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US Marine Corps

PCN 143 000081 00

MCWP 3-34.1

Military Police Operations

USMC

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVYHeadquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, D.C. 20380-1775

9 September 2010

FOREWORD

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-34.1, Military Police Operations,provides the doctrinal basis for employment of military police (MP) in support ofMarine air-ground task force (MAGTF) operations. This publication addresses MPtasks, functions, objectives, and capabilities occurring in peace, crisis, and war. It alsodescribes how military police serve as a MAGTF force-multiplier by interacting andsupporting tactical-level expeditionary activities.

This publication is designed for commanders and staff planners who are responsible for theconduct of activities in support of expeditionary operations and operations other than war.It provides information to facilitate planning and execution of MP operations regardingsupport of mission assurance, limited detainee operations, law and order operations, MPplanning and training, and corrections. It also identifies logistic requirements, physicalsecurity, customs, and military working dog employment.

This revision supersedes MCWP 3-34.1 dated 13 October 2000.

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

GEORGE J. FLYNNLieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps

Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration

Publication Control Number: 143 000081 00

DISTRIBUTION A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Military Police Operations _____________________________________________________________________________________ A-1

MILITARY POLICE OPERATIONS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1. OverviewMP Support to Mission Assurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2Law and Order Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2Military Working Dog Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4Limited Detainee Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4Planning and Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5United States Customs and Border Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5

Chapter 2. Military Police PersonnelMEF or MAGTF Provost Marshal or Provost Sergeant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2MP Major Subordinate Command Staff Officer and/or SNCO . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2MEF MP Support Company Commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2Major Subordinate Command MP Company Commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3CID Chain of Command and Investigations Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3Investigations Officer (MOS 5805) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3Criminal Investigators (MOS 5821) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3Corrections Officer (MOS 5804) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4MEU or Special Purpose MAGTF Mission Assurance Officer

and MP Detachment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2-4Corrections Officer or Specialist (MOS 5804 or 5831) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5Detention Operations Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6Detention Legal Advisor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6Detention Facility and RDF Positions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7

Chapter 3. Mission AssuranceForce Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1Antiterrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4Critical Infrastructure Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4

Chapter 4. Law and Order OperationsAuthority. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4Law and Order Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4Host Nation Law and Order Operations Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9

iv ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

Chapter 5. Military Working Dog OperationsMission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2Types of Military Working Dogs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3Supported Unit Questions for the MWD Handler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-5Planning Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-6Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-7Veterinary Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8Medical Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8Field Kennels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-9

Chapter 6. Limited Detainee OperationsThe Geneva Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1Personnel Categories. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2Detainee Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-6Civilian Internee Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-7Detainee Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-7Detainee Reporting System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-13Internment Serial Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-14Detainee Identification Band and Identification Badge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-15

Chapter 7. Planning and TrainingPlanning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1Interagency Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2Training of In-Lieu-of-Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2Military Police and Law Enforcement Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3Training for Units Deploying to Conduct Detention Operations . . . . . . . . . . 7-5Personnel Deploying to Conduct Detention Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-6

AppendicesA Customs and Border Clearance Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1B Sample Military Police Support Estimate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1C Physical Security and Crime Prevention Checklists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-1

Glossary

References and Related Publications

CHAPTER 1OVERVIEW

Military police (MP) support Marine air-groundtask force (MAGTF) operations during peace,conflict, and war. As described in the NationalDefense Strategy (June 2008) and The Long War:Send in the Marines, there is an unparalleled needfor police skills worldwide as terrorists, insur-gents, and criminal technology advancementsincrease. Military police identify and help reducethese threats at all levels of conflict across therange of military operations (see fig. 1-1) and pro-vide support within assigned areas through perfor-mance of their mission and support capabilities.

The Marine Corps’ military police have the capa-bility to function across the range of militaryoperations. Not all police forces of the other Ser-vices and other nations can replicate this func-tional capability and utility. Since there is anabundance of multinational, interagency, and jointsecurity services, the early involvement of MPleaders and staffs in the operations planning proc-ess is essential. Early involvement ensures theproper development of security responsibilities,communications, connectivity, liaisons, proc-esses, and rules of interaction among all forces.The ultimate goal is the phased employment ofMP forces to support the commander’s operationplan. Military police assets are limited; therefore,they are not able to perform all functions simulta-neously. Specific functions are performed at spec-ified times as determined by the supported

commander’s priorities, the intensity of the con-flict, the phase of the operation, and the availabil-ity of MP resources. The MAGTF commander,upon advice from the senior MP commander orprovost marshal (PM), establishes priorities andcourses of action (COAs) for MP support.

Military police possess specialized training andskills (i.e., law enforcement, accident and criminalinvestigations, use of force and continuum offorce expertise, military working dog [MWD]employment, customs support) that differentiatethem from other forces, increase their utility to thecommander, and typically possess organic trans-port at the lowest level of employment to performtheir mission. Mobility, weapons systems, andtraining enable military police to react quickly tochanging situations and changes in priorities orconditions during operations, resulting in prob-lem resolution and potential return to normalityfor the populace.

To meet Marine Corps and joint responsibilities,military police provide support within assignedareas through performance of their mission andsupport capabilities in support of the operationalcommander. The areas of support include missionassurance, law and order operations (LOO), MWDoperations, limited detainee operations (LDO),planning and training, and US customs and border

Crisis Response andLimited Contingency

Operations

Major Operations andCampaigns

Military Engagement, SecurityCooperation, and Deterrence

Figure 1-1. Range of Military Operations.

1-2 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

operations. Military police also perform special-ized functions within these areas, including acci-dent investigations, criminal investigations (e.g.,tactical site exploitation, evidence collection andprocessing, interrogations, protective servicesoperations [PSO]), physical security, forensics,and biometrics. In addition, military policeenhance interoperability through liaison and coor-dination with interagency law enforcement organi-zations, joint, multinational, host nation (HN), andnongovernmental organizations.

MP Support to Mission Assurance

Military police capabilities contribute to the sup-port of mission assurance. The ever-changingenemy and environmental situation requires mili-tary police to advise the commander of the proba-ble impact a COA has with respect to missionassurance. Military police conduct vulnerabilityassessments to identify command areas that arevulnerable to terrorist attack. These assessmentsand the criminal and tactical information gatheredby military police, criminal investigation divi-sion (CID), and the Naval Criminal InvestigativeService (NCIS) assist in the development of unitplans that are dedicated to safeguarding propertyand personnel. Military police also provide PSOfor key government leaders, flag officers, andcivilian dignitaries. They also function as a train-ing cadre that assists in providing the requiredantiterrorism training.

Law and Order Operations

Military police LOO are conducted to maintainand extend the commander’s discipline and con-trol by providing a lawful and orderly environ-ment in which to operate. During LOO, militarypolice establish liaison with HN police and con-duct joint patrols with HN or multinational forces

to maintain order and conduct security operations,thereby enhancing interoperability. The level andtype of operation determines the requirement foradditional MP support. The level and type ofoperation determines the requirements for LOOsupport. Law and order operations include mea-sures that are necessary to conduct—

Law enforcement operations.Criminal investigations, site exploitation, evi-dence collection, interrogations, and protectiveservices.US customs support operations.Joint, interagency, multinational, and HN policeoperations and training.Police intelligence operations.

Law Enforcement Operations

An evolving criminal threat may have an adverseeffect on military operations and require com-manders to take actions that will reduce the nega-tive impact on forces, resources, and operations.As part of this effort, military police—

Enforce laws and appropriate directives of thecommander.Provide crime prevention and physical security.Conduct traffic accident investigations and lawenforcement patrolling.

Military police also enforce the MAGTF com-mander’s main supply route (MSR) regulationsand traffic circulation plans to keep MSRs freefor priority military movement. Military policemaintain liaison and coordinate with otherDepartment of Defense (DOD) police organiza-tions, HN military and civilian authorities, andmultinational police organizations. A coordinatedlaw enforcement effort removes the conditionsand opportunities that promote crime, therebymaintaining military discipline and preventingdiversion of military resources.

Military Police Operations_______________________________________________________________________________________ 1-3

Criminal Investigations,Site Exploitation, Evidence Collection, Interrogations, and Protective Services

Marine expeditionary force (MEF) MP supportcompanies provide CID support to the MEF andMAGTF. Offenses committed against US forcesand properties degrade military discipline,morale, and operational capabilities. Thesecrimes and offenses must be investigated to sup-port the commander’s responsibility to protectpersonnel, supplies, facilities, readiness, andoperational capabilities. Military police and/orCID will conduct criminal investigations, siteexploitations, evidence collection, interrogations,and protective services. Depending upon the typeand seriousness of the offense under investiga-tion, military police investigators (MPIs)-, CID-,or NCIS-led investigations may be conducted incoordination with other DOD and HN investiga-tive agencies.

Joint, Interagency, Multinational, andHost Nation Police Operations/Training

Military police LOO may involve operations,training, and liaison with joint, interagency,multinational, and HN military or civilianpolice, or a combination thereof. The status-of-forces agreement (SOFA), standing rules ofengagement (SROE), standing rules for the useof force (SRUF), and other guidance serve as thebasis for MP law and order activities. As part ofthese operations, military police may, in situa-tions where the local national authority has dete-r iorated or been el iminated, conduct lawenforcement operations and investigations; pro-vide initial assistance and training to HN mili-tary and civilian police forces; or assist in thecreation, training, and operation of these forces.

United States Customs Support Operations

Customs support is a requirement when US per-sonnel return to a customs territory of the United

States (CTUS). Military police provide customssupport and border control to ensure units andindividuals comply with United States Customsand Border Protection (CBP), other Governmen-tal agencies, and United States Department ofAgriculture (USDA) requirements. In the absenceof CBP personnel, customs-certified militarypolice, often aided by MWD teams, conduct mili-tary customs inspections to enforce US customslaws and regulations. While conducting customssupport operations, military police may berequired to establish and operate or assist HNauthorities with border security operations.Appendix A addresses customs support opera-tions in more detail.

Police Intelligence Operations

Police intelligence operations (PIO) support,enhance, and contribute to the commander’s pro-tection program, situational awareness, and bat-tlefield visualization by portraying relevant threatinformation that may affect the operational andtactical environments. This threat information isgathered while conducting MP tasks. Police intel-ligence operations include the following:

Demonstrating MP and CID capability to col-lect relevant threat information actively or pas-sively.Ensuring that all information collected whileconducting MP tasks continues to be reportedthrough the proper MP channels so that it canbe analyzed by the appropriate battalion, regi-ment, or higher level staffs.Maintaining constant liaison and communica-tion with the following:

Higher headquarters.Psychological operations units, as appropriate.HN police and other law enforcement agencies.Joint, interagency, and multinational forces.Staff judge advocate (SJA).Civil-military operations center.Civil affairs teams.Mission assurance officer.

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Military Working Dog Operations

The MWD program effectively integratesexpertly trained MWD handlers and highly intel-ligent breeds of dogs into MWD teams. Theseteams are employed in dynamic ways that con-tinue to evolve and be a highly trained asset thatcommanders continue to use around the world.These specialized teams aid commanders in con-ducting stability and warfighting operations.Being modular and mobile makes these teamsvery agile, enabling them to deploy rapidly andintegrate quickly into operations. In order to per-form joint operations, multiechelon tasks, andinteragency missions, these teams maintain a hightempo of operations. As technology and worldsecurity situations evolve, the MWD team willcontinue its transformation to provide command-ers the unique capabilities required to be combatforce multipliers on the battlefield and supportmission assurance efforts.

Limited Detainee Operations

As an integral part of the full range of militaryoperations, there is the requirement to preparefor and conduct intensive detainee operations.Combat and stability operations in the war onterrorism and the long war continue to result inthe detention of known or suspected criminals,combatants, and civilians as military forces seekto support emerging democracies, eliminate ter-rorists, and quell insurgencies. Modern militaryactions, whether in a contiguous or noncontig-uous environment characteristic of the war onterrorism, result in the capture of many and var-ied detainees. The detainees of the war on ter-rorism differ significantly from the traditionalenemy prisoners of war (EPWs) of past conflictsand present a much greater security threat dur-ing processing, escorting, and handling.

Personnel conducting detainee operations mustensure that these operations are performed in amanner that reduces the possibility of incidents of

abuse involving US Armed Forces and detainees.All detainees will be provided the protections ofthe Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatmentof Prisoners of War until some other status isdetermined by competent authority. Professionalperformance by military police of the detaineeoperations mission is critical for sustaining good-will between the HN and international population.

The Secretary of the Army is designated as theexecutive agent for the administration of theDOD EPW Detainee Program per Department ofDefense directive (DODD) 2310.01E, TheDepartment of Defense Detainee Program.

Military police support the MAGTF and assumethe responsibility for detainee operations.Detainee operations apply to any person captured,detained, held, or otherwise under the control ofDOD personnel (e.g., military, civilian, contrac-tor employee). Detainee operations do not applyto persons being held primarily for law enforce-ment purposes, except where the United States isan occupying power across the range of militaryoperations. Detainees may fall into the followingcategories as defined in DODD 2310.01E:

Enemy combatants (ECs), including both law-ful and unlawful.EPWs.Retained persons (RPs).Civilian internees (CIs).

The handling of detainees is an administrative,tactical, and operational consideration that mustbe addressed during planning to prevent forcesfrom being hindered by large numbers of EPWsand CIs.

Note: During Operation Desert Storm, mul-tinational forces detained 86,743 EPWs andCIs and only 1,492 were categorized as in-nocent civilians. During Operation IraqiFreedom, multinational forces detained over25,000 EPWs and CIs.

When faced with large detainee control responsi-bilities, the conduct of detainee operations by mil-itary police enhances MAGTF effectiveness.

Military Police Operations_______________________________________________________________________________________ 1-5

Military police assumption of these efforts miti-gates the diversion and tasking of other MAGTFresources to conduct detainee operations, whichaids in maintaining combat strength. Althoughmilitary police provide the MAGTF commanderwith these unique capabilities, detainee operationsare manpower-intensive. To maximize the capa-bilities of limited MP assets, the MAGTF com-mander must prioritize MP missions and tasking.Even though military police support the MAGTFby undertaking detainee operations, commandersand staffs should understand the following:

The law of war.The US policy governing provisions for han-dling detainees.The objectives, principles, and the MP role indetainee operations.

The MEF MP support companies provide correc-tions and detainee expertise. The MEF major sub-ordinate command (MSC) MP companies mayconduct LDO, but are not resourced to conductintensive detainee operations. Military policedetachments assigned to Marine expeditionaryunits (MEUs) are not equipped to conduct deten-tion operations without severely degrading allother capabilities and support to the MAGTF.Marine expeditionary units require significantaugmentation and mitigation in order to conductdetention operations.

Planning and Training

Military police provide subject matter expertiseand training for in-lieu-of MP forces and MP andlaw enforcement (e.g., detective, criminal investi-gations) training for infantry and other Marines,providing them with additional skills needed tocarry out assigned missions and tasks. Each MSChas a staff noncommissioned and commissionedofficer assigned to provide MP planning, training,coordination, and oversight. Military police pro-vide specialized and general support planning andtraining as required by supported units. Special-ized support is primarily located in the MEF withthe MP support company under the MEF head-quarters group. If additional planning, training,or MP support is required beyond the organiccapability of MSC military police, the MSCsshould request support from the MEF.

United States Customs and Border Support

Military police provide the commander a highdegree of flexibility through the execution ofcustoms operations. Personnel, equipment, andmaterial entering the CTUS must meet customs,postal, immigration, agriculture, and other Fed-eral agency requirements. During the redeploy-ment of forces, customs-trained military police,working with joint and US Federal agencies,help to ensure compliance with regulations andapplicable provisions of international agreementsby detecting and investigating violations.

CHAPTER 2MILITARY POLICE PERSONNEL

The mission, enemy or potentially hostile ele-ments, and operational environment influence thecomposition and employment of MP assets. TheMP commander task-organizes personnel andequipment for the assigned mission.

The MAGTF commander may task-organize MPunits as required. Consolidation of MP personneland resources creates a more robust MP unitcapable of executing a wider range of operationaltasks while allowing greater support flexibilitythroughout the MAGTF area of operations (AO).To maintain capabilities, an MP platoon (1 officerand 40 enlisted) is normally the lowest level ofunit employed.

A variety of command and control options maybe employed to use limited MP assets efficientlybased upon an analysis of the mission. Thoseoptions include:

Decentralized control and decentralized execu-tion.Centralized control and decentralized execu-tion.Centralized control and centralized execution.

The traditional option of decentralized controland decentralized execution retains MP units ineach MSC. Military police remain assigned to therespective MSC MP commander and are organicto the MSC, which provides administrative andlogistical support. While this method is the mostresponsive to the individual MSC commander’sneeds and is useful when the MAGTF elementshave wide geographic separation, it may be diffi-cult to rapidly coordinate MP capabilities.

Centralized control and decentralized executioncombines MAGTF MP assets to form an MPunit under a single commander. This MP unitprovides either general support throughout theMAGTF AO or direct support to subordinate

elements as required. The MAGTF commanderretains the ability to shift MP assets as the situa-tion dictates. This method of employment maybe best suited in a combat environment wheresubordinate elements are collocated or sharecommon boundaries. In addition, this methodprovides for a timely response to a supportedelement’s needs, yet allows the senior MP com-mander to analyze and direct MP activities,while the MAGTF command element providesadministrative and logistical support.

During centralized control and centralized exe-cution, MAGTF MP assets are placed in a MPunit under a single commander (e.g., the MEFPM or the senior MP company commander maybe designated as the MEF MP commander) andthis MP unit provides general support to theMAGTF. While this is the least traditionalmethod of employment, it may be preferredwhen the MAGTF mission is peacekeeping orhumanitarian assistance within a limited AO.The MAGTF command element also providesadministrative and logistical support.

Each MAGTF commander may designate aMAGTF PM under the cognizance of theMAGTF operations assistant chief of staff/opera-tions officer. Each MEF has a field grade MPofficer assigned as the MAGTF PM and a seniorstaff noncommissioned officer (SNCO) assignedas the provost sergeant. The MEFs have an MPsupport company in the MEF headquarters groupto provide MP specialized support. Each MEFMSC (e.g., Marine division, Marine aircraft wing,Marine logistics group) has an MP officer andSNCO serving on the staff to provide MP plan-ning, coordination, and expertise and an organicMP company to provide operational support.Each MEU has an MP officer assigned as themission assurance officer and a detachmentassigned to the MEU command element.

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MEF or MAGTF ProvostMarshal or Provost Sergeant

The PM provides the MAGTF commander withMP employment subject matter expertise andcoordinates MP activities to ensure the properallocation of limited resources. The PM is respon-sible for ensuring that military police are taskedaccording to the concept of operations and thepriorities established by the MAGTF commander.

This position is normally held by a senior MPofficer on the MEF staff. If the PM deploys or isnot staffed, the provost sergeant will performthese duties. If both are present, the PM is respon-sible and the provost sergeant supports him. Thefollowing are PM duties and responsibilities:

Advises the MEF or MAGTF commander onmatters pertaining to MP operations.Supervises and coordinates MP assets andoperations within the MAGTF.Supervises joint prosecution and exploitationcenter (JPEC).Coordinates law enforcement matters betweenMSCs.Provides MP planning for the MEF.Coordinates MP training for the MEF.Coordinates MEF and MAGTF law enforce-ment matters with other Services and or HNs.Coordinates and oversees matters pertaining todetainees.Advises the commander on mission assurance.Oversees the use of biometrics in the MEF.Coordinates and oversees the law enforcementadvisor program in the MEF.

MP Major SubordinateCommand Staff Officer and/or SNCO

The following are duties and responsibilities ofthis position:

Advises the MSC or MAGTF commander onmatters pertaining to MP operations.

Supervises and coordinates MP assets andoperations within the command.Coordinates law enforcement matters betweensubordinate commands.Provides MP planning for the MSC.Coordinates MP training within the MSC.Coordinates MSC law enforcement matterswith the MEF, other Services, and HNs, asappropriate.Coordinates and oversees matters pertaining todetainees.Advises the commander on mission assurance.Coordinates and oversees biometrics programin MSC.Coordinates and operates the law enforcementadvisor program in the MSC.

MEF MP Support Company Commander


Coordinates MP support through the MEF PM.Provides MP general support to include train-ing and planning.Provides MP specialized support in the follow-ing areas:

Mission assurance support (e.g. physical se-curity, nonlethal weapons [NLWs]).Criminal investigation support (e.g., tacticalsite exploitation, PIO, evidence collectionand processing, interrogations, PSO, biomet-ric support).Traffic accident investigation support.MWD support (e.g., drug and explosive de-tection, patrolling, tracking, specializedsearch).Corrections expertise and advisory supportin planning, conducting, and supporting de-tainee operations.Supervision of MP specialized planning andtraining.

Military Police Operations ______________________________________________________________________________________ 2-3

Major SubordinateCommand MP Company Commander


Coordinates MP support through the MCS MPstaff officer.Conducts MP operations (i.e., mission assurance,LOO, LDO, planning, and training) in support ofthe MSC or as directed per this publication.Provides centralized and decentralized supportas required.Provides MP training.

CID Chain of Commandand Investigations Officer

During deployments, CID investigators are oper-ationally controlled by the MEF PM or senior MPofficer assigned to a command where CIDMarines are assigned. Any issues concerninginvestigations (e.g., taskings, requests for investi-gations) are the responsibility of the investiga-tions officer and PM or senior MP officer withinthe command.

Investigations Officer (MOS 5805)

The following are duties and responsibilities ofthe investigations officer:

Serves as the subject matter expert for all mat-ters pertaining to criminal investigations, pro-tective service details, evidence collection,processing, storage and disposition, criminalintelligence, and criminal interrogations.Serves as MEF or MAGTF liaison concerningMEF or MAGTF criminal investigations andCID capabilities.Supervises all criminal investigators (i.e., mili-tary occupational specialty [MOS] 5821)assigned throughout the MEF or MAGTF.

Ensures the Consolidated Law EnforcementOperations Center/Department of the NavyCriminal Justice Information System criminalreporting systems are incorporated into thedocumentation of the investigations.Tracks MEF or MAGTF criminal investiga-tions and CID operations.Oversees the daily operation and administra-tion of the CID as follows:Case management (e.g., requests for assis-tance, forensic examination requests, commandnotifications, SJA briefs).Staffing issues.Training (e.g., Consolidated Law EnforcementOperations Center/Department of the NavyCriminal Justice Information System, predeploy-ment criminal investigator training, in-servicecriminal investigator training, documentationprocedures, HN judicial process).Oversees the placement and delivery of ordersfor investigative equipment.Maintains, revises, and updates fragmentaryorders (FRAGOs), standing operating pro-cedures (SOPs), and other pertinent directives.Conducts liaison with HN and other militaryand civilian law enforcement agencies.Provides status reports on investigations ofinterest to MEF PM, SJA, or commanders.Maintains standards for training of CID staffpersonnel.Makes the necessary notifications and/or refer-rals to agencies deemed appropriate.Coordinates and provides advice in the use ofbiometrics in the MEF.Coordinates and operates the law enforcementadvisor program.

Criminal Investigators (MOS 5821)

Criminal investigators are assigned to the MEFMP support company and provide support to theMEF unit. Duties of criminal investigators are

2-4 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

based upon the type of mission assigned and mayinclude the following:

Conducts criminal investigations.Conducts protective security operations.Plans and conducts law enforcement and inves-tigations training, including site exploitation,evidence collection and exploitation, and tacti-cal questioning (TQ).Collects, processes, stores, and disposes ofevidence.Advises commanders and their staffs on lawenforcement and criminal investigations.Serves as and conducts the duties of a lawenforcement advisor when assigned.Conducts criminal intelligence operations.Makes the appropriate notifications.Employs and advises units on the use offorensics and biometrics.Supports JPEC operations.Conducts liaison with US, HN, multinational,and other military and civilian law enforce-ment organizations as required.Employs and advises units on the use of invest-igative equipment.

Corrections Officer (MOS 5804)

The following are duties and responsibilities ofthe corrections officer:

Serves as the subject matter expert for all mat-ters pertaining to detainee handling procedures.Serves as MEF or MAGTF liaison concerningMEF, MAGTF detention facilities, and theadministration and operation of regional deten-tion facilities (RDFs).Supervises all corrections specialists (i.e.,MOS 5831) assigned throughout the MEF and/or MAGTF.Ensures biometric automated toolsets and/orother biometric tools are incorporated into thedetainee processing procedures at each deten-tion facility or RDF.

Tracks MEF and/or MAGTF detainees fromdetention facility or RDF through internment attheater internment facilities (TIFs).Provides accountability for detainees evacu-ated from detention facilities or RDFs to the-ater medical treatment facilities.Oversees daily operation and administration ofdetention facilities or RDFs in the followingareas:

Supplies (e.g., detainee uniforms, identifica-tion bracelets, warning signs, mattresses,blankets, forms, biometric automatedtoolsets).Staffing issues.Training (e.g., biometric automated toolsets,predeployment, in-service corrections training).

Prepares and submits MEF or MAGTF dailydetention report.Requests the appropriate force protectionequipment.Provides regular assessments of detentionfacilities and RDFs and ensures operationalreadiness of each facility.Maintains, revises, and updates FRAGOs,SOPs, and other pertinent directives.Updates MEF and MAGTF detentions webpage.Provides detention operations input for MEF orMAGTF command chronology.Maintains standards for training of detentionfacility or RDF staff personnel.

MEU or Special Purpose MAGTF Mission Assurance Officer and MP Detachment

Mission Assurance Officer

Each special purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF) orMEU is assigned an MP officer who is speciallytrained to perform duties as the MAGTF missionassurance officer. This MP officer is responsible


to the commander. Tasks performed by the MEUor SPMAGTF mission assurance officer includethe following:

Develops unit plans to protect personnel andequipment and to preserve combat power.Advises the commander on mission assuranceissues.Conducts vulnerability assessments of ports,points of embarkation or debarkation, andother forward areas while deployed and/or dur-ing predeployment site surveys.Liaises with HN authorities, NCIS, and theDepartment of State for force protection mea-sures abroad and to coordinate law enforce-ment matters while deployed.Conducts MP training throughout the MAGTF(e.g., NLWs, detainee operations, evidencecollection and handling, customs operations,level I antiterrorism awareness).Advises the commander on law enforcementand mission assurance matters during COAdevelopment and mission execution and devel-ops MP support estimates (see app. B) of thesituation for MAGTF operations.Enhances unit preparedness through the identi-fication, procurement, employment, and main-tenance of force protection systems andequipment.Supervises and coordinates MP assets andoperations within the MEU or SPMAGTF.Trains and/or supports HN, joint, and com-bined law enforcement activities.Gathers and disseminates information withinthe MAGTF and submits police informationand intelligence to the MAGTF G-2 or S-2.

MP Detachment

When assigned, MP detachments provide spe-cialized support to the MEU or SPMAGTF. TheMP detachment is operationally controlled by theMEU or SPMAGTF command element throughthe MEU or SPMAGTF mission assurance

officer. The MP detachment or cadre providesthe MAGTF commander with mission assurancesupport capabilities, and the mission assuranceofficer suggests methods to detect and defeat theterrorist threat and plans and coordinates the MPoperations. The MEU and SPMAGTF subordi-nate elements may also have organic MP detach-ments. The MEU or SPMAGTF MP detachmentis task-organized to provide the MAGTF com-mander capabilities in—

MP support.NLW training and employment, per MarineCorps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-15.8,MTTP for the Tactical Employment of NonlethalWeapons (NLW).Mission assurance planning and assessments.Criminal investigations.Accident investigations.Physical security.

Corrections Officer orSpecialist (MOS 5804 or 5831)

Mission support requirements determine thenumber of corrections specialists in a correc-tions detachment. The MAGTF and MEF MSCcommanders may request that the correctionsspecialists support deployments and operationswith a detention requirement. Typically, a mini-mum of two SNCO corrections specialists areassigned to each detention facility or RDF andare designated as the staff noncommissionedofficer in charge (SNCOIC) and the operationsor training chief.

The corrections officer’s or specialist’s capabili-ties enhance the commander’s ability to protectforces and assets. Each MEF has a cadre of cor-rections specialists assigned in the MP supportcompany and controlled by the MEF PM. Correc-tions specialists enhance the effectiveness of lawenforcement and other operations by providing

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subject matter experts to assist in the area ofdetention operations. In-garrison corrections spe-cialists are employed at Levels I, II, and III DODcorrectional facilities and pretrial confinementfacilities. Corrections specialists deploy in sup-port of any unit conducting detention or intern-ment operations. During conflict, deployments,and field environments, assigned correctionsdetachments provide subject matter experts toassist in the following areas:

Predeployment detention operations training.Development of the detention facility or RDFSOP.Development of the detention facility or RDFplan of the day (POD).Development of the detention facility or RDFdetainee rules and regulations.Development of the detention facility or RDFin-service training plan.Daily supervision and operation of each deten-tion facility or RDF.Development of a corrections training team.

Detention Operations Officer

This position is held by an officer (i.e., MOS5803) or corrections chief warrant officer (i.e.,MOS 5804). Responsibilities of this position areas follows:

Serves on the MEF or MAGTF staff andreports to the PM.Assumes responsibility for overall operation ofall detention facilities and RDFs.Coordinates detainee transfers from detentionfacilities and RDFs to the TIF.Advises the MEF or MAGTF commander andstaff on operational planning, status of deten-tion facilities, and detainee processing.Prepares the weekly brief concerning the num-ber of detainees in detention, special status,upcoming releases, and other items of interest.Responds to high visibility requests for informa-tion concerning detainees in MAGTF custody.

Responds to detainee related queries fromMAGTF staff.Serves as MEF or MAGTF detentions liaison.Provides assessments and site visits to alldetention facilities and RDFs to ensure opera-tional readiness and compliance with MEF andMAGTF SOPs.Maintains, updates, and revises MEF orMAGTF detentions Web site.Maintains standards for detainee handling andadministration of detention facilities and RDFsfor MEF or MAGTF personnel and MSCs.Ensures all MEF or MAGTF personnelassigned to detention duties are trained inaccordance with applicable standards.Ensures biometric automated tool sets and/orother biometric tools are incorporated into thedetainee processing procedures at each deten-tion facility and RDF.

Detention Legal Advisor

Depending on the situation, either a judge advo-cate assigned as a detention legal advisor, or thecognizant command's SJA, will be responsible toensure that the detention facility commanderreceives legal advice on international law anddomestic laws, rules, and regulations in allaspects of the detention facility’s operation. Theseoperations include intake processing, holding,review, and release. Additional responsibilities ofthe detention legal advisor include the following:

Reviewing and overseeing detainee packages,if applicable.Reviewing and providing advice on the deten-tion facility’s internal SOPs and regulations.Reporting all allegations of detainee abuse.Reviewing and overseeing all investigations ofdetainee abuse.Inspecting and overseeing detainee interroga-tions.Inspecting the detention facilities on a regularbasis.


Serving as the primary liaison for externalvisitors (e.g., International Committee of theRed Cross [ICRC], other government agency).Serving as the primary liaison to MSCs andproperly constituted release and review boardson detainee-related issues.Maintaining the traditional legal functions,which includes advising the facility com-mander of legal issues affecting the operationof the facility.

Detention Facility and RDF Positions

Detention Facility and RDF Officer in Charge

This position is held by at least a noncommis-sioned officer and is, preferably, not a rotatingposition. The officer in charge (OIC) may alsoappoint a primary and alternate custodian toensure a custodian is available at all times.Responsibilities of this position are as follows:

Ensures detainees are treated firmly, fairly, andconsistently with dignity and respect.Oversees the daily operations, staffing, safety,security, and well-being of all personnel (e.g.,guards, detainees) housed or working withinthe detention facility or RDF.Conducts a daily head count of each detainee,noting and taking action on any problems.Documents the daily head count in the deten-tion facility or RDF master log.Signs every Department of Defense (DD)Form 2708, Receipt for Inmate or DetainedPerson, associated with persons held in thedetention facility or RDF or delegates signa-ture authority to SNCOIC. Ensures all detention facility or RDF guardforce members have read and understand thecommanding general’s intent for detentionoperations.Ensures all detention facility or RDF guardforce members have read and understand therules for guards.

Ensures all detention facility or RDF guardforce members have received all availablepreservice detention operations training, toinclude rules for use of force classes, prior tostanding guard watch.Ensures preservice training documentation iswell-maintained.Reports any mistreatment of detainees immedi-ately to the next detention operations officer orhis designee.Ensures proper handling, documentation, andstorage of all evidence and property within thedetention facility or RDF.Appoints property and evidence custodians, inwriting, to collect and preserve detainee prop-erty and evidence.Limits access to property and evidence to cus-todians, OIC, and SNCOIC.Ensures detainee confinement procedures arein accordance with applicable orders, direc-tives, and SOPs.Ensures only official visitors are allowedaccess to detainees.Establishes and publishes the detention facilityor RDF POD.Ensures a credentialed medical authorityexamines each detainee at least every 24 hours.The daily sick call fulfills this requirement.Ensures that each detainee’s personnel file isreviewed by the detention facility or RDF’sdetention review authority within 72 hours ofconfinement.Conducts random and unannounced inspec-tions of the facility to verify detainees arebeing treated firmly, fairly, and consistentlywith dignity and respect in accordance with thedetention facility or RDF SOP.Maintains a facility SOP and posts orders andemergency plans.Ensures biometric automated tool sets andother biometric tools are incorporated intodetainee processing.

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Detention Facility or RDF SNOIC

The SNOIC position is usually held by MOS 5831.Responsibilities of this position are as follows:

Ensures detainees are treated firmly, fairly, andconsistently with dignity and respect.Assists the detention facility or RDF OIC andassumes the responsibilities of the OIC duringtimes of absence.Conducts a daily head count of each detainee,noting and taking action on any problems.Documents the daily head count in the deten-tion facility or RDF master log.Assesses and implements the most effectiveNLWs.Trains and supervises the use of biometricautomated tool sets and other biometric toolsemployed in detainee processing.

Detention Facility or RDFOperations and Training Chief

This position is usually held by MOS 5831.Responsibilities of this position are as follows:

Ensures detainees are treated firmly, fairly, andconsistently with dignity and respect.Assists the detention facility or RDF SNCOICand assumes responsibilities of the SNCOICduring times of absence.Supervises the day-to-day detention opera-tions, conduct of guard shifts, and noncommis-sioned officers in charge (NCOICs).Assists in daily head count of each detainee,noting and taking action on any problems.Documents daily head count in the detentionfacility or RDF master log.Trains and supervises the use of biometricautomated tool sets and other biometric toolsemployed in detainee processing.

Detention Facility and RDF Shift NCOIC

This shift NCOIC is held by the senior noncom-missioned officer of a guard watch. Responsibili-ties of this position are as follows:

Ensures detainees are treated firmly, fairly, andconsistently with dignity and respect.Executes the POD.Conducts guard mount.Supervises the guard section.Maintains all required detention facility orRDF logs and documentation.Supervises the use of biometric automatedtool sets and other biometric tools in detaineeprocessing.

Detention Facility and RDFProperty and Evidence Custodian

This position is held by a SNCO. Responsibili-ties of this position are as follows:

Ensures detainees are treated firmly, fairly, andconsistently with dignity and respect.Inventories property and evidence and anno-tates the results on an Office of the Chief ofNaval Operations (OPNAV) Form 5527/22,Evidence/Property Custody Receipt, or Depart-ment of the Army (DA) Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Receipt. Either form may beused based upon the situation in a given opera-tional area and the chain of command.Ensures the delivering unit verifies the dateand signs the “Released By” block on theOPNAV Form 5527/22 or DA Form 4137.Ensures the property and evidence custodiansigns the “Received By” block on OPNAVForm 5527/22 or DA Form 4137.Seals all evidence in a large envelope or container.Marks across the seam of the sealed envelopeor sealed container, annotating the signature of


the person sealing the evidence, date, time, anddetention facility or RDF number of thedetainee.Attaches a copy of OPNAV Form 5527/22 orDA Form 4137 to the envelope or container.Attaches a label to items too large for a con-tainer, with the signature of the person invento-rying the evidence, annotating the date, time, anddetention facility or RDF number of the detainee.Stores all evidence pertaining to a detainee in asecure evidence and property room that isaccessible only to property and evidence custo-dians, OIC, and SNCOIC.Ensures that a copy of OPNAV Form 5527/22or DA Form 4137 accompanies all propertyand evidence pertaining to a detainee.Inventories all property and evidence weeklyand annotates all inventories in the propertyand evidence log.Verifies the integrity of sealed containers ordocuments.Records the specific number of bills of eachdenomination and nomenclature of the moneyseized, on OPNAV Form 5527/22 or DA Form4137 rather than simply indicating “cash”(e.g., five 25,000 Iraqi Dinar notes, six $100US dollar bills, serial numbers).Annotates the serial number for seized firearmson OPNAV Form 5527/22 or DA Form 4137.If there is no serial number, the firearm will belabeled identifying the date, location, anddetainee detention facility of RDF numberfrom whom the firearm was seized. A photo-graph of the firearm will also be included.Maintains the property and evidence log to beable to track the chronological movement ofevidence to and from the property and evi-dence room.Records when the evidence custodian is notavailable or on duty, who the alternate custo-dian is, and when he assumed duty.

Documents any access to the property, secur-ing and inventorying the property and evidenceroom following access. Inventories evidence ifit changes hands or the detainee is transferred.The evidence will be signed for by the personassuming custody by utilizing OPNAV Form5527/22 or DA Form 4137.Ensures when a detainee is released that hewill not receive a confiscated weapon withoutshowing a valid weapons authorization card.Ensures that improvised explosive device (IED)materials will not be returned.

Detention Facility and RDF Guards

Guard positions are held by Marines with therank of sergeant and below. Responsibilities ofthese positions are as follows:

Ensures detainees are treated firmly, fairly, andconsistently with dignity and respect.Reads and understands the commanding gen-eral’s intent for detention operations and rulesfor guards prior to standing guard watch.Receives preservice detention operations train-ing prior to working in the detention facility orRDF.Maintains custody, control, and discipline ofdetainees in the detention facility or RDF.Conducts periodic inspections, searches, headcounts, and roll calls.Follows orders and instructions given by thedetention facility or RDF OIC, SNCOIC, andshift NCOICs.Reports the mistreatment of detainees to thechain of command (i.e., OIC, SNCOIC, opera-tions and training chief, or shift NCOICs)immediately. Utilizes biometric automated tool sets andother biometric tools in detainee processing.

CHAPTER 3MISSION ASSURANCE

The mission assurance process ensures thatassigned tasks or duties can be performed inaccordance with the intended purpose or plan.This chapter is a summation of the activities andmeasures taken to ensure that required capabili-ties and all supporting infrastructures are avail-able to the DOD to carry out the NationalMilitary Strategy. It links numerous risk manage-ment program activities and security-related func-t i o n s , w h i c h i n c l u d e fo r ce p ro t ec t i on ;antiterrorism; critical infrastructure protection;information assurance; continuity of operations;chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, andhigh-yield explosives defense; readiness; andinstallation preparedness.

The mission assurance process creates the synergis-tic effect required for the DOD to mobilize, deploy,support, and sustain military operations throughoutthe full range of military operations. As part of themission assurance program, commanders establisha plan that incorporates the programs, activities,and functions defined by DODD 3020.40, DefenseCritical Infrastructure Program (DCIP), and themilitary police provide the commander with thecapabilities that contribute to the unit’s ability todevelop a plan and be able to accomplish the mis-sion set forth in the plan.

Although the above is a complete list of missionassurance functions, the military police only pro-vide support to force protection, antiterrorism,and critical infrastructure protection.

Force Protection

Military police provide support to force protec-tion within the areas of assessments, PSO,NLWs, MWD operations, biometrics, and LOO.

Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 1-2, Cam-paigning, states that force protection safeguardsour own centers of gravity and protects, con-ceals, reduces, or eliminates critical vulnerabili-ties. In stability operations, force protection mayinclude protecting the supported nation’s popula-tion, infrastructure, and economic or governmen-tal institutions. An inherent command respon-sibility—force protection—also encompassesprecautions taken against terrorist activities thattarget US forces or noncombatants. Leaders areresponsible for ensuring that Marines are prop-erly prepared to meet, counter, and survivethreats that may be confronted throughout thebattlespace; thus, conserving combat power forapplication at a decisive time and place.

Force protection is designed to protect militarypersonnel, civilian employees, family members,facilities, and equipment. This protection isaccomplished through a systematic approachthat integrates the planning and application ofantiterrorism and combating terrorism mea-sures, physical security, operations security,LOO, and personal protective measures, whichare supported by intelligence, counterintel-ligence, and other security programs. The Navy/Mar ine Corps Depar tmenta l Publ ica t ion(NAVMC) 2927, Antiterrorism/Force Protec-tion Campaign Plan, clarifies the issue of anti-terrorism as it relates to force protection and alsoprovides commanders with a source documentupon which to institutionalize local programs.

Note: For operating forces, force protectionwill normally be addressed in the operationorder or operation plan’s Appendix 15(Force Protection) of Annex C (Operations).

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Assessments

Assessments are essential to the development ofan effective mission assurance program. Threatassessments form the basis for planning, justifica-tion of resource expenditures, and contribute tothe planning and establishment of specific forceprotection condition measures. The Navy Antiter-rorism Analysis Center prepares area threatassessments to provide the commander with anupdated analysis of the threat in a particular AO.The local threat assessment may also be obtainedvia the resident NCIS office.

Vulnerability assessments provide the com-mander a threat-based analysis and self-assess-ment tool to evaluate the unit’s vulnerability toterrorist attack. In a tactical environment, vulner-ability assessments enhance the unit security pos-ture by improving stationary asset security. Themore vulnerable a unit, the more attractive itbecomes to terrorists.

Vulnerabilities identified during assessments pro-vide justification for establishing specific forceprotection condition measures and actions. Priorto deployment, vulnerability assessments must beconducted to identify the appropriate force pro-tection measures and to reduce risk. Militarypolice assigned to the MAGTF should be inte-grated into the vulnerability assessment team andpredeployment site survey team.

Military police reduce vulnerabilities to terroristattack by—

Focusing on those elements directly related tocombating terrorism, including preventing ter-rorist acts, and if prevention fails, limitingmass casualties.Identifying vulnerabilities that could be exploitedby threat groups and recommending options toeliminate or reduce those vulnerabilities.Concentrating on areas identified by the com-mander as being essential to mission accom-plishment.

Protective Services Operations

Commanders may be required to perform PSO toreduce individual or group vulnerability to terror-ist attack. To assist in PSO, CID and militarypolice provide personal security for key US Gov-ernment leaders, flag officers, and civilian digni-ta r ies . Depending upon ava i lab i l i ty andcompletion of the US Army Protective ServiceTraining Course, CID may coordinate PSO forMarine Corps commands. In addition, CID andmilitary police may also support HN and foreignlaw enforcement PSO.

Nonlethal Weapons

Military police are trained to use the lowest levelof force necessary to control incidents in war,peace, civil support, and stability operations.Because military police use NLWs daily in theperformance of their law enforcement missions,their skills are highly developed for NLW use inmilitary operations.

Military police are the Marine Corps’ primaryuser of NLWs and munitions, MWDs, andcrowd control devices, such as the riot baton.The traditional MP role in crowd control andLOO requires the use of NLWs under certainconditions and under restrictive SROE. Accord-ingly, military police use of NLWs affords theMAGTF commander additional flexibility andoptions for action.

Military police also provide the commander aforce that can function as a training cadre for theapplication of NLWs. Military police attend theInterservice Nonlethal Individual WeaponsInstructor Course (INIWIC), which is the onlyformal DOD nonlethal training course. MarineCorps military police are directly involved withthe INIWIC and in the development of DODNLW doctrine. They incorporate applicableNLW capabilities into programs of instruction forboth the instructor- and user-development


courses. The INIWIC is designed to provide com-manders with instructors that are well-trained inthe employment of NLWs, who, in turn, can traintheir Marines.

Because of restrictions imposed under interna-tional law, limitations may apply to the use ofcertain NLWs, depending on the nature of theoperation. For example, the United States Chem-ical Weapons Convention prohibits the use ofriot control agents, including OC [OleoresinCapsicum] (also known as pepper spray), as amethod of warfare in certain operations. Thoseoperations may include consensual peacekeepingand peace enforcement operations in accordancewith the Charter of the United Nations, ChapterVII, Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace,Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression.Restrictions, as well as permissive use, may beaddressed in the rules of engagement, but mili-tary police should consult with the cognizantSJA for guidance if there is any doubt regardingthe use of NLWs. Refer to MCWP 3-15.8 formore information.


Special MWD capabilities significantly enhancethe commander’s ability to protect forces andassets. Chapter 5 addresses MWD operations inmore detail.

Biometrics

The protection of information and physical assetsis vital to the national security of the UnitedStates, and biometrics—methods of human iden-tification using physiological or behavioral char-acteristics—can enhance national security andprovide a higher level of identity assurance byaugmenting security systems.

In the MP community, CID and physical securityspecialist are the primary users of biometrics. TheCID uses biometrics for site and evidence exploi-tation, investigations, forensics, and evidence col-lection and processing. The CID and physical

security specialists provide biometrics subjectmatter expertise for the MEF. Physical securityspecialists provide biometrics for access control,electronic security systems, intrusion detectionsystems, and automated access control systems.Biometrics may also be used in detainee opera-tions and include physiological, behavioral, andauthentication applications as follows:

Physiological biometrics include the following:Iris.Fingerprint, including the nail.Hand, including the knuckle, palm, and vascu-lar.Face.Voice.Retina.DNA [deoxyribonucleic acid].Odor.Earlobe.Sweat pore.Lip.Behavioral biometrics include the following:

Signature.Keystroke.Voice.Gait.

Authentication biometric-based applicationsinclude the following:

Workstation.Network and domain access.Single sign on.Application logon.Data protection.Remote access to resources.Transaction security and internet security.

Law and Order Operations

Military police conduct LOO to provide command-ers a lawful and orderly environment. They alsoimplement proactive law enforcement measures toreduce opportunities for crime and terrorism. Theconduct of LOO supports mission assurance.Chapter 4 addresses LOO in more detail.

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Antiterrorism

Antiterrorism support provided by the militarypolice includes conducting training and crimeprevention and providing physical security capa-bilities. An MP officer assigned to a MEU orSPMAGTF staff is qualified to function as theMAGTF mission assurance officer and is respon-sible for coordinating antiterrorism training, plan-ning, and execution. The MP officer suggestsways to detect and defeat the terrorist threat andthe MP detachment provides the commander withantiterrorism capabilities.

Training

Antiterrorism training provided by military policeto individual units includes—

NLWs.MP mission-oriented training for Marines as-signed as in-lieu-of forces.MP and law enforcement training to developthe necessary skills to accomplish a mission.

Chapter 7 addresses training in more detail.

Crime Prevention and Physical Security

Crime PreventionMilitary police provide commanders with crimeprevention plans that include prevention,enforcement, and education on recognizing,countering, and preventing criminal and terroristactivities. As part of crime prevention, militarypolice investigate and report criminal activitiesthat will assist the commander in maintainingunit order and discipline. Appendix C providescrime prevention checklists.

Physical SecurityPhysical security provided by military policeincludes—

Employing physical measures designed tosafeguard personnel.Preventing unauthorized access to equipment,installations, material, and documents.Safeguarding personnel against espionage, sab-otage, damage, and theft.

Normal MP involvement in physical security islimited to providing units advice for security intheir AO. When assisting in security enhance-ment planning, military police provide practicaland executable advice on the use of physicalsecurity equipment that may include—

Perimeter barriers.Protective lighting.Security containers.Locking mechanisms.Intrusion systems.Personal identification.Access control.Movement control.

Appendix C provides physical security checklists.

Critical Infrastructure Protection

Critical infrastructure protection is a risk manage-ment program that focuses on determining therisk of loss to the Marine Corps’ critical assetsand infrastructures from all threats and hazards. Itassesses the resultant impact on the ability to exe-cute and sustain core capabilities, missions, andfunctions and comprehensively manage risks.


Military police conduct assessments (see Assess-ments, page 3-2) and make recommendations tocommanders on actions that can be taken to pre-vent, remediate, or mitigate the risks resultingfrom the determination of vulnerabilities of criti-cal infrastructure assets. Depending upon therisk, these actions could include changes in tac-tics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), adding

redundancy, selection of another asset, isolation,hardening; or guarding.

Additional support to critical infrastructure pro-tection is provided by MP physical security spe-cialists, who assist in the design and employmentof physical security intrusion detection systems,electronic security systems, barrier plans, andaccess control systems to reduce risk.

CHAPTER 4LAW AND ORDER OPERATIONS

Law and order operations are important to main-taining combat readiness and efficiency. A keyfactor in the success of these operations is theMP’s ability to use and apply the force continuum(see fig. 4-1), identify probable cause, and operatewith restraint under designated authority. Mili-tary police have the authority to enforce laws,directives, and regulations; conduct criminal andtraffic accident investigations; and control popu-lations and resources to provide commanderswith a lawful and orderly environment. They alsoimplement proactive law enforcement measuresto reduce opportunities for crime and conductLOO within their authority and jurisdiction.While military police may have the authority toapprehend a suspect, the military may not havejurisdiction to adjudicate charges. The concept ofjurisdiction discussed in this chapter refers to theauthority of military police to apprehend militarypersonnel and to detain civilians.

Law and order operations that are implementedby military police include the following:

Authority.Jurisdiction.Command and control.Law and order functions.HN LOO support (e.g., training, police stationoperations).

Authority

Authority is the lawful right of designated per-sons or agencies to exercise governmental poweror control. The authority of the military police toenforce military law, orders, and regulations byapprehension or detention, if necessary, is derivedfrom the President, as Commander in Chief of theUnited States, and the Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice (commonly referred to as UCMJ). TheUCMJ specifies the types of persons that are sub-ject to its provisions and articles.

ReasonablePerception

ReasonableResponse

Assaultive(serious bodily

harm/death)

Assaultive(bodily harm)

Resistant(active)

Resistance(passive)

Deadly force

Contactcontrols

Defensivetactics

Compliancetechniques

Verbalcommands

Complaint(cooperative)

Figure 4-1. Force Continuum Model.

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The continental United States (CONUS) author-ity of the military police over persons other thanthose subject to the UCMJ is derived from Fed-eral law and the policies and orders of the mili-tary commander.

The outside of the continental United States(OCONUS) MP authority is founded in the lawsof the country concerned, international agree-ments, and the UCMJ. In some countries, aSOFA authorizes one government to take actionin cases where both governments could takeaction. In the absence of an international agree-ment or SOFA provisions that provide otherwise,MP authority may be limited. Military policeshould consult with the cognizant SJA for adviceon MP authority OCONUS.

Persons Subject toUniform Code of Military Justice

The UCMJ, as established by Congress, providesone basic code of military justice and law for theMilitary Services. The code authorizes the Presi-dent of the United States to set rules of evidence,pretrial, trial, and posttrial procedures and to max-imum punishments for violations of the UCMJ.Under this authority, the President issues theManual for Courts-Martial United States. Thispublication is an executive order implementingthe provisions of the UCMJ and primary sourcedocument for matters relating to military justiceand establishing the military law of evidence.

Active duty military personnel, as well as someretired members and other personnel enumeratedin Article 2 of the UCMJ, are subject to the provi-sions of the UCMJ. Military police have theauthority to take appropriate action with personssubject to the UCMJ. This authority is not limitedto military reservations or Federal property.

Persons Not Subject toUniform Code of Military Justice

Commanders and military police are advised toconsult the local SJA concerning the circum-stances warranting detention of persons not sub-ject to the UCMJ. In areas under military

jurisdiction or control, military police may detainthe following persons who are not in the MilitaryServices or subject to UCMJ:

Persons found committing a felony or a misde-meanor might be detained long enough to beturned over to civil authorities.Persons found violating properly promulgatedmilitary regulations.Persons cited for violating the AssimilativeCrimes Act, not including felonies or breaches ofthe peace, might be referred to a US magistrate.Civilians may be subject to military authority insituations involving martial law or hostilities.

Persons Subject to Posse Comitatus Act

Within the United States, the Posse ComitatusAct (PCA) generally limits direct militaryinvolvement with civilian law enforcement.Department of Defense directive 5525.5, DODCooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Offi-cials, also provides guidance in this area, as doesSecretary of the Navy instruction 5820.7C, Coop-eration with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials.Although the PCA does not apply to the use ofarmed forces abroad, DODD 5025.5 applies PCArestrictions to extraterritorial military assistanceto law enforcement. In case of compelling orextraordinary circumstances, the Secretary of theDefense may consider exceptions to the prohibi-tion of direct military assistance to law enforce-ment outside the territorial jurisdiction of theUnited States.

The PCA restrictions are divided into three broadcategories—use of information, use of equip-ment and facilities, and use of military person-nel. These restrictions are governed by a complexset of regulations and are highly nuanced. Somedirect assistance by military personnel is strictlyprohibited as follows:

The interdiction of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, orsimilar activity.A search or seizure.


An arrest, apprehension, stop and frisk, or sim-ilar activity.The use of military personnel for surveillanceor pursuit of individuals, as undercover agents,informants, investigators, or interrogators.

Military authorities may provide some permissi-ble direct assistance or training, information,equipment, or expert advice; but such assistancewill depend on the specific facts, circumstances,and statutory or regulatory authority. For exam-ple, Military Purpose Doctrine addressed in theDomestic Operational Law Handbook for JudgeAdvocates, covers actions where the primarypurpose is to further a military interest, such asinvestigative actions related to the enforcementof the UCMJ. Another example is DODD3025.12, Military Assistant for Civil Distur-bances, which requires presidential authoriza-tion for the use of military forces, except inlimited emergency circumstances. Commandersand military police should consult with their cog-nizant SJA before providing support to civilianlaw enforcement.

Jurisdiction

Military jurisdiction is the extent of and limita-tion on the rights of an armed force to exerciseauthority and control over persons and offenses(i.e., limits the exercise of authority). The juris-diction of every offense or incident depends uponthe status of the suspect, international agree-ments and treaties, military interest in the offense,and other factors (e.g., legal, administrative,actual offense, civilian intent in the case, mediainterest). Military jurisdiction is exercisedthrough the application of military law, orders,and regulations and extends to military personnelwhether or not they are in an area under militarycontrol. The military may have exclusive or con-current jurisdiction to try persons subject to theUCMJ regardless of where the offenses are com-mitted, while civil jurisdiction is exercisedthrough the application of Federal and state law.

Under international law, the HN normally hasprimary jurisdiction to prosecute nonmilitaryoffenses committed within its borders by mem-bers of a visiting force. This authority may befurther defined or surrendered to military authori-ties through SOFAs and other treaties or agree-m e n t s , d e p e n d i n g u p o n t h e n a t u r e a n dcircumstances of the offense. This limitation toprosecute does not prohibit commanders fromtaking administrative action against suspects. TheSJA should be consulted when questions existconcerning military jurisdiction. While conduct-ing LOO in geographic areas, military policeoperate under exclusive, concurrent, and propri-etary jurisdictions.

Exclusive Jurisdiction

Under exclusive jurisdiction, the US Governmentassumes sole jurisdiction over the designated area.Many military installations have exclusive Fed-eral jurisdiction. On these installations, the Fed-eral Government exercises executive, legislative,and judicial authority. To facilitate exclusive juris-diction and to avoid the difficult task of enactingand maintaining a code of criminal laws appropri-ate for areas under its jurisdiction, Congresspassed United States Code, Title 18, Crimes andCriminal Procedure, part I, chap. 1, sect. 13,Laws of States Adopted for Areas Within FederalJurisdiction. This statute, based on the FederalAssimilated Crimes Act (FACA), provides that allacts or omissions occurring in an area under Fed-eral jurisdiction, which would constitute crimes ifthe area were under state jurisdiction, will consti-tute similar crimes, similarly punishable, underFederal law. This act does not assimilate crimesbased upon state statutes that are contrary to Fed-eral policy and law, such as civil rights legislation,nor does it assimilate state law if there is an exist-ing Federal statute or law on the subject.

Concurrent Jurisdiction

Concurrent jurisdiction exists when the US Gov-ernment and the state or local governments exer-cise simultaneous authority over an area.

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Essentially, this type of jurisdiction is dual juris-diction. Under dual or concurrent jurisdiction,state criminal laws are applicable in the area andcan be enforced by the state, as well as the Fed-eral Government, under FACA.

Proprietary Jurisdiction

Proprietary jurisdiction applies in instanceswhere the US Government has ownership to anarea but has not retained jurisdiction. In thiscase, the US Government has the same rights asany other landowner. The state retains jurisdic-tion over the area and has the authority toenforce laws in the area. The FACA does notapply to areas of Federal proprietary jurisdic-tion. In such areas, military police exerciseauthority in compliance with the instructions ofthe appropriate commander.

Command and Control

The commander determines when MP assets areneeded and can be afforded for dedicated LOO.When required by the commander or when battleintensity permits, the commander typicallyemploys military police for limited LOO and toconduct LDO. Military police will typically con-duct a full-scale dedicated LOO before an opera-tion begins and after the AO has matured. In apeacetime environment, military police conductextensive LOO.

Military police performing LOO enhance thecommander’s combat readiness, efficiency, andcommand and control by—

Preventing the diversion of military resources,thereby aiding in the maintenance of combatstrength.Suppressing opportunities for criminal behavior.Assisting and protecting forces.Preserving good order and discipline.

Assisting intelligence organizations in obtain-ing a complete tactical intelligence picture bycollecting and providing criminal and opera-tional data and information.Providing liaison to civil or military lawenforcement agencies.

Law and Order Functions

Military police will often conduct LOO simulta-neously with other tasks. They also implementand perform physical security measures for desig-nated critical assets, crime prevention measures,and selective enforcement measures as part oftheir mission assurance support and other tasks.

Crime is detrimental to MAGTF operations andcan cause a severe deterioration in morale. Mili-tary police assist the commander in curtailing andeliminating criminal activities by enforcing lawand order and preserving good order and disci-pline. Based upon the MAGTF commander’sconcept of operation, military police employ thefollowing LOO functions:

JPEC establishment and operation.Law enforcement.MWD operations.Traffic enforcement and investigations.Criminal investigations.Crime prevention and physical security.US Customs support operations.Police intelligence operations.Joint, multinational, and HN police operations.

Joint Prosecution and Exploitation Center

Military police perform a critical role in theestablishment and operation of the JPEC. TheJPEC supports HN security forces’ developmentof internationally accepted criminal investiga-tive and forensic practices and also synchronizes


multinational force intelligence and criminalprosecution efforts associated with—

Detainees and detainee-related evidence.Site and evidence exploitation.Document exploitation.Criminal investigation and other battlefieldmaterial.

Law Enforcement

An efficient and effective law enforcement efforteliminates the conditions and opportunities thatpromote crime. Successful law enforcement oper-ations maintain combat readiness and efficiencyby preventing the diversion of personnel andresources to fight crime and by maintaining mili-tary discipline. Marine Corps Order (MCO)5580.2B, Law Enforcement Manual, providesspecific guidance concerning the establishment oflaw enforcement operations aboard Marine Corpsinstallations and may be used in tactical situationsor serve as the basis for development of appropri-ate law enforcement TTP.

Patrol OperationsThe key to an effective law enforcement effort isan aggressive MP patrol operation. The methodof MP patrol depends upon the mission, numberof military police available, terrain, time ofresponse, and level of HN support. Militarypolice establish patrols to—

Meet prescribed objectives.Protect designated resources.Identify and apprehend or detain offenders.Provide a deterrent and/or presence and preventcrimes.Provide an ability to respond quickly.

Desk OperationsMilitary police establish desk operations to—

Coordinate and document MP patrol activity.Receive complaints and calls for assistance.Refer incidents to the appropriate investigativeagency for further action.


Military working dog teams enhance the effec-tiveness of law enforcement operations withcapabilities to detect explosive devices, explo-sive residue, and controlled substances and todetect, track, control, and apprehend personnel.They are used in peacetime environments toextend MP resources and contribute to the detec-tion, investigation, and prevention of criminalactivity. The MWD teams support a variety ofMP operations, which are discussed in chapter 5.

Mission support requirements determine thenumber of functional MWD teams that make up awartime, mission-oriented MWD team. Duringwartime operations, MWD teams—

Help detect and deter the enemy.Support force protection operations by aug-menting security forces and assisting in the pro-tection of key personnel.Support population control by augmenting dis-located civilian (DC) and crowd control forces.Assist in temporary internment operations.

Traffic Enforcementand Accident Investigations

Traffic accidents account for a large number ofdeployed military casualties. Military police helpto reduce the number of noncombat traffic acci-dent casualties (i.e., civilian and military) andloss of equipment through enforcement of HNand command traffic regulations (i.e., com-mander’s MSR regulation measures). As acci-dent investigators, military police also assist HNor other authorities investigate accidents involv-ing US personnel or property.

Types of Accidents InvestigatedProviding they do not interfere with the tacticalmission or mission-essential operations, the

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types of accidents military police investigateinclude those—

Resulting in the fatalities of US military per-sonnel.Involving US military personnel and equip-ment, as well as HN persons and/or property.Involving substantial vehicle damage and/ormultiple vehicles.

Investigative ServicesThrough the investigation of traffic accidents,military police serve to—

Identify the personal, environmental, andequipment factors that caused or contributed tothe accident.Document the facts of the incident for crimi-nal or civil actions that may result from theaccident.Expedite HN litigation.

Traffic Enforcement MeasuresBased upon the operational and political environ-ment, traffic enforcement measures may include—

Traffic circulation plan development.Operator license and dispatch checks.Safety inspection checkpoints.Vehicle load and route restriction enforcement.Speed control measures.

Main Supply Route Regulation and EnforcementMilitary police units support the commander’sMSR regulation measures as stated in the estab-lished traffic regulation plan, the unit’s SOPs, orcommand directives. They provide MSR regula-tion enforcement to keep the routes within a com-mander’s AO free for priority tactical andsustainment operations and by controlling high-way traffic activities to support military forcemovement. Enforcement efforts focus on ensuringthat only authorized traffic uses controlled MSRs.

The traffic regulation plan contains specific mea-sures to ensure smooth and efficient use of theroad network (e.g., classified routes are usedonly by authorized traffic within their timetableschedule, vehicles are prevented from travelingon roads that are too narrow for their passage orwill not support their weight) to ensure that theroute remains unobstructed. The plan alsoassigns military route numbers and names, direc-tion of travel, highway regulation points, andpreplanned MP traffic control points (TCPs).

Military police use TCPs, roadblocks, check-points, holding areas, and defiles at critical pointsto monitor MSRs and enforce command regula-tions. Mounted MP teams patrol between staticposts to observe traffic and road conditions, togather information on friendly and enemy activ-ity, and to assist stranded vehicles and crews.Military police units place temporary route signsto warn of hazards or to guide drivers unfamiliarwith the routes. Using these measures, MP unitsexercise jurisdiction over the road network in theAO and, when possible, will coordinate with theHN to expedite movement on MSRs. Anychanges in road condition and enemy activityalong MSRs are reported immediately throughMP channels.

Military police units employed with engineer,logistic, explosive ordnance disposal, and aviationforces may establish movement corridors to pro-vide secure movement of military traffic throughuncontrolled terrain. Based upon published move-ment tables, the combined movement corridorforces will open a safe passage route throughuncontrolled terrain.

Criminal Investigations

Crimes occurring within an AO may require anin-depth investigation. Military police investi-gate offenses committed against US personnel orproperty, and occasionally crimes committed byHN citizens. There are two types of criminalinvestigations on the battlefield—minor crimes(e.g., petty theft) or major incidents and serious


offenses (e.g., alleged war crimes). Minor crimesare usually investigated by military police orMPIs. Major incidents and serious offenses, espe-cially those involving death, serious bodilyinjury, and/or war crimes, are referred to CID.The CID investigative authority originates fromthe PM or from the commander to whom the CIDelement is attached.

The NCIS role varies and will be dependent uponthe operation. The CID investigators providecriminal investigative support to commanders,including investigation, fingerprinting, evidencecollection, and exploitation. When authorized,CID personnel initiate the appropriate criminalinvestigations during these operations, conductinterrogations as required, and conduct criminalintelligence operations in support of PIO.

The commander immediately notifies the chain ofcommand, the SJA, CID, or NCIS upon receiv-ing information concerning alleged war crimescommitted by Marines. The CID will notifyNCIS as appropriate. It is extremely importantthat alleged war crimes be investigated promptlyby CID or NCIS and not by an investigatingofficer appointed by the command. Close coordi-nation between the SJA, CID, and NCIS duringwar crime investigations is essential.

Commanders are prohibited from interfering withthe investigations or impeding the use of investi-gative techniques. When a commander objects tothe opening of a criminal investigation of a seri-ous incident for operational or other reasons, thatcommander must report the circumstances imme-diately via the chain of command—SecurityDivision, Plans, Policies, and Operations—to theCommandant of the Marine Corps.

Joint investigative activities, such as drug orblackmarket suppression teams, may involveinvestigators from NCIS, CID, military police, orother US Services or agencies, and may requireclose liaison and cooperation with HN or alliedcivil or military agencies.

Crime Prevention and Physical Security

Crime PreventionCrime prevention is accomplished through aheightened degree of awareness and education.Units aware and educated on the detrimentaleffects of criminal activities often police them-selves to maintain unit integrity and morale. Mili-ta ry pol ice provide the commander wi thawareness programs, as well as instruction andinformation on recognizing, countering, and pre-venting criminal activities.

The objective of crime prevention is to provide asecure environment for military personnel opera-tions. Crime prevention employs proactive mea-sures aimed at protecting persons and property. Asuccessful crime prevention effort focuses on thenumber, type, location, and causes of crimesbeing committed. After causes are identified, mil-itary police employ preventive techniques byplanning, implementing, evaluating, modifying,and developing new crime prevention measures.

Physical SecurityA strong physical security program supports thecrime prevention effort by helping to identify,reduce, eliminate, or neutralize conditions favor-able to criminal activity. As part of the overallphysical security effort, military police conductphysical security inspections and surveys of des-ignated mission-essential or vulnerable activi-t ies within a command. Physical securityinspections and surveys also identify measuresto reduce the opportunity and desire for engag-ing in criminal acts.

Physical security measures supplement the mis-sion assurance process and enhance the overalldefensive posture. Trained force protection andphysical security personnel, using current informa-tion and technology, can provide the commander adefense in depth (e.g., security posts, barriers,access control, electronic security systems, identi-fication controls, technology, biometrics) against

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identified and perceived threats. Physical securitypersonnel support the mission assurance processby assessing vulnerabilities and conducting aphysical security survey.

A physical security survey is a systematic evalua-tion of a facility or activity’s overall security.Physical security personnel identify security defi-ciencies and recommend active and passive cor-rective measures through surveys. A physicalsecurity survey addresses—

Structural design information and deficiencies(e.g., walls, doors, ceilings).Tactical employment of physical barriers andobstacles. Preventive and compensatory security mea-sures and procedures.Employment of physical security aids, equip-ment, and devices (e.g., lighting, fencing,locks, key and lock control, portable electronicsecurity measures).Access and control procedures of US and HNcivilian and military personnel and equipmentwithin an AO.

In addition, physical security specialists providesubject matter expert support in the use of biomet-rics in physical security applications. Biometricsare utilized in access control, electronic securitysystems, intrusion detection systems, and auto-mated access control systems.

US Customs Support Operations

Military police provide customs support and bor-der control to ensure units and individuals com-ply with CBP, other US Governmental agencies,and USDA requirements. In the absence of CBPpersonnel, customs-certified military police,often aided by MWD teams, conduct militarycustoms inspections to enforce US customs lawsand regulations. While conducting customs sup-port operations, military police may be requiredto establish and operate or assist HN authorities

with border security operations. Border control ismaintained for—

Security.Customs and tariff enforcement.Protection of the civilian economy.Apprehension of criminals, absentees, terror-ists, and persons of intelligence interest.

Control is maintained through the establishmentof authorized road or rail crossing points, borderpatrols, and control posts. Essential to the suc-cess of these operations is constant liaison withHN and neighboring country authorities. Militarypolice conducting these operations will—

Establish the identity of US military memberscrossing borders, determine the purpose of travel,and examine vehicles and travel documents.Instruct US military members to make oral orwritten customs declarations as required.Conduct searches of vehicles, luggage, and anyother property being imported or exported byUS military personnel.Seize contraband items that are in violation ofcustoms regulations.

Appendix A addresses customs support opera-tions in more detail.

Police Intelligence Operations

Success in MP LOO relies upon the use of essen-tial information and intelligence, which aids inthe crime prevention and criminal investigationprocess. While performing PIO, military policecollect, analyze, and disseminate information andintelligence as part of other missions.

The MP information operations complement thecommand intelligence program by integratinginformation with military intelligence and provid-ing the commander with a complete and relevantintelligence picture for military operations. Mili-tary police use TQ while conducting PIO. Depart-ment of Defense directive 3115.09, DOD


Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debrief-ings, and Tactical Questioning, provides detailedinformation concerning TQ.

Joint, Interagency, Multinational,and Host Nation Police Operations

Military police LOO may involve patrols withjoint, interagency, multinational, HN military orcivilian police, or a combination of these groups.The SOFA, SRUF, SROE, rules of interaction,force continuum, and other guidance have animpact on MP LOO activities. When conductingthese LOO, military police must maintain con-stant liaison with other DOD police organiza-tions, HN authorities, and allied police agenciesto develop employment options that best sup-port MAGTF operations. As part of these opera-tions, military police may, in situations wherethe local national authority has deteriorated orbeen eliminated, provide assistance and trainingto HN military and civilian police forces orassist in the creation of these forces as autho-rized by competent authority.

Joint investigative activities, such as drug orblack market suppression teams, may involveinvestigators from NCIS, CID, military police, orother US Services or agencies. Such operationsmay require close liaison and cooperation withHN, allied civil, or military agencies. The CIDinvestigators also work closely with counterintel-ligence teams, pooling their resources to gatherinformation on certain activities (e.g., under-ground activities, terrorist groups, black market-ing). In addition, CID investigators are trained tohandle hostage incidents, hostage negotiations,and related terrorist incidents.

Host Nation Law andOrder Operations Support

Military police HN LOO support includes train-ing and police operations support (e.g., station set-up, administration, evidence collection, storage,and processing).

Host Nation Police Training Programs

Authorized police training programs for HNsshould be targeted to the level of officer that isbeing trained. Senior police officer level trainingshould address those things relevant to theadministration of effective police operations,including planning, personnel, logistics, training,and police information operations. Basic policeofficer training should focus on police skills thatwould be most beneficial to them, includingunarmed self-defense, weapons training, andapplication of restraints.

There are several categories of team and policetraining categories. Those categories are—

Transition teams training.Police transition teams training.Executive level training.Mid-level police supervisor training.Basic police officer training.Field training officer (FTO) program.Support personnel training.In-service training.

Transition Teams TrainingThe primary mission of transition teams is toadvise the security forces in the areas of intelli-gence, communications, fire support, logistics, andinfantry tactics. The intent is to make HN forcescapable of conducting independent counterinsur-gency operations tactically, operationally, andlogistically. When executing military operations,transition teams call for US close air support, indi-rect fire, and medical evacuation as necessary.They also perform the critical role of liaisingbetween the foreign unit and nearby US units toensure that each unit is aware of and can assist theother in their operations. Transition teams alsomonitor and report on the capabilities of the fledg-ling security force. They work with their HNcounterparts to enhance the understanding of therule of law and fundamental human rights.

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Note: In both Operation Enduring Freedomand Operation Iraqi Freedom, the transitionteams are considered a central part of thestrategy to train and equip national securityforces. One of the primary missions of the USmilitary in Iraq is the training of competentIraqi security forces. By the end of 2006, tran-sition teams had assisted in the training andequipping of approximately 326,000 Iraqi se-curity services. That figure includes 138,000members of the Iraqi Army and 188,000 Iraqipolice and national police forces.

Police Transition Teams TrainingPolice transition teams provide a similar functionfor the HN police forces. These teams varygreatly in size based upon the AO and level ofthreat. They may include military police units andcontracted civilian personnel.

Executive Level TrainingThe US forces tasked with training HN policepersonnel must ensure that HN police forceshave capable management in the top ranks. Mili-tary police leaders should consider assigningexperienced senior MP personnel to positionswith their HN police force counterparts to serveas executive trainers and advisers. Militarypolice planners, working with police expertsfrom the Department of Justice and the Depart-ment of State, should also develop formal train-ing programs for execut ive leve l po l icepersonnel. Executive level personnel will requireknowledge of general administration and theinternal functions of the organization in order tomanage the ongoing operations of a large policeorganization. Executive level police training con-siderations include the following:

Recruiting police officers and staff.Managing police records. This includes casefile management and statistics on variouspolice data (e.g., calls for service, location ofincident, time of incident, day of the week ofthe incident, category of incident [e.g., acci-dent, request for assistance, robbery, murder],

demographics of the victims and perpetrators,affiliations of the victim and perpetrators).Conducting internal affairs operations. Thisfunction ensures professional standards aremaintained and that officer violations andinternal security issues are investigated. Pre-employment investigations may also bealigned under this function.Distributing and scheduling patrols and plan-ning special events.Planning contingency operations.Developing criminal information and intel-ligence.Staffing and training specialty sections. Thesesections include patrol, criminal investiga-tions, special reaction team, and traffic.Managing police desk operations. This includessupervision and monitoring desk and com-munications operations, such as dispatch andelectronic communications.Managing an evidence room. This includes evi-dence collection requirements, chain of custodydocumentation, and processing and control ofevidence stored in the evidence room.Issuing and controlling police credentials.Issued credentials must be strictly controlledwith credential data and personnel informationstored in a secure location and/or database.Managing licensing and permit functions.Managing jail facilities.Managing court liaison requirements. Thecourt liaison coordinates for prisoner pretrialrelease, transfer of prisoners to permanentdetention facilities, and case preparation.Establishing SOPs. Procedures are required tomaintain order, professionalism, and credibilitywithin the organization. The SOPs mayinclude—

Police procedures.Uniform and equipment standards (e.g., uni-form appearance, accessories, weapons, dutyequipment).Vehicle equipment requirements.Radio protocols.

Military Police Operations _____________________________________________________________________________________ 4-11

Protection equipment (e.g., helmets, vests,chemical protection equipment).Desk operations.Jail operations.

Providing logistic training. Training should befocused on how to understand and manage thevarious aspects of logistical support requiredfor the organization. At a minimum, trainingshould include the following:

Budget training.Procurement of equipment and services.Maintenance operations (e.g., vehicle fleet,communications equipment).Supply operations (e.g., supply distribution,accountability of equipment, establishing asupply and/or logistic discipline program).

Maintaining a comprehensive training pro-gram. At a minimum, a police training programshould include the following:

Preservice training.In-service training.Mid-level and senior-level managementtraining.FTO.

Mid-level Police Supervisor TrainingThe HN police force units only become effectivewhen their leaders and staffs can effectively plan,prepare, execute, and assess police operations. Thetraining program for mid-level managers shouldinclude the professional development that is neces-sary to maintain management proficiency, consis-tent application of policy, and dissemination andunderstanding of organizational goals and objec-tives. Initial mid-level police supervisor trainingshould focus on building effective leaders andstaffs for small units, then progressively move intohigher echelons of supervisory training. Bothexecutive and mid-level training should be focusedat the police station level. A cadre of carefullyselected low- and mid-level police leaders can beprovided an advanced level of education at formalstrategic-level schools. This cadre can, upon theirreturn home, assume leadership positions, and

become faculty for HN schools. However, theseprograms are expensive and time-consuming.

Basic Police Officer TrainingIf possible, basic police officer training shouldoccur in established training academies with stan-dardized programs of instruction. The trainingshould be conducted by experienced law enforce-ment personnel on basic police procedures,weapons proficiency, and survival skills. Duringinitial training, law enforcement trainers mustobserve and conduct the training. More experi-enced HN police are selected as assistant instruc-tors and demonstrators. Over time, the HNassistant trainers will become the primary train-ers. The majority of the training is hands-on prac-tical exercise training.

Field Training Officer ProgramThe FTO program is on-the-job training directedat new police officers. This training is executedwith an experienced police officer certified as anFTO, in order to ensure that new police officersare trained and evaluated and can meet estab-lished standards. The standards should beextracted from a critical task list and adminis-tered by an FTO who is familiar with police pro-tocols and the patrol sector in which the trainee isbeing trained and evaluated. The senior MPofficer present establishes FTO program certifi-cation standards and critical tasks based uponmission analysis of requirements for the locationof the program.

Support Personnel TrainingPolice forces, just like military forces, need sup-port personnel in order to be effective. Thisrequires training teams in support of these func-tions. Specially trained personnel required bypolice forces include armorers, supply special-ists, communications personnel, administrativepersonnel, and vehicle mechanics. Support per-sonnel should not be counted against the numberlimit of sworn HN police officers, as they do notconduct law enforcement activities.

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In-service TrainingIn-service training is a periodic refresher and pro-fessional development training provided to allofficers throughout their service. The SOP estab-lishes the frequency and number of hoursrequired. The length and location of in-servicetraining may range from 15 minutes during guardmount to extended periods on specialized trainingsites. Training should be based upon assessmentsconducted by police management and supervi-sors; and it is driven by observations and objec-tives identified by mid-level and senior leaders.

Subject areas of in-service training may includeweapons proficiency, ethical conduct, officer sur-vival, and identification of threats or criminalactivity. Leadership may often use in-servicetraining as a venue to focus on policy changes orreinforcement, identified shortcomings in perfor-mance, new equipment, or special events training.Subjects are limited to the needs of the organiza-tion. Training should be focused on patterns,trends, and tactics of criminal and other threats(e.g., insurgents, transnational criminals that maybe active in the area). This information is criticalfor police officers to understand in order to effec-tively and efficiently counter the threat andachieve their mission objectives.

Host Nation Police Station Support Operations

A police station is most effective when supportoperations (e.g., police station requirements andprotection, administration, personnel, evidenceprocessing, highway patrol) are streamlined anddeveloped to work in concert with the efforts ofthe police officers.

Police Station: Renovation,Rebuilding, and ProtectionDuring the initial standup of police stations, differ-ent types and sizes of stations should be establishedbased upon a mission, enemy, terrain and weather,troops and support available-time available.

Effective policing requires a base of operationsfrom which police forces can operate. The police

station provides a static, recognizable landmarkfor the public to access the police with reportsand complaints or to provide and receive infor-mation necessary to the maintenance of a stableenvironment. In many operations, military policewill be faced with situations where little or nopolice infrastructure is present. This may beattributed to long-standing neglect, inadequa-cies on the part of the HN, natural disaster, orcombat operations.

During operations where significant destructionattributed to natural or manmade disaster orwhere adequate police infrastructure does notexist, renovation or rebuilding of police stationsis critical. Military police, in conjunction withcivil affairs, other multinational forces, govern-mental agencies, and the HN forces, must assessthe existing police structures and requirementsfor possible new structures and to coordinate forconstruction support.

If required, military police must provide input forthe creation of a statement of work. The state-ment of work must address all constructionrequirements for the police station, including dis-cussion of protection requirements.

Regardless of the physical structure or layout ofthe various police stations, basic protection mea-sures need to be in place before police operationsbegin. Police personnel and facilities are oftentargeted by criminals, terrorists, and insurgents;therefore, police personnel, equipment, and facili-ties require robust security and protection mea-sures. Many of these measures may take weeks ormonths to construct. Protection measures include:

Protection in depth.Standoff distance.Access control.Barriers and blast mitigation.

Notes: In order to be most effective, policestations must be closely linked to a court sys-tem to adjudicate the offender and a prisonfacility to incarcerate the convicted.


Vehicle impound lots must also be a planningconsideration in the establishment of police sta-tions. Police require locations to secure seizedvehicles and property being held for evidentiaryvalue. Stations should have a centralized lot thatsupports a number of stations (e.g., at the districtlevel), a temporary lot, and a lot constructed forlong-term storage.

Police Station: AdministrationMilitary police assist in the establishment ofadministration and personnel functions (e.g.,developing forms, processing procedures) and set-ting standards for daily operations (e.g., supplysystems). Personnel must be familiar with thescope of police powers, authority, and jurisdic-tion. Reference materials should be on hand forquick reference and offense codes should be estab-lished for use in recordkeeping and administrativeaction. Patrol reports and security checklists (seeapp. C) must be developed and used to record per-tinent information and activities. Military policeshould not force the use of US forms since the useof existing or development of new local forms willgive ownership to the HN police force. The USforms may be used if there is no existing form thatmeets a requirement and the local police officialsagree to adopt the form in-lieu-of creating theirown version. An organizational supply system is akey part of police operations. Military police canassist in the development of logistical accountabil-ity systems, acquisition of supplies, and record-keeping requirements as follows:

Maintenance procedures and service agree-ments for maintaining fleet operations andequipment.Policy letters and SOPs to standardize supplyand maintenance operations, desk operations,police administration functions, database man-agement, and evidence procedures. Guidelines for maintaining readiness, bench-marks for organizational goals, and reasonablestandards for LOO training that ranges frombasic to advance tactics and procedures.

Communications protocols, such as call signsand radio procedures for daily communication,operations security procedures, informationsystems security procedures, and communica-tions security measures.Public affairs procedures by establishing guide-lines and methods regarding release of infor-mation to the media while protecting the publicand not compromising ongoing operations. Theintent should be to tell the “good news story” toshow where progress is being made.

Police Station: PersonnelPolice Officers. Police officers responsible forevidence collection and storage should receivetraining in crime scene processing. Personnelselected for these positions should be experi-enced officers.

Police officers should be specifically identified towork juvenile cases. Care must be exercised toprocess and handle juvenile offenders separatelyfrom adult offenders.

An interpreter should be provided for MP opera-tions (i.e., training, mentoring, and conductingjoint operations) with HN police personnel. Anyinterpreter selected to translate in police opera-tions must receive a background check, be clearedby the appropriate authority, and be trained byMP leadership or police assistance team on spe-cific police procedures and operations.

Support Personnel. The successful managementof a police station depends upon administrativespecialists, recordkeepers, budgeting personnel,personnel specialists, facilities personnel, and cus-todial staffs. These critical staff positions shouldnot count against the number of sworn positionsidentified for the individual police stations. Sup-port positions do not require sworn police offic-ers nor do they require any police training.However, they do require some level of securityclearance and a background investigation.

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Dispatchers and others working at the control ordispatch center should receive training in dis-patch procedures and be graduates of a policeacademy. They must also receive training inadministrative functions to allow them to trackand record police operations as they occur. Dis-patchers prioritize and dispatch responding patrolswith guidance from the shift and desk supervisors.

Other personnel essential in sustaining policeoperations include mechanics, electricians, andcommunications and supply specialists. Allpolice stations should have a maintenance facil-ity and motorpool within the police departmentcompound. The supply specialist should betrained in equipment issuance, accountability,and procurement measures.

Police Station: InformationSystems Development and ManagementCommon crime information databases greatlyimprove interoperability among local HN policeagencies and can link them to international policeintelligence sources, such as Interpol (the world’slargest international police organization). Militarypolice provide the capability to train foreign mili-tary and civilian police concerning the establish-ment of police information files and automatedpolice databases. Developing and sharing policeinformation with the appropriate HN and interna-tional agencies is crucial in environments wherecriminals (e.g., terrorists, insurgents) threaten sta-bility. Military police coordinate these efforts withinternational police and intelligence agencies.

Systems Development. Military police or contrac-tors train HN police and provide initial training toforces in the development and management ofpolice information systems. In countries wherethe government, including its law enforcemententities, has been precarious and/or corrupt, theremay have been no development or managementof police information. If a database (i.e., auto-mated information system) does exist, militarypolice should assess whether the existing systemis functional and if so, commence training and

incorporation as soon as possible. An existingsystem provides local familiarity and culturalconsiderations, but if no system exists, militarypolice or contractors must assist in developingand managing a police information system thatwill be executable within the skill, experience,and cultural parameters of the HN police person-nel. Considerations during the development andmanagement of the information system mayinclude the following:

Establishing police information requirements(e.g., biometrics).Establishing police statistical requirements.Establishing a police information collection plan.Gathering information directed from the collect-ion plan.Establishing a database and training operators.Establishing supporting documents.Conducting analysis of the information todetermine police intelligence value.Training HN military and civilian police per-sonnel to manipulate the information systemfor maximum efficiency and benefit.

The establishment of the automated informationsystem is an extremely important part of settingup a modern policing capability and should alsoaccommodate the development of a centralizeddata storage capability that is accessible to allpolice and security agencies. When designing andimplementing these automated information sys-tems, the following must be considered:

Incorporating a security program into the system.The system must be secure and not accessible tounauthorized users.Developing an information management systemthat will provide support—combining admin-istration, logistics, training, operation reporting,vehicle registration, police reporting, and penalinformation.Determining additional law enforcementreports needed, such as daily activity logs andother automated entries.


Providing law enforcement access to automatedpolice records from a centralized database.Conducting queries expeditiously from a cen-tralized database for real-time information andquick compilation of crime statistics.

Note: The development and maintenance of adatabase is paramount to recording and stor-ing police information. A database promoteseasy retrieval and analysis of the data. Ini-tially information management experts maybe required to establish and train on the da-tabase, providing data for assessment of theHN’s capabilities. The end state is to transferthe responsibility of database population,analysis, and maintenance to the HN or inter-national police agency as soon as possible.

Information Gathering. Information must be gath-ered in accordance with the collection plan.Reporting and documentation procedures must alsobe developed and trained to accommodate relevantinformation received by patrols that may not havebeen driven by the collection plan but may pro-vide indicators of emerging crime. These findingswill be documented through review of standardpolice reports and field interview documentation.As military police and contractors train their HNpolice counterparts, extensive use of joint collec-tion teams and multinational police operations willaid the training and mentorship of the HN policeand accelerate familiarity with information gather-ing as specified in the collection plan.

All information gathered must be filed and orga-nized to promote easy retrieval and analysis ofthe data to gain maximum benefit. Ideally, thedata will be filed in electronic form within asecure database. At a minimum, the HN or inter-national police should establish the followingtypes of files:

Area. Area files include information on defin-able geographic areas that have activities of

police interest. Such areas include residentialand recreational—where the general populationmight gather and where unfriendly populationscongregate (e.g., drug trafficking or other illicitactivities; areas controlled by criminals orinsurgents to recruit, train or meet; areas thatmay provide supplies and equipment to irregu-lar threat forces).Activity. Activity files contain all informationof interest to the HN or international police.These files capture information regarding peo-ple, activities, functions, and properties. Mili-tary police and contractors cannot necessarilyapply the laws of the United States to thesefiles, but may use them as a guide in establish-ing the database for or with the HN or interna-tional police. The HN or international policewill need to make the legal determinationswhen they assume responsibility of the files.Such categories of these files may include par-ticipants in demonstrations or individualsinvolved in other criminal activity.Individual. The HN or international policemay develop dossiers on any person consid-ered significant. Individuals are identified assignificant because of their involvement inactivities, leadership, contacts, or type of sym-bols displayed that reflect religious, economic,social, or political affiliations. Once they arein place, the authorizations and legalities ofthese files will be determined by the HN orinternational authorities.Investigative. Investigative files are compiledby police on individuals who are suspected of acrime. Military police and contractors shouldmentor the HN or international police concern-ing how to capture information (e.g., forms)that may be used in MP investigations. Thiswill assure that critical information is capturedconcerning a crime or incident.

Once the database has been established and pop-ulated, the military police and HN forces will

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establish the types of administrative documenta-tion (e.g., reports) needed and the format thatwill provide maximum benefit to the users forcriminal analysis purposes.

Criminal Analysis. The purpose of conductinganalysis of police information is to determine itspolice intelligence value. This information isvaluable to US forces, the HN, and the interna-tional community. For US forces, it assists com-mands in protection efforts, mission assurancesupport areas, base defense, antiterrorism efforts,crime prevention measures, counterterrorism,investigations, and prosecutions. A viable crimi-nal analysis capability allows the HN to identifycriminals, criminal activities and groups, loca-tions of crime and activity, and correlationsbetween categories of criminal activity andenables predictive analysis. It is critical to estab-lishing and maintaining a mature and viablepolice and investigative organization that can beeffective in enforcing laws and investigatingcriminal activity.

Police Station: Highway Patrol

The mission of the highway patrol is to providelaw enforcement and security along highways andmajor roadways, ensuring the safety of all citi-zens, international visitors, and the free flow ofnational and international commerce. Militarypolice should assist in the development of the HNhighway patrol’s capabilities. A part of this devel-opment includes designing mutually-supportivejurisdictional boundaries, which will cross othernational police jurisdictions. By the nature of themission, the highway patrol becomes a key con-duit of police information across local policeboundaries. The development of a highway patrolwill also assist in US and multinational force free-dom-of-movement. Highway patrol officersshould attend the basic police training academyand receive specialized training focused on their

unique mission. Key tasks for the highway patrolmay include the following:

Providing deterrence and interdiction of terror-ists, weapons, and supplies through activepatrolling of highways.Searching, locating, securing, reporting, andcoordinating the timely discovery of explosivedevices.Responding rapidly to incidents and accidentsalong highways and major roadways.Providing emergency first aid.Coordinating evacuation of injured personsand aiding disabled motorists.Investigating criminal and traffic complaints andviolations along highways and major roadways.

To aid the HN patrol in the accomplishment ofthese key tasks, a comprehensive registry shouldbe developed to track vehicles and their regis-tered keepers. Military police should assist theHN police in developing policies, procedures,and model programs that encourage the effectiveand efficient administration of jurisdictionaldriver licensing and control requirements. Con-siderations include the following:

Facilitating the exchange of ideas and informa-tion on issues concerning licensing and con-trol, law enforcement, education, research, andjudicial and governmental communities.Promoting liaison with other safety-relatedorganizations.Facilitating the establishment of vehicle licens-ing and registration as a means of deterringcriminals from disguising stolen cars with theidentity of others.Safeguarding personal information to preventpersonal data from being accessed by unautho-rized persons. The issue of identification reli-ability, integrity, and confidentiality is criticaland must be of prime concern to all citizensand law enforcement officials.

CHAPTER 5MILITARY WORKING DOG OPERATIONS

The MWD teams are employed in dynamic waysthat continue to evolve into a highly trained assetthat commanders continue to use around theworld. These specialized teams aid commandersin conducting stability and warfighting operations.Being modular and mobile makes these teamsvery agile, enabling them to deploy rapidly andallowing them to quickly integrate into operations.The MWD program effectively integrates expertlytrained MWD handlers and highly intelligentbreeds of dogs that maintain a high tempo of oper-ations in their support of joint operations, multi-echelon tasks, and interagency missions. Astechnology and world security situations evolve,the MWD team will continue to adapt in order toprovide commanders the unique capabilitiesrequired to be combat multipliers on the battle-field and support mission assurance efforts.

The Marine Corps MWD program provides vary-ing MWD capabilities that are matched to themission or task by the supported commander.Although all MWDs are different, their detectionand warning capabilities are a combined result ofthe MWD’s superior senses of sight, sound, andsmell. The MWDs can be a force multiplier whenproperly employed in military operations onurbanized terrain with the infantry and otherMarines. Failure to match the MWD capabilitiesto the mission creates a wasted resource andincreases the potential for failure.

Mission

The MWD teams provide commanders with aforce multiplier in the following areas:

Explosives detection.Drug detection.Intruder detection.

Human tracking.Patrolling.Nonlethal apprehension of combatants.A psychological deterrent.

Organization

The MWD platoon is organized under the MP sup-port company in each MEF. The platoon com-mander or sergeant, kennel master, assistantkennel master, training SNCOIC, and chief MWDtrainer provide leadership for the MWD platoon.The MWD platoon is broken down into threesquads containing all of the MWD disciplines.These squads provide scalable elements to supportthe MAGTF. Each squad has an assigned SNCOICsquad leader or trainer and a subject matter experttrainer for each MWD discipline. Each of thesedisciplines is unique and requires extensive train-ing in the development of and maintenance ofteam proficiency. Because of these unique disci-plines, and the extensive training requirements ofthe MWD, it is important that command relation-ships for forward deployed elements of the MWDplatoon are identified prior to deployment. TheMWDs may also be task-organized into detach-ments of varying sizes and compositions to sup-port other MAGTFs (e.g., SPMAGTFs, MEUs). Inthese cases, MWDs should be requested by theMAGTF commander from the MEF, after analy-sis of the unit’s mission.

The MWD platoons provide the MAGTF com-mander with mission capable MWD teams. TheseMWD teams, composed of a Marine and anMWD, are trained as a cohesive element that maybe attached to a ground combat element, logisticscombat element, or aviation combat element—asan individual team or as part of a larger elementas dictated by the mission.

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Capabilities

The MWD’s heightened senses of sight, smell,and hearing, coupled with obedience and patroltraining by a certified dog handler, provides a sig-nificant detection capability, as well as a physicaland psychological deterrent. In addition, theMWD provides a psychological advantage to theunit and significantly enhances the commander’sability to protect forces and assets. On- and off-leash, MWDs provide the commander an addeddeterrence factor and the ability to address andpotentially neutralize the threat from IEDs. TheMWDs also enhance the MAGTF’s ability tolocate weapons and explosives caches and conductother appropriate missions. Depending upon theMWD’s type of training, they can also detect andlocate a person or explosives faster than a humancan, even when obstacles, distance, or terrainmight obscure the threat from human detection.

Public knowledge of MWD team detection capa-bilities provides commanders with a formidabledeterrent wherever the MWD team is employed.The MWDs are trained for detecting drugs andexplosives, tracking, scouting, patrolling, andperforming building and area searches. Like otherhighly specialized equipment, MWDs enablecommanders to perform their mission more effec-tively with a significant savings of manpower,time, and money.

Employing MWDs with different capabilities(see table 5-1) to work together may prove veryeffective. For example, during route clearance,units can use specialized search dogs (SSDs) tosweep the roads and find caches and combattracker dogs (CTDs) to follow the tracks of pos-sible insurgents that were initiated from the siteof an SSD find. When MWDs are collocatedand working as a single unit their effectivenessis improved

Table 5-1. Military Working Dog Program Capabilities

Assignment by Type of MWD

Operational Task MWD Functions P/DDD P/EDD SSD CTD

Main or alternate supply route Explosive detection and tracking X X X

Inspection Explosive and drug detection X X

Entry control point Explosive, drug detection, and patrol X X X

Quick search Explosive detection X X

Vehicle control point Explosive and drug detection X X X

Cordon and knock Explosive detection, tracking, and patrol X X X

Raid Explosive detection, tracking, and patrol X X X X

High value target Explosive, drug detection, patrol, tracking X X X X

Search and rescue Tracking X

Perimeter security Patrol X X X

Crowd control Patrol X X


Types of Military Working Dogs

Patrol Dog

Patrol dogs (PDs) can be used as tactical enhance-ments to support combat operations. The PD in theMarine Corps is normally dual-certified as eitheran explosive detector dog (EDD) or drug detectordog (DDD). These types of MWDs are referred toas patrol/explosive detector dog (P/EDD) andpatrol/drug detector dog (P/DDD). The PD teamsenable the commander to employ less Marines andapply their resources to other areas. This forcemultiplier is especially valuable in area security,force protection, and antiterrorism operations. Onebenefit of MWD employment is the deterrence ofcriminal activity and/or infiltration. The obviouspresence and well-published activities of MWDteams can successfully deter trespassers, vandals,violent persons, infiltrators, and other would-becriminals. When the desired task is to deter unau-thorized or suspicious individuals, an MWD teamshould be assigned to that location both day andnight. The PD’s contribution is most effectivewhen the MWD team is utilized as a walkingpatrol. As a walking patrol, the PD team can checkor clear buildings, perimeters, and open areas.Mobility significantly increases the potential areaof coverage. In addition, PD teams can and shouldbe utilized as a tool for area defense and provid-ing warning and response. The PDs are trained toapprehend suspects at or near a crime scene, stopthose who may attempt to escape, and protect theirhandlers from harm. Some PDs may also be uti-lized for the following:

Supporting antiterrorism operations.Supporting force protection and antiterrorismefforts.Assisting in military police investigations.Walking and mobile patrols.Checking and searching building.Identifying and apprehending individuals.Locating suspects who have left the scene of acrime.

Protecting high-risk personnel.Performing area searches.Supporting the control of civil disturbances.Assisting in perimeter security.Detecting external intrusion.Assisting the response force.Supporting entry control points (ECPs).Supporting high-risk targets.Patrolling vulnerable areas.Performing combat patrols.Manning observation posts and listening posts.Supporting EPW operations.

Drug Detector Dog

The DDD provides commanders with uniquecapabilities in combat support environments.The DDDs in the Marine Corps are normallydual-certified with the capability of a PD and isreferred to as a P/DDD. These dual-certifiedMWD teams should perform normal patrolduties when not required for specific detectionwork because they can quickly lose their patrolproficiency if they are not assigned to performtheir full range of capabilities. Commandershave a very effective means of detecting the pos-session and/or use of controlled substances withthe employment of a DDD team. The drug detec-tion capabilities of the DDDs can be used tomaintain the order and discipline of US forces aswell as combatants and other persons involved inoperations (e.g., EPWs, DCs, CIs, refugees,other detained/interred persons during time ofwar or conflict). Commanders should requestdrug detector support when drug use or expo-sure to illicit drugs are anticipated or suspectedin the following environments:

Contingency and combat operations.Low intensity conflicts.Extended deployments.Whenever Marines come in regular contactwith civilians.

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The DDD is trained to detect the odor and loca-tion of the source of illicit drugs and drug-associ-ated paraphernalia. In order to maximize theaccuracy of the DDD’s response, the DDD willnot be trained to detect explosives. The DDDs aretrained to recognize the scent of certain illegalsubstances through a program of practice andreward. When the DDD responds on any of thesubstances the DDD is trained to detect, theMWD handler will provide an appropriate reward.The DDDs are not employed to search people.The DDD teams can be utilized for the following:

Investigations.Health and welfare inspections.Barrack searches.Workplace searches.Random gate inspections.Area searches.Vehicle searches.Postal support.Aircraft and luggage searches.US customs searches.Predeployment and redeployment searches.

Explosive Detector Dog

The EDD is trained to detect the odor and loca-tion of the source of an explosive. In the MarineCorps, EDDs are normally dual-certified with thecapability of a PD. This type of MWD is referredto as a P/EDD. In order to maximize the accu-racy of the EDD’s response, the EDD will not betrained to detect drugs. These dual-certifiedMWD teams should perform normal patrol dutieswhen not required for specific detection workbecause they can quickly lose their patrol profi-ciency if they are not assigned to perform theirfull range of capabilities. The EDD teams arecritical when conducting searches or performinginvestigations involving explosives to ensure per-sonnel and facilities are safe and protected fromwould-be terrorists. The EDD teams are particu-larly useful if there is a requirement to locate oneor more explosive item(s) that may have beenhidden in an area. The EDDs should not be used

once a suspicious item has been identified or toconfirm suspicious items. If there is reason tobelieve an item contains explosives, explosiveordnance disposal should be employed. Thedeterrent value and the detection capabilities ofEDD teams are a very effective countermeasureto terrorism. Public knowledge that EDD teamsare in use is a deterrent to persons who may try touse explosives illegally. The knowledge thatexplosives can be detected by EDD teams atentry points or in places where explosives havebeen hidden can prevent a person from attempt-ing to commit a terrorist act. An EDD team canconduct a significantly more effective search ofan area or facility in a much shorter time than alarge number of personnel can. Using EDD teamsreduces the potential risks associated with explo-sive searches, while enhancing detection results.The EDDs are not to be used to search people.The EDD teams can be utilized for the following:

Bomb threat incidents.ECP searches.Checkpoint searches.Random gate searches.Investigations.Health and welfare inspections.Building and area searches.Vehicle searches.Postal support.Aircraft and luggage searches. Predeployment and redeployment searches.Protective services missions.

Specialized Search Dog

The SSDs are trained off-leash to detect the odorand presence of specific explosives. This special-ized ability makes the SSD a valuable tool to helpcommanders maintain law and order whileenhancing safety procedures. The SSD can beemployed as an antiterrorism and force protectionasset or in combat operations worldwide. TheSSDs are single-purpose MWDs that detect IEDs,explosive components, and weapon caches on-and off-leash, up to 100 plus meters from the


MWD handler. The SSDs may be utilized tosearch on-leash, but this is not the preferredmethod. The SSDs are capable of searching vehi-cles, buildings, roadways, and open areas. Theyare primarily used in support of the operatingforce but may be employed in-garrison as anEDD. The SSDs provide the commander a viableasset in detecting IEDs, explosives and explosivecomponents, and weapons caches off-leash. TheSSDs may be directed (i.e., controlled) through thesearch pattern by voice command, hand and armsignals, a combination of both, or voice commandvia radio. The SSDs should not be used to searchpeople but may be utilized for the following:

Bomb threat incidents.Checkpoint searches.Investigations.Health and welfare inspections.Building and area searches.Postal support.Aircraft and luggage searches.Predeployment and redeployment searches.Protective services missions.ECP searches. (This is not a preferred usebecause the EDD is better suited to this taskand it eliminates specialization of SSD.)Random gate searches. (This is not a preferreduse because the EDD is better suited to this taskand it eliminates specialization of SSD.)

Combat Tracker Dog

The CTDs are a single purpose MWD: they pro-vide the commander with the capability of track-ing. When supporting the operating force, theCTD can re-establish contact with ECs, relocatefriendly personnel, or conduct reconnaissance ofan area. The CTDs are capable of working in bothurban and rural environments, day or night. If aCTD is required to work at night, night visionshould be provided to the handler, enabling him toread the dog’s alerts. The CTD will track humans(i.e., groups and specific individuals) and mayalert on a human presence (i.e., strongest scentand specific scent). The CTD will close on the

quarry using the strongest scent—groundborne,windborne, or waterborne. A CTD can track in orover vegetation, routes, sand, water, concrete, andasphalt. To conduct a successful track, a CTDneeds an adequate starting point that is not con-taminated with extraneous humans. Because ofthe nature of casting and conducting a track whenemployed in a combat zone, the CTD teamrequires dedicated security and cover as the han-dler is focused entirely on controlling the animal.The CTDs are capable of tracking the following:

Enemy personnel:Makers of IEDs and explosives.Planters of IEDs and explosives.Handlers of IED and explosives.Enemy personnel from points of origin.Snipers (including while hidden).Fleeing enemy personnel (maintaining contact).

Friendly personnel:Who are lost.Missing in action.Taken as a prisoner.

Supported UnitQuestions for the MWD Handler

The MWDs’ capabilities will vary from team toteam, depending upon experience, training, andthe dog-handler relationship. To enhance theemployment of MWD teams, supported unitsshould answer the following questions in order tounderstand the MWD team’s capability:

What is the MWD’s endurance level—howlong will he be able to work?What odors are the MWD trained to detect?What types of missions has the MWD previ-ously performed?How well does the MWD work off-leash?Is the MWD aggressive toward Marines?Is the MWD aggressive toward civilians?How well does the MWD travel in vehicles?Has the MWD ever been transported via helicopter?

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How well does the MWD work at night?What is the MWD’s maximum effective off-leash distance?What action does the MWD take upon findinga suspected target?What is the MWD’s medical condition?How much water and food does the MWDconsume daily?What is the MWD’s reaction to gunfire?How is the MWD rewarded?How will the MWD react if his handler iswounded or killed, and what actions should betaken if this does occur?How is the MWD team-certified?How experienced is the handler?How can the MWD team be integrated with afire team, squad, or platoon?What are the required and/or recommendedwork and rest cycles in order to maintain theMWD’s effectiveness?What is required if a MWD bites someone?

Planning Considerations

When MWD teams are employed they partici-pate in all phases of the unit’s mission; therefore.it is essential that the kennel master, handler, MPstaff officer or SNCO, MP support companycommander, or PM participate in mission plan-ning. The handler and the kennel master may alsorecommend ways to use the MWD team. In addi-tion to the commander’s concept and mission,enemy, terrain and weather, troops and supportavailable-time available, the handler must con-sider the following:

Length of tactical employment.Climate and environment.Location and size of area to be covered.Condition and type of terrain.Prevailing wind direction.

Combat operations require the handler’s fullattention to maintain focus on working and con-trolling their MWDs. This severely reduces the

handler’s ability to employ his weapon rapidlyand effectively if enemy contact occurs; there-fore, the MWD team operates within the “buddysystem” concept used on all Marine Corps com-bat operations. Because the handler is almosttotally focused on his dog, it is in the best inter-ests of all concerned to assign a two-man buddyteam to the handler so they can maintain themutual support and all-encompassing securitynecessary in a combat, contingency, or militaryoperations on urbanized terrain environment.

WARNINGUnits employing MWDs must establish proce-dures for use of weapons to ensure MWDs arenot accidentally shot and to protect themfrom indigenous personnel and animals.

Usually MWD teams work in front of or on theflanks of other personnel or the protected facility,but not so far that the accompanying Marines can-not provide security for the team. The team shouldbe downwind from potential locations or avenuesof approach of the person(s) and/or explosive(s) tobe detected. This improves the chances of provid-ing early warning. If the MWD team is support-ing a patrol that is moving directly into the wind,the team may have to move left or right of a line-of-march to take advantage of the prevailing wind.If the situation or terrain dictates, the MWD teamcan traverse while the supported unit continues ona direct route.

The MWD handlers must socialize the dog intothe supported unit immediately. The handler isresponsible for training the dog to be tolerant andobedient, regardless of the environment. Famil-iarity with members of the unit will reduceaggression toward unit personnel. In order tomaintain discipline of the MWD, supported unitpersonnel must strictly adhere to the following:

Do not feed the MWD. Only the handler isauthorized to feed the MWD.Do not play with or pet the MWD, exceptunder the handler’s direct supervision.


Do not make any move or gesture that anMWD may interpret as a threat to his handler.Do not think of the MWD as a pet or mascot.

The MWD team should rehearse with the sup-ported unit prior to a mission so that everyonecan become accustomed to working with theMWD. Supported unit personnel must know whatto do if a handler is seriously wounded or killed.A MWD that has worked closely with a sup-ported unit and developed a tolerance for one ormore of the individuals will usually allow one ofthem to return it to the kennel. If the MWD willnot allow anyone near its handler, other handlersmust be called in to assist.

Normally handlers are armed with a sidearm andmay carry a weapon with a sling. These weaponsare primarily for the defense of the handler andthe MWD. The handler focuses on working andcontrolling the MWD. The recommended weaponfor a MWD handler is the M-4 because theshorter length of the weapon provides the han-dler more flexibility and movement while work-ing the MWD during an operation. The shorterbarrel of the M-4 also prevents the MWD frombeing struck in the head during operations.

Both training and health present unique planningconsiderations. Training must be consideredwhile conducting field training and duringdeployments. Training aids, such as explosivesand/or narcotics, are required to maintain MWDteam proficiency. Finding and employing a site toeffectively train, kennel, and provide medicaltreatment must also be taken into consideration.While an MWD team may be employed in vari-ous austere environments, it is essential to pro-vide veterinary support if the care required isbeyond the capabilities of the handler.

Transportation

The MWD team can be transported by ground,air, or water. In both combat and garrison, theallocation of transportation assets is essential to

allow for effective employment, training, andcare. During training, the ability to transportMWD to training sites, as well as to veterinaryfacilities, must be planned for and adequatelysourced. During tactical missions when the MWDis not being employed, the preferred method ofkenneling is to keep the MWD in a kennel crate ifpossible and supportable; however, it is under-stood there will be times when this will not bepossible or supportable. The kennel crate can betaken apart, but the load plan must take intoaccount that the MWD team requires additionalspace in the transportation vehicle. Advantagesand disadvantages of transporting the MWD inthe kennel crate include the following:

Advantages:MWD handler can man a weapon if neces-sary.Better for the MWD’s rest management.Safety of friendly forces is enhanced (e.g.,eliminates the potential for the MWD bitinga Marine).

Disadvantages:Logistical footprint (i.e., ability to be trans-ported in the field).The MWD may be isolated from the support-ed unit, limiting camaraderie and cohesion.

The MWD can be transported by a variety ofmeans, ranging from tactical aircraft to armoredvehicles. However, in each case, the safety ofboth the MWD and the vehicle crew must be con-sidered. For example, in an M1114 up-armoredHMMWV [high-mobility multipurpose wheeledvehicle], the placement of the MWD may inter-fere with the operation of the turret gunner, espe-cially if the kennel crate is employed. The MRAP[mine-resistant ambush-protected] armored vehi-cles also provide unique challenges because ofthe layout of seating and the elevation of the crewcompartment. A medium tactical vehicle replace-ment should be used for transport only as a lastresort because of the extreme height of the troopcompartment and the lack of environmental con-trols. The MWD can safely travel in all types ofassault support aircraft. Consideration should bemade to allow handlers to control the MWD

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effectively without interfering with aircrew oper-ations. In some cases, the MWD may requirebeing transported on aircraft without the advan-tage of the kennel crate. It is essential that the air-crew and other passengers are briefed concerningthe safety considerations involving the MWD.

When MWDs are transported by ships or areembarked for amphibious operations, the MWDsshould be kenneled in their kennel crate. A desig-nated area should be established so that person-nel other than MWD handlers do not have accessto the MWDs. When possible and feasible, thepreferred method would be for the MWD teamsto fly and meet the unit at a deployed location.

Veterinary Support

The US Army Surgeon General provides profes-sional veterinary support for the entire MWDprogram through the Army Veterinary Corps.This responsibility includes the following:

Providing medical and surgical care.Conducting inspections to ensure that MWDkennel facilities are safe and sanitary.Prescribing an adequate feeding program forMWDs.Instructing handlers and supervisors in all mat-ters related to the health of MWDs, includingfirst aid for MWDs.Conducting research to improve the DODMWD program.

The responsible veterinary corps officer (VCO)provides treatment for the diseased or injuredMWD at the kennel facility or at the installationveterinary treatment facility. The US Army Veter-inary Corps is responsible for equipping the veter-inary treatment facility and providing medical andsurgical supplies. The VCO is responsible for theMWD veterinary treatment record and relatedinformation about examinations, immunizations,and treatment. The VCO instructs MWD han-dlers about dog health, care, feeding, and first aid.

This instruction helps the MWD handler todevelop a better understanding of the MWD’shealth needs and improves the MWD handler'sability to care for the MWD. The VCO pre-scribes an appropriate feeding program basedupon the MWD's health, the climate, and work-ing conditions. The VCO is involved in thereview of all plans for new MWD kennel facilityconstruction or modifications. This ensures thatpotential health and safety hazards can be cor-rected before construction begins.

In the combat environment, the PM or kennelmaster must coordinate with the responsible VCOto ensure proper support. Additionally, MWDsmust be routinely evaluated prior to and afteremployment, like any other Marine. In some the-aters, the use of prophylactic medications isrequired for preventative medicine purposes. Theeffective coordination and planning with the VCOis required to maintain both combat effectivenessand readiness.

Medical Concerns

The MWD handler is trained to know how andwhen to use items deployed in the first aid kit.For example, he can assist with intravenous flu-ids, sutures, medications, and splints with thehelp of a corpsman. The most common medicalconcerns for MWDs are overheating, diarrhea,cuts, abrasions, and eye irritations. A wounded orsick MWD may be evacuated by air if necessary.

Environment

Some environmental situations severely restrict orprohibit the use of MWDs. Before employingMWDs, the following factors should be considered:

MWD employment near petroleum, oils, andlubricants must be limited. These elements candamage a MWD’s paws and affect his sense ofsmell.


MWDs are prohibited from areas contaminatedwith chemical, biological, radiological, andnuclear (CBRN) agents because there are noprotective devices for them.MWDs may work in open areas where riotcontrol agents are in use if the wind velocity isnormal; however, they should be closely moni-tored and taken to a veterinarian if they showsigns of distress.

Other environmental concerns may also impactthe use of the MWD. In some theaters, the pres-ence of disease carrying vectors, feral animals,and other circumstances (e.g., heat, humidity,amount of water, type of soil) may pose risks toMWD that may hinder effective employment.

Field Kennels

An MWD field kennel may be constructed out ofany available resources. The design is not stan-dard and varies from site to site, depending uponthe location, mission, and duration of opera-tions. Using a concept similar to constructingfighting positions, the MWD field kennel will beimproved as needed or until a permanent MWDkennel facility is completed. Using tents andshipping crates may be a hasty method of settingup an MWD field kennel. Although this methodis not optimal for sustained operations, it may beuseful until other accommodations can be coor-dinated. Kenneling of MWDs and billeting ofMarines, excluding handlers, should be separate.The tents should be erected at a location that

allows the MWDs a safe place to rest away fromother troop activities after operations. Wheneverpossible, terrain or buildings should be used as abarrier between troop activity and the MWDfield kennel. Never place the MWD field kennelnear motor pools, dining facilities, or high noiseareas. In some areas of operation, it may be pos-sible to obtain the use of a building or otherstructure for temporary kenneling. In these cases,the building must be well-ventilated, free of haz-ards (e.g., chemicals, bare wires, holes, debris)and structurally sound. Engineers are often usedto assist in the improvement of a MWD fieldkennel. In addition, fencing should be erectedand dog runs created. Procedures for using ashipping crate (e.g., Vari Kennel, kennel crate)as temporary kenneling of a MWD are detailedas follows:

The interior, exterior, and ground beneath theshipping crate must be cleaned daily to preventthe accumulation of moisture, waste, or insectinfestation.The shipping crate must be raised 4 to 6 inchesoff the ground to allow for adequate drainageand to reduce parasite-breeding environments.In hot climates, place the shipping crate undertrees with a tarpaulin or plywood to provideshade and ventilation. Adequate shade andcover must be provided for the MWD. Kennelareas should be cleared of all objects that caninjure the MWD.Spread gravel, if available, around and underthe shipping crate to allow for drainage and theeasy removal of solid waste.

CHAPTER 6LIMITED DETAINEE OPERATIONS

United States forces must recognize that the abil-ity to determine detainee intent will be increas-ingly more complex in the future. It may bedifficult to determine the identity of the enemy.Civilians may lose their protective status by takingan active and direct part in hostilities. Detainees,current and future, understand how their behaviorcan influence decisions up to and including thenational level, which may divert the efforts of themilitary detention operations.

Detainee operations are conducted to enhanceMAGTF effectiveness when faced with largeprisoner and detainee control responsibilities.Through the use of collection points and holdingareas, military police provide the commanderwith the ability to collect, process, guard, pro-tect, account for, and transfer EPWs and CIs.Military police enhance the tempo of operationsby effecting the quick control and evacuation ofprisoners from the forward battle area to tempo-rary holding areas and, in joint operations, to USArmy EPW and CI holding facilities. In addition,military police aid in the movement of forces byclearing the AO of EPWs and CIs.

For additional information concerning detainee oper-ations, see MCO 3461.1, Enemy Prisoners of War,Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and OtherDetainees, and MCWP 5-12.1, The Commander’sHandbook on the Law of Naval Operations.

The Geneva Conventions

Detainee operations are governed by the provi-sions of the Geneva Conventions, which were rati-fied by the United States and came into force forthe United States on 2 February 1956. Comprisedof four treaties, the Geneva Conventions provideinternationally recognized humanitarian standards

for the treatment of victims of war. It is DOD pol-icy to comply with the law of war during allarmed conflicts. Therefore, the United States isobligated to adhere to the Geneva Conventionsand the law of war during all armed conflicts.However, such conflicts are characterized, andpresent in all other military operations regardingthe treatment of EPWs, CIs, and detained persons.

Geneva Convention (I) for theAmelioration of the Condition of theWounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field

This Convention provides for the protection ofmembers of armed forces and other persons whoare wounded and sick on the battlefield. It pro-vides for members of the conflict to take all pos-sible measures to—

Search for and collect the wounded and sick.Protect them against pillage and ill treatment.Ensure their adequate care.Search for the dead and prevent their beingdespoiled.

Geneva Convention (II) for the Ameliorationof the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea

This Convention deals with the humane treat-ment and protection by the parties to a conflictthat involve armed forces members and other per-sons at sea who are wounded, sick, or ship-wrecked and the protection of hospital ships andburial at sea.

Geneva Convention (III) Relative tothe Treatment of Prisoners of War

The governing motive of this Convention is toprovide for the humane treatment of EPWs by the

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parties involved in a conflict. It regulates, in detail,the treatment of EPWs, including the following:

Care, food, clothing, and housing.Discipline and punishment.Labor and pay.External relations.Representation.International exchange of information.Termination of captivity.

Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War

This Convention deals with the general protectionof populations against the consequences of war,the status and treatment of protected persons, andthe treatment of CIs.

Protection Provisionsof the Geneva Convention

The provisions of the Geneva Convention providethe EPWs and CIs with the applicable and enti-tled protections from their time of capture untilrelease or repatriation.

The EPW or CI must receive humane treatmentwithout distinction founded on race, sex, nation-ality, religious belief, political opinions, or othersimilar criteria. The EPWs or CIs may not bemurdered, mutilated, tortured, and degraded.Individuals and capturing nations are responsiblefor acts committed against EPWs and CI that arein violation of the Geneva Convention.

The EPWs and CIs are entitled to respect andhonor as human beings. They are to be protectedagainst acts of violence, insults, public curiosity,and reprisals. They are not to be subjected tophysical mutilation or to medical or scientificexperimentation, only normal medical, dental, orhospital treatment.

No form of coercion may be inflicted uponEPWs and CIs to obtain information. Those whorefuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted,

or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageoustreatment. Female EPWs and CIs are to receivetreatment at least as favorable as that accorded tomale EPWs and CIs.

United States GoverningPolicy of the Geneva Convention

In accordance with the Geneva Convention, USpolicy directs that EPWs and other enemy per-sonnel captured, interned, detained, or held incustody during the course of a conflict shall beafforded humanitarian care and treatment fromthe moment of custody until final release or repa-triation. The observance of this policy is bindingon US personnel.

This policy also applies to the protection ofdetained or interned personnel whether their sta-tus is that of prisoner of war, CIs, or a criminalsuspected of a war crime. The punishment ofcriminals is administered by due process of lawand under legally constituted authority. Theadministration of inhumane treatment, even ifcommitted under stress of combat and with deepprovocation, is a serious and punishable viola-tion under national law, international law, andthe UCMJ.

Personnel Categories

Detainees

The term detainee means any person captured,detained, held, or otherwise under the control ofDOD personnel (military, civilian, or contractor).Detainees may also include ECs (lawful [i.e.,EPWs] and unlawful), RPs, and CIs (see DODD2310.01E). It does not include personnel beingheld for law enforcement purposes, except wherethe United States is the occupying power.

Enemy CombatantsAn EC is a person engaged in hostilities againstthe United States or its coalition partners during


an armed conflict. The term EC includes bothlawful ECs and unlawful ECs.

Lawful ECs, who are entitled to protectionsunder the Geneva Convention, include membersof the regular armed forces of a state party to theconflict; militia, volunteer corps, and organizedresistance movements belonging to a state partyto the conflict, which are under responsible com-mand, wear a fixed distinctive sign recognizableat a distance, carry their arms openly, and abideby the laws of war; and members of regulararmed forces who profess allegiance to a govern-ment or an authority not recognized by thedetaining power.

Lawful ECs are EPWs upon capture, and they areentitled to combatant immunity for their lawfulprecapture warlike acts. They may be prosecuted,however, for violations of the law of war. If soprosecuted, they still retain their status as EPWs.

Unlawful ECs are persons not entitled to combat-ant immunity, who engage in or support actsagainst the United States or its coalition partnersin violation of the laws and customs of war dur-ing an armed conflict. For purposes of the war onterrorism, the term unlawful EC is defined toinclude, but is not limited to, an individual who isor was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaedaforces or associated forces that are engaged inhostilities against the United States or its coali-tion partners.

Enemy Prisoners of WarCaptured enemy personnel may be presumed tobe EPWs immediately upon capture if they arearmed and uniformed. See MCO 3461.1 for moreinformation. Captured personnel must receive thesame treatment to which EPWs are entitled untilcompetent military authority has determined thattheir status is otherwise. The Geneva Conventiondefines EPWs as the following:

Members of the enemy armed forces, as wellas members of militias or volunteer corpsforming part of such armed forces.

Members of other militias and members ofother volunteer corps, including those of orga-nized resistance movements, belonging to anenemy power and operating in or outside theirown territory, even if this territory is occupied,provided that such militias or volunteer corps,including such organized resistance move-ments, fulfill the following conditions:

That of being commanded by a person respon-sible for his subordinates.That of having a fixed distinctive sign recog-nizable at a distance. That of carrying arms openly.That of conducting their operations in accor-dance with the laws and customs of war.

Members of enemy regular armed forces whoprofess allegiance to a government or anauthority not recognized by the detainingpower.Persons who accompany the armed forces ofthe enemy without actually being membersthereof, such as civilian members of militaryaircraft crews, war correspondents, supply con-tractors, members of labor units, or of servicesresponsible for the welfare of the enemy armedforces, provided that they have received autho-rization from the armed forces which they areaccompanying.Members of crews, including masters, pilots,and apprentices, of the merchant marine andthe crews of civil aircraft of the enemy power,who do not benefit by more favorable treat-ment under any other provisions of interna-tional law.Inhabitants of nonoccupied territory, who, onthe approach of US forces, spontaneously takeup arms to resist the invading forces, withouthaving had time to form themselves into regulararmed units, provided they carry arms openlyand respect the laws and customs of war.Persons belonging, or having belonged, to thearmed forces of a country occupied by USforces, if the commander considers it necessaryby reason of such allegiance to intern them, eventhough they may have been originally liberatedfrom EPW status while hostilities were going onoutside the occupied territory.

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Civilian InterneesA CI is a civilian who is interned during anarmed conflict, occupation, or other militaryoperation for security reasons, for protection, orbecause he has committed an offense against thedetaining power. Such individuals, unless theyhave committed acts for which they are consid-ered unlawful combatants, generally qualify forprotected status in accordance with the GenevaConvention, which also establishes proceduresthat must be observed when depriving such civil-ians of their liberty. The CIs are to be accommo-dated separately from EPWs and personsdeprived of liberty for any other reason.

Retained PersonAn RP is a special category for medical personneland chaplains because of their special skills andtraining. Although they are not EPWs, they maybe retained by the detaining power to aid EPWs,preferably those of the armed force to which theRP belongs. Per the Geneva Convention, RPs willreceive the same benefits and protection asEPWs. An RP is a person who falls within one ofthe following categories:

A person who is a member of the medical ser-vice of an enemy armed force.A medical person of an enemy force exclu-sively engaged in—

Searching, collecting, transporting, or treat-ing wounded or sick personnel.Preventing disease.Administering a medical unit or establish-ment.

A chaplain attached to an enemy armed force.A member of the International Federation ofRed Cross and Red Crescent Societies oranother voluntary aid organization. The organi-zation must be duly recognized and authorizedby its government. The staff may be employedin the same duties as medical personnel if theorganization is subject to military laws andregulations.

The following privileges and considerations areextended to RPs because of their professions:

Correspondence privileges that are over andabove those afforded to EPWs.Facilities to provide medical care, spiritualassistance, and welfare services to EPWs.Transportation for periodic visits to EPWbranch internment or resettlement facilities andhospitals outside the EPW internment or reset-tlement facility to carry out medical, spiritual,and welfare duties.Work assignments that are restricted to medi-cal and religious duties that they are qualifiedto perform.Quarters that are separate from EPW quarters,when practicable.

United States Military Confinees

Military police have a continuing mission todetain, sustain, protect, and evacuate US militaryconfinees. In CONUS, corrections specialists arethe primary performers of this mission.

During contingency operations, a correctionsdetachment is the ideal organization to performUS military prisoner internment operations. TheUS Army is the executive agent for US militaryprisoners. These confinees must be segregatedfrom the EPWs and CIs and evacuated as rapidlyas possible to a US Army facility.

During a deployment or contingency operation,when possible, Marines awaiting trial remainwith their respective units unless they are a haz-ard to the mission, themselves, or others. In thesecases, they are detained in pretrial confinementunder MP control. These confinees are moved toconfinement facilities outside the combat zonewhen possible.

Dislocated Civilians

A DC is a civilian who left his homes for variousreasons. His movements and physical presencecan hinder military operations and he most likely


requires some degree of aid (e.g., medicine,food, shelter, clothing). A DC may not be nativeto the area or to the country where he is resid-ing. Dislocated civilian is a generic term that isfurther subdivided into the following categories:

Displaced person. A displaced person has beendislocated because of war, a natural disaster, orpolitical or economic turmoil. Consequently,the motivation for civilians to flee and estab-lish status under international and domesticlaws may vary, as does the degree of assistancerequired, and the location for relief operations. Refugee. The United Nations ConventionRelating to the Status of Refugees states that arefugee is a person who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons ofrace, religion, nationality, membership in aparticular social group, or political opinion, isoutside the country of his nationality, and isunable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling toavail himself of the protection of that country.”Evacuee. An evacuee is a civilian who isremoved from his place of residence by mili-tary direction because of personal security orother requirements of the military situation.Stateless person. A stateless person is a civilianwho has been denationalized, whose country oforigin cannot be determined, or who cannotestablish his right to the nationality claimed.War victim. A war victim is a civilian who suf-fered an injury, a loss of a family member, ordamage to or destruction of his home becauseof war.Migrant. A migrant is a worker who movesfrom one region to another—by chance,instinct, or plan.Internally displaced person. An internally dis-placed person may have been forced to flee hishome for the same reasons as a refugee, but hehas not crossed an internationally recognizedborder.Expellee. An expellee is a civilian who is out-side the boundaries of his country of nationalityor ethnic origin and is being forcibly repatri-ated to that country or a third country for politi-cal or other purposes.

Until their status is determined, the DCs are ini-tially processed and handled the same as EPWsand CIs. Civil affairs units, in coordination withHN authorities, work to resettle DCs and refu-gees. Military police support these efforts byassisting in the collection, evacuation, and reset-tlement of these persons. During operations, mili-tary police ensure that DC and refugee trafficdoes not adversely affect military maneuver andmobility by redirecting these persons out ofharm’s way. The DC camps are established in thesame manner as EPW and CI facilities. Whendetainees are contained in a facility for extendedperiods, dissatisfaction and restlessness mayresult. Commanders and military police shouldexpect and be prepared for demonstrations, dis-turbances, or riots. Effective communication andrumor control measures, coupled with profes-sional, humane treatment by security forces, willminimize the possibility and severity of distur-bances in the internee population.

Military police conduct straggler control opera-tions to assist commanders in maintaining com-bat strength by locating and returning stragglers totheir units. Military police locate stragglers atTCPs, checkpoints, roadblocks, defiles, or whileon patrol. For large numbers of stragglers, specialposts and collection points are set up along MSRsor military police can operate straggler posts atestablished TCPs, checkpoints, and roadblocks.

To expedite movement on MSRs, military policeconduct DC control operations. Although the HNusually takes measures to control the movementof their populations during a conflict, a massiveflow of civilians can seriously affect the move-ment or security of military units. If needed, mili-tary police redirect or prevent the movement ofcivilians when their location, direction of move-ment, or actions hinder military activity. Duringcontrol operations, military police direct DCs tosecondary roadways and areas not being used bymilitary forces.

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Detainee Operations

Objectives of Detainee Operations

Under the provisions of the Geneva Convention,a capturing power is responsible, from themoment of capture or apprehension, for properand humane treatment of detainees. The use ofbiometric systems should be leveraged during allphases of detention operations for optimum orga-nizational purposes. The EPW and CI detain-ment operations must provide for—

Implementation of the Geneva Conventionprovisions.Humane and efficient care and full account-ability for persons captured or detainedbecause of foreign military or related opera-tions.Appropriate support of the military objectivesof the United States.

Principles of Detainee Operations

To achieve detainee operations objectives, mili-tary police employ the following principles:

Employ humane treatment.Support prompt evacuation from the combatzone.Provide instruction to troops on the provisionsof international agreements and regulationsrelating to EPWs and CIs.Support integration of procedures for EPWand CI evacuation, control, and administrationwith other combat, combat support, and com-bat service support operations.

Detainee Functions

Military police, via the PM or MP staff officer,assist the MAGTF commander in the develop-ment of plans, policies, and procedures pertainingto EPWs and CIs. During operations, militarypolice focus their efforts on collecting, safeguard-ing, processing, evacuating, and transferring

EPWs and CIs. Specific guidance on legal andcapturing unit requirements for EPW handlingprocedures can be found in MCO 3461.1.

Detention

Although detainees are normally interned by theUS Army, in some situations the Marine Corpsmay be assigned a detention mission. Detaineesare selectively assigned to appropriate detentionfacilities that best meet the needs of the detain-ing power and the detainee. Some detainees(e.g., ECs) that hold violent opposing ideologiesare held in separate facilities in an effort to iso-late them from the general population and pre-empt any unforeseen problems. Once they havebeen assigned to a facility, they may be furthersegregated because of nationality, language, orother reasons. Within each facility, detainees arefurther segregated into the following categories:

Leaders—both perceived status and positionsof authority.Hostile elements (e.g., mutually hostile reli-gious, political, ethnic groups).Security risks (e.g., agitators, radicals, uncoop-erative detainees).Suspected criminals.Civilian from military.Military by rank (i.e., officers, noncommis-sioned officers, enlisted).Deserters and those who surrendered fromthose who resisted capture.Minors and females. If possible, keep smallchildren with their mothers.Adult males.Groups of CIs, RPs, or EC, if known.Nationality.Other persons (not noted in one of the previouscategories).

When segregating detainees by the preceding cat-egories they may be further assigned to separatecompounds. Females are always interned in com-pounds separate from males. Further separationmay be necessary, depending upon security issues.


As general policy for the conduct and sustainmentof detainee operations at detention facilities, educa-tional, religious, recreational, safety, agricultural,and employment and work programs should beencouraged and supported. These programs will bebased upon practicality, operational consider-ations, and type of detainees held. When possible,adequate facilities, instructional materials, and rec-reational equipment will be provided for suchactivities.

Civilian Internee Operations

Military police collect, process, evacuate, safe-guard, and, if established, transfer CIs to USArmy internment camps. The handling of CIs andEPWs is similar; however, CIs are normally notprocessed or interned with EPWs. The CI campsprovide for separate internment and completeadministration of interned civilians. These campsare operated in the same manner as EPW facili-ties, with regard given to the fundamental differ-ences between the two categories. For example,special consideration is given to the age, physicalcondition, and the ability of civilians to adjust todetainment conditions. Separate quarters are pro-vided for family groups when the detainment ofmore than one member of a family is necessary.

The conditions for internment of civilian personsin a CI camp is authorized and directed if suchpersons satisfy the requirements for CI status andone of the following two conditions applies:

Internment has been determined by competentauthority to be necessary for imperative rea-sons of security to US forces in the occupiedterritory.Internment has been directed by a properlyconstituted military court, sitting in the occu-pied territory, as the sentence for the convictionof an offense in violation of penal provisionsproperly promulgated by the occupying force.

Detainee Processing

Depending upon the number of EPWs and CIsanticipated, military police are likely to requireaugmentation. An MP platoon can guard up to500 captives and a company can guard up to 2,000during limited, short-term detainee operations at acollection point or temporary holding area. Duringdetainee operations, military police—

Perform security tasks (e.g., searching, segre-gating).Conduct field processing (e.g., security, medi-cal, evacuation)Execute collection control measures (e.g., deliverdetainees).

Security Tasks

Military police receive EPWs and CIs from oper-ating forces as far forward as possible. Whenreceiving prisoners, military police perform thesecurity tasks detailed in the following paragraphs.

Receiving and SecuringThe detainee is received from the capturing com-mand and secured to prevent escape, or harm tothe detainee or capturing unit personnel. Restraintdevices are applied to limit detainee movementand prepare for additional processing. Militarypolice treat EPWs and CIs humanely, but firmly,at all times. To maintain control and ensureunderstanding, military police issue instructionsto EPWs and CIs in their native language. Theseinstructions also include a warning of the seriousconsequences that may result from violations ofsuch instructions. While detained, captives maycomplain about the food, clothing, living condi-tions, or their treatment. Displays of conflict mustbe brought under control quickly and properlyand the offenders segregated and isolated. Byquickly restoring order using the force continuum,military police can maintain effective control of

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EPWs and CIs. Excessive force provides the cap-tives a rallying point for future disturbances andcan be the basis for enemy propaganda. Tocounter disruptions, military police develop andrehearse plans for defusing tense situations, han-dling unruly captives, and quelling riots.

SearchingThe detainee is searched to neutralize him byconfiscation of weapons, personal items, anditems of potential intelligence or evidentiaryvalue. Military police search each EPW and CI assoon as they are captured or received and when-ever custody is transferred. Searching is con-ducted for the safety of friendly forces anddetained persons; to gather information; and toconfiscate weapons, documents, and contrabandensuring that procedures for evidence collectionand property accountability are strictly followed.

TaggingEach detainee will be tagged using DD Form2745, Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) CaptureTag, which provides the only official detaineetracking number prior to receiving an internmentserial number (ISN). All confiscated items will belinked to the detainee using the ISN.

SegregatingMilitary police segregate EPWs and CIs into sepa-rate groups of officers, noncommissioned officers,enlisted, civilians, and males and females. Segreg-ation, and the resulting interruption of the enemychain of command, is crucial to the security andcontrol of prisoners. Detainees are prevented fromcommunicating with one another or from makingaudible clamor, such as chanting, singing, or pray-ing. Uncooperative detainees are silenced by muf-fling them as appropriate. The EPWs and CIs mayalso be silenced to prevent them from planningescapes or disruptions.

SafeguardingSafeguarding refers to the MP obligation to pro-tect the safety of detainees and ensure the custodyand integrity of confiscated items. Military policemust safeguard detainees against combat haz-ards, from conflict with each other, and fromimproper treatment. Military police also safe-guard EPWs and CIs by ensuring that theyreceive humane treatment. It is the responsibilityof the unit that captures and holds detained per-sons to ensure their safety throughout all phasesof detention operations.

EvacuatingMilitary police quickly transport detainees fromtheir point of capture to collection points to avoidrisks associated with that location. Speedyremoval from familiar surroundings lessens thelikelihood of an attempted escape and reduces theexposure of the detainee to the battlefield. Tofacilitate the rapid movement of EPWs and CIs tocollection points, military police make maximumuse of available transportation.

Field Processing

During the performance of their security tasks,military police are responsible for field process-ing of the detainees (e.g., medical care, evacua-tion, temporary holding areas).

Proper field processing of detainees, EPWs, CIs,and their associated evidence and property isessential for security and effective control of pris-oners and intelligence gathering purposes. Pro-cessing also helps to establish the condition andwelfare requirements of detainees, EPWs, and CIs.Field processing actions include the following:

Individual searches.Segregation and interrogation.Sanitation.Medical care.


Classification.Evacuation.Temporary holding areas.Security.

Individual SearchesImmediately upon capture, detainees, EPWs, andCIs must be disarmed and searched for concealedweapons and for equipment and documents ofparticular intelligence value. Detainees should besearched each time custody is transferred andsearches should be documented.

During this phase of processing, items that maybe of interest to intelligence personnel are confis-cated by the military police and turned over tointerrogation teams. Military police work closelywith military intelligence teams to determine ifcaptives and their equipment have intelligencevalue. Normally military police permit detainees,EPWs, and CIs to retain personal effects whileretaining and documenting unauthorized itemsand contraband in accordance with theater regula-tions and the MAGTF SOP. Examples of personalitems that are normally permitted to be retainedon the detainee’s person include the following:

Money.Valuables.Protective equipment (e.g., helmets, protectivemasks).Articles used for clothing or eating, with theexception of knives and forks.Identification cards or tags.Badges of grade and nationality.Articles having a personal or sentimental value,to include religious items.

Segregation and InterrogationOnly trained and certified intelligence personnelwill conduct intelligence interrogations. In accor-dance with DODD 3115.09, DOD personnelresponsible for detention operations, including

military police, security forces, master at arms,and other individuals providing security fordetainees, are responsible for ensuring the safetyand well-being of detainees in their custody inaccordance with applicable law and policy. Theywill not directly participate in the conduct ofintelligence interrogations.

SanitationMilitary police provide detainees, EPWs, and CIwith sanitation facilities and supplies as soon aspossible to permit them to disinfest themselvesand their clothing. Soap and washing facilities arealso made available when possible.

Medical CareMilitary police coordinate and ensure that medicalcare, equipment, and supplies are administered todetainees, EPWs, and CIs. Although they are notnormally assigned to medical facilities to processor guard captives, military police may be tasked toescort prisoners to medical facilities for care. Mili-tary police process these captives after medicalpersonnel classify their physical condition.

ClassificationBefore evacuation, detainees, EPWs, and CIs aremedically classified as walking wounded, non-walking wounded, or sick. Walking wounded andsick are evacuated through MP evacuation chan-nels. Nonwalking wounded and sick are deliveredto the nearest medical aid station and evacuatedthrough medical channels.

EvacuationMilitary police coordinate the prompt evacuationof detainees, EPWs, and CIs out of the bat-tlespace. The evacuation chain moves from theforward collection point to the rear area holdingareas. In a joint operation, detainees, EPWs, andCIs are moved to a US Army internment camp.

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While in a multinational environment, detaineesmay be transferred to forces from other nations.

Throughout the evacuation process, militarypolice treat detainees, EPWs, and CIs humanelyby ensuring that—

They are not used to shield areas or facilitiesfrom attack.They are not retained for psychological opera-tions.Food (e.g., religiously appropriate), potablewater, appropriate clothing, shelter, and medi-cal attention are provided if necessary.They are provided protective facilities andequipment in case of CBRN attack.Rigorous security is maintained to preventescape and to protect US forces.The ability to conduct religious practices (e.g.,prayer) is provided.

Temporary Holding Areas When distances or conditions preclude the com-pletion of detainee, EPW, and CI movement,

military police may establish temporary holdingareas along the evacuation route. If possible, mil-itary police select existing facilities that provideshelter from the elements as well as a perimeterfence, wall, or other barrier for security.

SecuritySpecific guidance concerning security require-ments during the evacuation process, as well asother information on internment operations, can befound in Field Manual (FM) 3-19.40, Internment/Resettlement Operations.

When and where appropriate, NLWs should beused by properly trained personnel. See Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3121.01B(S) (NOTAL), Standing Rules of Engagement forUS Forces/Standing Rules for the Use of Force,and MCWP 3-15.8 for more information concern-ing the employment of NLWs.

Once field processing is completed, the militarypolice are responsible for delivery of the detaineesto collection points, as appropriate.

Trench or CoverFightingPosition

Construction Supplies Barbed wire Concertina Long and short pickets Staples and anchors Water cans (5 gallon)

W

L

LatrineTrench or coverTriple strand concertinaWater

Figure 6-1. Initial Collection Point.


Collection Control Measures

To support EPW and CI collection and evacua-tion efforts, military police establish initial col-lection points, central collection points, andholding areas. Normally, military police estab-lish and operate collection points to the immedi-ate rear area of forward uni ts in a l inearbattlespace or near supported units in a nonlin-ear battlespace, but they may be located wher-ever they are needed. If possible, collectionpoints should be located near MSRs to ease themovement of detainees, EPWs, and CIs to thenext echelon of detainment and to facilitate thetransportation of supplies and medical support.Once transported to the collection areas, militarypolice will use the appropriate biometrics sys-tems and tools, such as biometric automatedtoolsets, to identify, track, and documentdetainee information.

Initial Collection Point Military police set up and operate initial collec-tion points to receive prisoners quickly fromoperating forces and to support the pace of theoperations as shown in figure 6-1. The establish-ment of initial collection points allows for therapid transfer of the custody of captives by cap-turing forces, without hindering their own com-bat effectiveness. At initial collection points,military police conduct security tasks, processand secure the captives, and prepare them forevacuation to a central collection point or hold-ing area. Every detainee should be processed init-ially with a capture tag and assigned an ISN assoon as possible.

The size of the initial collection point enclosureand the placement of internal facilities, services(e.g., water, latrine, trench, cover), and forceprotection vary based upon the situation. Sup-plies and instructions on components are dis-cussed in FM 5-34, Engineer Field Data.

Construction Supplies Barbed wire Concertina GP medium tent* Long and short pickets Staples and anchors Water cans (5 gallon)

Fighting positionGP medium tent**Latrine**Triple strand concertinaTrench or cover**Water**

To receiving andprocessing area

156’

152’

15’ 15’

31’

13’

16’ x 33’

** Tent, water, latrine, and trench or cover in each compound

* 20 EPW per GP medium tent authorized

GP = general purpose

Figure 6-2. Central Collection Point.

6-12 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

The duration of stay at each echelon is driven bysecurity, operational conditions, availability oftransportation, and theater regulations. For exam-ple, the exploitation of intelligence from adetainee at the tactical level may require theholding unit to maintain the detainee for anunspecified time. Throughout each phase ofdetention operations, and between each echelonof custody, it is critical that the humane treatmentof detained persons remains consistent and thatstrict accountability of detainees, property, andevidence is maintained.

Central Collection PointA central collection point is larger than an initialcollection point, but the considerations for setupand operations are the same. The detainees,EPWs, and CIs are held at central collectionpoints until they can be transferred to holding

areas. Military police use existing structures whenpossible to reduce construction requirements asshown in figure 6-2. The size, compound configu-ration, placement of internal facilities, field pro-cessing site, and military intelligence screeningsite vary based upon the situation. Instructions forthe use of triple strand concertina wire can befound in FM 5-34. Central collection points willbe established as required.

Holding AreasA holding area is a temporary structure, building,or enclosed area, where detainees, EPWs, and CIsare held pending further evacuation. Holdingareas accommodate more captives for longerstays than collection points. Most holding areas,like collection points, are temporary facilities thatmust be able to move with little or no notice.Prisoners are interrogated and detained in holding

Receivingand fieldprocessing

Intelligence/screening andinterrogation

20’

20’

20’ 20’ 20’

316’

372’

CC

126’

156’

CC

30’

30’

20’

20’

20’

10’

10’

30’

30’

20’

20’

20’

10’

10’

50’

10’

30’

30’

20’

20’

20’

10’

10’

30’

30’

20’

20’

20’

10’

10’

50’

10’

20’

10’

20’

20’

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10’

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30’ 30’

30’ 30’

20’

20’

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10’

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50’

CC

10’

20’

20’

20’

10’

10’

30’ 30’

30’ 30’

20’

20’

20’

10’

10’CC

50’

10 ft wooden gateCenterline/separationCoverBarbed wireGP medium tentLatrineTriple strand concertinaWater

GP = general purpose

Construction Supplies Barbed wire Concertina Long and short pickets Staples and anchors

Figure 6-3. Holding Area.


areas until they can be evacuated further to therear. Although holding areas are temporary facili-ties, captives may remain at a holding area untilthey can be moved to a more permanent detain-ment facility.

Usually one holding area is set up to supporteach MAGTF conducting operations. The firstconsideration in the selection of an EPW hold-ing area is that it be adjacent to the evacuationroute (i.e., MSR). Related considerations includethe location of suitable existing facilities, prox-imity to supply areas, and protection from enemyactivities. Holding areas are operated on an aus-tere basis and should be designed to meet theminimum requirements necessary for the tempo-rary retention of detainees, EPWs, and CIs. Fig-ure 6-3 is an example of a holding area withfour, 120-person segregation compounds. Thisarea includes receiving, field processing, screen-ing, and intelligence collection sites.

Detainee Reporting System

The Detainee Reporting System (DRS) is themandated detainee accountability database for allDOD agencies and operations. The DRS may notbe used in multinational operations. The keyfunctions of the DRS at a detention facility andRDF include the following:

Assigning ISNs.Documenting detainee transfers, releases, andrepatriations.Recording detainee deaths.Recording detainee escapes.

The timely and accurate reporting of data throughthe DRS is critical in order to ensure detaineeaccountability. As detainees are collected andprocessed, the Geneva Convention require thattheir information be forwarded to the appropriateauthorities and failure to do so may bringunwanted scrutiny upon the US Government forneglecting its duties under international laws.

The National Detainee Reporting Center (NDRC)is the executive agent designated by the US ArmyOffice of the Provost Marshal General to receiveand archive all detainee information. The NDRCprovides detainee information to the ICRC to ful-fill US obligations under the Geneva Conventionand various agencies in the DA, DOD, the FederalBureau of Investigation, and the Congress of theUnited States. The NDRC’s principal responsibil-ity is to ensure the collection, storage, and appro-priate dissemination of detainee information asrequired by MCO 3461.1, and DODD 2310.01E.The NDRC directs the development of a DRS andissues blocks of ISNs to theater detainee report-ing centers (TDRCs).

The TDRCs function as field operations agenciesfor the NDRC. They report all detainee datadirectly to the NDRC. The TDRCs are responsiblefor maintaining information on all detainees andtheir personal property within an assigned table oforganization. They obtain and store informationconcerning all detainees in the custody of the USArmed Forces. This also includes detainees cap-tured by US Armed Forces and transferred toother powers for detention or those received fromother powers for detention by US forces—eithertemporarily or permanently. The TDRCs serve astheater repositories for information pertaining todetainee accountability and ensure the implemen-tation of DOD policy. They provide both the ini-tial and replenishment blocks of ISNs to the unitsperforming detainee operations in-theater as theyare needed and will request additional blocks ofISNs from the NDRC as needed. The detentionfacility and RDF request ISNs from the TDRCand forward all information concerning the detain-ees to the TDRC.

Once an ISN is issued, the issuing activity shouldprovide detainee information to the TDRC. TheISN will be used as the primary means of identi-fication throughout the detainee's detention. It isused to link the detainee with biometric data,personal property, medical information, andissued equipment.

6-14 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

Internment Serial Number

The ISN is the DOD-mandated identificationnumber used to account for and/or track detainees(see fig. 6-4). Once an ISN is assigned, it is usedon all detainee documentation. The ISN is gener-ated by the DRS. The DRS is the only approvedsystem for maintaining detainee accountability. Itis the central data-point system used for report-ing to the national level and sharing detaineeinformation with other authorized agencies. TheISNs are normally issued within 14 days of cap-ture, regardless of where detainees are held, oraccording to applicable policy. The followingcomponents comprise the ISN:

Capturing power—a two-digit alpha charactercode representing the capturing power. Onlycountry codes found in the Defense Intelli-gence Agency Manual 58-12, The Depart-ment of Defense Human Intelligence System,are used.Theater code—a one-digit number representingthe command/theater under which the detaineecame into US custody.Power served—a two-digit alpha character coderepresenting the country that the detainee isfighting for. Only country codes found withinthe Defense Intelligence Agency Manual 58-12are used.

Sequence number—a unique six-digit numberassigned exclusively to an individual detainee.The DRS assigns these numbers sequentially.If a detainee dies, is released, repatriated,transferred, or escapes, the detainee’s numberis not reissued during the same conflict.Detainee classification—a two- or three-digita lpha charac te r code represen t ing thedetainee’s classification. Current classificationsare CI, RP, and EC.

The detainee information is reported through theTDRC to the NDRC. The TDRC is collocatedwith the commander of the detainee operations.This may be at the detention facility or RDF if nocommander of the detainee operat ions isappointed. Once the DRS creates an ISN, nocomponent may be changed or corrected at the-ater level without approval from the NDRC. Allchanges to ISNs must be requested in writing andapproved by the NDRC.

When required by law and/or policy, the NDRCprovides detainee information (e.g., point of cap-ture, country of origin, injury status, internmentstatus) to the ICRC to satisfy the obligations of theGeneva Convention. The ICRC uses this detaineeinformation to give the detainee’s status to hisrespective government. Commanders shouldattempt to standardize the tracking of detainees

US9AF-000234RP

Capturing Power

Theater Code

Sequence Number

Power Served

Detainee Classification

Figure 6-4. Internment Serial Number.


from the point of capture through the issuance ofan ISN. The number assigned by DD Form 2745is the only authorized tracking number that maybe used before the assignment of an ISN. After anISN is assigned, previously completed documentsshould be annotated with the assigned ISN. Forexample, medical channels should use the DDForm 2745 number first and then use the ISN oncean ISN has been issued to the detainee. The DRSwill cross-reference the ISN and the DD Form2745 numbers for administrative purposes.

If a detainee is inadvertently issued a secondISN (e.g., due to clerical error, recapture), theprocessing personnel will contact the NDRC,which will correct the sequence, since gaps arenot permitted in the official records and number-ing of detainees.

Detainee IdentificationBand and Identification Badge

The requirements for identifying a detainee byname and ISN are many and varied. Among themore common reasons are—

Verifying detainee rosters against the actualcompound population.Identifying compound work details.Matching detainees with their individual medi-cal records.

Checking the identities of detainees to be trans-ferred or released against actual transfer rosters.Tracking through medical channels.

The detainee identification band or badge (e.g.,produced by biometric automated tool sets) permitsrapid and reliable identification of each detainee.Identification bands or badges enhance facilityadministration and operation. The detainee's ISNand last name are recorded on the identificationband and secured to the detainee’s left wrist. If theappropriate bands are not available, a medicalwristband or similar item may be used.

When the identification band has serious deterio-ration or the ISN and name are obscured, theidentification band will be replaced with a newone. Periodic random checks of detainee identifi-cation bands will detect normal wear and tear andany efforts to destroy the bands. When inspect-ing for normal wear and tear, also check for anyevidence of detainees exchanging bands. Suchexchanges are very possible and should beexpected; however, removal of the identificationband by the original wearer will result in damagethat is easily detected. When positive identifica-tion is essential, such as for transfer or hospital-ization, the identification band should beexamined carefully for any evidence of such tam-pering. Additionally, periodic routine inspectionswill be conducted of randomly selected identifi-cation bands during compound inspections or atother opportune times. These random inspectionswill help detect any attempt to tamper with orexchange an identification band.

CHAPTER 7PLANNING AND TRAINING

Military police SNCOs and commissioned offic-ers provide both MP specialized and generalplanning and training support at the MEF, MEFMSC, and company levels. Each MSC has a staffnoncommissioned and commissioned officerassigned to provide MP planning, training, coor-dination, and oversight. Specialized support isprimarily located in the MEF with the MP sup-port company under the MEF headquarters group.If additional planning, training, or MP support isrequired beyond the organic capability of MSCmilitary police, the MSCs should request supportfrom the MEF. The Marine Corps establishes andtask organizes in-lieu-of MP units when require-ments for MP units exceed MP unit availability.In-lieu-of MP units are non-MP units trained toconduct certain MP tasks.

Planning

The planning efforts of the military police reflectthe combination of the multiple and diversecapabilities of all participants in a joint, inter-agency, or multinational environment. Militarypolice keep lines of communications open andprovide coordination to offset the cultural chal-lenges presented by this interoperability. Suchchallenges include the following:

Political objectives differences.Capabilities differences.Cultural and language differences.Legal and policy constraints.Media involvement and impacts.Compromising sensitive processes, procedures,and equipment.Command and control.Communications (e.g., digital, analog equipmentdifferences).

Considering these challenges, MP plans mustalso accommodate the differences involved whenplanning functional capabilities and consider thedifferent actions encountered in transitionsthroughout the full range of military operations.The MP leaders must understand how to connectoperational objectives to tactical tasks. Bydescribing their objectives and grouping them bydesired and undesired effects within the AO, MPforce planners can help guide the initial analysis.This, along with the commander’s intent andplanning guidance, helps MP staffs identifypotential tasks and functions for military police.

In addition to defining MP forces and resources,interaction with other agencies must be consid-ered. Coordination is the key to mission successin joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and mul-tinational operations. Extensive communicationwith the civil support staff and planners aids inthe coordination of issues; therefore, MP effortsmay require contact with the following nonmili-tary agencies:

Government organizations.Interagency law enforcement organizations.Nongovernmental organizations.International organizations.International humanitarian organizations.HN authorities and agencies.

The MEF, MEF MSC MP officers, and SNCOsprovide MEF- and MSC-level planning. Addi-tionally, the MEF MP support company andMEF MSC MP companies provide planning sup-port to individual units within the MEF and MEFMSC. If MP planning requirements exceed theMSC’s capability, support should be requestedfrom the MEF.

7-2 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

Interagency Coordination

By understanding the influence of other agencies,commanders can add diplomatic, informational,and economic depth to their military efforts. Thecapabilities of the US military allow other agenciesto interact with foreign powers from a position ofstrength and security. Unified action of all USGovernmental organizations is a desired end statein any conflict. In order to achieve this end state,commanders must recognize the challenges associ-ated with interagency cooperation and proactivelymitigate the friction inherent in interagency oper-ations with effective prior planning, coordination,and training. Military police provide a vital linkagebetween the commander and interagency lawenforcement agencies. Military police support thecommander’s intent through the conduct of inter-agency coordination and liaison at the lowest oper-ational levels in order to resolve potential conflictsand maximize the benefits of unified action.

Training of In-Lieu-of-Forces

Military police provide MP mission-orientedtraining for Marines assigned as in-lieu-of MPforces or when Marines have been assigned amission that requires specialized skills (e.g., evi-dence collection, site exploitation, TQ, detentionoperations). When the Marine Corps fields in-lieu-of MP units, it is recommended that MPSMEs fill key staff positions in these units to pro-vide critical MOS expertise. In-lieu-of forces lackthe requisite training, knowledge, and experienceto provide all of the MP doctrinal functionsrequired in a deployed environment.

Military police predeployment training shouldfocus on specific assigned tasks, such as LDO.Ideally, in-lieu-of MP units will be embeddedwith MP subject mater experts who would par-ticipate in unit predeployment training anddeploy with the unit to theater. Predeploymenttraining should include the equipment that is cur-rently being used at the in-theater location of

deployment. In-lieu-of MP units should incorpo-rate scenario-based training that includes use offriendly force tracker, biometrics, electroniccountermeasures equipment, force continuumTTP, and IED detection and response. Marinesshould also experience training that simulatesconditions in the AO, for example—

Handling differences that are associated withHMMWVs [high-mobility multipurpose-wheeled vehicles] that have the additionalweight of added armor.Enduring cramped quarters for tasks that last12 or more hours, while wearing the requiredpersonal protective equipment.

In-lieu-of MP forces should receive both predeploy-ment and during deployment training as follows:

Basic in-lieu-of MP training should be accom-plished prior to the deployment and follow-ontraining should be accomplished during thedeployment after arriving in-theater.Basic in-lieu-of MP training should be accom-plished by the military police organic to theMEF MSC, if available, and the MEF, if notavailable. Additional support should berequested if the requirement is beyond theMEF's ability to support. Basic MP skills train-ing should focus on the individual and collec-tive tasks necessary for anticipated missionsper NAVMC 3500.10, Military Police andCorrections Training and Readiness Manual.Follow-on MP training should focus on spe-cific mission tasks after the mission analysishas been completed.Refresher MP training should be accom-plished by an organic MP (i.e., MP detachmentassigned to a command or unit) detachmentwhile en route, if possible.An operational MP unit already deployed in-the-ater could provide a mobile training team (MTT)to train an in-lieu-of MP force once in-theater.Teacher-to-student ratio should be 1 to 25,which is in accordance with Training and Edu-cation Command’s standard student-instructorratio for classroom instruction.


The following MP training in CONUS occursduring predeployment:

MP training for designated in-lieu-of militarypolice is conducted by the MEF MP supportcompany, MSC MP company, MSC MP staffofficer, MEU MP detachment, or MP MTT.Time should be allowed for the proper trainingand access to additional personnel and equip-ment, if required.Adequate training areas are determined asrequired by mission analysis for the MP train-ing being conducted.MP training occurs during MEU or otherMAGTF workups and preparations required todeploy.The Military Police Center of Excellence hasdeveloped an in-lieu-of MP program ofinstruction and MP course descriptive data.Mojave Viper or an alternative venue, such asCajun Viper, ensures that MP training providesthe in-lieu-of MP appropriate skills and pre-pares the in-lieu-of MP for battle.

During deployment, MP trainers will complete therequired MP training for in-lieu-of MPs. Militarypolice trainers may be sourced from in-theater MPunits or organic MP trainers.

Military Police andLaw Enforcement Training

The MEF MP support company and MEF MSCMP companies can provide specialized training toenhance the skills of deploying Marines for cer-tain missions (e.g., detective, criminal investiga-tions, MP skills, law enforcement skills). It isrecommended that commands integrate lawenforcement training into predeployment trainingprograms and exercises. Reservists who are lawenforcement professionals can be identified andaligned with units to serve as trainers. In order to

gain experience, additional types of training pro-vided for deploying Marines are as follows:

Participating in local, state, and federal lawenforcement organization, providing on-the-job training.Participating in command-coordinated “ride-along” events with local law enforcementorganizations.

Law Enforcement Advisor

The purpose of the law enforcement advisor is toprovide the commander with an experienced lawenforcement perspective on criminal networkenterprise operations within his AO. Based onspecific operational requirements, law enforce-ment advisor personnel may be sourced from theinteragency law enforcement community, con-tracted support (e.g., US Army’s Law Enforce-ment Professional Program), MP, CID, NCIS,Marine Corps reservist, or civilian police officer(with the appropriate depth of applicable lawenforcement training and experience).

The threat confronting deployed forces mayincorporate an operational framework includingguerilla, insurgent, and profit-motivated organi-zations exhibiting strong criminal network char-acteristics. Conventional military forces andassociated information collection methods andanalytical processes, even when augmented withspecial operations experts, lack the full range ofskill sets and experience necessary to under-stand and attack complex criminal and insur-gency networks. Law enforcement advisors withthe requisite anti-criminal, network analytical,and investigative skill sets may be used by USmilitary units when required by the mission.

Law Enforcement Advisor ResponsibilitiesThe responsibilities of law enforcement advisorpersonnel embedded within a Marine Corps unitwill vary according to the requirements of thecommander and the nature of the operation. The

7-4 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

following list provides an overview of law enforce-ment advisor tasks used to effectively understand,identify, target, penetrate, interdict, and suppresscriminal (i.e., insurgent) and IED networks:

Identify criminal hot spots—both meetingplaces and IED locations—and advise com-manders and staffs on methods to recognizesigns of radicalization in assigned AOs.Identify methods to enhance local communityparticipation in police information and intelli-gence gathering.Cultivate community and individual assistanceby understanding the local leadership, centersof influence, and activities within the commu-nity (e.g., normal verses abnormal activity).Identify the threat and AO dynamics throughcultivation of community support networksand identification of deceptive means that maybe employed to source, produce, deliver,emplace, and detonate IEDs.Provide advice and support to deliberate offen-sive actions that result in the ability to effec-tively attack, disrupt, and neutralize criminaland IED networks.Examine, recommend, and support means andactivities that discourage the regeneration ofIED cells, including activities intended to createconfidence and earn the trust of HN and localpopulations.Advise and mentor Marine forces as they col-laborate with and build capacity among HNpolice and security forces.Advise on and support actions that ensure HNlaw enforcement and security forces maintain avisible, capable, responsive, and proactivepresence in order to instill confidence withinthe population.Support JPEC and joint interrogation anddebriefing center operations as required.Serve as the supported battalion commander’slaw enforcement criminal network subjectmatter expert and primary training resource

for police skills in the absence of military lawenforcement personnel.Coordinate directly with law enforcement advi-sor counterparts at higher and subordinateheadquarters and neighboring units to ensurethe unity of effort and synchronization of effort.Apply a law enforcement countercriminal per-spective to the execution of counterinsurgencyoperations to the supported battalion’s area ofresponsibility.Coordinate with HN law enforcement assets tostrengthen and encourage trust, confidence,cooperation, and information sharing betweenlocal assets and the supported unit.Accompany mounted and dismounted patrolson street-level operations in hostile threatenvironments within the supported battalion’sAO to instruct and mentor on law enforcementTTP and to provide immediate feedback andassistance.Participate in TQ and debriefing of suspectsand detainees.Provide assistance to the development ofdetainee packages by the unit or HN lawenforcement and security forces.Coordinate operational and tactical investiga-tions and judge advocate general investiga-tions as directed.Conduct site exploitation.Train, mentor, and advise Marines in conductsof site exploitation.

Law Enforcement Training, Tactics, and ProceduresThe emerging trend involving the blending ofmilitary and law enforcement related TTP isdesigned to enhance warfighting capabilities withspecialized law enforcement skills (e.g., foren-sics, evidence collecting, site exploitation [i.e.,crime scene processing], profiling, TQ). Theapplication of these skills will enable Marines toconfirm and exploit targets, as well as expand theunit’s capability to respond to hybrid threats


across the full range of military operations. Thelaw enforcement TTP will enable Marines to—

Develop the ability to conduct forensics, evi-dence collection, and sensitive site exploitation.Develop the ability to conduct biometrics col-lection and exploitation (e.g., fingerprints, DNA[deoxyribonucleic acid], facial recognition).Develop the ability to conduct AO-specificprofiling.Develop an understanding of criminal networkenterprise operations.Develop criminal and forensic intelligencecapabilities.Develop surveillance skills.Develop tactical interviewing and questioningtechniques.Provide training in criminal patrolling tactics.Identification of insurgents, foreign fighters,criminals, and bombmakers via street contacts,interviews with suspicious people, sources, andcontacts with local community members andthe criminal element on a daily basis.Patrol in active insurgent areas during times ofenemy activity. Maximize efforts and person-nel to attack problem areas. Every patrol has adirected purpose.Vary times and locations of patrols. Concen-trate efforts after dark when insurgents andcriminals conduct IED operations, move weap-ons and explosives, and emplace IEDs torestrict the enemy’s ability to work at night.Display a proactive, aggressive patrol with anoffensive mindset and interview anyone dis-playing suspicious or unusual behavior.Immediately conduct aggressive control tech-niques by checking for weapons, car alarms,cell phones, cameras, large amounts of cash,the digging of holes, and the usage or dealingof drugs.Interdict IED and terrorist and criminal cellsand disrupt the flow of components to buildIEDs and vehicleborne IEDs (e.g., electronics,

long-range cordless phones, satellite phones,cell phones, machine shops, car repair shops,car dealerships).

Training for Units Deployingto Conduct Detention Operations

Units preparing to deploy with a detention opera-tion mission should receive mission-orientedtraining prior to deployment. Training should betailored to the deploying location’s detentionstandard in the AO. Usually the corrections spe-cialists provide the training, sometime aug-mented by the military police, in conjunctionwith either the local MEF corrections specialistsor the MTT.

Training for units deploying to conduct deten-tion operations includes, but is not limited to,the following:

Detention facility or RDF detention operations.Detention facility or RDF guard duties.SROE or rules for the use of force.NLWs.Handcuffing techniques.Detainee transporting, escorting, and release.Temporary detention facilities.Training tailored to the AO standard and inten-sity level requested by the deploying unit.Required training aids, role players, and facili-ties that are conducive to realistic training.Training should be based upon the correctionsinstructor and unit input.Convoy operations scenarios to simulatedetainee transfer and release operations.Riot formations and cell extractions.Specific training on the detention facility orRDF SOP that the unit will use during thedeployment.Language training.Geneva Conventions training.Biometrics and biometric automated tool setsusage.Property accountability.

7-6 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

Evidence handling and processing.Communications.Law of war.

The OICs and SNCOICs also require specificpredeployment training to address their respon-sibilities, reports, and supervisory duties at thedetention facility or RDF.

Personnel Deploying toConduct Detention Operations

Corrections specialists and all other personnelengaged in detention operations shall receive thefollowing minimum predeployment training:

Basic area language training.Rule of law.Criminal mind-set and staff awareness.

Universal precautions on diseases.SRUF and SROE.Contraband and control procedures.Restraint procedures.Accountability procedures.Emergency actions for fire, escape, bombthreats, and disorder.Main gate and sally port procedures.Visitation and escort procedures.Tower guard procedures.Disciplinary and adjustment procedures.Unarmed self-defense.Forced cell move and riot control procedures.NLWs and INIWIC qualification.Biometric automated tool sets.Evidence collection, handling, and storage pro-cedures.Ground transport procedures.Air transport procedures.IED awareness.

APPENDIX ACUSTOMS AND BORDER CLEARANCE PROGRAM

It is DOD policy to assist and cooperate with USand foreign HN border clearance agencies in halt-ing the flow of contraband into the US and for-eign countries and enforcing this policy whenentry is through military channels. This policyapplies to the export of US goods to and throughother countries and enforcement of DOD policyto eliminate the flow of contraband and unaccept-able products to other nations. Areas of enforce-ment include compliance and enforcement of USand foreign laws and regulations and customsrequirements (e.g., agriculture, immigration).

Note: The DOD acknowledges the primacyof the Department of Homeland Security,CBP, and the US Citizenship and Immigra-tion Services over cargo and personnel mov-ing into the CTUS. They also acknowledgethat those officers or inspectors may delay,impound, or otherwise prohibit the entry orexport of military cargo into or from theCTUS, without obstruction by the DOD, theServices, or defense agencies.

Military police provide commanders a highdegree of flexibility through the execution ofcustoms operations. During the execution ofthese operations, commanders and their staff(e .g. , geographic combatant commander,deployed commander, staff officers) should befamiliar with the military customs inspection pro-gram per DODD 5030.49, DOD Customs Inspec-tion Program, and DOD Regulation 4500.9-R,Defense Transportation Regulation (DTR), appli-cable to all international movement of DODcargo and personnel at the time they cross theborder. In the MEF or MAGTF, military policeare trained as military customs inspectors-excepted (MCI-Es) and customs and borderclearance agents (CBCAs). They coordinate withjoint and US Federal agencies to ensure compli-ance with regulations and applicable provisions

of international agreements by detecting andinvestigating violations and conducting inspec-tions concerning the CTUS. Responsibilities,training, and certification needed to performthese duties are detailed in this appendix.

When deemed to be beneficial to the DOD, CBP,or USDA, preclearance programs may be estab-lished. Under certain circumstances (e.g., majorunit rotations, redeployments in conjunction withexercises and contingency operations), cargo andpersonnel returning to the United States can be“precleared” (e.g., inspected and/or certified at thepoint of origin instead of at the US border). Thesepreclearance programs will be initiated only whenthe theater command, United States Transporta-tion Command (USTRANSCOM), and therespective US agency or agencies explicitly agreeto their establishment. Procedures for requestingthe establishment of a preclearance program aredetailed in DOD 4500.9-R, chapter 506.

Responsibilities

Military ServicesEstablishes points of contact for coordinationand implementation of the program withintheir respective components.Ensures that the shipment sponsor’s shippingactivities prepare customs documents (e.g., for-eign country, CBP) for use by carriers and gov-ernment agencies to gain entry or exit for DODshipments. Takes any actions required to correct programdeficiencies.Provides facilities and other assets, throughinter-Service or defense agency support agree-ments, for the performance of customs andborder clearance functions.

A-2 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

Furnishes information to USTRANSCOM toresolve customs and border clearance issues(e.g., preclearances) per DOD 4500.9-R,chapter 506.Provides representation on committees or work-ing groups as requested by USTRANSCOM. Assists USTRANSCOM in the developmentand collection of metrics data and the evalua-tion of the DOD Customs and Border Clear-ance Program (CBCP).Provides customs and border clearance docu-ments necessary for entry officials to clear per-sonnel and cargo entering or exiting the UnitedStates or foreign countries.Follows the theater, destination, and in-transitcountry national customs and movement certi-fication requirements contained in theatertransportation regulations.

Geographic Combatant CommanderImplements and enforces provisions of DOD4500.9-R.Establishes and coordinates any unique cus-toms and/or border clearance requirements forcountries in the commander’s areas of respon-sibility during deployments or redeploymentsand in support of exercises or contingencyoperations.Designates a customs and/or border clearancecoordinator.Forwards any written supplementary guidanceto USTRANSCOM (TCJ5/4).Ensures Service components designate, inwriting, DOD or other personnel as CBCAsand that those personnel are properly trained.Establishes quality control procedures toensure the effectiveness of the DOD CBCP.Disseminates information within the commandto all DOD members, employees, and familymembers concerning the prohibitions, restric-tions, requirements, and penalties pertaining tothe importation of illegal narcotics and drugs,prohibited firearms, and other contraband.Establishes policy and official guidance on con-trol and retention of war trophies or souvenirs.

Provides details on prohibitions, restrictions,requirements, and penalties that pertain to theentry or exit from their theater of operations toUSTRANSCOM (TCJ5/4), as it impacts theDOD CBCP.Assists USTRANSCOM in the developmentand collection of metrics data and evaluation ofthe DOD CBCP.Keeps the subunified commands informed onissues relating to customs or border clearance.

Geographic Combatant CommandCustoms and Border Clearance Coordinator

Coordinates the DOD CBCP for the theatercommander.Serves as the primary point of contact for thecustoms or border clearance requirements onmatters of importance concerning the entry orexit of DOD-sponsored movements.

Deployed CommanderEnsures that unit personnel (i.e., military,civilian, and contractors) are briefed on CBPand USDA entry requirements prior to theirredeployment to CONUS or OCONUS andthat all unit equipment or sustainment stocksreturning to CONUS and OCONUS arecleaned and inspected per USDA-recom-mended procedures. See DOD 4500.9-R,chapter 505, for details.Ensures that shipping, customs, and borderclearance documentation, is available for eachshipment or passenger and that documentationis prepared and free of abbreviations or acro-nyms to ensure entry or exit. Implements requirements in DOD 4500.9-R(chapter 501, paragraph D.9) and maintainsperformance quality that will ensure customsor border clearance agencies (i.e., foreign anddomestic) certification.

MEF, MAGTF PM, orMEF MSC MP Staff Officer

Establishes and conducts a military customsprogram as directed and per DOD 4500.9-R.Appoints, provides training for, and obtainsproper certification for MCI-Es and CBCAsper DOD 4500.9-R and appropriate regulations.

Military Police Operations ______________________________________________________________________________________ A-3

Military Customs Inspector-ExpectedPerforms duties per DOD 4500.9-R and USand/or foreign country border clearancerequirements. Inspects or examines baggage, professionalequipment, and cargo as authorized in estab-lished memorandums of understanding anddesignated on that person’s Customs Form 55,Designation, Customs Officer-Excepted. Allpassengers and crewmembers are subject toinspection. The degree to which accompaniedbaggage or equipment is inspected or exam-ined is dependent upon the discretion and judg-ment of the MCI-Es. “Dumping” of baggagecontents is against both DOD and CBP policyand is prohibited.Accomplishes inspections in a courteous andprofessional manner.Inspects only active duty military personnel.Civilian personnel will be inspected by a CBPofficer.Reports any contraband discoveries (e.g.,drugs, firearms, explosives) to the closest CBPport director and the installation commanderimmediately.

Customs and Border Clearance AgentsPerforms duties per DOD 4500.9-R and USand/or foreign country border clearancerequirements.Inspects and certifies that DOD-owned mate-rial, personal property, and passengers areacceptable for entry into the United States andnotifies the appropriate legal authorities if con-traband is discovered.Represents the commander in performance ofinspections and ensures that the proper and/orrequired documentation accompanies all ship-ments or personnel.Ensures that customs and border clearanceviolations are expeditiously reported to theproper legal authority or military agency fordisposition.Conducts all inspections and examinations in aprofessional, expeditious, and courteous manner.Does not, under any circumstances, collect oraccept duty payments.

Training and Certification ofMilitary Customs Inspectors-Exceptedand Customs and Border Clearance Agents

The MCI-Es and CBCAs will be trained perDOD 4500.9-R. Training will be provided andapproved by CBP and USDA. Training may beaccomplished in CONUS or at an overseas loca-tion. Upon successful completion of the training,CBP and USDA will provide certification for thetrainees. Certified trained personnel will beappointed as CBCAs on orders issued by thesponsoring Service component and those orderswill include an effective termination date.

The geographic combatant commander and theService component commander will coordinatethe request to the Service for sourcing of militarylaw enforcement or other designated personnel toact as CBCAs for the duration of the redeploy-ment. All personnel designated for MCI-E orCBCA duties will be E-4, the civilian equivalent,or above.

In some cases CBP may approve DOD personnelas certified trainers. When a “train the trainer”process is approved, commanders will berequired to—

Use a CBP and USDA-approved CBCA train-ing curriculum.Provide program management, as well as anycommand-specific training.

Employment

Marines trained as MCI-Es or CBCAs will per-form their duties according to DOD 4500.9-R andother implementing regulations. They representtheir commanders by performing inspections andexaminations, reporting violations to their super-visor and validating shipping documents. TheMCI-Es or CBCAs are employed to inspectDOD-sponsored cargo, military impedimenta,ships, aircraft, vehicles, and personnel.

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APPENDIX BSAMPLE MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT ESTIMATE

The following sample format may be modified as necessary to meet situational requirements.

CLASSIFICATION

Copy no.__ of __copiesOFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF COMMANDPLACE OF ISSUEDate/time groupMessage reference number

MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT ESTIMATE (U)(U) REFERENCES: As appropriate to the preparation of the estimate.

1. (U) Mission

a. (U) Basic Mission. State the mission and its purpose as described in the basic plan.

b. (U) Purpose of the Estimate

(1) (U) Determine if military police (MP) capabilities are sufficient to support proposed courses of action (COAs).

(2) (U) Determine which COA is most desirable from an MP support standpoint.

(3) (U) Determine what measures must be taken by the commander to overcome MP support problems and/or limiting factors in supporting each COA.

2. (U) Situation and Considerations

a. (U) Enemy Forces

(1) (U) Present Disposition of Major Elements. Reference may be made to the Intelligence Estimate.

(2) (U) Major Capabilities. Enemy tactical capabilities likely to affect friendly MPsupport matters.

B-2 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

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(3) (U) Other Capabilities and/or Limitations. Enemy capabilities and/or limita-tions likely to affect the MP or tactical situation.

b. (U) Own Forces

(1) (U) Present Disposition of MP Support Elements. May be shown as a situation map or an overlay appended as an annex.

(2) (U) Courses of Action. A statement of the COA under consideration.

c. (U) Characteristics of the Area. Those likely to affect the MP support situation, such as weather, terrain, hydrography, communications routes, and local resources.

d. (U) Current MP Support Status. A brief description of the current MP support sta-tus, which includes planned or known changes before and during the period covered by the estimate. Follow-on subparagraphs address typical MP support areas of con-cern; if possible, state specific quantities.

(1) (U) MP Support Organizations and Task Organizations. Each organic support organization or task organization is described using the following format:

(a) (U) Locations. May be an overlay.

(b) (U) Missions and/or Tasks

(c) (U) Task Organizations and Command Relationships

(d) (U) General Capabilities and Status. Capabilities and status are described in terms of task organization using the applicable categories listed in para-graphs (2) through (9) below.

(e) (U) Tactical Responsibilities. If any.

(f) (U) Communications and Automated Data Processing Systems Support Arrangements

(2) (U) Personnel

(a) (U) Strengths. Identify strengths of each major subordinate unit.

(b) (U) Replacements. Identify replacements on hand, replacements to be re-ceived, and the quality of the replacements.

(c) (U) Morale. Determine the level of fighting spirit, significant factors af-fecting current morale, religious and welfare matters, and awards.

(d) (U) Personal Services Support

Military Police Operations _____________________________________________________________________________________ B-3

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(e) (U) Military Justice. Court martial and correction facilities.

(f) (U) Personnel Procedures. Significant items, if any.

(3) (U) Mission Assurance Support Operations

(4) (U) Law and Order

(5) (U) Military Working Dogs

(6) (U) Limited Detainee Operations

(7) (U) Planning and Training

(8) (U) Corrections

(9) (U) Customs Support

e. (U) Assumptions. A statement of those assumptions made for the preparation of this estimate. An example of the critical assumption is the estimation of the length of time for the entire operation and for each COA (if different).

f. (U) Special Factors. Items covered elsewhere, such as state of training of MP sup-port personnel or task organizations.

3. (U) Analysis. Each COA under consideration is analyzed, in the light of all significant factors, to determine problems that may arise, measures required to resolve those prob-lems, and any limiting factors that may exist. Omit areas not applicable. State all consider-ations of the analysis that have equal effects on all proposed COAs.

a. (U) Course of Action #1

(1) (U) MP Support Organizations and Task Organizations. Each organic support organization or task organization is described using the following format:

(a) (U) Locations. May be an overlay.

(b) (U) Missions and/or Tasks

(c) (U) Task Organizations and Command Relationships

(d) (U) General Capabilities and Status. Capabilities and status are described in terms of task organization using the applicable categories listed in para-graphs (2) through (9) below.

(e) (U) Tactical Responsibilities. If any.

B-4 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

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(f) (U) Communications and Automated Data Processing Systems Support Arrangements

(2) (U) Personnel

(a) (U) Strengths. Identify strengths of each major subordinate unit.

(b) (U) Replacements. Identify replacements on hand, replacements to be re-ceived, and the quality of the replacements.

(c) (U) Morale. Determine the level of fighting spirit, significant factors af-fecting current morale, religious and welfare matters, and awards.

(d) (U) Personal Services Support

(e) (U) Military Justice. Court martial and correction facilities.

(f) (U) Personnel Procedures. Significant items, if any.

(3) (U) Mission Assurance Support Operations

(4) (U) Law and Order

(5) (U) Military Working Dogs

(6) (U) Limited Detainee Operations

(7) (U) Planning and Training

(8) (U) Corrections

(9) (U) Customs Support

b. (U) Course of Action #2. Same subparagraphs as shown for COA #1.

c. (U) Course of Action #3. Same subparagraphs as shown for COA #1.

4. (U) Evaluation. From an MP support standpoint and based on the foregoing analyses, summarize and compare the advantages and disadvantages of each COA under consideration.

5. (U) Conclusion

a. (U) Preferred Course of Action. A statement as to which COA, if any, can best be supported from the MP support viewpoint.

b. (U) Major Disadvantages of Other Courses of Action. A statement whether any or all remaining COAs can be supported from MP support viewpoint citing the disadvan-tages that render the other COAs less desirable or unsupportable.

Military Police Operations _____________________________________________________________________________________ B-5

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c. (U) MP Problems and Limitations. A statement of significant problems to be re-solved and any limitations to be considered in each COA.

d. (U) Decision or Action. A statement of measures required to resolve MP support problems cited above that must be brought to the attention of the commander.

/s/

ANNEXES: (As required)

APPENDIX CPHYSICAL SECURITY AND CRIME PREVENTION CHECKLISTS

Military police provide commanders with crime prevention plans that include prevention, enforcementand education on recognizing, countering, and preventing criminal and terrorist activities. As part ofcrime prevention, military police investigate and report criminal activities that will assist the commanderin maintaining unit order and discipline. This appendix contains installation perimeter, facilities andbuilding, port and harbor security, and transportation checklists.

A. Installation Perimeter Checklist

1. Perimeter security

a. Physical barriers

(1) Yes/No. Is there some type of physical barrier; e.g., wall, fence around the installation? If yes,describe. Include guard towers, antivehicle ditches, ground sensors, and exclusion zones ifapplicable. (Use continuation sheets if necessary.)____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

(2) Yes/No. Does the barrier establish the property line?

(3) Yes/No. Is the barrier a deterrent to entry. If not, explain.

(4) Yes/No. Does the barrier establish personnel control?

(5) Yes/No. Does the barrier establish vehicle control?

(6) Yes/No. Are there any holes/breach points in the barrier or fence line?

If so, where?

(7) Yes/No. Are there any places along the barrier/fence where the ground is washed away?

If so, where?

(8) Yes/No. Are there any places where streams and/or drainage ditches and tunnels enter theperimeter barrier? If so, where?

(9) Yes/No. Are the above entry points protected? If so, which ones?

(10) Yes/No. Is there a clear zone on each side of the barrier/fence?

What is the clear zone distance on the exterior of the barrier/fence?

(11) Yes/No. Does the perimeter meet the minimum DOD stand-off distance requirement?

C-2 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

What is the distance from the nearest building to the barrier/fence in feet?

(12) Yes/No. Is the clear zone obstructed by obstacles/material near the fence? If so, what?

(13) Yes/No. Are there any poles near the barrier or fence that can be used for entry or exit?

If so, where?

(14) Yes/No. Are there any trees or shrubbery in the clear zone? If so, which ones?

(15) Yes/No. Should trees be removed or shrubbery trimmed? If so, which ones?

(16) Yes/No. Is there a scheduled maintenance/landscape contract to keep the clear zone cut toallow a continuous unobstructed view of the barrier/fence?

(17) Yes/No. Are there any openings other than gates or doors in the barrier or fence that areunprotected? If so, where?

(18) Yes/No. Are there “No Trespassing” signs posted on the fence exterior at regular intervals inlocal and English languages?

(19) Yes/No. Is the entire fence line within easy view of patrolling guards or closed-circuit TV?

If not, what area is not visible?

(20) Yes/No. Is the perimeter barrier/fence inspected regularly?

(21) Yes/No. Is immediate action taken to repair reported perimeter damage?

(22) Yes/No. Are vehicles allowed to park near the barrier/fence, both internally and externally?

(23) How much time would it take to penetrate the barrier/fence using one of the following?

______________ Wire cutters

______________ Power tools

______________ Vehicle

______________ Explosives

______________ Other hand tools

(24) How many entrance points to the perimeter?___________

How many different exits only?____________

b. Gates and doors

(1) Yes/No. Are all gates/doors secured and operating properly? If not, which ones?

(2) Yes/No. Do swing gates close without leaving a gap? If not, which ones?

(3) Yes/No. Are gates, which are rarely used, properly secured and frequently checked?

(4) Yes/No. Are the locking devices adequate? Do they do the job?

Military Police Operations ______________________________________________________________________________________ C-3

(5) Yes/No. Are alarm devices used on any gates? If not, which ones?

(6) If alarms are used, do they provide:

Yes/No. A local signal?

Yes/No. A signal at a guard office?

(7) Yes/No. Are alarms checked for operating efficiency on a regular basis?

(8) Yes/No. Are any entrances or exits controlled by closed-circuit television or card access?

(9) Yes/No. Are there any gates or doors where closed-circuit television or card access could beused to control access/exit?

(10)Yes/No. Are entrances posted with “No Trespassing” signs in the local language andEnglish?

(11) Yes/No. Has a key control system been established to control issuance of keys and locks?

(12) Yes/No. Are key and lock inventories current?

(13) Yes/No. Is there a back-up set of keys? Are they inventoried and kept separate from the pri-mary set?

(14) Yes/No. Are all perimeter areas lighted during hours of darkness?

(15) Is lighting manual or automatic (circle one: manual/automatic)?

(16) Yes/No. Are all entrance/gates well-lighted?

(17) Yes/No. Does perimeter lighting also cover adjacent buildings? Should it?

(18) Yes/No. If lights burn out, do light patterns overlap for continuous coverage?

(19) Who is responsible for turning lights on/off?

(20) Who is responsible for maintenance?

c. Security personnel

(1)Are guards:

Yes/No. Exposed by lighting?

Yes/No. Protected by lighting?

(2) Yes/No. Do lights at gate(s) illuminate interior of vehicles?

(3) Yes/No. Are critical areas along the perimeter well-lighted?

(4)Yes/No. Is there an auxiliary power source? Is it automatic or manual? If manual, whoemploys it and how long does it take to employ?

(5)Yes/No. Is there a guard service that supplements the overall antiterrorism plan?

C-4 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

(6)Yes/No. Are background checks conducted on contractor guard personnel?

(7)Yes/No. Is there a rapid response force? Required response time? How often is the rapidresponse time exercised?

(8) How many guards and shifts are provided?

(9) What is the nationality of the guards? Do they speak the native language and English?

(10)Yes/No. Is there an effective communication(s) system with all guards, both military andcontract, with all gates and patrols and supervisors?

(11)Yes/No. Are guards, both military and contract, properly trained and qualified on theirassigned weapons?

(12)Yes/No. Have all personnel who perform law enforcement and security duty been trained inthe proper use of deadly force?

(13)Yes/No. Is the above training documented and (terrorist) scenario based?

(14)How do guards/security personnel initiate an emergency alarm?

d. Other significant concerns (e.g., emergency procedures, shelters, security enhancements)

(1) What emergency evacuation procedures exist? Are these rehearsed?

(2) Yes/No. Are any internal/external sensors employed to enhance the security posture? If not,should there be?

(3) Yes/No. Do bomb shelters exist? At offices? Living areas?

(4) Yes/No. Are the bomb shelters maintained in safe order? Lighted? Communications?

(5) Yes/No. Have requirements for bomb shelters been coordinated with Service components/higher headquarters for funding and fielding support?

(6) Yes/No. Are military working dogs, night vision devices, x-ray detection systems, intrusiondetection systems, ground sensors, closed-circuit television, day and night surveillance cam-eras, thermal imaging, advanced communications systems, or any other security relatedequipment used or required to enhance the antiterrorism posture of this installation?

(List and use continuation sheets as necessary)________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

e. Host nation (HN) coordination.

Yes/No. Has coordination and/or a formal memorandum of understanding been initiated withany HN official (name and title) for additional security support, including personnel, equipment,perimeter layout, response forces?


2. Airfield security. The following questions are provided to supplement specific airfield security con-cerns. These questions are not all-inclusive of airfield operations and may be further supplemented:

a. Yes/No. Does the airfield command have an installation security plan that covers the entire facil-ity to include tenant responsibilities? Elaborate:_______________________________________

b. Location of airfield:_____________________________

c. Unit inspected:___________________________________

d. Date of this inspection:__________________________

e. Last time base was inspected:______________

f. Yes/No. Were previous deficiencies corrected?

g. Inspectors:________________________________________

h. Personnel contacted:____________________________

i. Type of airfield? US Military? US/Multinational collocated? Civilian use?

j. What type of security forces/guards are employed at this base?

____ US military police

____ US Navy master at arms

____ US Air Force security forces

____ Multinational

____ Contracted US or local nationals

k. Yes/No. Are these security personnel trained in the use of deadly force?

l. Yes/No. Is there sufficient stand-off distance from runways to the nearest civilian property?

m. Yes/No. Are alerted aircraft afforded adequate security?

n. Yes/No. Are air operations susceptible to surface-to-air missile attack?

If so, explain countermeasures (e.g., thread surveillance, external perimeter security, host nationpatrols).

o. Yes/No. Are any runway approaches or take-offs over water?

If so, is emergency watercraft immediately available to effect rescue operations?

p. Yes/No. Is perimeter fencing and lighting in sound condition?

q. Yes/No. Are bilingual “No Trespassing/Restricted Area” signs posted at regular intervals alongthe perimeter barrier?

r. Yes/No. Are military and civilian aircraft parked in the same area?

C-6 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

s. Yes/No. Is the control tower entrance continuously secured/guarded?

t. Yes/No. Is emergency lighting systems for security as well as approaching aircraft available? Is ittested periodically?

u. Yes/No. Are security response forces on-call? What is their minimum response time?

3. General comments ________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

4. Recommendations

a. Immediate (within 30 days):_______________________________________________

b. Near Term (within 45-60 days):____________________________________________

c. Long Term (60 days or longer):_____________________________________________

B. Facilities and Building Checklist

1. General information and background

a. Date of this inspection:____________________________

b. Unit inspected:____________________________

c. Location/site (include grid coordinates):___________________________

d. Last time this facility/building was inspected:_____________________

e. Yes/No. Were previous deficiencies corrected?

f. Inspectors:_________________________________________

g. Personnel contacted:____________________________

2. Facility – building specifics

a. Purpose of this structure:______________________

b. Number of floors:_________________________________

c. Approximate number and (nationality) of occupants: _______________________________

d. Type of construction:

___Reinforced concrete

___Tilt-up concrete panels

___Reinforced masonry

___Unreinforced masonry


___Brick

___Trailer

___Metal

___Wood frame

___Other_______________________________

e. Number of entrances:______exits:______

Does this building create a likely threat target? Explain.

f. Describe the intervening distance between perimeter barriers and the nearest structure (internal orexternal) (e.g., open cleared flat land)___________________________________

g. Distance from building to perimeter (______ft).

h. Distance to vehicle parking from this building (outside of perimeter______ft).

i. Yes/No. Are exterior power facilities/transformers/fixtures vulnerable to tampering or sabotage?

j. Identify external perimeter obstacles/vulnerabilities (e.g., buildings, dumpsters, parking areas,streets).

k. What physical security measures have been initiated or exist that mitigate perimeter threats(e.g., other buildings, barriers, distance, berms, walls, guards, patrols, host nation assistance).

List:

(1)_______________________________________

(2)_______________________________________

(3)_______________________________________

(4)_______________________________________

l. Protection against glass fragmentation:

___ Shatter resistant window treatment

___ Window frame reinforcement

___ Thermally-treated safety glass

___ Polycarbonate

___ Steel doors

___ Door frame reinforcement

___ Heavy duty hinges

___ Other_________________________________________

C-8 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

m. Blast protection initiatives:

___ Walls

___ Berms

___ Sealed doors

___ Heavy curtains

___ Sealed windows

___ Steel grates

___ Extending perimeter

___ Shutters

___ Landscaping

3. Facility – building specifics

a. Access, alarms, guard

(1) Yes/No. Are procedures established to control access to the building?

(2) Yes/No. Is a visible identification system established to distinguish employees, residents, andvisitors?

(3) Yes/No. Are entrances and exits to this building alarmed?

(4) Yes/No. Are entrances and exits controlled by guards? If yes, circle one: US, multinational,and/or contract.

(5) Yes/No. Guards:

___ Are guards trained and qualified on their individual weapons

___ Are guards trained on use of deadly force

___ Is training documented

___ Are background checks conducted on contract guards

___ Are guards bilingual

___ Do guards incorporate land line communications

___ Can guards communicate with central control security desks and with installation entrycontrol points

(6) Yes/No. Are guards equipped with:

___ Night vision devices

___ CBRN protection


___ Portable communications

___ Body armor

___ Individual weapons/type

___ Binoculars

(7) Yes/No. Are closed-circuit television and/or motion detection systems employed?

(8) Yes/No. Are windows alarmed, grilled, shatter resistant with protective window film?

(9) Yes/No. Does the facility have exterior lighting?

(10) Yes/No. Is the lighting adequate? Does it cover all dead spaces? Do lights overlap to com-pensate for burnout?

(11) Yes/No. Are outdoor accesses to the building such as fire escapes, roof doors, air vents, andutility openings secured?

(12) Yes/No. Are interior doors to personal rooms, offices, closets, and restrooms locked atnight, on weekends, and when unoccupied or unattended?

(13) Yes/No. Is there a security check system that ensure item #12 above is accomplished whenthe facility is unattended?

(14) Yes/No. Is a positive key control and accountability system established?

(15) Yes/No. Are visitors escorted while in the facility?

(16) Yes/No. Is incoming mail examined?

(17) Yes/No. Are assigned personnel trained not to reveal personal information, itineraries, securitymeasures, home addresses/unit locations or addresses, and telephone numbers to strangers?

(18) Yes/No. Are assigned personnel instructed on how to report suspicious activity?

(19) Yes/No. Are guards/sentries posted to overwatch this building? Is this considered a criticalrequirement?

b. Emergency procedures

(1) Yes/No. Does the building have a safe haven?

Does it have:

___Emergency water

___Emergency lighting/power

___Emergency medical supplies

___Uninterrupted communication

___Solid core door

C-10 __________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

___Emergency escape

___Latrine facilities

___Proper ventilation

___Dead-bolt locks

(2) Yes/No. Are assigned personnel trained on actions to take in case of a terrorist attack?

(3) Yes/No. Are terrorist attack and postal bomb drills conducted periodically?

(4) Yes/No. Does the building have an emergency power source such as a generator?

(5) Yes/No. Is the back-up source periodically tested to ensure sound and safe operating condi-tions? And tested? Are additional operators trained?

(6) Yes/No. Is there an effective intercom and emergency public address system such as “giantvoice” utilized at this building?

(7) Yes/No. Is there a back-up?

(8) Yes/No. Is there an emergency evacuation plan? Is it posted on all floors and rehearsed on aperiodic basis?

c. Internal building security/safety

(1) Yes/No. Do personal rooms have a door viewers?

(2) Yes/No. Are dead bolt locks installed on entry doors?

(3) Yes/No. Do windows have effective locking devices?

(4) Yes/No. Are elevators available and used in this building?

(5) Yes/No. Do elevators connect controlled access floors with public access floors?

(6) Yes/No. Do elevators service a parking garage?

(7) Yes/No. Do elevators that service garages stop automatically at the lobby? Are elevator pas-sengers observed by personnel at the lobby level before traveling to subsequent floors?

(8) Yes/No. Are there any open stairways to upper or lower levels? Are these stairways super-vised or monitored by closed-circuit television?

(9) Yes/No. Are custodial services provided by a contracted, local national source?

(10) What hours do custodial personnel work?

(11) How and whom supervises the custodial staff?

(12) Who approves the employment of custodial staff?

(13) Yes/No. Does the custodial staff have keys to all rooms? Are these controlled? Is the custo-dial staff permitted to leave the building with these keys?

Military Police Operations ____________________________________________________________________________________ C-11

(14) Yes/No. Is there any control exercised over the custodial staff entering and leaving thebuilding?

(15) Yes/No. Are packages carried by custodial personnel inspected when entering and leavingthe building?

(16) Yes/No. Does the building have a sprinkler system?

(17) Yes/No. Is the building equipped with smoke alarms?

(18) Yes/No. Is the building equipped with carbon monoxide alarms?

(19) Yes/No. Is the building serviced by a local fire department? Is this department on the instal-lation or in the local community?

(20) Yes/No. What is the fire department estimated response time to this building? Day? Night?

(21) Yes/No. How many floors can the fire department ladder platform reach?

(22) Yes/No. Based on item #21 above, have alternative emergency evacuation plans been initi-ated and rehearsed?

(23) Yes/No. Is the building equipped with an audible local fire alarm to alert occupants?

(24) Yes/No. Does the alarm system enunciate at a central control desk and identify the exactlocation/floor of the incoming alarm? Is the system periodically tested?

(25) Yes/No. Are fire alarm pull boxes located on each floor?

(26) Yes/No. Does each floor have an appropriate number of fire extinguishers? Are these extin-guishers checked and serviced accordingly?

4. Yes/No. Has the command conducted a risk assessment concerning the safe and secure occupancy ofthis building? Does such a risk, if any, outweigh the operational/mission necessity for remaining inthe building?

5. Based on the explanation in paragraph 4 above, should the occupants in this building relocate and issuch a move time–sensitive? What alternative locations have been considered?

6. General comments ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

7. Recommendations

a. Immediate (within 30 days):________________________________________________



C-12 __________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

C. Port and Harbor Security Checklist

1. General description. The medium of water presents unique challenges and stressful demands on secu-rity resources and equipment used to build a well-rounded physical security system. This checklistshould be used to supplement the integrated principles of installation/perimeter security detailed inthe installation perimeter checklist.

a. Provide a general description of the port site________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

b. Security planning

(1) Yes/No. Has a security officer been appointed on orders?

(2) Yes/No. Does the port facility have a current port security plan (PSP)? Date of plan?

Does the plan include:

___ Preventative measure to reduce opportunities for introduction of bombs

___Procedures for evaluating and handling bomb threats

___Policy for evacuation and safety of personnel

___Procedures to be used to search for bombs

___Procedures in the event a bomb or suspected bomb is found on the port

___Procedures to be taken in the event of a bomb explosion or detonations

(3) Yes/No. Does the port have a counter sabotage program?

(4) Yes/No. Are physical security/vulnerability assessments conducted at least semiannually?

(5) Yes/No. Are threat assessments conducted periodically? How often? By whom?

(6) Yes/No. Has the port commander conducted a “risk analysis” concerning the local terrorist/criminal threat?

(7) Yes/No. Have “Restricted Areas” been designated in writing and applicable signs postedthroughout the port area?

(8) Yes/No. Are security measures in effect to protect:

___ Electrical power facilities

___ Communication centers/equipment

___ Arms, ammunition, off-loaded

(9) Yes/No. Are special after-duty hours and weekend security checks conducted on restrictedareas?


(10) Yes/No. Are breaches in these security checks promptly reported to the chain of supervision?

(11) Yes/No. Does the port have a privately owned vehicle (POV) parking plan?

(12) Yes/No. Does the parking plan include:

___ Restriction of POV parking in exclusive and limited areas

___ Fenced/enclave parking in controlled areas

___ Restricted parking near perimeter fence lines/barriers

(13) Yes/No. Does the port have a traffic control plan? Is the emergency evacuation?

c. Security force

(1) Yes/No. Is the present security force adequate to handle the stated port security mission?

Explain._______________________________________________________

(2) What is the composition of the security force? (circle) US military, multinational, host nationcontract, US contract?

(3) Yes/No. Are security posts, both fixed and mobile, provided with standard operating orders?

(4) Yes/No. Are all guards trained in the use of deadly force? Is this training scenario-based andapproved by the serving judge advocate and senior military/police officer?

(5) Yes/No. Are security force orders reviewed at least monthly for currency?

(6) Yes/No. Are security force personnel inspected by a supervisor prior to being posted eachshift?

(7) Yes/No. Are multinational and host nation contract guards bilingual?

(8) Yes/No. Do supervisors inspect each post at least twice per shift?

(9) Yes/No. Is there a rapid reaction force available? What is the minimum response time? Is thisresponse time commensurate with the latest threat assessment?

(10) Yes/No. Do security personnel report or record their presence at key locations in the port?

___ Portable watch clocks

___ Telephones

___ Hand-held or vehicle radios

Other means?_______________________

(11) Describe the host nation/multinational security support provided on the water side of this site:______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

C-14 __________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

(12) What additional security measures are implemented for those vessels at anchorage? Whoprovides this service?___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

(13) Yes/No. Are guard assignments, times, and patrol routes varied at frequent intervals to avoidestablishing routines?

(14) What type and how many watercraft are involved in the port security mission? ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

(15) Do these craft have viable communication with shore-based security forces? Is there a lan-guage barrier?

(16) Yes/No. Are all security force personnel qualified on their assigned weapon(s)? Do theyfamiliarize with these weapons on a quarterly basis?

(17) Yes/No. Are security force vehicles properly equipped with emergency equipment (e.g.,lights, communications, siren, public announcement system, proper markings)?

(18) Yes/No. Are security force weapons and ammunition properly secured and accounted forwhen not in use? Briefly explain procedures:___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

d. Personnel and vehicle movement control

(1) Yes/No. Is a pass and badge identification system in effect to limit access to the port?

Is this system further supplemented at restricted areas?

(2) Yes/No. Is the pass and badge system used for all personnel entering the port, particularlyhost nation and third country national personnel?

(3) Yes/No. Is there positive access system in place for visitors and contractors? Are visitorsescorted?

(4) Yes/No. Are issued badges serialized and strictly controlled for accountability?

(5) Yes/No. Are lost badges replaced with badges bearing different serial numbers?

(6) Yes/No. Have procedures been established for issuance of temporary badges for those per-sonnel who have forgotten their permanent badges?

(7) Yes/No. Are badges of such design and appearance as to enable guards, and other personnel,to recognize quickly and positively the authorization and limitations applicable to thebearer?


(8) Yes/No. Are procedures in existence to ensure return of badges upon termination of employ-ment or reassignment?

(9) Yes/No. Are POVs and contractor vehicles that routinely have access to the port registered atthe security office?

e. Perimeter barriers (See installation perimeter checklist)

f. Protective lighting

(1) Yes/No. Does the protective lighting incorporated for this port meet adequate intensityrequirements?

(2) Yes/No. Are the zones of illumination from the lamps directed downward and away from theguard personnel?

(3) Yes/No. Is perimeter protective lighting utilized so that security patrols remain in compara-tive darkness?

(4) Yes/No. Are lights checked at least weekly for proper operation prior to darkness?

(5) Yes/No. Do light patterns overlap to compensate for burned-out lamps?

(6) Yes/No. Is there a back-up power source for all electrical power?

(7) Yes/No. Is the above source protected?

(8) Yes/No. Is the backup power system easily operated? Are there additional trained operatorson each shift that can safely operate this equipment?

(9) The above protective lighting questions extend to any contiguous body of water. Are theseareas protected with required lighting as well? Who is responsible for water-side lighting?

2. Yes/No. Do foreign vessels have access to US designated ports? If yes, explain security procedures for:

a. Foreign personnel entering the US port:_____________________________________________

b. Foreign vessels at anchor:________________________________________________________

c. Off-loaded cargo, in-transit and/or stockpiled cargo within the US designated port area:_____________________________________________________________________________

3. General comments____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

4. Recommendations

a. Immediate (within 30 days):_______________________________________________________

b. Near Term (within 45-60 days):____________________________________________________

c. Long Term (60 days or longer):_____________________________________________________

C-16 __________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

D. Transportation Checklist

1. General description. The following questions are intended to increase awareness, stimulate thinkingand preparation, and enhance transportation protective measures where the threat of terrorist activityis a vital concern.

a. Vehicle identification

(1) What type and quantity of vehicles are used for local transportation?

Tactical:

Nontactical:

Commercial:

(Hardened)

b. Host nation:

(1) Yes/No. Are vehicle safety and maintenance checks conducted prior to usage?

(2) Yes/No. Are vehicles kept in good mechanical condition?

(3) Yes/No. Is maintenance properly documented?

(4) Yes/No. Are vehicles searched prior to use after being parked in a nonsecure area?

(5) Yes/No. Are vehicles secured when not in operation? How? Is off-street secure parkingavailable?

(6) Yes/No. Have vehicle exhausts (e.g., commercial vehicles) been modified to preclude inser-tion of an explosive device? If yes, explain procedure:____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

(7) Yes/No. Do vehicles have:

___ Communications

___ Backup communications available

___ Alarm systems

___ Locking gas caps

___ First aid kits

___ Spare tire

___ Road repair tools

(8) Yes/No. Are commercial vehicles rotated among users to confuse possible surveillanceactivity?


(9) Yes/No. Do drivers have constant communication with a dispatcher, unit operations office, orUS Embassy? Briefly explain ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

(10) Yes/No. Are drivers instructed in off-base defensive driving techniques?

(11) Yes/No. Are drivers and passengers provided preconvoy predeparture briefings on:

___ Accident reporting and what to do

___ Vehicle breakdowns

___ Safe havens

___ Emergency actions during contact

___ Reporting suspicious activity

(12) Yes/No. Are convoy routes routinely surveyed for possible terrorist activity/vulnerability? Isthis information properly disseminated on a timely basis?

(13) Yes/No. Are departure and return times varied to inhibit predictability?

(14) Yes/No. Is travel off-base limited to mission essential activity?

(15) Yes/No. Are alternate escape routes included in each mission essential travel serial? Dotravelers confirm their understanding and familiarity with these plans?

(16) Yes/No. Are escorts provided for each convoy?

(17) Yes/No. Are escorts armed? If yes, by order of whom?

(18) Yes/No. Are all armed personnel trained in the use of deadly force? Is this documented?

(19) Yes/No. Is the training in the use of deadly force terrorist scenario-based?

(20) Yes/No. Is the training in deadly force approved by the local servicing Judge Advocate andsenior military/security police officer?

2. General comments ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

3. Recommendations

a. Immediate (within 30 days):_______________________________________________



GLOSSARYSECTION I. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .area of operations

CBCA . . . . . customs and border clearance agentCBCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Customs and Border

Clearance ProgramCBP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . United States Customs

and Border ProtectionCBRN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . chemical, biological,

radiological, and nuclearCI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . civilian interneeCID . . . . . . . . . . . .criminal investigation divisionCOA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . course of actionCONUS. . . . . . . . . . . . . continental United StatesCTD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .combat tracker dogCTUS . . . . customs territory of the United States

DA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Department of the ArmyDC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . dislocated civilianDD (form) . . . . . . . . . . . . Department of DefenseDDD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . drug detector dogDOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Department of DefenseDODD. . . . . . . . Department of Defense directiveDRS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Detainee Reporting System

EC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . enemy combatantECP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..entry control pointEDD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . explosive detector dogEPW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . enemy prisoner of war

FACA . . . . . . . . Federal Assimilated Crimes ActFM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . field manualFRAGO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .fragmentary orderFTO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . field training officer

G-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . brigade or higherintelligence staff officer

HN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .host nation

ICRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . International Committeeof the Red Cross

IED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . improvise explosive deviceINIWIC . . . . . . .Interservice Nonlethal Individual

Weapons Instructor CourseISN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . internment serial number

JPEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .joint prosecutionand exploitation center

LDO . . . . . . . . . . . . . limited detainee operationsLOO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . law and order operations

MAGTF . . . . . . . . . Marine air-ground task forceMCI-E . . . . . military customs inspector-exceptedMCO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps orderMCRP . . . . . .Marine Corps reference publicationMCWP . . .Marine Corps warfighting publicationMEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine expeditionary forceMEU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine expeditionary unitMOS . . . . . . . . . . military occupational specialtyMP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . military policeMPI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . military police investigatorMSC . . . . . . . . . . . . major subordinate commandMSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .main supply routeMTT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . mobile training teamMWD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . military working dog

NAVMC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Navy/Marine Corpsdepartmental publication

NCIS . . . . . Naval Criminal Investigative ServiceNCOIC . . . . . noncommissioned officer in chargeNDRC . . . . . National Detainee Reporting CenterNLW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . nonlethal weapon

OCONUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . outside the continentalUnited States

OIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . officer in chargeOPNAV. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Office of the Chief

on Naval Operations

PCA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Posse Comitatus ActPD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . patrol dog

Glossary-2 ___________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

P/DDD . . . . . . . . . . . . . .patrol/drug detector dogP/EDD. . . . . . . . . . .patrol/explosive detector dogPIO . . . . . . . . . . . . police intelligence operationsPM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . provost marshalPOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . plan of the dayPSO . . . . . . . . . . . . .protective services operations

RDF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . regional detention facilityRP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . retained person

S-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . intelligence staff officerSJA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . staff judge advocateSNCO . . . . . . . . . .staff noncommissioned officerSNCOIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . staff noncommissioned

officer in chargeSOFA . . . . . . . . . . . . . status-of-forces agreementSOP . . . . . . . . . . . . standing operating procedures

SPMAGTF . . . . . . . . . . special purpose MAGTFSROE . . . . . . . . . . .standing rules of engagementSRUF . . . . . . . standing rules for the use of forceSSD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . specialized search dogTCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . traffic control pointTDRC . . . . . . . theater detainee reporting centersTIF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . theater internment facilityTQ………………………….. tactical questioningTTP . . . . . . . . tactics, techniques, and procedures

UCMJ . . . . . . . Uniform Code of Military JusticeUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . United StatesUSDA . .United States Department of AgricultureUSTRANSCOM . . . United States Transportation

Command

VCO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . veterinary corps officer

Military Police Operations _____________________________________________________________________________ Glossary-3

SECTION II. DEFINITIONS

area of operations—An operational area definedby the joint force commander for land and mari-time forces. Areas of operation do not typicallyencompass the entire operational area of the jointforce commander, but should be large enough forcomponent commanders to accomplish theirmissions and protect their forces. Also called AO.(JP 1-02)

area of responsibility—The geographical areaassociated with a combatant command withinwhich a geographic combatant commander hasauthority to plan and conduct operations. Alsocalled AOR. (JP 1-02)

biometric—Measurable physical characteristicor personal behavior trait used to recognize theidentity or verify the claimed identity of an indi-vidual. (JP 1-02)

biometrics— The process of recognizing an indi-vidual based on measurable anatomical, physio-logical, and behavioral characteristics. (JP 1-02)

biometrics-enabled intelligence—Intelligenceinformation associated with and or derived frombiometrics data that matches a specific person orunknown identity to a place, activity, device,component, or weapon that supports terrorist/insurgent network and related pattern analysis,facilitates high value individual targeting,reveals movement patterns, and confirmsclaimed identity. (DODD 8521.01E)

civilian internee—A civilian who is internedduring armed conflict, occupation, or other mili-tary operation for security reasons, for protec-tion, or because he or she has committed anoffense against the detaining power. (JP 1-02)

civil support—Department of Defense support toUS civil authorities for domestic emergencies,

and for designated law enforcement and otheractivities. (JP 1-02)

contraband—Material, goods, plant and animalproducts, agricultural pests and hazards, andother articles prohibited entry into the Customsand Border Territory of the United States or hostnation country, including controlled substances,as identified in 21, United States Code 812,Schedules of Control led Substances , andrestricted items when the conditions of therestriction have not been met. (DOD 4500.9-R)

controlled substance—1. A drug or othersubstance, or immediate precursor included inSchedule I, II, III, IV, or V of the ControlledSubstances Act. (JP 1-02)

counterdrug operations—Civil or militaryactions taken to reduce or eliminate illicit drugtrafficking. (JP 1-02)

counterinsurgency—Comprehensive civilianand military efforts taken to defeat an insurgencyand to address any core grievances. (JP 1-02)

customs territory of the United States—The 50United States, the District of Columbia, andPuerto Rico Not included are American Samoa,Guam, Johnston Island, Midway Island, the VirginIslands of the United States, Wake Island, or theformer Panama Canal Zone. (DOD 4500.9-R)

deadly force—Deadly force is force likely tocause death or serious physical injury.

defense in depth—The siting of mutuallysupporting defense positions designed to absorband progressively weaken attack, prevent initialobservations of the whole position by the enemy,and to allow the commander to maneuver hisreserve. (JP 1-02)

Glossary-4 ___________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

dislocated civilian—A broad term primarilyused by the Department of Defense that includesa displaced person, an evacuee, an internallydisplaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a state-less person. Also called DC. See also displacedperson; evacuee; internally displaced person;migrant; refugee; stateless person. (JP 1-02)

displaced person—A broad term used to refer tointernally and externally displaced personscollectively. See also evacuee; refugee. (JP 1-02)

evacuee—A civilian removed from a place ofresidence by military direction for reasons ofpersonal security or the requirements of the mili-tary situation. See also displaced person; expel-lee; refugee. (JP 1-02)

expellee—A civilian outside the boundaries ofthe country of his or her nationality or ethnicorigin who is being forcibly repatriated to thatcountry or to a third country for political or otherpurposes. (JP 1-02)

force continuum—The wide range of possibleactions ranging from voice commands to appli-cation of deadly force that may be used to gainand maintain control of a potentially dangeroussituation.

force protection—Preventive measures taken tomitigate hostile actions against Department ofDefense personnel (to include family members),resources, facilities, and critical information.Force protection does not include actions todefeat the enemy or protect against accidents,weather, or disease. (JP 1-02).

host nation—A nation which receives the forcesand/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO orga-nizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transitthrough its territory. Also called HN. (JP 1-02)

improvised explosive device—A device placed orfabricated in an improvised manner incorporating

destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incen-diary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapaci-tate, harass, or distract. It may incorporate militarystores, but is normally devised from nonmilitarycomponents. Also called IED. (JP 1-02)

intelligence preparation of the battlespace—The systematic, continuous process of analyzingthe threa t and envi ronment in a speci f icgeographic area. Also called IPB. (MCRP 5-12C)

interagency—United States Government agen-cies and departments, including the Departmentof Defense. (JP 1-02)

internally displaced person—Any person whohas been forced or obliged to flee or to leave theirhome of places of habitual residence, in particu-lar as a result of or in order to avoid the effects ofarmed conflict, situations of generalized violence,violations of human rights or natural human-made disasters, and who have not crossed aninternationally recognized state border. (JP 1-02)

joint interrogation and debriefing center—Physical location for the exploitation of intelli-gence information from detainees and othersources. Also called JIDC. (JP 1-02)

law enforcement agency—Any of a number ofagencies (outside the Department of Defense)chartered and empowered to enforce US laws inthe following jurisdictions: The United States, astate (or political subdivision) of the UnitedStates, a territory (or political subdivision) of theUnited States, a federally recognized NativeAmerican tribe or Alaskan Native Village, orwithin the borders of a host nation. Also calledLEA. (JP 1-02)

Marine Corps installations—Those installa-tions, bases, and/or stations under the control,supervision, jurisdiction, or responsibility of andoperated by the Marine Corps or unit of theMarine Corps.

Military Police Operations _____________________________________________________________________________ Glossary-5

migrant—A person who (1) belongs to a nor-mally migratory culture who may cross nationalboundaries, or (2) has fled his or her native coun-try for economic reasons rather than fear of polit-ical or ethnic persecution. (JP 1-02)

military jurisdiction—The extent of and limita-tion on the right of an armed force to exerciseauthority and control over persons and offenses.

mission assurance—A process to ensure thatassigned tasks or duties can be performed inaccordance with the intended purpose or plan. Itis a summation of the activities and measurestaken to ensure that required capabilities and allsupporting infrastructures are available to theDOD to carry out the National Military Strat-egy. It links numerous risk management programactivities and security related functions—such asforce protection; antiterrorism; critical infrastruc-ture protection; information assurance; continu-i ty o f opera t ions ; chemica l , b io log ica l ,radiological, nuclear, and high-explosive defense;readiness; and installation preparedness—tocreate the synergistic effect required for DOD tomobilize, deploy, support, and sustain militaryoperations throughout the full range of militaryoperations. (DODD 3020.40)

nonlethal weapon—A weapon that is explicitlydesigned and primarily employed so as to inca-pacitate personnel or materiel, while minimizingfatalities, permanent injury to personnel, andundesired damage to property and the environ-ment. Also called NLW. (JP 1-02)

operational environment—A composite of theconditions, circumstances, and influences thataffect the employment of capabilities and bear onthe decisions of the commander. (JP 1-02)

physical security—1. That part of securityconcerned with physical measures designed tosafeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorizedaccess to equipment, installations, material, and

documents; and to safeguard them against espio-nage, sabotage, damage, and theft. (Part 1 of a 2part definition, JP 1-02)

Posse Comitatus Act—Prohibits search, seizure,or arrest powers to US military personnel.Amended in 1981 under Public Law 97-86 topermit increased Department of Defense supportof drug interdiction and other law enforcementactivities. (Title 18, “Use of Army and Air Forceas Posse Comitatus” - United States Code,Section 1385) (JP 1-02)

preservice training—Initial law enforcementtraining conducted before an individual beginsservice in law enforcement duties, police, crimi-nal investigations, and detention operations.

refugee—A person who owing to a well-foundedfear of being persecuted for reasons of race, reli-gion, nationality, membership of a particularsocial group or political opinion, is outside thecountry of his or her nationality and is unable or,owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himselfor herself of the protection of that country. Seealso dislocated civilian; displaced person;evacuee; expellee; stateless person. (JP 1-02)

retained person—Individuals under the custodyand/or control of the Department of the Defenseaccording to Reference (g), Article 33. (DODD2310.01E)

sensitive site exploitation—A related series ofactivities inside a captured sensitive site toexploit personnel documents, electronic data, andmaterial captured at the site, while neutralizingany threat posed by the site or its contents. Alsocalled SSE. (JP 1-02).

stability operations—An overarching termencompassing various military missions, tasks,and activities conducted outside the United Statesin coordination with other instruments of nationalpower to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure

Glossary-6 ___________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

environment, provide essential governmentalservices, emergency infrastructure reconstruc-tion, and humanitarian relief. (JP 1-02)

stateless person—A person who is not consid-ered as a national by any state under the operationof its law. See also dislocated civilian; displacedperson; evacuee; expellee; refugee. (JP 1-02)

supporting distance—The distance between twounits that can be traveled in time for one to cometo the aid of the other.

supporting range—The distance one unit maybe geographically separated from a second unityet remain within the maximum range of thesecond unit’s weapons systems.

tactical questioning—Direct questioning by anyDepartment of Defense personnel of a captured ordetained person to obtain time-sensitive tacticalintelligence information, at or near the point ofcapture or detention and consistent with applica-ble law. Also called TQ. (JP 1-02)

REFERENCES AND RELATED PUBLICATIONS

Geneva Conventions of 1949

Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in theField. Geneva, 12 August 1949

Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Membersof Armed Forces at Sea. Geneva, 12 August 1949

Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949

Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949

Federal Publications

Federal Statutory Laws

Manual for Courts-Martial United States

National Defense Strategy

Uniform Code of Military Justice

United States Code, Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure, part I, chap. 1, sect. 13, Laws of StatesAdopted for Areas Within Federal Jurisdiction

Department of Defense Issuances

Department of Defense Directives (DODDs)

2310.01E The Department of Defense Detainee Program3000.3 Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons3000.07 Irregular Warfare (IW)3020.40 Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP)3025.12 Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS)3025.15 Military Assistance to Civil Authorities3115.09 DOD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning5030.49 DOD Customs Inspection Program5111.10 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Inter-

dependent Capabilities (ASD(SO/LIC&IC))5525.5 DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials8521.01E Department of Defense Biometrics

Department of Defense Regulation (DODR)

4500.9-R Defense Transportation Regulation (DTR)

References-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

Defense Intelligence Agency Manual

58-12 The Department of Defense Human Intelligence System

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI)

3121.01B (S) (NOTAL), Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces/Standing Rules for the Use of Force

Joint Publication (JP)

1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms2-0 Joint Intelligence3-01.1 Countering Air and Missile Threats3-03 Joint Interdiction3-06 Joint Urban Operations3-07.1 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)3-07.3 Peace Operations3-07.4 Joint Counterdrug Operations3-08 Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordi-

nation During Joint Operations Volumes I and II 3-16 Multinational Operations3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations3-26 Counterterrorism3-27 Homeland Defense3-28 Civil Support3-29 Foreign Humanitarian Assistance3-32 Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations3-57 Civil-Military Operations3-60 Joint Targeting3-63 Detainee Operations3-68 Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) Instruction

Possee Comitatus Act (PCA)

Navy/Marine Corps Departmental Publications (NAVMCs)

2890 Small Wars Manual2927 Antiterrorism/Force Protection Campaign Plan3500.10 Military Police and Corrections Training and Readiness Manual

Army Field Manuals (FMs)

3-07 Stability Operations (proposed FM 1-04.10)3-19.1 Military Police Operations (proposed FM 3-39)3-19.13 Law Enforcement Investigations (proposed ATTP 3-39.12)3-19.15 Civil Disturbance Operations (proposed ATTP 3-39.33)

Military Police Operations __________________________________________________________________________ References-3

3-19.17 Military Working Dogs (proposed ATTP 3-39.34)3-19.4 Military Police Leaders’ Handbook (proposed TC 3-39.30)3-19.50 Police Intelligence Operations (proposed ATTP 3-39.20)5-34 Engineer Field Data3-19.40 Internment/Resettlement Operations 27-10 The Law of Land Warfare (proposed FM 1-04.10)

Marine Corps Publications

Marine Corps Doctrine Publications (MCDPs)

1 Warfighting1.0 Marine Corps Operations1-2 Campaigning1-3 Tactics2 Intelligence3 Expeditionary Operations5 Planning

Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs)

2-1 Intelligence Operations2-2 MAGTF Intelligence Collection2-3 MAGTF Intelligence Production and Analysis2-4 Marine Air-Ground Task Force Intelligence Dissemination3-02D Combating Terrorism3-15.8 MTTP for the Tactical Employment of Nonlethal Weapons (NLW)3-33.8 Peace Operations, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conducting Peace

Operations3-33.5 Counterinsurgency5-1 Marine Corps Planning Process5-12 The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations

Marine Corps Reference Publications (MCRPs)

3-17A Engineer Field Data3-31.4B Cordon and Search, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Cordon and

Search Operations3-33.8A Advising, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Advising Foreign Forces

Marine Corps Interim Publications (MCIPs)

3-33.01 Small-Unit Leader’s Guide to Counterinsurgency3-34.01 Military Working Dogs in Urban Terrain3-35.01 Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) for Reduction of Urban Area Strongpoints

Marine Corps Orders (MCOs)

3461.1 Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees

References-4 ________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-34.1

5530.14A Marine Corps Physical Security Program Manual5580.2B Law Enforcement Manual

Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP)

3-07.11M Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, Maritime Interception Operations

Miscellaneous

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century SeapowerCapstone Concept of Operations for DOD ForensicsCharter of the United Nations, Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Combat Hunter HandbookBiometrics SmartbookBreaches of the Peace, and Acts of AggressionDomestic Operational Law Handbook for Judge AdvocatesIrregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC)JCISFA SFA Planner’s GuideMarine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changing Security EnvironmentMulti-Service Concept for Irregular WarfareUSAID Fragile States StrategyUSAID Security Sector ReformWeapons Technical Intelligence HandbookUnited Nations Convention Relating to the Status of RefugeesUnited States Chemical Weapons Convention

USMC

USMC

Military Police Operations 3-34.1.pdfMilitary police provide customs support and border control to...

Documents

Transcript of Military Police Operations 3-34.1.pdfMilitary police provide customs support and border control to...