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CAUSA CAUSARUM

Chapter eme

Referring to the poet quoted by Aristotle in the

Second Physics « St. Thomas says s "Vult enim poeta quod non

omne ultimum sit finis, sed id quod est ultimum et optimum,

hoc est oujus causa fit," (l) The final cause, therefore,

implies not only the notion of ultimate but also that of

•what is a greatest good. Hot every end can be a final cause,

but only that end "which is a good, "Ultimum et optimum" -

such therefore is the definition of final cause.

A true understanding of final cause depends profound­

ly therefore upon a' correct notion of the good. Wherever a

true concept of the good is not present, a true concept of

final causality must necessarily be absent. Indeed, it may

■well be conceived that the general rejection of the notion

of final causality by the positive sciences has been due in

some part at least to a gradual but profound misconception

of the good.

In pursuing this theory we trill first examine the

doctrine of St. Thomas on the good and its role in final

causality. We trill then attempt to show how this true notion

(1) St. Thomas, II Physics, Lectio 4, n. 8.

2 -

of the good came to be lost gradually in the fifteenth and

sixteenth centuries, among certain schoolmen of that era.

Lastly, we mil state the doctrine of John of St. Thomas

concerning the good, a doctrine reaffirming the basic

notions of St, Thomas, From this restatement of the true

notion of the good, we mil see in contrast how far these

scholastic teachers had strayed from the basic concepts,

In later chapters dealing with moderns who have

had great influence in leading the thinking world away from

final causality, we will be careful to note their doctrine

of the good as well as their false conceptions of final

causality. We hope thereby to point out what connections

may exist between these early Scholastic errors regarding

the good and the ultimate rejection of final causality. We

think that comparison will evidence as well that, although

the Scholastic errors passed unnoticed by many whereas those

of modern thinkers are obvious, these former were far more

profound in their deviation from the truth, and serve thereby

to demonstrate the superficial character of many of the

moderns.

DOCTRINE OF ST. THOMAS

The principal doctrine of St. Thomas concerning

the good is to be found in the Summa Theologica, Prima Pars,

- s -

Question Y, in the De Veritate, Question I, Article I, and

Question 2X1, article 1 and in the treatise in Boethium de

Hebdomadibus,

In these places he speaks of the good as a ■trans­

cendental convertible with being. It will be well to note

that throughout this discussion we will confine ourselves to

the transcendental good. The moral good is concerned with

the responsible actions of creatures having an intellect and

free will. The transcendental good is more extensive, is

indeed coextensive with being. It is with this good that our

problem of final causality is principally concerned. Many

will admit final causality in human actions but at the same

time deny it in the universe as a whole. Indeed, the first

objection of those who admit a moral good and a purposeful

action of human beings is that in claiming final causality

for the universe of being we are committing the error of

anthropomorphism, projecting unwarrentedly our own purpose­

ful action on the universe.

Turning first, therefore, to the doctrine of the

good given by St. Thomas in the First Part of the Summa

Theologica we read s

’’Ratio enim boni in hoc consistit, quod sit aliquid appetibile » Unde Philosophus dicit, quod bonum est

quod omnia appetunt.” (1)

(1) St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, I, Q. V, a. 1, o.

4 -

"... cum bonum sit quod omnia appetunt: hoc autem ha­beat rationem finis $ manifestum est quod bonum ratio­nem finis importat.” (l)

”... bonum dicitur diffusivum sui eo modo quo finis di­

citur movere.11 (2)

”... Unumquodque dicitur bonum, inquantum est perfectum;

sic enim est appetibile, ut supra dictum est (art. 1 et 3). Perfectum autem dicitur, cui nihil deest secun­

dum modum suae perfectionis. Cum autem unumquodque sit id quod est per suam formam; forma autem prae supponit quaedam, et quaedam ad ipsam ex necessitate consequun­tur; ad hoc quod aliquid sit perfectum et bonum, ne- cesse est quod et formam habeat, et ea quae praeexis­tunt, et ea quae consequuntur ad ipsam, Fraeexigitur autem ad formam determinatio sive commonsuratio prin­cipiorum, seu materialium, seu efficientium ipsam. Et hoc significatur per modum; unde dicitur quod mensura modum praefigit. Ipsa autem forma singificatur per speciem, quia per formam unumquodque in specie consti­tuitur; et propter hoc dicitur quod numerus speciem praebet; quia definitiones significantes speciem sunt sicut numeri, secundum Philosophum. Sicut enim unitas addita vel subtracta variat speciem numeri, ita in de­finitionibus differentia apposita vel subtracta variat speciem. Ad formam autem consequitur inclinatio ad fi­nem, aut ad actionem aut ad aliquid hujusmodi; quia unumquodque inquantum est actu, agit et tendit in id quod sibi convenit secundum suam formam. Et hoc per­tinet ad pondus et ordinem. Unde ratio boni, secundum quod consistit in perfecto esse, consistit etiam in * 1 2 3modo., specie, et ordine." (g)

From these passages -me may conclude that the proper

nature of the transcendental good includes the notions of

perfection, appetihility, and final causality. In reality

(1) St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, I, Q. V, a. 4, c

(2) ibidem, a. 4, ad 2.

(3) ibidem, a. 5, o.

5 -

good and being are identical and yet the terms are non

synonymous. Good is being in so far as it is perfect and

therefore appetible, and hence a final cause.

Going now to the De Veritate me find that therein

St. Thomas approaches the notion of the good through a treat­

ment of the general notion of property1 of being. Thus, in

Question I we read s

"... secundum hoc aliqua dicuntur addere supra ens, in

quantum, exprimunt ipsius modum, qui nomine ipsius entis non exprimitur. Quod dupliciter contingit $ uno modo ut modus expressus sit aliquis specialis modus entis ; sunt enim diversi gradus entitatis, secundum quos acci­piuntur diversi modi essendi; et juxta hos modos acci­piuntur diversa rerum genera;......Alio modo ita quodmodus expressus sit modus generaliter consequens omne ens ; et hio modus dupliciter accipi potest; uno modo se­cundum. quod consequitur unumquodque ens in ordine ad aliud........ Si autem modus entis accipiatur secundo

!/ modo, scilicet secundum ordine unius ad alterum; hoc

potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo secundum divisionem unius ab altero; et hoc exprimit hoc nomen aliquid;... Alio modo secundum convenientiam unius entis ad aliud; et hoc quidem non potest esse nisi accipiatur aliquid quod natum sit convenire cum omni ente. Hoc autem est anima, quae quodammodo est omnia........ In anima autemest vis cognitiva et appetitiva. Convenientiam ergo entis ad appetitum exprimit hoc nomen bonum; ut in prin- oipio Ethic, dicitur: Bonum est quod omnia~appetunt.

Convenientiam, vero entis ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen verum." (l)

Here ws see that good is a general mode of being,

consequent upon every being, not in so far as it is considered

(l) St. Thomas, De Veritate, Q. I. a. 1, c

6 -

in itself, but in so far as it has order to another. We

see further that this order is an order of convenientia,

of proper proportion, not between any two beings whatever,

but between any being and the intellectual appetite. Good,

therefore, is a name expressive of the general mode of being

which is the convenientia of every being to the appetite*

Hence in this passage St* Thomas brings out once again that

appetibility, order to appetite, is of the very nature of

good.

In Question XXI of the De Veritate, St* Thomas

once again approaches the notion of good from the viewpoint

of property of being. This time, however, he stresses rather

the notion of its causality rather than of its simple relation

to appetite. He says :

"...et sic oportet quod bonum, ex quo non contrahit ens, addat aliquid super ens, quod sit rationis tantum. ...

"verum. et bonum positive dicuntur j unde non possunt ad­dere nisi relationem quae sit rationis tantum. Illa autem relatio, secundum Philosophum in V Metaphye. (text. 20), dicitur esse rationis tantum, secundum quam dicitur referri in quod non dependet ad id ad quod refertur,... sicut patet in scientia et scibili; .... relatio vero qua scibile refertur ad scientiam, est rationis tantum*.... et ita est in omnibus aliis quae se habent ut mensura et mensuratum, vel perfee- tivuzn et perfeotibile.wOportet Igitur quod verum et bonum super intellectumentis addant respectum perfeotivi. In quolibet autemente est duo considerares scilicet ipsam rationem

speciei, et esse ipsum quo aliquid aliud subsistit in specie illa : et sic aliquod ens potest esse perfectum dupliciter. Uno modo secundum rationem speciei tan­tum; et sic ab ente perficitur intellectus, qui perfi­citur per rationem entis ; neo tamen ens est in eo se­cundum esse naturale; et ideo hunc modum, perficiendi addit verum super ens....."Alio modo ens est perfeetivum alterius non solum se-

••7 e*

eundum iràtionem speciei, sed etiam secundum esse quod habet in rerum naturas et per hunc modum est perfacti­vum bonum; bonum enim in rebus est, ut Philosophus li­

cit in VÏ Metaphya. (com* 8), In quantum autem unum

ens est secundum esse suum perfect liram alterius et con­servativum, habet rationem finis respectu illius quod

ab eo perficitur5 et inde est quod omnes recte defini­entes bonum ponunt in ratione ejus aliquid quod perti­neat ad habitudinem finis; undePhilosophuB dicit in I Ethic, (in princip.)’, quod bonum optime definiunt di­centes, quod bonum est quod omnia appetunto (Ï) "*

From this we see that to rightly define good we

must consider it as perfective, not in any way whatsoever,

but as perfective according to all the being which it has

in the nature of things, This is the perfectivity of reality,

the perfectivity which has the nature of final cause, the per­

fectivity which all seek, which is,, therefore, referred to

the appetite.

From all this doctrine of St, Thomas, therefore,

we must clearly conclude that the notion of transcendental

good must include not only being as such, but being as , perfect,

and hence as perfective, not of the intellect, but of the

appetite, Good, most essentially, therefore, is being as

appetibile, as final cause.

EKROSEOÜS H0TIQHS OF SHE GOOD

vWe will not turn to investigate how this notion

(1) St, Thomas, De Veritate, Q, 3X1, a. 1, c,

8 -

of the transcendental good suffered scans basic, yet subtle

changes in the hands of some Scholastics of the fifteenth

and sixteenth centuries. It will be impossible at present

to investigate all the writers of this epoch, but we will

examine as many as time and the sources at hand permit.

DUBAHDDS

A member of the Order of Preachers, Durandus de

Sancto Portiano published a commentary on the Books of

Sentences in 1508. In commenting on the Second Book he set

forth the proper nature of the good as follows :

"Dicendum ergo quod formalis ratio boni est ratio con­venientis ita quod bonitas est formaliter ipsa conve­

nientia et contrahit entitatem ad partem subjectivam quae est relatio$ et ad tglem relationem quae est con­venientia : et sio omnis bonitas est quaedam entitas qtiae est respeetiv&î sed non omnis entitas est quidditative bonitas s ita iquod non convertuntur essentialiter» bonum vero ratione concretionis importat id quod habet talem convenientiam ut ejus subjectum : vel fundamentum et quia illud potest inveniri in quolibet generet saltem in generibus absolutis: ideo bonum dicitur converti cum ente non essentialiter sed denominative t formalis ta­men ratio boni est respectiva scilicetratio conve­nientiae . ” (1)

This short paragraph contains one of the most basic

errors possible regarding the nature of the good. Unfortun- 1

(1) Durandus, II Sent., Dist. 34, Q. 1, Fol, CCXII, L

9 -

ately, moreover, this doctrine formed a basis for later

errors, errors which may well have been the bridge leading

in part at least to the eventual rejection of final causality

by the moderns,

The most glaring blunder “which Durandus makes here

in Ms complete misconception of good as a property of being.

Indeed, he depicts it as a property of being by holding it

to pertain to being as an accident to its subject. Thus he

distinguishes between the formal ratio of the good and the good

considered in the order of concretion. He says that the formal

ratio of the good is a relation, the relation of convenientia.

Considered concretely good is the subject to which this relation

inheres *

In So far as good is said of this subject of the

relation of convenientia, Durandus admits its convertibility

with being, non essentialiter sed denominative. We will best

understand what he means by this if we read the distinction

as he himself makes it in the form of a premise to his response.

He says $

”...aliquid potest converti cum ente dupliciter uno modo

essentialiter i alio modo denominative. Primo modo res convertitur cum ente: quia omnis entitas extra animam est essentialiter realitas et e converso. Secundo modo quando unum non est alterum, essentialiter et formaliter tamen unum non invenitur sine altero sicut ens creatum et relatio: quia dato quod non omnis essentia creata sit relatio $ nulla tamen essentia creata invenitur sine

relatione et ideo convertuntur denominative.n (1) 1

(1) Durandus, II Sent. Diet. 34, Q. 1, Pol. COXI, M,

10 -I

Thug > when Durandus says that good Is convertible

with, being denominative » he means simply that wherever being

is found there also is the relation of convenientia which is

the good. This relation is evidently a real relation accord­

ing to his definition quoted above.

The question immediately arises as to how be would

hold God to be good, as to whether he would posit a relation

inhering In the Divine Essence* The answer is found in his

response to an objection against his position. It reads as

follows $

"Ad quartam dicendum quod antecedens est falsum quia

bonum in Deo dicit relationem vel respectum form&liter non quidem respectum ad intrat sed ad extra videlicet ad creaturas et cum dicitur quod Deus non refertur realiter ad creaturas, Dicendum est quod sicut dictum fuit primo libro dist. xxx. SI relatio accipiatur pro respectu per se consequente ad naturam rei. Sic Deus non refertur ad creaturas. Si autem accipiatur pro reali denominatione sumpta ex pluribus : sio Deus re­fertur realiter ad creaturas cum dicitur creator vel bonums et quod subditur quod sequeretur quod Deus es­set bonus ex habitudine ad creaturas: et sic bonitas ejus dependeret a creaturis dicendum quod falsum est. Aliud enim est Deum dici bonum in habitudine ad crea­turas et bonitatem ejus dependere ad creaturas. Pri­mum enim est verum: sed secundum est falsumi imo po­tius bonitas creaturae dependet a Deo: et propter hoo

Deus dicitur bonus in habitudine ad creaturam: quia tota creatura : et quicquid bonitatis et perfectionis est in ea dependet a Deo.” (l) (l)

(l) Durandus, II Sent* Dist. 54, Q. 1, Pol. CCIIII, G,

11

According to this doctrine, therefore, God is good

only by a relation of reason « at any rate, His goodness is

at most a real denomination, flowing from His relation to

creatures, Were there no creatures God should not be able

to be said good, Goodness requires plurality of being for

its very existence,

Ibis doctrine is so shockingly erroneous as almost

to discourage a response. It will serve well to show to

what point an error on the nature of the good can lead. We

will point out only briefly its gross error by indicating

the doctrine of St, Thomas concerning the divine goodness.

This doctrine is found in the sixth question of

the Prima Pars, There is the first article St. Thomas

•demonstrates that it belongs to God to be good. The teaching

of this article is extremely profound. To be correctly under­

stood one must have grasped well what St, Thomas taught of

the nature of the good itself in the preceding question.

Since Durandus failed to do that as we shall see it is

small wonder that he erred in this matter.

In this first article St. Thomas sets out to prove

"quod bonum esse praecipue Deo convenit," (1) To do this he

(l) St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, I, V, a. 1, e.

» 12 —

shows that God is the object of every appetite in so far as

He is "prima causa effectiva omnium." Thus St. Thomas proves

that God is good by referring to creatures, but he does not

in any way state that God is good only in so far as He has

respect to creatures * Nor does he mean in any way to say

that the causality of God's goodness is efficient causality,

as some seem later to interpreted him (1). His intent here

in this first article is merely to prove that God is good ;

he does this by showing that God is appetible to creatures. All

things, he says, seek their own perfection. This perfection

however is a similitude of the agent. Hence the agent is ap­

petible and thus good. God, however is the first agent, the

first efficient cause and is therefore certainly good.

Even in this first article, however, St. Thomas by

the very profundity of Ms wording gives indication of how

God is good in Himself, a doctrine which he asserts explicitly

only in Article III. It will not be amiss to read the body

of this first article,

"...bonum esse praecipue Deo convenit. Bonum enim

aliquid est secundum, quod est appetibile; unumquodque autem appetit suam perfectionem; perfectio autem et forma effectus est quaedam similitudo agentis, eum 1

(1) Cf. Suarez below, pg

omne agens agat sito simile j unde ipsum agens est appetit ile, et habet rationem boni} hoc enim est quod de ipso appetitur, ut ejus similitudo participetur.

Cum ergo Deus sit prima causa effectiva omnium, ma­nifestum est quod ei competit ratio boni et appetibi­lis.” (1)

In the second article of this question St. Thomas

is still speaking of the divine goodness in comparison to

the created. There he proves that Sod is the highest good,

summum bonum} the use of the superlative here indicates that

a comparison is made, St, Thomas says that this adjective

summum ”addit supra bonum non rem aliquam absolutam, sed re­

lationem tantum.” (2) This relation is a relation of reason

in respect to God, is real in creatures.

It is in the third article that St. Thomas speaks

of the proper goodness of God. There he shows that God is

good through His very essence and that it is proper to God

alone to be good in this my# Since this article is the

proper answer to Durandus* grave error we will quote it in

its entirety#

”... solus Dew est bonus per suam essentiam. Unum­

quodque enim dicitur bonum, secundum quod est perfec­tum. Perfectio autem alioujus rei triplex est. 1. 1 2

(1) St, Thomas, Summa Theologica, I, Q. VI, a# 1, e.

(2) St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, I, Q. VI, a. 2, ad 1.

14

quidem, secundum quod in suo esse constituitur# 2« vero, prout ei aliqua accidentia superadduntur ad

suam perfectam operationem necessaria, 3. vero per­fectio alieujus est per hoc quod aliquid aliud attin­git sicut finem. Utpote prima perfectio ignis con­sistit in esse quod habet per suam formam substantia­lem. Secunda ejus perfectio consistit in oaliditate, levitate, et siccitate, et hujusmodi. Tertia vero perfectio ejus est secundum quod in suo loco quies­cit. Haec autem triplex perfectio nulli creato com­petit secundum suam essentiam sed soli Deo, cujus solius essentia est suum esse, et cui non adveniunt aliqua accidentia; sed quae de aliis dicuntur acci- dentallter, sibi conveniunt essentialiter; ut esse potentem, sapientem, et alia hujusmodi, sicut ex

dictis patet (quaest. Ill, art. 8), Ipse etiam ad nihil aliud ordinatur sicut ad finem, sed ipse est

ultimus finis omnium rerum. Unde manifestum est quod solus Deus habet omnimodam perfectionem secun­dum suam essentiam* Et ideo ipse solus est bonus per suam essentiam.” (1)

Thus, w® see how very properly Sod is said to be

good in Himself, by pis very essence, since His essence is

His very being, since, moreover, -whatever is attributed as

accidental to creatures is attributed to God as being of

His essence, and since, lastly, God is ordained to no other

as an end but all others to Him, Durandus1 serious mistake

in this matter, therefore » while is springs from a mistaken

notion of the good itself, forms a most shocking misconcept­

ion of the very nature of God,

In the fourth and last article of this question

(l) St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, I, Q. VI, a* 3 o

15 ~

St. Thomas shows that all creatures are good by a certain

participation of the divine goodness* He says $

"A primp igitur per suam essentiam ente et bono, unum­quodque potest dici bonum et ena, inquaatum partici­pat ipsum per modum, cujusdam assimilât!onis; licet re­

mote et deficienter... ( 1 )

Far, therefore, from God's being good in so far

as creatures exist, the truth is that creatures are good

only because God is so good by His very essence,

Just as it is difficult to believe that Durandus

could have made this error regarding the goodness of God,

so it is hard to conceive that he could have made the errors

he did about the nature of the good i| he read the doctrine

given by St* Thomas in the De Veritate Question 1X1« In

giving St. Thomas' doctrine of the good above, we quoted

part of this,article# the part referring more directly to

the good. The beginning of the article affords such a olear

and beautiful explanation of just how a transcendental prop­

erty of being is to be distinguished from being itself, that

it is incredible that anyone could read it and still err.

St. Thomas begins by saying that something can be

(1) St. Thomas# De Veritate, Q. XXI, a. 1, o

16

added to smother In three ways. ' The first is when the

thing added is outside of the essence of that to which it

is added, as when an accidental quality is added to a subs­

tance . In this way something can he added to a particular

thing only, for as St* Thomas says 5 "nulla enim res naturae

est quae sit extra essentiam universalis, quamvis aliqua ree

sit extra essentiam hujus entis." (l)

Thus, it is most evident that in this way nothing

can be added to being as such. Nevertheless, this is the

way according to which Durandus would seem to say the good

formally considered appertains at least to created beings.

The second way given by St. Thomas in which some­

thing is said to be added to another is the way of contract­

ing or determining. An example of this is the way the notion

"homo" adds something to that of "animal". Animal is not a

part to which mab is added, but animal is something which in

itself is determined by man.

This is undoubtedly the way in which. Durandus

thought he was adding good to being, for he speaks of being

as contracted by the notion of good. Even in understanding

(1) St. Thomas, De Veritate, Q. XXI, a. 1, c

- 17

this way# however# he was wrong# for he seems to have

conceived, contraction or determination as meaning a per­

pétuai presence of the accident, relation of convenience#

in the substance# being*

Had he understood it rightly# however# he would

still have been wrong. Good does not contract being. Being

contracted or determined in this way gives rise to the

division of the ten predicaments. But, as St. Thomas says

"bonum, dividatur aequaliter in decem genera, ut ens." (1)

The third and final way in which something is

added to another, according to St* Thomas, is "secundum, ra­

tionem tantum"; quando scilicet aliquid est de ratione unius

quod non est de ratione alterius; quod tamen nihil est in

rerum, natura, sed in ratione tantum; sive per illud contra­

hitur id cui dicitur addi, sive non." (2)

It is in this way in which good is said to be added

to being. It does not contract being, however, for as St.

Thomas noted in the first question of the De Veritate it is

(1) St. Thomas, De Veritate, Q,. XXI, a. 1. e

(2) ibidem.

18

a general mode following all 'being.

Durandus ’ further contention that the proper

nature of the good is a relation of convenientia, convenien­

tia being taken as a proportion "between the natures of two

beings as such, is an outgrowth of this basic misconception

of good as a property of being. Good, as we have seen in.

the doctrine of St. Thomas, is not a relation of convenientia,

but the name good expresses a certain convenientia, a con­

venientia of the beings with the intellectual appetite.

As we have seen above, St. Thomas in the De Veri­

tate, Question I, describes the transcendental properties

of being as general modes consequent on every being, Among

these general modes he makes a division between those which

follow every being in se and those which follow each being

in ordine ad aliud. It is among these latter that the good

is to he found.

The group of general modes consequent on every

being in ordine ad aliud is subdivided into those consequent

upon every being according to its division from another being,

and those following every "being "secundum conoenientiam unius

entis ad aliud." In the first of these subdivisions, the

aliud to which every being is ordered is any other being,

but in the second group, expressive of convenientia, the

19

aliud denominates two very determined beings, intellect

and will.

It is precisely this that Durandus failed to note.

For him the aliud of convenientia ad aliud signifies any

being whatsoever. St. Thomas says this is impossible.

Indeed, immediately upon giving the division of those general

modes which follow every being secundum convenientiam entis

ad aliud, he says s "hoc quidem non potest esse nisi acci­

piatur aliquid quod natum sit convenire cum. omni ente. Hoc

autem est anima quae quodammodo est omnia..." (1)

Thus the aliud here Is the soul, and it is divided

according to the two potencies of the soul, intellect and

will. The convenientia of every being with the intellect is

truths the convenientia with the will is good.

It is because Durandus has forgotten the intellect­

ual soul, therefore, that he has erred on the nature of the

good. A system of beings which does not contain an intellect­

ual soul can have neither truth nor goodness. It is wierd, ^

therefore, to see men with an intellectual soul using that

soul to try to explain the universe without the inclusion of

(1) St. Thomas, De Veritate, Q. I, a. 1, c

such a soul. Such men are not scientists or philosophers $

they are sophists*

Durandus’ first error does not ###m to h*** been

the exclusion of the intellectual soul* It seems rather to

have been an error as to the nature of the transcendental

properties of being, an attempt to explain them -without

reference to reason. Transcendental* as such can exist only

for the intellectual soul and only through the Prime Intellect.

In the explanation of Ms doctrine Durandus divides

convenientia into infer insec and extrinsic, the former imply­

ing sometimes the relation of formal or material cause, and

the latter that of efficient cause. Hence the good, would

sometimes seem to have the ratio of formal material or ef­

ficient cause, (l)

In regard to final causality Durandus makes the

following distinction $

"...aut intelllgltur d# ratione importata per hoc nomen

finis et ad finem aut de ratione rei cui competit esse denominative fines» vel ad finem*”

(1) Durandus, II Sant* Diet. 84, Q, 1, Pol, C0HII A,

(2) ibidem, pol, ooni, I.

21

Thus he makes a distinction concerning final cause

here similar to the one he makes regarding the good. He does

not deny that good might have the ratio finis, but, on the

other hand, he does not list this ratio in his classification

of convenientia. He does say, however, that good cannot

possibly be finis in so far as the thing to which It belongs

denominatively to be finis is connoted .

"... nullo igitur modo formalis ratio boni est esse fi­

nem, vel ad finem, si sic accipiantur." (1)

As we know, the distinction regarding the finis

which Durandus makes is incorrect. Good has the ratio finis,

as St. Thomas says, and good is convertible with being, and

with res. Hence Durandus is actually guilty here of denying

the ratio finis to the good, although in the confusion of

his doctrine one might better say he is guilty at most of

having a very vague conception of the relation of good and

end. Since he does not list the relation of final causality

among his relations of extrinsic convenientia, one may well

assume that he does not mean to include the ratio finis in

the formal ratio of the good even as a type of good.

Durandus does attribute a motion to the good,

(1) Durandus, Il Sent. Diet. 34, Q. 1, Fol, CCXÏI I

22

though it is difficult to see in what my it is a motion.

He says the motion of the good consists in its apprehension

hy the practical intellect. It will he best if we read Ms

own words in this matter :

”Ad quintum, dicendum quod solus respectus non movet sed absolutum cum respectu movet tam intellectum practicum quam voluntatem. Simplex enim quidditas licet possit

movere intellectum ad actum simplicem qui est indivisi­bilium intelligentia: tamen non potest movere ad actum componentem nisi accepta in habitudine ad alterum quia actus intelligendi componens fertur in duo propter con­venientiam unius ad alterum: et sic intellectus practi­

ces movetur a bono inquantum apprehendit aliquam natu­ram absolutam sub ratione convenientis ad alterum.*(1)

Although Durandus speaks here of a motion of the

will, Ms words would seem to imply that the prime motion of

the good is a motion of the practical intellect, the motion

of the will being consequent upon this. Actually the motion

of the good is a movement of the will, a movement of attract­

ion; a necessary condition for such a movement, however, is

the presentation of the good to the will by the intellect.

This apprehension of the good by the intellect is not due to

a motion of the good, but is rather due to the motion of the

intellect.

Durandus1 idea of the motion of the good is

(1) Durandus, II Sent. Diet. 54, Q. 1, Fol. CCZIII D.

23

fundamentally a rationalization from his concept of the

essence of the good. It will he interesting to note how

a variation of this idea recurs in the doctrine of Vasques

when he says that finis has the formal ratio of finalizing

when it bespeaks an objective concepts in other words, final

c&tiie moves bjr being known and not merely through being known.

This doctrine of Vasques is merely one evidence of how much

his thought was influenced by the teaching of Durandus? there

are many more as we shall soon see.

To summarize the errors of Durandus ' doctrine of

the good, then, we may say that he has erred in considering

good as a contraction of being, in staking it an accidental

relation in so far as it refers to creatures, an extrinsic (?)

denomination as it refers to Sod, in speaking of it as a

convenientia of a being not to the appetite but to another

being, and in ignoring, to say the least, its ratio of final

cause.

LATER SOHQOLMEST

We will consider now the doctrine of son® of the

later schoolmen. Time will limit us at present to only two

of their number, two* however, whose names rank among the

- 24

foremlst isa scholarship, Vasques and. Suarez, We Mil

endeavour to point out not only the errors of their doctrine

of the good and final cause, hut also in -what My these errors

seem to have been motivated by "the teaching of Durandus »

VASQUEZ SÜAEEZ

In his Metaphysics, published in 1614, Francis

Suarez, 8 .J. discusses at great length the notion Of the

transcendental good, His discussion is found in Disputatio X.

The tract begins -with a list of various opinions

aS to the proper nature of the transcendental good. Second

among these opinions Suarez lists that claiming good to be

a real relation of convenientia. This opinion, he says, is

attributed to Durandus, but is not the mind of that school­

man, Suarez claims rather :

*Sed cum Durandus in aliis etiam rebus neget proprias relationes reales, alia est in praesenti mens ejus,

, ut infra videbimus*® (1)

Although Durandus’ own words as quoted above and

the entire nature of Ms treatment of the transcendental good

seem to belie this claim of Suarez, still we will not argue

(1) Suarez, Me taphys io or urn Disputationum, Disp. X, Sect. 1,no. G.

25 -

the point here since in the confused state of mind in "which

Durandus seems to have conceived things anything is possible.

It is strong indication, however » of how much influence

Durandus had on Suarez ’ thinking that Suarez later should

claim that his own position regarding the transcendental

good is in reality what Durandus meant*

The fourth opinion regarding the transcendental

good quoted by Suarez is that attributed to a certain Hervaeus

in his Quodlibetaleg. Two Servaei lived in the fourteenth

century, both of whom wrote concerning Thomistie doctrine.

In the absence of the proper text we will give the opinion

as set forth by Suarez t

K ». «bonitatem nihil aliud dicer© quam intrinsecam rei

perfectionem quae absoluta est in absolutis, et rela­tiva in relativis. Unde fieri videtur consequens, bonum nihil aliud esse, quam ipsum ens, quatenus in se aliquid perfectionis habet. Haec opinio tribuitur Hervaeo quodlib* 5, qu. 2, ibi tamen magis sentit bo­nitatem dicer^T entitatem quatenus est perfeetiva al­

terius, seu quatenus ad alterius perfectionem ordina­tur, quam ut in se habet perfectionem aliquam, de que sensu infra dicam.” (1)

Suarez accepts this opinion as true, but says it

is necessary to add something to it. With this addition he

forms his own conclusion which he says is the one Durandus

(1) Suarez, Metaphysieorum Disputationum, Disp. I, Sect. 1,no. 9.

- 26

also intended. Let us read it $

"Dicendum ergo est bonum supra ens solum posse addere rationem convenientiae, quae non est proprium relatio, sed solum cono tat in alio talem naturam habentem na­

turalem inclinationem, capacitatem, vel coniunctionem cum tali perfectione: unde bonitas dicit ipsam perfec­tionem rei, oozmotando praedictam convenientiam seu denotationem consurgentem ex coexistent ia plurium." (l)

One will certainly see Durandus mirrored here.

Suarez, however, did not make the basic error regarding the

nature of a property of being which we found in Durandus.

Indeed, Suarez never speaks of good as a contraction of being,

but he speaks of the two as distinct only by reason. He

strongly maintains their coextension, moreover, saying there

can never be good where there is not being, It will not be

amiss to read seme of his texts on this point $

"ut sio (i,e. according to Ms opinion) nonnulla dis­

tinctio rationis fundata in rebus inter bonum et ens, ut sic possit bonum attribui enti tamquam proprietas, en non esse synonimum cum illo, quia formal iter aliud est esse seu habere entitatem: aliud vero ratione en­ti tat is habere semper aliquam convenientiam, quam ra­tio boni declarat." (2)

"Dicendum tamen censeo, bonum proprie dictum semper sup­

ponere vel includere ens, seu fundari in ente, ideoque non posse bonum, sub quacunque praedictarum rationum,

(l) Suarez, Metaphysicorum Disputationum, Disp. X, Sect, 1,

no 12,

(2) ibidem,

27

latius patere» quam ens,” (l)

“Sequitur dqinde "bonum sub eadem ratione sumptum esse

aliquo modo passionem, seu proprietatem entis, quia et cum illo convertitur, et secundum rationem illud

supponit, et ab eo aliquo modo distinguitur secundum formalem rationem a nobis conceptam et significatam. Et ideo dixi, esse aliquo modo passionem, quia non est passio in eo rigore, in quo passio requirit dis­

tinctionem aliquam ex natura rei a suo subjecto, sed solum, ut dicitur de quolibet attributo secundum ra­tionem , distincto ab eo cui attribuitur, ut superius declaratum est, tranotando de passionibus. “ (8)

“Cum bonum nomen sit connotativum seu denominativum hic non inquirimus, quid illud sit, quod bonum deno­minatur: nam certum est, illud, in communi loquendo, esse ens quod natura seu ratione bonum antecedit, ut in superioribus dictum est, et ex sequentibus magis constabit, sed inquirimus quaenam. sit illa forma seu ratio a qua res bona denominatur. “ (5)

This last text, one with which Suarez opens Ms

tract, when taken alone, is reminiscent of Durandus f

convertibility non essentialiter sed denominative between

good and "being. Understood, however, in the light of Suarez’

whole doctrine we will see that while he maintained the correct

conception of a property of being, he was forced to a vague

acceptance of denominative convertibility.

Although Suarez did not follow Durandus in this basic

error regarding the properties of being, he did follow him in * 8

(1) Suarez, Metaphysicorum Disputationum, Disp. X, Sect. 5,

no. 1.

(8) ibidem, Sect. 5, no. 5.

(3) ibidem, Sect. 1, no. 1.

28 -

holding the ratio formalis of the good to he convenientia

not to the appetite hut to being, for him the aliud of St,

Thomas is another being, not always really distinct as Du­

randus required, hut distinct at least by reason. This is

indeed the basic error of Suarez* doctrine, and once again

it springs from an omission of the notion of intellectual

soul in the system, though Suarez* omission was not so

complete as was Durandus *,

In his discussion, Suarez seems'often to teeter

dangerously on the precipice of Durandus* error of denominat­

ive convertibility. In so far as he saves himself he does

so only by holding tight to his correct notion of property

of being and by a logical vagueness. His most complete fall

comes in his answer to an objection to Ms conclusion as to

the proper nature of the good.

This objection may be stated briefly as follows $

good is divided into bonum alteri and bonum in se. The former

is only good secundum quid. The ratio formalis of the good

as Suarez gives it applies, however, only to the bonum alteri.

Suarez gives two answers to this difficulty. In

the first he falls into Durandus * error, but he pulls him­

self out again in the second. In his first answer he maintains

his definition $

- 29

"...describere bonitatem» qua© est passio entis % bonum autem solum esse passionem entis prout dicit convenientiam, ad alteram» seu prout est bonum alteris hoc enim modo distinguitur bonum aliquo modo ab ente, et convenit omni enti, etiam perfectissimoi • ».

"Bonum autem absolute sumptum, scilicet, prout est bo­num in se, non videtur pertinere ad passionem entis, sed potius ad essentiam, seu entitatem ejus ut supra argumentabar, quia bonum hoc modo idem est, quod per­fectum, ut D. Thom, saepe dicit I Part. q. 5 perfec­tum autem includitur in essentiali conceptu entis realis, quia non potest concipi ens cum entitate quin concipiatur cum perfectione essentiali." (1)

Suarez here seems to echo Durandus} very •words,

distinguishing between bonum in its formal ratio and bonum

ratione concretionis. He follows Durandus too in denying

the formal ratio of the good to include the perfect (2). In

this matter it will be interesting to note the distinctions

of the perfect which Suarez makes. They will form interest­

ing comparison with that most illuminating distinction which

we will find in John of St, Thomas. Suarez divides the

perfect as follows :

"... dicit enim Aris t. 5 Metaph. c. 6 ’perfectum dici, extra quod non esse ullam partem accipere seu oui nihildeest’.... Hoc ergo sensu perfectum dicitur, non quod-cunque bonum, sed illud quod omni ex parte consummatum est, quod est simpliciter bonum."

(1) Suarez, Disp» X, Sect. 1, no. 14#

(2) Durandus, II Sent. Diet, 34, Q. I, Fol. CCXII I

so

"Alio tamen modo potest perfectum, dici, quidquid sub aliqua ratione entis, habet perfectionem simpliciter necessariam et essentialem.... Atque hoc modo bonum et perfectum convertuntur, imo sunt omnjno idem, prout bonum dicit id quod in se bonum est, seu quod habet bonitatem, i,e. perfectionem sibi debitam; hoc autem nihil aliud est quam habere essentiam vel en­ti tatam sibi debitam, igitur bonum sub hac ratione nihil aliud essentialiter ac formaliter dicit quam

ens;11

"Imo etiam esse perfectum priori modo, seu bonum sim­pliciter, nihil aliud est quam esse ens habens totam entitatem, quae ad complementum requiritur." (1)

This doctrine can be interpreted in keeping with

the teaching of St. Thomas, but unless the proper distinctions

are made it is prima facie far from that doctrine. One cannot

divorce the notion of perfect from the formal ratio of the

good, nor can one say that under this ratio of perfect the

good essentially and, formally signifies only being, is

synonymous with being. We shall find the proper distinction

to answer this difficulty in the treatise on the transcendental

good given by John of St. Thomas. We will defer its solution

till we come to see this doctrine.

One will not fail however to see the hand of

Durandus in this doctrine of Suarez as it is Written here.

Indeed, Suarez does everything here but say that good and 1

(1) Suarez, Hetaphysicorum Disputationum, X, Sect. 1, no* 15

— SI —

being are convertible non essentialiter sed denominative.

He says that good under the notion of perfect is being

essentially and formally. This notion of perfect* however*

he does not hold to be the formal ratio of good, Hence in

so far as perfect and good are convertible here (unless the

matter is interpreted in the true sense of St. Thomas and

John of St. Thomas) the only implication possible is that

the convertibility is one of denomination only.

In his second response Suarez seems to extract

himself from this difficulty. A careful analysis* however,

will reveal that even here he does not quite evade the notion

of denominative convertibility between good and being. He

says $

"Verumtaaen propter usum vocum potest adhiberi alia res­

ponsio. Nam, licet prior in hoc habeat verum, quod bonum sub ea ratione in re non differt ab ente, nihil­ominus possunt ratione distingui, quod satis est ut bonum assignetur ut proprietas entis, ad modum aliorum transcendentium. Est itaque quoad impositionem vel significationem nominis advertendum ens solum dici ab esse aut entit&te ut supra exposuimus, perfectum autem clarius exprimere entis perfectionem; in quo negatio­nem includit, vel saltem sine illa non potest a nobis ejus significatum explicari, scilicet quod nihil ei desit secundum eam rationem secundum, quam perfectum dicitur. Bonum vero dicere convenientiam aliquam, ra­tione cujus habet res, quod appetibilis sit; nam bo­num per ordinem aliquem aut appetitum , dictum est ut D. Thomas docuit,#., ex illo Arist. I Ethie. Bonum est, quod omnia appetunt, et statim magis explicabitur.Unde necesse est res illas quae absolute et secundum se dicuntur bonae, sic denominari; quia habent perfec­tionem sibi convenientem et appetibilem; et ita etiam

— 52 «

sit ut bonum, hoc modo, de formali significet perfec­tionem existentem in tali re connotando in eadem re capacitatem, inclinationem seu naturalem, connexionem cm tali perfectione.11 (l)

tiras, for Suarez, the goodness of a being in itself

consists in the perfection it has according as that perfection

bespeaks a convenientia with the being. Suarez goes on to

say that sometimes this perfection is distinguished from

the being as accidently inhering in it. In this case it is

easily discerned how the being is good through the goodness

of this perfection. Suarez finds the case more difficult

however, where the perfections are not really distinct from

the being as accident from substance* Let us read his words

again in these matters : .

"Quod clarius patet, quando talis perfectio est dis­

tincta ab ipsa re, quae ab illa bona denominatur; nam quando homo dicitur bonus ratione virtutis, de formali significatur virtus, non utcunque sed ut bonitas quae­dam, in quo importatur, non tantum perfectio virtutis, sed etiam convenientia, quam habet cum humana natura connotando ex parte ipsius naturae capacitatem vel pro­pensionem ad talem perfectionem. In his vero rebus in quibus non est distinctio inter perfectionem, et rem, quae perfecta dicitur, difficilius videtur explicari haec convenientia, vel connotatiot dicendum, est tamen, quamvis in re non sit distinctio, a nobis tamen conci­pi ac significari ad modum distinctorum, id est per mo­dum formae denominantis et rei denominatae, et ideo significari illam formam ut perfectionem aceomodatam

ei in quo' existit, in quo computatur naturalis connexio

(1) Suarez, Metaphysics, Disp. Z, Sect. 1, no. 17.

— 33 —

ejus cw tali forma, et ita distingui tale bonum ab ente, saltem ratione.” (1)

In this latter instance the distinction between

good and being is one of reason only therefore. One may

well ask whether Suarez intended only a distinction of

reason rati opinantis or a distinction implying a fundamen­

tum in re. That he intended it as a distinction of reason

ratiocinatae is clearly stated in his commentary on the

Prima Pars of St. Thomas* Summa Theologica, There in

discussing the goodness of God he says that a thing can be

said good in three ways %

"Primo igitur dicitur res bona quia in suo esse perfec­

ta est, i,e. quia habet omnia, quae ad complementum sui esse requiruntur." (2)

"Secundo modo dicitur aliquid ens bonum, quia conveniens est alicui, ac proinde ei est appetibile. Hoc autem ip­sum intelligi potest duobus modus. Primo quatemus unum­quodque habet perfectionem sibi convenientem et amabi­lem, quae convenientia si per modum relationis conside­retur, dolum est per considerationem nostram: tamen ut in re habet virtual# fundamentum, solet vocari So­

nitas transeendentalis, juxta probabilem opiniornem, de qua disput. 10 Metaphysica©.....Alio vero modo di­citur una res bona respectu alterius, quia est Illi conveniens." (&)

(1) Suarez, Metaphysics, Disp. X, Sect, 1, no, 17.

(2) Suarez, in I Pars, Lib. I, Tr, I, cap. 8.

(3) Suarez, in I Pars, Lib. I, Tr* I, cap. 8, no. 12

M

"Tertio modo denominantur peculiariter res intellec­tuales bonae bonitate morali, vel actuali, quia ope­ra bona moralia exercent, vel habitu et aptitudine retinent, quatenus sunt dispositae et propensae ad illud bonum, exercendum., * .hanc tertiam bonitatem non esse 'illam quae transcendental!» sit.” (1)

From the first division of the second mode in "which

Suarez says things are said good we may well conclude that

Suarez was thinking of a distinction of reason ratiocinatae

in his passage in the Metaphysics quoted on page twenty»gig.

Indeed this mode of good and that last mode of the passage

in the Metaphysics both refer to a simple being and are un­

doubtedly to be understood in the same way.

That the distinction is one of reason ratiocinatae

is evident since Suarez posits a virtual fundament in re. It

is a virtual fundament in re which underlies a distinctio ra­

tionis ratiocinatae. * 1

Further and conclusive evidence that he could only

have meant a distinction rationis ratiocinatae is afforded

by the fact that he did not admit of such a thing as a dis­

tinction rationis ratiooinantis. We can find this doctrine

in his Metaphysical Disputes Disp. 7. John of St, Thomas

(1) Suarez, in I Pars, Lib, I, Tr. 1, cap. 8, no. 16

36 -

SUDOS up Ms doctrine as follows ;

“Sed quidam explodunt distinctionem rationis ratio­cinant! set solum admittunt illam, quae habet funda­mentum aliquod in re# distinctionem, vero rationis ra­tiocinant is utpote fictam solum ease repetitionem ejusdem conceptus sine resultantia alicujus distinc­tionis in conceptu objective. Videatur Suarez in

Met&ph, disp. 7. sect. 1, Vasques, I p. diet, 117»

cap* 6.n (1)

In the above commentary wherein he makes the three

divisions of the good Suarez is discussing in what says God

is said good. He applies especially to God this mode wherein

a being is said good in so far as it has the perfection con­

venient to itself, a convenientia which we discern by our

reason basing it on a virtual fundamentum in re. Just after

describing it he says a

“Hoe ergo modo, per s© notum, et evident is s imum est,

Deum esse summe bonum, habet enim perfectionem sibi maxime convenientem, et amabilem a se, unde se neces­

sario amat, ut postea videbimus. “ (2)

thus Suarez did, not fall into the error which

Durandus made in saying God is good only in relation to His

creatures, because goodness requires a plurality of being.

Suarez held that God is good in Himself, though he too

required a plurality for the formal notion of goodness. We

(1) John of St. Thomas, Curs. Phil., T. I, II P, Q, II, a.

HI, 2MM1.

(2) , Ci. page, *»v j- i,

— 36 —

may have remarked this in the last phrase of his definition

given above*

"unde bonitas dicit ipsam perfectionem rei, coxmotando praedictam convenientiam seu denominationem consur­gentem ex coexistent!» plurium." (1)

Here again he seems to have morrored Durandus ’

words, though he has certainly changed their import. Du­

randus ’ plurality was of real beings only) Suarez makes his

plurality either real, or one of reason. Thus he is able to

save the goodness of God in Himself.

Suarez also held God to be good in so far as He

is conveniens to creatures. He does not posit this as being

so evident as his first conclusion as to God’s goodness in

se, but he does hold it. In discussing this point he again

mirrors the errors of Durandus, saying that good in its formal

ratio of convenientia may be considered as the form or some

part of another, or as its efficient cause. H© concludes

that God id conveniens to creatures in so far as He is their *

end, their object, their friend, and through His great power

as efficient cause « Thus he does not place the causality

of the good in final causality alone but leaves it roam

(1) Of, page

37

through several genera of cause. Indeed, what he has to

say of God’s causality as end in a later tract will manifest

that his conception of final causality tended confusedly to

identify it with efficient causality, (l)

We will do well to read Suarez’ final conclusion

as to the transcendental goodness of God. He says :

"Bonitas ergo trans cendentalis in Deo est vel prima,

vel secunda, quae a nobis explicatae sunt, vel utramque simul juxta varios modos explicandi bonitatem trans- cententalem, de quibus in disp. 10 Metaphysicae dixi­mus. Praecipue vero solet denominari Deus bonus ex plenitudine omnis perfectionis, et quatenus ex plenitu­dine ejus propensus est ad se diffundendum, et com­municandum aliis, quibus bonus esse potest. Quomodo videtur de bonitate Del praecipue agere Dionys. cap,4 de Divi. ndaa. Sic autem clarum est bonitatem nihil

addere essentiae Dei secundum rem, sed solum secundum quondam comatationem, et habitudinem rationis nostro modo concipiendi, non quod relationrationis sit boni­tas, sed fundamentum ejus, ut dicto loco declara- vi." (2)

We may wonder exactly to which division Suarez

refers by prima and secunda, whether it is to his first two

modes in which a thing is said good as given in the quo­

tation on page 33, or to Me two divisions of the

second mode. According to the phrase which follows

"juxta varios modes explicandi bonitatem transcendentalem",

and in the light of his last sentence of this quotation, we (l)

(l) Of. below, page

(B) Suarez, in I Parte, Lib. 1, Tr. I, cap. 8.

38

conclude that he would Interpret his first mode in the

light of Ms first division of the second, that thus Ms

first mode is not formally transcendental good, but is

presupposed to it.

This position is supported by three conclusions

with which Suarez resolves Ms treatment of the transcendental

good in the Metaphysics, These three we will find to be quite

parallel with the first mode and with the two divisions of

the second mode named in the Commentary above. The con­

clusions in the Metaphysics are $

"Dicendum tamen censeo bonum proprie dictum semper supponere vel includere ens, seu fundari in ente, ideoque non posse bonum, sub quacunque praedictarum rationum, latius patere, quam ens." (l)

"Omne verum ens in se bonum est, seu bonitatem aliquam

habet sibi convenientem: atque Ita sit ut bonum abso­lute dictum cum ente convertatur * (2}'

"Omne ens etiam est bonum respectu alioujus, id est, alicui conveniens, quo circa etiam bonum, sub ratione conveniens sumptum, cum ente convertitur, et est at­tributum seu passio ejus." (3)

(1) Suarez, Metaphysicarum Disputationum, Disp. X, Sect.

HI, no. 3,

(2) ibidem, no 4.

(3) ibidem, no. 6.

89 -

We will note that only the last of these is said

to be an attribute or property of being. Suarez intends,

however, that the second denote a property of being also

provided it be understood correctly. For that he makes a

division of the perfection of a thing according as that

perfection in an accident to the thing or is its very essence,

We saw this same division earlier (1) when Suarez gave the

second answer to his difficulty as to how a thing may-be said

good in se. Here he makes it clear that he considers only

the convenientia of the essential or intrinsic perfection of

a thing in se as transcendental bonum, in se, a property of

being. He says :

"Potest autem haec perfectio in creaturis esse, vel es­sentialis seu intrinseca (sub qua ipsum esse comprehen­do) (%) vel accidentalis. Prior est inseparabilis ab

unoquoque ente si in suo actuali esse conservetur: Posterior vero saepe potest separari. Denominatio %1- tur boni, quae omni ente necessario convenit: illa est quae a perfectione intrinseca, et essentiali desumitur, prout vero sumi potest a perfectione accidentali (sub

hac ratione includendo quicquid ex natura rei distin­guitur ab essentia rei, et entitati actuali) sio non est

ne cesse, omne ens creatum esse bonum, id est, affectum omni perfectione sibi possibili aut debita. Atque ita

(jj (0 > jp-cU? Jr-(l)^We may wonder whether Suarez means existence or being

by the word "esse" here, Should he have meant being

he would have been distinguishing being against itself, and then his relation could only have been identity and not convenientia. We must understand the term, there­fore, as existence, because he meant to consider perfection of a thing as convenient to itself. Moreover as we saw- above Suarez admitted of no distinction of reason ratio- cinantis and hence we should not logically expect one here.

40

sit, bonura priori ratione sumptum converti eum ente: ostenàimus eaaim oiaae eELS esse bonum, nihilque esse

vere bomm, nisi quod vere est. Sequitur deinde bo­num sub eadem ratione sumptum esse aliquo modo passio­nem, seu proprietatem entis, quia et cum illo conver­titur, et secundum rationem illud supponit, et ab eo aliquo modo distinguitur secundum formalem rationem a nobis conceptam et significatam. Et ideo dixi esse aliquo modo passionem, quia non est passio in eo ri­gore, in quo passio requirit distinctionem aliquam ex natura rei a suo subjecto, sed solum ut dicitur de quo­libet attributo secundum rationem distincto ab eo cui attribuitur, ut superius declaratum est, tractando da passionibus *" (1)

By these words Suarez does not rule out accidental

perfection as a transcendental good3 he does, however, remove

it from the ratio of bonum in se, considered as a transcendental

good. For him accidental perfection is to be considered as

something distinct from the thing in itself, and, therefore,

as bonum alteri. This is clearly indicated in the passage from,

his second response to the objection against Ms doctrine,

quoted above on page twenty-six; He says there :

"Quod clarius patet, quando talis perfectio est distinc­

ta ab ipsa re, quae ab illa bona denominaturi nam quan­do homo dicitur bonus ratione virtutis, de formali si­gnificatur virtus, non utcunque sed ut bonitas quaedam,

in quo importatur, non tantum perfectio virtutis, sed etiam convenientia, quam habet cum humana natura conno- tando ex parte ipsius naturae capacitatem vel propen­sionem ad talem perfectionem.n (2)

(1) Suarez, Metaphysioorum Disputationum, Disp. X, Sect. Ill,

no, 5.

(2) ibidem, Sect. 1, no, 18.

41

Undoubtedly, therefore, Suarez considers accidental

perfection as a passio entier a transcendental good in so

far as it is conveniens alteri. Hence, in so far as it is a

good it is so according to the second division of his second

mode in the Commentary or to the ttird conclusion in the Meta­

physical Disputes»

This Snaresian doctrine is more than slightly

startling in its ramifications. It manifests first of all,

as its basis, a complete misconception of thalnotion of in­

dividuality, and it postulates in its logical consequences

an annihilating overthrow of the whole doctrine of the

distinction of bonam simpliciter and bonum secundum quid.

Indeed, this doctrine of simpliciter and secundum

quid as applied to being and to good is Incomprehensible

without a correct notion of what is an individual. As we

shall see when we read it, St, Thomas’ whole treatment of this

important point presupposes a correct notion of individuation.

It will not be amiss, therefore* to enter briefly into the

Thomistic idea of the individual and to point out how Suarez

is opposed to it.

An individual is defined by St. Thomas in the Summa

Theologica as follows $ ”Individuum autem est quod est in se

42

indistinctum, ab aliis vero distinctum," (l) As the

principle of individuation, he assigns in many places materia

signata quantitate, One reference especially clear is found,

in Ms Opusculum In Boethium De Trinitate, There he says :

"Illa quae differunt numero in genere substantiae non solum differunt accidentibus, sed etiam forma et materia. Séd si quaeratur, quare haec forma differt ab illa, non est alia ratio, nisi quia est in alia materia signata. Neo invenitur alia ratio, quare haec materia sit divisa ab illa, nisi propter quantitatem. Et ideo materia subjecta dimensioni intelligitur esse principium hujus diversitatis." (2)

We -will note above that St, Thomas refers to the

difference of individuals as being by accidents. John of

St. Thomas makes this illusion more explicit -when he says $

"Unde obiter intelligitur, quam vera sit sententia D.

Thome, quod principium individu&tionis est materia signata quantitate et accidentibus, non quia accidentia formali ter "constituant individua tionem, sed quia a

materia ut a principle per se dependet individuatio, ab accidentibus autem ut a conditionibus designationis,

alias frustra individuum definiretur per collectionemproprietatum, etc." (5)

(1) St. Thomas,

(2) St. Thomas,

(S) John of St*

429b7.

Summa Theologica, I, Q, XXIX, a. 4, o.

Opuse. 70, in Boeth, de Trin, 4, 2 ad 4.

Thomas, Cursus PMI., T. I, II P. Q. IX,

43

The definition to which John of St. Thomas refers

in this last line is the famous definition of the individual

given "by Porphyrins :

“Individua ex eo dicuntur, quod ex proprietatibus con­

sistit unumquodque eorum, quarum collectio numquam in alio eadem.erit.”

Thus accidents are indeed included within the in­

dividual and serve as conditions from which the individual may

be designated.

Suarez*opinion is completely at variance with all

this. He holds that everything is individuated by itself,

by its own being. Thus, he would seem to separate accidents

from the composite as other individual, though accidental,

entities, stuck, as it were, upon this compositum. Hot only

does he thereby destroy the principle of individuation but he

also renders impossible the designation of any individual,

since the accidents are the means for this.

Suarez * doctrine of the principle of individuation

is found in his Metaphysical Disputes, Dispute V. Neither

time nor the scope of'this paper permit a thorough investigation

of this tract. We shall have to content ourselves therefore

with a passage or two quoted therefrom to illustrate our point,

and with the interpretation of this doctrine as given by John

- 44 -

of St, Thomas. Suarez' notion of individuation is indicat­

ed in the following $

”.,.dicendum, est res omnes, quae sunt actualia entia,

. seu quae existant, veil existera possunt immediate, esse singulares ac individuas. Dico immediate ut ex­cludam communes rationes entium, quae ut sio non pos­sunt immediate existera, neque habere actualem enti- tatem, nisi in entitatibus singularibus et individuis, quibus sublatis Impossibile est, aliquid reale manere, sicut de primis substantiis dixit Aristoteles in Prae­dicamentis, cap. de substantia...,,Omnis ergo entitas hoc ipso quod est una entitas in rerum natura necessa­rio est una praedicto modo, atque adeo singularis et individua.” (1)

Tfife may glimpse something of his notion of the in­

dividuation of accidents from the following :

“Diximus enim dupliciter posse nos loqui, de principio

individuationisj primo in ordine ad esse, et ad pro­priam rei constitutionem secundum se. Secundo in or­dine ad productionem quatenus determinatur agens ad distinctum individuum producendum, vel ad efficiendum unum potius, quam aliud, et consequenter in ordine ad nostram cognitionem, quatenus sensibiliter (ut sio di­cam) distinguere possumus unum ab alio. Priori igitur consideratione (quae maxime a priori est et maxime pro­pria hujus scientiae) vera est posterior sententia do­

cens accidentia non subjecto, sed ex propriis entita­tibus habere suam individuationem et numerioam distinc­tionem. .... Posteriori autem consideratione (quaemagis est physica et a posteriori) dioi possunt accidentia

accipere individuationem ex subjecto, tamquam ex radice, seu occasione potius multiplicationis, et distinctio­nis eorum. Hoc tamen non de subjecto nude sumpto, sed adhibitis aliis circumstantiis, vel conditionibus ad actionem necessariis intelligendum est, ut in eolutio- 1

(1) Suarez, Metaphysieorum Disputationum, Disp. V, Sect. I,

no. 4.

46

nibus argumentorum commodius explicabitur. " (l)

Thus for Suarez accidents do not serve as conditions

for designating the individual being, but rather the substance

seems to serve as a means for our distinguishing the accidents,

John of St* Thomas* summary of Suarez* doctrine is

brief and concerns itself only with his idea of the individual.

He says ;

"Prima (sententia) affirmat unumquodque individuari

seipso et ex propria entitate, et sicut seipsa habet unitatem formalem, et omnis unitas est passio entis, ideo ipsam entitatem ponit pro principium individuatio- nis. Ita tenet P. Suarez, Metaph. sect. 4." (2)

The consequence of this opinion is, as we have said,

the utter overthrow of St. Thomas * distinction between bonum

simpliciter and secundum quid. This distinction affords a

definite contrast between being and its transcendental property,

good, the one being said simpliciter or secundum quid inversely

to the other. St, Thomas * doctrine is found in his reply to

the first objection of Article I, Question V, in the Prima Pars.

Unmistakably clear it paints a valuable metaphysical picture.

(1) Suarez, Metaphysieorum Disputationum, Disp. V, Sect. VII,

no. 4,

(2) John of St. Thomas, Cursus Phil., T. II, Phil. Nat. Ill P.

IX, art. Ill, 771 a 11.

46

"... Licet bonum, et ens sint idem secundum rem; quia tamen differunt secundum, rationem, non eodem modo di­citur aliquid ens simpliciter et bonum simpliciter.Warn, cum ens dicat aliquid proprie esse in actu, actus autem proprie ordinem habeat ad potentiam; secundum hoc simpliciter aliquid dicitur ens, secundum quod primo discernitur ab eo quod est in potentia tantum.Hoc autem est esse substantiale rei uniuscujusque. Un­de per suum esse substantiale dicitur unumquodque ens simpliciter; per actus autem superadditos dicitur ali­quid esse secundum quid; sicut esse album significat

esse secundum quid; non enim esse album aufert esse in potentia simpliciter; cum adveniat rei jam praeexis­tenti In actu, Sed bonum dicit rationem perfecti,

quod est appetibile; et per consequens dicit rationem ultimi. Unde id quod est ultimo perfectum, dicitur bo­num simpliciter. Quod autem non habet ultimam perfec­tionem quam debet habere, quamvis habeat aliquam perfec­tionem inquantum est actu; non tamen dicitur perfectum simpliciter, nec bonum simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Sic ergo secundum, primum esse, quod est substantiale, dicitur aliquid ens simpliciter et bonum secundum quid; id est, inquantum est ens. Secundum vero ultimum ac­tum dicitur aliquid ens secundum, quid et bonum simpli­citer. Sic ergo quod dicit Boetius quod in rebus aliud est quod sunt bona, et aliud quod sunt; referendum est ad esse bonum simpliciter, et ad esse simpliciter: quia secundum primum actum est aliquid ens simpliciter; et secundum ultimum, bonum simpliciter; et tamen secundum primum actum est quodammodo bonum: et secundum ultimum actum est quodammodo ens,"

This whole doctrine rests upon a correct and common

sense notion of the individual and a true idea of the good.

Since Suarez had neither of these, it is small wonder that

we find Mm utterly destroying the whole signification of the

distinction with the one word "equivocal” when he comes to

speak of it, % find his treatment of it immediately following

his division of the perfect which, as we saw above, (1) he made

(1) Of. pg.

47 -

in the course of hie first response to the difficulty to

his notion of the good, There, we nay remember, he divided

the perfect into that which is perfect simpliciter, i»e. lacks

nothing to its complement, and that "which is perfect only

essentially, i«e* has only necessary and essential perfection.

He says explicitly in this passage that the good in so far

as it signifies the perfect in this second sense “nihil aliud

essentialiter ac foraaliter dicit quam ens.“ He concludes

also that only bonum simpliciter Is to be said perfect in the

first sense. In this sense as well he seems to have conceived

the good as formally identical with being for in the last

sentence he says : “Imo etiam esse perfectum, priori modo, seu

bonum simpliciter, nihil aliud est quam esse ens habens totam

entitatem, quae ad complementum, requiritur.” From this he

proceeds to the distinction of bonum simpliciter and bonum

secundum quid. Let us read what he has to say ;

“Et hoc mode intelligendus est D, Th. cum dicere solet (ut videre licet I p» qu« 5, art, 1, ad 1) aliter inter

se comparari in creaturis ens simpliciter et secundum quid, quam bonum simpliciter et secundum quid; nam res habet quod sit ens simpliciter per esse substantiale, secundum quid vero per esse accidentalei habet autem quod sit bona secundum quid per esse substantiale, sim­

pliciter autem per esse accidentale « Hoc autem ultimum intelligendum est non praecise de esse accidentali, sed

ut conjuncto esse substantialis non esset enim bonus homo per accidentales virtutes nisi supponeretur homo et consequenter substantialiter et naturaliter bonus. Unde in illis vocibus secundum quid et simpliciter,videtur esse aequivocatio: nam. cum dicuntur de ente; videntur dici de substantia et accidente praecise com- oaratiss cum autem dicuntur de bono, dicuntur de subs-

48 -

tantia creata aut solitarie sumpta, aut ut affecta dispositionibus et facultatibus sibi connaturalibus.Quo fit, ut licet in modo loquendi sit diversitas, in

re tamen nulla videatur esse differentia, quia etiamtonitas rei perfectio, quam confert accidens, si praeei-

se comparetur ad eam bonitatem, quam, confert substan­tia, est secundum quid. Sio enim In universum verum est, quod ex D. Thorn. supra retulimus, unumquodque quantum habet de esse tantum habet de bonitate, et quod etiam retulimus ex August, quod in quantum sumus, boni sumus.” (l)

Thus understood, St. Thomas’ doctrine given above,

would have no meaning in reality. Indeed, it could not have

any meaning if bonum and ens are formally one as they are

according to this consideration, lor could it mean anything

if accidents are capable of standing in the relation of separate

individuals to the substances in which they inhere.

Having so identified being and good Suarez can only

resort to equivocation to explain St. Thomas’ doctrine. Taking

being itself to be the principle of individuation he could

only think of physical or real precision, moreover, whan he

considered the division of being into substance and accident.

St. Thomas’ whole purpose in making this distinction

of how simpliciter and seoundum quid are said with respect to

being and to good is to show that the two do not differ seoun- 1

(1) Suarez, Metaphysicarum Disputationum, Disp. X, Sect. I,

no. 16.

dum rem but secundum rationem only. Thus the distinction

must needs be univocal, the teras simpliciter and secundum

quid must necessarily be taken univocally in both cases.

These terms serve as the very fulcrum for the understanding

of the formal difference between being and good.

The reason which Suarez gives for considering the

terms simpliciter and secundum quid as equivocal in the two

cases is that in speaking of being these terms are applied

to substance and accident as praecise comparatis, i.e, as

,individuated one from the other. In speaking of good, on

the other hand, he says these terms are ,applied to substance

and accident differently $ secundum quid is applied to substance

as existing without any accident, while simpliciter is applied

to accident but only when it is actually inhering in a substance.

In this Suarez is entirely mistaken. St. Thomas

never speaks of substance and accident as individuated one

from the other. He is speaking here of the individual both

when he speaks of being and when he speaks of good. Indeed in

the natural order accident cannot be conceived as having a

separate existence from substance. The distinction which St.

Thomas makes between the two both as regards being and good

is intentional, though none the less real. Indeed when he

speaks of accident in the line of being he makes definite

*• 50

mention of its actual inhesion in substance ,with the words

"cum. adveniat rei jam praeexistenti in actu*" (l)

Substance and accident divide both, being and its

transcendental property, good* St* Thomas uses this division

hre because it serves to distinguish the actuality of an

individual proportionally as being prime or secondary.

ISince being "dicat aliquid proprie esse in aotu",

and it is by substance that something is first distinguished

from potency, Ahas its first actuality* substance is said to

be being simpliciter. Accident, being a secondary actuality

is said of being secundum quid.

' The nature of good, however, bespeaks the perfect

which is appetible, and, says St. Thomas* "per consequens di­

cit rationem ultimi. " This word ultimate has profound

significance for it may be understood to signify the causal

nature of the good, as well as the nature of perfect to be

said of a thing to which nothing is lacking, i.e, to be present

only when the ultimate actuality is present to the individual.

Thus while being most properly looks to the first actuality

of an individual, good by its proper nature concerns the ultimate

51

actuality. Hence through the ultimate actuality, the ultimate

accidental perfection inhering in it an individual is said

good simpliciter; through its prime actuality, its substance,

it is said good secundum, quid.

The fact that the good simpliciter regards the whole

being, the individual, substance and accidents down to the

last perfection, is due to the very nature of the good which

faces the appetite as it were, by reason of the ultimate

perfection. Being, on the other hand, by its nature is not

ultimate but prime. Hence this difference is not to be at­

tributed to an equivocation in the terms simpliciter end se­

cundum quid, but is to be explained by them, as univocal.

In making this error Snares has taken the word

good according as "nihil aliud essentialiter ac formaliter

dicit quam ens", as we have seen. This is not the transcen­

dental good for him, however, as we know. For him the trans­

cendental good adds over being the ratio convenientiae. It is

divisible into bonum in se and bonum alteri according as the

beings between which this convenientia is found are distinct

by a distinction of reason ratiocinatae or by a real distinction.

Snares never makes the assertion openly that, as

Durandus claimed, good and being are convertible non essentia-

liter sed denominative, His whole doctrine carries this

implication, however. When he speaks of the good as being

52

nothing other than being formally and essentially, good

can be no more than another name f or being and hence their

convertibility only denominative. We pointed this out when

first we spoke of his doctrine in this matter, a doctrine

enuntiated in replying to the objection concerning his

definition of the good, (l)

We remarked secondly that when he spoke of the good

as a property of being according to his own notion, he seemed

unable to evade even then denominative convertibility, refer­

ring more than once to the good as denominative. We saw this

to be especially evident when he spoke of the bonum in se,

wherein he distinguished the perfection and the thing only

by a distinction of reason. There he said that we distinguish

them by reason "per modum formae denominantis et rei denomi­

natae ," (2) He used a similar expression moreover when he

spoke of Ms bonum alteri, for when he spoke of accidental

perfection as a good (we saw just above that he considered

this bonum alteri) he said "talis perfectio est distincta ab

ipsa re, quae ab illa bona denominatur." (3)

(1) Of, page

(2) Of. page 3>

(5) Of, page J^

55 -

We might point out many other places in his

doctrine 'where he more or less explicitly leaves this im­

pression of denominative convertibility. As vue saw at the

beginning of our discussion he seems to have had a correct

notion of a property of being. This would not logically fit

with denominative convertibility and may have been the thing

which hindered him from openly asserting it.

It was through his false concept of the formal

ratio of good that Suarez was forced into this logical impasse

which leaves his doctrine with a certain vagueness. Thus we

can see how very necessary it is to understand correctly the

meaning of convenientia ad aliud. St. Thomas * words contain,

profound truth when they say that in the case of those proper­

ties of being which bespeak convenientia ad aliud, the aliud

is to be understood as the soul, because the soul is quodammodo

omnia.

The convenientia which Suarez assigned as the formal

ratio of the good is no general mode of being at all. It is

a special mode, as specialized as each individual being itself.

Thus it is that although Suarez tries to hold to the correct

notion of a property of being with which he started, he finds

himself forced to its denial in the explanation of his doctrine

of the good, Since he does not want to make an explicit denial

— 54

of this doctrine, the final result is the illogical vagueness

•which -we have noted.

This error of making the formal ratio of the good

to be convenientia between beings is one of immense import.

It especially has formed the link leading to the/traeunotion

of final causality. We have seen it in Durandus and here

again in Snares. We will find it again in Vasques, though

in a new and more modern form. We will discover it finally

in the philosophies of such moderns as Bacon and Spinoza, and

there we will clearly see its connection with their doctrines

of final cause.

The other errors which Suarez makes concerning

the good are patently at variance with the doctrine ' given by

St. Thomas. Their categorical assertion removes the need for

much discussion as to what Suarez might have intended

The first of these errors holds that the ratio of

appetibility is posterior to that Of the good. Suarez says ;

"Bonum autem formali ter in ratione et denominatione

sua non includit conformiiatem ad appetitum, quamvis

haec ad rationem boni consequatur." (1)

(1) Suarez, Metaphysics, Disp, X, Sect. 1, no. 19

55 *

This doctrine follows as a necessary corollary of

Suarez* definition of the good, As we have seen Ms aliud

is not the appetite* Be looks upon good as the formal ratio

of attaining the appetible, He says $■

.bonitas autem supponitur in objecto appetitus, et

est ratio formalis attingendi illud: appetibilitas autem dicit denominationem sumptan ex proportione ta-

' lis objecti eum tali potentia, unde non dicit formalem

rationem objecti, sed conditionem concomitantem." (1)

Thus, he would compare the good to the appetible

as light is compared to colour as the object of sight* , The

two are for him formally distinct*

A conclusion such as this is almost unthinkable

in the light of that most famous of all definitions of the

good, the one given by Aristotle himself in the 1 BtMos »

"bonum est quod omnia appetunt."

Suarez1 second glaring error is Ms denial of the

ratio finis to the good, it is tMs in which we are most

interested here. He says s

"Bonum habere rationem finis, eo scilicet modo, quo

habet rationem appetiMlis." (2) 1 2

(1) Suarez, Metaphysics, Disp. X, Sect. 1, no. 19*

(2) Suarez, Metaphysics, Disp. X, Sect. 2, prologue.

56 -

Accordingly, bonum, and finis are formally distinct.

In explanation of this statement, Suarez makes an extremely

strange division of finie.

"Etenim si formali ter sumatur habitudo, ac denomina­tio finis, illa non est de ratione boni, sed ad illam

consequi potest. Nam finis ut sio, dicit rationem cau­sae in ordine ad media* vel ad aliquam actionem, quae propter finem fiat; quam, habitudinem non dicit bonum, sed solum rationem convenientis. Si autem sumatur fi­nis fundamentaliter, sio attribuitur bono, qua ratione bonitatis habet finis vim causandi finaliter," (1)

In this division we may again remark the shadow

of Durandus* He similarly divided end, as we saw above (2),

a division which was markedly parallel to his division of the

good itself into bonum formali ter and bonum ratione concre­

tionis « Durandus, however, did not come out bluntly and

deny the ratio finis to the proper nature of the good, although

we saw that this division would have forced him to do so,

had he understood the nature of the good correctly*

Suarez, therefore, is more logical here when he

denies that the good ‘and end are formally the same, Be looks

upon the good as that whence the end has its motive force, a

formality separate from end but basic to it. Indeed, neither 1 2

(1) Suarez., Metaphysics, Disp. X, Sect. 2, prologue*

(2) page

- 57

hs nor Durandus deny a motion to, the good*

In connection ■with, this matter it will be interesting

to take note of Suarez1 theory of the ratio causandi of final

cause. He divides final causation according to actus primus,

which he also calls the proxima ratio final iter oausandi, and

actus secundus.

Be says then that the actus secundus of final cau­

sation is the very act of the will. - It will be best to use

his own words <

“Bat ergo tertia sententia, quae constituit etiam hanc finis causalit&tem in motione Metaphorica. Addit vero hujusmodi motionem non poni in actu secundo, nisi quan­do voluntas ipsa in actu secundo movetur, et quando sic ponitur, in re non esse aliquid distinctum ab Ws ornet actu voluntatis.n (l) t

w.,.ita aiunt unam et eandem actionem voluntatis causari

a fine et a voluntate ipsa, et prout est a voluntate, esse eaus&litatem effectivam; prout vero est a fine, esse causalitatem finalem, et priori ratione esse mo­tionem realem ac propriam, quia talis actio manat a potentia ut a proprio principio Physico, posteriori autem ratione esse motionem Metaphoricem, quia manat ab objecto alliciente, et trahente ad se voluntatem.” (2)

This opinion Suarez attributes to St, Thomas (l) and

most expressly to Ocham. Be himself accepts it as the only 1 2

(1) Suarez, Metaphysics, Disp* XXIII, Sect. 4, no. 8

(2) ibidem,

58 -

possible solution. In support of it he makes the following

distinction :

"Segue contra illam guioguam obstat objectio supra fac­ta, guod actus voluntatis potius est effectus, quam causalités finis. Nam in primis in ipsomet actu vo­luntatis possumus distinguere actionem ab actu, et ac­tum dicemus esse effectum, actionem vero quatenus ia suo genere est a fine, esse causalitatem ejus, sicut pro- porfcionaliter dicendum est de causalitéte effectiva. Deinde etiamsi in illo actu non di stinguantur ex natura rei illae duae rationes, sed fingatur esse pura actio, nihilominus non repugnant, ut eadem res, quae est effec­tus causae, in eo genere in quo est effectus sit etiam

causalités quando ille effectus est ipsamet actio, sufficitque distinctio rationis, ut distinguantur per modum oausalitatis, vel per modum effectus, sicut in causalitate activa manifeste constat.rt (l)

The actus primus or proxima ratio finaliter causandi '

Suarez holds to be the good. Be describes what he means by

actus primus and then asserts it to be the good in the follow­

ing words $

"...ergo ilia ratio sub qua (aliquid) exercet munus

causae finalis, erit, quae proxime constituit finalem causam, quasi in actu primo. " (2)

"De hac igitur re communis consensus Doctorum omnium, esse

videtur, bonitatem esse proximam rationem sub qua finis movet: atque ita illam esse, quae constituit finalem cau- 1 2

(1) Suarez, Metaphysicorum Disputationum XXIII, Sect. 4, no. 12

(2) ibidem, Sect, 5, no. 1.

59

sam, stans illi (ut ita dioam) virtutem ad causan­dum," (l)g

The proof which Suarez gives for this will be

interesting in the better understanding of his whole doctrine.

He say® s

"Ratio autem est, quia causalités finis consistit in

motione Metaphorica voluntatis, qua illam ad se alli­cit, nihil autem ad se allicit voluntatem, nisi quate­nus bonum est: ergo bonitas est ratio movendi volunta­

tem ergo etiam est ratio, seu principium causandi fi- naliter." (2)

This distinction of final causality into actus

primus and actus secundus will be found to be quite novel.

Indeed, the distinction, as customarily understood, is made

according to a proportion to potentiality and cannot be under­

stood except as referred to potentiality. It cannot signify

a division of actuality as of a continuum, but denotes a

distinction according to a proportion to potentiality. The

actuation of potentiality according to the proportion “in"

is called actus primus; further actuation according to the

proportion "to" is called actus secundus, It is this way in

which St. Thomas makes the distinction in the Prima Pars,.when 1 2

(1) Suarez, Metaphysicorum Disputationum XXIII, Sect. 5, no. 2.

(2) ibidem.

60 -

h© says i

"Aotus autem est duplex! primus et secundus . Actus quidem primus est forma et Integritas rei; actus au­tem secundus est operatio." (l)

The bans for this division may be found in the IX

Metaphysics, Lectio V, -where St. Thomas comments on Aristotle * s

division of the modes in which aotus is said i

"Ostendit quod diversimode dicatur actus. Et ponit duas diversitates t quarum prima est* quod actus dici­

tur vel actus, vel operatio. Ad hanc diversitatem actus insinuandam dicit primo, quod non omnia dicimus similiter esse actu, sed hoc diversimode. Et haec di­versitas considerari potest per diversas proportiones. Potest enim sic accipi proportio, ut dicamus quod si­cut hoc est in hoc, ita hoc in hoc. Utpota visus si­cut est in oculo, ita auditus in aure. Et per hunc modum proportionis accipitur comparatio substantiae, i de st formae, ad materiam; nam forma in materia dici­tur esse.

"Alius modus proportionis est, ut dicamus quod sicut habet se hoc ad hoc, ita hoc ad hoc; puta sicut se

habet visus ad videndum, ita auditus ad audiendum. Et per hunc modum proportionis accipitur comparatio motus ad potentiam motivam, vel cujuscumque operationis ad potentiam operativam. " (2)

Thus, the division, actus primus and actus secundus

is not a division qf actus considered simpliciter, but of

aotus according as it is proportioned to potentiality. The

division as Suarez makes it here, however, is a division of 1 2

(1) St. Thomas, Summa Theol. Q. XL7III, a. 6, c.

(2) Of, no, 1828, 1829.

- 61 '

actuality simply considered.! is, indeed, a division made

in terms of quantity. It is quite unthinkable, moreover,

that the actus secundus of any cause (considering actus secun­

dus here in the correct sense) should extend even partially

beyond the operation of that cause,

1

The reason underlying this rather strange division

of Suarez1 may "well be found in his doctrine concerning the

role of final causality in respect to God and creatures below

the intellectual order. The doctrine -which we have given

above is limited by Suarez to final causality as it applies

to created intellectual beings only.

Before going on to consider what Suarez has to

say of final causality in respect to God and the non-intel­

lectual cosmos, it will not be amiss to add a note concerning

his idea of the metaphorical motion of the end. Indeed, he

does not seem to have had a notion of metaphorical motion at

all, but he interprets this terminology as being merely a

means of distinguishing the causality of the end from that

of the .efficient agent. Here again -we will do well to read

his own words :

"Quare cavenda est æquivocatio in vocabulo Metaphor i cae motionis, nam respectu nostri illa particula Meta-

phoricae, additur ad distinguendam illam motionem a mo­

tione efficientis causae, non vero ad excludendam illam

62 -

a tota latitudine motionis et oausalitatis realisproprie diotae; cum varo Deus dicitur moveri aut alli­

ci a bonitatesua tota locutio est Metaphorice ad ex­plicandam solam rationem divinae voluntatis.” (l)

For Suarez, therefore, the motion of the good in

final causality as regards the created intellect is a real

motion, a motion proprie dicta, and is not merely metaphorical.

When he comes to speak of final causality as it

refers to God, Suarez distinguishes the action of God into

immanent and transient. Of the former he says :

’’Unde dicendum est finem non posse exercere causalité-

tern sudm in divinam voluntatem quam ad actus immanentes,

seu determinati ones liberas ejusdem voluntatis.” (2)

We can agree on the whole with this conclusion,

disregarding for the moment Ms speaking of a plurality of

immanent acts. Indeed, this is the true Thomistie doctrine

as Or. BeKoninek has so clearly asserted in Ms Defence of

St. Thomas $

nObviously, when we consider the divine good with respect to the divine will the term finis cannot be taken in the strict sense of final cause, since causality involves de­pendence." (5) 1 2 3

(1) Suarez, Metaphy Disp. XXIII, Sect,. 9, no. 6.

(2) Suarez, Metaph. Disp. XXIII, Sect. 9, no. 3.

(3) Laval Theologique et PMlosopMque, Vol. I, No, 2,

pg. 65*

65

In support of this Dr. DeKoninok has quoted from

the De Veritate, wherein St. Thomas says *

"...Voluntas est alicujus dupliciter; uno modo prin­cipaliter , et alio modo secundario, Principaliter quidem voluntas est finis, qui est ratio volendi omnia alia; secundario autem est eorum quae sunt ad finem quae propter finem volumus. Voluntas autem non habet habitu­dinem ad volitum quod est secundarium sicut ad causam; sed tantummodo ad volitum principale, quod est finis. Sciendum, est autem, quod voluntas et volitum aliquando distinguuntur secundum rem; et tunc volitum comparatur ad voluntatem sicut realiter causa finalis. Si autem voluntas et volitum distinguuntur tantum ratione, tunc volitum non erit causa finalis voluntatis nisi secun­dum modtim significandi. Voluntas ergo divina compara­tur, sicut ad finem, ad bonitatem suam, quae secundum

rem idem est quod sua voluntas? distinguitur autem so­lum secundum modum significandi. Unde relinquitur quod voluntatis divinae nihil sit causa realiter, sed solum secundum modum significandi. Eec est inconveniens, in Deo significari ^liquid per modum causae; sic enim divi­nitas significatur in Deo ut habens se ad Deum per mo­dum causae formalis. Res vero creatae, quae Deus vult, non se habent ad divinam voluntatem ut fines, sed utordinata ad f inem; propter hoc enim Deus creaturae^vult

esse, ut in eis sua bonitas manifestetur, et ut sua bo­nitas, quae per essentiam multiplicari non potest, sal­tem similitudinis participatione in plures effundatur."(1)

The above words have been underlined in anticipation

of an error which Suarez makes in considering finality in the

transient acts of God. Let us read his conclusion immediately?

"...Actio Dei transiens non est Deus, nec in Deo, sed in

creatura, et ideo habere potest causam finalem, et or­dinari in finem. Atque ita, licet Deus non habeat fi­nem sui esse, habet tamen finem sui actionis transeuntis: 1

(1) St. Thomas, De Veritate, Q, 23, a. 1, ad 3.

/

- 64

qui si sit finis proximus esse potest aliquid extra Deum* agit enim Deus ad extra ut sese communicet « quae communicatio aliquid est extra Deum, et in universum actio dici potest ordinari in terminum ut in finem suum* si vero sit sermo de fine ultimo, est ipsemet Deus, non quia intendat aliquid commodum vel bonum sibi acquirere, sed quia agit propter suam bonitatem communicandam et manifestandam,” (l)

Io understand the fundamental nature of the errors

of this passage# it will be necessary first of all to in­

vestigate the true concept of the division of action into

immanent and transient, and secondly to consider how this di­

vision applies to the divine action.

St, Thomas gives the division of action into transient

and immanent in many places, We will quote here two of the

principal references found in the Summa Theologica $

.Duplex est actio. Una quae transit in exteriorem materiam; ut calefacere et secare, Alia quae manet in agente; ut intelligere, sentire, et velle,” (2)

"Duplex enim est actionis genus# ut dicitur. Una scili-.

cet quae transit in aliquid exterius inferens ei pas­sionem; sicut urere et secare$ alia vero actio est quae non transit in rem exteriorem# sed magis manet in ipso agente; sicut sentire, intelligere et velle* per hujus­modi enim actionem non immutatur aliquid extrinsecum, sed totum in ipso agente agitur* De prima ergo actione manifestum est quod non potest esse ipsum esse agentis,” (5) 1 2 3

(1) Suarez, Metaphysics# Disp. XXIII, Sect. 9, no, 12.

(2) St, Thomas# Summa Theologica, Q. XVIII, a. 3, ad 1.

(3) ibidem, Q, LET, a. 2, c.

66

A transient action, therefore, is one which passes

outside the agent to some other thing? an immanent is one

which remains within the agent acting.

When we speak of action with respect to God we

must remember that we are speaking analogously. Since God is

entirely immutable there is no such thing as a motion proper

in God. We add ’’proper” "because motion may he understood in

a broad and improper sense (l). We do, however, speak of an

action or operation of God which is identified in reality with

His being. This operation is only one in reality, but we dis­

tinguish it by reason. Thus, St. Thomas says :

”Sed in Deo secundum rem mon est nisi una operatio,

quae est sua essentia,” (2)

This operation of God is formally an immanent

operation. It is an operation in which we distinguish the

formalities of knowing and willing. We also make the rational

division of the action of God into His action ad intra and His

action ad extra. God's action ad extra consists in the product­

ion and conservation of creatures, This action is formally an 1 2

(1) Gf. St, Thomas, De Divinis Hominibus 0. 9, lect, 4,

(2) St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, I Q. XXX, a, 2, ad S.

• 66 «

immanent action, for God produces and conserves things "by

His knowledge and volition. Since this immanent action may

he said to pass into something exterior in so far as the

effect of the immanent action is exterior to God, it is said

to be virtually transient,

John of St. Thomas says that St, Thomas in his

question on the existence of God in things concluded that ;

"Deus est in rebus non sicut accidens, nec sicut pars

essentiae, sed sicut agens5 et quia agit ipsum esse, profundissime et intime est in rebus." (1)

From this, John of St» Thomas, speaking of the im­

mensity of God and His presence to creatures, shows :

..Sententia Divi Thomae est, quod ipsa operatio Dei immanens, secundum quod virtual!ter est transiens. et ponens effectum in esse, est formalis ratio a priori contactus divini ad creaturas, et exietentiae Dei in rebus quantum ad contactum." (2)

According to this; therefore, w© see that the

division of action into immanent and transient cannot he

.applied to the divine action as denoting two formalities.

The divine action is only formally immanent; it is, however,

(1) John of St. Thomas, Cursus Theologicus, Tome IX, Disp.

8, a. 3, no, 8* 2

(2) ibidem.

67

virtually transient in so far as its effects are exterior,

It would seem protable that Suarez understood the

action of God correctly,- but still Ms doctrine, as given in

this second conclusion cm the action of God, ad extra (page ^

employs so loose a terminology as to leave it open to a pan­

theistic interpretation. To say that the transient action

of God is in the creature seems little short of pantheism.

Again, the division of finis into ultimate and

proximate does not apply when the divine action is considered.

This division is based on the possibility of a multiplicity

of intentions of the will. Through it that which objectively

has only the ratio medii can corns subjectively to have the

ratio finis, not ultimate but proximate, "Where there is no

possibility of a multiplicity of intentions the means can

never take on the ratio finis, and hence the division cannot

apply. Such, however, is the ease with the divine will, Whose

end is eminently one, the divine goodness.

In support of this we have the words of St. Thomas

in the De Veritate, underlined on page . For convenience

we will requote them here $

"Res vero creatae, quae Deus vult, non se habent ad di-

- 68 -

Tinam voluntatem ut fines, sed ut ordinata ad finem.n (l)

It is somewhat shocking to hear Suarez say, there­

fore, that God can have a proximate end and that that end

is something outside of Himself, üe may well suspicion that

this doctrine has close connection with his strange distinction

of the causality of final cause into actus primus and actus se­

cundus. Thus, with respect to the so called transient action

of God, the actus primus of His final causality would he His

ultimate end, His own goodness, while the aotus secundus

would he His action in creatures, which while it is His action

is at the same time, pantheisticaliy, the action of the creatures.

This contention is supported in the following words of Suarez,

wherein, indeed, he even confuses the final causality of God

with His efficient causality.

“Consistit autem causalités finis Dei respectu effec­tuum ad extra in hoc, quod Deus intuitu et amore suae

honitatis effectus extra se produciti unde ipsamet operatio quam ad extra habet, essentialiter pendet a

Deo tum in ratione efficientis, tum etiam in ratione

finis, quia respicit Deum et ut omnipotentem, et ut summe bonum, qui ratione suae bonitatis, et dignus est ut omnia ad ipsum ut ad finem ordinentur, et seipeum dicto eminenti modo inclinat ad communicandam aliis suam bonitatem propter ipsam. Atque ita facilis 1

(1) St. Thomas, De Veritate, Q. 23, a. 1, ad 3.

* 69 -

est responsio ad rationem dubitandi: negamus enim esse semper necessariam causalitétem finis intra ip­sum agens, ut habere possit looim extara ipsum in alios effectus ejus..." (l)

fhis same doctrine will explain Suarez* peculiar

conception of final causality as it concerns natural things.

He says $

"Nihilominus proprius modus loquendi in hac materia est, actiones horum agentium naturalium esse propter finem, et esse effecta causae finalis♦ lon tamen ut praecise egrediuntur ab ipsis naturalibus agentibus, sed ut simulsunt a primo agente, quod in omnibus et per omnia ope­ratur, Tei e converso (et fere in idem redit) prout

ipsa proxima agentia substant directioni et intentione superioris agentis. Et ideo ipsa agentia naturalia nontam Wcunturoperari propter finem, quam dirigi in fi­

nem a superiore agente,w (2)

In the scope of natural agents considered here

Suarez would include all creatures below the intellectual

order, In a special article on the final causality of brute

animals he says that they participate in the causality of

the end, as a material motion of the end, but "quantum, ad

formalem relationem in finem ita existimandum est de actio­

nibus brutorum, sicut aliorum agentium naturalium,"

Immediately after stating the above quoted conclusion 1

&(1) Suarez, Metaphysics, Bisp. XXIII, Sect, 9, no. 9.

(2) ibidem, Sect, 10, no. 5.

TO -

Suarez goes on to say that this opinion is that of St,

Thomas and many others including Aristotle. In support of

his contention that it is the doctrine of St, Thomas he cites

an example used by St, Thomas - the example of the arrow

directed to the target, not by itself but by the archer.

St. Thomas gives this example in the Prima Pars,

Question 103, one of the references given by Suarez. This

question concerns the government of things in common, and the

first article is entitled t "Utrum mundus gubernatur ab aliquo,"

The example in question is found in the response to the first

objection. We will quote both objection and response $

"Videtur quod mundus non gubernatur ab aliquo. Illorum,

enim est gubernari, quae moventur vel operantur propter finem. Sed res naturales, quae sunt magna pars mundi, non moventur aut operantur propter finem, quia non co­gnoscunt finem. Ergo mundus non gubernatur.

"Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliquid movetur vel opera­

tur propter finem dupliciter$ uno modo sicut agens seip- sum in finem, ut homo et aliae creaturae rationales $ et talium, est cognoscere rationem finis, et eorum quae sunt ad finem: alio modo aliquid dicitur operari, vel moveri propter finem, quasi ab aliquo actum, vel directum in finem; sicut sagitta movetur directa ad signum a sagit­tante, qui cognoscit finem, non autem sagitta* Unde sicut motus sagittae ad determinatum finem demonstrat aperte quod sagitta dirigitur ab aliquo cognoscente; ita certus cursus naturalium rerum cognitione carentium manifeste declarat mundum ratione aliqua gubernari."

St. Thomas’ intention in this reply is to prove that

the world is governed by an intellect. To do this he, draws

71

a parallel between the directed motion of an

arrow and that of natural things. From the former we con­

clude to the presence of an archer; from the latter we con­

clude to the presence of a governor of the universe,

This argument is an argument a posteriori, from

effect to cause. Directed motion is an effect of final cau­

sality. But final causality necessarily implies an intellect­

ual agent. Therefore, directed motion in beings lacking an

intellect necessitates their receiving direction or being

governed by an intellectual being, a being other than them­

selves *

According to Suarez* interpretation, however, this

argument would utterly confuse efficient and final causality,

would tend dangerously to pantheism, and would render univocal

our direction of an arrow and Sod’s direction of natural things.

For St, Thomas, directed motion is always the effect

of final causality, It may be either action or passion with

respect to its subject. If it is action it is efficient cau­

sality; if it is passion it is the result of efficient cau­

sality, Whichever it is, however, it is always the effect

of final causality. That it could not be final causality

itself is evident from the fact that it is motion, for final

— 72 **

causality'is only said to bo motion metaphorically.

Suarez, howver, as we have seen does not remove

final causality from the scope of motion properly so called.

Hence he considers this directed motion as final causality

and as the effect of final causality as well, "non tamen ut

praecise egrediuntur ab ipsis naturalibus agentibus, sed ut

simul sunt a primo agente", (1) Hence, as we have seen above, (2)

final causality for him here, being identified with action, is

identified with efficient causality and is simply the action

of a thing moving to its determined end, in so far as that

action is the transient action of God,

The whole impact of St, Thomas’ argumentation lies

in showing that directed motion in a being lacking intellectual

knowledge demands the existence of an intellect directing.

This is utterly lost in Suarez’ interpretation, Suarez would

place in the premise what St. Thoms hag in the conclusion*

Directed motion for him would not only be the effect of final

causality but would be the final causality itself, and as we

(1) Of, quotation pg, Lj

(2) Of. pg. ^ /

75

have just seen this is here identical with efficient cau­

sality, Hence Suarez looks upon directed motion as being

at the same time directing motion* Thus while St, Thomas '

argument proceeds from effect to cause in actu secundo, from

directed motion to directing motion, and thence to a real

difference between directed and director, Suarez would in­

terpret the argument as proceeding from cause in actu secundo

to cause in actu primo. From this it becomes very difficult

to avoid pantheism.

Suarez might try to evade this difficulty by saying

that he too is arguing from effect to cause in actu secundo,

for he distinguishes by reason the same act into final cau­

sality and the effect of final causality* This distinction

would be similar to that which we saw him make in regard to

the created intellectual appetite, (l) Even though he should

in some way make such an evasion, he still would have to ex­

plain how the same act numerically can proceed from two prin­

ciples, one lucreated, the other created. If it is formally

from the two as he would appear to hold, it seems impossible

to avoid pantheism.

(1) Of. page

74 -

The most obvious error which Suarez seems to have

made in this matter, however, is that of considering the

directed motion of the arrow and that of natural things as

univocal, St, Thomas used the example of the arrow as an

analogue from which he manifested the idea of a neewd for a

director in the case of natural things, hut he did not intend

to identify the two modes of direction.

In the case of the arrow wb may speak of two motions:

in so far as the arrow is a natural thing it has a natural

motion, a natural action following its forms in so far as it

is an arrow directed to a target it has an artificial motion,

a motion imparted to it which is a passion in so far as it is

a natural body. It is this passion of the arrow which we

call its directed motions this passion, however, is at the

same time the virtual efficient action of the archer, an effect

of final causality.

Thé case of the directed motion of natural things

is quite different from this. In this case the directed

motion is not a passion in respect to these bodies but their

very own action, St. Thomas combats the opinion that Sod im­

mediately operates all things in article V of Question CV, Pri­

ma Pars, In the corpus articuli he says :

11,. «quod Deum operari in quolibet operante aliqui sic intellexerunt, quod nulla virtus creata aliquid opera-

- 75 -

re turi puta quod ignis non calefaceret» sed Deus in igne i et similiter de omnibus aliis. Hoc autem est impossibile,”

Farther in this same article St, Thomas shows in

■what way God does operate in creatures as regards each of

the three active principles, final, efficient and formal.

Since Suarez has confused final and efficient causality here

we will quote St* Thomas’ words as regards these two causes.

"Sic igitur secundum haec tria Deus in quolibet operan­te operatur. Primo quidem secundum rationem finis; cum enim omnis operatio sit propter aliquod bonum ve­rum, vel apparens (nihil autem est vel apparet bonum, nisi secundum quod participat aliquam similitudinem

summi boni, quod est Deus) sequitur quod ipse Deus est cujuslibet operationis causa ut finis. Secundo consi­

derandum est quod si sint multa agentia ordinata, sem­per secundum agens agit in virtute primi agentis. Nam primum agens movet secundum ad agendum; et secundum hoc omnia agunt in virtute ipsius Dei; et ita ipse est cau­sa omnium actionum agentium. " (1)

Thus, in respect to final cause, we » see that in

so far as created goods move finally they do so in virtue of

the similarity which they bear the divine goodness. Thus

created goods cause in virtue of the divine goodness, but

formally their causality is their own. The same is true of

efficient causes the created agent moves in virtue of the (l)

(l) St. Thomas, Summa Theol. I Pars, Q. CY, a. 5, c.

- 76

divine, but its formal efficiency is its own. Ibis is

another my of stating God's presence to all by Sis immanent

operation is so far as it is virtually transient# (1)

Indeed, St# Thomas states explicitly in many

places that nature acts for an .end* We find this question

treated at length in Ms commentary on the II Physios of

Aristotle, where he concurs with Aristotle in defining nature

in terms of its action for an end*

". » .latura nihil est aliud quam ratio cujusdam artis, scilicet divinae, indita rebus, qua ipsae res moventur ad finem determinatum: sicut si artifex factor navis posset lignis tribuere, quod ex se ipsis moverentur ad navis formam inducendam. (2)

From this it is also apparent how specious is

Suarez* argument when he claims Aristotle to have held that

natural things do not operate on account of an end because in

the I De Caelo

"dum conjuhgit Deum et naturam, dicens, nihil facere frustra, satis indicat naturam in agendo propter fi­nem subordinari Deo,” (S)

(1) Of* pg. /df

(2) St# Thomas, II Physics, Lectio» 2TV, n8« 8.

(3) Suarez, Metaphysioarum Disputationum, Disp. XXIII, Sect,

X, no* 6*

77 -

It is true that Aristotle held that nature is

subordinated to God in acting for an end, but he did not

deny that nature does act for an end, by its own proper

action. Indeed he defined nature in terms of its acting for

an end, as we have seen just above. Thus not only did he

attribute action for an end to natural things, but he made

nature itself a principle of action for an end.

The positive sciences have been all too willing

to accept the Su&resiam doctrine that nature does not act

on account of an end,rejecting its counterpart of direction

by God as something not within the scope of experimental in­

vestigation, Thus Suarez by this doctrine, though certainly

unmeaningly, left open a path whereby modern science has been

able to reject finality from nature and thence God from the,

universe.

Strangely enough this doctrine which has been so

popular with modern science has had its point of departure

in the heights of metaphysical speculation as we have seen.

It was there that Suarez made his basic error concerning the

nature of the good. It was there that he divorced the good

and final cause as being formally distinct, related only

insofar as the good is that whence the end has its first

78

virtus of causing. Good, therefore, is to end -what light

is to colour in his system. We saw how in his strange di­

vision of the causality of the end good held the role of

actus primus, directed motion that of actus secundus. We

saw too how he used this doctrine to explain final causality

in respect to God, how his divine transient action was so

dangerously capable of pantheistic interpretation. Then from

these speculations in metaphysics concerning the transcen­

dental good and its relation to tile first of all causes, from

these doctrines as to the actions of God Himself, Suarez

enuntiated this doctrine of a denial of action for an end

as proper to natural things.

To summarize Suarez1 basic errors we may recall

that although his conception of a property of being was cor­

rect, he comprpmised it in regard to the good by his very

formal ratio of the good as convenientia to another being.

From this sprang the vagueness of his doctrine in so far as

it tended to Durandus1 convertibility of good with being,

denominative et non essentialiter. From his omission of

the appetite in the formal ratio of the good followed his

rendering good and appetible as formally distinct, appetible

being posterior to the good. The next step was a similar

distinction of the good and final cause with all

- 79

the consequent erroneous notions of final causality which

we. haw just outlined#

Suarez* principal and most misleading error was

his false interpretation of good as convenientia ad aliud.

The step between the misconception of the nature of the good

as convenientia to another being and the rejection of final

cause in sow of modern philosophy is the identification

of the notion of convenientia to another being with that of

final cause. Suarez left the two formally distinct. Vasques,

however, brought about their identification and thus formed

a further link between Scholastic error and the errors of

modern philosophy. We will find it interesting to see how

he formulated this new step away from truth.

VASQUEZ

The doctrine of Gabriel Vasquez, S.J. concerning

the transcendental good and final causality is to be found

in his commentary on the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas*

This commentary was published in 1621.

We will examine first his doctrine of the good,

noting at the same.time how far he too was influenced by

the writings of Durandus. From that we will turn to see his

teaching about the final cause.

80

Vasquez* doctrine of the good is to be found

principally in his commentary on the Prima Pars» Disputation

XXIII, Significant of the influence -which Durandus has upon

him and his time is the fact that the first two chapters of

this disputation are a presentation of Durandus1 opinion of

the good and a refutation of part of this opinion,

Unlike his contemporary Suarez, therefore, Vasquez

did not attempt to adept and interpret Durandus in accordance

•with his own mind, though he did accept certain of Durandus1

teaching. Like Suarez, however, he accepted as the starting

point for his own opinion the teaching of Hervaeus (1), even

though he was not entirely in agreement with it,

Suarez, as we may remember, first set forth his

notion of the formal ratio of the good and then considered,

by way of replying to a difficulty, how it would apply to

good considered either in se or- relatively to another, Vasquez,

however, starts his treatment with this division of the good

and from there proceeds to formulate his opinion as to the

nature of the transcendental good.

In making this division of the good Vasquez says $

(l) Of, above page ^

— 83. —

"Iribus igitur modis aliquid dicitur bonum, primo,

ia seipso, quatenus in se bonum, est, et non alteri. Secundo dicitur bonum, quod alteri bonum est, cujus ratio in relatione congruentiae, et convenientiae cum alio posita videtur, Hoc vero genus boni adhuc duobus modis contingere potest. Aut enim est in na­turalibus , sicut calor in debita proportione, et sa­nitas respectu animalis; Aut est in moralibus, et sic actio moralis quae dicitur esse secundum rectam ra­tionem aut conveniens naturae rationali, ut ratio­nalis est, illi bona est," (l)

In considering the good Vasques reduces these three

modes to their basic division as bonum alteri and bonum in se,

First he focusses attention upon the bonum alteri and there,

in agreement -with the opinion of Durandus, he places the

bonum alteri in a relation of convenientia between beings.

He says s

"Hoc jacto fundamento nostra in hac re sententia in

duobus consistit. Alterum est de bono relate et ad aliud; alterum est de bono absolute, et in ses priorem partem in hoc cap, explicabimus posteriorem vero in sequenti, Bonum igitur relate, et quod est alteri bonum in relatione convenientiae positum est, et in hoc veram existimo sententiam Durandi. An vero sem­per relatio illa sit rationis, vel realis, parum interest. In moralibus autem, tam bonitatem, quam malitiam in universum, esse relationem rationis, pro­

babo I. 2, o. 71, art. 6« Inter illa vero, quae di­cuntur bona hoc modo, quaedam primarie bona sunt, quia ratione sui alteri conveniunt, ut eunt formae acciden- tariae subjecto inhaerentes: quaedam vero dicuntur 1

(1) Vasques, Commentariorum in I Parte, Disp. XXIII, c. 4

82 -

secundarie bonae ab effectu* quia aliquid bonum in

subjecto efficiunt% quo pacto ma substantia alte­ri dicitur bona#" (1/

Vasques# however » does not maintain that this

relation of convenientia# this bonum alteri is the trans­

cendental good. Indeed, he denies it categorically t

"Observandum tamen est# bonitatem hoc modo non esse passionem entis# ut cap. 2. contra Durandum probatum«*t,* (2)

It is really because of his misconceived notion

of convenientia ad aliud that Vasques removes the notion of

convenientia and the consequent rationes appetibilitatis et

finis from the proper nature of the transcendental, good* He

could not understand how this notion of convenientia between

beings could fit in with the notion of good as a property

of being» In this he was quite correct, since the aforesaid

convenientia would indeed be as limited as the species of

beings themselves. We find this argument in his refutation

of Durandus immediately following the argument wherein he

argued against Durandus* conception of the goodness of God. 1 2

(1) Vasques* Commentariorum in I Parte, Disp, XXIII, o. 4.

(2) ibidem.

— 85 -

He says $

"Secundo, aliis rebus hoc modo non convenire bonita­

tem, quae eat passio entis sic ostenditur. Huila est res quae non sit absolute, et simpliciter bona, quae si aliquae malae dieuhtur non absolute, et sim­pliciter, sed quibusdam malae dicuntur: sicut vene­num animantibus: paucissimae vero aut nullae omnibus

aliis conveniunt, et borne sunt; Res igitur creatae non dicuntur bonae simpliciter ex respectu convenien­tiae cum aliis, sed absolute, et secundum se ratione suae entitatis. POrro qua ratione res quibusdam sunt convenientes, et bonae, aliis sunt malae, et adversae; ac proinde bonum et ens absolute non reciprocarentur, aut non minus ens et malum, quam ens, et bonum, mutua consequentia invicem penderent; quod est absurdum..."(l)

In the light of this it will seem quite paradoxical

that Vasques when he gives his own notion of the formal ratio

df the good, whilst he preserves that essential note of

opposition to evil, nevertheless flagrantly renders impossible

that good should be a transcendental property of being. In

setting forth this notion he says t

"Ratio igitur formalis bonitatis, quae convertitur

cum ente, mea quidem sententia* est integritas, et perfectio rei in suo esse." (2)

Were it not for the word "integritas" here one

might understand this definition correctly. We have seen

that St. Thomas said in the Prima Pars that "unumquodque di~ 1 2

(1) Vasques, Commentariorum in I Parte, Disp. XXIII, c. 2

(2) ibidem, c. 5.

- 84

citur bonum, inquantum. est perfectum»* (l) For a correct

, conception of the good, however^ a correct conception of

how the word perfect applies to the good is essential. From

St. Thomas we have seen that the good implies not only the

notion of perfect hut also that of perfective. We will find

that John of St. Thomas when he speaks of the good as perfect

shows how it is through this notion of perfective that the

good can have its transcendental character.

We noted above that Suarez when he spoke of the

perfect with respect to the good failed to make the proper

distinctions* We saw that he considered the perfect only as

identical with being. (2) Hence he did not include the notion

of perfective,

Vasques has indeed done the same thing here. The

word "integritas” is a first indication of his mind, Within

the n©21 few lines he gives further evidence of Ms misconcep­

tion of St, Thomas’most direct and explicit statement that

"Bonum dicit rationem appetibilis," Be says that by these ,

words, St. Thomas : 1 2

(1) St, Thomas, Summa Theologica, I, Q. V# a. 5, c,

(2) Of* above page

86

“non iatelligit denominati onera relativam a potentia

appetente, neo relationem convenientiae sed rationem perfecti, in qua fundatur praecipue, et ex qua pro­venit, ut res aliqua appetatur," (l)

Vasquez has arrived at this conclusion from the

doctrine given by St, Thomas as to the distinction of sim­

pliciter and secundum quid when applied to being and to good.

We "will remember that in making that distinction St. Thomas

wanted to whow in what way being and good while "idem secun­

dum. rea" were different "secundum rationem". To do that he

pointed out how simpliciter and secundum quid when applied

to good were said just inversely as when applied to being.

The reason for this inversion we found to be in

the very formal difference between being and good. Thus it

is because the good bespeaks the perfect whbh is appetible,

and "per consequens dicit rationem ultimi" as St, Thomas says,

that it is said simpliciter by reason of that which is only

secundum quid when we speak of being. As we noted above,

when treating of this matter, St. Thomas’ ultimum here has a

very profound meaning and is to be understood in the line of

causality as well as in that of being (2), Indeed St. Thomas 1 2

(1) Vasques, Commentariorum in I Parte, Disp. XXIII, o. 5

(2) Of above page

— 86

by Ms very words in this response shows that he understands

by perfect not merely that to which nothing of being is lack­

ing, but as perfective of the appetite. These words are the

paucis interjectis which Vasques has unfortunately omitted

'

from his argument. But let us read it as he has rittem it :

"Hanc sententiam (viz. Ms opinion of the formal ratio of the good as integritas et perfectio rei in suo esse)

dissertis verbis tradit 8. Thomas in hac quaest. nam

in 1, art. inquit bonum esse quod omnia appetunts unum­quodque vero appetitur secundum quod est perfectum, et in solut. I. inquit* Sed bonum dicit rationem perfecti.Et paucis interjectis; Unde quod est ultimo perfectum, dicitur bonum simpliciter, quod autem non habet ulti­mam perfectionem, quam debet habere, quamvis habeat aliquam perfectionem inquantum est actu, non dicitur per­fectum simpliciter, neo bonum simpliciter, sed secundum quid." (l)

Whence he adds the conclusion we quoted above and

wMch for the sake of completeness we will repeat $

"Quare cum in I. a. in fine subjungit* Bonum dicit ra­

tionem appetibilis, non intelligit denominationem re­lativam a potentia appetente neo relationem, convenien­tiae, sed rationem perfecti, in qua fundatur praecipue,

et ex qua provenit, ut res aliqua appetatur." (2)

The paucis interjectis without wMch the proper nature

of the good is entirely lost and the good is rendered identical

with being are the following : 1 2

(1) Vasques, Commentariorum in I Parte, Disp. XXIII, c. 5.

(2) ibidem.

- 8? -

"Sed bonum dicit rationem perfecti, quod est appetibile, at per consequens dicit rationem ultimi» Unde id quod est ultimo perfectum. . (i) ' ”

St, Thomas, therefore, did not understand the good

to bespeak the perfect solely in the line of being , but

according as it is perfective of the appetite, is appetible

and consequently ultimate. It is true that the good as

perfective in this way is founded on the perfect as being,

but this latter is not taken in itself the formal ratio of

the good, We will find this most clearly pointed out in the

doctrine of John,of St, Thomas.

In further confirmation of his doctrine Vasques

cites St. Thomas' doctrine in Articles 3 and 5 of the question

wherein he treats the notion of the good. He says :

"In artio. 3 & 6. idem, omnino docet, ét tandem in art.

5. colligit rationem boni, quae in perfectione posita est, constare modo, specie et ordine. Ex quibus licet modum varie videatur explicare idem S. Doctor in hanc quaest. art. 5. et 1, 2, quaest. 85. art, 4. et quaest.

21 de veritate; eodem tamen recidit, ut optime notat Cajetam, in praedicto art, 5. Quovis autem modo expli­cetur, saltem, ex S. Thoma habemus, rationem boni ex mo­do, specie et ordine constari, atque ita idem esse bo­nitatem entis, et integritatem illius ex his omnibus perfectam." (2) 1 2

(1) St, Thomas, Summa Theologica, I, Q. V, a. 1, ad 1.

(2) Vasques, Commentariorum in I Parte, Disp. XXIII, e. 5.

88

In Article 8 cited above St. Thomas has for his

purpose to prove "quod orne ens inqü&ntum est ens, est bo­

num. " To do this he says ;

"Qmne enim eus, inquantum est ens, est in actu, et

quodammodo perfectum; quia omnis actus perfectio quae­dam est* Perfectum vero habet rationem appetibilis et boni, utex diotis patet (art. 1). Unde sequitur

omne ens, inquantum hujusmodi, bonum esse." (1)

It is most evident here that St. Thomas considers

the perfect to be good in so far as it is appetible, has

convenientia with the appetite. It is thus that the good is

distinguished from being, while the two are identical and

coextensive secundum rem.

In article 5, where St. Thomas proves the ratio boni

to consist in mode, species and order he concludes with the

sentence we underlined above when we quoted this entire article.

"Unde ratio boni, secundum quod consistit in perfecto

esse, consistit etiam in moào, specie, et ordine.# (2)

Thus it is only according as perfect is considered

in the line of being that good, having the ratio perfecti,

consists in mode, species and order. 1 2

(1) St; Thomas, Summa Theologica, Q,, V, art. 3, c

(2) ibidem, art. 5, c.

- 89 —

Moreover, we must remember that to have mode,

species and order is proper to the created good, St. Thomas

notes this in his reply to an objection in the first article

of Question VI, in the Prima Pars, Be says ;

"... Habere modum, speoiem et ordinem, pertinet ad ra­tionem boni creati$ sed bonum in Deo est sicut in causae unde ad eum pertinet imponere aliis, modum, speoiem et ordinem. Unde ista tria sunt in Deo sicut

in causa." (1)

The question which Vasques raises as to the way

in which St, Thomas defines mode in the various passages is

beyond both the point involved and the scope of this paper.

Vasques’ definition of the proper nature of the

transcendental good, therefore, actually left good and being

both in reality and in reason identified through the mis­

understood notion "perfectum". Vasques appended a corollary

to Ms doctrine, however, wMoh reduced good to a relation,

flagrantly denying its transoendental character. To

preserve this character, he had just previously denied the

doctrine of Durandus wMoh made good a relatio convenientiae

between beings. Vasques’ corollary reads :

"Verum rogabit aliquis, utrum ratio bonitatis sit ab­

soluta, an respectiva, vel ab utraque abstracta. Res­pondeo ex superiori doctrina bonitatem hoc modo esse 1

(1) St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, I, Q. VI, a. 1, ad 1.

- so

relationem, non quidem convenientiae unius rei cum altera, ut putavit Durandus, sed integritatis ex plu­ribus, Conventus enim omnium absque defectu ad all­

ouons rei constitutionem relate significatur; haec autem relatio non est ad ipsam essentiam tanquam alicujus rei convenientis, sed est inter ea, quae

ad- integritatem conveniunt; ipsam quoque essentiam quodammodo respicit tanquam ex eis consummatam, et per­fectam. Utrum autem haec relatio sit rationis tantum; an realis, non curo; certam tamen est, in rebus sim­plicibus esse solum rationis; nam conventus eorum, qu&e sola ratione distinguuntur, non potest esse rea­lis, ut patet. Quare si haec bonitas esset relatio realis, in rebus tantum, compositis esse posset. " (1)

By means of this relation of reason as constitutive

of the transcendental good in simple things. Vasquez was able

to posit his transcendental goodness of God, making God good

in Himself. Thus he concludes his corollary with a demons­

tration of how this goodness is said of God.

"Ceterum, ut finem imponam huic disputationi, id quod

praecipue ad nostrum spectat institutum ex dictis in­feramus, Deum videlicet esse bonum, inmo summe bonum, hoc genere bonitatis, quae constituitur veluti passio entis. Est enim integer, et perfectus in suo esse, ut nihil ei deesse possit, sive ex iis, quae ad essentiam, sive ad personas, sive ad operationes et emanationes pertinet." (2) 1 2

(1) Vasques, Commentariorum in I Parte, Disp. XXIII, c. 7

(2) ibidem.

91

We may note here that Vasquez holds this good,

whose proper nature is to be a relation of integrity, either

real or of reason, to be veluti passio entis, In what my

he considers it a property of being is indicated throughout

his treatise by Ms frequent use of the word "reciprocal"

in place of. "convertible" when speaking of being and good.

That he follows Durandus * opinion of convertibility non es­

sentialiter sed denominative is certain^ from his open

acceptance of that part of Durandus* doctrine,when in the

first part of his disputation he explains It, as we saw above.

It is further evident from the corollary to Ms explanation

of how simple things are said to be good in se. Showing that

they may be said good in so far as by our intellect we dis­

cern various perfections in these simple entities and then

bind these together by the relation of reason of integrity,

he adds :

"Ex quibus etiam colligere licet, ens, et bonum non essentialiter reciprocari, sed denominative juxta

notata in I cap." (1) 1

(1) Vasques, Commentariorum in I Parte, Disp. XXIII, c, 6

— 92 —

In introducing Vasquez -we remarked that, in so

far as he identified the notions of convenientia between

beings and final cause, he forged a new link between the

Scholastic corruption of the notion of the good and the

rejection of final causality by modern thought. We have

seen how he has rejected the relation of convenientia between

beings as the formal ratio of the transcendental good. He

has not, however, removed it from the concept of good taken

in all its entirety. For him it forms the ratio of the bo­

num alteri.

In his explanation of Article 4, of St. Thomas ’

question on the good, Vasquez gives his doctrine, making the

good, as convenientia between beings, have the rationem finis.

The conclusion, drawn by St. Thomas in the article in question,

is found in its first few words. He says : t

".. .Cum bonum sit quod omnia appetunt $ hoc autem ha­beat rationem finis* manifestum est quod bonum ratio­

nem finis importat." (1)

Vasquez explains this as follows $

"Conclusio affirmat, quae intelligenda est non de bono, quod in integritate rei positum est, sed de bono re­late ad alterum, quod dicitur alicui conveniens $ de (l)

(l) St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, I, Q. V, a. 4. c.

93 -

quo genere boni praecedenti disputatione dictum est.Ceterum, ut ibi notavimus; haec ratio boni conveni­entis alteri, oritur ex bonitate ipsius rei, quae est ejus integritas, et perfectio et reciprocatur cum ente." (1)

We say above that he considers appetibility, which

for him is the type of convenientia between beings arising

from the final cause, to flow from his transcendental good

which is the perfection in integrity of the being.

In what way this convenientia, called appetibility,

has the ratio of final cause is evident from Vasques* dis­

cussion of final cause in his Commentary on the Prima Secundae.

There he teaches that the proper nature of the final cause is

the objective concept of goodness as convenientia. This ob­

jective concept moves the appetite by manifesting the con­

venientia between the external object and the appetite, and

thus it renders the external thing appetible properly speaking.

Thus final causality for him is entirely a matter of intel­

lection.

We noted the germ of this concept in the doctrine

of Durandus, (given above page 22) Durandus held that the first

motion of the good is that whereby the practical intellect is

moved to apprehend the relation of convenientia. For Durandus

this seems to have been properly a motion of the intellect, the

good acting as object. Vasques goes farther in placing the formal

ratio of final cause in the ..... . 1

(1) Vasques, Commentariorum in I Parte, Q. V, a. 4 explica­

tione.

— 94 ■ —

intellect. But leave us read now Vasquez ’ doctrine in his

own words :

"His praemissis notationibus, nostra sententia, et na­tura ipsa, seu ratio formalis finis facile explicari potest, Dicimus igitur primum, ex illis tribue, quae ex parte finis reperimtur, ut supra notatum est, illud esse objectivum, quod est bonum, apprehensum, esse ob­jectum ipsum formale voluntatis, sicut color est ob­jectum formale visus, ac si cum Logicis diceremus, con­ceptus objectivas, in quem fertur voluntas est ratio

formalis objecti. Deinde dicendum est, conceptum for­malem, et denominationem illam cogniti in conceptu ob­jective non pertinere ad rationem formalem objecti sed esse conditionem objecti voluntatis, nisi quando finis eSt res supposito a nobis distincta, et habet rationem finis, et appetitus quatenus nobis coniungen­da per cognitionem. Utraque pars nostrae sententiae facile probaturi prior quidem, quia illud dicitur esse objectum formale voluntatis, in quod fertur voluntas affectu suo ratione ipsius ; ita enim est ratio volendi, ut etiam sit volitum; hujusmodi autem est bonum objec­tive existons in intellectu, ut manifestum est; ergo illud est formale objectum voluntatis concrete* ratio vero formalis abstracte erit bonitas in eo apprehensa, nempe convenientia; quo circa esse reale finis quod est in rebus, aut erit, secundum se non movet, sed qua­tenus objective apparet in intellectu; cum tamen quae- cunque causa efficiens, formalis, aut materialis solum causet secundum esse reale, quod habet extra animam. Ratio vero discriminis est, quia oaeterae causae non causant medio sui desiderio, sed secundum quod sunt re ipsa talis, aut talis naturae: at vero finis causât medio sui desiderio, et nisi medio amore sui causare non potest, amor autem respicit ut proprium objectum rem objective existentem in intellectu, ergo ratio fi­nis est id, quod objicitur voluntati media cognitione. Ex quo sit, ut interdum sicut inferius dicemus, finis sit res omnino conficta ab intellectu nullum habens esse adhuc futurum, sed tantum objective existons in intellectu.” (l)

(1) Vasques, Commentariorum, in I-II, Disp. II, c. 2

- 95

For Vasquez, therefore , the convenientia apprehend­

ed in the objective concept is the ratio formalissima of the

final cause. In setting forth this opinion he ms trying to

find a middle course between two schools of thought regarding

the formal ratio of the final cause. Listing these two

opinions, he says that the first held that the final cause

moves by its real being and that consequently its apprehension

is only a condition required for its exercise, The other

opinion maintained that the intellectual apprehension of the

final cause was its very ratio causandi.

In formulating his opinion Vasques seems to have

sought to avoid either of these positions by making a dis­

tinction between the objective concept as it is in the in­

tellect and according as it is affected by the extrinsic de­

nomination of "known.” In this he was in error and his error

manifests itself again in Ms doctrine of formal truth, a

doctrine wherein he agreed with Durandus that

"Ista veritas est in conceptu objective, ita quod ipsa

conformitas inter rem objective attactam et seipsam ut est in re, dicitur veritas formalis." (l)

In combatting this doctrine John of St. Thomas

clarifies the notion of objective concept with the words s 1

(1) John of St. Thomas, Cursus Theol. Tome II, Disp. XXII,

a, 2, no. 1, 604.

96

”conceptus enim objectivas non est conceptae reprae­sentans, sed res concepta et objecta ipsi cognitio-ni," (1)

Later he shows how a distinction may be made in

the objective concept between the thing known and its ex­

trinsic denomination of known. He says $

"Conceptus autem objectivas quantum ad rem est idem

quod res ipsa in se: haec enim est quae objicitur et cognoscitur} quantum autem ad statum seu denominatio­nem objective, hoc resultat in ipsa re, ex eo quod cognoscatur et concipiaturi" (2)

If, therefore, the objective concept is considered

from the part of the thing alone it is identical with the

thing In itself in natura rerum and is not the thing as ex­

istent in the intellect. A thing existing in the intellect

cannot escape, the denomination "known".

Because of his misconception of the very nature of

objective concept# Vasques, although he attempted to avoid

making the denomination "known" be more than a condition of

final causation, still, because he considered the objective

concept as existent in the intellect he necessitated Intel-

(1) John of St, Thomas, Cursus Theol, Tome II, Disp. XXII,

a. 2, no, 9, 606,

(2) ibidem, no. 9, 606»

@7

lection as the formal ratio of final cause -whether he -wish­

ed to do-so or not. Indeed, as John of St. Thomas points

out in his treatise on the formal truth, the objective con­

cept considered as including the denomination "known” sup­

poses the formal concept.

Requiring intellection in this way for the very

nature of final causality, making it indeed to be the ap­

prehension of the convenientia of a being to the appetite of

the being apprehending, Vasques made final causality impos­

sible for creatures below the intellectual level, That he

himself saw this is evident from his words :

”.. .ideo agentia naturalia non dicuntur proprie movere

seipsa in finem, eo quod non cognoscant, ao proinde non desiderent finem; sed latiori dumtaxat modo dicun­tur moveri in finem, quia a causa prima intelligente finem, et terminum suarum actionum moventur....11 (1)

By this doctrine Vasquez not only denied the very

Aristotelian concept of nature which we pointed out in our

discussion of the Suarezian doctrine, hut he also left open,

the way for the accusation of anthropomorphism so often made

by more modern critics of teleology. 1

(1) Vasquez, Coramentqriorum in I-II, Q. I, Rotatio in art.2.

** 98

In Ms Cursus Philosophions John of St. Thomas

combats the idea that apprehension is the proper nature of

final causality. His thesis concerning this matter reads

as follows $

’’Apprehensio non est ratio formalis fin&lizandi, sed conditio requisita ad finem pro ea parte* qua finis etiam est objectum, neque est conditio solum per mo­dum applicationis, sed etiam per modum existenti&e.”$ 1 $

In support of this thesis John argues that ap­

prehension is a necessary condition to every object of the

will whether it he end or means, Hence, he concludes that

apprehension, since it is common to both end and non end,

cannot be the formal ratio of final causality.

He applies this argument to both the formal and

objective concepts and in this latter he is evidently speak­

ing directly against Vasques * position. He says :

"Quod non solum, convincit cognitionem et conceptum

formalem esse conditionem, et non rationem formalem, sed neque ipsam rationem conceptus objectivi ut ap­prehensi et ut habentis esse intentional©, quia hoc ipsum est commun© omni appetibili et objecto volito, sive sit finis, sive non.” (2) I

(1) John of St, Thomas, Cursus Phil., Tome II, Phil. Hat.

I Pars, Q. XIII, a. 1, 272bl6.

(2) ibidem, 273al.

99

As a further argument John states that apprehension

is in the line of manifestation* that it manifests the ap-

petibility of the good* Hence, he shows that since the good

as end is in the line of appetibility, while the apprehension

is in an entirely different line, namely that of manifestation,

the two cannot be considered as one formal ratio* Instead,

appetibility is to be considered as presupposed to apprehen­

sion, Appetibility is of the formal ratio of the good and of

end, but apprehension is only a condition sine qua non.

In the case of creatures below the intellectual

level this requisite condition of apprehension is replaced

by their very nature which is a "ratio cujusdam artis, sci­

licet divinae". Thus, although not possessing their own

manifestive apprehension, they move nevertheless to a de­

termined end, being susceptible by reason of their very nature

to the direct appetibility of that end.

Vasques erred too in his interpretation of the

meaning of the "metaphorical motion" of the end. His notion

of this follows immediately Ms doctrine that the objective

concept is the very proper nature of the final cause. He

says $

"Heque obstat, quod inter causas physicas finis etiam connumeratur : nam non omnis causa naturalis, effectus eodem amodo causare debet: et de fine plane docuit Aris-

- 100

toteles primo lit. de generat, et corruptione c. 7. textu 65« non movere physice, hoc est secundum ésse

reale suum, sed metaphorice $ dicitur autem movere me­taphorice, quia per sui desiderium tantum, movet ut sequenti articulo dicemus, et ita solum est causa physici effectus media causa efficienti rationali, quae dicitur gratia finis operari per desiderium ipsius.” (1)

Exactly -where this -whole doctrine errs and in what

way it leaves open the door for anthropomorphism, we will see

shortly when we consider the doctrine of John of St. Thomas

concerning the causality of the end. Before going on to hie

doctrine we will summarize briefly the teaching of Vasquez

which we have just seen.

Vasques erred as gravely as Durandus in his con­

ception of the nature of a property of being. Both placed

the good to be a relation, Vasquez adding over Durandus that

it might be a relation of reason as well as a real relation.

Vasquez saw Durandus ' error in making so specialized a thing

as convenientia between beings a transcendental property of

being. Still he was unable to overcome the notion of such

convenientia as applied to good. Instead of making it the

proper nature of the transcendental good, he left it as some- (l)

(l) Vasquez, Commentariorum in I-II, Disp. II, o. 2,

101

thing flowing from, that proper nature, and gave it the ratio

finis* He formed in this my a new link in the process

leading to the denial of final causality, for he made end

identical with convenientia between beings « His next mis­

leading step ms, as we have just seen, to make the proper #

nature of final causality to be the objective concept mani-

festive of this convenientia between being. Thereby he opened

the my for the objection of # anthropomorphism. The trans­

cendental good itself ms for him the relation, either of

reason or real, of integrity in the very entity of the being

said good.

JOHN OF ST. THOMAS

John of St. Thomas, O.P., writing his Cursus Phi­

losophicus and Cursus Theologicus around the years 1634-1637,

restated with unusual profundity the doctrine of the good and

of final cause which St. Thomas had first given nearly four

hundred years earlier. Mary of his theses and arguments stand

in direct opposition to that Scholastic corruption of the true

concept of the good and final cause which we have been out­

lining. It will, therefore, he interesting to see something

of what he has to say and in what my he refutes the false

notions which had begun to grow.

102 -

We find John’s doctrine of the transcendental good

in the First Tome of his Cursus Theologicus, in his Disputation

concerning Questions V and VI of the Prima Pars. There he

investigates this good under two aspects; first# "what as a

passio entis it adds over end above beings and# secondly#

what is its formal ratio»

Regarding the first of these he points out that a

property of being cannot add anything really distinct to being#

since being is the most universal of all things# and therefore

anything really distinct added to it would be non-being or

nothing. Hence, a properly of being must include being itself

and not only whatever it adds over and above. To quote John’s

own words ;

"Qtiare formalis ratio boni# et aliarum passionum entis, non potest distingui ab ipsa entitate, sed est ipsamet entitas: non absolute, sed supponendo aliquam connota- tionem vel conditionem, qua supposita, et per ordinem ad illam, entitas ipsa est passio; sicut in Deo ipsamet essentia, ut explicat peculiarem aliquam condicionem, est attributum.” (1)

This,idea of a passio entis therefore draws a very

fine distinction, a distinction lost to the mind looking for

the usual concept of property or passio, as expressed by the * 6

(1) John of St. Thomas, Cursus Theol., Tome I, Q. V, Disp

6, a# 1, no. 7, 519.

accidental properties attaching to certain non-transcendent&l

natures» In these nature and property can easily be distinguish­

ed as substance and accident. To illustrate such a property

John of St. Thomas uses the example of risibility as a property

of man. (l)

In contrasting the properties of being with the

ordinary kinds of property, John of St. Thomas is laying the

ground-work for his principal criticism of the errors of Du­

randus and Vasques who so obviously went astray in this matter.

Later when he rules out the possibility that good be a relation

we will remark how he answered these errors more specifically.

Turning secondly to look for the formal ratio of the

good John of St. Thomas points out where we are to seek it:

"Gum autem bonum sit formali ter oppositum malo et excludat illud, necasse est formalem rationem boni venari ex illa condicione seu formalitate, quae for­malius est exclusiva malit inde enim accipi debet constitutio boni." (2)

Continuing then, John declares that the proper

nature of the good cannot formally consist "in aliquo absoluto 1 2

(1) John of St. Thomas, Cursus Theol., Tome I, Q. V, Disp. 6,

a. 1, no. 22, 524*

(2) ibidem, no 7, 519.

- 104 -

superaddito enti; nec ia aliqua relatio ne reali» vel ra­

tionis”. (1) Whereupon* he lays down in the following words

what precisely this proper nature of the transcendental good

is*

"DICO SECÜHD0: Formalis ratio boni transcen&entaliS consistit in ipsa perfection® intrinseca et entitati- va rei, quatenus fundat et connotât rationem perfecti- vi per modum appetibilis, et non solum per modum for­mas informantis et constituentis. Et licet appetibi- litas explicetur per relationem quamdam rationis ad appetitum, sicut scibile per relationem rationis ad scientiam* non tamen in ista relatione formali ter con­sistit ipsa ratio boni, sed ia eo quod est fundamen­tum hujus relationis et ei prae supponitur, licet eam connotet aut fundet.” (2)

This conclusion is based on several texts from St.

Thomas. One is that of the Prima Pars Question XL7III, ar­

ticle 5, wherein the Angelic Doctor says t "bonum consistit

in perfectione et actu principaliter et per se",- another is

that of Question V, article, 5 of this same Part : "unumquod­

que dici bonum in quantum perfectum* sic enim est appetibile."

We saw this text above when giving the doctrine of St. Thomas.

We saw there too the principal text which John uses to support

his doctrine, the text of Question XXI, article 1 of the 1 2

(1) John of St. Thomas, Cursus, Theol., Tome I, Q. V, Disp. 6,

art. 1, no. 8, 519.

(2) ibidem, no* 12, 520

De Veritate.

Ia his definition John has been most careful not

to confuse the two fundamental notions of the transcendental

good which he first mentioned in discussing it, viz. the notion

of its being a passio entis, and the notion of that formality

proper to it, i.e. its exclusion of evil. He has named the

latter as the genus in his definition, "perfections intrin­

seca et entitativa rei", for, as he says, "quod perfectum sit,

omnes intelligunt tamquam per se notum”. The reason for this

universal acknowledgement that the good is the perfect is

that only the perfect rules out evil, since the perfect is

that having all the actuality due it.

We saw just above that Vasques in setting forth his

notion of the transcendental good used this very argument to

prove his position. We noted at the same time that while he

placed the transcendental good in the perfection of the thing,

he did not have a full understanding of the signification of

this word "perfectum" as applied to the good, Like Suarez he

failed to consider the good as perfect as comprehending any­

thing more than actuality and being,

In setting down the specific difference of his

definition, John of St, Thomas makes an all-important dis-

106

tinetion of the notion of perfect, from this distinction

we will be able to discern exactly where Suarez and Vasque:

were in error.

John points out that two types of perfection may­

be conceived} the constitutive and the perfective. Of these

the former pertains to the genus of formal cause, for it cons­

titutes and integrates the entity in itself. Perfective

perfection, on the other hand, is of the genus of final cause,

for it bespeaks the appetitle. It la that which perfects,

not as constituting in actuality, but as drawing, attracting

to itself as to an end. As John points out, this second sense

is more proper of perfection than the first, for it is more

proper of perfection to perfect than to constitute in integrity.

"Perfectum perficere" is indeed an example of the fourth mode

dicendi per se, given by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics.

This is the mode "secundum quod haec praepositio per designat

habitudinem causae, effectus, vel cujuscumque alterius", (l)

Since, therefore, the Proper nature of the good consists in

the perfect, as St. Thomas says, we may well conclude that it

consists in the perfectum per se in all its actuality, operat­

ing causally as the perfect, rather than in the perfect eon-

(1) Of, St. Thomas I Post. An&lybieo. Leo* 10, no. ?

107

sidered as statio, divorced from its own causality and

constituting entity only.

In denominating good perfectum per se nee must be

careful to have always in mind that we are employing the

fourth mode dioendi per se. Hence perfectum per se here is

synonymous with perfectum perfactivum alterius. When one

says per se the mind tends to think of a thing as an absolute,

inclosed in itself. Per se in the fourth mode, however, having

the notion of perfective connotes another and this other in

the case of the good is the appetite* Thus good as perfectum

per se is perfectum perfeotivum appetitus per modum finis.

In making this distinction of the perfect and in

setting forth the notion of the perfect as perfective as the

specific difference in his formal ratio of the good John of St.

Thomas has clearly manifest where Durandus, Suarez and Vasquez

faltered. It is indeed this notion of the good as perfective

of the appetite which gives to it the character of a property

of being. Considered simply as constitutive perfection it

has the necessary note of exclusion of evil, but it lacks that

of property of being* In considering the doctrines of Durandus,

Suarez and Vasques we did not find any of them including this

note of perfectivity of the appetite in their proper nature of

108 -

the good* As we saw Durandus and Vasquez were in fund­

amental error in their notion of good as a property of being;

Suarez# however, had the correct notion of property of being

and so as we noted he was forced to illogic in his final

position.

The notion of convenientia ad aliud given as the

proper nature of the transcendental good by Suarez cannot be

referred to the perfect as perfective but as constitutive.

The aliud for him as we noted so often was another being, and

the purpose for making this notion the proper nature of the

good was because this convenientia seemed, to add to the notion

of integrity and completeness which the perfect had for him.

Constitutive perfection, however, as we have said,

cannot be a passio entis. It is nothing other than being

itself; it is actuality as constituting and integrating being.

Perfective perfection, on the other hand, does add something

to being; it adds a certain respectus, a convenientia to another,

which other in the case of the good is the intellectual appetite.

For, as we saw in St. Thomas, it is necessary that this per-

factivity this convenientia have for its object the intel­

lectual soul, since that soul "quodammodo est omnia.11

109 -

Thus perfective perfection implies in being a

certain connotation, gives it a certain orientation, which

orientation is the basis of the relation of reason by which

we know being as good. ’’Perficiens1' therefore is the specific

difference in the formal ratio of the good. This formal ratio

may be simply summed up in two wordss "perfectio perficiens”,

provided they are rightly understood.

To stress this notion that it Is the perfect as

perfective which makes the good a property of being we may

well read the words of John of St, Thomas describing what is

a passio entis

"Bec valet argumentum quod passio debet distingui a re

cujus est passio, et sic bonum ab ente. Jam enim dic­tum est, quod non est passio rigoroses sed solum ra­tione distincta, et secundum diversum conceptum- expri­mendi ens ut in se, vel up perfecturum alien jus.” (1)

From these words we must not conclude that good can

be considered to be a relation of reason. As noted above it

is known to us by a relation of reason which it founds, and

may therefore be said "distincta (ab ente) rationis*8 To

clarify the point again with the words of John of St. Thomas s

(1) John of St, Thomas, Cursus Iheol., Tome I, Q. V, Disp. 6,

art* 1, no, 22, 52d.

110

"Hon tamen potest formali ter ia hae relatione consis­

tere bonum., licet per illum a nobis explicetur: quia

non potest regiis bonitas constitui per id quod ratio­nis est* Unde formale constitutivum boni non potest distingui ab ente, sed entit&tive et in re coineidunt. Superaddit autem ad essentiam, non id quod formaliter est constitutivum suit sed id quod se habet ut condi­cio requisita ad hoc Ut bonum exprimat distinctum con­ceptum quam ens absolute dictum: quod non exprimeret nisi condicionem illam superadderet*" (l)

Even though this relation of reason is not the formal

ratio of the good it is very important for our knowing that

formal ratio. It is so important simply because of the abstract

nature of the properties of being, -wherein "radicale et for­

male eoinoidunt, et solum penes diversos conceptus seu habi­

tudines distinguuntur: et secundum quod fundant istam diver­

sitatem dicitur unum radicaliter fundare alterum." (2)

In direct refutation of the tendency to make the

proper nature of the good be a relation John of St. Thomas

sets forth in his treatise in the Cursus Theologicus arguments

to prove that neither a relation of reason, nor a pre­

dicament&l relation not a transcendental relation can cons­

titute the ratio formalis of the good.

He argues first of all that it is obviously absurd

- Ill -

to claim that good is a relation of reason, because it is

a property of real being* If it mere only a relation of

reason it mould not belong to being in re,

John finds annually evident proof that good can­

not he a predicaments! relation* Be says that as a property

of being good must he coextensive with being. Predicamental

relation,- however, is one of the ten divisions of being and

so is not being universally considered. Thus in so far as

it is a good it is rather a certain particular good and not

the proper nature of the transcendental good.

These first two arguments are directed against the

positions of Durandus and Vasquez, the first claiming good

to be a real relation of convenientia and the latter, claiming

good to be a relation of integrity, either real or of reason.

In his last argument John proves that good cannot

be a transcendental relation. Be gives his proof in the

following words :

"Traneeendentalis enim relatio qua aliquid ordinatur

r adj^lium potius dioit rationem perfectibilis et ten-'p " dentiae ad bonum et perfectum quam ipsam formalem ra­

tionem bonij licet enim plura perficiantur aliquo res­

pectu transcendental!, tamen non dicuntur formai i, ter bona quia sic respiciunt et perficiuntur, sed quia

supposita tali relations et perfections terminant respectum, appetitus ad se et redduntur appetibilia,"(l)

This argument may he conceived as directed against

the position of Suarez* Suarez# however* never uses the term

"transcendental relation" in setting forth his position. Still

Mg ratio convenientiae which the good adds over being and

which* he says# "non est proprium relatio, sed solum connotât

in alio talem naturam habentem naturalem inclinationem, ca-

pacit&tem, vel conjunctionem eum tali perfectione" may be

construed as a transcendental relation. John of St. Thomas

tells us in Ms Logie that a transcendental relation ;

"non est forma adveniens subjecto seu rei absolutae, sed illi imbibita, oozmotans tamen aliquid extrinsecum* a quo pendet vel circa quod versatur, ut materia ad formam, caput ad capitatum, creatura ad Deum," (2)

Since* therefore, Suarez1 good seems to be a ratio

rei absolutae imbibita* connoting something extrinsic, it may

be looked upon as a transcendental relation. It does not,

seem to have the notion of perfectible, however, and so one

may doubt whether or not John's refutation exactly applies

to it.

(1) John of St. Thomas, Cursus Theol., Tome I, Q* V, Disp. 6*

a, 1# no. 10, B2Q,

(2) John of St, Thomas, Cursus FMI., Trane I, Logica, II Pars,

0. mi, a. 2, 578bS0.

113

Jzl concilieion we will turn to the Cursus Fhilogo-

phicus to see wherein John of St. Thomas placed the causality

of the end. We will thereby be able to see where Suarez and

Vasques erred in this and in their notions of the metaphorical

motion of the end,

John gives a single conclusion in this matter* It

reads t

"Met&phorica motio, qua finis dicitur causare secundum

veritatem, est primus amor finis ut passive pendens ab appetibili, non ut active elicitus a voluntate,” (1)

As he himself notes, this conclusion supposes one

thing. It will be well to quote his own words in regard to

this supposition s

"Supponit, quod causalitas finis, licet metaphorice

sit motio, vere tamen esse eausalitatem reaiem, quia alias si totum, quod datur in oausalitate finis, esset metaphor!cum et nihil reale, finis non esset vera cau­sa physica, cum tamen sit praecipua et prima causarum, imo per excellentiam, est id, cujus causa seu cujus gra­tia cetera fiunt. Ergo si nullam veram eausalitatem habet, vera causa non est.” (2)

The cause best known to us is the efficient cause.

(1) ibidem, Tome II, Phil* hat., I Pars, Q, XIII, a. 2,

278a23.

(2) John of St. Thomas, Cursus Phil., Tome I, Phil. Hat, I

Pars, Q. XIII, a. 2, 2?8a29.

114 -

Its causality consists in action, the action of the agent

on the effect. For us, therefore, the idea of action, of

motion, is invariably tied up with the idea of causality.

Causality', as such, nevertheless, consists rather in the

influence in the entity of a tiling. This influence need not

always be a motion in the proper sense.

It is probably because we always look for motion

when we look for causality that the causality of the end is

also described in terms of motion. It is called a metaphorical

motion. Since metaphor removes from the world of reality one

may be tempted to look upon final causality itself as unreal.

It is against this that John warns us in this last quoted

passage. Final causality, though only metaphorically motion,

is real influere in esse.

In explaining the metaphorical motion which is final

causality John of St. Thomas analyzes the prime act of love.

In this act are joined two formalities - that of the first ef­

fect of the final cause, and that of its causality. John for­

mulates this doctrine quite euceintly as follows :

R...In ilia volitions sunt duo* Alterum, quod est Cau­

satum a fine, alterum, quod est ratio causandi, Ne- que est mirum, quod causalités identifiestur cum eau-, sato, quia etiam, actio identificatur cum effeetu. Id ergo, quod elioientiae seu actionis est in illa voli­tions, est causatum a fine, quod vero coaptationis et

coniunctionia est etna appetibili seu ordinis ad ip­sum, quo redditur ponderans in appetitu, ut incline­tur ad se et ad alia, hoc dicitur attractio per mo­dum, causalitatis ad actum, ut explicatum est. Unde ista attractio et causalités identice et realiter est ipse actus amoris, formaliter est ordo seu dependentia

Ipsius ab objecto appetibili proposito ut ponderantein voluntate." (l)

Again be says :

"Imo ipsemet amor finis ut elicitus a voluntate est cau­

satus a fine, ut autem passive pendens ab ipso pondere appetibilis causalités finis est,,," (2)

John of St, Thomas bases his doctrine in this matter

on that of St, Thomas, Among the texts "which he quotes from

the Angelic Doctor, one of the principal is taken from the De

Veritate. It reads :

"Sicut autem influere causae efficientis est ageres ita influere causae finalis est appeti et desidera­ri,” (S)

Further explaining what he means by saying that the

causality of the end is the act of love in so far as it is

dependent passively on the very weight of the appetible, John 1

(1) John of St, Thomas, Cursus Phil. Tome II, Phil. Hat, I

Pars, Q. XIII, a, 2, 282M5.

(2) ibidem, 279a5.

(3) St, Thomas, De Veritate, Q. XXII, a, 2, o.

116

follows St, Thomas to distinguish a certain immutation in

the act of love from the complacency of this hot. Between

these two lies the bridge from final to efficient causality.

The formality of final causality is the immutation of the

appetites that of efficient causality is the complacency.

The immutation of the will which is the formality

of final causality proceeds the complacency though both in re

constitute the same action of the will. John of St, Thomas

explains why this immutation must precede and just what it is

in the following words $

"At vero finis non constituit speciem, sed movet agens ad exercitium actionis, et quia non potest exercere actionem nisi per aliquam inclinationem, quae gene­raliter dicitur appetitus, neque inclinatio potest ten­dere nisi ad aliquid certum, prius neoesse est, quod reddatur inclinatio prop ortionata respectu illius ter­mini in quem tendit;. Et illa proportio seu immutatio reddit Tnolina^ionem quasi conjunctam ipsi appetibili.Bt sic inclinatio ponderos'aT facta ' tendit ia ünem.77( 1 )

This immutation is said, to be to the first love of

the will as a passion, because it is as it were breathed onto

the will by the object, and is that whence the action of love

as elicited may be perfected. 1

(1) John of St. Thomas, Cursus Phil. Tome II, Phil. Hat

I Pars, Q. XIII, a. 2, 279bl.

117

Thus also it is called, a metaphorical motion. There

is in this immutation no true transitus, and hence no true

motion. There is only this attraction, this proportion, this

connaturality whereby the end is said to move in an immobile

way.

To Summarize this causality of the end, we may say

that it is to he found really identical with the first motion

of love of the will. In this low, however, we distinguish

two formalities * the act of the will as it is an action elicited

by the will, and this we say to be the first effect of the final

cause} and the immutation of the will whereby it is inclined

as by a weight and this metaphorical motion we call final

causality. In intellectual agents the act of the will is

elicited by knowledge which both applies and gives intentional

existence to the end; in natural agents lacking knowledge these

functions are supplied by the nature itself, as instituted by

the Prime Intellect.

In comparing this doctrine with that taught by Suarez,

we may remember that he distinguished between actus secundus

and actus primus in final causation. Actus secundus he said to

be the very act of the will, actus primus to be the good.

We noted above that his distinction of actus primus

and actus secundus was not correct. Precluding from this, however,

- 1X8

and reading his texts concerning the actus secundus as

given on page 57 above, of final causation, one might con­

ceive that he had the correct notion* He places this actus

secundus in the action of the will not according as it is

from the will hut according as it is from the end.

He asserts, moreover, (text, page 58) that the

two are identical in re and are distinct only ratione. In

all this he may seem quite in agreement with the doctrine

just given by John of St, Thomas » "When, however, we under­

stand what precisely he means we find he is far from that

doctrine, When he speaks of final causality as being the

action of the will as coming from the end, he means that it .

is this action itself in so far as it is an action and is there­

fore a real motion. We learn this from his definition of

metaphorical motion given on page 81. There he maintains that

metaphorical motion is real motion, the motion of the final

cause, and is only so called to distinguish it from the motion

of the efficient cause.

Hence' when Suarez speaks of identity in re between

the causality and the effect of the end# he concurs with the

opinion of John of St. Thomas. When he distinguishes the two,

however, by reason according as this same real action has two

119

principles he falls into error* He conceives these two

principles as the will pushing in the line of efficiency,

as it were» and the end pulling in the line of finality*

Thus one action "would depend equally from two principles in

so far as it is a real transitus* This notion has led Suarez

to confuse final and efficient causality in the case of Cod,

as wé saw above, (page 68). From it seems to flow also the

error of his doctrine of the finality of natural things,

wherein he identified the action of God and creature. Indeed,

Jif real action flows from the final cause, even though it ^

posited as a pull in contrast to the push of efficient cause

it will be impossible not to confuse efficient and final cau­

sality.

John of St. Thomas, as we saw, distinguished the two

formalities of effect and causality by reason by positing the

one as the real action, efficient causality, the other as me­

taphorical motion, the immutation of the will, the rendering

it ponderous by the good. Unless we maintain this influence

of the final cause to be actually metaphorical motion we

shall not be able to distinguish it from efficient causality.

The real - action in which effect i and causality of the end are

identified, moreover, does not depend equally upon efficient and

and final cause* but depends on the efficient as,moved by the final.

Vasques1 error in this matter of the causality of

the end» like his error in the notion of the good, is less

subtle than that of Suares. As we saw above in treating his

doctrine he places the ratio formalis finis in the objective

concept and hence requires active intellection as causality of

the end* It would seem, however, that intellection is but the

first motion of the end for him* When he speaks of the

metaphorical motion of the end he defines this metaphorical

motion as movement "per desiderium sui" as we saw in his text

given on page . In placeing these two motions he has

followed closely a doctrine first laid down by Durandus (of.

quotation on page twenty two above. )

Vasques* notion of the motion of the end as "per

desiderium sui" could be understood in the true sense, if he

intended that "desiderium" be understood in the passive, in

agreement with those words of St. Thomas % "influere causae

finalis est appeti et desiderari." (1)

That he did not intend the passive but the active

motion of desire, to be the proper causality of the end is

evident, however, from his following article wherein he says :

(1) St. Thomas# De Veritate, Q,. XXII* a. 2, c

"Multo probabilior sententia est finem exercere munus, et officium propriae causae finalis, non quidem ad

desiderium sui, sed solum per desiderium, sui movendo ad voluntatem mediorum vel ad aliquod opus ordinatum ad sui ipsius consequutionem...R (1)

Hence, for Vasques, the motion of the end was two- ,

fold, that of intellection and that of desire. Because of

his mistaken notion of objective concept we might excuse him

from formally holding active intellection to be the motion of

the end* but his doctrine speaking of the metaphorical motion

of the end as desire, and making it active desire, can scarcely

be misinterpreted. For him, as for Suarez, therefore, metaphor­

ical motion was not metaphorical but real.

ïo conclude we might briefly sum up what we have

seen. Our purpose as stated in the opening pages has been to

show that the rejection of final causality by modern thinkers

has been due in part at least to a gradual but profound cor­

ruption of the true notion of the good. In this present paper

we have confined ourselves to the presentation of the true

doctrine of the good and of end as given by St, Thomas and John

of St, Thomas, using this latter as a means of throwing into

relief the errors of those Scholastics who fell away from the (l)

(l) Vasques, in I-II, Bisp, III, c, 2.

ïhomistio doctrine

We found time and opportunity to treat of only a

few of the Scholastic errors. We saw how those we did treat

stemmed in large part from the writings of Durandus de Sancto

Portiano. This schoolman made two basic errors in bis doctrine

of the good. Both are contained in his formal ratio of the

transcendental good, which he said to he a real relation of

convenientia between beings. First and most evident of his

errors was the fact that he completely misunderstood the notion

of a property of being, making so special a mode of being as

a particular relation to be such a property because he found it

always concomitant with every created being. Bis second error

was even more insidious than this, however. It was the con­

sideration of good as the particular convenientia between two

beings. This error as we saw ruled out the intellectual soul.

It was this error in particular which some later Scholastics

were unable to reject and which especially led to a corruption

of the notion of finality.

Suarez, as we saw, adopted the teaching of Durandus

as his own. He seems to have had the correct notion, of a

property of being, however, and so he attempted to change

Durandus* relation to a ratio convenientiae. Nevertheless he

did not overcome the notion of convenientia ad aliud as being

a particular proportion between beings. Because of this, as

we sew, he divorced the notions of appetible and end from the

proper nature of the good and fell into a strange doctrine of

finality which denied motion for an end to natural things*

Vasquez took a step even farther away from truth in

Ms doctrine. Be accepted Durandusr notion of a relation as

a property of being, though he changed this relation to one

of integrity. Thus he separated the relation of convenientia

from, the transcendental good, but he did not remove it from

the notion of good entirely. He left it as the ratio of the

bonum alteri and he made it to be identical with the ratio fi­

nis. 2h this way he most properly applied convenientia between

beings to the notion of finality. Going further still he made

the intellection of this convenientia to be the ratio formalis»

sima of the end, and so left wide open the door to the accusation

of anthropomorphism.

Our last consideration then showed hour John of St.

Thomas combatted these doctrines by making the appetite enter

once more into the proper notion of the good and by defining

the transcendental good through the correct notion of the per­

fect as perfective. We saw too, how he carefully pointed out

the real causality of the end at the same time as its metaphor­

ical motion, and how he placed this metaphorical motion to be

Ï&4

the immutatioa of the will identical with its first motion

of love.

We hope in the future to carry this discussion into

the realm of more modern thinkers, to show how those erroneous

notions of Scholastics conceived as they were in the very

heights of metaphysical speculation, are reflected in the more

superficial postulates of the modems, We hope especially to

link this trend away from finality because of a misconception

of the good to the doctrine of Bacon and Spinosa and through

them to Kant and more recent thinkers. In this modern philosophy

we believe we will be able to find the cause of the superstitious

taboo with which modem science has branded finality.

m&HXBWMK

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