Net Digests Specpro.

8/13/2019 Net Digests Specpro.

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3A Digestgroup*SpecPro* 2008-2009

RULE 72

Hagans v. Wislizenus1Spec Pro Rule 72 Distinction between Civil Action and Special Proceedings

Facts: Wislizenus is a judge in the CFI of Cebu. In a certain proceeding, he

appointed assessors for the purpose of fixing the amount due to an

administrator for his services and the expenses for the care,management and settlement of the estate of the deceased person.

Hagans (doesnt say who he is but we can infer that he was a party tothe case where the judge appointed the assessors) questioned theauthority of Wislizenus to appoint such assessors.

Wislizenus filed a demurrer to the petition of Hagans. He claims thatprovisions of Act 1902 permit him to appoint assessors in specialproceedings Hence, this case for certiorari with the SC

Issue/Held:w/n a judge of the CFI, in special proceedings, is authorized under the lawto appoint assessors for the purpose of fixing the amount due to an

administrator or executor for his services and expenses in the care,management and settlement of the estate of a deceased person NO

Ratio:The only provisions of law which could permit the appointment of

assessors in special proceedings are sections 53-6 of Act no. 90. Sec 54thereof states that either party to an actionmay apply in writing to the judgefor assessors to sit in the trial. Upon the filing of such application, the judgeshall direct the assessors to be provided. The interpretation of the wordACTION given by the SC in this provision is not one that includes aspecial proceeding. The court distinguished the two terms as such:

Action Special Proceeding

Formal demand of ones legal right in

a court of justice in the mannerprescribed by the court or by law;

An application or proceeding to

establish the status or right of a partyor a particular fact

it is a method of applying legalremedies according to definiteestablished rules

Usually in special proceedings, noformal pleadings are required unlessthe statute expressly provides; theremedy in special proceedings isgenerally granted upon application ormotion.

1This case is barely 2 pages, so really, theres not much facts2The case doesnt say what this act is, it just states the act no.

In proceedings such as the one above, judges of Courts of First Instance arewithout authority to appoint assessors. The order of Judge Wislizenus inappointing assessors is annulled and set aside.

Hernaez v. IAC

Facts

Petitioner Teodoro Hernaez Jr. (Jr.), represented by his mother andnatural guardian, Evelyn Palmes, filed a complaint with the thenJuvenile and Domestic Court (now Regional Trial Court) againstTeodoro Hernaez Sr. (Sr.), private respondent, for acknowledgmentand support with supportpendente lite

The court found for Jr. and declared him the recognized natural childof Sr. Sr. was ordered to give his son a monthly support of P400.00(Decision A).

Sr. appealed. Jr. moved to dismiss the appeal as it was filed beyondthe reglementary period.

Thus, Sr. filed a Motion to Give Due Course to Appeal or Petition forRelief. This was denied on the ground that the motion was filed out oftime and the petition did not comply with Section 3 of Rule 38 of theRevised Rules of Court.

Later, Sr., thru his new counsel, filed another Petition for Relief fromJudgment alleging that he was not aware of the decision of the lowercourt.

On the same date, Estrella Hernaez, Sr.s wife, together with their sixchildren likewise filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment with Motionto Intervene because they were not included as parties in the instantcase. These were denied for lack of merit and on the ground that thedecision had already become final and executory.

After, Jr. filed a motion to require Sr. to deposit support in arrears orto be cited for contempt pursuant to Decision A.

During the hearing of the motion for contempt, Sr.s counselrequested for 10 days within which to comply with Decision A.

However, Sr., instead of complying with said decision, filed a petitionfor certiorari, prohibition or mandamus or alternatively, an action forthe annulment of judgment with preliminary injunction with theIntermediate Appellate Court,which declared Decision A null and voidfor lack of summons by publication being an action in rem.

Thus, Jr. instituted the instant Petition for Review.


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Issue/Held

Does an action for compulsory acknowledgement and support of anillegitimate child fall under rule 72? NO.

Jrs contention: Jr. Says that such an action is not one of the instancesenumerated in Section 1 of Rule 72 of the Revised Rules of Court requiring

publication of the petition before jurisdiction can be acquired by the Court.Under the "expressio unius est exclussio alterius" principle on statutoryconstruction, this action should be considered a proceeding in personam.

Ratio

An action for compulsory recognition of minor natural children is notamong cases of special proceedings mentioned in Section 1, Rule 72of the Rules of Court. Consequently, such an action should begoverned by the rules on ordinary civil actions.

The case at bar does not fall under Rule 105 of the Rules of Courtsince the same applies only to cases falling under Article 281 of the

Civil Code where there has been a voluntary recognition of the minornatural child, i.e., prior recognition of the minor natural child in adocument other than a record of birth or a will, which is absent in theinstant case.

Sr.s claim that notice of an action for compulsory recognition shouldalso be given to the wife and legitimate children of the putativeparent, Teodoro Hernaez, Sr., is unmeritorious.

o First of all, in a case for compulsory recognition, the party inthe best position to oppose the same is the putative parenthimself.

o Secondly, implicit in Articles 283 and 285 of the Civil Code isthat an action for compulsory recognition should be brought

against the putative father.

The exceptions to this rule are:

1. when either the putative parent died during theminority of the child, or

2. when after the death of the parent a documentshould appear of which nothing had been heard andin which either or both of the parents recognize thechild, in which cases the action is brought againstthe putative parent's heirs.

An action for compulsory recognition is an ordinary civil action. Thus,service of summons on the putative parent shall be as provided forunder Rule 14. Said action shall be brought against the putativeparent only; his heirs may be made party defendants only under thecircumstances mentioned in Article 285.

NATCHER V. COURT OF APPEALS & THE HEIRS OF GRACIANO DELROSARIO

(G.R. No. 133000. October 2, 2001)

FACTS:

Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were the registeredowners of a 9,322 sqm parcel of land located in Manila. Upon the death ofGraciana, Graciano and his 6 children entered into an extrajudicialsettlement of Gracianas estate adjudicating and dividing amongthemselves the Manila property. Graciano received 8/14 share while eachchild received 1/14 share. Accordingly, the old TCT was cancelled, and anew TCT issued in the name of Graciano and the 6 children.

Then, the heirs executed and forged an Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights where they subdividedamong themselves the parcel of land covered by the new TCT. Gracianodonated to his children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest inthe land amounting to 4,849.38 sqm leaving only 447.60 sqm under hisname. Subsequently, Gracianos portion was further subdivided into 2separate lots (first lot and second lot). Eventually, Graciano sold the firstlot to a third person but retained ownership over the second lot.

26 years later, Graciano married Patricia Natcher. During their marriage,Graciano sold the second lot to Patricia and a TCT was issued in her name.5 years later, Graciano died leaving Patricia and his 6 children by his firstmarriage, as heirs.

In an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages filed before the RTC of Manila, the heirs of Graciano alleged that uponGracianos death, Natcher, through fraud, misrepresentation and forgery,acquired the TCT for the second lot, by making it appear that their faitherexecuted a Deed of Sale in her favor. As a consequence of such fraudulentsale, their legitimes have been impaired.

In her answer, Natcher contended that she was legally married toGraciano and thus, she was likewise his compulsory heir. During hislifetime, Graciano already distributed in advance properties to his children,hence, they may no longer claim against his estate or against Natchersproperty.

RTC Ruling: The sale between Graciano Del Rosario and Patricia Natcher isprohibited by law. The sale cannot also be considered as a valid donation.


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But, it may be considered as an extension of advance inheritance ofNatcher being a compulsory heir.

CA Ruling: Reversed the RTC. The RTC should have merely ruled on thevalidity of the sale and left the issue on advancement to be resolved in aseparate proceeding instituted for that purpose since it is the probatecourt that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distributionof the estate. The RTC trying an ordinary action for

reconveyance/annulment of title went beyond its jurisdiction when itperformed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for the settlementof estate of a deceased person.

ISSUE/ HELD: May the RTC, acting as a court of general jurisdiction,adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of adeceased person particularly in questions as to advancement ofproperty made by the decedent to any of the heirs? NO.

RATIO:

A civil actionis one by which a party sues another for the enforcementor protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. An actionis a formal demand of ones right in a court of justice in the mannerprescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legalremedies according to definite established rules.

A special proceedingis a remedy by which a party seeks to establish astatus, a right or a particular fact. A special proceeding may be defined asan application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, ora particular fact. Usuall, no formal pleadings are required unless thestatute expressly so provides. And, the remedy is granted generally uponan application or motion.

An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civilaction, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of adeceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent,partake of the nature of a special proceeding.

Matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of thedecedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the

exercise of its limited jurisdiction. Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of theRules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to havebeen made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined bythe court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings - meaning aprobate court. The RTC in this case, acting in its general jurisdiction, hasno authority to resolve the issue of advancement of the real property infavor of Natcher.

Whether a particular matter should be resolved by the RTC in the exerciseof its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction is not ajurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. Thus, it is aprocedural question involving a mode of practice which may be waived.But in this case, no waiver was made.

OTHER POINTS

Generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership.However, (1) if the interested parties are all heirs, or (2) the question isone of collation or advancement, or (3) the parties consent to theassumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of thirdparties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decidethe question of ownership.

No settlement of estate is involved when there is merely an allegationseeking appointment as estate administratrix.

To arrive at the legal share due to a compulsory heir, first ascertain thenet estate of the decedent. Deducting all payable obligations and chargesfrom the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of hisdeath. Then, all donations subject to collation should be added to it. Withthe partible estate thus determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir/scan be established; and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether ornot a donation had prejudiced the legitimes.

PACIFIC BANKING CORP. vs. COURT OF APPEALS (1995)Difference between Civil Action and Special Proceedings

FACTS

These are two consolidated cases involving the question of whether apetition for liquidation is a special proceeding or an ordinary civil action.

CASE 1. The Pacific Banking Corporation (PaBC) was placed underreceivership by the Central Bank, and subsequently placed under liquidation.

The Pacific Banking Corporation Employees Organization (Union) filed aComplaint-in-intervention seeking payment of benefits due its members asemployees of PaBC. The Trial Court ordered payment of the principal claimsof the Union.

The Liquidator filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but which wassubsequently denied. The Liquidator then filed a notice of Appeal and aMotion for Addiditional Time to Submit Record on Appeal. The Trial Courtdisallowed the Notice of Appeal on the ground that it was filed more than 15days after receipt of the decision.

CASE 2. Ang Keong Lan and EJ Ang Intl filed claims for the payment ofinvestment in the PaBC allegedly in the form of shares of stocks amountingto US$2,531,632.18. The Trial Court directed the Liquidator to pay privaterespondents the total amount of their claim as preferred creditors. After hisMotion for Reconsideration was denied, the Liquidator filed a notice ofAppeal. The Trial Court ordered the Notice of Appeal stricken off the recordon the ground that it had been filed beyond the 15 day period from receiptof the decision.

ISSUES/HELD


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W/N a petition for liquidation is a special proceeding or an ordinary civil action. Apetition for liquidation is a special proceeding

W/N the appeals of the Liquidator should have been upheld.CASE 1 - YESCASE 2 - NO

RATIO

Rule 2 of the Rules of Court provide:1. Action defined - Action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by whichone party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or theprevention or redress of a wrong2. Special proceeding distinguished Every other remedy, including one toestablish the status or right of a party or a particular fact, shall be by specialproceeding.

Civil Action:1. The act by which one sues another in a court of justice for the

enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of

a wrong.2. A formal demand of a right by one against another3. Ex. Where a party litigant seeks to recover property from another

Special Proceeding:1. The act by which one seeks to establish the status or right of a

party, or a particular fact2. A petition for a declaration of a status, right or fact.3. Ex. Where a party litigant seeks the appointment of a guardian for

an insane, the remedy is a special proceeding to establish the factor status of insanity calling for an appointment of guardianship.

A petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation should be classified as aspecial proceeding and not an ordinary action. Such a petition does not seek theenforcement or protection of a right nor the prevention or redress of a wrongagainst a party.

A petition for liquidation merely seeks a declaration of the corporations state ofinsolvency and the concomitant right of creditors and the order of payment oftheir claims in the disposition of the corporations assets.

In a petition for liquidation, the period of appeal is 30 days (Not 15) and theparty appealing must, in addition to a notice of appeal, file with the trial court arecord on appeal.

In Case 1, the Liquidator filed a notice of appeal and a motion for extension tofile a record of appeal on within 30 days from receipt of the order granting theUnions claim, and filed a record on appeal within the extension sought.

In Case 2, the Liquidators notice of appeal was filed on time, having been filedon the 23rdday of receipt of the order granting the claim of the Stockholders.However, the Liquidator did not file a record on appeal, with the result that hefailed to perfect his appeal.

REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS (2005)

Rule 72: Subject Matter of Special Proceedings

FACTS Apolinaria Jomoc filed a petition for the declaration of the presumptive death

of her absentee husband Clemente Jomocbefore the RTC of Ormoc City. The RTC granted the petition and declared Clemente, who had left Apolinaria 9

years earlier, presumptively dead. The Republic appealed by filing a Notice of Appeal. The RTC noted that no Record on Appeal was filed and served by the

Republic as required by Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure since this casewas a special proceeding. Hence, the RTC disapproved the Notice of Appeal.3

So the Republic filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA contending that thedeclaration of presumptive death under Art 41 of the Family Code is not aspecial proceeding or a case of multiple or separate appeals requiring a recordon appeal.

CA denied the petition of the Republic on the ff grounds:1.Republic failed to file a record on appeal, in addition to its notice ofappeal. A record on appeal is required since the present petition is a

special proceeding- The CA enumerated the difference:

ORDINARY ACTION SPECIAL PROCEEDING

A party sues another for theenforcement or protection of a right, orprevention or redress of a wrong

A remedy by which a party seeks toestablish a status, right, or particularfact

Period to appeal is 15 days from noticeor decision or final order appealed from

Period to appeal is 30 days

Appeal perfected by filing a notice ofappeal

Party appealing must, in addition toa notice of appeal, file with the trialcourt a record on appeal to perfect

its appeal- Following the above distinction, the present petition for the declaration ofpresumptive death of an absentee spouse is a special proceeding since it doesnot seek to enforce or protect a right or prevent or redress a wrong2.Republic did not attach a certified copy of the assailed order of the RTC

(declaring Clemente presumptively dead) to its Petition for Certiorari.

3 Rule 41, sec 2a): Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by theRegional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdictionshall be taken by filing a notice ofappeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copythereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in specialproceedingsand other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules sorequire. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.


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ISSUE / HELD: W/N the declaration of presumptive death under Art 41of the Family Code is a special proceeding, thus requiring a record onappeal, in addition to a notice of appeal NO, not a special proceedingbut a summary proceeding pursuant to the Family Code

Rule 72, section 1(m) of the Revised Rules of Court provides that the rules ofspecial proceedings are provided for in the declaration of absence anddeath

But Civil Code & Family Code provisions on the matter must be considered:1. Art 390 CC: After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether ornot the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for allpurposes,except for those of succession.

2. Art 41 FC: A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of aprevious marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of thesubsequent marriage, the prior spouses had been absent for four consecutiveyears and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absentspouses was already dead

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under thepreceding paragraph, the spouses present must institute a summaryproceeding as provided in this Codefor the declaration of presumptivedeath of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of a reappearance of

the absent spouse.3. Art 238 FC: Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rulesin this Title4 shall apply in all cases provided for in this Codesrequiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided inan expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.

In declaring Clemente presumptively dead, the RTC cited Art 41 of the FamilyCode. From this fact, it can be inferred that the petition of Apolinaria tohave her absent spouse declared presumptively dead was due to herdesire to contract a valid subsequent marriage.

Therefore, the petition Apolinaria filed for that purpose is a summaryproceeding, following above-quoted Art. 41, par 2 of the Family Code.

The petition of Apolinaria required, and is, therefore, a summaryproceeding under the Family Code. It is NOTa special proceeding under

the Revised Rules of Court.

It is a summary ordinary proceeding, and therefore, the filing of a Notice ofAppeal from the trial courts order sufficed. There is no need for a recordon appeal to be filed by the Republic.

Also, Art 254 of the Family Code provides that laws, decrees, executive orders,and rules and regulations inconsistent with the Family Code are repealed. Thisfurther strengthens the case of the Republic.

Minor ISSUE / HELD: W/N failure of the Republic to attach to its petitiona copy of the assailed order of the RTC is fatal NOT necessarily

4Title XI: Summary Judicial Proceeding in the Family Law

Such failure is not fatal since rules of procedure are not to be applied in atechnical sense.

The CA, instead of dismissing the petition of the Republic upon this ground,should have directed the Republic to comply with the rule

* So CAs decision is reversed, case to be remanded.

PORTUGAL vs. PORTUGAL-BELTRAN (2005)

Jose Portugal married Paz Lazo, who gave birth to Aleli Portugal-Beltran(ALELI). Later, Jose Portugal married Isabel de la Puerto who gave birth toJose Portugal, Jr. (PORTUGAL).

Jose Portugal inherited from his father the disputed land located inCaloocan City (CALOOCAN LAND). Under the TCT of said property, Paz wasindicated as the wife (she died later). Jose Portugal died intestate leaving theCALOOCAN land as his only property. ALELI executed an Affidavit ofAdjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person adjudicating to herselfthe Caloocan land.

PORTUGAL later learned of the transfer of the subject property to ALELI.

He filed a COMPLAINT FOR ANNULMENT OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF ADJUDICATIONand the TCT, alleging that ALELI was not really related to Jose Portugal. Afterthe Answer, the PRE-TRIAL ORDER indicated the following issues to beresolved:

1.Which marriage (to PAZ or ISABELA) is the valid marriage?2.Who (between ALELI and PORTUGAL) is the Jose Portugals legal heir?

After trial and WITHOUT RESOLVING THE ISSUES indicated in the PRE-TRIAL ORDER, the RTC dismissed the complaint for:

1.lack of cause of actionbecause PORTUGAL has not established that he isan heir in a probate proceeding; and

2.lack of jurisdictionover the case citing Guido vs. Del RosarioSimply, PORTUGAL must institute a special proceeding to determine his

status as an heir before pursuing the complaint for annulment.

ISSUE

Whether PORTUGAL needs to institute the special proceedings beforefiling the complaint for annulment? GENERALLY, YES. BUT IN THISCASE, NO.

SUBJECT OF A SPECIAL PROCEEDING

The establishment of a status, a right, or a particular fact is remediedthrough a special proceeding (Sec. 3(c), Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Court), notan ordinary civil action whereby a party sues another for the enforcement or


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protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong. The operativeterm in the former is to establish, while in the latter, it is to enforce, aright.( Guido vs. Del Rosario)

GENERALLY, the establishment of an heir (a right) should be made in a specialproceeding NOT in a civil action. HOWEVER, the circumstances of this casewarrant that the same be decided in the ordinary civil action.

UNDER CURRENT JURISPRUDENCE, where the adverse parties areputative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedingsfor its settlementis that if the special proceedings are pending, OR if thereare no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstancesof the case, a need to file one , then the determination of heirship should beraised and settled in said SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS.

Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been finallyterminated OR if a putative heir has lost the right to have himselfdeclared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longerask for its re-opening, then an ORDINARY CIVIL ACTIONcan be filed forhis declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition ordistribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estateof the deceased.

NOTE that in this case, PORTUGAL lost the right to have himself declaredan heir in a special proceeding as there was no judicial/probate proceeding tospeak of since ALELI only made an AFFIDAVIT. ALSO, the case involves justONE PROPERTY.

THUS, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE, to require a specialproceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish thestatus of the heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate withthe costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluousin light of the fact that the parties to the civil case subject of the presentcase, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial courtwhich assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

*The RTC in the ORDINARY ACTION is hereby directed to determine theissues in indicated in the PRETRIAL ORDER.

Vda. De Manalo v. CADistinction between ordinary and special civil actions

FACTS:

Troadio Manalo died intestate leaving his spouse Pilar and 11 children. He hadreal properties in Manila and Tarlac and a Machine Shop Business.

8 of the children filed a petition with the RTC of Manila for judicial settlement ofthe estate of Troadio and for the appointment of Romeo Manalo, a son of thedecedent, as administrator thereof.

It was set for hearing and the trial court issued an order after proper publicationthat declared the whole world in default, except the govt. This Order was setaside upon motion of the oppositors, the wife and the 3 other children.

In their opposition, among other claims, they sought to schedule a preliminaryhearing on their affirmative defenses as grounds for dismissalof the case.This was denied, thus, this petition for certiorari.

For the dismissal of the case, the oppositors aver that (1) there was absence ofearnest efforts toward compromise among members of the same family asrequired by Article 222 of the Civil Code, and (2) no certification of non-forumshopping was attached to the petition.

Oppositors claim that the proceeding is actually an ordinary civil actioninvolving members of the same family. Certain averments of the petitionersin the judicial settlement case bolster this claim.

In sum, these averments state that Antonio (one of the oppositors), without

settlement of the properties managed and controlled the properties of thedeceased, without proper accounting, to his own benefit and advantage and thatthis is to the damage and prejudice of the oppositors who are co-heirs.

Oppositors claim that the case be dismissed under Rule 16(j) of the Rules ofCourt which states that a complaint may be dismissed on the ground that acondition precedentfor filing the claim has not been complied with. Relate thisto Art. 222 stated above.

ISSUES / HELD

Whether or not the action is an ordinary civil action and must then bedismissed for not complying with a condition precedent. No, it is a specialcivil action. Articile 222 applies to adversarial proceedings.

RATIO

It is a fundamental rule that the averments and the character of the reliefssought in the complaint or petition is controlling in the determination of thenature of an action or proceeding.A perusal of the petition for judicial settlement shows that the action is a specialcivil action.

The petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for thesettlement of the estate of a deceased person such as: (1) the fact of death, (2)residence of the decedent. These are foundations upon which all the subsequentproceedings in the administration of the estate rest.


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Jaring does not cite any law providing that when there are two lessees orsublessees, the obligation to pay rent is solidary; nor that it is the nature oflease.

Solidary liability can only come about when lessees or sublessees refuse tovacate the leased property after the lease period but they become liable asjoint tortfeasors and not because of the contract.

Since the obligation of the Alipios and the Manuels is chargeable against their

respective conjugal partnership, the unpaid balance should be divided into two(P50,600/2=P25,300)

Petition granted. Complaint against Purita dismissed without prejudice to filingof claim by respondent in proceedings for settlement of estate pf Placido forcollection of share of the Alipios in the unpaid balance of the rent.

BERNARDO VS. CA (1963)

Dissolution of Marriage Rule 73

FACTS:

Eusebio Capiliand Hermogena Reyeswere husband and wife. Eusebiodied and a testate proceeding for the settlement of his estate was

instituted. His will was admitted to probate disposing of his properties infavor of Hermogena and his cousins. Deogracias Bernardo wasappointed as Eusebios executor. Hermogena died a year after.

Bernardo filed a project of partition in the testate proceeding inaccordance with the terms of Eusebios will, adjudicating the estate ofEusebio among the testamentary heirs with the exception of Hermogena,whose share was allotted to her collateral relatives.

Hermogenas relatives filed an opposition to Bernardos project of partitionand submitted a counter-project of partition of their own, claiming ofthe properties mentioned in Eusebios will on the theory that theybelonged not only to Eusebio but to the conjugal partnership of thespouses.

The heirs of Eusebio and executor Bernardo contend that the propertiesbelonged exclusively to Eusebio because Hermogena donated to him herhalf share of such partnership.

The heirs of Hermogena contend that the deed of donation itself wasdeterminative of the original conjugal character of the properties and thatsince the donation was null and void, Eusebio did not become the owner ofthe share of his wife and therefore could not validly dispose of it in hiswill.

The probate court issued an order declaring the donation void for tworeasons: First, the prohibition of donation between spouses duringmarriage and second, because the donation did not comply with theformalities of a will there being no attestation clause.

The probate court also disapproved both projects of partition and directedBernardo to file another, dividing the property between the heirs ofEusebio and the heirs of Hermogena upon the basis that the propertieswere conjugal properties of the deceased spouses.

The CA affirmed.

ISSUE AND HELD: W/N the probate court has the power to adjudicate titlehaving limited and special jurisdiction. Yes.

RATIO:

As a general rule, question as to title to property cannot be passedupon on testate or intestate proceedings except where one of theparties merely prays for the inclusion or exclusion from theinventory of the property. In which case, the probate court maypass provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its finaldetermination in a separate action.

However, when the parties interested are all heirs of thedeceased, it is optional to them to submit to the probate court a

question as to title to property and when so submitted, theprobate court may definitely pass judgment thereon.

And with the consent of the parties, matters affecting propertyunder judicial administration may be taken cognizance of providedinterests of third persons are not prejudiced.

The question of whether certain properties involved in a testateproceeding belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husbandexclusively properly is a matter within the jurisdiction of theprobate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugalpartnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent whichis to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to theproceedings. (This was the cited ratio in Herrera)

It is true that the heirs of Hermogena are not the heirs of Eusebio, butHermogena is an heir of Eusebio, in addition to her own right to theconjugal property. And it is this right that is being sought to be enforcedby her substitutes.

Therefore, the claim that is being asserted is one belonging to an heir tothe testator and complies with the requirement of the exception that theparties interested are all heirs claiming title under the testator and nothird persons are prejudiced.


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CALMA VS. TANEDO

FACTS:

Eulalio Calma & Fausta Macasaquit are spouses and are owners of theproperty (conjugal property) subject of the proceedings.

The spouses were also indebted to Esperanza Tanedo, chargeableagainst the conjugal property.

On October 10, 1933, Fausta Macasquit died leaving a will wherein sheappointed her daughter, Maria Calma, as administratrix of herproperties.

Maria Calma was indeed appointed as administratrix of Faustas estateduring the probate proceedings.

While the probate proceedings were pending, Esperanza Tanedo filed acomplaint for sum of money against Eulalio Calma. The RTC ruled infavor of Tanedo and ordered the payment of the sum. In the executionof the judgment, despite the 3 rdparty claim filed by the estate of FaustaMacasaquit, the sheriff still sold the property.

Maria Calma, as administratrix of Faustas estate, now brings this actionand asks that the sale made by the sheriff of the subject property benullified and that the estate of Fausta Macasaquit be declared the soleand absolute owner of it.

ISSUE/HELD: Was the sale made by the sheriff void? YES.

RATIO:

Act No. 3176 provides:

SEC. 685. When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife,the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated,and the debts thereof shall be paid, in the testamentary or intestateproceedings of the deceased spouse, in accordance with the provisions of thisCode relative to the administration and liquidation and partition proceeding,unless the parties, being all of age and legally capacitated, avail themselves ofthe right granted to them by this Code of proceeding to an extrajudicialpartition and liquidation of said property.In case it is necessary to sell any portion of said community property in orderto pay the outstanding debts and obligations of the same, such sale shall bemade in the manner and with the formalities established by this Code for thesale of the property of deceased persons. Any sale, transfer, alienation ordisposition of said property effected without said formalities shall be null andvoid, except as regards the portion that belonged to the vendor at the time theliquidation and partition was made.

Under this provision, the administrative power of the husband ceases upon thedeath of one of the spouses. Such power is then passed to the administrator ofthe estate property in the testate or intestate proceedings if there are anydebts to be paid.

It must then be held that when Esperanza Tanedo filed the action againstEulalio Calma, he already did not have power of administration over their

conjugal property. The administrative power has already been passed to MariaCalma, the administratrix of the property. Thus, the action to recover the debt,being chargeable against the conjugal property, should have been filed in thetestamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquits estate.

Having to be filed according to Act No. 3176 under the provisions of the Codeof Civil Procedure relative to the administration and liquidation of properties ofdeceased persons, it should be filed before the committee on claims in saidtestamentary proceedings and, at all events, thereafter, by appeal to thecorresponding Court of First Instance, in an ordinary action against the judicialadministratrix.

On the other hand, the property described in the complaint is included amongthe inventoried properties subject to the testamentary proceedings of FaustaMacasaquit because, belonging as it does to the conjugal property, it should,under Act No. 3176, be included among the properties of the testamentaryproceedings.

The judgment on the action wrongly filed against Eulalio Calma must then beconsidered to have no legal effect and the sale made by the sheriff beconsidered null and void. The subject property must be deemed subject to the

testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquits estate.

CAMAYA vs. PATULANDONG (2004)Rule 73 A: Limited jurisdiction of probate court

FACTS

On November 17, 1972, Rufina Reyes (testatrix) executed a notarized willwherein she devised, among others, Lot No. 288-A to her grandsonAnselmo Mangulabnan5. Rufinas son, Bernardo Patulandong wasappointed in the will as the executor. During her lifetime, Rufina filed apetition for probate of her will before the CFI (Sp. Pro. No. 128). CFI

admitted the will to probate and on June 27, 1973, the testatrix executeda codicil6modifying her will.

On May 14, 1988, Rufina died. Anselmo sought the delivery to him byexecutor Bernardo Patulandong of the title to Lot 288-A. Bernardo refused

5The pertinent portion of her will reads: IKALIMA. - Aking inihahayag at ginagawa na tagapagmana, sa aking kusang loob, ang pinalakikong APO na si ANSELMO P. MANGULABNANaking ipinagkakaloob at ipinamamana, sa akingpagkamatay, angLOT NO. 228-A6UNA. - Ang Lote No. 288-A na na aking ipinamana sa aking apong si ANSELMO P.

MANGULABNANbasically, here Anselmo gets 1/5 of the property,as the codicil states that he shareslot w/4 other co-heirs


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in view of the codicil. Mangulabnan then filed an "action for partition"against Patulandong w/ the RTC.

TC ordered the partitioning of the properties and the delivery to Anselmoof the copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-47089. But the TCalso stated that the partition is without prejudice to the probate of thecodicil. Bernardo filed a petition for probate of the codicil of Rufina. Theprobate court then issued an Order setting the petition for hearing and

ordering the publication of said order. By virtue of the decision in the partition case, Anselmo caused the

cancellation of the title of Rufina over Lot No. 288-A and TCT No. NT-2157507 was issued in his name. Anselmo later sold to petitionersCamayas Lot No. 288-A by a Deed of Sale, TCT issued to Camayas.

TC (in Sp. Proc. No. 218) admitted the codicil to probate and declared theTCT issued in the name of Anselmo and the Deed of Absolute Saleexecuted in favor of Camayas as null and void; Anselmo was given 1/5 ofthe property pursuant to the codicil. Camayas and Anselmo appealed toCA but it was denied; hence present petition.

ISSUES / HELD

1) W/n the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared null and voidand ordered the cancellation of the TCTs of petitioners and the deed of sale?YES; TCTs of Camayas not null and void

2) W/n the final judgment in Civil Case 552 bars the allowance of the codicil(minor issue) No

RATIO

As to the 1stissue, Petitioners contend that the probate court has NO authorityand jurisdiction to declare null and void the sale and titles of Petitioners; andthat the probate court can only resolve the ff issues:

(1) W/n the instrument offered for probate is the last will and testament ofthe decedent (question of identity)

(2) W/n the will has been executed in accordance w/ formalities prescribedby law (question of due execution)

(3) W/n the testator had testamentary capacity at the time of the executionof the will (question of capacity)

In Cuizon vs. Ramolete, Court stated, in relation to limited jurisdiction of aprobate court: a probate court cannot determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate and equally claimed to belong to outside parties...the courtonly determine w/n properties should be included in the inventory of propertiesto be administeredif there is dispute, the parties, the administrator andopposing parties have to resort to ordinary action for final determination ofconflicting claims of title b/c probate court cant do that.

In this case, the property in question was in the possession of third parties andmore important, covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in the name ofsuch third parties, the CA should have denied the motion of the administratorand excluded the property in question from the inventory of the property ofthe estate. It had no authority to deprive such third persons of theirpossession and ownership of the property.

Following Cuizon, the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it further

declared the deed of sale and the titles of petitioners null and void, it havinghad the effect of depriving them possession and ownership of the property.

Also, Section 48 of the Property Registry Decree provides that a certificate oftitle shall not be subject to collateral attack. Under probate proceedings,Petitioners titles cannot be declared null and void.

[minor issue] As to the 2ndissue, petitioners argue that by allowing the codicilto probate, it in effect amended the final judgment in the partition case w/c isnot allowed by law. The Court ruled that although the judgment in the partitioncase had become final, it specifically provided that the decision was withoutprejudice to the probate of the codicil, thus the rights of prevailing partieswere subject to the outcome of the probate of codicil.

COCA v. BORROMEOSETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONSRule 73 (Venue andProcess)Limited Jurisdiction of the Probate Court

FACTS:

Spouses Juan and Teresa Pangilinan died intestate in 1943 and 1948,respectively. They possessed two parcels of land located in MisamisOccidental: Lot No. 1927and Lot No. 1112.

According to Guadalupe Pizzaras (surviving spouse of Francisco, son ofJuan and Teresa) and her children, a third parcel of land, Lot No. 1920,with an area of eight hectares surveyed in the name of ConcepcionPangilinan (one of the daughters of the spouses Pangilinan) and adjoinsLots 1927 and 1112, also forms part of the estate of the deceasedspouses.

Special Proceeding No. 508 was instituted on 5 September 1963 for thesettlement of the estate of the deceased spouses Juan and Teresa.

On 25 September 1965, the administrator presented a project ofpartition wherein the combined areas of Lots 1927 and 1112, or 22.0082hectares, were partitioned as follows:

o Crispin Borromeo-three hectares, as payment of hisattorneys fees

o Francisco Pangilinan, represented by his widow GuadalupePizzaras-5.3361 hectares

o Prima Pangilina-6.3361 hectareso Concepcion Pangilinan, represented by her heirs-7.3360

hectares in addition to the debt of the estate to her in the


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amount of P5,088.50, to be borne by the 3 other heirsequally

Guadalupe Pizzaras opposed that project of partition. She contendedthat such project of partition contravened the lower courts order of 6December 1963, which recognized the right of the heirs of Francisco tothe 12-hectare portion of Lot No. 1112; that Prima sold her share toFrancisco and should thus be excluded from the project, among others.

The lower court, in its order of 2 October 1965 directed theadministrator to pay the debt of the estate to Concepcion. It deferredaction however on the project of partition until the ownership of the 12hectares claimed by Guadalupe and the 6 hectares being claimed byCrispin Borromeo is determined in an ordinary action.

On 31 August 1966, after noting that no separate action had been filedto determine the ownership of the 12 hectares, the lower court issuedan order approving the project of partition but excluding the 12hectares being claimed by Franciscos heirs.

This order is being appealed by Filomeno Coca as well as some of theheirs particularly because the same is incomplete. They contend thatthe lower court, as a probate court has no jurisdiction to decide theownership of the 12-hectare portion of the estate. Guadalupe iscontending that in excluding the 12-hectares from the project of

partition, the lower court did not decide on the ownership of the parcelof land.ISSUE:Whether or not the ownership of a parcel of land left behind by the deceasedmay be decided in the probate proceeding.

HELD:YES

RATIO: As a general rule, the question as to title to property may not be passed

upon in the testate or intestate proceeding. That question should beventilated in a separate action. This general rule however, admits ofexceptions justified by expediency and convenience. If the interestedparties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement,or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probatecourt and the rights of the parties are not impaired, then the probatecourt is competent to decide the question of ownership

The probate court may provisionally pass upon in a probate proceedingthe question the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to itsfinal determination in a separate action.

The instant case may be treated as an exception to the general rulebecause here the probate court has already received evidence on theownership of the 12 hectares and that the interested parties are only theheirs who have all appeared in the intestate proceeding.

Case REMANDED to the Lower Court for further proceedings in accordance withthe following guidelines:

That the heirs of Francisco file in the intestate proceedings, a motion inthe form of a complaint, wherein they must set forth their claim over the12 hectares.

Copies of that complaint-motion must be served upon the administrator,etc., who shall prepare their answer.

After the issues have been joined, and in case no amicable settlementhas been reached, the probate court must receive evidence, or a full-

dress hearing should be held. Crispin Borromeo may also set forth his claim.

CUENCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS (1973)

Rule 73 - Venue and Process (Proceedings)

FACTS

Senator Mariano Cuenco died at Manila and was survived by his widow,petitioner Rosa Cuenco, and 2 minor sons, all residing at QC, and by his childrenof the 1stmarriage, respondents Lourdes et.al. all residing in Cebu.

Respondent Lourdes filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the CFI

of Cebu alleging that decedent died intestatein Manila, that he was a residentof Cebu at the time of his death; and that he left properties in Cebu and QC.

The Cebu court issued an order setting the petition for hearing and orderingthe publication at a newspaper of gen. circulation in Cebu. It was modifiedstating that it will beprematureit to act, it not having yet regularly acquiredjurisdiction, the requisite publication of the notice of hearing not yet havingbeen complied with and copies of the petition have not been served on all ofthe heirs specified.

In the meantime, Rosa filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal (QC) for the probate of the last will and for the issuance of letters testamentary in herfavor. Having learned of the intestate proceeding in Cebu, Rosa filed an

Opposition and MTD as well as an Opposition to Petition for Appointment ofSpecial Administrator for which an order holding in abeyance its resolution onthe MTD until after the CFI of QC shall have acted on the petition for probate.No MR or appeal was filed.

Instead, respondents filed in the QC court an Opposition and MTD opposingprobateand assailing its jurisdiction to entertain petition for probate in view ofthe alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by her petition in the Cebu court.

The QC court denied the motion, giving as a principal reason the "precedenceof probate proceeding over an intestate proceeding." It further found that theresidenceof the senator at the time of his death was at QC. If a party has tworesidences, the one which he himself selects or considers to be his home or


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which appears to be the center of his affairs will be deemed his domicile. Thepetitioner, in filing in QC, follows the first choice of residence of the decedentand once the QC court acquires jurisdiction, it is to the exclusion of all others.Lourdes' two MRs were denied.

The hearing for probate of the will was called three times but none of theoppositors appeared and the court proceeded with the hearing in theirabsence. Instead of appealing from the QC court's order admitting the will toprobateand naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof, respondents filedan SCA of certiorari and prohibition with PI with the CA which rendered adecision against Rosa and held that Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venuefor the settlement of the estate of a deceased, covers both testate andintestate proceedings. Cebu case having been filed ahead, it is that courtwhose jurisdiction was first invoked and which first attached. MR was denied,thus, Rosa filed with the SC a petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE / HELD Whether the QC court acted without jurisdiction or with GAD intaking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probateproceedings filed with it? NO

RATIO

1. The Judiciary Act concededly confers original jurisdictionupon all CFI over"all matter of probate, both of testate and intestate estates." On the otherhand, Rule 73 lays down the rule of venue. The Rule specifies that "thecourt first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of adecedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all othercourts."

It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or thelocation of his estate is notan element of jurisdiction over the subjectmatter but merely of venue.

It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with

whom the estate or intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusivejurisdiction.

A fair reading of the Rule since it deals with venue and comity between courtsof equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction indicates that the court with whom thepetition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the settlement of theestate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all othercourts.

Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition forprobateof thedecedent's last will has been presented in another court where the decedentobviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow andtheir minor children, and that the allegation of the intestatepetition before it

stating that the decedent died intestatemay be actually false, may decline totake cognizanceof the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, andinstead defer to the second court which has before it the petition forprobateofthe decedent's alleged last will.

2. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner's filing with it amotion to dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order holding inabeyance its action on the dismissal motion and deferred to the QC court,awaiting its action on the petition forprobatebefore that court. Implicit inthe Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly admitted toprobate, by the QC court, then it would definitely decline to takecognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition which would thereby beshown to be false and improper, and leave the exerciseof jurisdictionto the QC court, to the exclusion of all other courts.

The Cebu court thus indicated that it would decline to take cognizance of theintestatepetition before it and instead defer to the Quezon City court, unlessthe latter would make a negative finding as to theprobatepetition and theresidence of the decedent within its territory and venue.

3. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without

jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizanceof the intestatepetition and deferring to the Quezon City court.

Necessarily, neither could the QC court be deemed to have acted withoutjurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting on the probate since under Rule73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take cognizanceover the estate andmust exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu courtdeclined to do. Furthermore, said rule only lays down a rule of venueand theQC court indisputably had at least equal and coordinate jurisdictionover theestate.

Since the QC court took cognizanceover theprobatepetition before itand assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and

deference of the Cebu court, the QC court should be left now, by thesame rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to theexclusion of all other courts.

4. Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption ofjurisdictionover the decedent's estate on the basis of the will duly presentedfor probate by petitioner-widow and finding that Quezon City was the firstchoiceof residenceof the decedent, who had his conjugal home and domiciletherein with the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu court could not becontested except by appeal from said court in the original case. The lastparagraph of said Rule expressly provides:


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... The jurisdiction assumedby a court, so far as it depends on theplace of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate,shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appealfrom that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdictionappears on the record.

The exception therein given could probably be properly invoked, had suchdeferencein comity of the Cebu court to the Quezon City court notappeared inthe record, or had the record otherwise shown that the Cebu court had takencognizance of the petition before it and assumed jurisdiction.

5. It would finally be unjust and inequitable that petitioner, who under all theapplicable rules of venue, and despite the fact that the Cebu court deferredtothe Quezon City court would be compelled under the appealed decision to haveto go all the way to Cebu and submit anew the decedent's will there forprobate either in a new proceeding or by asking that the intes tate proceedingsbe converted into a testate proceeding when under the Rules, the propervenue for the testateproceedings, as per the facts of record and as alreadyaffirmed by the Quezon City court is Quezon City, where the decedent andpetitioner-widow had their conjugal domicile.

6. The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court didnot act without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in declining totake cognizance of the intestatepetition and instead deferring to the testateproceedings filed just a week later by petitioner as surviving widow anddesignated executrix of the decedent's last will, since the record before itshowed the falsityof the allegation in the intestatepetition that the decedenthad died withouta will.

It is noteworthy that respondents never challenged by certiorarior prohibitionproceedings the Cebu court's order deferring to the probate proceedingsbefore the Quezon City court, thus leaving the latter free (pursuant to theCebu court's order of deference) to exercise jurisdiction and admit thedecedent's will to probate.

For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to haveacted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretionin admitting thedecedent's will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix in accordancewith its testamentary disposition, in the light of the settled doctrine that theprovisions of Rule 73, section 1 lay down only a rule of venue, not ofjurisdiction.

Dinglasan v. Ang ChiaSpecial ProceedingsRule 73 Venue and Process; B. Proceedings

FACTS:

Rafael Dinglasan filed a case in the CFI of Capiz against Ang Chia inher personal capacity to recover the ownership and possession of a parcel ofland. Dinglasan also filed a motion for the appointment of a receiver which wasobjected to by Ang Chia.

It was only at the hearing of said motion when Dinglasan discovered

that there was pending case in the same court concerning the intestate estateof Lee Liong, deceased husband of Ang Chia. Hence, the motion for theappointment of a receiver was withdrawn and Dinglasan filed an amendedcomplaint seeking the inclusion as party-defendant of the administratrix of theestate, who also was Ang Chia.

Dinglasan also filed in the intestate proceedings (1) a claim inintervention and (2) a motion praying the appointment of a co-administrator ofthe estate and (3) increase of the bond of the administratrix. Dinglasan prayedthat the intestate proceedings be not closed until said civil case shall havebeen terminated. Ang Chia objected to all of these. The court issued an orderdenying the petition for a co-administrator but increasing the bond to P5,000.

The administratrix did not appeal from said order nor file a new bond

and instead moved for the closing of the proceedings and her discharge asadministratrix on the ground that the heirs had already entered into anextrajudicial partition of the estate. Dinglasan objected to this motion. Thecourt then issued an order holding in abeyance the approval of the partitionand the closing of the proceedings until after the decision in said civil case hasbeen rendered. Ang Chia appealed this order.

ISSUES/HELD:

1) W/N the lower court erred when it required the administratrix to file a newbond of P5,000, contending that by taking such action the court assumedjurisdiction over the case which it cannot do because its jurisdiction as probatecourt is limited and special.

NO.

The order increasing the bond of the administratrix to P5,000 was notappealed by the appellants and hence has become final. The present appeal isonly from the order of the lower court which denied the motion of theappellees to terminate the intestate proceedings on the ground that they havealready agreed on the extrajudicial settlement of the estate and to relieve theadministratrix of the obligation of filing an increased bond. The lower court inits later order (2ndOrder), reiterated its order to the administratrix to file anew bond in the amount of P5,000 within 30 days after receipt thereof, butthis cannot have the effect of receiving the former order (increasing the bond;1storder), nor does it give the appellants the right to question in this instancethe validity of said order, which has long become final.


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2) W/N the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of theintestate proceedings pending the termination of the separate civil action filedby the Dinglasan.

NO.

The act of the lower court in taking cognizance of civil case to recover the landis not tantamount to assuming jurisdiction over said case nor does it violate

the ruling of this court which says that "when questions arise as to theownership of property, alleged to be part of the estate of a deceased person,but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any rightof inheritance from the deceased, but by title adverse to that of the deceasedand his estate, such questions cannot be determined in the course ofadministration proceedings. The Court of First Instance, acting as probatecourt, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must besubmitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a Court ofFirst Instance to try and determine ordinary actions. . . ."

If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it wasonly pursuant to their desire to protect their interests; and the court isjustified in taking cognizance of said civil case because of the unavoidable factthat whatever is determined in said civil case will necessarily reflect and have

a far reaching consequence in the determination and distribution of the estate.In so taking cognizance of civil case to recover the land, the court does notassume general jurisdiction over the case but merely makes of record itsexistence because of the close interrelation of the two cases and cannottherefore be branded as having acted in excess of its jurisdiction.

Eusebio v. Eusebio

FACTS:- On 29 October 1952, Andres Eusebio bought a house and lot in A.

Espana Extension. While transferring his belongings to this house,soon thereafter, Andres Eusebio suffered a stroke, for which reasonDr. Eusebio took him to Dr. Eusebios residence, where AndresEusebio remained until he was brought to the UST hospital sometimebefore 26 November 1952.

- On this date, he contracted marriage in articulo mortis with hiscommon law wife, Concepcion Villanueva, in said hospital.

- 2 days later he died of acute left ventricular failure secondary tohypertensive heart disease.

- Consequently, he never stayed or even slept in said house at EspanaExtension.

- On 16 November 1953, Eugenio Eusebio filed with the CFI a petitionfor appointment as administrator of the estate of his father, AndresEusebio, who died on 28 November 1952 residing, according to saidpetition, in Quezon City.

- On 4 December 1953, Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente andCarlos Eusebio, objected to said petition on the ground that AndresEusebio was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga and asking for thedismissal of the case on the ground that venue had beenimproperly filed.

- On 10 March 1954, the court overruled this objection and granted thepetition for appointment as an administrator.

- An appeal was taken, the appeal hinges on the situs of the residenceof Andres Eusebio on 28 November 1952

7

.

ISSUE/HELD: W/N Andres Eusebio is a resident of Pampanga orQuezon City? Pampanga (Thus, whether or not the venue had beenimproperly filed - YES)

- It is not disputed that up to, at least, 29 October 1952, AndresEusebio was, and had always been, domiciled in San Fernando,Pampanga where he had his home, as well as some other properties.

- The domicile of origin was San Fernando, Pampanga where he residedfor over 70 years, the presumption is that he retained suchdomicile, and hence, residence, in the absence of satisfactoryproof to the contrary, for it is well settled that a domicileonce acquired is retained until a new domicile is gained.

-

Under the circumstances surrounding the case at bar, if AndresEusebio established another domicile, it must have been one ofchoice, for which the following conditions are essential:

o Capacity to choose and freedom of choiceo Physical presence at the place choseno Intention to stay thereon permanently

ISSUE/HELD: W/N he manifested his intent to change his domicile? NO

- There is no direct evidence of such intent. Neither does the AndresEusebio appear to have manifested his wish to live indefinitely in saidcity.

- The aforementioned house and lot were bought by the Andres Eusebiobecause he had been advised to do so due to his illness. In fact, it isvery likely, that said advice was given and followed in order that thepatient could be hear his doctor and have a more effective treatment.

- It is well settled that domicile is not commonly changed by presencein a place merely for ones own health, even if coupled withknowledge that one will never again be able, on account of illness, toreturn home.

7Rule 75 Secion 1 provides:

If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or analien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in theCourt of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an

inhabitant of a foreign country, the CFI of any province in which he had his estate xxx


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- Andres Eusebio did not part with, or alienate, his house in SanFernando, Pampanga. Moreover, some of his children, who used tolive with him in San Fernando, Pampanga, remained in thatmunicipality.

- On 29 October 1952, or less than a month before his death, thedecedent gave San Fernando, Pampanga as his residence.

- The marriage contract signed by Andres Eusebio when he wasmarried in articulo mortis, to Concepcion Villanueva, at the UST

Hospital, on 26 November 1952, or 2 days prior to his demise, statedthat his residence is San Fernando Pampanga.

- The presumption in favor of the retention of the old domicile whichis particularly strong when the domicile is one of the origin as SanFernando, Pampanga, evidently, was as regards Andres Eusebio hasnot been offset by the evidence of record.

Garcia Fule v. CAVenue

FACTS:In 1973, Virginia Fule filed with the CFI of Laguna a petition for letters ofadministration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, alleging that Amado Garcia, aproperty owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila,

leaving some properties. She also moved ex parte for her appointment asspecial administratrix over the estate, which was granted.

MR was filed by Preciosa Garcia, contending that the order appointing VirginiaFule as special administratrix was issued without jurisdiction. MR was denied.Preciosa Garcia filed MTDthen alleging that jurisdiction over the petition orover the parties in interest has not been acquired by the court and that venuewas improperly laid. MTD was dismissed.

Preciosa Garcia filed an MR. MR was denied. In 1974, she commenced aspecial action for certiorari and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction beforethe CA to annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C ofCFI of Laguna. CA rendered judgment annulling the proceedings before JudgeMalvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C for lack of jurisdiction. Denied of their MR, VirginiaFule filed an appeal by certiorari.

However, even before Virginia Fule could receive the decision of the CA,Preciosa Garcia had already filed a petition for letters of administration beforethe CFI of Rizal, QC over the same intestate estate of Amado Garcia. PreciosaGarcia urgently moved for her appointment as special administratrix of theestate, which was granted by Judge Ericta.

For the first time, in 1975, Preciosa Garcia informed Judge Ericta of thependency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before Judge Malvar of the CFI of Laguna, andthe annulment of the proceedings therein by the CA. Judge Ericta ordered thesuspension of the proceedings before his court until Preciosa Garcia inform thecourt of the final outcome of the case pending before the CA. Thisnotwithstanding, Preciosa Garcia filed an "Urgent Petition for Authority to PayEstate Obligations."

Virginia Fule filed a "Special Appearance to Question Venue and Jurisdiction."

Judge Pano, who succeeded Judge Ericta, issued an order granting PreciosaGarcia's "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" in that thepayments were for the benefit of the estate and that there hangs a cloud ofdoubt on the validity of the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the CFI ofLaguna.

Virginia Fule instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a petition for certiorari withtemporary restraining order, to annul the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 and to restrain Judge Pao from further acting in the case.

It is important to notethat in this case divergent claims are maintained byVirginia Fule and Preciosa Garcia on the residence of the deceased AmadoGarcia at the time of his death. In her original petition for letters ofadministration before the CFI of Calamba, Virginia Fule stated that AmadoGarcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City ofManila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and inother places within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court." Preciosa Garciaassailed the petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement andimproper laying of venue. For her, the quoted statement avers no domicile or

residence of the deceased Amado Garcia. To say that as "property owner ofCalamba, Laguna," he also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her,non sequitur.

On the contrary, Preciosa Garcia claims that, as appearing in his deathcertificate presented by Virginia Fule before the Calamba court and in otherpapers, the last residence of Amado Garcia was at Quezon City.Parenthetically, in her amended petition, Virginia Fule categorically allegedthat Amado Garcia's "last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna."

ISSUE:1. W/N the petition for certiorari filed by Virginia should be granted. NO2. What does the word "resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules OfCourt, referring to the situs of the settlement of the estate of deceasedpersons, mean? Actual/personal residence, not legal residence.3. W/N the last place of the deceased Amado Garcia was at Quezon City, andnot at Calamba, Laguna. YES

RULING:1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, specifically the clause "sofar as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the locationof the estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Ruleindicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venueand Processes.It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subjectmatter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealingmerely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over thesubject matter is another.


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The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon CFI jurisdiction over allprobate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Theplace of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will,and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element ofjurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it isupon this reason that the Revised Rules of Court properly considers theprovince where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled as "venue."

2. Term "resides" connotes "actual residence" as distinguished from "legalresidence or domicile." This term "resides," is elastic and should be interpretedin the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it isemployed. In the application of venue statutes and rules, Section 1, Rule 73 ofthe Revised Rules of Court is of such nature, residence rather thandomicile isthe significant factor.

Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed asmeaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Terms "residence"and "domicile" as generally used in statutes fixing venue, are synonymous,and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant."

"Resides"should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, thepersonal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of

abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In thispopular sense, the term means personal residence, not legal residence ordomicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitantin a givenplace, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also anintention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of residence isrequired though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.

3. The Court ruled that the last place of residence of the deceased AmadoGarcia was at Quezon City, and notat Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate isadmissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death.Thedeath certificate of Amado Garcia, which was presented in evidence by VirginiaFule and by Preciosa Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was atQuezon City. Aside from this, the deceased's residence certificate obtainedthree months before his death; the Deed of Donation transferring part of hisinterest in certain parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina Garcia; and

certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, show in bolddocuments that Amado Garcia's last place of residence was at Quezon City.The conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia Fule's petitionfor letters of administration was improperly laid in the CFI of Calamba, Laguna.

Therefore, venue in the instant case was properly assumed by and transferredto Quezon City and that it is in the interest of justice and avoidance ofneedless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over thesettlement of the estate of the deceased Amado Garcia and the appointment ofspecial administratrix over the latter's estate be approved and authorized andthe CFI Laguna be disauthorized from continuing with the case and instead berequired to transfer all the records thereof to the CFI of Quezon City for thecontinuation of the proceedings.

Heirs of Doronio v. Heirs of Doronio (2007)

II. A. Limited Jurisdiction of Probate Court

FACTS

Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante, now both deceased,were the registered owners of a parcel of land covered by OCT 352.They had children whose number was not indicated in the records but

two of them were Fortunato and Marcelino. The petitioners are theheirs of Marcelino while the respondents are the heirs of Fortunato.

Sometime prior to their death the spouses executed a private deed ofdonation propter nuptiasin favor of Marcelino and his wife includinga parcel of land described as follows:

o Fourth A piece of residential land located in the barrio ofCabalitian but we did not measure it, the area is bounded onthe north by Gabriel Bernardino; on the east by FortunatoDoronio; on the south by Geminiano Mendoza and on the westby a road to Villasis. Constructed on said land is a house oflight materials also a part of the dowry.

The parcel of land is covered by OCT 352, however, there was adiscrepancy since OCT 352 described the land differently, as beingbound on the east by the Najordas and not Fortunato Doronio as stated

in the deed of donation. Both petitioner and respondent have been occupying the land.

Petitioners claim their title by virtue of the deed of donation in favor oftheir predecessor Marcelino while the respondents stake their claim onthe theory that spouses Simeon and Cornelia (parents of Marcelino andFortunato) intended to donate only of the land as manifested by thediscrepancy between the description in the OCT and the deed ofdonation. The theory is that the parents placed Fortunato, instead of theNajordas, as the owner of the property to the east because theyrecognized that the eastern half belonged to Fortunato.

The petitioners heirs of Marcelino filed a case for registration of privatedeed of donation in the RTC. No respondents were named but the courtordered the posting of notices in several places. No objection was everpresented so the RTC ordered the registration of the deed of donation.

After a year, the respondents, filed in the registration case, a petitionfor reconsideration seeking the annulment of the deed of donation. Thepetition was dismissed on the ground that the judgment of the court inthe case had already become final.

Respondent heirs of Fortunato filed an action for reconveyance anddamagesagainst the petitioners. Respondents claimed:

o The spouses Simeon and Cornelia (the parents) intended todonate only half of the property.

o The deed of donation is void.o They have acquired the property through acquisitive

prescription. RTC: petitioners are rightful owners of the land. CA: reversed and held that the discrepancy between the OCT and the

deed of donation manifested the intent of the parents of donating only


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half of the property and that the donation is void because itimpaired the legitime of Fortunato.

ISSUES / HELD

Whether the CA was correct in deciding in favor of the respondent heirs ofFortunato in ruling that the donation is void for having impaired the legitime ofFortunato. NO. The issue on legitime should be threshed out in a special

proceeding and not in civil action for reconveyance and damages.

RATIO

A probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction is the best forum to ventilateand adjudge the issue of impairment of legitime and as well as other matters involvingthe settlement of the estate of the deceased.

A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement orprotection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. On the otherhand, a special proceeding is remedy by which a party seeks to establish astatus, a right or a particular fact.

An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action,whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such asadvancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a specialproceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as providedfor in the Rules of Court.

Matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedentfall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of itslimited jurisdiction.

OTHER MATTERS:

On the claim that the validity of the donation cannot be challenged by a partynot impleaded in a petition for quieting of title or declaratory relief and that the

judgment awarding the land to the plaintiffs can no longer be set aside since ithas attained finality:

o The validity of the donation was raised by the respondents inthe pre-trial. A void contract is inexistent from the beginningand the right to set-up as a defense the illegality of the deedcan never be waived and is available not only to the parties inthe case but also to third parties who are directly affected bythe contract. Since the respondents are directly affected bythe donation, they may set-up its illegality. The decisio asreached without the respondents being heard in the case forregistration. No notice was sent to them and the courtdirected only the posting of notices. Therefore since an actionfor quieting of title is an action quasi in rem, binding only the

parties therein, the finality of the judgment cannot bid therespondents who were not parties to the case.

Titled property cannot be a subject of acquisitive prescription. Donation of property made in a private instrument prior to the

effectivity of the New Civil Code is void. The OCT written in Spanish, although not translated into English or

Filipino is admissible as evidence due to lack of timely objection.

MACIAS v. UY KIMRule 73/ VENUE

FACTS: This is a MACIAS filed a complaint forAnnulment of Salein Branch

10 of Manila CFI, averring that:

1.) He is the beneficiary of the estate of Julian, in pending SpecialProceeding 57405 (lets call this A), pending in Branch 6 andof Rosina Wolfson pending settlement in Special Proceedings63866 (B) pending in Branch 8. InB,he appealed from theorder appointing Cruz as the ancillary administrator.

2.) That he was named as special administrator of the estate ofRosina in Special proceeding 67302 (C) originally assigned toBranch 6 but later transferred to Branch 8 and consolidatedwith B, but Cwas afterwards dismissed

3.) To protect his interest over the properties in the estate, hecaused a notice of lis pendens to be annotated on the TCT in thename of Rosina

4.) However, Judge Barcelona presiding in Special Proceeding B,authorized Cruz as the ancillary administrator to sell theproperties to pay for the estate, inheritance and realty taxes andexpenses of administration

5.) Cruz negotiated with Reliable Realty, organized by Uy Kim, whowas willing to buy the property if the notice of lis pendens werecancelled.

6.) Judge Barcelona ordered the notice of lis pendens to becancelled, allowing Cruz to enter into a sale with Uy Kim. Judgethen approved the Deed of Sale, and Rosinas TCTs werecancelled, new ones issued to Uy Kim.

7.) Macias claims that the Orders were issued without due notice tohim and without or in excess of jurisdiction since Judge Barcelonawas already divested of jurisdiction in Special Proceeding Bbecause of his appeal.


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UY KIM filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that Branch 10hasNO JURISDICTION over the suit since the subject matter properlybelongs to the exclusive jurisdiction of Branch 8 or branch 4 whereSpecial proceedings A and B were pendingsince his alleged claimof beneficiary interest in the estate of Julian and Rosina depends uponthe recognition thereof by the probate court.

The Compliant was dismissed so Macias filed this Petition for Reviewon Certiorari

ISSUE / HELD:

1.) W/N Branch 10 had jurisdiction to annul the Orders issued by thePresiding Judge of Branch 8 where the Special Proceeding waspending? - NO

RATIO:

Under Sec. 1 of Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of thesettlement of the estate of the deceased, shall exercise

jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.

Pursuant to this, all questions concerning the settlement ofthe estate of the deceased Rosina should be filed beforeBranch 8 of the CFI of Manila where Special Proceeding forthe settlement of her estate was filed and still pending

The reason of the law - that the settlement of the estate of thedeceased is but one proceeding, for the successful administration ofthe estate it is necessary that one court should be responsible whoshall have exclusive control over every part of such administration. Toentrust it to 2 or more independent courts would result in confusionand delay.

This is for the public interest and not for the benefit of the partieslitigants so the parties have no control over it.

Any challenge to the validity of the will, any objection to itsauthentication, and every demand or claim of an heir or partyin interest in a testate or intestate succession must be decidedwithin the same special proceedings and not in a separateaction and by the same judge having jurisdiction in theadministration of the estate

The orders sought to be annulled were assigned to branch 10presided over by Judge Moya but such orders were issued by JudgeBarcelona of branch 8 (because the 2 were coordinates)

o The various branches of the CFI of a province or city, havingthe same or equal authority as and exercising as they doconcurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should not, cannot,and are not permitted to interfere with the respective cases,much less with their orders or judgments.

MACIAS claims that his Complaint in Branch 10 was NOT forthe annulment of the Order of Branch 8 because nowhere in its

body or prayer did he seek such annulment.

o Belied by par. 8of the complaint alleging that the Order ofcancellation of the Notice of lis pendens was made withoutdue notice to him

o By par. 9, alleging that the issuance of the new TCT werenull and void because Branch 8 was already divested ofjurisdiction by reason of his appeal

o That even without par. 8 and 9, his prayer in thecomplaint for the nullification of the deed of sale maynot be decreed without passing on the validity of theOrders of the Judge in Branch 8, wherein Branch 10had no jurisdiction to pass upon

His insistence that in Civil Case that he seeks to recover hisdistributive share of the estate of Rosina, all the moreremoves the case from the jurisdiction of Branch 10; becausethe distribution of the estate is within the exclusive

jurisdiction of the probate court.

He must therefore seek his remedy in the same probate court

Branch 8 which is hearing Special Proceedings B, (and wasstill pending since there was NO order terminating it), insteadof filing a separate civil case in Branch 10.

ADDITIONAL RATIO:

The better practice is for the heir who has not received his share, is todemand his share through a proper motion in the same probate oradministration proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate oradministrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and notthrough an independent action, which would be tried by another court orJudge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate or intestatecourt already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributedand disposed of


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MALOLES II VS. PHILLIPS

Rule 73 Venue

FACTS: On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati

City filed a petition of probate of his will with Branch 61 of RTC of Makati

City(hereinafter probate proceeding) He had named in his will as sole

legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc. and that he

disposed by his will his properties with an approximate value of not lessthan P2,000,000.00;

Judge Gorospe of Branch 61(hereinafter Judge G61) granted thepetition and allowed the will for probate.

In Feb.1996, Dr. De Santos passed away. In April 1996, Maloles filed a Motion for Intervention claiming that, as the

only child of Alicia de Santos (testator's sister) he was the sole full-

blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He likewise alleged

that he was a creditor of the testator. He thus prayed for the

reconsideration of the order allowing the will and the issuance of letters of

administration in his name.

Meanwhile, Pacita Phillips, the executrix in the will, filed a motion for theissuance of letters testamentary with Branch 61 which she later on

withdrew.

Pacita Phillips then refiled the same through a petition for the issuance ofletters testamentary. This was raffled to Branch 65 of RTC of Makati

(hereinafter appointment proceedings). Judge Abad Santos (hereinafter

Judge A65) granted her petition and made her the estates special

administrator.

Maloles also sought to intervene in the appointment proceedings and toset aside the appointment of Phillips. He also claimed, among others, that

the probate proceedings i

Net Digests Specpro.

Documents

Transcript of Net Digests Specpro.