G.R. No. 160597             July 20, 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.ROSELIE ELOISA BRINGAS BOLANTE a.k.a. MARIA ELOISA BRINGAS BOLANTE, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

GARCIA, J.:

In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Republic of the Philippines assails and seeks to set aside the decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 21, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 74398 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bangued, Abra in Special Proceeding Case No. 1916, a petition for change of name thereat commenced by herein respondent Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante also known as Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante.

In her petition before the RTC, respondent alleged, among other things, the following:

1. That she is a Filipino, of legal age, married, born to spouses Floriano B. Bolante and Paula B. Bringas and a resident since birth of Bangued, Abra;

2. That per records in the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar, Bangued, Abra, her registered name isRoselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante which name, as far as she can remember, she did not use but instead the name Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante;

3. That the name Maria Eloisa appears in all her school as well as in her other public and private records; and

4. That her married name is Maria Eloisa B. Bolante-Marbella.

Thus, to prevent confusion, Ms. Bolante prayed that her registered name be changed to conform to the name she has always carried and used.

Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court ordered respondent, as petitioner thereat, to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of notice and publication, and set the hearing on February 20, 2001.

At the scheduled February 20, 2001 initial hearing, the trial court issued an Order giving respondent five (5) days within which to file a written formal offer of evidence to establish jurisdictional facts and set the presentation of evidence proper on March 26, 2001. In the afternoon of February 20, respondent filed her "Offer of Evidence for Marking and Identification Purposes to Prove Jurisdictional Facts."

On June 5, 2001, the branch clerk of court, acting upon the trial court's express March 26, 2001 directive for a resetting, issued a notice for a July 18, 2001 hearing. Following another resetting, what actually would be the initial hearing was, after notice, scheduled on September 25, 2001 and actually held. At that session, respondent presented and marked in evidence several documents without any objection on the part of herein petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), thru the duly deputized provincial prosecutor of Abra. Among the documents thus submitted and marked in evidence were the following:

Exh. "A" - The Petition

1

Exh. "B" - The Notice of Initial Hearing

Exh. "C" - The Certificate of Posting

Exh. "D" - The Appearance of the Solicitor General

Exh. "E" - The Authority given to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor

Exh. "F" - The Affidavit of Publication

Exh. "F-I" -The Newspaper Clippings

Exh. "G" - The Norluzonian Courier

Exh. "H" - Another copy of Norluzonian Courier

Shortly after the trial court has declared its acquisition of jurisdiction over the case, respondent took the witness stand to state that the purpose of her petition was to have her registered name changed to that which she had actually been using thru the years. She also categorically stated she had not been accused of any crime under either her registered name or her present correct name.

An excerpt of other portions of her testimony, as recited in the Republic's petition which cited the decision of the trial court:

At the witness stand the petitioner [herein respondent Bolante] testified, among others, that she is now married to Jorge Marbella, Jr. and presently residing at Bliss Angad, Bangued, Abra since 1995 but before she resided in Zone 4, Bangued, Abra since birth. She presented her birth certificate and was marked as Exhibit J to establish such fact of birth and to effect that the name Roselie Eloisa B. Bolante entered therein is not her true and correct name but instead Maria Eloisa Bolante which she had been using during her school days, while being a government employee, and in all her public and private records.

She presented her professional license issued by the Professional Regulation Commission, Certificate issued by the Philippine Institute of Certified Public Accountant and a 'Quick Count' document all issued in her name Maria Eloisa B. Marbella, which documents were marked as Exhibit K and Exhibit L and Exhibit M respectively. She likewise marked her marriage license as Exhibit N to prove her marriage xxx.

xxx       xxx       xxx

On cross she stated that the purpose of filing the petition is that, she wanted to secure a passport and wanted that the same be issued in her correct name and that she would not have filed the petition was (sic) it not for the passport.

On clarificatory question by the Court she said that her reason in filing the petition is her realization that there will be a complication upon her retirement.2 (Words in bracket added.)

On January 23, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment granting the basic petition, disposing as follows:

2

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this petition is hereby approved and is granted by this Court for being meritorious.

The Municipal Registrar of Bangued, Abra, is hereby directed:

a) To change the name of the petitioner in her record of birth from Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante to Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante; and,

b) To record this decision in the Civil Registry in accordance with Registry Regulations.

Furnish copy of this Order to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Bangued, Abra for recording and compliance.

SO ORDERED.3 (Underscoring added)

In time, the Republic, through the OSG, went to the CA whereat its appellate recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 74398. In the herein assailed Decision of October 21, 2003,4 the appellate court affirmed in toto that of the trial court.

Hence, the Republic's present petition on the following issues:

I

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT'S SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH SEC. 3, RULE 103 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS SUFFICIENT TO VEST THE TRIAL COURT WITH JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE PETITION A QUO.

II

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT'S BARE TESTIMONY, UNSUPPORTED BY ANY OTHER EVIDENCE, IS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THAT THE CHANGE OF HER NAME IS NOT RESORTED FOR ILLEGAL PURPOSES.

Sections 2 and 3, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court prescribe the procedural and jurisdictional requirements for a change of name. As we articulated in Republic v. Hon. Judge of Branch III of the CFI of Cebu,5 citing pertinent jurisprudence,6 non-compliance with these requirements would be fatal to the jurisdiction of the lower court to hear and determine a petition for change of name. The provisions adverted to are pertinently quoted hereunder:

SEC. 2. Contents of petition. - A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:

(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing;

(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;

(c) The name asked for.

SEC. 3. Order for hearing. - If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the

3

hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general circulation published in the province, …. The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four (4) months after the last publication of the notice. (Underscoring added.)

On the postulate that the initial hearing of a petition for a change of name cannot be set within four (4) months from the last publication of the notice of such hearing, petitioner submits at the threshold that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for want or defective publication.

We are not persuaded.

As gleaned from the records, the basic petition for change of name was filed on October 18, 2000 and set for hearing on February 20, 2001 via an Order issued on November 13, 2000. The notice of hearing was published in the November 23, and 30, 2000 and December 7, 2000 issues of the Norluzonian Courier. Counted from the last day, December 7, 2000, of publication of the Order, the initial hearing scheduled on February 20, 2001 is indeed within the four-month prohibited period prescribed under Section 3, Rule 103 of the Rules. The Court, as did the CA,7 must emphasize, however, that the trial court, evidently upon realizing the error committed respecting the 4-month limitation, lost no time in rectifying its mistake by rescheduling, with due notice to all concerned, the initial hearing for several times, finally settling for September 25, 2001.

It is the Republic's posture that the fact that the hearing took place on September 25, 2001, beyond the four-month prohibited period, did not cure the jurisdictional defect since notice of the September 25, 2001 setting went unpublished. Pressing on, the Republic would state – and correctly so – that the in rem nature of a change of name proceeding necessitates strict compliance with all jurisdictional requirements, particularly on publication, in order to vest the court with jurisdiction thereover.8

The Court, to be sure, is fully aware that the required publication serves as notice to the whole world that the proceeding in question has for its object to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any and against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.9

In the context of Section 3, Rule 103 of the Rules, publication is valid if the following requisites concur: (1) the petition and the copy of the order indicating the date and place for the hearing must be published; (2) the publication must be at least once a week for three successive weeks; and, (3) the publication must be in some newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem best. Another validating ingredient relates to the caveat against the petition being heard within 30 days prior to an election or within four (4) months after the last publication of the notice of the hearing.

It cannot be over-emphasized that in a petition for change of name, any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. Likewise, the Solicitor General or his deputy shall appear on behalf of the Government.10 The government, as an agency of the people, represents the public and, therefore, the Solicitor General, who appears on behalf of the government, effectively represents the public.11 In this case, the Solicitor General deputized the provincial prosecutor of Abra for the purpose of appearing in the trial on his behalf. As it were, the provincial prosecutor of Abra was fully apprised of the new dates of the initial hearing. Accordingly, there was no actual need for a republication of the initial notice of the hearing.

4

Not lost on the Court is the fact that during the September 25, 2001 initial hearing which, to reiterate is already outside the 4-month limitation prescribed by the Rules, the provincial prosecutor of Abra interposed no objection as to the genuineness, authenticity, relevancy or sufficiency of the exhibits presented to prove the jurisdictional requirements exacted by the Rules. In a very real sense, therefore, the petitioner Republic fully and knowingly acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the trial court. The peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case and the requirements of fair dealing demand that we accord validity to the proceedings a quo.

On the issue as to propriety of the desired change of name, we are guided by decisional law on the matter. As we have held, the State has an interest in the names borne by individuals for purposes of identification, and that changing one's name is a privilege and not a right. Accordingly, a person can be authorized to change his name appearing in either his certificate of birth or civil registry upon showing not only of reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change, but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. 12 Jurisprudence has recognized certain justifying grounds to warrant a change of name. Among these are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change will avoid confusion; (c) when one has been continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (d) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name will prejudice public interest.13

The matter of granting or denying petitions for change of name and the corollary issue of what is a proper and reasonable cause therefor rests on the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court; it need not be the best evidence available.14 What is involved in special proceedings for change of name is, to borrow from Republic v. Court of Appeals, 15 "not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the petition, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the courts."

With the view we take of the case, respondent's submission for a change of name is with proper and reasonable reason. As it were, she has, since she started schooling, used the given name and has been known as Maria Eloisa, albeit the name Roselie Eloisa is written on her birth record. Her scholastic records, as well as records in government offices, including that of her driver's license, professional license as a certified public accountant issued by the Professional Regulation Commission, and the "Quick Count" document of the COMELEC, all attest to her having used practically all her life the name Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante.

The imperatives of avoiding confusion dictate that the instant petition is granted. But beyond practicalities, simple justice dictates that every person shall be allowed to avail himself of any opportunity to improve his social standing, provided he does so without causing prejudice or injury to the interests of the State or of other people.16

The OSG's argument that respondent's bare testimony is insufficient to show that the requested name is not sought for any illegal purpose and/or in avoidance of any entanglement with the law deserves scant consideration. Surely, the issuance of a police and NBI clearance or like certification, while perhaps apropos, cannot, as the OSG suggests, be a convincing norm of one's good moral character or compelling evidence to prove that the change of name is not sought for any evil motive or fraudulent intent. Respondent's open court testimony, given under pain of perjury and for which she was cross-examined, that she had not been accused of any crime under her registered name or under her present name (name that she is using) had convinced the trial court of the bona fides of her request for change of name. As the CA correctly ratiocinated:

5

In the case at bar, petitioner [now respondent] seeks to change her registered name in order to avoid confusion having used a different name all her life. This is a valid ground under the afore-mentioned enumeration not to mention that the instant remedy presents the less cumbersome and most convenient way to set her records straight.

Anent the contention of oppositor-appellant that petitioner failed to prove that the petition is not resorted to for an illegal purpose due to her inability to present NBI as well as police clearance to the effect that she has no derogatory records, due perusal of the requirements of Rule 103 reveals that it does not so provide such a quantum of proof to establish the fact that a petitioner has no derogatory records. This purpose, we think, is served upon the declaration and affirmation of the petitioner in open court that the petition is not to further fraud but for a legitimate purpose, coupled by the absence of any oppositor to the petition. There is yet no jurisprudence requiring a petitioner in a petition for a change of name to present NBI and police clearances to prove that the said petition is not resorted to for purpose of fraud. Until such time, we see no urgency to impose the requirements espoused by oppositor-appellant. (Word in bracket added).

At bottom, petitioner Republic has not demonstrated that the allowance of the basic petition is whimsical or based on a consideration other than to avoid confusion. The trial court appears to have exercised its discretion judiciously when it granted the petition. Like the CA, the Court loathes to disturb the action thus taken.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 21, 2003 is AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 189476               February 2, 2011

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG-MAGPAYO (A.K.A. JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG), Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo (respondent) is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondent’s certificate of live birth1shows, contracted marriage on March 26, 1972.

Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed on July 22, 2008 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. The petition, docketed as SPP No. Q-0863058, was entitled "IN RE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAMEOF JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG MAGPAYO TO JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG."

In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the National Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique "does not appear in [its] National Indices of Marriage."2 Respondent also submitted his academic records from elementary up to college3 showing that he carried the surname "Coseteng," and the birth certificate of his child where "Coseteng" appears as his surname.4 In the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections, respondent

6

ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon City’s 3rd District using the name "JULIAN M.L. COSETENG."5

On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC,6 respondent amended his petition by alleging therein compliance with the 3-year residency requirement under Section 2, Rule 103] of the Rules of Court.7

The notice setting the petition for hearing on November 20, 2008 was published in the newspaper Broadside in its issues of October 31-November 6, 2008, November 7-13, 2008, and November 14-20, 2008.8 And a copy of the notice was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general default was entered by the trial court which then allowed respondent to present evidence ex parte.9

By Decision of January 8, 2009,10 the trial court granted respondent’s petition and directed the Civil Registrar ofMakati City to:

1. Delete the entry "March 26, 1972" in Item 24 for "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARTIES" [in herein respondent’s Certificate of live Birth];

2. Correct the entry "MAGPAYO" in the space for the Last Name of the [respondent] to "COSETENG";

3. Delete the entry "COSETENG" in the space for Middle Name of the [respondent]; and

4. Delete the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the space for FATHER of the [respondent]… (emphasis and underscoring supplied; capitalization in the original)

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court by Order of July 2, 2009,11 hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged the present petition for review to the Court on pure question of law.

The Republic assails the decision in this wise:

I. . . . THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME…INVOLVES THE CHANGE OF [RESPONDENT’S] CIVIL STATUS FROM LEGITIMATE TO ILLEGITIMATE AND, THEREFORE, SHOULD BE MADE THROUGH APPROPRIATE ADVERSARIAL PROCEEDINGS…

II. THE TRIAL COURT EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT DIRECTED THE DELETION OF THE NAME OF RESPONDENT’S FATHER FROM HIS BIRTH CERTIFICATE.12 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Republic contends that the deletion of the entry on the date and place of marriage of respondent’s parents from his birth certificate has the effect of changing his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, hence, any change in civil status of a person must be effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding.13

The Republic adds that by ordering the deletion of respondent’s parents’ date of marriage and the name of respondent’s father from the entries in respondent’s birth certificate,14 the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction, such order not being in accord with respondent’s prayer reading:

7

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that the Honorable Court issue an orderallowing the change of name of petitioner from JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG MAGPAYO to JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG, and that the Honorable Court order the Local Civil Registrar and all other relevant government agencies to reflect the said change of name in their records.

Petitioner prays for other reliefs deemed proper under the premises.15 (underscoring supplied)

Respondent counters that the proceeding before the trial court was adversarial in nature. He cites the serving of copies of the petition and its annexes upon the Civil Registrar of Makati, the Civil Registrar General, and the OSG; the posting of copies of the notice of hearing in at least four public places at least ten days before the hearing; the delegation to the OSG by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to appear on behalf of the Republic; the publication of the notice of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation for three consecutive weeks; and the fact that no oppositors appeared on the scheduled hearing.16

The petition is impressed with merit.

A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.17 Respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds, however.

The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines. 18 In Alfon, the Court allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use the name that she had been known since childhood in order to avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She merely sought to use the surname of her mother which she had been using since childhood. Ruling in her favor, the Court held that she was lawfully entitled to use her mother’s surname, adding that the avoidance of confusion was justification enough to allow her to do so. In the present case, however, respondent denies his legitimacy.

The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant respondent’s supplication.

Labayo-Rowe v. Republic19 categorically holds that "changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate . . . are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings . . ."

Since respondent’s desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, Rule 108 applies. It reads:

SECTION 1. Who may file petition.—Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the [RTC] of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.

x x x x

8

SEC. 3. Parties.—When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar andall persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication. –Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one’s civil status should be filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected – that of Makati in the present case, and "all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby" should be made parties to the proceeding.

As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati where his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City. And as the above-mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent before the RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties thereto.

Respondent nevertheless cites Republic v. Capote20 in support of his claim that his change of name was effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding.

Republic v. Belmonte,21 illuminates, however:

The procedure recited in Rule 103] regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct. They may not be substituted one for the other for the sole purpose of expediency. To hold otherwise would render nugatory the provisions of the Rules of Court allowing the change of one’s name or the correction of entries in the civil registry only upon meritorious grounds. . . . (emphasis, capitalization and underscoring supplied)

Even assuming arguendo that respondent had simultaneously availed of these two statutory remedies, respondent cannot be said to have sufficiently complied with Rule 108. For, as reflected above, aside from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil registrar of Makati and  all affected parties  as respondents in the case.

Republic v. Labrador22 mandates that "a petition for a substantial correction or change of entries in the civil registry should have as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby." It cannot be gainsaid that change of status of a child in relation to his parents is a substantial correction or change of entry in the civil registry.

Labayo-Rowe23 highlights the necessity of impleading indispensable parties in a petition which involves substantial and controversial alterations. In that case, the therein petitioner Emperatriz Labayo-Rowe (Emperatriz) filed a petition for the correction of entries in the birth certificates of her children, Vicente Miclat, Jr. and Victoria Miclat, in the Civil Registry of San Fernando, Pampanga. Emperatriz alleged that her name appearing in the birth certificates is Beatriz, which is her nickname, but her full name is Emperatriz; and her civil status appearing in the birth certificate of her daughter Victoria as "married" on "1953 Bulan" are erroneous because she was not married to Vicente Miclat who was the one who furnished the data in said birth certificate.

The trial court found merit in Emperatriz’s petition and accordingly directed the local civil registrar to change her name appearing in her children’s birth certificates from Beatriz to Emperatriz; and

9

to correct her civil status in Victoria’s birth certificate from "married" to "single" and the date and place of marriage to "no marriage."

On petition before this Court after the Court of Appeals found that the order of the trial court involved a question of law, the Court nullified the trial court’s order directing the change of Emperatriz’ civil status and the filiation of her child Victoria in light of the following observations:

x x x x Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other indispensable parties should have been maderespondents. They include not only the declared father of the child but the child as well, together with the paternal grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby. All other persons who may be affected by the change should be notified or represented. The truth is best ascertained under an adversary system of justice.

The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be substantially impaired if her status would be changed from "legitimate" to "illegitimate." Moreover, she would be exposed to humiliation and embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate filiation that she will bear thereafter. The fact that the notice of hearing of the petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section 13, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, which directs that such rules "shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights." If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, without observing the proper proceedings as earlier mentioned, said rule would thereby become an unconstitutional exercise which would tend to increase or modify substantive rights. This situation is not contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil Code.24 (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

As for the requirement of notice and publication, Rule 108 provides:

SEC. 4. Notice and publication.—Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition.—The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A reading of these related provisions readily shows that Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets of notices to different "potential oppositors." The first notice is that given to the "persons named in the petition" and the second (which is through publication) is that given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties, such as creditors. That two sets of notices are mandated under the above-quoted Section 4 is validated by the subsequent Section 5, also above-quoted, which provides for two periods (for the two types of "potential oppositors") within which to file an opposition (15 days from notice or from the last date of publication).

This is the overriding principle laid down in Barco v. Court of Appeals.25 In that case, Nadina Maravilla (Nadina) filed a petition for correction of entries in the birth certificate of her daughter June from June Salvacion Maravilla to June Salvacion "Gustilo," Armando Gustilo being, according to Nadina, her daughter’s real father. Gustilo in fact filed before the trial court a

10

"CONSTANCIA" wherein he acknowledged June as his daughter. The trial court granted the petition.

After Gustilo died, his son Jose Vicente Gustilo filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the Order of the trial court granting the change of June’s family name to Gustilo.

Milagros Barco (Barco), natural guardian of her minor daughter Mary Joy Ann Gustilo, filed before the appellate court a motion for intervention, alleging that Mary Joy had a legal interest in the annulment of the trial court’s Order as Mary Joy was, by Barco’s claim, also fathered by Gustilo.

The appellate court dismissed the petition for annulment and complaint-in-intervention.

On appeal by Barco, this Court ruled that she should have been impleaded in Nadina’s petition for correction of entries of the birth certificate of Mary Joy. But since a petitioner, like Nadina, is not expected to exhaustively identify all the affected parties, the subsequent publication of the notice cured the omission of Barco as a party to the case. Thus the Court explained:

Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108.1awphi1 Her interest was affected by the petition for correction, as any judicial determination that June was the daughter of Armando would affect her ward’s share in the estate of her father. It cannot be established whether Nadina knew of Mary Joy’s existence at the time she filed the petition for correction. Indeed, doubt may always be cast as to whether a petitioner under Rule 108 would know of all the parties whose interests may be affected by the granting of a petition. For example, a petitioner cannot be presumed to be aware of all the legitimate or illegitimate offsprings of his/her spouse or paramour. x x x x.

x x x x

The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108 but were inadvertently left out. x x x x.26 (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

Meanwhile, in Republic v. Kho,27 Carlito Kho (Carlito) and his siblings named the civil registrar as the sole respondent in the petition they filed for the correction of entries in their respective birth certificates in the civil registry of Butuan City, and correction of entries in the birth certificates of Carlito’s minor children. Carlito and his siblings requested the correction in their birth certificates of the citizenship of their mother Epifania to "Filipino," instead of "Chinese," and the deletion of the word "married" opposite the phrase "Date of marriage of parents" because their parents ─ Juan and Epifania ─ were not married. And Carlito requested the correction in the birth certificates of their children of his and his wife’s date of marriage to reflect the actual date of their marriage as appearing in their marriage certificate. In the course of the hearing of the petition, Carlito also sought the correction of the name of his wife from Maribel to "Marivel."

The Khos’ mother Epifania took the witness stand where she declared that she was not married to Juan who died before the filing of the Khos’ petition.

The trial court granted the petition.

On the issue of whether the failure to implead Marivel and the Khos’ parents rendered the trial of the petition short of the required adversary proceedings and the trial court’s judgment void, this Court held that when all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are followed, the publication of the notice of hearing cures the failure to implead an indispensable party. In so ruling, the Court

11

noted that the affected parties were already notified of the proceedings in the case since the petitioner-siblings Khos were the ones who initiated the petition respecting their prayer for correction of their citizenship, and Carlito respecting the actual date of his marriage to his wife; and, with respect to the Khos’ petition for change of their civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, their mother Epifania herself took the witness stand declaring that she was not married to their father.

What is clear then in Barco and Kho is the mandatory directive under Section 3 of Rule 108 to implead the civil registrar and the parties who would naturally and legally be affected by the grant of a petition for correction or cancellation of entries. Non-impleading, however, as party-respondent of one who is inadvertently left out or is not established to be known by the petitioner to be affected by the grant of the petition or actually participates in the proceeding is notified through publication.

IN FINE, when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated.

WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, GRANTED. The January 8, 2009 Decision of Branch 77 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in SP Proc. No. Q-0863058 is NULLIFIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-32600 February 26, 1988

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.HON. FELICIANO BELMONTE, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet and ANITA PO alias VERONICA PAO, assisted by her mother HELEN POA, respondents.

 

GANCAYCO, J.:

Can a petition for a change of name and the correction of certain entries in the civil registry be joined in the same proceeding? This is the issue posed in this petition for review of a decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet. 1

The record of the case discloses that on August 28, 1968, the herein private respondent Anita Po alias Veronica Pao, a resident of Baguio City, filed with the then Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet a Petition for the change other name from Anita Po to Veronica Pao. 2 For this purpose, she also sought court permission to have her birth records corrected in that her father's name appearing as PO YU be corrected to PAO YU and her mother's name recorded as PAKIAT CHAN be changed to HELEN CHAN. At the time the litigation was commenced, the petitioner was a 16-year old minor. Thus, she was assisted in the case by her mother. The suit was docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. 642.

The petitioner alleged before the trial court that the maiden name of her mother is Helen Chan and that the given name Pakiat written on her birth certificate is actually the given name of her maternal grandmother. The petitioner also asserted that the name of her father is Pao Yu and not Po Yu as erroneously written in her birth certificate and as such her real surname is Pao. She

12

assigns these alleged errors to the common misunderstanding of Chinese names. The petitioner also averred that she had been baptized by a Catholic priest and that she was christened as Veronica Pao, the first being her Christian given name and the latter being the correct spelling of her surname; that since her childhood up to the present, she had always been known and referred to as Veronica Pao and not Anita Po.

On the basis of these allegations, the petitioner asked the trial court to allow her change of name and to order the correction of her records in the Local Civil Registrar's Office at La Trinidad, Benguet to conform to the nameVeronica Pao. She also asked the trial court to order the correction of her father's name recorded in her birth certificate from Po Yu to Pao Yu, as well as her mother's name appearing as Pakiat Chan changed to Helen Chan.

At the hearing scheduled by the trial court on March 4,1969, the Office of the Solicitor General presented its Opposition to the Petition and sought the dismissal of the same. The thrust of the said Opposition is that the remedies prayed for by the petitioner cannot be allowed by the mere submission of the said Petition. The pertinent portions of the written arguments in the Opposition are as follows —

... A petition for change of name is filed under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court ... and a petition for correction or cancellation of entries in the Civil Register is filed under Rule 108 of the same Rules... . Rule 103 and Rule 108 are distinct and separate from each other and each provides for different requirements that must be satisfied in order that a person may avail of any one of them. The present petition apparently satisfies the requirements of Rule 103 on change of name but fails insofar as the request for correction of certain entries is concerned because the civil registrar concerned and the other parties affected by the corrections sought to be made have not been included in the petition as required by section 3 of Rule 108. And from the nature of the change sought to be made by the herein petitioner in her surname, it seems that orderly and proper procedure requires that a correction be first made of the alleged errors in the names of the petitioner's parents to justify her petition for change of name. Thus, petitioner alleges that her father's name is correctly Pao Yu but the same is recorded in her birth certificate as Po Yu However, in the said birth certificate, petitioner's name appears as Anita Po following the name of her father as registered in the same birth certificate, which is Po Yu. It therefore appears that until the name of the father is shown to have been registered erroneously, there is no justification for allowing the petitioner to use the surname Poa The importance and necessity of first determining the propriety of the corrections sought to be made by the herein petitioner before allowing her to change her name is magnified when it is noted that the corrections sought involve the very identity of the parents of the herein petitioner, without a clear-cut clarification of which, the court may unwittingly allow itself to become an instrument in the substitution in a public record of the Identities of certain persons.

In view of these circumstances, it appears that considered as a petition for change of name, the present petition does not state a cause of action considering that on the basis of the data appearing in the birth certificate, petitioner's father is Po Yu and not Pao Yu And the present petition can not be considered (sufficient) in form and substance as a petition for correction because it does not satisfy the requirements set forth by section 3 (Rule 108) of the Rules of Court and there is no allegation of how the alleged error was committed.

xxx xxx xxx 3

13

In a Decision dated July 24,1969, the trial court, with respondent Judge Feliciano Belmonte presiding therein, ruled in favor of the petitioner. 4 The petitioner was allowed to change her name from Anita Po to Veronica Pao. The court also allowed the correction of the names of her parents as prayed for in the Petition in the registry of birth. The Local Civil Registrar of La Trinidad Benguet was ordered to implement the corresponding corrections.

On behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, the Office of the Solicitor General elevated the case to this Court by way of the instant Petition. 5 The Solicitor General raises the following issues —

(1) Whether or not the private respondent Anita Po alias Veronica Pao has presented a proper and reasonable cause for the change of her name; and

(2) Whether or not the names Po Yu and Pakiat Chan appearing in the birth certificate of Anita Po can be changed in the same proceeding for the change of name of Anita Po.

The parties having submitted their respective briefs, the case is now submitted for decision.

We have gone through the entire record of the case and We find merit in the instant Petition.

The allegations of the private respondent are not disputed by the petitioner. The respondent Judge rendered judgment in accordance with these undisputed facts. A conclusion of a court drawn from undisputed facts raises a question of law. 6 The issues raised in the instant Petition are directed against the conclusions arrived at by the respondent Judge and drawn from undisputed facts. Taking into account these observations and considering that the resolution of the issues raised herein would not require this Court to re-examine the evidence presented before the trial court, We hold that the two issues raised in this Petition are questions of law. Inasmuch as the two issues are related to each other, they will be resolved together.

In fine, the petitioner maintains that her correct name is Veronica Pao inasmuch as Veronica is her Christian name and Pao is the surname of her father. She does not, however, deny that the name of her father appearing in her birth certificate is Po Yu and not Pao Yu. She assigns the discrepancy to mere clerical error.

An examination of her allegations reveal that her claim to the supposed correct name of Veronica Pao is predicated on the assumption that the correct name other father is Pao Yu and not Po Yu as recited in her own birth certificate. The assumption is baseless, absent any proof that the name other father in her birth certificate was entered erroneously. As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, until the name of her father is shown to have been registered in her birth certificate erroneously, there is no justification for allowing the petitioner to use the surname Pao. The corrections sought by the petitioner involve the very Identity of her parents. Surely, the propriety of such corrections should first be determined in a different proceeding more adversary in character than the summary case instituted by the petitioner with the trial court. Aside from the change of her name, the petitioner seeks a correction of entries in the civil registry for the benefit of her parents. This she may not do through a summary proceeding. The summary procedure for correction of the civil register under Rule 108 is confined to innocuous or clerical errors and not to a material change in the spelling of a surname as prayed for by the petitioner. 7 A clerical error must be apparent on the face of the record and should be capable of being corrected by reference to the record alone. 8 The petitioner seeks more than just the correction of a clerical error.

Moreover, under Section 3 of Rule 108, when cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby should be made parties to the proceeding. An inspection of all the pleadings

14

filed by the petitioner with the trial court shows that the local civil registrar concerned was never made a party to the proceeding. Said civil registrar being an indispensable party, a final determination of the case cannot be made. 9

The procedure recited in Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct. They may not be substituted one for the other for the sole purpose of expediency To hold otherwise would render nugatory the provisions of the Rules of Court allowing the change of one's name or the correction of entries in the civil registry only upon meritorious grounds. If both reliefs are to be sought in the same proceedings all the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 must be complied with.

Accordingly, We hold that the Petition filed with the trial court is not sufficient in form and substance and should have been dismissed by the trial court for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet in Special Proceeding Case No. 642 dated July 24,1969 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared to be without force or effect. The entries in the local civil registry of La Trinidad, Benguet pertaining to the petitioner Anita Po and her parents Po Yu and Pakiat Chan stand as they were before such Decision. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of La Trinidad, Benguet for his information and implementation. We make no pronouncement as to costs.

15

G.R. No. L-20874             May 25, 1966

IN RE PETITION FOR THE CHANGE OF NAME OF JOSELITO YU. JOSELITO YU, represented by his guardian ad litem, JUAN S. BARRERA, petitioner and appellant, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor and appellee.

Syquia Law Offices for petitioner and appellant.Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. C. Zaballero and Atty. J. Domingo de Leon for oppositor and appellee.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

In the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, Joselito Yu, represented by his guardian ad litem Juan S. Barrera, filed a petition to have his name changed to Ricardo Sy. Petitioner avers in his petition that he is a minor of 13 years, and a Chinese citizen who has been a resident of Manila for more than three years prior to the filing of the petition. As grounds for the change of name he alleges that as far as he can remember has been using the name "Ricardo Sy," that he grew up under the care and custody of Juan Sy Barrera, his guardian ad litem; that he is enrolled in school under the said name and that he was baptized "Ricardo Sy with his real name also stated."

Without a hearing being had, the court motu propio dismissed the petition on the ground that Rule 103 of the Revised Rules of Court may not be invoked by aliens.

In his appeal, petitioner1 contends that the lower court erred (1) in ruling that an alien cannot avail himself of the provisions of the rules of court relating to change of name; (2) in concluding that in this jurisdiction family or personal rights of an alien should be governed by the laws of his country; (3) in concluding that a simple reason why an alien's name should not be changed by judicial decree in this jurisdiction may be found in the inability of the local judicial authority to provide for the alien's change of name in his passport; and (4) in engaging in judicial legislation beyond its authority when it applied the law on change of name.

Rule 103 does not say that only citizens of the Philippines may petition for a change of name.2 Section 1 provides that "a person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Court of First Instance of the province in which he resides, or, in the City of Manila to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court." Here the word "person" is a generic term which is not limited to Filipino citizens, but embraces all natural persons. The rule does not even require that the citizenship of the petitioner be stated in his petition. It is enough that the petition be verified, signed by the petitioner or some other person in his behalf, and set forth (a) that the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of filing; (b) the cause for which the change of name is sought; and (c) the name asked for (Section 2). The rule is clear and affords no room for interpretation. It sets forth all the requirements, and Filipino citizenship is not one of them.

The Court a quo ruled that since the use of surnames is based on family rights, and since under Article 15 of the Civil Code laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad, the converse of the principle must be recognized, that is to say, the same matters in respect of an alien must be governed by the laws of his own country. The major premise of the proposition may be true in a general sense: one's surname is usually that by which not only one as an individual but one's family as well is known. Thus Title XIII of the Civil Code (Articles 364 to 373) contains provisions for the use of surnames by legitimate, legitimated, illegitimate, and adopted children,

16

as well as by women who are married, widowed or legally separated from their husbands. But a change of name as authorized under Rule 103 does not by itself define, or effect a change in, one's existing family relations, or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom; nor does it create new family rights and duties where none before were existing. It does not alter one's legal capacity, civil status or citizenship. What is altered is only the name, which is that word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from others and which he bears as the label of appellation for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him (38 Am. Jur. 596). The situation is no different whether the person whose name is changed be a citizen or an alien.

To be sure, there could be instances where the change applied for may be open to objection by parties who already bear the surname desired by the applicant, not because he would thereby acquire certain families with them but because the existence of such ties might be erroneously impressed on the public mind. But this is precisely the purpose of the judicial application — to determine whether there is proper and reasonable cause for the change of name. As held by this Court in several cases, in which pertinently enough the petitioners were aliens, the change is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will likely follow (Ong Peng Oan v. Republic, L-8035, Nov. 29, 1957; Tan v. Republic, L-16384, April, 26 1962; Ong Te v. Republic, L-15549, June 30, 1962; Moore v. Republic, L-18407, June 26, 1963). In not one of those cases, however, has it been ruled that an alien is not entitled to file a petition at all.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. No costs.

G.R. No. L-18008            October 30, 1962

ELISEA LAPERAL, petitioner, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor.

Martin B. Laurea and Associates for petitioner.Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor.

BARRERA, J.:

On May 10, 1960, Elisea Laperal filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio (Sp Proc. No. 433) a petition which reads:

1. That petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the City of Baguio for the last three years prior to the date of the filing of this petition;

2. That petitioner's maiden name is ELISEA LAPERAL; that on March 24, 1939, she married Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria; that in a partial decision entered on this Honorable Court on January 18, 1958, in Civil Case No. 356 of this Court, entitled 'Enrique R. Santamaria vs. Elisea L. Santamaria' Mr. Enrique Santamaria was given a decree of legal separation from her; that the said partial decision is now final;

3. That during her marriage to Enrique R. Santamaria, she naturally used, instead of her maiden name, that of Elisea L. Santamaria; that aside from her legal separation from Enrique R. Santamaria, she has also ceased to live with him for many years now;

17

4. That in view of the fact that she has been legally separated from Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria and has likewise ceased to live with him for many years, it is desirable that she be allowed to change her name and/or be permitted to resume using her maiden name, to wit: ELISEA LAPERAL.

WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prayed that after the necessary proceedings are had, she be allowed to resume using her maiden name of Elisea Laperal.

The petition was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that the same violates the provisions of Article 370 (should be 372) of the Civil Code, and that it is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court.

In its decision of October 31, 1960, the court denied the petition for the reason that Article 372 of the Civil Code requires the wife, even after she is decreed legally separated from her husband, to continue using the name and surname she employed before the legal separation. Upon petitioner's motion, however, the court, treating the petition as one for change of name, reconsidered its decision and granted the petition on the ground that to allow petitioner, who is a businesswoman decreed legally separated from her husband, to continue using her married name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. Hence, this appeal by the State.

The contention of the Republic finds support in the provisions of Article 372 of the New Civil Code which reads:

ART. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation. (Emphasis supplied)

Note that the language of the statute is mandatory that the wife, even after the legal separation has been decreed, shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation. This is so because her married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. It seems to be the policy of the law that the wife should continue to use the name indicative of her unchanged status for the benefit of all concerned.

The appellee contends, however, that the petition is substantially for change of her name from Elisea L. Santamaria, the one she has been using, since her marriage, to Elisea Laperal, her maiden name, giving as reason or cause therefor her being legally separated from the husband Enrique R. Santamaria, and the fact that they have ceased to live together for many years.

There seems to be no dispute that in the institution of these proceedings, the procedure prescribed in Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for change of name has been observed. But from the petition quoted in full at the beginning of these opinion, the only reason relied upon for the change of name is the fact that petitioner is legally separated from her husband and has, in fact, ceased to live with him for many years. It is doubtful, to say the least, whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general, may prevail over the specific provisions of Article 372 of the New Civil Code with regards to married women legally separated from their husbands. Even, however, applying Rule 103 to this case, the fact of legal separation alone — which is the only basis for the petition at bar — is, in our opinion, not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of herein petitioner, for to hold otherwise would be to provide an easy circumvention of the mandatory provisions of Article 372.

It is true that in the second decision which reconsidered the first it is stated that as the petitioner owns extensive business interests, the continued used of her husband surname may cause undue confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. This finding is however without basis. In the first place, these were not the causes upon which the petition was

18

based; hence, obviously no evidence to this effect had been adduced. Secondly, with the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, the conjugal partnership between petitioner and her husband had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. (Art. 106[2], Civil Cod). Consequently, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.

WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court of December 1, 1960, granting the petition, is hereby set aside and the petition dismissed. Without costs. So ordered

G.R. No. L-18284             April 30, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR, ANA ISABEL HENRIETTE ANTONIA CONCEPCION GEORGIANA, ISABEL VALDES JOHNSTON, petitioner-appellant, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.

Domingo T. Zavalla for oppositor-appellee.

LABRADOR, J.:

Appeal taken by petitioner-appellant Isabel Valdes Johnston from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dated September 19, 1960 and its order of October 31, 1960, Hon. Andres Reyes, presiding, prescribing the use of the surname Valdes by the adopted child instead of Valdes Johnston petitioner's married name at the time of the filing of the petition.

On June 24, 1960, petitioner-appellant Isabel Valdes Johnston, filed a petition for the adoption of one Ana Isabel Henriette Antonio Concepcion Georgiana, 2 years and 10 months old, then under the custody of the Hospicio de San Jose, an orphanage situated in the city of Manila. The petition shows that petitioner-appellant is 48 years old, married to Raymond Arthur Johnston, Filipino, residing at 12 San Lorenzo Drive, Makati, Rizal; that the couple are childless; that the consent of the Mother Superior of the orphanage and the husband of petitioner-appellant was obtained.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

Notice of the hearing of the petition was issued and duly published as required by law, and after hearing, the lower court rendered a decision granting the petition, with the following dispositive part:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted declaring the child Ana Isabel Henriette Antonia Concepcion Georgiana freed from all legal obligations and obedience and maintenance with respect to its natural parents and is, to all legal intents and purposes, the child of the petitioner, with the corresponding change of surname VALDES, which is the surname of petitioner.

The petitioner-appellant filed a motion on October 24, 1960, praying that the surname given to the minor be "Valdes Johnston", instead of "Valdes" only, but this motion was denied by the lower court in its order of October 31, 1960. Hence, this appeal.

Petitioner-appellant argues that since she is now using the surname of her husband by virtue of Article 370, par. 1 of the new Civil Code, and because that is the surname (Valdes Johnston) she

19

used in filing the petition in the present case, under which she testified at the time of the trial, and under which she is now known to all her relatives, friends and acquaintances, she had to be known by her maiden surname, and the lower court should have decreed that the minor whom she adopted should be allowed to bear the surname she is now using. She also argues that the use of the surname "Valdes" by the adopted child, as prescribed by the lower court, will create the impression that she is the illegitimate child of petitioner-appellant begotten before her marriage, a situation which is humiliating to both adopter and adopted.

The Solicitor General in reply argues that while it is true that a married woman is permitted to add to her surname her husband's surname, the fact remains that appellant's surname is Valdes and not Johnston; that a married woman has a surname of her own to which may be added her husband's surname if she so chooses; that if the minor be permitted to use the surname Valdes Johnston, much confusion would result because the public would be misled into believing that she was adopted by appellant's husband also, which is not true in this case.

We agree with the decision of the lower court authorizing or prescribing the use of the surname Valdes by the adopted child. The provision of law (Art. 341, par. 4, Civil Code) which entitles the adopted minor to the use of the adopter's surname, refers to the adopter's own surname and not to her surname acquired by virtue of marriage. Petitioner-appellant's real surname is Valdes and not Johnston, and as she made the adoption singly without the concurrence of her husband, and not as a married woman, her name as adopter was her maiden name. The adoption created a personal relationship between the adopter and the adopted, and the consent of Raymond Johnston, Isabel Valdes' husband, to the adoption by her individually, did not have the effect of making him an adopting father, so as to entitle the child to the use of Johnston's own surname.

Since adoption gives the person adopted the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter (Art. 341, par. 1, Civil Code), much confusion would indeed result, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, if the minor child herein were allowed to use the surname of the spouse who did not join in the adoption.

For one thing, to allow the minor to adopt the surname of the husband of the adopter, would mislead the public into believing that he had also been adopted by the husband, which is not the case. And when later, questions of successional rights arise, the husband's consent to the adoption might be presented to prove that he had actually joined in the adoption.

It is to forestall befuddling situations pointed out above and other possible confusing situations that may arise in the future, that this Court is inclined to apply strictly the provision of the Civil Code to the effect that an adopted child use the surname of the adopter himself or herself, and not that which is acquired by marriage.

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of the court below prescribing the use of the surname "Valdes" by the adopted minor Ana Isabel Henriette Antonio Concepcion Georgiana, is hereby affirmed. Without costs.

20

G.R. No. L-21194             April 29, 1966HAW LIONG, petitioner-appellee, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, First Assistant Solicitor General E. Umali and Atty. J. Domingo de Leon for oppositor-appellant.Feliciano A. Asoy for petitioner-appellee.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Petitioner seeks to change his name from Haw Liong to Alfonso Lantin in a petition filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte.

He testified that he is 47 years old, married, and an employee of the Leyte Asia Trading Company; that he has been a resident of Tacloban City for more than 20 years; that he wants to change his name to Alfonso Lantin because he is called by his Filipino friends as Alfonso and the name of his father is Placido Lantin; that he wants to have a Filipino name because he will soon be a Filipino citizen; that he came to the Philippines in 1925 and since then his Filipino friends have been calling him Alfonso; that there is no pending case against him as Haw Liong; and that in the event a case will arise against him as Haw Liong he is willing to appear and answer the same.

After hearing, the court a quo allowed petitioner to change his name from Haw Liong to Alfonso Lantin. The government has appealed.

This Court has already had occasion to state the view that the State has an interest in the names borne by individuals for purposes of identification and that a change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right. So that before a person can be authorized to change the name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry he must show proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied (Ong Peng Oao vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-8035, November 29, 1957). The following may be considered, among others, as proper or reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a petitioner for change of name: (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a change of status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimated; and (3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed., Vol. 1, p. 660).1äwphï1.ñët

Petitioner has not shown any proper or compelling reason that may justify the request for a change of name other than his desire to adopt the name Alfonso for the reason that he has always been known by that name by his Filipino friends and associates and because that is the family name of his father which he desires to follow to conform with the customs and traditions in the Philippines. But this claim which is merely supported by his own testimony cannot overcome the fact that the name given him from the very beginning as Haw Liong as in fact this is the name that appears in his landing certificate. The fact that he claims to be the son of one Placido Lantin, a Filipino is of no moment because if the same were true it is strange that the name that was given him upon birth is Haw Liong and he had to file a petition for naturalization to become a Filipino citizen. This indirectly belies his claim that the name that should be given him is Alfonso Lantin because that is the family name of his father "to conform with the customs and traditions and also for sentimental reasons."

The true situation however is, as was disclosed in his cross examination, that in his business dealings with other people he always signed as Haw Liong and never used the name Alfonso Lantin; that he came to be called Alfonso by his friends only when during the Japanese occupation his Filipino friends asked him how he was called and he told them that his name was Alfonso, and since then they started calling him by that name; and that he is known in Tacloban City as Haw Liong and has not contracted with any person under the name of Alfonso Lantin. We find, therefore, no proper or compelling reason that may justify the change of name desired by petitioner for his petition does not come under any of the cases above adverted to.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is set aside. The petition is denied, with costs.

21

G.R. No. L-20018             April 30, 1966CHIU HAP CHIU, petitioner-appellee, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, First Assistant Solicitor General E. Umali and J. Domingo de Leon for oppositor-appellant.Teodorico P. Labtic for petitioner-appellee.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Chiu Hap Chiu seeks to change his name to Lo Hap Chiu in a petition filed before the Court of First Instance of Davao. He testified that he was 30 years old, single, a doctor of medicine, and a resident of Davao City; that the name given him at birth was Lo Hap Chiu; that during his school days, or from elementary school to college, he was called by his classmates as Lo Hap Chiu for which reason he desires to have said name adopted instead of Chiu Hap Chiu to avoid confusion in the use of his name; and that the name given him in his alien certificate of registration is Chiu Hap Chiu.

After the reception of the evidence, the court a quo granted the petition. It found that petitioner was born on February 1, 1930 at Kulagsu, Fuken, China; that he is a Chinese citizen holding an alien certificate of residence; that he is a physician by profession and has no criminal record; that he has paid all his taxes to the government; that he desires to change his name from Chiu Hap Chiu to Lo Hap Chiu for the reason that the latter is the name he used while studying in the school and because his present name and surname are the same.

The government opposed the petition in view of its failure to find sufficient justification for the change of name desired by petitioner.

This Court has already had occasion to express the view that the State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entitles for purpose of identification and that a change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right. So that before a person can be authorized to change the name given him either in his certificate of birth or in the civil registry he must show proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied (Ong Peng Oan vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-8035, November 29, 1957). The following may be considered among others, as proper and reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a petition for change of name: (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a change of status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimized; and (3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed., Vol. I, p. 660).1äwphï1.ñët

Petitioner has not shown any proper or compelling reason that may justify the request for change of name other than his desire to use the name Lo Hap Chin on the alleged reason that that is the name given him in his birth certificate and in the schools he attended, but his claim was not satisfactorily proven, for aside from his own testimony and a photostatic copy of a certification issued in his favor as Doctor of Medicine by the University of Santo Tomas wherein it appears that his name is Lo Hap Chiu, there is nothing in the record to show that he used said name from grade school to college for he failed to present any documentary evidence to prove it. The truth is that he was registered in the Bureau of Immigration as Chiu Hap Chiu and in all the clearances secured by him from said Bureau the name used therein was Chiu Hap Chiu thereby indicating that he considered himself as such as regards the public. He has not shown that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name, and as a matter of fact he was referred to as Dr. Chiu Hap Chiu in his clearance from the Court of First Instance of Davao. Since the State has an interest in the name borne by an individual, especially an alien, and the latter's identity as a rule is established by the name appearing in his alien certificate of registration, we find no plausible reason for authorizing the change of name desired by petitioner.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside. No costs.

22

G.R. No. L-51201 May 29, 1980IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF MARIA ESTRELLA VERONICA PRIMITIVA DUTERTE, ESTRELLA S. ALFON, petitioner, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

ABAD SANTOS, 

This is a petition filed pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440 to review an Order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIII, dated December 29, 1978, which partially denied petitioner's prayer for a change of name. Only a question of law is involved and there is no controversy over the facts which are well-stated in the questioned Order as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£

This is verified petition filed on April 28, 1978 by petitioner Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte through her counsel, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez, praying that her name be changed from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon.

The notice setting the petition for hearing on December 14, 1978 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning was published in the Times Journal in its issues of July 28, August 5 and 11, 1978 and a copy thereof together with a copy of the petition was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (Exhibits C, C-1, C-2 and C-3).

At the hearing of the petition on December 14, 1978, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez appeared for the petitioner and Fiscal Donato Sor. Suyat, Jr. represented the office of the Solicitor General, Upon motion of counsel for the petitioner, without objection on the part of Fiscal Suyat, the Deputy Clerk of Court was appointed commissioner to receive the evidence and to submit the same for resolution of the Court.

From the testimonial and document evidence presented, it appears that petitioner Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte was born on May 15, 1952 at the U.S.T. Hospital (Exhibit A). She was registered at the local Civil Registrar's Office as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte On June 15, 1952, she was baptized as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte at the St. Anthony de Padua Church Singalong, Manila (Exhibit B). Her parents are Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte has been taken cared of by Mr. and Mrs. Hector Alfon. Petitioner and her uncle, Hector Alfon, have been residing at 728 J.R. Yulo Street corner Ideal Street, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila for twenty-three (23) years. When petitioner started schooling, she used the name Estrella S. Alfon. She attended her first grade up to fourth year high school at Stella Maris College using the name Estrella S. Alfon (Exhibits E, E-1, E-2 and E-3). After graduating from high school she enrolled at the Arellano University and finished Bachelor of Science in Nursing (Exhibit E-4). Her scholastic records from elementary to college show that she was registered by the name of Estrella S. Alfon. Petitioner has exercised her right of suffrage under the same name (Exhibit D). She has not committed any felony or misdemeanor (Exhibits G, G-1, G-2, G-3 and G-4).

Petitioner has advanced the following reasons for filing the petition:

1. She has been using the name Estrella Alfon since her childhood;

2. She has been enrolled in the grade school and in college using the same name;

3. She has continuously used the name Estrella S. Alfon since her infancy and all her friends and acquaintances know her by this name;

4. She has exercised her right of suffrage under the same name.

Section 5, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court provides:

23

Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that such order has been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner adjudge that such name be changed in accordance with the prayer of the petition.

The evidence submitted shows that the change of name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon is not proper and reasonable with respect to the surname. The fact that petitioner has been using a different surname and has become known with such surname does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to legally authorize and change her surname to Alfon. The birth certificate clearly shows that the father of petitioner is Filomeno Duterte. Petitioner likewise admitted this fact in her testimony. To allow petitioner to change her surname from Duterte to Alfon is equivalent to allowing her to use her mother's surname. Article 364 of the Civil Code provides:

Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.

If another purpose of the petitioner is to carry the surname of Alfon because her uncle who reared her since childhood has the surname "Alfon" then the remedy is not a petition for change of name.

WHEREFORE, the petition insofar as the first name is granted but denied with respect to the surname. Petitioner is authorized to change her name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon Duterte.

Let copy of this order be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig, Metro Manila pursuant to Section 3, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.

The lower court should have fully granted the petition.

The only reason why the lower court denied the petitioner's prayer to change her surname is that as legitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon she should principally use the surname of her father invoking Art. 364 of the Civil Code. But the word "principally" as used in the codal provision is not equivalent to "exclusively" so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which it is equally entitled. Moreover, this Court in Haw Liong vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-21194. April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 677, 679, said: têñ.£îhqwâ£

The following may be considered, among others, as proper or reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a petitioner for change of name; (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a change of' status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimated; and (3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed., Vol. 1, p. 660).

In the case at bar, it has been shown that petitioner has, since childhood, borne the name Estrella S. Alfon although her birth records and baptismal certificate show otherwise; she was enrolled in the schools from the grades up to college under the name Estrella S. Alfon; all her friends call her by this name; she finished her course in Nursing in college and was graduated and given a diploma under this name; and she exercised the right of suffrage likewise under this name. There is therefore ample justification to grant fully her petition which is not whimsical but on the contrary is based on a solid and reasonable ground, i.e. to avoid confusion.

WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is hereby modified in that, the petitioner is allowed to change not only her first name but also her surname so as to be known as ESTRELLA S. ALFON. No costs.

24