Graft and Corruption Phil Experience

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113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSEPARTICIPANTS’ PAPERS

* Deputy Director / Dean of Academic, PhilippineNational Police Academy, Philippine Public SafetyCollege, Philippines.

1 “Initiatives Taken Against Corruption: ThePhilippine Case”; unpublished paper prepared byLedivina V. Cariño, University Professor and Dean,Gabriele R. Iglesias, Assistant Professor, and Ma.Fe V. Mendoza, Associate Professor, College ofPublic Administration, University of thePhilippines.

GRAFT AND CORRUPTION: THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE

Nelson Nogot Moratalla*

I. INTRODUCTION

This paper will present a condensedreport on graft and corruption in thePhilippines. Information was compiled bythe author from documents, articles,newspaper clippings and other datagathered from the reports and journals ofthe Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan,two of the constitutional bodies mandatedby Philippine law to investigate and act oncomplaints filed against public officials andemployees for violations of graft andcorrupt practices. More specifically, thisreport will cover input from an unpublishedresearch paper prepared by scholars fromthe University of the Philippines, Collegeof Public Administration, whom I willaccordingly acknowledge in this work.1

This report will generally follow theoutline as provided. The first portion willintroduce the theoretical perspective andcontext of corruption in the Philippines. Itclarifies the national context within whichcorruption operates. It will look into theintersection of corruption and Philippinehistory and culture. It will likewise discusssome public perceptions of corruption.Estimates of the extent and losses ofcorruption in the Philippines will be brieflydiscussed. The history of the Philippine

fight against corruption will be taken upin terms o f law, ant i - corrupt ionconst i tut ional bod ies , and o thergovernment agencies and non-governmentinitiatives. Finally, there will be anassessment of the anti-graft and corruptionprograms, and recommendations on whatmight be done in the light of Philippinedemocracy, culture and development.

II. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

We view corruption as an agent’sdeparture from the principal’s demand forthe responsible use of power in society. Assuch, although it is centered on a publicofficial’s act and is indicated by a violationof law, it does not involve the state alone.Rather, it is embroiled in the accountabilityof public officials, and indeed of the state,to the people. Thus, in analyzing andcombating corruption, we look beyond thestate. Corruption shows up what thesociety views as the responsible use ofpower and thus what it will accept andsupport. In this light, any attack againstcorruption must come to terms not onlywith the law, but also with the country’shistory, ie what is accepted by the cultureand the behavior of civil society as well.2

III. THE CONTEXT OFCORRUPTION IN THE

PHILIPPINES

In the late 1980’s, the Philippinesentered the Guinness Book of WorldRecords for allegedly the biggest corruptionof all time, referring to the period of thedictatorship of the former President,

2 Ibid, “Initiatives Taken Against Corruption: ThePhilippines Case”; p.4

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Ferdinand Marcos. Marcos was oustedfrom his twenty-year presidency by abloodless people’s power revolution inFebruary 1986. To describe the corruptionof his regime, “kleptocracy” and “plunder”became part of the Filipino’s politicalvocabulary and discourse.3 “Governmentby thievery” did not stop with theenactment of the Republic Act No. 7080 in1991, entitled “An Act Defining Plunder”.Indeed, although both laws and agenciesto combat corruption have increased in thepost-Marcos period, it remains one of theprime problems complained of by thepeople. The currency and gravity of theproblem are manifested in the followingclippings from a September 7, 1998 issueof the Philippine Daily Inquirer:

“On board a Philippine Airlineschartered flight to Manila fromMindanao where he inspected on-going government infrastructureprojects, President Joseph EjercitoEstrada... thought of a sloganreminding Filipinos that he is seriousin fighting graft and corruption in thegovernment. Dubbed “Supilin, pigilinang pagnanakaw sa pamahalaan,”( “Win over, s t op th i every ingovernment”), he thought of putting-up such a message on billboards, hugeposters and the like to remind peoplein government and the private sectornot to succumb to the “evils of stealingfrom government coffers.” Stealing,i f a g g r e g a t e d w i t h o t h e rmisdemeanors of public service andtheir “transactees,” he said, wouldsum up to about 20 percent of thenational budget. With a proposedbudget of more than 500 billion in1999, “this means roughly 100 billion

pesos will go to waste if corruptionremains unchecked.”

While the figure cited above is a ballparkfigure that cannot be validated, the concernof President Estrada is certainly warrantedby the findings of this research. It is alsonot a recent phenomenon but one that hasbeen identified and decried since theSpanish colonization in the 16th century.

A. Filipino Culture and CorruptionCorruption has been viewed as a

“cultural and psychological phenomenon ina country marked by incompatible legal andcultural norms” (Tapales 1995:407). Theformer emphasizes “rationality anduniversal principles of action” as againstand in conflict with “reliance and obligationtoward kinship, friendship and primarygroups” (Bautista 1982). This conflict ishighlighted in the use of the alibi of a gift-giving culture to justify bribery andextortion, or the Filipino regard for theother (pakikipagkapwa-tao) to justifygiving benefits to unqualified butpersonally known recipients.

This is a real problem, but it can beoverblown. For instance, both culture andlaw similarly define cases of corruption andrectitude. One’s kin may ostracize abureaucrat who chooses to stay within thelaw. The state may, however, leave themalone, provided they do not compromisetheir official role. Another case is when anofficial participates in a decision involvingkin, even if they vote against that person’sinterest, that official (under the RepublicAct 3019) can still be charged withcorruption. For an official similarlysituated, but who bends over backwards tomake sure their kin gets a prizedgovernment contract engages in so called“favour corruption”. This is indeed thequintessential conflict between culture andlaw.

3 Lengthy discussion on this is presented in “Politicsof Plunder: The Philippines Under Marcos”, BelindeAquino, Great Books Trading and UP College ofPublic Administration, 1987.

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The idea of cultural acceptance ofcorruption also needs to be re-examined inthe light of a string of public opinion pollswhere Filipinos decry it as a major problem.The media, church pastoral letters andother culturally valued sources likewisedenounce this. Indeed, the long list of lawsenacted against them manifest that graftand corruption are not colonial impositionsbut are desired by Filipinos themselves.

B. Public Perception of Graft andCorruption

In a speech in 1988, Jaime Cardinal Sin,Archbishop of Manila, stated that“corruption was the biggest problem of themall” (Murphy, October 9, 1988). In 1989,after months of declaring the rectitude ofthe government she heads, PresidentCorazon C. Aquino despaired, “Corruptionhas returned, if not on the same scale, atl e a s t w i t h e q u a l s h a m e l e s s n e s s(Cagurangan, 1989).” Apparently, manyFilipinos agree with her. In a surveyconducted in July 1989 in Metro Manilaby the Social Weather Station (SWS), arespected public opinion polling firm, asmuch as 58 percent of respondents agreedthat given current conditions, corruptgovernment officials are a greater threatto the country than the NPA (New People’sArmy, communist guerrillas who lostground after Aquino’s assumption to office).Those who were satisfied with theperformance of the Aquino administrationin fighting graft and corruption decreasedfrom 72 percent in March 1987 to 26percent in July 1989 (Guidote, 1989). Inher State of the Nation Address in July1989, President Aquino shared the people’sexasperation that she would leave as aproblem the very issue that she wanted toleave as a legacy: a clean and accountablegovernment.

Indeed, her successor, Fidel V. Ramos,ranked graft and corruption as third amongthe major problems that obstruct the

country’s achievements in his developmentstrategy for the Philippines 2000. The SWSpoll of September 1993 validates this fear:89 percent of the respondents felt thatcorruption would indeed be a big obstacleto attaining this vision.

Other SWS polls since have producedconsistent results. An August 1990 surveyconducted in Metro Manila askedrespondents to state their satisfaction withthe activities of several agencies inreducing graft and corruption. Theproportion of dissatisfied respondents isconsistently higher than those satisfied, foreach agency. They stated that graft andcorruption is big in the PresidentialCommission on Good Government (PCGG),the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), theCabinet as a whole, the courts of justice,the Bureau of Customs (BOC), and in thepolice force. They considered corruption inthe courts and in the military as small.Very few thought that there was nocorruption in any of these governmentinstitutions.

In November 1991, 41 percent of thosepolled agreed that most high-rankinggovernment employees are not suited totheir positions based on their knowledgeand capabilities, and 62 percent noted thatthe performance of government employeeshas not improved from 1986 (SWB, July1993). In a February 1992 nationwide pollon the attributes of high officials ingovernment, 40 percent of its respondentsstated that, based on personal observation,“most” of these high officials are corrupt,and another 27 percent said “some” of themwere, a total of 67 percent weighing in onthe positive side (SWB, July 1993).

The public verdict on the judiciary ismixed. In 1985, a Bishop-Businessmen’sConference poll revealed that 30 percentagreed and 29 percent disagreed with thestatement that most judges could not be

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bribed. In 1993, a similar split in half canbe discerned. While 50 percent said noneor few judges could be bribed or bought, 49percent thought many or most could (SWBJuly 1994). However, one out of twoFilipinos considered the degree ofcorruption in the judiciary serious (SWBJuly 1993).

Over the years, the performance of thegovernment in f ighting graft andcorruption was evaluated more poorly thanthat of the overall performance. Iti n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e g o v e r n m e n tperformance in fighting corruption hasindeed has been dismal. PhilippineOmbudsman, Aniano Desierto, in a nation-wide public affairs TV program, FiringLine, aired on September 14, 1998, statedthat the Philippine anti-corruptionlandscape “is improving as evidenced by thegood marks the country is getting frominternational groups like TransparencyInternational (IT) and the Political andEconomic Risk Consultancy (PERC), Ltd”.The Hong Kong based Political EconomicRisk Consultancy Ltd, likewise graded 12Asian countries and ranked the Philippinesthe 4th least corrupt country in its survey.

As PERC (1998:1) hinted, most surveygrades deteriorated probably as a reflectionof the change of sentiment in businessmenfrom “turning a blind eye to corruptionwhen economic times are good. As economicconditions worsened, however, suchtolerance disappeared.. . Economicconditions were becoming more difficultand it was easier for businessmen to see thelink between that deterioration andcorruption.” On the whole, the results ofnational and international surveysconsistently depict the Philippines asriddled with corruption and unable toeffectively fight corruption.

C. The Magnitude of and Losses dueto Corruption

It is difficult to estimate the total lossesdue to corruption. The best measure is theamounts involved in cases filed with theOmbudsman. The Of f i ce o f theOmbudsman (OMB) reported that about P9billion was lost to government due tomalversation, estafa (swindling) andviolation of the provision of RA 3019 (theAnti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) fora period of eight and a half years (1990 toJune 1998) (OMB 1998) . In theOmbudsman’s report, 63 agencies anddepartments contributed to the losses.However, the top ten of these agenciesalone accounted for almost P8.5 billion.

Large though these sums are, biggeramounts are involved in cases involving theMarcoses. From the Office of the SpecialProsecutor under the Ombudsman, themoney value of cases filed against theMarcoses involving the same offences(malversation, estafa and RA 3019violations) for the same period was P1,117billion. These cover cases of behest loans,both f i led and under review andinvestigation, forfeiture cases, PCGG casesfor recovery, criminal cases against Marcoscronies, and criminal cases against otherpublic officials. The Ombudsman claimedthat, “the government lost P1.4 trillion andcontinues to lose P100M daily since theOffice began investigating corruption ingovernment since 1988.”4 This is similarlypointed out by President Joseph Estradawhen he said, “at least P24.13 B of whatthe Philippine government spent last yearfor various projects was lost to graft andcorruption, or barely 20% of all projectfunds are lost to grafters.”5

4 Desierto, Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 10, 1999.5 Estrada, Philippines Daily Inquirer, June 10, 1999.

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III. ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIESAND PROGRAMS

Philippine initiatives against corruptionhave taken the form of law and anti-graftbodies created by the Constitution, law andexecutive orders. In addition to the state,others institutions have been active in thefight against graft and corruption.

A. Anti-corruption LawsThe accountability of public officials is

enshrined in the Constitution of 1987, asit has been in the Malolos Constitution of1898, the Commonwealth Constitution of1935 and then the Constitution of 1973, theMartial Law period. Article XI of the 1987Constitution, entitled “Accountability ofPublic Officers”, states the fundamentalprinciple of public office, as public trust.It requires full accountability and integrityamong public officers and employees. ThePresident, Vice-President, members of theSupreme Court , members o f theConstitutional Commissions and theOmbudsman may be impeached forviolations of the Constitution, treason,bribery, graft and corruption, other highcrimes, and for betrayal of public trust.Other public officials committing such actscan be investigated and prosecuted throughthe regular judicial process provided bylaw.

The Philippine government is directedto maintain honesty and integrity in thepublic service, and to take action againstgraft and corruption (Section 27, Art. II).It is also directed to give full publicdisclosure of all transactions involving thepublic interest (Section 28, Art. II). Thisprovision is complemented by the Bill ofRights within the Constitution, which givespeople the right to information on mattersof public concern, including official records,documents and papers pertaining to officialacts, transactions or decisions, and togovernment research data used as the basisfor policy development (Section 7, Art. III).

The Anti-Graft and Corrupt PracticesAct (RA 3019) was passed in 1960. Itenumerates what may be consideredcorrupt practices by any public officer,declares them unlawful and provides thecorresponding penalties of imprisonment(1 month, 6 years and 15 years), perpetualdisqualification from public office, andconfiscation or forfeiture of unexplainedwealth in the favour of the government. Italso provides for the submission by allgovernment personnel of a statement ofassets and liabilities every two years.Considered landmark legislation at thetime, it also elicited the following wrycomment:

“The anti-graft law was passed notbecause there was a need for it butonly to appease public opinion. Therewas no urgent need for anti-graftlegislation because the Revised PenalCode and other laws were sufficientto br ing the gui l ty to court ”(Congressman Manuel Zosa, quotedin G.U. Iglesias, 1993:35).

B. Laws During the Martial LawPeriod (1972-1986)

Presidential Decree no.6, which tookeffect six days after the imposition ofMartial Law, was the “legal” basis for thepurge of almost 8,000 officials andemployees in the first year of thedictatorship. The provision for summaryproceedings was reiterated in PresidentialDecree No. 807, the Civil Service Act of theperiod and was repealed by the CorazonAquino administration. All other anti-graftpresidential decrees remain in effect. Thisincludes:

(i) Presidential Decree No. 46 (1972),making it unlawful for governmentpersonnel to receive, and for privatepersons to give, gifts on any occasionincluding Christmas, regardless ofwhether the gift is for past or future

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favors. It also prohibits entertainingpublic officials and their relatives.

(ii) Presidential Decree No. 677 (1975)requires the statement of assets andliabilities to be submitted every year.

(iii) Presidential Decree No. 749 (1975),granting immunity from prosecutionto givers of bribes or other gifts andto their accomplices in briberycharges if they testify against thepublic officials or private personsguilty of these offences.

C. Laws of the RedemocratizationPeriod (1986 to the present)

Immediately after Aquino’s assumptionto office, she promulgated the “FreedomConstitution” which, among otherprovisions, declared all governmentpositions vacant unless otherwiseidentified (Section 3, March 28, 1986). ThisFreedom Constitution was the basic law ofa revolutionary government and wassuperseded by the Constitution of 1987. Sixnew anti-corruption laws emerged underits operation.

The Administrative Code of 1987(Executive Order No. 292)6 incorporates ina unified document the major structural,functional and procedural principles andrules of governance. It reiterates publicaccountability as the fundamentalprinciple of governance. In 1989, theRepublic Act No. 6713, the Code of Conductand Ethical Standards for Public Officialsand Employees was passed. It promotes ahigh standard of ethics and requires allgovernment personnel to make an accuratestatement of assets and liabilities, disclosenet worth and financial connections. It alsorequires new officials to divest ownership

in any private enterprise within 30 daysfrom assumption of office, to avoid conflictof interest. The Ombudsman Act of 1989(RA 6770) provides the functional andstructural organization of the Office of theOmbudsman. The Act further defining theJurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan (RA8249) places the Sandiganbayan as aspecial court on par with the Court ofAppeals.

D. Constitutional Anti-corruptionBodies

The 1987 Constitution establishedspecial independent bodies to support theprinciples of honesty, integrity and publicaccountability. These are:

(i) the Office of the Ombudsman as thepeople’s protector and watchdog;

(ii) the Civil Service Commission as thecentral personnel agency;

(iii) the Commission on Audit as thesupreme body responsible fora u d i t i n g t h e g o v e r n m e n t ’ sexpenditures and performance; and

(iv) The Sandiganbayan as a special courtthat hears cases of graft andcorruption.

To ensure that these organizations andtheir commissioners can fulfill their dutieswithout fear of reprisal from other agenciesof the government, the Constitution grantsthem fiscal autonomy7 (Section 2, ArticleVIII). Their actions are appealable only tothe Supreme Court.

The Office of the Ombudsman wascreated to investigate and act promptly oncomplaints filed against public officials and

6 Executive orders promulgated by President Aquinoduring the revolutionary period when she was solelegislator (1986-87) have the force of the law.

7 Fiscal autonomy in that their approved annualappropriation shall be automatically and regularlyreleased, so that there can be no undue delay inthe execution of their duties. Their annualappropriation cannot be reduced from that of theprevious years.

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employees, and to serve as the people’swatchdog of the government. It is aninstitution with the biggest responsibilityto prevent graft and corruption. It providesfor a Deputy Ombudsman for the military,and at least one each Deputy for thegeographical divisions of Luzon, Visayasand Mindanao.

The Civil Service Commission is thecentral personnel tasked to promoteefficient and responsive public servicedelivery, to establish a career service,strengthen the merit system and humanresource development, promote publicaccountability and enforce the Code ofConduct and Ethical Standards for PublicOfficials and Employees (RA 6713). Itundertakes anti-corruption functions, suchas values orientation workshops andemployee voluntarism.

The Commission on Audit, whileprimarily regarded as an evaluator of thegovernment’s performance in handlingfunds, also has as a function on the inputside, as it conducts audits on the incomeand revenues of government. Aside fromensuring financial accountability, theCommission may also inquire as to theeffectiveness and impact of programs, andnot alone into the economy, efficiency or thelegality and regularity of governmentoperations.

The Sandiganbayan, literally “the pillarof the nation”, is a special court withjurisdiction over civil and criminal casesinvolving graft and corrupt practices.

E. Presidential Anti-corruptionBodies

Each president has appointed his or heranti-graft or investigating agencies “as anexercise of the president’s power to probeinto the anomalous members of his/heradministrative organization (Alfiler, 1979:329)”. President Aquino broke tradition by

organizing a committee of cabinet officialsrather than an agency with full-timepersonnel, the President’s Committee onPublic Ethics and Accountability (PCPEA).Its framework advanced the inseparabilityof accountability from other acts ofgovernance, the idea that corruption canbe tackled by management actions thatincrease its risks and decrease its benefits,and decentralized graft-busting.

President Fidel V. Ramos created thePresidential Commission against Graft andCorruption (PCAGC) under ExecutiveOrder No. 151 dated January 11, 1994. Itwas tasked to investigate presidentialappointees charged with graft andcorruption. Likewise, it functions as acoordinating body in the efforts ofinhibiting the practice of graft andcorruption, to expeditiously prosecute suchpractices by officials in the executivedepartment , and to moni tor theimplementation of the Moral RecoveryProgram.

Unlike other presidents, PresidentEstrada has not created his own anti-corruption body and has allowed theRamos’ created PCAGC to continue inoffice. He seemed to be inclined to useinstead the Inter-Agency Anti-graftCoordinating Council, composed of theCommission on Audit, Civil ServiceCommission, the Ombudsman, theDepartment of Justice, the NationalBureau o f Invest igat ion and thePresidential Commission against Graft andCorruption.

F. The Rank and File as GraftBusters (Cariño, 1992)

Because of their knowledge of theworkings of both formal and informalprocesses, employees are natural sourcesof information about deviations fromaccountability. It was in the Aquino regimein 1986, that the potential of employees as

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graft-busters was tapped. Several unionshad tangled with their respectivemanagement on the issue of theiraccountability and performance. The unioni n t h e N a t i o n a l E l e c t r i f i c a t i o nAdministration has unearthed anomaliesand delays in the implementation of someprojects such as the USD$ 192 million ruralelectrification revitalization program, ajoint project of the World Bank and theOffice of Economic Cooperation Fund ofJapan (Manila Chronicle, November 13,1995:4). The most successful effort is stillthat as described by Gaffud (1994), whichwas able to remove the top administratorsof an agency in 1990. The union questionedtransactions worth P176 million, includingoverpricing, purchases made without beingutilized, purchases made for non-existentprojects, etc. After being ignored by theDepartment of Justice and the higherofficials of the department to which it isattached, the union finally found alistening ear in an NGO (non-governmentorganizat ion) , the Gis ing BayanFoundation, which then filed complaintswith the Ombudsman. After investigation,President Aquino dismissed three assistantadministrators, but not the headadministrator.

Since 1986, the leadership of at leastseven other unions faced harassment,intimidation, and sometimes, removal fromoffice for their anti-corruption stance.Nevertheless, they have succeeded inbringing cases of corruption, abuse andnepotism practiced by their superiors to theattention of control bodies such as theCommission on Audit, the Ombudsmanand legislative committees for furtherinvestigation.

G. Participation of the Non-governmental Sector

People power energized in the EDSAinflamed non-government organizations(NGOs) to get concerned about issues of

integrity and corruption. Their initialapproach centered not on punishingcorruption, but in being involved in keepinggovernment operations clean and effective.The Community Employment andDevelopment Program (CEDP) of the late1980s became the laboratory for this newpartnership of government and cause-oriented groups. For instance, the NationalMovement for Free Elections (NAMFREL)8

branched from election cases to themonitoring of CEDP implementation invarious local areas. Based on this virtualexperiment, the government promulgatedguidelines on the use of such volunteergroups for exception monitoring.

Some associations focused directly onpreventing corruption. OperasyongWalang Lagay (OWL), its name connotinga movement to prevent bribery, assistedsome departments and local governmentsin streamlining procedures and improvingbidding committees. However, it folded in1989 because the volunteers could not copewith the increasing demands on their time,a very real problem for volunteerism in agrowth field such as corruption.

The National Coalition of Transparencywas launched in 1989 to show that publicsupport for measures to enhanceaccountability could still be mustered.Composed of over thirty NGOs, includingBishop-Businessmen’s Conference (BBC),NAMFREL, and other groups that were inthe forefront of the anti-Marcos struggle,it put forward a comprehensive approachto the problem as it recognized the privatesector’s incrimination in the continuationof governmental corruption. Lacking self-righteousness, its first campaign was forits membership to pay the proper taxes,and thus be morally capable of censuringthe dissipation of public revenues by

8 NAMFREL is now active in sponsoring seminar-workshops on Japan’s koban system of policing.

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government. It was in meeting with themthat the President admitted the return ofshameless corruption in her administration(Cagurangan, 1989).

Anti-corruption organizations associatedwith religious groups include the BBC, theGising Bayan Foundation9 and thereligious right, calling itself Citizens BattleAgainst Corruption (CIBAC)10. TheNationalista Party, a political party, alsoformed an anti-graft panel, composedlargely of former officials of the Marcosregime (Manila Bulletin, June 4, 1989),making it suspect as a political neutralbody.

Meanwhile, the Anti-Police ScalawagGroup (APSG) is focused on policecorruption. It recently called on thePhilippine National Police (PNP) to curbrampant “tong” and payola collection fromoperators of illegal gambling, ironicallyperpetrated by members of the PNP’s ownillegal gambling task forces. An APSGspokesperson disclosed that in MetroManila alone, there were about 30 to 45gambling “maintainers” of vice dens suchas video karera, sakla, hi-lo,11 lottery,bookies, and prostitution dens who givegoodwill money ranging from P500, 000 toP1 million, aside from the monthly “payola”for protection of P100, 000 to P500, 000(Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 10,1998:22).

IV. THE OMBUDSMAN'S STRATEGYAGAINST GRAFT AND

CORRUPTION

In this portion, I will present some dataf r o m t h e O m b u d s m a n a n d t h eSandiganbayan that can provide us withinsight on the results of the Philippine anti-corruption effort. These efforts are focusedon the intriguing causes of corruption:

(i) Indiv idual causes which areattributed to weak moral fiber anddistorted values among bureaucrats,such as materialism, lack of integrityand nationalism;

(ii) Organizational causes refer todeficiencies, in the bureaucraticapparatus such as low salary, poorr e c r u i t m e n t a n d s e l e c t i o nprocedures , and red tape ingovernment; and

(iii) Societal causes where corruptbehavior is itself the norm of society.

A. Programs of the Office of theOmbudsman

The OMB is mandated under theConstitution to protect the people fromabuse or misuse of power by government,its agencies or functionaries. It must fightfor justice for all citizens, prevent loss ofgovernment funds and bring the culprit tojustice. It faces a gigantic challenge inc a r r y i n g o u t t h e g o v e r n m e n t ’sdetermination to rid itself of undesirablesin the public service. The conferment ofth i s ex tens ive author i ty by theConstitution insulated the Office frompolitical influence or interference by:

(i) Stating that the Ombudsman isremovable from office only byimpeachment;

(ii) Prescribing a fixed term of office forseven years without reappointment;

(iii) During the term, his/her salarycannot be diminished;

(iv) Leveling the Ombuman’s rank with

9 “Gising Bayan” means “Wake Up Nation.” It wasoriginally the title of a radio program under RadioVeritas, the Catholic station.

10 CIBAC is coined from the Tagalog word “sibak”which means to cut down.

11 These are local gambling practices consideredillegal.

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that of a Supreme Court justice.

B. Five (5) Major Functions12

The Ombudsman performs five majorfunctions, such as investigation, graftprevention, public assistance, prosecution,and administrative adjudication. It isinvested with corresponding authority tobe able to carry out these functions. Theinvestigative function of the Office involvesdetermination of violations of the anti-graftlaws by public functionaries through fact-finding or evidence gathering. It alsoincludes the finding of probable causethrough formal preliminary investigationfor the purpose of prosecution.

In graft prevention, the Office has theauthority to prevent the commission ofgraft by ordering or stopping theimplementation of government contractsthat are found to be disadvantageous to thegovernment. In the exercise of its publicassistance, the Office of the Ombudsmanextends assistance to citizens in gettingbasic public services from the government.In prosecution, the Office may file chargesor prosecute cases in court against erringpublic officials and private citizens foundto have connived with them. The Office ofthe Special Prosecutor may prosecute thecase in the Sandiganbayan. In the regularcourts, regular prosecutors are deputizedby the Office of the Ombudsman to handleprosecution.

Under its administrative adjudicationfunction, the Office has the authority toconduct administrative penalties where theerring public official or employee, includingCabinet Secretaries, may be suspended ordismissed from public service. It holdsdisciplinary authority over all governmentfunctionaries, except the president andmembers of congress and the judiciary andother impeachable officials. In all other

criminal cases, however, all public officialsand employees, without any exception, areunder the Ombudsman’s investigativejurisdiction.

In consonance with all these functionsperformed by the Ombudsman, s/he shallact on all complaints, but not limited to actsor omissions which:

(i) are contrary to law or regulations;(ii) are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive

or discriminatory(iii) are inconsistent with the general

course of an agency’s function, thoughin accordance with law;

(iv) proceed from a mistake of law or anarbitrary ascertainment of facts;

(v) are in the exercise of discretionarypowers but for an improper purpose;or

(vi) are otherwise irregular, immoral ordevoid of justification.

In its effort to solve the twin evils of graftand corruption, the Off ice of theOmbudsman employs a two-prongedstrategy: confrontational and psychologicalapproaches.

The confrontational approach involvesthe administrat ive and cr iminalinvestigation and prosecution of erringmembers of the bureaucracy. In thisregard, a number of criminal cases werefiled in the Sandiganbayan involving high-ranking officials and about 2,500 casesreferred to the ordinary courts involvinglow-ranking members of the bureaucracy.To complement this capability, the Inter-Agency Consultative Committee with theCommission on Audit (COA), Civil ServiceCommission (CSC), Philippine CommissionAgainst Graft and Corruption (PCAGC),and the National Bureau of Investigation(NBI) have been formed and organized foreffective coordination.

12 The Ombudsman Primer, p.2.

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As part of the strategy, the tripod systemwas adopted to enforce honesty andefficiency. This system includes theestablishment of Corruption PreventionUnits (CPUs), Junior Graftwatch Units(JGUs) and installation of the Offices of theResident Ombudsman. The CPU’s wereorganized to broaden communityp a r t i c i p a t i o n a n d s e r v e a s t h eOmbudsman’s eyes and arms, closelymonitoring critical and substantiallyfunded government projects and/ortransactions in their respective areas ofconcern. They also serve as a front desk toreceive and facilitate requests forassistance, complaints, or reports of anyanomalous or corrupt practices. Inaddition, the CPU’s work hand-in-handwith the Office of the Ombudsman inpromoting the objectives of the latterthrough the conduct of various activitiesinvolving community participation, such asconsultative workshops, symposia,seminars and conferences, developing

moral values of honesty, as well aseducating the public on preventivemeasures in its fight against graft andcorruption. At present, about 200 CPU’shave been already organized from amongc i v i c - m i n d e d n o n - g o v e r n m e n t a lorganizations.

The Junior Graftwatch Units (JGU’s)have been organized to mobilize the youth(both at high school and college level,including the out-of-school youth) in thefight against graft and corruption, byencouraging them to become the primarycoordinating arm of the Ombudsman withrespect to the educational and motivationalprojects involving youth, and as an effectiveally of the Office of the Ombudsman. Allover the country, there are already sevenhundred and seventy-four (774) JuniorGraftwatch Units accredited by theOmbudsman. These are organized todevelop and strengthen their instinct ofgoodness and idealism which is anchored

Figure I. THE POLICY OF GRAFT PREVENTIONStages of Graft Prevention

UNCOVERING PLANS FORCORRUPTION

STOPPING ON-GOING ACTSOF CORRUPTION

DETERRINGCORRUPTION

CONDITIONING THE MINDAGAINST CORRUPTION

PROACTIVEGRAFT

PREVENTION

RESIDENT OMBUDSMEN JUNIOR GRAFTWATCH UNIT CORRUPTION PREVENTION UNITS

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in the principle that a child who grows upin an environment of honesty will bedifficult to corrupt when s/he attainsmaturity.

The Office of the Ombudsman believesthat in empowering the citizenry to practicetheir innate virtues of honesty anduprightness, and getting them involved inthe Ombudsman’s struggle for the rightvalues, we can expect a citizenry with evenstronger moral fiber in the future. TheOffice’s graft prevention efforts are directedat sustaining the support of all sectors ofFilipino society, which is a healthy sign ofempowering the citizenry in nationbuilding. It has likewise installed ResidentOmbudsmen (ROs) in 22 importantdepartments of the government to serve aswatchdogs and guardians of integrity andefficiency. They closely monitor theperformance of government functionaries,thereby producing strong deterrence tobureaucratic corruption and inefficiency.

See Figure I for the stages of graftp r e v e n t i o n a s c o n c e i v e d b y t h eOmbudsman.

The psychological approach adopted hasbeen designed to create and nurture anenvironment of integrity in the Philippinesociety. This proceeds from the principlethat corruption cannot thrive in a milieuof honesty. This approach, which has along-range objective, is expected to have alasting effect because it aims to develop astrong moral fiber for the citizenry.

For this purpose, the Office has workedwith the Education Department onintroducing graft prevention modules thatwill teach students old Filipino values ofhonesty and integrity. It has forged anagreement with the Movie and TelevisionReview and Classification Board (MTRCB)to ascertain that corrupt practices picturedin movie films and television programshave redemptive values or punishment of

Figure II. THE OMBUDSMAN’S TOTAL STRATEGY AGAINSTGRAFT AND CORRUPTION

CONFRONTATIONALAPPROACH

AdministrativeAdjudicationInvestigation Protection

GRAFT-FREEBUREAUCRACY/SOCIETY

CommunityMobilization

Values Formation& Reorientation Strengthening of the Citizens’ Moral

Fiber; Graft Deterrence

PublicAssistance

Graft PreventionEducation

ResidentOmbusmenPSYCHOLOGICAL

APPROACH

Enforcement of Laws on Public Accountability

513


the corrupt. Orientation seminars for newgovernment entrants are also conducted toprovide a deeper understanding of publicservice values and of the accountabilityattached to their positions in thegovernment. It has continuously conductedvalues orientation seminars/workshops toenhance organizational effectiveness andstrengthen the moral fiber of the personnel.The totality of the Ombudsman’s strategyagainst graft and corruption is shown inFigure II.

C. Focus on New Initiatives: Dealingwith “Graft-prone Agencies”

Given the fact that stolen money isusually never recovered, even if aconviction is obtained, the Ombudsmandecided that the problem must beconfronted before it is committed. Apsychological approach was developed toaddress the social environment withinwhich graft and corruption occur. Theapproach as previously mentionedattempts to strengthen the citizen’s moralfiber and deter the opportunities for graft.

In determining the graft-prone agenciesof the government, the Ombudsman adoptsthree criteria:

(i) the size of the budget of the agency,(ii) the number of its personnel; and(iii) the number of cases filed in the

Office of the Ombudsman.

As may be noted, the first two criteriarelate to the presence of opportunities forcorruption, while the third relates to actualcases uncovered by complaints andinvestigation. The agencies meeting thesecriteria are the following:

(i) Department of Education, Cultureand Sports (DECS)

(ii) Department of Public Works andHighways (DPWH)

(iii) Department of Environment and

Natural Resources (DENR)(iv) Department of Agriculture (DA)(v) Department of Health (DOH)(vi) Department of Transportation and

Communication (DOTC)(vii) Department of Interior and Local

Government (DILG)(viii)Department of National Defence

(DND)(ix) Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)(x) National Irrigation Administration

(NIA)(xi) National Power Corporation (NPC)(xii) Bureau o f Immigra t i on and

Deportation (BID)(xiii)Philippine Economic Zone Authority

(PEZA)(xiv) Philippine Ports Authority/Bureau of

Customs (PPA/BOC)(xv) Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)(xvi) Board of Investment (BOI)

For these agencies , the ResidentOmbudsmen reviews processes to cut redtape, and inspects bidding requirementsand contracts for evidence of graft.

This program appears to be a worthwhileini t iat ive to the extent that theOmbudsman assists an agency inimproving policies and programs to preventcorruption. In that sense, it is proactive,and views corruption from a systemicperspective. However, the work that theResident Ombudsman is given should notduplicate or take away the responsibilityof the management, through a workinginternal control unit, in supervising theperformance of the functions assigned tothat agency. To transfer this responsibilityto an outside agency may enmesh theOmbudsman in implementation problems,as well as corruption opportunities, anddecrease its capacity for enforcement andprovision of sanctions. This seems to ussimilar to the pre-audit functions that usedto be performed by the Commission onAudit, until it recognized that management

514


should wield this important power, forwhich it is responsible.

Another problem may be in the labellingof agencies as graft-prone. Bigness aloneis not necessarily a prelude to corruption.Besides, the third criteria of the numberof cases may be misleading if theyprimarily consist of cases still underinvestigation, rather than resolved. Alitigation-prone agency may not beequivalent to a corruption-prone one. Wemay point out that this issue shows theurgent need for the Ombudsman toexpeditiously dispose of cases brought toits jurisdiction.

VI. CONCLUSION ANDRECOMMENDATIONS

The Philippines has unleashed manyweapons against irresponsible behavior inthe government. It has a comprehensiveset of laws that may have ascertained allthe possible instances of graft andcorruption that can be devised. The anti-corruption agencies have been given amplepowers to identify and punish offenders.They recognize the burden of power, withspecial agencies to give priority to catchingthe “big fish” and grave offences, over theacts of lower ranking personnel. Theystarted on their own to coordinate witheach other for greater over-all effectiveness.They approach corruption in both apreventive and punitive way. Theyrecognize that the task is not only with thegovernment, and have enlisted civil societyin the struggle. For their part, citizenshave also volunteered, in cooperation withstate agencies or by themselves, in fightingcorruption. On the whole, the Philippineapproach has used democratic means,relying on due process, transparentprocedures, and volition in effecting manyof its aspirations. Yet corruption continues.What else needs to be done?

A. Re-examination of Existing LawsThe Philippines does not need any more

laws against corruption. If anything, whatit needs is a re-examination of anti-corruption laws not only to removeduplication, but also to ensure that thoseexisting are accepted by the populace andenforceable by the anti-corruptionagencies. We can only cite a few areas forfurther study. There are at present someprovisions that, in their strictness, mayencourage their breach:

(i) The Anti-gift Decree has never beenimplemented, but it can conceivablybe used against a completelyinnocent, generous person, who(being a devout Christian) cannothelp but give gifts on Christmas day,an act sanctioned by PD 46 andignored by almost everybodyimmersed in Philippine culture.

(ii) The statement of assets andliabilities, a simple but potentiallys t r o n g m e c h a n i s m t o f i n dunexplained wealth, is submittedyearly by all public officials, but noone ever studies them. In any case,any well-paid accountant can hideunexplained wealth, and so the onlypeople potentially at risk are civilservants that cannot afford to haveothers write their statements.

(iii) Other provisions may work againstgetting good people in government,for example, by the requirement fordivestment. This approach topossible conflicts of interest will bemet by well-qualified people enteringinto the highest reaches of the stateapparatus. The current divestmentprocedure may be too harsh, since itcould effectively mean that no topindustrialist for instance can beSecretary of Trade and Industry, andno top banker may be Central Bank

515


Governor. That would be denying thegovernment valuable humanresources.

A possible alternative is to put moretrust in transparency and the press(which requires an amendment ofexisting law). When a presidentchooses a person who showsreluctance because of the divestmentrequirement, exemption must bemade for that person, provided thathe or she discloses in detail andpublicly all personal interests thathave public implications. This couldmean that the citizenry could keeptrack of the development of therelevant businesses and industries,while a valued member is in publicoffice. Conversely, the problem ofconflict of interest must be tackledhead on by removing persons whosepersonal interest prospered whilethey were in office. This is amplyprovided for in RA 3019 and RA 6713,even without the divestmentrequirement.

(iv) The schedule of penalties may alsobe looked into. In some cases thepenalty may be too low, e.g, themax imum impr i sonment f o rcorruption under RA 3019 is 15 years.In others, it may be too high, e.g, thesole penalty for grave misconduct onfirst offence is dismissal from theservice. Extreme penalties do notencourage prosecution of offences,even when they are blatant, becauseof the cultural trait of “sayang” (wasteof time) for those who will merit onlylow penalties and “awa” (pity) forthose who will be hit by harshpunishment.

B. EnforcementThe Philippines has an impressive

number of laws to tackle practically all

cases requiring fast actions. However,enforcement of these laws leaves much tobe desired. The retention of officials whomthe President’s anti-graft agency itselfrecommended to be removed suggests alack of political will, and the priority ofpartisanship over the public interest. Thiswould have provided an occasion forarticulating the Administration’s ethicalvision, catching a big fish, and warningeveryone that the leadership meansbusiness.

The people expect not only equalenforcement of the law, but even morestrictness on persons perceived to be in thePresident’s inner circle. Decisivenesswould also be perceived if the public isinformed of a clear connection between theofficial’s misdeed and his/her removal. Partof the popular dissatisfaction with theconduct of accountability is the lack ofc losure of cases. The number ofinvestigations that were not finished, orhave “softer” findings and conclusionswhen no longer laboring under the publiceye, does not increase public confidence inthe anti-corruption programs.

C. Leadership in the Anti-corruption Drive

Leadership of the organizationsprimarily focused on fighting corruptionrequires higher qualifications than whatis normally demanded. This appliesparticularly to the Ombudsman and to theheads of other agencies specifically createdfor this purpose. The very concept of anOmbudsman requires a person of highintegrity whose very presence provokesrespect and rectitude. The Philippines hasnot been blessed with the appointment ofsuch persons to this office. Instead, theyhave been controversial, such that theyraised questions about the Office, itself notonly about its head. The President whoappoints the Ombudsman should becognizant of the high expectations of the

516


people to bring to the Ombudsman’s officepersons known for their ethical rolemodeling, non-partisanship, and goodjudgement.

D. More Resources for EnhancingAccountability

Resources for enhancing accountabilityand attacking corruption must be provided.This is an investment that will pay off inthe long run. Guardians must be supportedin their programs and given incentives notto stray from accountability. The funds,personnel, technology, and other resourceso f t h e O m b u d s m a n a n d t h eSandiganbayan must allow them to keepin step with the corrupt they are trying tocatch. The personal income of such officialsshould be competitive with the privatesector, subject to the conscientiousperformance of their duties. Theirorganizations should be provided with thenecessary equipment high-tech devices likehidden cameras, etc and mundane matterssuch as paper clips, envelopes, filingcabinets as is needed in their work.Incumbents should be imbued with a senseof mission early, via a well-plannedorientation program, and keep them goingwith peer group and leadership support,and a hotline for counseling on theproblems they meet.

Civil servants who perform exceptionallywell should be recognized. The CivilService Commission program to this effectis a step in the right direction, but it honorstoo few people. The increase of salariesacross the board through the SalaryStandardization Law is a way to keep upwith inflation, but it has had the perniciouseffect of eating up any resources that maybe given competitively. Merit increases andpromotion can signal that an agencyrecognizes that one official is doing betterwork than the others are.

E. Better Public AdministrationThe management approach started

under the Aquino administration should becontinued and improved. Persons indecision-making positions should betrained and encouraged to thinkstrategically. The challenge is to usewhatever capacity there is towards workthat is focused on enhancing the publicinterest. There is also a need toinstitutionalize some of the efforts thath a v e b e e n p u t i n t o e n h a n c i n gaccountability since 1986. This means thesupport of agency reform measures, as wellas the establishment of new procedures, topave the way for cleaner administration.

F. Encouraging Public SectorUnions

Democracy is developed in thebureaucracy as the rank and file are giventhe chance to air their grievances, press forbetter working conditions, and demandresponsibility and rectitude from themanagement. Even with Civil ServiceCommission encouragement, unions stillface an uphill battle in being heard by theirbosses. An arrangement where the unionkeeps its independence while remainingopen to a partnership for service withmanagement would provide the bestavenue not only for pol ic ing howaccountable management is, but also forimproving the performance of everyone atall levels of the organization.

G. Reform of Politicians andBusiness People

Changes should also focus on the maincorrupters, the politicians and the privatesector. The NGOs that require theirmembers to pay the right taxes and conductactivities towards corruption preventionwithin their ranks should be encouraged.Political parties should reform themselves,primarily through the continuous trainingof their members on party principles andpolicies, and their acceptance of the

517


principle of political neutrality among civilservants. Pending that, the passage of thelaw required by the Constitution againstpolitical dynasties, and increased recourseto and encouragement of the activities ofthe Ethics Committees of both Houseswould be more immediate steps. Cause-oriented groups and public sector unionsmay assist politicians, especially those whoregard themselves as non-traditional, indeveloping support groups to re-enforcetheir desire for true public service, not merepatronage.

H. Transparency and AccountabilityMake transparency real, allowing civil

servants and the public to accessinformation in government. A questionhour in Congress, or a radio-TV programwith questions and comments to beanswered by executive officials may helpinquiries into any aspect of their policiesand performance. Reports of investigationsshould be made available to the public. Thesupport of the mass media in theseendeavors, accompanied by their ownefforts at reforming their ranks, would becrucial to the success of these efforts.

Accountable performance would besupported if the public is informed aboutwhat the agency does and why. It is ameans of ensuring that the personnelthemselves know its mission. At the sametime, both they and the public would alsothen understand the reasoning behindwhat seem to appear only as red tape.Information sharing - particularly of stepsin service delivery - also makes itunnecessary for the client to seek out a‘fixer’. Open transactions can build a senseof partnership between the governmentand the people the agencies serve.

I. Moral ReformHaving role models, a code of ethics and

value formation exercises speak of a desirefor moral reform within the government.

While cultures cannot be changedovernight, support for value changes mustbe developed through a system of rewardsand punishments that becomes regularizedin standard operating procedures. Also, themeting out of positive and negative strokesmust be swift but fair, and even-handed.Value development seminars should becase-oriented, thought provoking, and ableto encourage innovative behavior, whileraising alarm about continued violations.

J. Role of the PeopleThere is a need for popular involvement

in ethics and accountability. Paying theproper taxes, obeying regulations, beingwell informed about government services -these are only the first steps in moving toa disciplined but democratic society. Inaddition, support for politicians whopromote causes rather than just theircharm and personality would also make theline of accountability clearer. Thedevelopment of parties with coherentplatforms should then be a focus of people’sparticipation, to tie up with the reformssuggested above. These are all in additionto the encouragement of NGOs that arenon-partisan in exposing corruption andbringing violators to justice. The start ofmany of these measures has already beenmade. They are in tune with democraticprinciples, as well as the culture. Onehopes that many more financial, humanand moral resources will be placed at theservice of accountability in the country.

518


Tab

le 1

OF

FIC

E O

F T

HE

OM

BU

DS

MA

NS

TA

TIS

TIC

AL

RE

PO

RT

ON

CR

IMIN

AL

/AD

MIN

IST

RA

TIV

E C

AS

ES

Fro

m 1

988

to 1

998

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

OM

B C

ases

Rec

eive

d du

ring

the

year

573,

722

3,99

75,

142

5,30

38,

172

9,45

46,

122

8,11

78,

150

8,55

1C

ases

rec

eive

d ba

ck t

o pe

ndi

ng

1992

2818

Old

Tan

odba

yan

Cas

es1,

811

2,81

499

814

531

410

515

446

552

Car

ry-o

ver

from

the

prev

ious

yea

er6

3,53

66,

403

8,80

59,

928

12,7

8914

,652

12,9

7512

,473

9,15

9To

tal W

ork

load

of C

rim

inal

/A

dm

inis

trat

ive

Cas

es/ C

omp

lain

ts1,

868

6,59

28,

511

11,6

9014

,422

18,2

0522

,397

20,8

3921

,736

20,6

5117

,728

Dis

pos

ed o

f1,

862

3,05

62,

108

2,88

54,

494

5,41

67,

772

7,86

49,

263

11,4

9210

,816

Dis

mis

sed/

Clo

sed

and

term

inat

ed1,

862

2,99

61,

908

2,27

83,

839

3,60

54,

851

4,26

25,

109

8,98

68,

397

Pen

alty

Im

pose

d73

9395

179

296

253

Pro

secu

tion

6020

060

765

51,

738

2,82

83,

507

3,97

52,

210

2,16

6R

egu

lar

Cou

rts

405

393

1,37

82,

198

2,98

83,

734

1,72

21,

700

Pen

din

g6

3,53

660

38,

805

9,92

812

,789

14,6

2512

,975

12,4

739,

159

6,91

2

519


Table 2WORKLOAD AND STATUS OF CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CASES

(as of December 31, 1997)

CentralOffice

Cases received during the year 1,246 1,494 2,075 1,150 2,185 8,150Referred by the other OMB office 8 13 0 49 0 445Disposed cases reverted back to pending 0 0 0 28 0 28Carry-over from 1996 3,980 2,460 1,932 3,244 857 12,473Total workload of criminaland administrativecases 5,234 3,967 4,007 4,471 3,417 21,473Less cases recalled to centraloffice / transferred to OMB office 186 68 177 9 5 445Net workload of cases 5,048 3,899 3,830 4,462 3,412 20,651Disposed 3,249 1,772 2,094 2,034 2,343 11,492

Dismissed / exonerated 2,812 1,337 1,527 1,520 989 8,185Prosecution 254 383 357 451 765 2,210Penalty imposed 148 15 86 47 0 296Closed and terminated 35 37 124 16 589 801Pending 1,799 2,127 1,736 2,428 1,069 9,159

Luzon Visayas Mindanao Military TotalParticulars

Table 3WORKLOAD AND STATUS OF CRIMINAL CASES


CentralOffice

Cases received during the year 880 1,125 1,242 847 1,370 5,454Referred by the other OMB offices 7 13 0 46 255 321Disposed cases reverted to pending 0 0 0 25 0 25Carry-over from 1996 2,989 1,997 1,281 2,765 756 9,788Total workload of criminal cases 3,876 3,125 2,523 3,683 2,381 15,855Less cases recalled to centraloffice / transferred to OMB offices 179 2 132 6 3 321Net workload of criminal cases 3,697 3,123 2,391 3,678 2,378 15,267DISPOSED 2,749 1,480 1,440 1,746 1,643 9,058

Dismissed 2,460 1,097 1,070 1,295 878 6,800Closed and Terminated 35 0 13 0 0 48Prosecution 254 383 357 451 765 2,210

with regular courts 176 244 291 309 752 1,772with Sandiganbayan 78 139 66 142 13 438

Pending 948 1,643 951 932 735 6,209


520


Table 4WORKLOAD AND STATUS OF ADMINISTRATIVE CASES


CentralOffice

Cases received during the year 366 379 833 303 815 2,696Referred by the other OMB offices 1 0 0 3 120 124Disposed cases reverted back to pending 0 0 0 3 0 3Carry-over from 1996 991 463 651 479 101 2,865Total workload ofadministrative cases 1,358 842 1,484 788 1,036 5,508Less cases recalled to centraloffice /transferred to other OMB offices 7 66 45 4 2 124Net workload of administrative cases 1,351 776 1,439 784 1,034 5,384DISPOSED 500 292 654 288 700 11,492

Dismissed / exonerated 352 240 457 225 111 1,385Penalty imposed 148 15 86 47 0 296Closed and terminated 0 37 111 16 589 753Active / awaiting final disposition 851 484 785 496 334 2,950


Table 5TOTAL WORKLOAD OF CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CASES


CentralOffice

Cases received 1,342 1,525 2,026 1,140 2,084 8,117Referred by other OMB offices 19 13 1 16 243 292Disposed cases reverted back to pending 0 0 5 87 0 92OSP / TBP transferred cases 6 1 1 544 0 552Carry-over from 1995 4,718 2,063 2,062 3,079 654 12,576Total cases received 6,085 3,602 4,095 4,866 2,981 21,629Less cases recalled to centraloffice /transferred to other offices 65 7 210 6 4 292Net workload of cases 6,020 3,595 3885 4,860 2,977 21,337Disposed 2,974 1,135 1,765 1,219 2,121 9,214

Dismissed 2,063 879 1,472 909 741 6,604Prosecution 350 185 201 221 549 1,506Penalty imposed 21 65 46 39 8 179Closed and terminated 0 6 46 50 823 925Pending 3,046 2,460 2,120 3,641 856 12,123


521


Table 7ADMINISTRATIVE CASES / COMPLAINTS


CentralOffice

Cases received 314 312 602 272 856 2,356Referred by the Central Office 1 0 0 6 65 72Disposed cases / reverted back to pending 0 0 1 11 0 12Carry-over 1995 1,316 406 720 474 79 2,965Total administrative cases received 1,631 718 1,323 763 970 5,405Less cases recalled to centraloffice /transferred to other offices 5 0 66 1 0 72Net workload of administrative cases 1,626 718 1,257 762 970 5,333Disposed 635 255 606 283 869 2,648

Dismissed / exonerated 614 184 531 208 38 1,575Penalty imposed 21 65 46 39 8 179Closed and terminated 0 6 29 36 823 894Active / awaiting final disposition 993 463 651 479 101 2,685


Table 6WORKLOAD AND STATUS OF CRIMINAL CASES


CentralOffice

Cases received 1,028 1,213 1,424 828 1,228 5,761Referred by other OMB offices 18 13 1 10 178 220Disposed cases reverted to pending 0 0 4 76 0 80OSP/TBP transferred cases 6 1 1 544 0 552Carry-over 1995 3,402 1,657 1,342 2,605 605 9,611Total criminal cases received 4,454 2,884 2,772 4,103 2,011 16,224Less cases recalled to centraloffice /transferred to other offices 60 7 144 5 4 220Net workload of criminal cases 4,394 2,877 2,628 4,098 2,007 16,004DISPOSED 2,339 880 1,159 936 1,252 6,566

Dismissed 1,989 695 941 701 703 5,029Closed and terminated 0 0 17 14 0 31Prosecution 350 185 201 221 549 1,506

with Regular Courts 195 181 153 194 542 1,265with Sandiganbayan 155 4 48 27 7 241

Pending 2,055 1,997 1,469 3,162 755 9,438


522


Table 8TOTAL WORKLOAD AND STATUS OF CRIMINAL AND

ADMINISTRATIVE CASES (as of December 31, 1995)

CentralOffice

Cases received 1,203 0 1,159 1,354 617 4,333Referred by the Central Office 0 1,142 109 137 248 1,636Disposed cases / reverted back to pending 0 0 0 19 0 19Referred by the other OMB offices 27 18 6 19 285 355OSP / TBP transferred cases 9 0 0 1 36 46Carry-over 1994 5,855 1,692 2,257 3,459 602 13,865Total criminal / administrativecases received 7,094 2,852 3,531 4,989 1,788 20,254Less cases recalled to centraloffice /transferred to other offices 30 2 85 231 7 355Net workload of criminal /administrative cases 7,064 2,850 3,446 4,758 1,781 19,899Disposed 1,984 1,416 1,475 1,834 1,155 7,864

Dismissed 1,637 1,140 1,143 1,311 473 5,704Prosecution 307 252 246 379 336 1,520Penalty imposed 1 24 15 55 0 95Closed and terminated 39 0 71 89 346 545Pending 5,080 1,434 1,971 2,924 626 12,035


Table 9CRIMINAL CASES


CentralOffice

Cases received 955 0 710 1,135 295 3,095Referred by the Central Office 0 852 85 100 217 1,254Disposed cases reverted back to pending 0 0 0 11 0 11Referred by the other OMB office 21 15 4 10 250 300OSP / TBP transferred cases 9 0 0 1 36 46Carry-over 1994 4,372 1,272 1,446 2,796 559 10,445Total criminal cases received 5,357 2,139 2,245 4,053 1,357 15,151Less cases recalled to centraloffice /transferred to other office 26 2 64 206 2 300Net workload of criminal cases 5,331 2,137 2,181 3,847 1,355 14,851Disposed 1,576 1,105 929 1,397 775 5,782

Dismissed 1,266 853 648 987 439 4,193Closed and terminated 3 0 35 31 0 69Prosecution 307 252 246 379 336 1,520

Pending 3,755 1,032 1,252 2,450 580 9,069


523


Table 10ADMINISTRATIVE CASES / COMPLAINTS


CentralOffice

Cases received during the year 248 0 449 219 322 1,238Referred by the Central Office (CO) 0 290 24 37 31 382Disposed cases / reverted back to pending 0 0 0 8 0 8Referred by the other OMB office 6 3 2 9 35 55Carry-over from 1994 1,483 420 811 663 43 3,420Total administrative cases received 1,737 713 1,286 936 431 5,103Less cases recalled to CO /transferred to other office 4 0 21 25 5 55Net workload of administrative cases 1,733 713 1,265 911 426 5,048Disposed 408 311 546 437 380 2,082

Dismissed 371 287 495 324 34 1,511Prosecution 1 24 15 55 0 95Closed and terminated 36 0 36 58 346 476Active / awaiting final disposition 1,325 402 719 474 46 2,966


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