptat a competitivitii, ca urmare a creterii costuriunitare forei de munc n raport cu concurenii, care creeaz un deficit de cont curent nevoie de finanare,pe care piaa un timp este dispus s o satisfac, nainte de a impuneoprire brusca ". Aceasta este o secven n care finanarea este vzut ca fiind necesa pentru a susine un deficit n curs de dezvoltare.

Dar o analiz profund a ceea ce de fapt a avut loc mai mult n zona euro, ar putea mermai degrab, dup cum urmeaz: "Fluxul liber de credit i libertatea sistemului bancar dcreea bani i bunuri de credit este indus de bariere n construcie, care au condus salari

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reale peste niveluri sustenabile n sectoarele tranzacionate unor economii, care a creeulterior problema competitivitii n cazul n care barierele dispar".

La baza dezechilibrelor din cadrul zonei euro a stat, prin urmare, micarea cu uurinfluxurilor de credit, completarea i aprofundarea pieei financiare interne, care au fost vzuteobiective clare i pozitive, att de la finalizarea pieei unice i ct i a monedei unice n sine.

O astfel de concluzie ar fi, desigur, imposibil, dac am putea presupune c fluxurile credit ar putea vreodat finana pe termen lung, proiecte de investiii viabile. Dar dac acefluxuri pot circula liber pentru a sprijini bariere imobiliare nesustenabile, libertatea mai marfluxului de credit i o mai mare libertate de a creea un credit suplimentar poate fi duntoare, benefica.

Crearea de credite private a fost, prin urmare, esenial la originile crizei din zona euro. itimp ce, n unele cazuri, a creeat deficite de cont curent semnificative, boom-ul de credit po provoca ru, chiar i absene de efecte de deficit de cont curent.

Irlanda a suferit o deteriorare de cont curent, ca urmare a intrrii n vigoare a boom-ului proprietate asupra salariilor din sectorul de comer real, i acum trebuie s abordeze o problemcompetitivitate. Dar amploarea dezechilibrului de cont curent este mult mai puin dect n Spa

iar Irlanda este deja pe traseul spre excedent de cont curent.Dar in Irlanda efectele micii pre-crize asupra fluxurilor de credit net din afara nu au protejo de efectele sale primare creend boom de credit. Boom-ul de credit poate creea probleme majntr-o economie nchis sau chiar ntr-o economie care alearg n continuu ctre un surplus de ccurent - aa cum a fost cazul n Japonia, att naintea ct i dup anii 1990. Boom-ul de crediJaponiei i scderea valorii imobiliare a lsat-o cu o datorie corporativ, care, aa cum RichKoo descrie, 5 a condamnat Japonia ntr-o "recesiune pe bilan", a gradului de profitabilitate,corporativ i a continuat cu adncirea deficitelor fiscale - deficite fiscale careanaliza Koo, a fost esenial pentru meninerea cererii, dar care au dus la o cretere continudatoriei publice n Japonia raportat la PIB. Irlanda a trecut printr-un ciclu similar, dar cu o adiferen crucial specific zonei euro aceea c rile din zona euro au mai puine grade de liber

pentru a rula deficite fiscale mari ca Japonia, tocmai pentru c nu mai sunt emitori de moneiar dac este necesar, au posibilitatea de a devaloriza moneda lor fa de o valut i / sau mai pulibertate pentru a-i cuantifica datoria6.

Deci, pentru a rspunde la ntrebarea mea, da, este clar c balanele de cont curent n zoeuro pot conta: i c mai multe ri se confrunt acum cu o competitivitatea de importan, preci cu provocri fiscale. Dar noi trebuie s recunoatem, de asemenea, faptul c, n unele ri zona euro - i, n special n Irlanda i Spania, problemele de baz au fost cele creeate de fluxurilecapital privat i de creeare de credit privat, interfaate cu sisteme fiscale i bancare ale ccaracteristici structurale a crescut gradul de coresponden ntre gospodria corporativ, sistem bancar i de risc suveran.

Din cauza acestor vulnerabiliti structurale, orice beneficii de micro-nivel de finalizare pieei unice generate de trecerea la o moned unic au fost copleite de consecine negatmacroeconomice. i, ca urmare am rmas acum cu problema fundamental a unui toxic n inrelaia dintre banc i riscul de credit suveran.

Percepiile de pia de bonitate bancar au fost subminate de preocuprile legate ddatoriile suverane pe care bancile le dein.

i costul de a salva o banc a subminat solvabilitatea suveran.

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Avnd n vedere aceast analiz a vulnerabilitilor din trecut, care este mixul de politnecesar n prezent - att pentru a face fa problemelor actuale ct i de a creea un sistem so pentru viitor? i, n special, n Europa avem nevoie mai mult de un amestec de politici sau o mmare autonomie naional? Rspunsul este un amestec din amandou, i un amestec diferit pentruafara i n Europa.

Un sistem trebuie s fie diferit fa de trecut din trei puncte de vedere:i. n primul rnd, exist argumente puternice c sistemul din zona euro nu va funciona bine

fr un anumit grad mai mare de integrare fiscal, precum i un rol de eurobonduri emisen comun7. Aceasta este pentru dou motive.

o n primul rnd, deoarece o zona a monedei

Overcoming Financial Barriers for Exporters- SEMINAR STIINTIFIC

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