Amen | Remedial Law Review 2 Notes | 2013

Remedial Law Review 2

Notes on Special Proceedings

Governing laws/rules:

Rules 72-109 pertains to the Rules on Special Proceedings. However, there are rules which are considered ineffective, impractical or impasse, to wit, Rule 106 (Constitution of Family Home), Rule 104 (Voluntary Dissolution of Corporations). Others remain but not used, say, Rule 99 (Adoption and Custody of Minors). The rules on Guardianship were amended and Rule 103 (Change of Name) and Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) were both amended by RA 9048 which was further amended by RA 10172, around last year, 2012.

Order of Importance

1. Settlement of Estate- this states the meat of Special Proceedings.2. Guardianship- practically the same rules of procedure as settlement of estate, because only that in settlement of estate, the subject is dead unlike in guardianship, the subject is still alive. Physically alive, but mentally dead or a minor. That is the difference between the two.3. Adoption- although this is already studied in civil law; it is important because of the new rule on adoption, not the laws on adoption (R.A. 3552, the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 as well as R.A. 8043, the Inter Country Adoption Law of 1995) not that because that is substantive. I am talking of the new rule on adoption which took effect sometime in August 2004, thats why I think its the second most important thing to discuss here. 4. Change of Name/ Correction of entries- Again, because of the new law. So the possibility of being asked in the BAR is great. (Read also R.A. 9048).5. Habeas Corpus- a peculiar kind of special proceeding

Definition of Special Proceeding

Under Rule 1, Section 3, a special proceeding is a remedy by which a person seeks to establish a status, right or particular fact.

Why Special?

Because primarily, the rules mandating Special Proceedings are governed not by the ordinary civil action rules, but has its own nuances. For example, because the objective is the establishment of a right, status, or a particular fact, summons, here, is ordinarily not needed. In special proceedings, there is no defendant, so there is no need for summons. Publication, is the means through which the court can acquire jurisdiction over the case. Summons, as we have studied is the way by which a court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant (Rule 14). The only exception is, of course, Habeas Corpus Proceedings wherein you name a respondent but the respondent here is different from a defendant because summons is not necessary.

The law on prescription will not apply. In that, the probate of the will can still be done anytime because what the law only requires for period to apply is on the duty to show/present the will within 10 days from knowledge of death.

Case: Erlinda Pilapil and Heirs of Donata Ortiz Briones vs. Heirs of Maximino Briones, GR No. 150175, February 5, 2007, J. Chico-Nazario.

FACTS: Petitioners are the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz-Briones (Donata), consisting of her surviving sister, Rizalina Ortiz-Aguila (Rizalina); Rizalinas daughter, Erlinda Pilapil (Erlinda); and the other nephews and nieces of Donata, in representation of her two other sisters who had also passed away. Respondents, on the other hand, are the heirs of the late Maximino Briones (Maximino), composed of his nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, in representation of the deceased siblings of Maximino. Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not produce any children. When Maximino died, Donata instituted an intestate proceeding to settle he husbands estate before the CFI. The court a quo issued a letter of administration appointing Donata as the adminstratrix of the estate. Subsequently, it likewise award ownership of the properties to Donata and the said order was recorded in the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds, and by virtue thereof, received new TCTs, covering the said properties, now in her name. The controversy arise when Donata died and one of her nieces, petitioner herein Erlinda Pilapil instituted before the RTC a petition for the administration of the intestate estate of Donata. Erlinda and her husband Gregorio was later on appointed as the administrators of the estate. Petitioner claimed exclusive ownership over three parcels of land based on the two deeds of donation allegedly executed in her favor by her aunt Donata. The other heirs opposed Erlindas claimed.

Meanwhile, Silverio Briones, filed a petition before the RTC for letters of administration for the intestate estate of the late Maximino, which was initially granted by the court, allowing Silverio to collect rentals from the said estate. But then Gregorio filed with the RTC a Motion to Set Aside the Order, claiming that the said properties were under his and his wife administration. The RTC set aside Silverios administration. Hence, the heirs of Maximino filed a Complaint with the RTC against the heirs of Donata for the partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of real property. They alleged that Donata, as administratrix of the estate of Maximino, through fraud and misrepresentation, in breach of trust, and without the knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded in registering in her name the real properties belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino. The RTC ruled in favor of the heirs of Maximino declaring that they are entitled to the of the real properties covered by the TCTs issued in Donatas named. And it ordered Erlinda to reconvey to the heirs the said properties and render an accounting of the fruits thereof. The heirs of Donata appealed the said decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs decision. This case was then elevated before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the order issued by the CFI awarding the properties of Maximino to Donata is void considering that no notices were sent to the other heirs of Maximino?

HELD: No. While it is true that since the CFI was not informed that Maximino still had surviving siblings and so the court was not able to order that these siblings be given personal notices of the intestate proceedings, it should be borne in mind that the settlement of estate, whether testate or intestate, is a proceeding in rem, and that the publication in the newspapers of the filing of the application and of the date set for the hearing of the same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice to the whole world of the existence of the proceedings and of the hearing on the date and time indicated in the publication. The publication requirement of the notice in newspapers is precisely for the purpose of informing all interested parties in the estate of the deceased of the existence of the settlement proceedings, most especially those who were not named as heirs or creditors in the petition, regardless of whether such omission was voluntarily or involuntarily made.

Moreover, there stands a presumption, in the absence to the contrary that the CFI judge, regularly performed his duties in the case which included sending out notices and requiring the presentation of proof of service of such notices. The heirs of Maximino did not profound sufficient evidence to debunk the presumption and that they only made general denial of the knowledge of the case.

A review of the records fails to show any allegation or concrete proof that the CFI also failed to order the publication in newspapers of the notice of the intestate proceedings and to require proof from Donata of compliance therewith. Neither can this Court find any reason or explanation as to why Maximinos siblings could have missed the published notice of the intestate proceedings of their brother.

Moreover, even if Donatas allegation that she was Maximinos sole heir does constitute fraud, it is insufficient to justify abandonment of the CFI Order, considering the nature of intestate proceedings as being in rem and the disputable presumptions of the regular performance of official duty and lawful exercise of jurisdiction by the CFI in rendering the questioned Order in the case at bar.

1. Settlement of Estate (Rule 74- Summary Settlement of Estate)

What is an estate?It is the totality of assets and liabilities of the decedent.

Why is that that the Settlement of Estate is complex?

It is because in this case, the person whose estate is subject to controversy is already NOT around.

2 Modes of Settlement of Estate

1. Judicial

a. Summary Settlement of Estate of small value

b. Judicial partition (Rule 69)c. Escheat (Rule 91)d. Administrative/Conventional Settlement of Estate (Rule 73-90)2. Extrajudicial

a. Extrajudicial partition

b. Affidavit of Self-Adjudication

A. Extrajudicial Partition

Situation: When X, the decedent left A, B, C, and D as heirs. The four of them enter into extrajudicial partition of the estate left by X. They had it published, and proceeded to the Register of Deeds, and finally, the distribution of the estate in accordance with the partition entered into. This pertains to an estate composing real properties. However, if the estate composes personal properties, the four of the heirs can right away distribute among themselves the personal properties left by X.

B. Affidavit of Self-Adjudication

The requirements include the following:

1. The decedent dies without a will.

2. There is only one heir left by the decedent.

3. Whether or not there is a debt left by the decedent so long as if there is debt, the estate can make good of it.

How do you undergo with the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication?The word suggests already that it is an affidavit, which in there, you have to state that your father or your mother died; and that he/she left the following properties; and that you are the only heir of your parent (evidenced by the marriage contract of your parents and your birth certificate); and that the estate are such and such (describe with particularity if the property happens to be a real property), valued accordingly; and that they are found there (location of property). After complying with the same, you simply submit that to the Register of Deeds and the Register of Deeds will act on it only after you comply with the requirement of publication and if there are personal properties belonging to the estate, you have to put up a bond according to the value or upon the discretion of the register of Deeds. This is extrajudicial; hence, the court has no participation whatsoever. You simply submit to the Register of Deeds, the Register of Deeds acts on it and if there is already publication, once a week for 3 consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation, the Register of Deeds will simply transfer the title in favor of the affiant.

Requirements of both Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate

1. The necessary filing of public instrument or by stipulation in pending action for partition or the sole heir in the latters affidavit of self-adjudication.

2. Bond with the said Register of Deeds in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal property involved as certified to under oath by the parties.

3. Conditioned upon payment of any just claim charged with a liability to creditors, heirs, or other persons for the full period of 2 years after such distribution, notwithstanding any transfers of real estate that may have been made.

4. This shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for 3 consecutive weeks.

Rules regarding Extrajudicial Settlement of Estates

1. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if NO creditor files a petition for letters administration within 2 years after the death of the decedent.

2. No extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.

A. Summary Estate of Small Value

This is provided for under Rule 74 (Summary Settlement of Estates). Requirements under the Rule:

1. The gross value of the estate of a deceased person, (testate or intestate) DOES NOT EXCEED P10,000.

2. A petition alleging the 1st requirement must be filed by an interested person.3. This can only be done upon hearing which shall be held not less than 1 month nor more than 3 months from the date of the last publication of a notice.4. The notice must be published once a week for 3 consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation.5. Notice to other interested persons as the court may direct.6. This can be proceeded to by the court summarily and even without the appointment of executor or administrator, and without delay to grant, if proper, allowance of will. The purpose will be.a. To determine who are persons legally entitled to participate in the estate.b. To apportion and divide among the heirs after payment of such debts of the estate as the court shall then find to be due, to persons in their own right, if they are of lawful age and legal capacity or by their guardians or trustees legally appointed and qualified, if otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to receive and enter into the possession of the portions of the estate so awarded to them respectively.c. To also make such other orders as may be just respecting the costs of the proceedings and all other orders and judgments made or rendered in the course thereof shall be recorded in the office of the clerk, and the order of partition or award, if it involves real estate, shall be recorded in the proper registers office.7. Distributees shall be required to file a bond in an amount to be fixed by the court for personal property, conditioned for the payment of any just claim.

Rules regarding Summary Settlement of Estate of Small Value

1. If within 2 years after settlement and distribution of an estate, an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation in the estate- such heir or such other person may compel the settlement of the estate in the courts for the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation.

2. If within 2 years, it shall appear that there are debts outstanding against the estate which have not been paid or that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation payable in money- the court may by order for that purpose, after hearing settle the amount of such debts or lawful participation and order how much and in what manner each distribute shall contribute in the payment thereof and may issue execution, if circumstances require, against the bond or against the real estate belonging to the deceased or both.

3. When can minor or incapacitated person file a claim against estate in this Rule? If on the date of the expiration of the period of 2 years, the person authorized to file a claim is a minor, mentally incapacitated, or is in prison or outside of the Philippines, he may present his claim within one (1) year after such disability is REMOVED.

B. Judicial Partition

This is provided for under Rule 69 on Partition.

C. Escheat

In another form of Judicial Settlement, Escheat tells us that if a person dies without a will, without an heir, and no debts, then the Office of the Solicitor General or his representative (such as the provincial or city prosecutor) may file a petition, under the directive of the President of the Philippines, an Escheat Proceeding.

Requirements before filing:a. Person dies intestate1. Is there a possibility to still file an escheat proceeding despite the presence of a will? Yes. Even if the decedent died testate but his will was NOT PROBATED, it is as if he has no known heirs and there are no persons entitled to his property.

b. Seized of real or personal properties in the Philippinesc. Left no heir or person by law entitled to the same Where to file?

a. If resident, RTC where the deceased last resided or in which he had estate.b. If non-resident, RTC of the place where his estate is located. But if it happens that during the pendency of the proceeding, a will pops up, and then the proceeding is discontinued.

If an heir, devisee, legatee, widow, widower or other person entitled to such estate (PERSON WITH INTEREST) pops up and files a claim thereto with the court within 5 years from the date of such judgment, then the proceeding may be suspended and such appearing person with interest shall establish his right otherwise, after the hearing, the property will go to the government. This escheat proceeding is founded on the theory that all lands belong to the State known as the Regalian Doctrine that you studied under LTD (Land Titles & Deeds and he who claims otherwise has the burden of proof so after the escheat proceedings, the property belonging to the estate will go to the city or municipality where it is found) and so as the Order of Succession in Civil Code.

The period of filing claims is WITHIN 5 YEARS FROM DATE OF JUDGMENT, and such 5 years shall be reckoned from the DATE THE PROPERTY WAS DELIVERED TO THE STATE. However, if the property has been sold, the municipality or city shall be accountable only for such part of the proceeds as may NOT HAVE BEEN LAWFULLY SPENT.

The court, at the instance of an interested party, or on its own motion, may ORDER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT TRUST, so only the income from the property shall be used. So if the proceeding is in Manila, but the property escheated is in Calamba, the property escheated located in Calamba will go to the City of Calamba and not to the City of Manila. The same thing with personal property, where it may be found and the Rule is very specific that the property will be spent for the benefit of public schools, and public charitable institutions and centers in said municipalities or cities.

What are the orders of the court after a petition is sufficient in form and substance?

1. Make an order of hearing and such shall NOT be more than 6 months after entry of order.

2. Direct the publication of a copy of the order at least once a week for 6 consecutive weeks.

What will be the remedy of the Respondent?

When the petition does not state facts which entitle the petitioner to the remedy prayed for, the respondent may file a MOTION TO DISMISS the petition.

To whom will the property escheated be assigned?

1. If personal property- to the Municipality or city where he last resided.

2. If real property- to the Municipality or city where the property is situated.

3. If the deceased never resided in the Philippines- to the Municipality of city where the property may be found.

Under Rule 91, Sec.5 is another form of escheat because that was given in the BAR 5 years ago. This speaks of reversion. In other words, the property was acquired by an individual in violation of the Constitution. Under the Constitution, any person, even foreigners who were former Filipinos, can now acquire property in the Philippines and that was given more strength because of the Dual Citizenship Law. Actions for REVERSION are proper in illegal sales of land to disqualified aliens. This will in no way apply to properties taken from enemy nationals after WORLD WAR II and which were reacquired by the Republic because such reacquisition was in pursuant to the Philippine Property Act of 1946 and not by virtue of an ESCHEAT PROCEEDING. The action must be instituted in the province where the land lies in whole or in part.

Even if title thereto was not transferred to the Government, can it be escheated to local government? No.

The thirds instance of escheat is that of unclaimed dormant accounts for 10 years under the Unclaimed Balance Act which shall be filed at the RTC of the place where the dormant deposits are found.

The right to escheat may be waived expressly or impliedly. The proceedings in Escheat CANNOT BE CONVERTED INTO SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE. For the distribution of the estate of the decedent to be instituted, the proper petitions must be presented and the proceedings should comply with the requirements of the Rule. This is so because, an escheat proceeding does not have the power to order or proceed with the distribution of the estate of a decedent in escheat proceedings and adjudicate the properties to the oppositor. (Municipality of Magalloon, Negros Occidental vs. Ignatius Henry, Oct. 26, 1960)

D. Administrative/Conventional Settlement of Estate

This is provided for under Rule 73-90 of the Rules of Court.

Rule 73- Venue and Processes

In this Rule, the word VENUE never appeared. But the word jurisdiction appears three times.

What court has jurisdiction over settlement of estate cases?

The jurisdiction is determined based on the GROSS VALUE of the property subject to settlement. It is in RTC, if the gross value exceeds 300,000 outside Metro Manila or if it exceeds 400,000 within Metro Manila. However, it is in MTC if the otherwise appears.

What will be the relevance of VENUE in this Rule?

This is provided for in the long line of cases starting from Cuenco vs. Cuenco, Fule vs. CA and latest is San Luis vs. San Luis. It is now settled (because of these cases) that residence is only a matter of venue. It is not a matter of jurisdiction.

Cuenco vs. Cuenco

This case of Cuenco is about Senator Cuenco. That Cuenco Street in Quezon City, parallelled to Espaa or Quezon Blvd. He was a resident of Cebu but also had a house in Quezon City because he was a member the Senate. When he died in Quezon City, his residence was in Cebu. When he died, he was already a widower at the time, so he had two families: the first family with his first wife and the second family with his second wife. His second wife, staying with him in Quezon City, filed a petition for the settlement of his estate in the RTC (Then CFI) of Q.C. After the 9- day novena for his demise, the heirs of Senator Cuenco in Cebu City, filed a petition for settlement of his estate in Cebu. This reached the SC. The issue was in fact wrong: Which court has jurisdiction? It is not a matter of jurisdiction but only of venue. But the greater error here is not the error of the petitioners but the error of the Court. Why? Because the Q.C. Court on its own initiative (motu propio) said we are going to give way to the court in Cebu to settle the estate. That cannot be done because under the Rule, the court which first takes cognizance of a petition for settlement of estate, takes it to the exclusion of all other courts. (Exclusionary Rule in Special Proceedings) And so, which court has jurisdiction? Both courts have jurisdiction actually, but because of the Rule, since it was first filed with the Q.C. Court, it was already taken cognizance of by said court in Q.C. to the exclusion of all other courts, including the Cebu Court. That is why if ever the court cedes its authority in favor of the Cebu Court, that is wrong. It should have been correct if anybody interested in the petition files a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue but there was none in Quezon City court NOT in Cebu court.

In one of the Bar Exams using Cuenco vs. Cuenco, way back in 1992, this was treated by the examiner saying that a motion to dismiss was filed with the Cebu Court and the Cebu Court granted it. Wrong. Why? Because the Cebu court did not acquire jurisdiction because the petition was first filed in Q. C. and there can be no dual jurisdiction here because the Rule says: the court acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.

This case was followed by the case of Eusebio vs. Eusebio and finally settled in the case of Fule vs. CA, a 1975 case. Take note of that doctrine because that is very basic in Settlement of Estate under Sec. 1 of the Rule, there does not speak of jurisdiction but only of venue. In Fule it has been settled that the residence is the actual place of habitation.

So that if a person has two residences, the Fule case settled that residence is the place of actual habitation or it may not be the place of actual habitation, provided there is animus manendi (intent to remain) and animus revertendi (intent to return).

Rule 75- Production of Will; Allowance of Will Necessary

Under the Rule, it says that, No will shall pass either real or personal property unless proved and allowed in the property court. And that subject to the right of appeal, such allowance of the will shall be conclusive as to its due execution.

Are you bound to file a petition?

No. The obligation there is only to deliver the will. But if you do file a petition, because you are the custodian of the will, you must have an interest in the estate. You may either be the named administrator, a devisee, a legatee, or a creditor, and with more reason, if you are an heir, you have an interest. If you are in the custody of the will, and you filed a petition for settlement of estate, you have to attach the will in your petition. But if you are not in custody of the will and you are interested in the settlement of the estate, you simply file a petition without the will annexed.

This can also be evidenced by the provision under Rule 76 Section 3 that, upon presentation of the will to the court having jurisdiction, the court will now set the date for hearing thereof with the exception when the testator on its own initiative probated his will during his lifetime, in which case, no publication is required and notice will only be required to be made to compulsory heirs. Hence, SURRENDER here is tantamount to a petition.

Situation: H is a resident of Caloocan and he executed a will. He gave it to his kumpadre as a custodian who lived in Baguio. H died in Caloocan. The kumpadre surrendered to RTC of Baguio City which is the court of proper jurisdiction, the will executed by H.

May the heir still file a petition? No, because of the EXCLUSIONARY RULE under Rule 73 in that mere surrender of the will commences the settlement of the estate.

What court has jurisdiction? Again, it depends on the gross value of the estate involved.

What if all the heirs resided in Caloocan City, and they filed petition for probate in RTC of Caloocan, given that the surrender of the will was done in RTC of Baguio where the custodian resided, can the heir move to dismiss the case in Baguio? Yes, because RTC of Caloocan has no jurisdiction since the commencement of the settlement was already done in RTC of Baguio which is understood to be to the exclusion of other courts.

What if the petition now was filed in RTC Baguio City, and you move for its dismissal in yet another RTC branch, how will you rule on the same? The same thing, you cannot do so because once a branch of RTC takes cognizance of the case, it is still understood that it is to the exclusion of the other branches of such RTC, if any.

If you are a custodian of a will of the decedent, what is your obligation?

To deliver to the court the will within 20 days after the death. (Sec. 2, Rule 75)

Rules under this Rule:

1. There is a corresponding sanctions to custodian and executor and also to persons retaining the will when not heeding to the mandate/order of the court, which are:

a. A person who neglects any of the duties of a custodian without excuse satisfactory- fined not exceeding 2,000.b. A person having custody of a will who neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same when ordered to do so- committed to prison and there kept until delivery.Rule 76- Allowance or Disallowance of Will

What is Probate?

It is the act of proving in a court a document purporting to be the last will and testament of a deceased in order that it may be officially recognized, registered and its provisions carried out insofar as they are in accordance with the law or also known as allowance of the will.

What will be the contents of the Petition?

The following must be shown on the petition as far as known to the petitioner:

1. The Jurisdictional Facts:

a. Death of the testator

b. His residence at the time of death or the province where estate was left by the decedent who is non-resident

2. Names, ages and residences of the heirs, legatees and devisees of the testator or decedent

3. Probate value and character of the property of the estate

4. Name of the person for whom letters are prayed for

5. Name of the person having custody of the will if it has not been delivered to the court

*No defect in the petition shall render VOID the allowance of the will or the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration with the will annexed.

What is the effect of the probate of the will?

It is conclusive as to the execution and validity of the will (even against the State). Thus, a criminal case against the forger may not lie after the will has been probated because the probate of the will is conclusive as to its execution and validity.

What is the issue in probate of the will?

It is with respect only to the determination of the extrinsic validity (due execution), not the intrinsic validity of testamentary dispositions.

Exceptions:

1. On Principle of Practical Consideration

a. The waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head on the issues of the validity of the provisions of the will in question.b. Where the entire or all testamentary dispositions are VOID and where the defect is apparent on its face.Case: Teresita De Leon, Zenaida Nicolas and Heirs of Antonio Nicolas vs. Court of Appeals and Ramon Nicolas GR No. 128781, August 6, 2002, J. Austria-Martinez.

FACTS: Petitioner Teresita De Leon was appointed as the administratrix of the estate of Rafael C. Nicolas, her father. Deceased spouses Rafael and Salud Nicolas were the parents of petitioner Teresita N. de Leon, Estrellita N. Vizconde, Antonio Nicolas (deceased husband of petitioner Zenaida Nicolas and predecessor of the petitioners Heirs of Antonio Nicolas), Ramon Nicolas and Roberto Nicolas. Private Respondent Ramon Nicolas filed a Motion for Collation claiming that the deceased Rafael Nicolas had given several properties to his grandchildren and that administratrix-petitioner Teresita failed to include the same in the inventory of the estate of the decedent. The trial court granted the motion and ordered the collation of the properties allegedly received by the grandchildren during the lifetime of the decedent to the estate proceeding. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the properties subject of the Order "were already titled in their names years ago" and those titles may not be collaterally attacked in a motion for collation. The RTC issued an Order denying said motion, ruling that it is within the jurisdiction of the court to determine whether titled properties should be collated, citing Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court which provides that the final order of the court concerning questions as to advancements made shall be binding on the person raising the question and on the heir. Based on the said order, Teresita filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and this time, the trial court ordered Ramon Nicolas to prove to the satisfaction of the court whether the properties disposed of by the late Rafael Nicolas before the latters death was gratuitous or for valuable consideration. The Court believes that he or she who asserts should prove whether the disposition of the properties was gratuitously made or for valuable consideration. Subsequently, the RTC removed petitioner as the administratrix on the ground of conflict of interest considering her claim that she paid valuable consideration for the subject properties acquired by her from her deceased father and therefore the same should not be included in the collation. Again, Teresita filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that her appointment as administratrix be maintained that the properties acquired by them be declared as the exclusive properties of the registered owners therein and not subject to collation. The trial court denied the said motion. The case was subsequently elevated via petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. However, it affirmed the decision of the lower court ruling that the order of the trial court directing the inclusion of the properties therein enumerated in the estate of the deceased Rafael Nicolas had already become final for failure of petitioners to appeal from the order of collation. Hence the matter was raised before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the order of the trial court to include properties received by the heirs for collation is final and binding upon the heirs or third persons?

2. Whether the order of trial court is an order of collation or an order of exclusion/inclusion?

HELD:

(1) No. Contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals that the order of the trial court had become final for failure of petitioners to appeal therefrom in due time, we hold that said order is interlocutory in nature. Our pronouncement in Garcia v. Garcia supports this ruling:

"The court which acquires jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person through the filing of the corresponding proceedings, has supervision and control over the said properties, and under the said power, it is its inherent duty to see that the inventory submitted by the administrator appointed by it contains all the properties, rights and credits which the law requires the administrator to set out in his inventory. In compliance with this duty the court has also inherent power to determine what properties, rights and credits of the deceased should be included in or excluded from the inventory. Should an heir or person interested in the properties of a deceased person duly call the courts attention to the fact that certain properties, rights or credits have been left out in the inventory, it is likewise the courts duty to hear the observations, with power to determine if such observations should be attended to or not and if the properties referred to therein belong prima facie to the intestate, but no such determination is final and ultimate in nature as to the ownership of the said properties." (Emphasis supplied)

A probate court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding, can only pass upon questions of title provisionally. The rationale therefor and the proper recourse of the aggrieved party are expounded in Jimenez v. Court of Appeals:

"The patent reason is the probate courts limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate action.

"All that the said court could do as regards said properties is determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so."

Further, In Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, we held:

"[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so."

Guided by the above jurisprudence, it is clear that the Court of Appeals committed an error in considering the assailed order as final or binding upon the heirs or third persons who dispute the inclusion of certain properties in the intestate estate of the deceased Rafael Nicolas. Under the foregoing rulings of the Court, any aggrieved party, or a third person for that matter, may bring an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims.

(2) It is an order of an exclusion/inclusion.

Such Order in question is an interlocutory and not a final order is more apparent than real. This is because the questioned Order was erroneously referred to as an order of collation both by the RTC and the appellate court. For all intents and purposes, said Order is a mere order including the subject properties in the inventory of the estate of the decedent.The Court held in Valero Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals that the order of exclusion (or inclusion) is not a final order; that it is interlocutory in the sense that it did not settle once and for all the title to the subject lots; that the prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties.Based thereon, we find that what the parties and the lower courts have perceived to be as an Order of Collation is nothing more than an order of inclusion in the inventory of the estate which, as we have already discussed, is an interlocutory order. The motion for collation was filed with the probate court at the early stage of the intestate estate proceedings. We have examined the records of the case and we found no indication that the debts of the decedents spouses have been paid and the net remainder of the conjugal estate have already been determined, and the estates of the deceased spouses at the time filing of the motion for collation were ready for partition and distribution. In other words, the issue on collation is still premature.Who may file for the allowance of will?

Any party who has direct and material interest in the will or estate consisting of:

D- Devisee

E- Executor

L- Legatee

T- Testator

A- Any other person interested in the estate

Why may be disqualified?

Here, you have to consider the last person allowed filing, Any other person INTERESTED IN THE ESTATE which means any person who would be benefited by the estate such as an HEIR or one who has a claim against the estate, such as CREDITOR. Hence, those not having such qualification may be disqualified to file for the allowance of the will.

Situation: If A executed the will and in his will, he named B as devisee, C as legatee and spurious son D, so as W as sister. Who among the persons stated in the will may file a petition?

All except W because the latter cannot file because under the Rule on Succession, a sister is not one in which will be inherited by the decedent unless the spurious son is not included in the facts.

What are these concepts referring to?

1. No witness rule

a. This is only applicable in case there is a lost or destroyed holographic will or the testator probated his own holographic will. General rule: A holographic will if destroyed CANNOT be probated. Except: If there exists a photostatic or Xerox copy thereof.2. One witness rule

a. In probating holographic will or notarial will and there is no contest thereof.3. Two witness rule

a. In case of a loss or destruction of notarial will, for the purpose of establishing the execution and validity thereof, NO NOTARIAL WILL SHALL BE PROVED in circumstances mentioned, when the will is proved to have been in existence at the time of death of the testator or is shown to have been fraudulently or accidentally destroyed in the lifetime of the testator without his knowledge, UNLESS its provisions are clearly and distinctly proved by at least 2 credible witnesses. If proved, the provisions thereof must be distinctly stated and certified by the Judge under the seal of the court and the certificate must be filed and recorded.4. Three witness rule

a. Required if someone else filed the probate of the will. If a holographic will is contested, the same shall be allowed if at least three (3) witnesses who know the handwriting of the testator and signature. Otherwise, an expert witness is required.5. Four witness rule

a. In case of notarial will to be probated, whether contested or not, referring to the number of subscribing witnesses. It is required that all the subscribing witnesses and the notary in case wills executed under Civil Code. What are the grounds for Disallowing Wills?

F- If the will is not executed and attested as required by law; formalities thereof

I- If the testator was insane or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the time of its execution

D- If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear or threats

U- If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person for his benefit

S- If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of fixing his signature thereto

Rule 77- Allowance of Will Proved Outside of Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder

What is the rationale for the re-probate?

This is because the Philippine courts do not recognize foreign judgment, and such that probate of the will abroad is one kind of a foreign judgment.

How will this be enforced in our jurisdiction?

In relation to Rule 39, Section 48, the effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order will be;

1. Conclusive upon the title to the thing- in case of a judgment or final order upon specific thing;

2. Presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by subsequent title- in case of judgment against a person.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of law or fact.

What if the probated will abroad is not established as a fact of such probate, what laws will apply?

The doctrine on processual presumption will be applicable, in a sense that foreign law is considered as the same as that of the domestic law

Which court has jurisdiction for re-probate of will?

It is in the RTC because the subject matter, that is, probate of will (considered as foreign judgment), is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Where is the venue?

It is in the place of final, and actual abode of the decedent. In the absence of residence, the place where any of the property is located to the exclusion of other venues. EXCLUSIONARY RULE STILL APPLIES HERE.

Who may file?

Any person interested in the estate.

In the petition for re-probate, what should be alleged?

1. That the testator was domiciled in a foreign country.

2. That the will has been admitted to probate in such country.

3. That the foreign court was, under the laws of said foreign country, a probate court with jurisdiction over the proceedings.4. The law on probate procedure in said foreign country proof of compliance therewith.5. The legal requirements in said foreign country for the valid execution of the will.There should be appointment of ancillary administrator (The administrator appointed to take charge of the properties in the Philippines, domestic) and domiciliary administrator (The administrator domiciled in foreign country)

Effects of the allowance of a will under this Rule:

1. The will shall be treated as if originally proved and allowed in Philippine courts.

2. Letters testamentary or administration with a will annexed shall extend to all estates in the Philippines.

3. After payment of just debts and expenses of administration, the residue of the estate shall be disposed of as provided by law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or country.

Rule 78- Letters Testamentary and Letters of Administration, When and to Whom issued

What is Letter Testamentary and Letter of Administration?

Letter Testamentary- It is a process in which there is an appointment of an executor.

Letter of Administration- It is a process in which there is no appointment of an executor

Can a letter of administration be issued even if a will provides for executor?

Yes. Section 4 hereto provides that a letter of administration may be issued even if there exist a will designating an executor, if the latter is incompetent, refuses to accept the trust and fails to give a bond.

When letters of administration be granted?

1. If no executor is named in the will,

2. or the executor/s are incompetent, refuse to accept the trust or fails to give a bond,

3. or a person dies intestate.

To whom letters of administration granted?

There is preference of persons allowed by Rules, as follows:

1. To the surviving spouse, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or their nominee, if competent and willing to serve.

2. In default of the foregoing, to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve.

3. In default of the preceding, to such other person as the court may select.

Case: In the matter of the Intestate Estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay and Emilio Suntay III vs. Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay GR No. 183053, June 6, 2010, J. Nachura.

FACTS: On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina), married to Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico), died intestate. In 1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and Federico. At the time of her death, Cristina was survived by her husband, Federico, and several grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay. During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they begot three children, namely: herein respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and Emilio II, all surnamed Cojuangco-Suntay. Emilio Is marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was subsequently annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had two children out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita Suntay Taedo (Nenita), by two different women, Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel Santos, respectively.

Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was reared ever since he was a mere baby, nine months old, by the spouses Federico and Cristina and was an acknowledged natural child of Emilio I. Nenita is an acknowledged natural child of Emilio I and was likewise brought up by the spouses Federico and Cristina. When Christina died, Federico adopted their illegitimate grandchildren Emilio III and Nenita. Respondent Isabel Cojuangco - Suntay filed a petition for the issuance of the letters of administration in her favor for the administration of the estate of Cristina. This was opposed by Federico claiming that as her spouse, he is better suited in administering the properties of his deceased wife.

He later filed a manifestation nominating his adopted son, Emilio the III, as administrator of the properties of Cristina in the event that he would be better adjudge as the one with better right to the letter of administration. In the course of the proceeding, Federico died. The trial court issued an order appointing Emilio III as the administrator of the decedent Cristina estate. Aggrieved, respondent appealed before the Court of Appeals, which reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and revoked the letters of administration issued to Emilio III and appointed respondent as the administratrix of the intestate estate. The CA argued that:

1. The appointment of Emilio III was subject to a suspensive condition, i.e., Federicos appointment as administrator of the estate, he being the surviving spouse of Cristina, the decedent. The death of Federico before his appointment as administrator of Cristinas estate rendered his nomination of Emilio III inoperative;

2. As between the legitimate offspring (respondent) and illegitimate offspring (Emilio III) of decedents son, Emilio I, respondent is preferred, being the "next of kin" referred to by Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, and entitled to share in the distribution of Cristinas estate as an heir;

3. Jurisprudence has consistently held that Article 99216 of the Civil Code bars the illegitimate child from inheriting ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother. Thus, Emilio III, who is barred from inheriting from his grandmother, cannot be preferred over respondent in the administration of the estate of their grandmother, the decedent; and

4. Contrary to the RTCs finding, respondent is as much competent as Emilio III to administer and manage the subject estate for she possesses none of the disqualifications specified in Section 1, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. The motion of reconsideration was subsequently denied, petitioner filed a certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Who among between Emilio III and Isabel, is better qualified to act as administrator of the decedent estate?

HELD: BOTH. From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA erred in excluding Emilio III from the administration of the decedents estate. As Federicos adopted son, Emilio IIIs interest in the estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this Court as the interest therein of respondent, considering that the CA even declared that "under the law, [Federico], being the surviving spouse, would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his share in the conjugal partnership." Thus, we are puzzled why the CA resorted to a strained legal reasoning Emilio IIIs nomination was subject to a suspensive condition and rendered inoperative by reason of Federicos death wholly inapplicable to the case at bar.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of preference in the appointment of an administrator of an estate:

SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.

However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends on the attendant facts and circumstances of each case. Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial court. In the main, the attendant facts and circumstances of this case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both respondent and Emilio III of their grandmothers, Cristinas, estate.

In the case of Uy v. Court of Appeals, we upheld the appointment by the trial court of a co-administration between the decedents son and the decedents brother, who was likewise a creditor of the decedents estate. In the same vein, we declared in Delgado Vda. de De la Rosa v. Heirs of Marciana Rustia Vda. de Damian that:

[i]n the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates, a situation which obtains here.

Similarly, the subject estate in this case calls to the succession other putative heirs, including another illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and Federico, Nenita Taedo, but who was likewise adopted by Federico, and the two (2) siblings of respondent Isabel, Margarita and Emilio II. In all, considering the conflicting claims of the putative heirs, and the unliquidated conjugal partnership of Cristina and Federico which forms part of their respective estates, we are impelled to move in only one direction, i.e., joint administration of the subject estate.

Hence, the Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95.

Who are incompetent to serve as executor or administrator?

They could be either of the following:

1. A minor (Obviously, a minor is incapacitated to manage the trust)2. A non-resident of the Philippines (The reason for disqualifying such is because it would be impossible for such person not residing therein to administer the estate of the deceased or be around to satisfy for the duties of an executor or administrator)3. A person in the opinion of the court is unfit to execute the duties of the trust by reason of:

a. Drunkenness (Such extent as would affect the capacity of a person by reason thereto, in managing the trust with respect to such estate)b. Improvidencec. Want of Understanding or Integrityd. By reason of conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude (Remember that this ground pertains only to an OFFENSE, not a CRIME unlike in Adoption, in this case, it will pertain to some offenses relating to immorality, say, urinating in public)4. The executor of an executor shall not administer the estate of the first testator (This disqualification is in order to prevent possible conflict of interest or commingling of estates of the two testators. An illustration will be in that, if A is the first testator, who appointed B as his executor in the formers will, B died with an estate appointing C as his executor. In this case, C cannot be allowed to administer the estate of A because he is now managing the estate of B as the testator)Case: Edgar San Luis vs. Felicidad San Luis GR No. 150175, February 5, 2007, J. Ynares-Santiago.

FACTS: The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973.

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. Respondent then sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo estate. She filed a petition for letters of administration before the trial court. Furthermore, she alleged that at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedents surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.

Petitioners Rodolfo San Luis and her sister Linda, the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death. However, the trial court denied the petition. The court a quo dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court which ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.

ISSUE:

(1) Where is the proper venue to file the letters of Administration?

(2) Whether Felicidad has the capacity to be an administrator in the estate of the deceased partner/spouse.

HELD:

(1) It is in Makati City. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence as contradistinguished from domicile of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:

[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. (Emphasis supplied)

The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

(2)

Yes. Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:

SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.

An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent.

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.

Upon, issuance of those letters (Letters testamentary and Letters of administration), what will courts do?

Under Rule 86 (Claims Against Estate), immediately after granting letters, the court shall issue a notice requiring all persons having money claims against the decedent to file them in the office of the clerk of court of said court. And it will now be the duty of every executor or administrator, after the notice to creditors is issued, to cause the same to be published in 3 WEEKS SUCCESSIVELY in a newspaper of general circulation in the province and to be posted for the same period in 4 public places in the province and 2 public places in the municipality where the decedent last resided.

Can Letters testamentary be objected to?

Yes, it may be objected and whatever resolution or resolution with that respect is FINAL AND APPEALABLE. Hence, this made true the existence of MULTIPLE APPEALS in Special Proceedings. In that case, a RECORD ON APPEAL is required to be filed since each part is complete in itself, say the Settlement, Probate or Appointment of Administrator. But with respect to SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, it would be a different remedy, because the appointment of the same is held INTERLOCUTORY, hence, UNAPPEALABLE and the remedy therefrom is PETITION FOR CERTIORARI alleging grave abuse of discretion.

Rule 79- Opposing Issuance of Letters Testamentary. Petition and Contest for Letters of Administration.

What is a Petition for Probate with a Will Annexed?

In this situation, there are two (2) petitions involved:

1. Petition filed by any interested person in a will stating the grounds why letters testamentary should not issue to the persons named therein executors, or any of them, and at the same time,

2. Filing of Petition for Letters of Administration with the will annexed.Who will file a Petition with a will annexed?

It is that person who has NO custody of the will or any person interested in a will.

What are the requirements for opposition to petition for administration?

1. Filing of a written opposition by any interested person, contesting the petition on the ground of:

a. Incompetency of the person for whom letters are prayed therein, orb. On the ground of the contestants own right to the administration.2. And may pray that the letters issue to himself, or to any competent person or persons named in the opposition.

Can Letters of Administration be granted to stranger?

Yes. Letters of Administration may be granted to any qualified applicant, though it appears that there are other competent persons having better right to the administration, if such persons fail to appear when notified and claim the issuance of letters to themselves.

Rule 80- Special Administrator

An administrator is of two kinds, what are they?

Rule 80

1. Special Administrator ( also of two kinds): With the will or Without a will annexed;

2. Regular Administrator

What is the distinction between an executor and an administrator?

The executor is the one appointed by the decedent as embodied in the will. The administrator is the one appointed by the court if there in no will, or if there is a will but does not designate an executor, or even if there is an executor, the executor refuses to accept the trust or fails to put up a bond. These are the requirements: He is either not qualified; he fails to accept the trust; or he fails to put up a bond so an administrator may be appointed

When may a Special Administrator appointed?

A special administrator may be appointed when:

1. There is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including appeal from the allowance or there is disallowance of the will.

2. The executor is a claimant of the estate he represents (Rule 86 Section 8)

What are the duties of Special Administrator?

He shall have the following duties:

1. He shall take possession and charge of goods, chattels, credits, and estate of the deceased,

2. He shall preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed and for that purpose may commence and maintain suits as administrator,

3. He may sell only such,

a. Perishable properties

b. As the court orders to be sold.

4. He shall be liable to pay any debts of the deceased is ordered by the court.

When will Special Administrator ceases to be such?

When questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators are appointed.

Case: Gloriosa Valarao vs. Conrado Pascual and Manuel Diaz, G.R. No. 150164, November 26, 2002, J. Bellosillo.

FACTS: FELICIDAD C. PASCUAL died at seventy-one (71) years, femme sole, leaving a substantial inheritance for her querulous collateral relatives who all appear disagreeable to any sensible partition of their windfall.

To divide the disputed estate are five (5) groups of legal heirs which include respondents Conrado C. Pascual, a brother of the deceased, and Manuel C. Diaz, a nephew, son of her sister Carmen P. Diaz, and petitioner Gloriosa V. Valarao who is the decedent's niece. The bloodlines marking the groups of heirs are: (a) the legitimate children of her late sister Leoncia P. Villanueva, including petitioner Gloriosa V. Valarao; (b) the legitimate children of her late sister Carmen P. Diaz including respondent Manuel C. Diaz;

(c) the legitimate children of her late brother Macario Pascual;

(d) the legitimate children of her late sister Milagros P. de Leon; and,

(e) the decedent's surviving sister Augustia C. Pascual and brothers Leonardo C. Pascual and Conrado C. Pascual, the latter being one of respondents herein.Then, Gloriosa Valarao, petitioner herein, initiated before the RTC of Paranaque a special proceeding for the issuance of the letter of administration in her favor over the estate of the decedent. Respondents Conrado Pascual and Manuel Diaz filed with the same probate court a petition for probate of an alleged holographic will of Felicidad. The two proceeding were consolidated. By agreement of the parties in the proceedings a quo, petitioner and respondent Diaz were appointed as join administrator of the estate of Felicidad. Subsequently, the probate court denied the probate of the alleged holographic will of the decedent and give due course to the intestate settlement of the estate. Respondent Pascual appealed the said order. In view of the disallowance of the holographic will, petitioner Valarao moved in the probate court for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate. Respondent Diaz likewise asked the court for his appointment as special co-administrator which was opposed by Valarao on the ground that he previously neglected his duties as co-administrator of the estate. The probate court appointed Valarao as special admistratrix of the estate and this was contested by Diaz demanding his appointment as a special-co administrator since justice and equity demands that his group be represented in the management of the estate. The probate court denied the motion for reconsideration and ordered respondent Diaz and all the heirs to respect the authority of petitioner Valarao as special administratrix, especially by furnishing her with copies of documents pertinent to the properties comprising the estate. Respondents Pascual and Diaz along with other heirs moved for reconsideration of the order on the ground that petitioner Valarao as special administratrix was not authorized to dispossess the heirs of their rightful custody of properties in the absence of proof that the same properties were being dissipated by them, and that the possessory right of petitioner as special administratrix had already been exercised by her "constructively" when the heirs on her side took possession of the estate supposedly in her behalf. A supplemental petition for certiorari was filed before the Court of Appeals assailing the said orders of the probate court. The court a quo reversed and set aside the order issued by the probate court appointing petitioner as lone special administrator. The appellate court explained that since the heirs were divided into two (2) scrappy factions, justice and equity demanded that both factions be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the appointment of a co-administrator is mandatory in the case at bar?

2. Whether the probate court erred in demanding from the respondents to turnover pertinent documents to Valarao as the special administrator for the management of the estate?

HELD

1. No. To begin with, the probate court had ample jurisdiction to appoint petitioner Valarao as special administratrix and to assist her in the discharge of her functions, even after respondents had filed a notice of appeal from the Decision disallowing probate of the holographic will of Felicidad C. Pascual. This is because the appeal is one where multiple appeals are allowed and a record on appeal is required. In this mode of appeal, the probate court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter of the appeal but retains jurisdiction over the special proceeding from which the appeal was taken for purposes of further remedies which the parties may avail of, including the appointment of a special administrator.

Moreover, there is neither whimsical nor capricious in the action of the probate court not to appoint respondent Diaz as special co-administrator since the Orders of 7 June 2000 and 11 September 2000 clearly stipulate the grounds for the rejection. The records also manifest that the probate court weighed the evidence of the applicants for special administrator before concluding not to designate respondent Diaz because the latter was found to have been remiss in his previous duty as co-administrator of the estate in the early part of his administration. Verily, the process of decision-making observed by the probate court evinces reason, equity, justice and legal principle unmistakably opposite the core of abusive discretion correctible by the special civil action of certiorari under which the appellate court was bound to act. Finally, the extraordinary writ does not operate to reverse factual findings where evidence was assessed in the ordinary course of the proceedings since perceived errors in the appreciation of evidence do not embroil jurisdictional issues.

Respondents cannot take comfort in the cases of Matias v. Gonzales, Corona v. Court of Appeals and Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, cited in the assailed Decision. Contrary to their claim, these cases do not establish an absolute right demandable from the probate court to appoint special co-administrators who would represent the respective interests of squabbling heirs. Rather, the cases constitute precedents for the authority of the probate court to designate not just one but also two or more special co-administrators for a single estate. Now whether the probate court exercises such prerogative when the heirs are fighting among themselves is a matter left entirely to its sound discretion.

HELD

2. No. We also rule that the probate court in issuing the Order of 11 September 2000 did not err in commanding respondents to turn over all documents pertinent to the estate under special administration and in enforcing such order by means of contempt of court. The powers of a special administrator are plainly delineated in Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, vesting upon him the authority to "take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed x x x x"

The law explicitly authorizes him to take possession of the properties in whatever state they are, provided he does so to preserve them for the regular administrator appointed afterwards. Clearly, the special administrator enjoys not merely subsidiary possession to be carried out when the heirs dissipate the properties but the primary and independent discretion of keeping them so they may be preserved for regular administration.

Moreover, respondents cannot deprive the special administratrix of access to and custody of essential documents by arguing that their possession thereof allegedly in behalf of petitioner is already the equivalent of "constructive possession" which constitutes full compliance with the possessory powers of petitioner as special administratrix under Sec. 2 of Rule 80. Contrary to what respondents seem to understand by "constructive possession," the right of possession whether characterized as actual or constructive invariably empowers the special administrator with the discretion at any time to exercise dominion or control over the properties and documents comprising the estate. Hence, even if we are to give credence to the theory that petitioner also has "constructive possession" of the documents alongside respondents' actual possession thereof, respondents would nonetheless be under the obligation to turn them over whenever the special administratrix requires their actual delivery.Needless to state, the special administratrix appointed by the probate court must be constantly aware that she is not a representative nor the agent of the parties suggesting the appointment but the administrator in charge of the estate and in fact an officer of the court. As an officer of the court, she is subject to the supervision and control of the probate court and is expected to work for the best interests of the entire estate, especially its smooth administration and earliest settlement. Whatever differences that may exist between the heirs shall be ironed out fairly and objectively for the attainment of that end. She ought to be sensitive to her position as special administratrix and neutral possessor which under the Rules of Court is both fiduciary and temporary in character upon which accountability attaches in favor of the estate as well as the other heirs, especially respondents Pascual and Diaz in light of her alleged rivalry with them.

Case: Margarito Jamero vs. Hon. Melicor, Atty. Bautista, in his capacity as the appointed Special Administrator, and Ernesto Jamero GR No. 140929, May 26, 2005, J. Austria-Martinez FACTS: Petitioner filed Special Proceedings No. 1618 for the Administration and Settlement of the Estate of his deceased mother Consuelo Jamero with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, Tagbilaran City. Private respondent Ernesto R. Jamero, a brother of petitioner, opposed the latters petition for appointment as regular administrator of the estate.Upon motion of private respondent Ernesto and over the objections of petitioner, the respondent court, in its Order dated December 4, 1998, appointed Atty. Alberto Bautista as special administrator pending the appointment of a regular administrator. Petitioner filed its MR but was denied.

On April 21, 1999, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. However, CA dismissed the petition due to technicality since the petition indicates no statement as to the date when the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the public respondents decision, in violation of Section 3, paragraph 2, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended by Circular No. 39-98 dated August 18, 1998 of the Supreme Court. It further rules that the appointment of a special administrator is discretionary on the part of the appointing court; that being an interlocutory order the same is not appealable nor subject to certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the appointment of a special administrator is an interlocutory order which not subject of certiorari?

HELD: No. It may be non-appealable but it is subject to certiorari. Suffice it to be stated that indeed, the appointment of a special administrator is interlocutory, discretionary on the part of the RTC and non-appealable. However, it may be subject of certiorari if it can be shown that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion or lack of or in excess of jurisdiction. As the Court held in Pefianco vs. Moral, even as the trial courts order may merely be interlocutory and non-appealable, certiorari is the proper remedy to annul the same when it is rendered with grave abuse of discretion.Rule 81- Bonds of Executors and Administrators

The bonds under Section 4 thereto for Special Administrator, shall be in a sum as the court directs conditioned that he will make and return a true inventory of the properties in possession while in case of regular administrator, the bond will be conditioned to the entire estate for its preservation. The regular executor may serve without a bond as directed by the testator in the latters will or with only his individual bond conditioned only to payment of debts of the testator, but the court may require such executor the filing of a further bond in case a change in his circumstances or for other sufficient cause. Such latter bond is called STATUTORY BOND, as prescribed for by statutes and will continue so long as the court has jurisdiction over the case.

What are the duties of executors and administrators?

1. To make and return to the court, within 3 months, a true and complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which shall come to his possession or knowledge or to the possession of any other person for him.

2. To administer according to these Rules the estate, and from proceeds, to pay and discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the same or such dividends declared.3. To render a true and just account of his administration to the court within 1 year and at any other time when required by the court.4. To perform all orders of the court.5. Duty to sell, encumber or mortgage6. Duty for distribution of the estate remaining.Rule 82- Revocation of Administration, Death, Resignation, and Removal of Executors and Administrators

When will administration be revoked?

Administration is revoked if a will is discovered.

When may a court remove an executor or administrator or accepts his resignation?

1. If an executor or administrator neglects to render his account within 1 year and when required by court,

2. If he neglects to settle estate according to the Rules,

3. If he neglects to perform an order or judgment of the court or a duty expressly provided by Rules,

4. When he absconds, or

5. When becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust.

*When an executor or administrator dies, resigns or is removed, the remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone UNLESS the court grants letters to someone to act with him. If there is no remaining executor or administrator, administration may be granted to any suitable person.The acts before revocation, resignation or removal are considered valid.

Rule 83- Inventory and Appraisal; Provision for Support of Family

What are the other duties of executors or administrators?

1. When 3 months after his appointment, he shall return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all real and personal estate of the deceased which has come to his possession or knowledge. In such appraisement, the court may order one or more inheritance tax appraisers to give his or their assistance.

2. To make an inventory of the assets of the administered estate, to the exclusion of wearing apparels of the surviving husband or wife and minor children, the marriage bed and beddings and such provisions and other articles for the subsistence of the family of the deceased.3. To give allowance to widow and minor children, NOT TO GRANDCHILDREN.

What will be done if such allowance has to be given but there isnt enough cash by the estate?

This time, a sale can be done, say to pay taxes.

Case: The Estate of Hilario Ruiz and Edmond Ruiz vs. CA, Heirs of Hilario Ruiz (Ruizs) GR No. 118671, January 29, 1996, J. Puno

FACTS: Hilario Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Petitioner Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. The testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate. When Hilario died, the cash component of his estate were distributed among his heirs named in the will but for some unknown reason the will was never been probated. Thus, four years later after the decedents death, Respondent Maria Pilar Montes filed before the trail court a petition to probate the will. This was opposed by Edmond on the ground that the will was executed under undue influence. Nevertheless, he withdrew his opposition and the will was subsequently probated. One of the properties in the will a house and lot which was bequeath to Catheryn, Candicem and Maria was leased out by the petitioner to third persons. Hence, the probate court ordered Edmond to deposit the rent of the lease to the branch clerk of court. During the pendency of the proceeding, petitioner moved to release the rent payments deposited before the clerk or court. Respondent on the other hand, oppose the said motion and concurrently filed "Motion for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs" and "Motion for Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will." Montes prayed for the release of the said rent payments to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline and for the distribution of the testator's properties in accordance to the holographic will. The probate court denied the motion for release petitioner's motion for release of funds but granted respondent Montes' motion in view of petitioner's lack of opposition. It thus ordered the release of the rent payments to the decedent's three granddaughters. It further ordered the delivery of the titles to and possession of the properties bequeathed to the three granddaughters and respondent Montes upon the filing of a bond of P50,000.00. Petitioner assails the order of the probate court to the Court of Appeals. The CA however, dismissed the petition and sustained the probate court.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the probate court err in the grant of allowance for support to the grandchildren of the decedent?

2. Whether it has authority to release the titles to certain heirs?

3. Whether it erred to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will?

HELD

1. Yes. Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law.Petitioner alleges that this provision only gives the widow and the minor or incapacitated children of the deceased the right to receive allowances for support during the settlement of estate proceedings. He contends that the testator's three granddaughters do not qualify for an allowance because they are not incapacitated and are no longer minors but of legal age, married and gainfully employed. In addition, the provision expressly states "children" of the deceased which excludes the latter's grandchildren.

It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83 should not be limited to the "minor or incapacitated" children of the deceased. Article 188 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the substantive law in force at the time of the testator's death, provides that during the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the deceased's legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their age, civil status or gainful employment, are entitled to provisional support from the funds of the estate. The law is rooted on the fact that the right and duty to support, especially the right to education, subsist even beyond the age of majority.

Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent's estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend it to the deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity. It was error, therefore, for the appellate court to sustain the probate court's order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the testator pending settlement of his estate.

HELD

2. No. Respondent courts also erred when they ordered the release of the titles of the bequeathed properties to private respondents six months after the date of first publication of notice to creditors. An order releasing titles to