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Nuno Boavida, António Brandão Moniz and Manuel Laranja

Abstract

This paper presents a preliminary analysis of a national electric mobility policy, named Mobi-E, by addressing the policy-making process, its social impact and knowledge creation. The paper concludes that the Mobi-E fell short of expectations. In fact, behind the innovation rhetoric, the programme left behind an integration of the electric vehicles in an overarching concept of sustainable mobility, the need to change human behaviour, the dynamics of users’ perceptions and knowledge creation. The Mobi-E was also hindered by

inability to involve key communities in electric mobility.

Introduction

In early 2008, the Portuguese government started a working group on electric mobility, aiming to develop infrastructure for street-charging of electric vehicles across the country.

in mid-2009, and its pilot project ended in June 2011 with the full implementation of 1300 slow-charging stations and 50 fast-charging stations in places of public access. The project also installed a payment system, which connects personal information and communication-technology devices (e.g. tablets, smart phones, etc.) and enables the user to select the most appropriate operation. It also allows for the analysis of a user’s mobility costs for optimizing energy consumption.

The research conducted for this work (Boavida 2011) revealed that one group promoted the elaboration of the Portuguese e-mobility policies, and centred the Mobi-E programme on the hardware and software to charge and control the e-car. The group was composed of several companies and was led by the Inteli group (a think tank associated with the Ministry of Economy), which was in charge of the Mobi-E concept and model. Other companies included CEIIA1 - a public-funded technology centre that developed an e-car prototype,

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part of the Inteli group, supported by the Ministry of Economy and in charge of the Mobi-E

Siemens, Efacec and Martifer – three technology companies, all dealing with the charging solution; and Critical and Novabase – two information technology (IT) companies, in charge of the IT solution.

Although the infrastructure for charging electric vehicles was fully built, the project failed to address the expected consumers. In fact, it can be said that far fewer cars than expected could be observed using the charging points in 2012. That year, an equivalent of only eleven cars, on average, used the public charging infrastructure (Complementary Interview 4, line 212-214).

designed to deal with the sensitive nature of the information requested and to avoid any suspicion of misuse of information. Thirteen interviews were conducted with policy makers, stakeholders, scholars and experts, which enabled the collection of information

talking to those involved in the programme. These interviews lasted from one hour up to four hours and were conducted between February 2011 and March 2013.

Leapfrogging Development?

It is important to frame the Portuguese policy on electric mobility in the changing international

electric vehicles in 2011 were the US (51%), followed by Europe (24%) and Japan (20%). According to the authors, the Chinese market represented only 4% of the world sales and the Indian around 1%. Furthermore, the distribution of public charging stations was also

charging stations and electric-vehicle sales in some countries.

of public charging infrastructure without the corresponding sales of electric vehicles. In fact, by the end of 2011, some countries had more charging stations installed than electric vehicles sold in their markets (e.g. UK, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Sweden).2 This mismatch reveals the push some governments decided to give to promoting electric vehicles in their countries.

Elaborate Studies after the Political Decision

A central question in the development of nations refers to how to use technology to catch the frontrunners (Freeman 1994). Many governments promote technology policies that can create conditions for developing new industries and stimulating their economies. To some

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of these governments, building an infrastructure for charging future vehicles appeared to be an effort that could promote economic growth and development. However, some critics support the view that for this generation of politicians, the technology is not really a way to modernize society, but a way to “conquer and retain power” (Interview 7, line 397-399). Critics sustained the view that there was a narrow focus on the popular electric car rather

“relatively centralized way” (Interview 9, line 318-319) and by Inteli - the leading company that won the consortium (Interview 7, line 46-47). As expected, the Mobi-E programme was a dynamic process that included a proposal to the Prime-minister cabinet being presented by a consortium of companies in full lobbing mode, to support the political decision of

(Interview 7, line 153-159).

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Figure 19: Worldwide public charging infrastructure for electric vehicles and sales in 2011 (based on Frost & Sullivan and OECD, cited by Beltramello 2012)

As expected in this context, some studies were elaborated “a posteriori […] to support the decision that was already taken” (Interview 7, line 88). Another interviewee agreed, stating

line 74-75). Furthermore, an interviewee reported that the decision was based not on the technological effect of the policy but rather on its political and social impact (Interview 9,

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line 84-86). In the Mobi-E case, the study of technical indicators was conducted after the decision was made (Interview 9, line 88-89).

The effort to elaborate studies to justify a posteriori the decision taken to promote electric cars was naturally hopeless, because governmental forecasts need to be inevitably too

1. of proportion. In fact, according to the forecast of the Government’s coordinator of

there would be 600 000 electric vehicles in 2020 only in a “very” optimistic scenario (Santos 2009). Furthermore, the governmental forecast was very optimistic because electric cars represented 80% of the sales,3 according to Gomes (2010). The author forecast an optimistic scenario with a penetration rate of 50% that predicted only 322 027 electric vehicles in 2020 (Gomes 2010). In addition, an interviewee revealed that

information, according to which the penetration forecast for electric vehicles was very slow (Interview 7, line 211-214). Moreover, the European Commission (2010) forecast an optimistic technology scenario where battery electric vehicles/fuel-cells vehicles would have only 5% market penetration in Europe in 2020.

2. Second, independent forecasts further helped to understand the misjudgement of governmental authorities. For example, an expert from the Portuguese Automotive Business Association (ACAP) reportedly stated that in a very optimistic scenario, 300 000 vehicles of all types of engines were expected to be sold in the year 2020 (Santos 2009). This forecast implied an optimistic increase both supported in the ratio population/sales of cars existent in countries like Belgium and the Netherlands, as well as in the assumption that in 2020 Portugal would reach these countries’ economic and social development (Santos 2009).

3. fact, the pessimistic Gomes scenario forecast 394 electric vehicles in Portugal in 2011 (Gomes 2010). However, there were only 193 electric vehicles in Portugal in 2011

vehicles in 2012, but there were only around 300 vehicles on the road (Mobi.europe 2012).

4. Fourth, the present most realistic scenario for 2020 is the non-acceptance of the technology. The most pessimistic scenario of the two pessimistic ones considered in Santos’ study predicted a meagre presence of electric vehicles in 2020 with only 80 000 units. Interestingly, the author described this scenario as “catastrophic”, given the

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supported this view, stating that hybrids – not electric vehicles – will be penetrating the markets for at least the next ten years.

Social Impact

Although information regarding pre-existing communities oriented at electric mobility is

4 This association had been receiving state funding for dissemination activities since 1999, and was also behind the public debate on this issue. However, according to interviews and information collected during the development of this work (Boavida 2011), it appears that this group remained on the fringes of the policy-decision centres existent for the Mobi-E programme.

At least in terms of public discourse, the Mobi-E programme did not initially rely on a planned, sustainable transport strategy. In fact, Mobi-E disregarded not only the existing strategies of city councils but also other alternative urban possibilities, such as public

often arises in public debates from simple persuasive messages, and the simplicity of the central idea of the urban e-car is a good example (Schwedes et al. 2012). To Schwedes et al, the complexity of the transport reality is an unappealing fact in the competitive construction of a hegemonic public discourse. Furthermore, the authors argued that it was still far from clear whether e-cars could be a part of a sustainable transport strategy. In the German case, for example, the problem started when the e-mobility discourse was pushed away from the discussion on a sustainable transport policy by powerful actors with particular interests, such as the government-protected automotive and energy industries. The authors argued that from a policy perspective, the e-car is only a small part of the technological innovation and should include a strategy to change people’s transport behaviour.

There are some indications to conclude that users perceptions were disregarded in Mobi-E

signs of inquiry about users perceptions before March 2010. By then, a small quantitative

2010), and it was about individuals’ acquisition intentions and the localization of charging points in Portugal.

Knowledge Creation

an international comparison calculated by Beltramello (2012).

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Nevertheless, it can be stated that despite the controversial decisions process, the Mobi-E programme produced a small impact on knowledge creation in Portugal. First, the project was referred directly5 in only 12 Master’s theses and indirectly6 in 27 Master’s theses.

7 Furthermore, only a few industrial-property procedures were disclosed (Gouveia 2010), including two patents

Engineering Faculty of the University of Porto. The patent uses techniques of control by

incorporates a method of energy optimization. The other patent was published in April 2009 and granted to the Engineering Faculty of the Technical University of Lisbon, consisting of a system for charging batteries of electric vehicles.

Second, there were not many Portuguese companies and inventors working previously in the Mobi-E programme with electric vehicles, according to Nuno Gouveia (2010). The author maintains that these actors were working in areas such as cars, vans, electric buses or moulds for plastic injection and electronics, but made no attempt to connect it to the Mobi-E case.

Third, there was only scarce information on research projects concerning electric vehicles

Science Foundation.8 For example, according to Gouveia (2010), the research team of one project worked together with companies in areas such as electric engines, suspension parts and steering wheels and brakes in a single system called “Motor in Wheel”. This research was included in the Mobi-E programme and was led by the CEIIA car technology centre and by a similar structure in Galicia named CTAG.9 The work was subdivided in several components, namely modelling the power-control system, laboratory implementation of this system, implementation in a prototype, “hybridization” of the electric vehicle, motor-in-

sustainability analysis. According to the author, the work also involved the building of three

mentioned Motor-in-Wheel. But most importantly, information is scarce on outcomes of the research project although, according to the author, several products and materials were expected, as well as impact studies on the electrical network, problems and technology solutions and a study on sustainability based on the electric car that would test different loads and usage scenarios. Furthermore, companies such as Efacec, Simoldes, MCG and TMG were involved in every part of the research project, according to Gouveia (2010). In

mobility in Portugal. At the time of the research project, there was also a promise from Renault-Nissan to build a factory for producing batteries for electric vehicles in Portugal. This factory is now producing batteries in the United States (Smyrna, TN).

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Conclusions

To conclude, the Mobi-E programme fell short of expectations. The Mobi-E policy-makers’ discourse inspired a sense of innovation, sublimity and the hope that technology would help with the solving of problems associated with transport economy and pollution. Behind the rhetoric, however, the Mobi-E programme left behind an integration of the e-car in an overarching concept of sustainable mobility, the need to change human behaviour, the

coincided with the lack of consumer mobilization around the Mobi-E programme. Among

to involve key communities in electric mobility. In this context, further research seems necessary to assess the way policy design was conducted and the existing development strategy.

References

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sustainable consumption. London.

Footnotes:

is a theoretical framework designed to offer assistance when taking sustainable decisions The model shows the connections between approaches which cause changes in values, prin-ciples and context and those which are aimed at altering behaviour (cf. Reid et. al., 2010, 721).

pii/S0013468612005671 [Accessed November 19, 2013].

November 19, 2013].Acknowledgements:

v7y2011i7p33-55.html.

Freeman, C., 1994. The economics of technical change. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 18(5), pp.463–514.

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Mobi.europe, 2012. mobi.europe Newsletter. , (1), pp.1–8.Santos, P.M.C., 2009. O Automóvel Híbrido como Elemento Fornecedor / Consumidor de Electricidade. Universidade Técnica de Lisboa.

Footnotes:1) Centro de Excelência e Inovação para a Indústria Automóvel2) The mass commercialization of pure electric cars only began at the end of 2010.3) Considering a sales growth rate of 1%

Fev/2013.

at 11/Jan/2013.

de Portugal, at 11/Jan/2013.8) Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia9) Centro Tecnológico de Automación de Galicia

Sustainability and Discontinuities in High-Speed Train Futures. A Multilevel-Framework

by the European Rail Industry Association (UNIFE).

and directions of technological change, Research Policy, 11 (3), 147-162.

Encouraging Modal Shift and decongestion of transport corridors”, “WP03 Ensuring sustainable urban transport”, “WP04 Improving safety and security”, “WP05 Strengthening Competition”. Published by ERRAC Roadmaps, The

Technology Assessment

and Policy Areas

of Great Transitions

Proceedings from the PACITA 2013 Conference in Prague

TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT AND POLICY AREAS OF GREAT TRANSITIONS

PROCEEDINGS FROM THE PACITA 2013 CONFERENCE IN PRAGUE

Technology Assessment andPolicy Areas of Great Transitions

Edited byTomáš Michalek, Lenka Hebáková,Leonhard Hennen, Constanze Scherz, Linda Nierling and Julia Hahn

Printed byInformatorium

Prague 2014

This publication was made in the framework of the EU-funded project Parliaments and Civil Society in Technology Assessment (PACITA).www.pacitaproject.eu

V

11 Foreword LARS KLÜVER

15 Introduction TOMÁŠ MICHALEK, LENKA HEBÁKOVÁ, LEONHARD HENNEN, CONSTANZE SCHERZ, LINDA NIERLING

AND JULIA HAHN

21 PART I - CHALLENGES FOR TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

23 Technology Assessment: The State of Play WIEBE BIJKER

STEFAN BÖSCHEN

49 Smart Infrastructure as a Prerequisite for Competitiveness RUT BÍZKOVÁ

57 PART II - INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

MARIANNE BARLAND AND WALTER PEISSL

LEONHARD HENNEN AND LINDA NIERLING

75 Institutional Interpretation of Participatory TA RASMUS ØJVIND NIELSEN

JON FIXDAL

87 From Shared Knowledge to Collective Action GÜNTER CLAR AND BJÖRN SAUTTEZ

TATSUHIRO KAMISATO AND MITSUAKI HOSONO

VI

125 PART III - PARTICIPATION IN TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

MICHAEL REHBERG, KORA KIMPEL, MARTIN KIM LUGE AND MARTINA SCHRAUDNER

SIMON PFERSDORF, MARTINE REVEL, BERND STAHL AND KUTOMA WAKUNUMA

STEFAN BÖSCHEN

GEORG AICHHOLZER

ALEXANDER BOGNER

JULIA HAHN, STEFANIE B. SEITZ AND NORA WEINBERGER

MARJOLIJN HEERINGS, STANS VAN EGMOND, ANNEKE SOOLS, LISA VAN DUIJVENBOODEN AND STANS DROSSAERT

MAHSHID SOTOUDEH, WALTER PEISSL, NIKLAS GUDOWSKY AND ANDERS JACOBI

185 The World Wide Views Citizen Consultations BJØRN BEDSTED

193 PART IV - QUESTIONS OF SUSTAINABILITY

FIELDS OF TRANSITION

ELISABETH BONGERT AND STEPHAN ALBRECHT

JUSTINE LACEY, KIEREN MOFFAT AND PETA ASHWORTH

JANELLE ALLISON, DAYNA BROUN, JUSTINE LACEY AND SARAH JONES

ENERGY TRANSITION

PIOTR STANKIEWICZ

PATRICK SUMPF, CHRISTIAN BÜSCHER AND CARSTEN ORWAT

KERSTIN SCHILCHER AND JOHANNES SCHMIDL

VII

MARTIN KNAPP, KIRA SCHUMACHER AND NORA WEINBERGER

MICHAEL ORNETZEDER, PETRA WÄCHTER AND HARALD ROHRACHER

FRIEDER RUBIK AND MICHAEL KRESS

SUSTAINABLE MOBILITY

RAINER ZAH AND PETER DE HAAN

NUNO BOAVIDA, ANTÓNIO BRANDÃO MONIZ AND MANUEL LARANJA

SUSANA MORETTO AND ANTÓNIO BRANDÃO MONIZ

279 PART V - FACING NEW AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES

HEALTHCARE INNOVATIONS

281 Healthcare Innovations in an Ageing Society ELLEN H.M. MOORS AND DIRK R.M. LUKKIEN

MANDY SCHEERMESSER, HEIDRUN BECKER, MICHAEL FRÜH, YVONNE TREUSCH, HOLGER AUERBACH, RICHARD HÜPPI, AND FLURINA MEIER

MIRJAM SCHUIJFF AND IRA VAN KEULEN

MARIA JOÃO MAIA AND ANTÓNIO BRANDÃO MONIZ

EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND ETHICS

HARALD KÖNIG, DANIEL FRANK AND REINHARD HEIL

MICHAEL STEINFELDT

OLE DÖRING

MARIE-DES-NEIGES RUFFO

VIII

OLIVER BENDEL WITH CONTRIBUTIONS BY GWENDOLIN WILKE

PRIVACY ASPECTS

LORENZ M. HILTY, BRITTA OERTEL, MICHAELA EVERS-WÖLK AND KURT PÄRLI

STEFAN STRAUß AND MICHAEL NENTWICH

SEBASTIAN SEVIGNANI

PHILIP SCHÜTZ AND MICHAEL FRIEDEWALD

373 Afterword DAVID COPE

383 References

432 Figures

434 Index