MORATALLA Graft and Corruption Phil Experience

8/20/2019 MORATALLA Graft and Corruption Phil Experience

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113TH IN TE RN ATION AL TRAINI NG COU RS E

PARTICIPANTS’ PAPERS

* Deputy Director /Dean of Academic, Phi l ippine

Na tional P olice Academy, Philippine Public Sa fety

College, P hilippines.

1 “ I n i t i a t i v e s Ta k e n Ag a i n s t C o r r u p t i o n : Th e

P hilippine Ca se”; unpublished paper prepared by

Ledivina V. Ca riño, U niversity P rofessor and D ean,

G abriele R. Iglesias, Assistan t P rofessor, and Ma .

Fe V. Mendoza, Associate Professor, College of

P u b l i c Ad m i n i s t r a t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y o f t h e

Philippines.

GRAFT AND CORRUPTION: THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE

Nelson N ogot M or atal l a*

I. INTRODUCTION

This paper wi l l present a condensed

r e p o r t o n g r a f t a n d c o r r u p t i o n i n t h e

P hilippines. In forma tion w a s compiled by

t h e a u t h o r f r o m d o c u m e n t s , a r t i c l e s ,

n e w s p a p e r c l i p p i n g s a n d o t h e r d a t a

ga th ered from the report s a nd journa ls of

the Ombudsman and t he Sandiganbayan ,

tw o of the constit utional bodies ma nda ted

by P hilippine la w to investigat e an d a ct on

compla int s filed a ga inst public officia ls an d

e m p l o y e e s f o r v i o l a t i o n s o f g r a f t a n d

corr upt pra ctices. More specifica lly, this

report w ill cover input from a n un published

research pa per prepar ed by scholar s from

th e U niversity of the P hilippines, College

o f Pub l i c A dmin is t ra t io n , who m I wi l l

accordingly acknowledge in this work.1

This report wi l l genera l ly fo l low theout line a s provided. The first port ion w ill

intr oduce the th eoretical perspective a nd

cont ext of corruption in t he P hilippines. It

clarifies th e na tiona l context w ithin w hich

corru ption opera tes. It w ill look int o th e

inters ection of corru ption a nd P hilippine

history a nd cultu re. It w ill likew ise discuss

some public perceptions of corruption.

E s t i m a t e s o f t h e e x t e n t a n d l o s s e s o f

corr uption in t he P hilippines w ill be briefly

discussed. The history of th e P hilippine

fight a ga inst corruption wil l be ta ken up

i n t e r m s o f l a w , a n t i -c or r u p t i o n

c on s t i t u t i o n a l b o d i e s , a n d o t h e r

government a gencies a nd non-government

i n i t i a t i v es . F i n a l l y, t h e r e w i l l b e a n

a ssessment of the a nti-gra ft a nd corruption

programs, and recommendations on what

might be done in th e l ight of P hil ippine

democra cy, culture a nd development .

II. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

W e v i e w c o r r u p t i o n a s a n a g e n t ’ s

depar tu re from t he principa l’s dema nd for

th e responsible use of pow er in society. As

such, al t hough i t is centered on a public

official’s a ct a nd is indicat ed by a violat ion

of law, it does not involve the sta te a lone.

Ra th er, it is embroiled in the a ccounta bility

of public officia ls, a nd ind eed of th e sta t e,

to th e people. Thus , in a na lyz ing andcomba tin g corr uption, w e look beyond t he

s t a t e . C o r r u pt i on s h ow s u p w h a t t h e

society v iews as the responsible use o f

pow er and th us wha t i t w i ll accept a nd

support . In this l ight , any at ta ck a gainst

corr uption must come t o terms n ot only

with the law, but also with the country ’s

history, ie wha t is a ccepted by t he cultur e

a nd t he beha vior of civil society a s w ell.2

II I. THE CONTEXT OFCORRUPTION IN THE

PHILIPPINES

I n t h e l a t e 1 9 8 0 ’ s , t h e P h i l i p p i n e s

e n t e r e d t h e G u i n n e s s B o o k o f W o r l d

Records for a llegedly t he biggest corr uption

of a l l t ime, referring t o the period of the

d i ct a t o r s h i p of t h e f or m e r P r e s i d en t ,

2 Ibid, “In it ia t ives Ta ken Aga inst Corruption: The

P hilippines Ca se”; p.4


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RE SOU RCE MATER IAL SE RIE S No. 56

Ferd inand Marcos . Mar cos wa s ous ted

f r o m h i s t w e n t y - y e a r p r e s i d e n c y b y a

bloodless people’s power revolution in

Febr ua ry 1986. To describe the corru pt ion

of his regime, “kleptocra cy” an d “plunder”

became par t o f the F i l ip ino ’ s po l i t i ca l

vocabula ry a nd discourse.3 “Government

b y t h i e v e r y ” d i d n o t s t o p w i t h t h e

ena ctmen t of th e Republic Act N o. 7080 in

1991, ent itled “An Act D efining P lunder ”.

Indeed, a l though both la w s an d agencies

to comba t corrupt ion ha ve increa sed in the

post-Marcos period, it remains one of the

pr ime pro b lems co mpla ined o f by the

people. The curr ency a nd gra vity of th eproblem ar e ma nifested in th e fol low ing

clippings fr om a Sept ember 7, 1998 issue

of the P hilippine Da ily Inquirer:

“On b oa r d a Ph i l i p p i n e A i r l i n es

ch a r t er ed f l i g h t t o M an i l a f r om

M i nd anao wh er e he inspected on-

goi n g gover nm en t i n f r a st r u ct u r e

pr ojects, Presi dent J oseph E j er cit o

E st r a d a . . . t h ou g h t of a s l o ga n

r em in di ng Fi li pin os that h e is ser ious in f ight ing graft and corr upt ion in the

gover nm ent. D ubbed “Supi li n, pi gil in

ang pagnanakaw sa pam aha laan,”

( “W i n o v er , st o p t h i ev er y i n

gover nm ent ”), he th ought of pu tt i ng-

up such a m essage on bil l boar ds, huge

poster s and th e l i ke to rem ind people

i n gover nm ent and th e pr i vat e sector

not t o succum b to th e “evi l s of steal i ng

fr om gover nm ent coffer s.” Steal i ng,

i f a g g r e g a t ed w i t h o t h e r m i sdemeanor s of pu bl i c ser vi ce and

th ei r “tr an sactees,” he sai d, w oul d

sum up to about 20 per cent of t he

nat i onal budget . Wit h a pr oposed

budget o f more than 500 bi l l ion i n

1999, “th i s means roughl y 100 bi l l i on

pesos w i l l go to waste i f cor r upt i on

r emai ns un checked.”

While the figure cited a bove is a ba llpark

figure tha t ca nnot be validat ed, the concern

of President Estra da is certainly wa rra nted

by th e f indings of this research. I t is also

not a recent phenomenon but one tha t h a s

b e e n i d e n t i f i e d a n d d e c r i e d s i n c e t h e

Spa nish coloniza tion in the 16th centu ry.

A. Filipino Culture and CorruptionC o r r u p t i o n h a s b e e n v i e w e d a s a

“cul tu r al an d psychologi cal ph enomenon in

a coun tr y mar ked by in compati ble legal and

cu l tu ra l norm s” (Ta pa les 1995:407). The

f o r m e r e m p h a s i z e s “r a t i on a l i t y a n d

un i ver sal pr i ncipl es of act i on ” a s aga inst

a nd in conflict w ith “r el i ance and obli gation

toward k in sh ip , f r iendsh ip and p r i mar y

groups” (B a ut ista 1982). This conflict is

highlight ed in the use of the a libi of a gift -

g i v i n g c u l t u r e t o j u s t i f y b r i b e r y a n d

extor t ion , or t he Fi l ip ino regar d for th e

o t h e r (pa k i k i p a g kapwa - t a o ) to jus t i f y

g i v i n g b e n e f i t s t o u n q u a l i f i e d b u tpersonally known recipients.

This i s a rea l problem, but i t can be

overblow n. For insta nce, both culture and

la w sim ilar ly define ca ses of corruption an d

r e c t i t u d e . O n e ’s k i n m a y o s t r a c iz e a

bureaucrat w ho chooses to sta y w ithin the

law. The sta te ma y, how ever, leave them

a lone, provided th ey do not compromise

th eir official role. Another ca se is w hen a n

officia l pa rt icipat es in a decision involvingkin, even if th ey vote a ga inst t ha t person’s

interest , tha t officia l (under t he Republic

A c t 3 0 1 9 ) c a n s t i l l b e c h a r g e d w i t h

c or r u p t i o n . F o r a n o ff i ci a l s i m i l a r l y

situat ed, but w ho bends over ba ckwa rds to

m a k e s u r e t h e i r k i n g e t s a p r i z e d

government cont ra ct enga ges in so called

“fa vour corr upt ion” . This is indeed th e

quint essentia l conflict between culture a nd

law.

3 Lengthy discussion on this is presented in “P olitics

of Plunder: The P hilippines U nder Ma rcos”, Belinde

Aquino, Grea t B ooks Tra ding a nd U P College of

P ublic Administ ra tion, 1987.


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T h e i d e a o f c u l t u r a l a c c e p t a n c e o f

corr upt ion a lso needs t o be re-exa mined in

th e light of a st ring of public opinion polls

w here Filipinos decry it a s a ma jor problem.

The media , church pas tora l le t ters and

oth er cultu ra l ly valued sources l ikew ise

denounce th is. In deed, th e long list of la w s

enacted aga inst t hem mani fest t ha t gra f t

a nd corr uption a re not colonia l impositions

but a re desired by Filipinos th emselves.

B. Public Perception of Graft andCorruption

In a speech in 1988, J a ime Ca rdina l Sin,

A r c h b i s h o p o f M a n i l a , s t a t e d t h a t“cor rupt i on was the biggest problem of them

al l ” (Mu rph y, October 9, 1988). I n 1989,

a fter month s of declar ing th e rectit ude of

t h e g o v er n m e n t s h e h e a d s , P r e s id e n t

Cora zon C . Aquino despaired, “Corrupt ion

ha s r etu r ned, i f n ot on t he same scal e, at

l ea s t w i t h eq u a l sh a m el es s n es s

(Cagura ngan, 1989).” Apparent ly, m a ny

F i l ip i n os a g r e e w i t h h e r. I n a s u r v e y

conducted in J uly 1989 in Metr o Man ila

by the Social Weather Station (SWS), arespected public opinion polling firm , a s

much a s 58 percent of respondent s a greed

tha t g iven curren t co nd i t io ns , co r rupt

government off icials a re a grea ter t hrea t

to th e count ry th a n t he NPA (New P eople’s

A r m y , c o m m u n i s t g u e r r i l l a s w h o l o s t

ground a fter Aqu ino’s a ssum ption t o office).

T h o s e w h o w e r e s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h e

performa nce of th e Aquino a dminist ra tion

in fighting gra ft a nd corruption decreased

f ro m 72 percen t in March 1987 to 26percent in J uly 1989 (G uidot e, 1989). In

her St a te of the Na t ion Address in J uly

1989, P resident Aquin o sha red th e people’s

exa spera t ion tha t she wo uld leave as a

problem th e very issue tha t she w a nted to

lea ve as a lega cy: a clean a nd a ccounta ble

government.

In deed, her successor, Fidel V. Ra mos,

ra nked gra ft a nd corruption a s third am ong

t h e m a jor p r o bl em s t h a t ob s t r u c t t h e

count ry’s a chievement s in his d evelopment

st ra tegy for the P hilippines 2000. The SWS

poll of September 1993 valida tes t his fea r:

89 percent o f the respondents fe l t tha t

corr uption w ould indeed be a big obsta cle

to at ta ining this vision.

Other SWS polls since have produced

consist ent r esults . An August 1990 sur vey

c o n d u c t e d i n M e t r o M a n i l a a s k e d

respondents to sta te their sat isfaction wit h

t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f s e v e r a l a g e n c i e s i n

r e d u ci n g g r a f t a n d cor r u p t i o n . Th e

proportion of dissatisfied respondents is

consistently h igher th a n t hose sa tisfied, foreach a gency. They s ta ted that gr a f t a nd

c o r r u p t i o n i s b i g i n t h e P r e s i d e n t i a l

Commission on G ood G overnment (PC G G ),

the B ureau of Interna l Revenue (B IR), the

Ca binet a s a w hole, the court s of justice,

the B ureau of Customs (B OC), an d in the

police force. They consid ered corr upt ion in

the cour t s a nd in the mi l it a ry a s smal l .

V e r y f e w t h o u g h t t h a t t h e r e w a s n o

corrupt ion in any o f these government

institutions.

In November 1991, 41 percent of th ose

p o l l e d a g r e e d t h a t m o s t h i g h - r a n k i n g

government employees are not suit ed to

their positions based on their knowledge

a nd capa bilities, a nd 62 percent n oted th a t

th e performa nce of governm ent employees

ha s not improved from 1986 (SWB, J uly

1993). In a Febru a ry 1992 na tionw ide poll

o n t h e a t t r i b u t e s o f h i g h o f f i c i a l s i n

governm ent, 40 percent of its respondent ssta ted tha t, ba sed on personal observat ion,

“most” of these high officia ls a re corru pt,

a nd a nother 27 percent sa id “some” of th em

w ere, a tota l of 67 percent w eighing in on

t he positive side (S WB , J uly 1993).

The public verdict on t he judicia ry is

mixed. In 1985, a B ishop-B usin essmen ’s

Conference poll revealed t ha t 30 percent

a greed a nd 29 percent disagr eed wit h the

statement that most judges could not be


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bribed. In 1993, a similar split in ha lf can

be discerned. While 50 percent s a id none

or few judges could be bribed or bough t, 49

percent t hought ma ny or m ost could (SWB

J uly 1994). H o wever , o ne o u t of tw o

F i l i p i n o s c o n s i d e r e d t h e d e g r e e o f

corr uption in th e judicia ry serious (SWB

J uly 1993).

Over the year s, the performa nce of the

g ov e r n m e n t i n f i g h t i n g g r a f t a n d

corruption wa s evalua ted more poorly th a n

t h a t of t h e o ve r a l l p e r f or m a n c e. I t

i n d i ca t e d t h a t t h e g o v e r n m e n t

performance in f ight ing corrupt ion hasi n d e e d h a s b e e n d i s m a l . P h i l i p pi n e

Ombudsma n, Ania no Desierto, in a na tion-

w ide publ ic a f fa i rs TV progra m, Fir ing

Line, a ired on September 14, 1998, sta ted

t h a t t h e P h i l i p p i n e a n t i - c o r r u p t i o n

landscape “i s im proving as evidenced by t he

good m ar ks the coun t r y i s get t i ng f r om

i n ter na t i ona l groups l i ke Tran spar ency

In tern a t ional ( IT ) and the Pol i t i ca l and

Economi c Ri sk Consul tan cy (PERC), L td ”.

The H ong Kong ba sed P olitica l E conomicRisk Consulta ncy Ltd, likew ise graded 12

Asian countr ies a nd r a nked the P hilippines

the 4t h lea st corr upt count ry in it s survey.

As PERC (1998:1) hinted, most survey

gra des deteriora ted proba bly a s a reflection

of th e cha nge of sent iment in businessmen

from “ tu r n i ng a bl i nd eye to cor r up t i on

when econom ic ti mes ar e good. As econom ic

cond i t i o ns wo r sened , how ever , such

t o l e r a n c e d i s a p p ea r ed . . . E c on om i c cond i t i ons wer e becom i ng m or e di f f i cu l t

and i t w as easier for businessmen to see th e

l i n k b et w een t h a t d et er i o r a t i o n a n d

corrupt ion.” On the whole, th e results of

n a t i o n a l a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l s u r v e y s

co ns i s ten t l y dep ic t the Ph i l ipp ines as

r i d d l ed w i t h c or r u p t i on a n d u n a b l e t o

effectively fight corru ption.

C. The Magnitude of and Losses dueto Corruption

It is difficult t o estima te t he tota l losses

due to corr uption. The best mea sure is the

a mounts involved in ca ses f iled with th e

O m b u d s m a n . Th e O f f i c e o f t h e

Ombudsman (OMB ) reported th a t a bout P 9

b i ll i on w a s l os t t o g ov e r n m e n t d u e t o

m a l v e r s a t i o n , esta fa ( s w i n d l i n g ) a n d

violation of the provision of RA 3019 (the

Ant i-G ra ft a nd C orru pt P ra ctices Act) for

a period of eight a nd a ha lf years (1990 to

J u n e 1 99 8) (O M B 1 99 8) . I n t h e

O mbudsma n ’s repor t , 63 a genc ies a nd

depa r t ments con t r ibu ted t o the losses .However , the top ten o f these agencies

a lone a ccounted for a lmost P 8.5 billion.

La rge tho ugh th ese sums a re , b igger

a mounts a re involved in cases involving the

Ma rcoses. From th e Office of the Specia l

P ro secu to r under the O mbudsman , t he

mo ney va lue o f cases f i l ed aga ins t the

Marco ses invo lv ing the s ame o f fences

( m a l v e r s a t i o n , es t a f a a n d R A 3 0 1 9

violat ions) for th e sa me period w a s P 1,117billion. These cover ca ses of behest loan s,

b o t h f i l e d a n d u n d e r r e v i e w a n d

investiga tion, forfeitur e ca ses, P CG G cases

for recovery, crimin a l ca ses aga inst Ma rcos

cronies, and criminal cases a ga inst other

public officia ls. The Ombudsma n claimed

that , “the gover nm ent lost P1.4 tr il l i on and

cont i nu es to l ose P100M dai l y si nce th e

Off i ce began i nvest i gat i ng cor r upt i on i n

gover nm ent sin ce 1988.”4 This is s imila rly

pointed out by P resident J oseph Est ra dawh en he sa id , “at l east P24.13 B of what

th e Phi l i ppi ne gover nm ent spent l ast year

for var i ous projects was lost t o graf t an d

cor r up t i on , or bar el y 20% of a l l pr oject

fun ds are lost t o gr after s .” 5

4 Desierto, Ph ilippine Da ily Inq uirer, J uly 10, 1999.

5 Est ra da , Philippines Da ily Inquirer, Jun e 10, 1999.


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III. ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIESAND PROGRAMS

P hilippine initia tives aga inst corrupt ion

ha ve taken the form of law a nd a nti-gra f tbodies creat ed by the Constitut ion, law a nd

executive orders. In a ddition to the sta te,

others inst itutions ha ve been a ctive in the

fight a gainst graf t a nd corruption.

A. Anti-corruption LawsThe a ccount a bility of public officials is

enshrined in t he Const itut ion of 1987, as

it ha s been in t he Ma lolos Constitu tion of

1898, th e Commonwea lth Constit ut ion of

1935 a nd t hen t he Const itut ion of 1973, theMa rt ial La w period. Art icle XI of the 1987

Consti t ution, enti t led “Account a bil ity of

P ubl ic Off icers” , s ta tes th e fundamenta l

principle of public office, a s public tr ust .

It r equires full a ccount a bility a nd integrity

a mong public officers an d employees. The

P resident, Vice-P resident, m embers of the

S u p r e m e C o u r t , m e m b e r s o f t h e

C o n s t i t u t i on a l C o m m i s si on s a n d t h e

O m b u d s m a n m a y b e i m p e a c h e d f o r

v io la t ions o f the Const i tut ion , t reason,

bribery, gra f t a nd corrupt ion, other high

crimes , an d for betra ya l of public t r us t .

Oth er public officia ls committ ing such a cts

can be investiga ted a nd prosecuted through

th e regula r judicial process provided by

law.

The P hilippine government is directed

to mainta in honesty and in tegr i ty in the

public service, and t o ta ke action aga instgra ft a nd corruption (Section 27, Art . II ).

I t i s a l s o d i r e c t e d t o g i v e f u l l p u b l i c

disclosure of all tr a nsa ctions involving t he

public int erest (Section 28, Art . II). This

provision is complement ed by t he B ill of

Rights w ithin th e Constitut ion, w hich gives

people th e right t o informa tion on ma tt ers

of public concern , includin g officia l records,

document s an d papers pert a ining to officia l

a ct s , t r a n s a ct i on s o r d e ci s ion s , a n d t o

government resea rch dat a used a s the basisfor policy development (S ection 7, Art . I II ).

The Anti-G ra f t a nd C orrupt P ra ct ices

Act (RA 3019) w a s pas sed in 1960. I t

e n u m er a t e s w h a t m a y b e con s i d er e d

corr upt pra ct ices by a ny publ ic of f icer,

declares t hem unlaw ful and provides th e

corresponding pena lties of imprisonment

(1 mont h, 6 years a nd 15 yea rs), perpetua l

d isqua l i f ica t ion f rom publ ic of f ice , a nd

confiscation or forfeiture of unexplained

wea lth in the favour of the government. It

a lso provides for the submiss ion by a l l

government personnel of a s tatement of

a s s e t s a n d l i a b i li t i es e v er y t w o y e a r s .

Co ns idered l andm a rk leg i s la t ion a t the

t ime , i t a l so e l ic ited t he fol low ing w rycomment:

“Th e ant i -gr af t l aw was passed not

because th er e was a need f or i t bu t

onl y to appease publ i c opini on. Th er e

wa s no ur gent need for an t i -g ra f t

l egislat i on because th e Revi sed Pena l

Code and other l aw s were suffi cient

t o b r i n g t h e g u i l t y t o cou r t ”

(Congressma n Ma nuel Zosa , quoted

in G.U. Iglesias, 1993:35).

B. Laws During the Martial LawPeriod (1972-1986)

P res ident ia l Decree no.6, w hich took

ef fec t s ix days a f te r the impo s i t io n o f

Mar tia l Law, wa s the “ legal” basis for the

p u r g e o f a l m o s t 8 , 0 0 0 o f f i c i a l s a n d

e m p l o y e e s i n t h e f i r s t y e a r o f t h e

dicta torship. The provision for summa ry

proceedings wa s reiterat ed in P residential

Decree No. 807, the Civil S ervice Act of theperiod and was repealed by the Corazon

Aquino a dminist ra tion. All other a nt i-gra ft

president ia l decrees rema in in effect. This

includes:

(i ) P res ident ia l Decree No. 46 (1972),

ma king i t unlaw ful for government

personnel to receive, an d for priva te

persons to give, gifts on a ny occa sion

including Chris t ma s , regar dless o f

w hether th e gift is for past or futur e


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fa vors. It also prohibits entert a ining

public officia ls an d th eir relat ives.

(i i) P residentia l Decree No. 677 (1975)

requires the sta tement of a ssets a nd

liabilities to be submitt ed every y ear.

(iii) P resident ia l D ecree No. 749 (1975),

gra nt ing immunit y from prosecut ion

to givers of bribes or other gifts a nd

t o t h e i r a c c o m p l i c e s i n b r i b e r y

charges if they tes t i fy a ga ins t the

publ ic of f icia ls or pr iva te persons

guilty of t hese offences.

C. Laws of the RedemocratizationPeriod (1986 to the present)

Immedia tely a fter Aquino’s a ssumption

to office, she promulgated the “Freedom

C o n s t i t u t i o n ” w h i c h , a m o n g o t h e r

p r o v i s i o n s , d e c l a r e d a l l g o v e r n m e n t

p o s i t i o n s v a c a n t u n l e s s o t h e r w i s e

ident ified (Section 3, Ma rch 28, 1986). This

Freedom C onstitut ion w a s th e basic la w of

a r e vol u t i on a r y g o ve r n m en t a n d w a s

superseded by the Const itu tion of 1987. Sixnew a nti-corruption law s emerged under

its operation.

Th e Ad m i n i s t r a t i v e C o d e o f 1 98 7

(Executive Order No. 292)6 incorpora t es in

a unif ied document t he ma jor st ructura l ,

functional and procedural principles and

rules of governa nce. I t rei tera tes public

a c c o u n t a b i l i t y a s t h e f u n d a m e n t a l

pr in ciple o f governa nce. In 1989, t he

Republic Act N o. 6713, t he C ode of Conducta nd Et hica l St a nda rds for P ublic Officials

a nd Employees wa s pa ssed. It promotes a

high s ta nda rd of eth ics a nd requires a l l

government personnel to make a n a ccurat e

sta tement of assets a nd liabilities, disclose

net worth a nd fina ncia l connections. It a lso

requires new officials t o divest own ership

in an y privat e enterprise with in 30 da ys

from a ssum ption of office, t o avoid conflict

of int erest . The Ombuds ma n Act of 1989

(RA 6770) provides t he fun ct iona l a nd

str uctura l orga niza tion of the Office of the

Ombudsma n. The Act further defining the

J ur i sd ict ion of the Sa nd iganba ya n (RA

8249) p la ce s t h e S a n d i g a n b a y a n a s a

spec i a l co ur t o n par wi th the Co ur t o f

Appeals.

D. Constitutional Anti-corruptionBodies

T h e 1 9 8 7 C o n s t i t u t i o n e s t a b l i s h e d

specia l independent bodies to support th eprinciples of honesty, int egrit y a nd public

a ccounta bility. These a re:

(i ) the Of fice of the Ombudsman as the

people’s protector a nd w a tchdog;

(i i) the Civil Service Commission a s the

centr a l personnel a gency;

(iii) t h e C o m m i s s i on o n Au d i t a s t h e

s u p r e m e b o d y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r

a u d i t i n g t h e g o v e r n m e n t ’ s

expenditures a nd performa nce; a nd(iv) The Sa ndiganba yan a s a special court

t h a t h e a r s c a s e s o f g r a f t a n d

corruption.

To ensure tha t t hese orga niza tions and

th eir commissioners ca n fulfill their d uties

w ithout fear of reprisal from other a gencies

of the government, th e Constit ution gran ts

them fisca l aut onomy7 (Section 2, Art icle

VIII). Their a ctions a re a ppea la ble only t o

the Supreme Court .

T h e O f f i c e o f t h e O m b u d s m a n w a s

creat ed to investiga te a nd a ct promptly on

compla ints filed aga inst public officia ls an d

6 Executive orders promulgat ed by P resident Aquino

during th e revolutionary period when she wa s sole

legisla tor (1986-87) ha ve th e force of th e la w.

7 Fisca l a u t onomy in tha t t he i r a pproved annua l

appropriat ion sha ll be automatically a nd regularly

released, so tha t t here can be no undue delay in

t h e e x ec u t i o n o f t h e i r d u t i e s . Th e i r a n n u a l

a ppropriat ion cann ot be reduced from tha t of the

previous year s.


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employees, and to serve as the people’s

w a t c h d og of t h e g ov e r n m e n t . I t i s a n

institut ion w ith t he biggest r esponsibility

to prevent gra ft an d corru ption. It provides

for a Deputy Ombudsma n for t he milita ry,

a n d a t l e a s t o n e e a c h D e p u t y f o r t h e

geographical divisions of Luzon, Visayas

an d Mindana o.

The C iv i l Serv ice Commiss ion is th e

c e n t r a l p e r s o n n e l t a s k e d t o p r o m o t e

ef f ic ient and responsive publ ic serv ice

de l ivery, t o es t a b l i sh a ca reer serv ice ,

s t rengthen the meri t sys tem and huma n

resource development , promote publ icaccountabi l i ty and enforce the Code o f

Conduct a nd Et hica l Sta ndar ds for P ublic

Off icials a nd E mployees (RA 6713). I t

undertakes anti-corruption functions, such

a s v a l u e s o r i e n t a t i o n w o r k s h o p s a n d

employee voluntarism.

Th e C o m m i s s i o n o n Au d i t , w h i l e

prima ri ly regarded a s an eva luat or of the

government ’s performance in handl ing

funds, a lso ha s a s a fun ction on the inputside, a s i t conducts a udits on t he income

a nd revenues of government . Aside from

e n s u r i n g f i n a n c i a l a c c o u n t a b i l i t y , t h e

Co mmiss ion ma y a l so inqu i re as t o the

effectiveness a nd impa ct of progra ms, a nd

not a lone into th e economy, efficiency or th e

l e g a l i t y a n d r e g u l a r i t y o f g o v e r n m e n t

operations.

The Sandiganbayan , litera lly “the pillar

of t h e n a t i o n ” , is a s p ec ia l cou r t w i t hjurisdiction over civil a nd crimina l ca ses

involving gra ft a nd corrupt practices.

E. Presidential Anti-corruptionBodies

E a ch president ha s appoint ed his or her

a nti-gra ft or investiga ting a gencies “as an

exer cise of th e pr esid en t ’s power to pr obe

in to the anomal ous member s of h i s/ her

adm in istrat i ve organi zat ion (Alfiler, 1979:

329)”. P resident Aquin o broke tr a dition by

orga nizing a commit tee of ca binet officia ls

r a t h e r t h a n a n a g en cy w i t h f u ll -t i m e

personnel, the President’s Committee on

P ublic Et hics a nd Account a bility (P CP E A).

Its fra mework advan ced the insepa ra bility

o f a c c o u n t a b i l i t y f r o m o t h e r a c t s o f

governa nce, the idea t ha t corruption ca n

be t ack led by mana gement ac t ions tha t

increa se its risks an d decrea se its benefits,

a nd decentra lized gra ft-busting.

P res ident Fidel V. Ra mos creat ed the

P residential Commission a gainst G ra ft a nd

Co rrupt io n (PCA GC) under Execut ive

Order No. 151 da ted J a nua ry 11, 1994. Itw a s t a s k ed t o in v e s t i ga t e p r e si d en t i a l

a p p o i n t e e s c h a r g e d w i t h g r a f t a n d

corru pt ion . Likewise , i t funct ions as a

c o o r d i n a t i n g b o d y i n t h e e f f o r t s o f

i n h i b i t i n g t h e p r a c t i c e o f g r a f t a n d

corr uption, t o expeditiously prosecut e such

prac t i ces by o f f i c i a l s in the execut ive

d e p a r t m e n t , a n d t o m o n i t o r t h e

implementa t ion o f the Moral Recovery

Program.

U n l i k e ot h e r p r e si d en t s , P r e s i d en t

E s t r a d a h a s n ot c r ea t e d h i s ow n a n t i -

c o r r u p t i o n b o d y a n d h a s a l l o w e d t h e

Ramo s ’ c rea ted PCA GC to co n t inue in

off ice. He seemed to be incl ined to use

i n s t e a d t h e I n t e r -Ag e n c y An t i -g r a f t

Coordina t in g C ouncil , composed o f th e

C o m m i s s i o n o n A u d i t , C i v i l S e r v i c e

C o m m i s s i o n , t h e O m b u d s m a n , t h e

D e p a r t m e n t of J u s t i ce , t h e N a t i on a l

B u r e a u o f I n v e s t i g a t i on a n d t h eP residential Commission a gainst G ra ft a nd

Corruption.

F. The Rank and File as GraftBusters (Cariño, 1992)

B e c a u s e o f t h e i r k n o w l e d g e o f t h e

w or k i n g s of b ot h f or m a l a n d i n f or m a l

processes, employees a re na tu ra l sources

o f i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t d e v i a t i o n s f r o m

a ccounta bility. It wa s in the Aquino regime

in 1986, th a t th e potent ial of employees as


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gra ft-busters w a s ta pped. Several unions

h a d t a n g l e d w i t h t h e ir r e s p ec t i ve

m a n a g e m e n t o n t h e i s s u e o f t h e i r

a ccount a bility a nd performa nce. The union

i n t h e N a t i o n a l E l e c t r i f i c a t i o n

Administrat ion ha s uneart hed anomalies

a nd delays in th e implementa tion of some

projects such a s t he U SD $ 192 million r ura l

e lectr i f ica t ion revi ta l iza t ion progra m, a

joint project of the World Bank and the

Office of Economic Cooperation Fund of

J a pan (Man ila Ch ronicle, November 13,

1995:4). The m ost s uccessful effort is st ill

that as described by Gaffud (1994), which

wa s a ble to remove the top a dministra torsof a n a gency in 1990. The union quest ioned

tr a nsa ctions w ort h P 176 million, including

overpricing, purchases ma de w ithout being

utilized, purchases made for non-existent

projects , etc. After being ignored by th e

D e p a r t m e n t o f J u s t i c e a n d t h e h i g h e r

off icials of the depart ment to wh ich i t is

a t t a c h e d , t h e u n i o n f i n a l l y f o u n d a

listening ea r in a n NG O (non-governm ent

o r g a n i z a t i o n ) , t h e G i s i n g B a y a n

Foundat ion, w hich t hen f i led complaint sw ith the Ombudsma n. After investiga tion,

P resident Aquino dismissed thr ee assista nt

a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , b u t n o t t h e h ea d

administrator.

Sin ce 1986, th e lea dership of at least

s e ve n ot h e r u n i on s f a c ed h a r a s s m e n t ,

intimidat ion, a nd sometimes, removal from

of f i ce fo r t he i r a n t i -corru pt io n s t a nce .

Never the less , they have succeeded in

bringing cases o f corrupt ion , a buse a ndnepotism pra cticed by th eir superiors to the

a t t en t ion o f con t ro l bod ies such a s t he

Commiss ion on Audi t , t he Ombudsma n

and leg i s l a t i ve co mmi t tees fo r fur ther

investigation.

G. Participation of the Non-governmental Sector

P eople pow er energized in th e ED SA

inflamed non-government organizations

(NGOs) to get concerned about issues of

in tegr i ty a nd corrupt io n . Thei r in i t i a l

a p p r o a c h c e n t e r e d n o t o n p u n i s h i n g

corr upt ion, but in being involved in keeping

government opera tions clean a nd effective.

Th e C o m m u n i t y E m p l oy m e n t a n d

Development P rogram (CED P ) of the lat e

1980s beca me t he la bora tory for t his new

par tnersh ip o f go vernment and cause-

oriented groups. For insta nce, th e Na tiona l

Movement for F ree E lections (NAMFR E L)8

b r a n c h e d f r o m e l e c t i o n c a s e s t o t h e

moni tor ing of CE DP implementa t ion in

various loca l areas . B a sed on this virtua l

experiment, the government promulga ted

guidelines on the use of such volunteergroups for exception monitoring.

Some a ssocia tions focused dir ectly on

p r e v en t i n g c or r u p t i o n . Ope rasyong

Walan g L agay (OWL), its n a me connoting

a movement to prevent bribery, a ssisted

some depa rt ments a nd local governments

in str eam lining procedures a nd improving

bidding commit tees. How ever, it folded in

1989 becau se the volunt eers could not cope

w ith t he increasing dema nds on th eir time,a very rea l problem for volunt eerism in a

growth field such as corruption.

The Na tiona l C oa lition of Tra nspa rency

w a s laun ched in 1989 to show th a t public

s u p p o r t f or m e a s u r e s t o e n h a n c e

a ccount a b i li t y cou ld s t i l l be mus tered .

Composed of over t hirt y NG Os, including

Bishop-Businessmen’s Conference (BBC),

NAMFRE L, a nd other groups tha t w ere in

th e forefront of the a nt i-Ma rcos str uggle,it put forwa rd a comprehensive a pproa ch

to the problem a s it recognized the priva te

sector’s incrimina tion in t he cont inua tion

of governm enta l corru ption. La cking self-

righteousness, its f irs t ca mpaign w a s for

i ts membership to pay the proper taxes,

a nd t hus be mora lly ca pable of censuring

t h e d i s s i p a t i on of p u b l i c r e v en u e s b y

8 NAMFRE L is now a ctive in sponsoring semina r-

workshops on J apa n’s koban system of policing.


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government. It w a s in meeting with them

tha t the P resident admitt ed the return of

sha meless corruption in her a dministra tion

(Cagurangan, 1989).

Ant i-corru ption orga niza tions a ssocia ted

w ith religious groups include the BB C, th e

G i s i n g B a y a n F o u n d a t i o n 9 a n d t h e

religious right , calling itself Citizens B a tt le

A g a i n s t C o r r u p t i o n ( C I B A C )10 . The

Nat iona l is ta P ar ty, a pol it ica l par ty , a lso

f or m e d a n a n t i -g r a f t p a n e l , c om p os e d

la rgely of form er off icials of the Ma rcos

regime (Ma nila B ulletin, J une 4, 1989),

making i t suspect as a po l i t ica l neutra lbody.

Meanw hi le, the Anti-P ol ice Scala w a g

G r o u p ( A P S G ) i s f o c u s e d o n p o l i c e

c or r u p t i o n . I t r e c en t l y c a l l e d on t h e

Philippine National Police (PNP) to curb

rampant “ tong ” and payola collection fr om

operators of i l legal gambling, ironical ly

perpetra ted by members of the P NP ’s own

i l lega l ga mbl ing ta sk forces . An AP SG

s p ok e s p er s o n d i s c los e d t h a t i n M e t r oMa nila a lone, there w ere about 30 to 45

ga mbling “ma inta iners” of vice dens such

as v ideo ka re ra , sak l a , h i - l o , 11 lo t tery ,

bookies, and pr osti tut ion dens w ho give

goodw ill money r a nging from P 500, 000 to

P 1 million, a side from t he monthly “payola ”

for prot ection of P 100, 000 t o P 500, 000

(P h i l ipp ine Da i l y I nqu i rer, Augus t 10,

1998:22).

IV. THE OMBUDSMAN'S STRATEGY AGAINST GRAFT AND

CORRUPTION

In t his port ion, I w ill present some dat af r o m t h e O m b u d s m a n a n d t h e

Sandiganbayan tha t can provide us w ith

insight on the results of the P hilippine ant i-

corr upt ion effort. These effort s a re focused

on t he intr iguing cau ses of corr uption:

(i) I n d i v i d u a l c a u s e s w h i c h a r e

a t t r ibuted to wea k mora l fiber a nd

distorted va lues a mong bureaucra ts,

such as ma teria lism, lack of integrity

a nd nat ionalism;(ii) O r g a n i z a t i on a l ca u s es r e f er t o

d e f i c i e n c i e s , i n t h e b u r e a u c r a t i c

a ppa ra tus such a s low sa la ry, poor

r e c r u i t m e n t a n d s e l e c t i o n

p r o ce d u r e s , a n d r e d t a p e in

government; an d

(iii) S o ci e t a l ca u s e s w h e r e c or r u p t

beha vior is itself th e norm of society.

A. Programs of the Office of theOmbudsman

T h e O M B i s m a n d a t e d u n d e r t h e

Consti tution to protect the people from

a buse or m isuse of pow er by government,

its a gencies or functiona ries. It must fight

for justice for all citizens, prevent loss of

government funds a nd bring t he culprit to

jus t ice. I t f a ces a g igan t ic chal lenge in

c a r r y i n g o u t t h e g o v e r n m e n t ’ s

determina tion to rid itself of undesira bles

in th e public serv ice. The conferm ent oft h i s e x t e n s i v e a u t h o r i t y b y t h e

Co ns t i tu t ion insu la ted t he O f f ice fro m

political in fluence or int erference by:

(i) S t a t i ng t h a t t h e Om bu ds ma n i s

r e m o v a b l e f r o m o f f i c e o n l y b y

impeachment;

(ii) P rescribing a fixed term of office for

seven years w ithout reappointment ;

(iii) D u r i n g t h e t e r m , h i s /h e r s a l a r y

cannot be diminished;(iv) Leveling the Ombuman’s rank w ith

9 “Gising Bayan ” means “Wake U p Nat ion.” I t wa s

originally the t it le of a r adio program under Radio

Veritas, the Catholic station.

10 CIB AC is coined from the Taga log w ord “sibak ”

which means t o cut down.

11 These are local gambling pract ices considered

illegal.


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th a t of a S upreme Court justice.

B. Five (5) Major Functions12

The Ombudsm a n performs f ive ma jor

func t io ns , such as inves t iga t io n , g ra f t

prevention, public assistance, prosecution,

a n d a d m i n is t r a t i v e a d ju d i ca t i on . I t i s

invested w ith corresponding a uthori ty t o

be a ble to ca rry out t hese functions. The

investiga tive fun ction of th e Office involves

determ ina tion of viola tions of the a nt i-gra ft

law s by public functionaries th rough fact-

f i n d i n g o r e v i d e n c e g a t h e r i n g . I t a l s o

inc ludes t he f ind ing o f pro ba b le ca use

through formal preliminary investigationfor th e purpose of prosecution.

In gr a f t prevention, the Off ice ha s the

a ut hori ty t o prevent t he commiss ion of

g r a f t b y o r d e r i n g o r s t o p p i n g t h e

implementa tion of government contr a cts

tha t ar e found to be disadvant ageous to the

governm ent. In t he exercise of its public

assistance, the Office of the Ombudsman

extends assistance to ci t izens in gett ing

ba sic public services from th e governm ent .In prosecution, t he Office ma y file cha rges

or prosecute ca ses in court a ga inst erring

public officials a nd privat e citizens found

t o ha ve conn ived wit h th em. The Office of

th e Special P rosecutor ma y prosecute the

case in the Sandiganbayan . In the regula r

court s, regula r prosecut ors a re deputized

by th e Office of the Ombudsma n to ha ndle

prosecution.

Un der i ts a dministra t ive adjudica t ionfunct ion , th e Of fice ha s th e aut hori ty to

conduct a dministra tive penalties wh ere the

err ing public official or employee, includin g

Ca binet Secreta ries, may be suspended or

dismissed from public service. I t h olds

disciplina ry a uth ority over all government

funct iona r ies , except th e president a nd

members of congress a nd t he judiciar y a nd

oth er impeacha ble off icials . In a l l oth er

crimina l ca ses, however, all public officia ls

a nd employees, w ithout a ny exception, a re

u n d e r t h e O m b u d s m a n ’s i n v e s t i g a t i v e

jurisdiction.

In consonance with all these functions

perform ed by the Ombud sma n, s/he sha ll

a ct on a ll complaint s, but not limited to a cts

or omissions w hich:

(i ) a re con t ra ry to law or regu la t ions ;

(ii) a re unrea sona ble, unfa ir, oppressive

or discrimina tory

(i ii ) a re incons i s ten t w i th t he genera l

course of a n a gency’s function, t houghin a ccorda nce with law ;

(iv) proceed from a mista ke of law or a n

a rbitrary a scertainment of facts ;

(v) a re in the exercise of d iscret iona ry

pow ers but for a n improper purpose;

or

(vi) a re otherw ise irregula r, immora l or

devoid of justification.

In it s effort to solve the tw in evils of gra ft

a n d c o r r u p t i o n , t h e O f f i ce o f t h eO m b u d s m a n e m p l o y s a t w o - p r o n g e d

stra tegy: confronta tiona l and psychologica l

approaches.

The confronta tiona l a pproa ch involves

t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a n d c r i m i n a l

inves t iga t ion a nd prosecut ion o f err ing

m e m b e r s of t h e b u r e a u c r a c y. I n t h i s

regard, a number of criminal cases were

filed in t he Sandiganbayan involving high -

ra nking o f f ic ia ls a nd a bout 2 ,500 ca sesreferred t o the ordina ry court s involving

low -ra nking m embers of t he burea ucracy.

To complement th is capa bility, t he I nt er-

Agency Consultative Committee with the

Comm ission on Audit (COA), C ivil S ervice

Commission (CS C), P hilippine C ommission

Aga ins t G ra f t a nd Corrupt ion (P CAG C),

a nd the Na tiona l Burea u of Investiga tion

(NB I) have been formed a nd orga nized for

effective coordination.12 The Ombudsma n P rimer, p.2.


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As par t of the st ra tegy, the t ripod system

w a s a d o p t e d t o e n f o r c e h o n e s t y a n d

e f f i c i e n c y . T h i s s y s t e m i n c l u d e s t h e

establishment of Corruption Prevention

U n i t s (C P U s ), J u n ior G r a f t w a t ch U n i t s

(J G U s) a nd insta llation of the Offices of the

Resident Ombudsman. The CPU’s were

o r g a n i z e d t o b r oa d e n c om m u n i t y

p a r t i c i p a t i o n a n d s e r v e a s t h e

O m b u d s m a n ’ s e y e s a n d a r m s , c l o s e l y

m o n i t o r i n g c r i t i c a l a n d s u b s t a n t i a l l y

f u n d e d g o v e r n m e n t p r o je c t s a n d /o r

tra nsa ct ions in t heir respect ive ar eas o f

concern. They a lso serve as a fr ont desk to

r e c e i v e a n d f a c i l i t a t e r e q u e s t s f o ra ssista nce, complaint s , or report s of a ny

a n o m a l o u s or c or r u p t p r a c t i c e s. I n

addi t ion , the CPU’s work hand-in-hand

w i t h t h e O f f i c e o f t h e O m b u d s m a n i n

pro mo t ing the o b jec t ives o f the l a t te r

thr ough t he conduct of va rious a ctivit ies

involving communit y par ticipat ion, such a s

c on s u l t a t i v e w or k s h o ps , s y m p os i a ,

seminars and co n ferences , deve lo p ing

m o r a l v a l u e s o f h o n e s t y , a s w e l l a s

e d u c a t i n g t h e p u b l i c o n p r e v e n t i v e

m e a s u r es i n it s f i gh t a g a i n s t g r a f t a n d

corr uption. At present , about 200 CP U ’s

ha ve been a lrea dy organized from a mong

c i v i c -m i n d e d n o n -g o v e r n m e n t a l

organizations.

The J un ior G ra f twa tch Uni t s (J G U’s )

ha ve been orga nized to mobilize the youth

(both a t h igh school and co l lege level ,

including th e out-of-school yout h) in t he

f ig h t a g a i n s t g r a f t a n d c or r u p t i on , b y

encoura ging th em to become th e primar y

coordina ting a rm of the Ombudsma n w ithrespect t o the educa tiona l an d motivat iona l

projects involving youth, a nd a s a n effective

a lly of the Office of the Ombudsma n. All

over the count ry, th ere ar e alrea dy seven

hund red a nd sevent y-four (774) J unior

G r a f t w a t c h U n i t s a ccr e di t ed b y t h e

O m b u d s m a n . T h e s e a r e o r g a n i z e d t o

develop and strengthen their instinct of

goodness a nd idea lism wh ich is a nchored

Figure I. THE POLICY OF GRAFT PREVENTIONStages of Graft Prevention

UNCOVERING P LANS FOR

CORRU PTION

STOPP ING ON-GOING ACTS

OF CORRUP TION

DE TERRI NG

CORRU PTION

CONDITIONING THE MIND

AGAINST CORRU PTION

PROACTIVE

GRAFT

PREVENTION

RESIDE NT OMBUDS MEN J UNIOR GR AFTWATCH UNIT CORRU PTION PRE VENTION UNITS


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in the principle tha t a child who grows up

i n a n e n v i r o n m e n t o f h o n e s t y w i l l b e

d i f f ic u l t t o co r r u p t w h e n s /h e a t t a i n s

maturi ty .

The Office of t he Ombu dsm a n believes

tha t in empowering t he citizenry to pra ctice

t h e i r i n n a t e v i r t u e s o f h o n e s t y a n d

uprightness, and getting t hem involved in

the O mbudsma n ’s s t r uggle for the r ight

va lues, w e ca n expect a citizenry w ith even

stronger moral f iber in th e futur e . The

Office’s gra ft prevention effort s ar e directed

a t sust a ining th e support of all sectors of

Filipino society, w hich is a h ealt hy sign of

e m p o w e r i n g t h e c i t i z e n r y i n n a t i o n

building. It ha s likewise insta lled Resident

O m b u d s m e n ( R O s ) i n 2 2 i m p o r t a n t

depart ments of the government t o serve as

wa tchdogs and gua rdians of integri ty a nd

e f f i c iency. They c lose ly moni t or t he

performa nce of governm ent functiona ries,

th ereby producing s trong deterr ence to

bureaucratic corruption and inefficiency.

S e e F i g u r e I f o r t h e s t a g e s o f g r a f t

p r e v e n t i o n a s c o n c e i v e d b y t h e

Ombudsman.

The psychologica l approa ch ad opted ha s

been des igned to creat e and nur tur e an

environment of integrity in the P hilippine

society. This proceeds from t he principle

tha t corruption ca nnot t hrive in a mil ieu

of honesty . This approa ch, w hich ha s a

long-ra nge objective, is expect ed to ha ve a

last ing effect beca use it a ims t o develop a

str ong mora l fiber for th e citizenry.

For th is purpose, the Office ha s w orkedw i t h t h e E d u c a t i o n D e p a r t m e n t o n

introducing gra ft prevention modules tha t

w ill tea ch stud ents old Filipino va lues of

hones ty and in tegr ity. I t ha s forged a n

a greement w ith t he Movie an d Television

Review a nd Cla ssificat ion B oard (MTRCB )

to ascerta in tha t corrupt pra ctices pictured

in movie f i lms an d t e levis ion progra ms

ha ve redemptive va lues or punishment of

Figure II. THE OMBUDSMAN’S TOTAL STRATEGY AGAINSTGRAFT AND CORRUPTION

CONFRONTATIONAL

APPROACH

Administrative

AdjudicationInvestigat ion P rotection

G RAFT-FR E E

B U RE AU CRACY/SOC IE TY

Community

Mobilization

Va lues Forma tion

& Reorientation Strengthening of the Citizens ’ Mora l

Fiber; G ra ft D eterrence

Public

Assistance

Graft Prevention

Education

Resident

OmbusmenPSYCHOLOGICAL

APPROACH

En forcement of La ws on P ublic Accounta bility


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PARTICIPANTS ’ PAP ERS

th e corru pt. Orienta tion semina rs for new

government ent ra nt s are a lso conducted to

provide a deeper underst a nding of public

service va lues a nd of the a ccount a bi li ty

a t t a c h e d t o t h e i r p o s i t i o n s i n t h e

governm ent. It ha s cont inuously conducted

va lues orient a tion semina rs/w orkshops to

enhance organizational effectiveness and

str ength en the mora l fiber of the personnel.

The tota lity of the Ombudsma n ’s s t ra t egy

aga ins t gra f t a nd corrupt ion is show n in

Figure II.

C. Focus on New Initiatives: Dealing

with “Graft-prone Agencies”G i v e n t h e f a c t t h a t s t o l e n m o n e y i su s u a l l y n e v e r r e c o v e r e d , e v e n i f a

convict ion is obta ined , the Ombudsma n

d e c i d e d t h a t t h e p r o b l e m m u s t b e

c on f r o n t e d b e f or e it i s c om m i t t e d . A

psychological a pproach w a s developed to

address the soc i a l env i ronment wi th in

w hich gra f t an d corru pt ion occur. The

a p p r o a c h a s p r e v i o u s l y m e n t i o n e d

a tt empts to strengt hen the citizen ’s mora l

fiber a nd deter the opportun ities for gr a ft.

In det ermining th e gra ft-prone a gencies

of the government , the Ombudsma n a dopts

thr ee criteria :

(i) the size of the budget of the agency,

(i i) the number of i ts personnel; and

(i ii) th e number o f cases f i l ed in t he

Office of the Ombudsm a n.

As ma y be noted, the f irst tw o cri teriarela t e to the presence of opport unit ies for

corruption, wh ile th e third relat es to a ctual

c a s e s u n c o v e r e d b y c o m p l a i n t s a n d

investiga tion. The agencies meeting t hese

criteria a re th e follow ing:

(i) D e pa r t m e nt of E d u ca t i on , C u lt u r e

a nd Sports (DE CS)

(ii) D e pa r t m e n t of P u b l ic Wor k s a n d

Highwa ys (DP WH)

(iii) D e p a r t m e n t o f E n v i r on m e n t a n d

Na tur a l Resources (DE NR)

(iv) Department of Agriculture (DA)

(v ) D epa r t m en t of H ea l t h (D OH )

(v i) Depar tment of Tra nspor ta t ion and

Commu nicat ion (DOTC)

(v ii) Depar tm ent o f In t er ior a nd Loca l

G overnment (DILG )

(v i i i )Depar tment o f Na t iona l De fence

(DND)

(ix) Depart ment of Foreign Affairs (DFA)

(x) N a t i on a l I r r i ga t ion Ad m in is t r a t i on

(NIA)

(xi) Nat ional P ower Corporat ion (NPC )

(xii) B u r e a u o f I m m i g r a t i o n a n d

Deportation (BID)(xiii)Philippine Economic Zone Authority

(PEZA)

(xiv) P hilippine P orts Authority/B urea u of

Cu st oms (P PA/B OC)

(xv) B ureau of Internal Revenue (B IR)

(xvi) B oard of Investm ent (B OI)

F o r t h e s e a g e n c ie s , t h e R e s i d e n t

Ombudsmen r eview s processes t o cut red

ta pe, an d inspects bidding requirements

a nd contr a cts for evidence of gra ft.

This progra m a ppears t o be a w orth w hile

i n i t i a t i v e t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e

O m b u d s m a n a s s i s t s a n a g e n cy i n

improving policies a nd progra ms t o prevent

corru ption. In th a t sense, it is proactive,

a n d v i e w s c or r u p t i o n f r o m a s y s t e m i c

perspective. However, the work tha t th e

Resident Ombudsma n is given should not

duplica te or ta ke aw a y t he responsibili ty

of the mana gement , th rough a w orkinginternal control unit , in supervising the

performa nce of t he functions a ssigned to

th a t a gency. To tra nsfer t his responsibility

t o a n o u t s i d e a g e n c y m a y e n m e s h t h e

Ombudsma n in implementa tion problems,

as well as corruption opportunit ies , and

decrea se its capa city for enforcement a nd

provision of sa nctions. This seems to us

simila r t o the pre-a udit functions th a t u sed

to be performed by the Commiss ion on

Audit, until it r ecognized t ha t ma na gement


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should w ield th i s impor t a n t pow er, f or

w hich it is responsible.

Anoth er problem ma y be in the la belling

of agencies as graft-prone. Bigness alone

is not necessarily a prelude to corruption.

B esides, the third cri teria of the num ber

o f c a s e s m a y b e m i s l e a d i n g i f t h e y

p r i m a r i l y c o n s i s t o f c a s e s s t i l l u n d e r

inves t iga t ion , r a th er tha n resolved . A

l i t i g a t i o n - p r o n e a g e n c y m a y n o t b e

equiva lent t o a corrupt ion-prone one. We

ma y poin t out t ha t t h i s is sue shows t he

u r g e n t n e e d f o r t h e O m b u d s m a n t o

expeditiously dispose of cases br ought toits jurisdiction.

VI. CONCLUSION ANDRECOMMENDATIONS

The P hi l ippines ha s unleashed ma ny

weapons against irresponsible behavior in

the government. I t ha s a comprehensive

set of law s tha t ma y ha ve ascer ta ined a l l

t h e p o s s i b l e i n s t a n c e s o f g r a f t a n d

corrupt ion tha t can be devised. The ant i-

corru ption ag encies ha ve been given ample

pow ers to identi fy a nd punish offenders.

They recognize the bur den of pow er, wit h

specia l ag encies to give priority t o cat ching

the “big fish” a nd gr a ve offences, over t he

a cts of low er ra nking personnel . They

s ta r ted on the i r own t o coord ina t e wi th

each oth er for gr eat er over-a ll effectiveness.

T h e y a p p r o a c h c o r r u p t i o n i n b o t h a

p r e v en t i v e a n d pu n i t i v e w a y. Th e y

recognize tha t t he ta sk is not only with t hegovernment , an d ha ve enlist ed civil society

in th e s tru ggle. For their par t , c it izens

ha ve also volunt eered, in coopera tion w ith

sta te a gencies or by t hemselves, in fighting

corru ption. On the whole, th e P hilippine

a p pr o a c h h a s u s e d d e m oc r a t i c m e a n s ,

r e l y i n g o n d u e p r o c e s s , t r a n s p a r e n t

procedures, a nd volition in effecting ma ny

of its a spira tions. Yet corru ption continues.

Wha t else needs t o be done?

A. Re-examination of Existing LawsThe P hilippines does not need a ny m ore

law s a gainst corruption. If a nything, wha t

i t n e e d s i s a r e - e x a m i n a t i o n o f a n t i -

c o r r u p t i o n l a w s n o t o n l y t o r e m o v e

duplica tion, but a lso to ensure tha t those

existing a re a ccepted by the populace an d

e n f o r c e a b l e b y t h e a n t i - c o r r u p t i o n

a gencies. We ca n only cite a few a rea s for

furt her study. There a re at present some

provis ions t ha t , in t heir s t r ic tness , ma y

encoura ge their brea ch:

(i) The Anti-gift Decree has never been

implemented, but it ca n conceivablyb e u s e d a g a i n s t a c o m p l e t e l y

i n n o c e n t , g e n e r o u s p e r s o n , w h o

(being a devout Chris t ian) cannot

help but give gifts on C hristma s da y,

a n a ct s a n ct i on e d by P D 4 6 a n d

i g n o r e d b y a l m o s t e v e r y b o d y

immersed in Philippine culture.

(ii) Th e s t a t e m e n t o f a s s e t s a n d

liabil i t ies , a s imple but potential ly

s t r o n g m e c h a n i s m t o f i n dunexpla ined wea l th , i s submi t ted

yea rly by a ll public officia ls, but no

one ever studies them. In any ca se,

any wel l-paid accountant can hide

unexplained w ealth , an d so th e only

people potent ia l ly a t r i sk a re c iv i l

servant s tha t cannot a f ford to have

others wr ite their s ta tements .

(i ii) Other provisions ma y work aga inst

gett ing good people in governm ent,for exa mple, by the requir ement for

d i v e s t m e n t . Th i s a p p r oa c h t o

possible conflicts of interest w ill be

met by w ell-qua lified people ent ering

into the highest reaches of the sta te

apparatus. The current divestment

procedure ma y be too ha rsh , since it

could ef fect ively mea n t ha t no top

i n d u s t r i a l i s t f o r i n s t a n c e ca n b e

Secreta ry of Tra de an d In dustry, a nd

no top banker ma y be Centra l Ba nk


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G overnor. Tha t w ould be denying the

g o v e r n m e n t v a l u a b l e h u m a n

resources.

A possible a ltern a tive is to put more

trus t in t ra nsparency a nd the press

(w hich requ i res a n a mendment o f

ex i s t ing l a w ). When a pres iden t

c h oo s es a p e r s o n w h o s h o w s

relucta nce because of the d ivestm ent

r e q u i r e m e n t , e x e m pt i o n m u s t b e

ma de for t ha t person, provided t ha t

h e o r s h e d i s cl os e s i n d e t a i l a n d

publicly al l personal interests that

ha ve public implicat ions. This couldmean that the ci t izenry could keep

t r a c k o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e

relevan t businesses a nd industr ies ,

w hile a va lued member is in public

off ice. Conver sely, the problem of

confl ict of interest m ust be ta ckled

hea d on by removing persons w hose

personal in teres t prospered whi le

th ey were in office. This is a mply

provided for in RA 3019 a nd RA 6713,

e v en w i t h o u t t h e d i v es t m e n trequirement.

(iv) The schedule of pena lt ies ma y a lso

be looked in to . In some ca ses the

p e n a l t y m a y b e t o o l o w , e . g , t h e

m a x i m u m i m p r i s on m e n t f o r

corr upt ion under RA 3019 is 15 yea rs.

In others, it ma y be too high, e.g, th e

sole pena lty for gr a ve misconduct on

f i rs t of fence is d ismissa l f rom the

service. E xtr eme pena lt ies do notencoura ge prosecution of of fences,

even when t hey are blata nt , because

of the cultura l tra it of “sayang ” (wa ste

of time) for t hose who w ill merit only

low pena l t i es and “awa ” (pity) for

t h o s e w h o w i l l b e h i t b y h a r s h

punishment.

B. EnforcementT h e P h i l i p p i n e s h a s a n i m p r e s s i v e

number of laws to tackle pract ica l ly a l l

ca ses requ i r ing f as t a c t ions . However,

enforcement of th ese la w s leaves much to

be desired. The ret ention of officia ls w hom

the Pres iden t ’s an t i -gra f t agency i t se l f

recomm ended to be removed suggests a

lack of poli t ical wil l , and the priori ty of

par tisa nship over the public interest. This

w o u l d h a v e p r o v i d e d a n o c c a s i o n f o r

a r t icula t ing t he Adminis tra t ion ’s ethical

v is ion , ca tching a b ig f i sh , an d wa rning

e v e r y o n e t h a t t h e l e a d e r s h i p m e a n s

business.

T h e p e o p l e e x p e c t n o t o n l y e q u a l

enforcement of the law, but even morest rictness on persons perceived to be in t he

P r e s i d e n t ’s inn er c i rc le. D ecis iveness

would also be perceived i f the public is

informed of a clear connection betw een t he

official’s misdeed an d his/her removal. P a rt

o f the popular d i s sa t i s f ac t ion wi th the

conduct of accountabi l i ty i s the lack of

c l os u r e o f c a s e s . Th e n u m b e r of

investigations that were not f inished, or

h a v e “ sof ter ” f ind ings a nd conc lus ions

w hen no longer la boring un der th e publiceye, does not in crea se public confidence in

the a nti-corruption progra ms.

C. Leadership in the Anti-corruption Drive

L e a d e r s h i p o f t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n s

prima rily focused on f ight ing corruption

requires h igher q ual i f ica t ions t ha n w ha t

i s n o r m a l l y d e m a n d e d . Th i s a p p l ie s

part icularly to the Ombudsma n a nd to the

hea ds of other a gencies specifica lly crea tedfor this purpose. The very concept of a n

O mbudsma n requ i res a person of h igh

integri ty whose very presence provokes

respect a nd rectitude. The P hilippines ha s

not been blessed w ith t he appoint ment of

such persons to th is office. In stea d, they

ha ve been contr overs ia l , such t ha t t hey

ra ised q uestions a bout th e Office, itself not

only about its head . The Pres ident w ho

a p p o i n t s t h e O m b u d s m a n s h o u l d b e

cognizan t of the high expecta tions of the


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people to bring t o th e Ombudsma n ’s office

p e r s o n s k n o w n f o r t h e i r e t h i c a l r o l e

model ing , non-par t i s ansh ip , and good

judgement.

D. More Resources for EnhancingAccountability

Resources for enhancing accountability

a nd a tt a cking corruption must be provided.

This is an investment tha t w ill pay off in

the long run. G ua rdians must be supported

in th eir progra ms a nd given incentives not

to stra y from account a bil ity . The funds,

personnel, technology, a nd oth er resources

o f t h e O m b u d s m a n a n d t h eSandiganbayan must a l low them t o keep

in step w ith t he corrupt they a re trying to

cat ch. The persona l income of such officials

should be compet i t i ve wi th the pr iva te

s e c t o r , s u b j e c t t o t h e c o n s c i e n t i o u s

p e r f or m a n c e o f t h e i r d u t i e s . Th e i r

orga nizat ions should be provided w ith t he

necessa ry equipment high-tech devices like

hidden ca meras, etc a nd munda ne mat ters

such as paper c l ips , enve lopes , f i l ing

c a b i n e t s a s i s n e e d e d i n t h e i r w o r k .Incumbents should be imbued w ith a sense

o f m i s s i o n e a r l y , v i a a w e l l - p l a n n e d

orient a tion progra m, a nd keep them going

w ith peer group an d leadership support ,

a n d a h o t l i n e f o r c o u n s e l i n g o n t h e

problems they meet.

Civil serva nt s w ho perform exceptiona lly

w el l should be recogn iz ed . The C iv i l

Service Commission progra m t o this effect

is a step in the right direction, but it honorst oo few people. The increa se of sa la ries

a c r o s s t h e b o a r d t h r o u g h t h e S a l a r y

Sta ndardiza t ion Law is a wa y to keep up

w ith inflat ion, but it ha s ha d the pernicious

effect of eating up a ny resources tha t m a y

be given competit ively. Merit increases a nd

p r om ot i on c a n s i gn a l t h a t a n a g e n cy

recognizes th a t one officia l is doing bett er

work tha n the others are.

E. Better Public AdministrationT h e m a n a g e m e n t a p p r o a c h s t a r t e d

under t he Aquino a dministra tion should be

c on t i n u e d a n d i m p r o v e d . P e r s o n s i n

d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p o s i t i o n s s h o u l d b e

t r a i n e d a n d e n c o u r a g e d t o t h i n k

s t ra teg ica l l y. The cha l lenge i s to use

wha tever capacity t here is towa rds work

th a t i s focused on enha ncing the publ ic

i n t e r e s t . Th e r e i s a l s o a n e e d t o

ins t i tut iona l ize some of the ef for t s th a t

h a v e b e e n p u t i n t o e n h a n c i n g

a ccount a bility since 1986. This mea ns the

support of agency reform measur es, as w ell

a s the esta blishment of new procedures, topave the w ay for clean er administra t ion.

F. Encouraging Public SectorUnions

D e m o c r a c y i s d e v e l o p e d i n t h e

bureaucracy as t he ra nk a nd file are given

the cha nce to air t heir grievances, press for

bet ter working condi t ions , and demand

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a n d r e c t i t u d e f r o m t h e

m a n a g e m en t . E v e n w i t h C i v il S e r v i ce

Commission encouragement, unions stillface an uphill batt le in being hea rd by t heir

bosses. An ar ra ngement wh ere th e union

keeps i ts independence w hile rema ining

open to a par tnersh ip for serv ice wi th

m a n a g e m en t w ou l d p r ov i d e t h e b es t

a v e n u e n o t o n l y f o r p o l i c i n g h o w

a ccounta ble ma na gement is , but a lso for

improving th e performa nce of everyone a t

a ll levels of the orga nizat ion.

G. Reform of Politicians andBusiness People

Cha nges should a lso focus on t he ma in

corrupters, t he politicians a nd t he private

s e ct o r . Th e N G O s t h a t r e q u i r e t h e i r

members to pay the right ta xes a nd conduct

a ctivit ies tow a rds corru ption prevention

w ithin t heir ra nks should be encoura ged.

P olitical pa rt ies should reform th emselves,

primarily th rough the continuous tra ining

of th eir members on pa rt y principles and

p o l i c i e s , a n d t h e i r a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e


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principle of politica l neutr a lity a mong civil

serva nts. P ending that , the pa ssage of the

law required by the Consti tution against

politica l dyna sties, an d increased recourse

to a nd encoura gement of the a ctivit ies of

the E th ics Commi t t ees o f bo th H ouses

w ould be more immediat e steps. Ca use-

orient ed groups a nd public sector u nions

ma y a ssist politician s, especially t hose who

regard themselves as non-tradit ional , in

developing support groups to re-enforce

th eir desire for t rue public service, not m ere

patronage.

H. Transparency and AccountabilityMa ke tra nsparency real , al low ing civils e r v a n t s a n d t h e p u b l i c t o a c c e s s

informa tion in government . A qu estion

hour in C ongress, or a ra dio-TV progra m

w i t h q u e s t i o n s a n d c o m m e n t s t o b e

a nsw ered by execut ive officia ls ma y help

inquir ies into a ny a spect of th eir policies

a nd performa nce. Report s of investiga tions

should be ma de ava ilable to the public. The

s u p p o r t o f t h e m a s s m e d i a i n t h e s e

e n d e a v o r s , a c co m pa n i e d b y t h e i r ow nefforts a t r eforming t heir ra nks, would be

crucia l to t he success of these effort s.

A c c o u n t a b l e p e r f o r m a n c e w o u l d b e

support ed if the public is informed a bout

w h a t t h e a g e n cy d oe s a n d w h y. I t i s a

m e a n s o f e n s u r i n g t h a t t h e p e r s o n n e l

th emselves know its mission. At th e sa me

time, both t hey a nd t he public w ould a lso

t h e n u n d e r s t a n d t h e r e a s o n in g b e h in d

w h a t s e e m t o a p pe a r o n l y a s r e d t a p e.Informat ion sha ring - part icularly of steps

i n s e r v i c e d e l i v e r y - a l s o m a k e s i t

unnecessary for the cl ient to seek out a

‘fixer ’. Open tra nsa ctions ca n build a sense

of par tnership betw een t he government

a nd t he people th e agencies serve.

I. Moral ReformH a ving role models, a code of eth ics a nd

va lue forma tion exercises speak of a desire

for mora l reform w ithin t he government.

W h i l e c u l t u r e s c a n n o t b e c h a n g e d

overnight , support for va lue cha nges must

be developed through a system of rewa rds

a nd punishments th a t becomes regula rized

in sta nda rd opera ting procedures. Also, th e

meting out of positive an d nega tive str okes

must be sw if t but fa ir, an d even-ha nded.

Va lue development semina rs s hould be

case-orient ed, th ought provoking, a nd a ble

to encourage innovative behavior, while

ra ising ala rm a bout continued violat ions.

J . Role of the PeopleThere is a need for popula r involvement

in e th ics and accounta bi li ty. P a y ing theproper t a xes, obeying regula tions, being

w ell informed a bout governm ent services -

these a re only t he first steps in moving t o

a disciplined but democra tic society . In

a d d i t i o n , s u p po r t f o r p o li t i c ia n s w h o

p r o m o t e c a u s e s r a t h e r t h a n j u s t t h e i r

cha rm a nd personality w ould also ma ke the

l i n e o f a c co u n t a b i l i t y c l ea r e r . Th e

d e v el op m e n t o f pa r t i e s w i t h c o h er e n t

plat forms should t hen be a focus of people’s

par t icipa t ion , to t ie up wi th the r eformssuggested above. These a re all in a ddition

to the encoura gement o f NG O s tha t a re

non-par tisa n in exposing corruption a nd

bringing violat ors to justice. The sta rt of

ma ny of these measures ha s alrea dy been

ma de. They a re in tun e w ith democrat ic

principles , a s wel l a s th e cul ture . One

hopes that ma ny more f ina ncia l , huma n

a nd mora l resources w ill be placed a t t he

service of accounta bility in t he count ry.


18/23

518


T

able1

OFFICEOFTHEOMBUDSMAN

STATISTICALREPORTONCR

IMINAL/ADMINISTRATIVECASES

From

1988to1998

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

19931

994

1995

1996

1997

1998

OM

BCasesReceivedduringthe

year

57

3,722

3,997

5,142

5,303

8,172

9,454

6,122

8,117

8,15

0

8,551

Ca

sesreceivedbacktopendin

g

19

92

2

8

18

OldTanodbayanCases

1,811

2,814

998

145

314

105

154

46

552

Ca

rry-overfrom

thepreviousyea

er

6

3,536

6,403

8,805

9,9281

2,789

14,652

12,975

12,47

3

9,159

To

talWorkloadofCriminal/

Ad

ministrativeCases/Complaints

1,868

6,592

8,51111,69014,42218,20522,39720,83921,73620,65

117,728

Disposedof

1,862

3,056

2,108

2,885

4,494

5,416

7,772

7,864

9,26311,49

210,816

Dismissed/Closedandtermi

nated

1,862

2,996

1,908

2,278

3,839

3,605

4,851

4,262

5,109

8,98

6

8,397

PenaltyImposed

73

93

95

179

29

6

253

Prosecution

60

200

607

655

1,738

2,828

3,507

3, 975

2,21

0

2,166

RegularCourts

405

393

1,378

2,198

2,988

3,734

1,72

2

1,700

Pe

nding

6

3,536

603

8,805

9,92812,78914,62512,97512,473

9,15

9

6,912


19/23

519



Table 2WORKLOAD AND STATUS OF CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CASES

(as of December 31, 1997)

Central

Office

Cases received during the year 1,246 1,494 2,075 1,150 2,185 8,150

Referred by the ot her OMB office 8 13 0 49 0 445

Disposed ca ses revert ed ba ck t o pen din g 0 0 0 28 0 28

Ca rry-over from 1996 3,980 2,460 1,932 3,244 857 12,473

Total workload of criminal

and administrativecases 5,234 3,967 4,007 4,471 3,417 21,473

Less ca ses recalled to cent ra l

office /t ra nsferred to OMB office 186 68 177 9 5 445

Net workload of cases 5,048 3,899 3,830 4,462 3,412 20,651Disposed 3,249 1,772 2,094 2,034 2,343 11,492

Dismissed /exonera ted 2,812 1,337 1,527 1,520 989 8,185

P rosecut ion 254 383 357 451 765 2,210

P ena lt y imposed 148 15 86 47 0 296

Closed a nd t ermina t ed 35 37 124 16 589 801

P ending 1,799 2,127 1,736 2,428 1,069 9,159

Luzon Visayas Mindanao Military TotalParticulars

Table 3WORKLOAD AND STATUS OF CRIMINAL CASES


Central

Office

Ca ses received during t he yea r 880 1,125 1,242 847 1,370 5,454

Referred by the oth er OMB offices 7 13 0 46 255 321

Disposed ca ses revert ed t o pending 0 0 0 25 0 25

Ca rry-over from 1996 2,989 1,997 1,281 2,765 756 9,788

Total workload of criminal cases 3,876 3,125 2,523 3,683 2,381 15,855Less ca ses recalled to cent ra l

office /t ra nsferred t o OMB offices 179 2 132 6 3 321

Net workload of criminal cases 3,697 3,123 2,391 3,678 2,378 15,267

DISPOSED 2,749 1,480 1,440 1,746 1,643 9,058

Dismissed 2,460 1,097 1,070 1,295 878 6,800

Closed a nd Termina t ed 35 0 13 0 0 48

P rosecut ion 254 383 357 451 765 2,210

w ith regula r court s 176 244 291 309 752 1,772

w ith S a ndiga nba ya n 78 139 66 142 13 438

P ending 948 1,643 951 932 735 6,209



20/23

520


Table 4WORKLOAD AND STATUS OF ADMINISTRATIVE CASES


Central

Office

Ca ses received during the yea r 366 379 833 303 815 2,696

Referred by t he ot her OMB offices 1 0 0 3 120 124

Disposed ca ses reverted ba ck to pending 0 0 0 3 0 3

Ca rry-over from 1996 991 463 651 479 101 2,865

Total workload of

administrative cases 1,358 842 1,484 788 1,036 5,508

Less cases reca lled t o centra l

office /t ra nsferred t o other OMB offices 7 66 45 4 2 124

Net workload of administrative cases 1,351 776 1,439 784 1,034 5,384DISPOSED 500 292 654 288 700 11,492

Dismissed /exonera ted 352 240 457 225 111 1,385

P ena lt y imposed 148 15 86 47 0 296

Closed a nd t ermina ted 0 37 111 16 589 753

Act ive /a w a it ing fina l disposit ion 851 484 785 496 334 2,950


Table 5

TOTAL WORKLOAD OF CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CASES(as of December 31, 1996)

Central

Office

Ca ses received 1,342 1,525 2,026 1,140 2,084 8,117

Referred by ot her OMB offices 19 13 1 16 243 292

Disposed ca ses revert ed ba ck t o pending 0 0 5 87 0 92

OS P /TB P t ra nsferred ca ses 6 1 1 544 0 552

Ca rry-over from 1995 4,718 2,063 2,062 3,079 654 12,576

Total cases received 6,085 3,602 4,095 4,866 2,981 21,629Less cases reca lled t o centra l

office /t ra nsferred t o other offices 65 7 210 6 4 292

Net workload of cases 6,020 3,595 3885 4,860 2,977 21,337

Disposed 2,974 1,135 1,765 1,219 2,121 9,214

Dismissed 2,063 879 1,472 909 741 6,604

P rosecut ion 350 185 201 221 549 1,506

P ena lt y imposed 21 65 46 39 8 179


P ending 3,046 2,460 2,120 3,641 856 12,123



21/23

521



Table 7

ADMINISTRATIVE CASES / COMPLAINTS(as of December 31, 1996)

Central

Office

Cases received 314 312 602 272 856 2,356

Referred by th e Cent ra l Office 1 0 0 6 65 72

Disposed ca ses /reverted ba ck to pending 0 0 1 11 0 12

Ca rry-over 1995 1,316 406 720 474 79 2,965

Total administrative cases received 1,631 718 1,323 763 970 5,405


office /t ra nsferred t o other offices 5 0 66 1 0 72

Net workload of administrative cases 1,626 718 1,257 762 970 5,333

Disposed 635 255 606 283 869 2,648

Dismissed /exonera ted 614 184 531 208 38 1,575

P ena lt y imposed 21 65 46 39 8 179

Closed a nd t ermina t ed 0 6 29 36 823 894

Act ive /a w a it ing fina l disposit ion 993 463 651 479 101 2,685


Table 6WORKLOAD AND STATUS OF CRIMINAL CASES


Central

Office

Cases received 1,028 1,213 1,424 828 1,228 5,761

Referred by ot her OMB offices 18 13 1 10 178 220

Disposed ca ses revert ed t o pending 0 0 4 76 0 80


Ca rry-over 1995 3,402 1,657 1,342 2,605 605 9,611

Total criminal cases received 4,454 2,884 2,772 4,103 2,011 16,224


office /t ra nsferred t o ot her offices 60 7 144 5 4 220

Net workload of criminal cases 4,394 2,877 2,628 4,098 2,007 16,004DISPOSED 2,339 880 1,159 936 1,252 6,566

Dismissed 1,989 695 941 701 703 5,029


P rosecut ion 350 185 201 221 549 1,506

w ith Regula r Court s 195 181 153 194 542 1,265

w ith S a ndiga nba ya n 155 4 48 27 7 241

P ending 2,055 1,997 1,469 3,162 755 9,438



22/23

522


Table 8TOTAL WORKLOAD AND STATUS OF CRIMINAL ANDADMINISTRATIVE CASES (as of December 31, 1995)

Central

Office

Cases received 1,203 0 1,159 1,354 617 4,333

Referred by t he Cent ra l Office 0 1,142 109 137 248 1,636


Referred by th e ot her OMB offices 27 18 6 19 285 355


Ca rry-over 1994 5,855 1,692 2,257 3,459 602 13,865

Total criminal / administrative

cases received 7,094 2,852 3,531 4,989 1,788 20,254

Less cases reca lled t o centra loffice /t ra nsferred t o other offices 30 2 85 231 7 355

Net workload of criminal /

administrative cases 7,064 2,850 3,446 4,758 1,781 19,899

Disposed 1,984 1,416 1,475 1,834 1,155 7,864

Dismissed 1,637 1,140 1,143 1,311 473 5,704

P rosecut ion 307 252 246 379 336 1,520

P ena lt y imposed 1 24 15 55 0 95


P ending 5,080 1,434 1,971 2,924 626 12,035


Table 9CRIMINAL CASES


Central

Office

Cases received 955 0 710 1,135 295 3,095

Referred by t he Cent ra l Office 0 852 85 100 217 1,254

Disposed ca ses reverted ba ck to pending 0 0 0 11 0 11

Referred by t he ot her OMB office 21 15 4 10 250 300

OS P /TB P t ra nsferred ca ses 9 0 0 1 36 46Ca rry-over 1994 4,372 1,272 1,446 2,796 559 10,445

Total criminal cases received 5,357 2,139 2,245 4,053 1,357 15,151

Less cases reca lled t o centra l

office /t ra nsferred t o ot her office 26 2 64 206 2 300

Net workload of criminal cases 5,331 2,137 2,181 3,847 1,355 14,851

Disposed 1,576 1,105 929 1,397 775 5,782

Dismissed 1,266 853 648 987 439 4,193

Closed a nd termina t ed 3 0 35 31 0 69

P rosecut ion 307 252 246 379 336 1,520

P ending 3,755 1,032 1,252 2,450 580 9,069



23/23



Table 10ADMINISTRATIVE CASES / COMPLAINTS


Central

Office

Cases received during the year 248 0 449 219 322 1,238

Referred by the Cent ra l Office (CO) 0 290 24 37 31 382


Referred by th e ot her OMB office 6 3 2 9 35 55

Ca rry-over from 1994 1,483 420 811 663 43 3,420

Total administrative cases received 1,737 713 1,286 936 431 5,103

Less cases r eca lled to CO /tr a nsferr ed

t o ot her office 4 0 21 25 5 55

Net workload of administrative cases 1,733 713 1,265 911 426 5,048Disposed 408 311 546 437 380 2,082

Dismissed 371 287 495 324 34 1,511

P rosecut ion 1 24 15 55 0 95


Act ive /a w a it ing fina l disposit ion 1,325 402 719 474 46 2,966


MORATALLA Graft and Corruption Phil Experience

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