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Modesty, Arrogance and Honesty of Accounts 1
Running head: MODESTY, AROGANCE AND HONESTY OF ACCOUNTS
Honesty doesn’t always pay - the role of honesty of accounts for success made in an
educational setting in inferences of modesty and arrogance.
Shlomo Hareli 1, Bernard Weiner 2 and Jennifer Yee 2
1 Graduate School of Business and Department of Human Services, University of Haifa,
Haifa, Israel
2 Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Shlomo Hareli, Graduate
School of Business and Department of Human Services, University of Haifa, Haifa
31905, Israel; e-mail: [email protected] or to Bernard Weiner, Department of
Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90095-156304; e-mail:
Modesty, Arrogance and Honesty of Accounts 2
Authors' biographical notes:
Shlomo Hareli is a Lecturer of Social Psychology in the School of Management and the
department of Human Services, University of Haifa. His areas of interest include, Social
Psychology, Psychology of Emotions, Attribution processes, Social Emotions and Social
Judgments as these are related to social settings and organizations.
Bernard Weiner is Distinguished Professor of Psychology at the University of
California, Los Angeles. Professor Weiner is a past recipient of the Donald T. Campbell
Distinguished Research Award from the American Psychological Association and the
Palmer Johnson Publication Award from the American Educational Research
Association. He holds honorary doctorates from the University of Bielefeld, Germany
and the University of Turku, Finland. Professor Weiner has research interests in
attribution theory, emotions, responsibility judgments, impression management, help
giving, achievement motivation, reactions to stigmatized, and theories of punishment.
Jennifer Yee – An undergraduate student at the Department of Psychology at the
University of California, Los Angeles.
Modesty, Arrogance and Honesty of Accounts 3
Abstract
Previous research has documented that attributional information contained in
causal accounts for success induce impressions of arrogance and modesty. The research
further examined the role of accounts as well as level of success when perceivers know
the real reason for success. Two studies of university students revealed that honesty
strongly decreases arrogance and increases modesty in the case of effort accounts, and
not in situations of communicated ability. In addition, honesty was determined not only
by the truth value of an account but also by the extent to which the account induced
impressions of arrogance and modesty. The present findings provide further
understanding of the link between attributional information and social judgments.
Key words: attribution theory, social perception, achievement motivation, arrogance,
modesty, honesty
Modesty, Arrogance and Honesty of Accounts 4
The study of achievement motivation has primarily focused on the prediction of
performance, such as grade point average and dropping out in a school setting, or output
and number of sales in an employment context. However, the interpersonal context of
most achievement strivings gives rise to a variety of other psychologically meaningful
phenomena in addition to achievement performance (see Hareli & Weiner, 2002). For
example, receiving a high grade in a course could elicit praise, admiration and flattery
from others or the person may be the object of envy and dislike. Furthermore, a failure
might elicit sympathy, anger, contempt, or even Schadenfreude (joy at the failure of
another). At times, these reactions from others may override the achievement itself in
psychological significance and in determining future behavior.
In addition, observers of an achievement also reach inferences about the aptitudes,
character, and personality of the achiever. For example, it might be concluded that the
achiever is smart, or dumb, or industrious, or lazy, all of which have important
psychological implications both for the actor and for the behavior of others toward that
person. In this paper, we focus on two personality inferences elicited in achievement
contexts that have important social and behavioral consequences, namely, arrogance and
modesty.
Arrogance and modesty
Arrogance and modesty are closely linked to the self-presentations of the
achiever. Carlston and Shovar (1983) documented when a performer makes attributions
for success that are internal to the self (e.g., ability or effort), then arrogance is inferred
Modesty, Arrogance and Honesty of Accounts 5
and perceptions of modesty are reduced. Subsequently, Hareli and Weiner (2000) found
that public accounts ascribing personal success not only to internal causes but also to
causes that are stable, uncontrollable, and desirable (e.g., “I succeeded because I have
high math aptitude”) are particularly likely to elicit beliefs of arrogance. Hence, among
the internal causes, communications of aptitude (stable and uncontrollable) are more
linked to arrogance than are personal statements of effort expenditure (unstable and
controllable). This is in part because all can try hard, whereas having high aptitude is a
characteristic relatively few share and it is unavailable to those not having it.
These communications are important because research in the domain of
impression management and self-presentation has documented the positive social
consequences that modest as opposed to boastful or arrogant communications elicit (e.g.,
Levine & West, 1976; Robinson, Johnson, & Shields, 1995; Schlenker & Leary, 1982;
Wosinska, Dabul, Whetstone-Dion, & Cialdini, 1996). Modesty judgments are especially
desirable in that they help gain access to important social benefits (Carlston & Shovar,
1883; Feather, 1994). Furthermore, people who respond modestly to their achievements
are better liked than those who are boastful (see Stebbins, 1976; Wosinska et al., 1996).
There are, however, some contexts (work interviews for example) in which modesty as
opposed to arrogance does not pay in terms of chances to get the offered job (Wosinska et
al., 1996).
The present research further examines the antecedent conditions that elicit
perceptions of arrogance or modesty. Here we are concerned with how these inferences
are affected by an achiever’s communicated cause for success in conjunction with the
Modesty, Arrogance and Honesty of Accounts 6
real cause known to the perceiver. In addition, we consider how the level of the success
involved may affect these social judgments. Thus, the present paper addresses the role
communicated causes for success have in inducing impressions of modesty and arrogance
and asks if the truth value of these communications and the level of success achieved
affect these personality inferences.
Previous research and discussion of self-presentation tactics in the context of
achievement success has considered some aspects of the complex relations between
causal accuracy, self-enhancement, and perceived humility (see e.g. Schlenker & Leary,
1982; Vonk, 1999). Among other things, this research indicates understatements of
performance enhance perceptions of modesty, whereas exaggerations of
accomplishments increase perceptions of arrogance (Schlenker & Leary, 1982). Thus,
there are indications that perceptions of modesty and arrogance are sensitive to the extent
that the communications of the presenter match reality.
While it has been reported that personal statements of ability are regarded arrogant,
is this also the case when ability in fact is the real cause? It is known individuals prefer
honest communications (Schlenker, 1975), so perhaps a true claim of high ability will not
be regarded arrogant. In a similar manner, perhaps a true claim that success was due to an
external, unstable, and uncontrollable cause (e.g., good luck) will not be regarded as
modest. These examples lead to the prediction that accurate or honest communications
mitigate impressions of arrogance and modesty. On the other hand, as already intimated,
prior research has suggested that decreased inferences of arrogance and increased
inferences of modesty follow when an achiever downplays a personal causal role in a
Modesty, Arrogance and Honesty of Accounts 7
positive performance by, for example, explaining success by referring to luck or help
from others (external causes). That is, the honesty of communications may be irrelevant
to perceptions of arrogance or modesty.
In the first study reported here information about the communicated causes of
success (ability, effort, help from others, and luck) and the real causes (the same four) are
varied in a factorial design. Ratings of arrogance, modesty, and honesty are assessed.
Previous research has not considered how true versus communicated causes for success
interact in determining inferences about the achiever, or which has greater impact on
inferences about others. In the second study, we replicate the design of the first
investigation using a different context of achievement and also manipulating the level of
success. Prior research examining the relation between accounts for success and the
inferences in question failed to find any effect of level of success on perceptions of
arrogance and modesty (Hareli & Weiner, 2000). However, in prior research the real
cause for success was unknown to the perceiver. Here we tested the possibility that the
importance of the success does affect arrogance and modesty perceptions when the
perceiver knows if the achiever is telling the truth or lying about how the success came
about. Considering that communications understating or exaggerating performance do
affect perceptions of modesty and arrogance (Schlenker & Leary, 1982), it is possible
that variations in level of actual success affect the perceptions in question. For example,
fabricated accounts of ability may have a different impact on perceived arrogance and/or
modesty as the level of achievement varies. This may be so because greater achievements
are expected to also be perceived as more important and hence lies may be considered
Modesty, Arrogance and Honesty of Accounts 8
less leniently than in the case of achievements of lower significance. This difference in
attitudes toward lies may also be reflected in perceptions of arrogance and modesty.
Study 1
Method
Subjects were 66 undergraduate psychology students at the University of California,
Los Angeles (UCLA) who received course credit for participating. They were asked for
their voluntary participation during an introductory class. The participants first read a
story about a person who achieved success in a school setting. This was followed by l6
combinations of information regarding the cause for success (4 communicated causes X 4
real causes). The four communicated and real causes were high ability, effort
expenditure, help from others, and good luck. Approximately one-half of the subjects (N
= 28) reported their inferences about the arrogance and honesty of the achiever, while the
others (N = 38) reported their beliefs about modesty and honesty. Judgments of modesty
and arrogance were assessed between-subjects to avoid any mutual influences between
the ratings that do not necessarily reflect the actual relation between the two judgments
but rather a stereotypical view that these are opposites. All ratings were made on seven-
point scales anchored at the extremes, ranging from (1) “not at all” to (7) “very much.”
The arrogance (or modesty) and honesty ratings were paired after each information
combination. Within each group, half the participants first rated arrogance (or modesty
depending on the condition) and then honesty, while for the other half these ratings
appeared in the reverse order. Thus, overall each participant rated 16 pairs of judgments
(honesty and arrogance or modesty). Causes appeared in a format of a table in which in
Modesty, Arrogance and Honesty of Accounts 9
each raw a specific combination of the communicated account appeared. First in order of
appearance was the real cause followed by the reported one. A Latin Square design was
used such that there were 16 different orders of the paired causal information within each
group (participants rating modesty versus those rating arrogance). No more than two
participants within each group received the same order of information.
Results
Arrogance. Arrogance ratings were analyzed using a 4X4 within-subjects analysis of
variance with real causes and stated causes as the independent variables. All effects were
tested using the Wilks' lambda (Λ) (the same procedure is also used in all subsequent
within-subjects ANOVA analyses in Studies 1 and 2). A main effect emerged for the
stated cause of success, Λ =.19, F (3, 20) = 28.76, p < .01, η2 = .81; (see Figure 1).
Newman-Keuls post hoc analyses performed at the level of p=.05 served to explore these
effects (the same method was used also for subsequent post-hoc tests). These tests
revealed that communication of the two internal causes (for ability, M = 4.73; SD = .35;
and for effort, M = 3.29; SD = .26) is regarded as more arrogant than communicating the
external causes (for luck, M = 2.65; SD = .21 and for help, M = 1.78; SD = .18). In
addition, among the internal causes, public statements regarding ability are seen as more
arrogant than are statements of effort expenditure, while among the external causes, luck
is a more arrogant communication than is help from others.
A main effect also was found for the real cause of success, Λ =.50, F (3, 20) = 6.70,
p < .01, η2 = .50;. However, real causes have a weaker effect on arrogance inferences
than do communicated causes, as reflected in their differential levels of effect (η2 = .50
Modesty, Arrogance and Honesty of Accounts 10
versus η2 = .81, respectively). Further post-hoc analyses revealed that when ability is the
actual cause (the left most bar graph in all four groupings), inferences of arrogance are
reduced in comparison to the other three causes, which do not significantly differ from
one another (for ability, effort, luck, and help, respectively, M = 2.52; SD = .19; M =
3.23; SD = .24; M = 3.37; SD = .24; M = 3.34; SD = .24).
These main effects are qualified by a Stated Cause X Real Cause interaction, Λ
=.17, F (9, 14) = 7.76, p < .001, η2 = .83 (see Figure 1, and upper left section of Table 11).
Further post-hoc analyses revealed that when ability is the stated (communicated) cause,
then inferences of arrogance are relatively high and do not significantly differ as a
function of the real cause. Thus, contrary to some beliefs, honesty does not mitigate
perceptions of arrogance when ability is the stated cause. Turning to the other internal
cause of success, when effort is the communicated cause, arrogance beliefs are
dramatically augmented when the real causes are external to the achiever (help and luck).
Thus, unlike ability, in the case of effort honesty does mitigate perceptions of arrogance.
Level of perceived arrogance in the case of a valid account of effort is also significantly
lower than in the case of the valid account of ability.
Concerning the external causes of success, inferences of arrogance are low except
in the case when luck is claimed although effort expenditure is the real cause. Perhaps in
this instance luck is interpreted as a characteristic of the person and regarded an internal,
stable, and uncontrollable cause, rather than being construed external to the individual
and unstable, as is chance. This belief also contributes to the finding that luck is regarded 1 In describing results of interactions across the paper we stress only major findings relevant to hypotheses. Table 1 serves to describe the full pattern of the results.
Modesty, Arrogance and Honesty of Accounts 11
a more arrogant communication than help from others. Finally, stating success was
caused by help from others results in low inferences of arrogance, regardless of the real
cause.
Modesty. For modesty, a within-Subjects two-way ANOVA again revealed a main effect
for the stated cause of success, Λ =.36, F (3, 25) = 15.08, p < .001, η2 = .64 (see Figure 2;
for ability, effort, luck and help respectively, M = 5.05; SD = .20; M = 4.40; SD = .24; M
= 3.34; SD = .20; and M = 3.63; SD = .19. Further post-hoc analyses revealed that
statements of external causes of success were regarded more modest than were internal
causal communications, and among the internal causes, effort was a more modest public
statement than ability. In contrast to beliefs about arrogance, luck and help did not
differentially affect modesty judgments and effort was considered as less modest than
luck.
A main effect also was found for the real cause of success, Λ =.13, F (3, 25) =
56.26, p < .001, η2 = .87, revealing the effect of the real cause is greater for modesty than
for arrogance judgments for ability, effort, luck and help respectively, M = 2.42; SD =
.20; M = 3.88; SD = .20; M = 5.20; SD = .19; and M = 4.90; SD = .23, see Figure 2).
Further analyses show that when the real cause is internal to the achiever, then one is
regarded as more modest than when the real cause is external (compare the two left-most
bar graphs with the two right bar graphs within each of the stated causes). Also,
considering the two internal causes, reporting any cause in the context of really having
ability is more modest than reporting any cause in the context of really investing effort
(compare the first and second bar graphs across the four stated causes). Concerning real
Modesty, Arrogance and Honesty of Accounts 12
external causes in the context of success, there is no difference between these causes
regarding perceived modesty.
These main effects are qualified by a Stated Cause X Real Cause interaction, Λ
=.29, F (9, 19) = 5.16, p < .01, η2 = .71 (see again Figure 2 and second left section of
Table 1). Post-hoc analyses indicate that, as in the case of arrogance, honesty regarding
ability does not mitigate impressions of lack of modesty; that is, stating one succeeded
because of ability when this is true nevertheless elicits inferences of lack of modesty. As
in the case of arrogance, but unlike honest accounts of ability, honest accounts of effort
do induce relative higher impression of modesty. The fact that honesty did augmented
perceptions of modesty for the valid account of effort but not the valid statements of
ability is also apparent from the fact that the effort led to a significantly higher level of
perceived modesty in comparison with ability. Level of modesty when effort was stated
but ability was the real cause was also similarly high. On the other hand, statements of
effort as causal in the context of luck or help as the real causes decrease the likelihood
that the communicator is perceived as modest. External accounts led to relative high level
of perceived modesty regardless of the real cause for success. Unlike in the context of
arrogance, reports of luck when effort is the real cause did not decrease modesty.
Honesty. A mixed-factors three way ANOVA was computed for the honesty ratings with
type of questionnaire (rating modesty versus arrogance) as a between-subjects factor and
real as well as stated causes as within-subjects factors. There were no effects for
questionnaire type, thus indicating that honesty ratings were not affected by which of the
two social inferences participants were asked to rate (all p’s > .19).
Modesty, Arrogance and Honesty of Accounts 13
There was a relatively weak main effect for the stated cause for success on
honesty, Λ =.63, F (3, 50) = 9.83, p < .001, η2 = .37 (see Figure 3). Further post-hoc
analyses show that ability as the stated cause was perceived as the most honest account
followed by effort. Luck and help led to similarly low levels of perceived honesty (for
ability, effort, luck and help respectively, (for ability, M = 4.08; SD. = .15; for effort, M =
4.11; SD = .14; for luck, M = 3.39; SD = .14; for help, M = 3.65; SD = .15). In sum,
ability as the stated cause relatively reduces perceived honesty.
This main effect was qualified by a Stated Cause X Real Cause interaction, Λ =.21,
F (9, 44) = 18.86, p < .001, η2 = .79 (see Figure 3 and third left section of Table 1). Post-
hoc analyses show, as expected, that in all conditions where the stated cause matches the
real cause, the communicator is perceived as most honest. Conversely, the combination
of stating ability as the cause when the real causes are external to the achiever is the
pattern that results in the communication being regarded as least honest. Likewise,
reporting effort when luck is the real reason is also seen as an account expressing
minimal honesty. Overall this indicates that all lies are not the same in deciding about
honesty.
Discussion
Taken together, the results concerning both personality inferences and honesty lead
to the conclusion that, although others have suggested truthfulness is preferred in
communications (e.g., Schlenker, 1975), honesty does not mitigate inferences of
arrogance in the case of ability self-statements. Consistent with this conclusion, being
Modesty, Arrogance and Honesty of Accounts 14
least honest (communicating ability when external causes are real) does not significantly
increase inferences of arrogance.
In a similar manner, impressions of modesty are not reduced merely because the
achiever is telling the truth. For example, when success is due to help from others or luck
and this is stated, one nevertheless is considered modest. Finally, honesty ratings are
sensitive not only to the mere question of whether one is telling the truth but also reflect
the extent to which the person is seen as arrogant or modest. Situations in which lies lead
to decreased arrogance or increased modesty (e.g., stating help when ability or effort was
the cause) are seen as more honest than lies that result in higher arrogance and/or lower
modesty (e.g., stating ability or effort when help was the cause). This implies honesty
inferences are not merely determined by a communication’s truth value but also by the
perceived motivation of the communicator. Given that modesty is socially desirable
whereas arrogance is socially undesirable, lies in the service of a socially desirable
impression hurt perceived honesty less than lies inducing a less socially desirable
impression.
In addition, the data suggest that arrogance and modesty are to a great extent
determined by statements made by the achiever, although real causes do play a
supporting role in these inferences. One question that arises in regard to this pattern of
data is whether arrogance and modesty are mere opposites or does each have some
unique features not shared by the other? In support of the position that arrogance and
modesty are not mere opposites, real causes play a greater role in judgments of modesty
than of arrogance. If one has little ability, then there is a reduced opportunity to be
Modesty, Arrogance and Honesty of Accounts 15
perceived as modest. That is, not everyone has the characteristics that permit or facilitate
modesty inferences. On the other hand, one can always be regarded arrogant regardless of
the truth. Additional support for the belief that arrogance and modesty are not just
opposites is the complex effort/luck relation in judgments of arrogance (stating luck was
the cause when in fact it was effort increases arrogance), which was not evident for
modesty.
On the other hand, it also is the case that arrogance and modesty judgments share
much in common. For example, stating ability as the cause of success promotes
perceptions of arrogance, whereas not using a causal presentation of ability evokes
inferences of modesty. Also, honest statements of effort both decrease inferences of
arrogance and increase inferences of modesty. Further discussion of these data is delayed
until the presentation of Study 2.
The first experiment indicated that perceptions of arrogance and modesty are
mainly influenced by an achiever’s causal communications, although under some
circumstances these inferences are sensitive to the question of the truth value of the
account. In the second experiment we focus on the question of whether the level of one’s
achievement affects the perceptions in question. Prior research indicates that perceptions
of arrogance and modesty are insensitive to the level of an account giver’s achievement.
What determines these perceptions is the achiever’s explanation of success, regardless of
the importance or significance of the achievement (Hareli & Weiner, 2000). However, in
previous research the honesty of the account giver was unknown to the perceiver. In the
present study, we examine the possibility that when a perceiver knows the real reason for
Modesty, Arrogance and Honesty of Accounts 16
success, modesty and arrogance inferences are sensitive to the importance of the
achievement. That is, lies about how minor achievements came about are not considered
modest and/or arrogant to the same extent as lies about the causes of significant
achievements. Likewise, honest accounts explaining minor achievements may affect
modesty and/or arrogance differently than when explaining more significant
accomplishments. Experiment 2 provides the opportunity to replicate findings from Study
1 using a somewhat different context of achievement, i.e., the success of a university
professor and a somewhat different cultural context (Israel).
Study 2
Method
Subjects were 79 (55 female, 17 male, 7 didn’t specify their gender) undergraduate
psychology students at the University of Haifa, Israel. They were asked for their
voluntary participation during an introductory class. The design was identical to that of
Study 1. However, the level of achievement also was manipulated so that within each of
the groups, about half the participants read about a Professor who conducted an
experiment whose results confirmed his hypotheses. This served as the condition of a low
level of success (total N=35; for arrogance rating group N=20, and for modesty rating
group N=15). The other participants read a description about a Professor from their
school awarded the Nobel Prize for a scientific breakthrough. This was the high level of
success condition (total N=44; for arrogance rating group N=19, and for modesty rating
group N=25). A Latin Square design was used such that there were 16 different orders of
the paired causal information within each group (participants rating modesty versus those
Modesty, Arrogance and Honesty of Accounts 17
rating arrogance). No more than two participants within each of these groups received the
same order of information.
Results
An independent-samples t-test revealed the manipulation of level of achievement
was successful, t (37) = 2.74, p<.01, η2 =.17 although not as strong as desired. The Nobel
Prize award was seen as a higher achievement (M=5.95; SD=.97) than a successful
experiment (M=4.95; SD=1.28).
Arrogance. For arrogance, a mixed-factors ANOVA with real and stated causes as
within-subjects variables and level of success as a between-subjects variable found a
main effect for the stated cause of success, Λ =.19, F (3, 32) = 46.31, p < .001, η2 = .81
(see Figure 4). Further analyses revealed that communicating the two internal causes (for
ability, M = 4.88; SD = .19 and for effort, M = 3.57; SD = .14) is regarded as more
arrogant than communicating the external causes (for luck, M = 2.00; SD = .16 and for
help M = 1.78; SD = .16). In addition, among the internal causes, public statements
regarding ability are considered more arrogant than are statements of effort expenditure,
while among the external causes, luck is not considered a more arrogant communication
than is help from others.
A main effect also was found for the real cause of success, Λ =.32, F (3, 32) = 22.64,
p < .001, η2 = .68. Similarly to Study 1, real causes have a somewhat weaker effect on
arrogance inferences than do communicated causes, as reflected in their differential levels
of effect (partial η2 = .81 versus partial η2 = .68, respectively). Further analyses revealed
that when internal causes are the actual causes, inferences of arrogance are reduced in
Modesty, Arrogance and Honesty of Accounts 18
comparison to the situations that involve actual external causes (for ability, effort, luck,
and help, respectively, M = 2.35; SD = .15; M = 2.43; SD = .14; M = 3.69; SD = .14; M
= 3.76; SD = .16). There are no significant differences between ability and effort and
between luck and help.
These effects were qualified by a Stated Cause X Real Cause interaction, Λ =.68,
F (9, 26) = 16.48, p < .001, η2 = .85 (see again Figure 4 and upper right section of Table
1). Further analyses show that arrogance level was highest when ability was
communicated as the cause of success and either luck or help was the real cause. A
somewhat lower level of perceived arrogance emerged when the account of ability was
and when effort was the real cause. Thus, unlike in Study 1, honesty did decrease to some
extent perceived arrogance. In both cases level of perceived arrogance was still higher
than that in the case of any other valid account, and also higher than any account
communicating an external cause or accounts communicating effort when the real cause
is external.
Turning to communications of effort, when effort is the communicated cause,
arrogance beliefs are strongly augmented when the real causes are external to the
achiever (help and luck). Thus, like in Study 1, and in the case of the valid account of
ability, a valid effort account mitigates perceptions of arrogance. Mitigation of
perceptions of arrogance in the case of a valid account of ability is significantly lower
than in the case of the valid account of effort. Thus, although in the present study honesty
mitigated perceptions of arrogance when the account of ability was valid, it did so to a
lesser extent than in the case of a valid account of effort.
Modesty, Arrogance and Honesty of Accounts 19
Concerning communicated external causes of success, inferences of arrogance are
low except in the case when luck is claimed although help is the real cause. This
replicates the finding from Study 1.
Finally, level of achievement had no effect on perceived arrogance (all p's > .26).
Modesty. For modesty, a mixed-factors ANOVA with real and stated causes as within-
subjects variables and level of success as a between-subjects variable revealed a main
effect for the stated cause of success, Λ =.18, F (3, 31) = 27.72, p < .001, η2 = .73 (for
ability, effort, luck and help respectively, M = 2.64; SD = .17; M = 3.62; SD = .17; M =
5.30; SD = .14; and M = 5.45; SD = .17, see Figure 5). Further analyses show that, as
expected, statements of external causes of success were regarded as more modest than
were internal causal communications, and among the internal causes, effort was
considered a more modest public statement than was ability. Luck and help did not
differentially affect modesty judgments. These results replicate the findings of Study 1.
A main effect also was found for the real cause of success, Λ =.27, F (3, 31) =
46.14, p < .001, η2 = .82, (for ability, effort, luck and help respectively, M = 5.26; SD =
.18; M = 4.81; SD = .14; M = 3.58; SD = .15; and M = 3.36; SD = .15). This effect
reflected the fact that when the real cause is internal to the achiever, then one is regarded
as more modest than when the real cause is external. Also, considering the two internal
causes, reporting any cause in the context of really having ability is more modest than
reporting any cause in the context of really investing effort. Concerning real external
causes in the context of success, there is no difference between these causes regarding
perceived modesty. These findings also replicate the findings of Study 1.
Modesty, Arrogance and Honesty of Accounts 20
These main effects are qualified by a Stated Cause X Real Cause interaction, Λ
=.41, F (9, 25) = 3.99, p < .01, η2 = .59 (see again Figure 5). As apparent in Figure 5 and
the middle right section of Table 1, relative low levels of perceived modesty are
expressed in the context of statements of ability regardless of the real cause for success.
Nevertheless, when the real cause for success is either ability or effort, level of perceived
modesty is somewhat increased. These findings mirror the effects of these accounts in the
context of arrogance. Statements of effort lead to relative high levels of modesty when
the real cause is internal. However, when the real cause is external, statements of effort
are not seen as modest. Again, this mirrors the results in the context of arrogance.
Honesty mitigated perceived modesty both for statements of effort and ability
nevertheless mitigation was stronger in the case of effort. This replicates the findings of
Study 1. Like in Study 1, highest levels of modesty are expressed when external causes
are stated but internal ones are actually the reasons for success. Similarly relatively high
levels of modesty also emerged for all valid causes except for ability but some of these
accounts did not differ from some of the lies that involve external accounts (e.g., reports
of help when luck was the actual reason for success). Overall, these results again indicate
that honesty does not mitigate inferences of modesty. Statements of luck in the context of
success due to help leads to somewhat lower levels of modesty. Like the case of
arrogance, there was no effect for the level of success (all p's > .09).
Honesty. A mixed-factors ANOVA was computed for the honesty ratings with type of
questionnaire (rating modesty versus arrogance) and achievement level as between-
subjects factors and real as well as stated causes as within-subjects factors. There were no
Modesty, Arrogance and Honesty of Accounts 21
effects for questionnaire type and level of achievement, thus indicating that honesty
ratings were not affected by which of the two social inferences participants were asked to
rate and the level of the achievement involved (all p’s > .10).
There was a main effect for the stated cause for success on honesty, F (3, 198) =
22.72, p < .0001, partial η2 = .26 (see Figure 6). Further Newman-Keuls post-hoc
analyses performed at the level of p=.05 show that, regardless of the real cause, all stated
causes differed from each other in terms of perceived honesty with ability as the least
honest account followed by effort then luck and most honest help (for ability, effort, luck
and help respectively, M = 3.60; SD = .08; M = 3.80; SD = .09; M = 4.12; SD = .11; and
M = 4.37; SD = .10). This replicates the findings of Study 1. In addition, there was a
main effect on honesty for the real cause of success, F (3, 198) = 47.19, p < .0001, partial
η2 = .42. Further Newman-Keuls post-hoc analyses performed at the level of p=.05 reveal
that, regardless of the stated cause for success, when the real cause of success is internal,
the communicator is regarded as more honest than when the real cause of success is
external (for ability, M = 4.51; SD. = .11; for effort, M = 4.40; SD = .11; for luck, M =
3.54; SD = .10; for help, M = 3.43; SD = .09). In sum, ability and effort as stated causes
reduce perceived honesty, whereas ability and effort as real causes relatively increase
perceived honesty.
These effects were qualified by a Stated Cause X Real Cause interaction, F (9, 594)
= 135.84, p <.0001, partial η2 = .67 (see Figure 6 and lower right section of Table 1). As
expected, in all conditions where the stated cause matches the real cause, the
communicator is perceived as most honest. However, within these conditions, a valid
Modesty, Arrogance and Honesty of Accounts 22
account of help seems somewhat more honest than a valid account of luck. Conversely,
the combination of stating ability or effort as the cause when the real causes are external
to the achiever is the pattern that results in the communication being regarded as least
honest. Finally, reporting effort while ability is the real cause is perceived as more honest
than stating effort while having real external causes for success. Likewise, reporting luck
when help is the real cause for success seems less honest than reporting luck when
internal causes are the real causes for success. These findings stand in accord with our
results in Study 1 and indicate again that all lies are not the same in deciding about
honesty. Overall, in the present experiment we replicated our main findings in Study 1
using a different context of achievement and participants from a different culture. We
failed to find any effect for the level of achievement on arrogance and modesty like in
prior research (Hareli & Weiner, 2000) or honesty.
General discussion
In the present paper, we tested the interplay between the truthfulness of causal
accounts for success and the nature of these causes in determining inferences of modesty,
arrogance and honesty. As previous research in the field of impression formation (e.g.,
Schlenker & Leary, 1982; Vonk, 1999), this research shows that the accuracy of self-
presentations is not the dominant factor in determining the created impression. In two
studies, using different achievement settings, it was evident that honesty does not
necessarily mitigate impressions of modesty and arrogance. To the contrary, some false
accounts increase perceived modesty and decrease perceived arrogance. This finding
stands in contrast to the view holding that higher levels of perceived modesty are
Modesty, Arrogance and Honesty of Accounts 23
expected when one reports an accurate picture of her/his achievements than a false one
(Ben-Ze’ev, 1993). These findings mirror evidence that exaggerations of achievements
lead to increased perceptions of arrogance while understatements of performance enhance
perceptions of modesty (Schlenker & Leary, 1982). The fact that claiming high ability
produces a relatively high impression of arrogance even when it is accurate goes along
with other findings showing the socially undesirable communications affect other's
impressions regardless of the question of whether it is valid or not. For example, Reeder
and Spores (1983) found that immoral behavior is seen as immoral regardless of its
causes. Likewise, Parkinson (1999) showed that people may experience guilt caused by
others' blaming them even if they do not see themselves responsible for what they are
blamed for. Finally, Hareli (in prep.) found that false feedback given by others for one's
performance is still hurtful even when both the achiever and the person that
communicated that feedback know the information is invalid. Thus it seems that validity
plays a relatively little role in the case of communicating information that has socially
undesirable implications. This idea is further supported by the fact that valid reports of
effort do not lead to similar results despite the fact that communications of effort can lead
to impressions of arrogance if they are reported in the context of success due to external
causes.
The present research also indicates that inferences of modesty and arrogance are
sensitive to the type of the communicated account as well as to the real cause for the
outcome, assuming this is known to the perceiver. For example, whereas accounts of
effort lead to increased impressions of arrogance and decreased impressions of modesty
Modesty, Arrogance and Honesty of Accounts 24
when perceivers know the actual cause for one’s success was external to the achiever,
stated accounts of effort in the context of internal real causes for success mitigate the
impressions in question. In contrast, statements of ability are less sensitive to the real
cause.
Another conclusion from the present research is that when perceivers know the
real cause for success, the relative impact of specific types of the accounts to others on
modesty and arrogance are sensitive to the different circumstances in which they are
reported. For example, previous studies showed that accounts of ability lead to higher
degrees of arrogance and lowest degrees of modesty in comparison to accounts of effort
and luck (Hareli & Weiner, 2000). In the present research, however, communications of
ability did not emerge as more arrogant and less modest than effort and luck under all
conditions. The relative impact of these accounts was sensitive to the real causes that led
to the achievement. Taken together, it is possible that perceivers weigh the reported cause
of success against the background of information concerning the real cause for it to infer
the intentions of the speaker. Among other things, the perceiver may infer that the
speaker wants to express an advantage over others (i.e., arrogance) or conceal an
advantage to protect others' self image (i.e., modesty). This possibility should be tested in
further research by measuring perceived intentions of the communicator. Finally, on a
more general level, this raises the possibility that the validity of attributional information
is an important factor that may have a significant effect also in other contexts in which
causal attributions play an important role. Prior research of attribution mostly ignored this
factor.
Modesty, Arrogance and Honesty of Accounts 25
Considering perceptions of honesty, the present research indicated honesty is not
just a function of the truth of one’s communication but also is dependent on whether that
communication is arrogant or modest. Honesty was strongly determined by the truth
value of the account but across both studies accounts that led to higher levels of
arrogance and lower levels of modesty also were judged less honest. This effect on
honesty is in line with previous studies that found a correlation between modesty and
honesty (Robinson et al., 1995).
In the present research, unlike previous studies, participants were aware to the
true reason of success. Hence, modesty or arrogance have an impact on honesty above
and beyond any possible impact on perceived truthfulness of a person’s account. One
explanation for this effect is that modest impressions are associated with accounts
depicting an individual relatively less able. Communications of a state or trait low in
social desirability increase one’s impression of honesty. That is, it is easier to be honest
about desirable things than undesirable or less desirable ones. Hence, people who tell the
truth when that is costly in social terms are considered more honest. This is less the case
when perceiver’s do not know the real reason for success. In such instances self
depreciative accounts do not increase perceptions of honesty and even may reduce such
perceptions (Robinson et al., 1995; Vonk, 1999).
Given that we used vignettes and self reports to study social perceptions, our
findings are susceptible to influence by the participant’s naïve theories related to the
perceptions in questions. The fact that both studies involved a within-subjects design
further increases the potential effect of naïve theories on the response of the participants.
Modesty, Arrogance and Honesty of Accounts 26
Indeed, recent discussions exploring the question of the extent to which self reports made
in the context of hypothetical scenarios reflect actual experience suggest that such reports
are most likely to represent participant’s beliefs about such situations rather than actual
experiences (Robinson & Clore, 2002). Nevertheless, this view also indicates that the
same beliefs that are reflected in self reports are also likely to determine long-term
reactions to the events under question. Given that perceptions of arrogance and modesty
may have also longer term implications on person perception, the present results are more
likely to represent such reactions. Nevertheless, these do not necessarily have to be
different than the more immediate reactions. It is therefore important to test our
hypotheses with methodologies that go beyond written descriptions of the situations
involved and self-reports.
Modesty, Arrogance and Honesty of Accounts 27
References
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Tabl
e 1
Perc
eive
d A
rrog
ance
, Mod
esty
and
Hon
esty
as a
func
tion
of S
tate
d an
d R
eal C
ause
for S
ucce
ss
Not
e. S
ubsc
ripts
bas
ed o
n N
ewm
an-K
euls
test
s at p
< .0
5. R
atin
gs w
ere
mad
e on
7-p
oint
scal
es. H
ighe
r num
bers
repr
esen
t gre
ater
mod
esty
, ar
roga
nce
and
hone
sty.
Num
bers
with
diff
eren
t sub
scrip
ts d
iffer
at p
< .0
5.
Stud
y 2
St
udy
1
R
eal c
ause
Rea
l cau
se
help
lu
ck
effo
rt ab
ility
help
lu
ck
effo
rt ab
ility
St
ated
cau
se
M
=5.5
3 a
SD=2
.08
M=5
.92
a SD
=1.5
7 M
=4.3
1 b
SD=1
.72
M=3
.69
b
SD=1
.85
M
=5.2
6 a
SD=2
.32
M=4
.87
a SD
=2.3
6 M
=4.1
3 a
SD=2
.40
M=4
.65
a SD
=2.1
7 ab
ility
A
rrog
ance
M=5
.08
a SD
=1.7
6 M
=5.2
2 a
SD=1
.59
M=1
.89
d
SD=1
.28
M=2
.11
d SD
=1.4
7
M=4
.52
a SD
=2.1
5 M
=4.6
5 a
SD=2
.12
M=1
.87
b SD
=1.6
3 M
=2.1
3 b
SD=1
.42
effo
rt
M=2
.92
c SD
=1.8
7 M
=1.4
4 d
SD=.
94
M=1
.83
d SD
=1.3
4 M
=1.8
3 d
SD=1
.36
M
=2.3
0 b
SD=1
.69
M=1
.74
b SD
=1.6
3 M
=4.7
0 a
SD=2
.08
M=1
.87
b SD
=1.7
1 lu
ck
M=1
.44
d SD
=.99
M
=2.1
9 d
SD=1
.55
M=1
.72
d SD
=1.2
3 M
=1.7
8 d
SD=1
.51
M
=1.2
6 b
SD=.
54
M=2
.22
b SD
=1.5
7 M
=2.2
2 b
SD=1
.68
M=1
.43
b SD
=.99
he
lp
M
=2.0
3 g
SD=1
.71
M=1
.80
g SD
=1.2
8 M
=2.9
1 f
SD=1
.22
M=3
.83
e SD
=1.6
4
M=2
.14
ef
SD=1
.67
M=1
.96
f SD
=1.5
3 M
=2.6
8 ef
SD
=1.7
2 M
=2.8
9 ef
SD
=1.7
1 ab
ility
M
odes
ty
M
=2.1
4 fg
SD
=1.0
9 M
=2.6
3 fg
SD
=1.5
9 M
=4.7
1 bc
d SD
=1.8
2 M
=5.2
6 ab
c SD
=1.6
0
M=3
.07
e SD
=1.5
6 M
=2.7
1 ef
SD
=1.7
8 M
=4.7
5 c
SD=1
.73
M=5
.00
bc
SD=2
.07
effo
rt
M=3
.97 d
e SD
=1.4
0 M
=5.2
0 ab
c SD
=1.6
9 M
=6.1
1 a
SD=1
.08
M=6
.09
a SD
=1.5
6
M=4
.21
cd
SD=1
.66
M=4
.86
c SD
=1.9
8 M
=5.3
2 bc
SD
=1.6
8 M
=6.3
9 a
SD=.
88
luck
M=5
.57
ab
SD=1
.56
M=4
.54
cde
SD=1
.40
M=5
.77
a SD
=1.6
1 M
=5.9
7 a
SD=1
.67
M
=5.0
0 c
SD=1
.83
M=3
.82
d SD
=1.6
8 M
=4.8
6 c
SD=1
.82
M=5
.93
ab
SD=1
.39
help
M
=1.9
3 f
SD=1
.26
M=2
.17
f SD
=1.5
0 M
=3.9
3 c
d SD
=1.6
9 M
=6.3
6 ab
SD
=1.3
2
M=2
.46
cd
SD=1
.77
M=2
.20
d SD
=1.9
5 M
=3.5
2 b
SD=1
.82
M=5
.93
a SD
=1.8
1 ab
ility
H
ones
ty
Stud
y 1
M=2
.17
f SD
=1.2
2 M
=2.2
0 f
SD=1
.16
M=6
.46
ab
SD=1
.36
M=4
.33
c SD
=1.5
1
M=3
.00
bcd
SD=1
.76
M=2
.28
d SD
=1.6
2 M
=6.1
5 a
SD=1
.66
M=3
.96
b
SD=1
.98
effo
rt
M=2
.91
e SD
=1.5
6 M
=6.1
6 b
SD=1
.81
M=3
.57
d SD
=1.5
1 M
=3.7
9 d
SD=1
.62
M
=3.0
7 bc
d SD
=1.7
3 M
=6.0
9 a
SD=1
.89
M=3
.46
b SD
=1.7
3 M
=3.0
4 bc
d SD
=1.7
2 lu
ck
M=6
.80
a SD
=.53
M
=3.5
3 d
SD=1
.51
M=3
.61
d SD
=1.5
0 M
=3.5
1 d
SD=1
.53
M
=6.1
1 a
SD=1
.77
M=3
.00
bcd
SD=1
.55
M=3
.33
bc
SD=1
.79
M=3
.37
bc
SD=1
.71
help
Modesty, Arrogance and Honesty of Accounts 1
Figures Caption
Figure 1. Arrogance ratings as a function of stated and real causes – Study 1
Figure 2. Modesty ratings as a function of stated and real causes – Study 1
Figure 3. Honesty ratings as a function of stated and real causes – Study 1
Figure 4. Arrogance ratings as a function of stated and real causes – Study 2
Figure 5. Modesty ratings as a function of stated and real causes – Study 2
Figure 6. Honesty ratings as a function of stated and real causes – Study 2
Modesty, Arrogance and Honesty of Accounts 2
Figure 1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Ability Effort Luck HelpStated cause
Arr
ogan
ce AbilityEffortLuckHelp
Real cause
Modesty, Arrogance and Honesty of Accounts 3
Figure 2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Ability Effort Luck Help
Stated cause
Mod
esty Ability
EffortLuckHelp
Real cause
Modesty, Arrogance and Honesty of Accounts 4
Figure 3
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Ability Effort Luck HelpStated cause
Hon
esty Ability
EffortLuckHelp
Real cause
Modesty, Arrogance and Honesty of Accounts 5
Figure 4
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Ability Effort Luck HelpStated cause
Arr
ogan
ce AbilityEffortLuckHelp
Real cause
Modesty, Arrogance and Honesty of Accounts 6
Figure 5
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Ability Effort Luck HelpStated cause
Mod
esty Ability
EffortLuckHelp
Real cause