Mfr Nara- t7- Tsa- Manno Claudio- 10-1-03- 00699

8/14/2019 Mfr Nara- t7- Tsa- Manno Claudio- 10-1-03- 00699

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Event: Interview with Claudio Manno, TSA Deputy Administrator for IntelligenceDate: October 1, 2003Special Access Issues: NonePrepared by: John RaidtTeam Number: 7Location: Commission OfficeParticipants - Non Commission: Claudio Manno; Brandon Strauss, TSA Counsel

Participants .. Commission: Bill Johnstone, Sam Brinkley, and John Raidt

[U] Manno currently serves as the Deputy Associate Administrator for Intelligence at theTransportation Security Administration (TSA). Prior to assuming his current position,Manno served in the following capacities (from earliest to most recent):- Nine years as a Special Agent for the USAF Office of Special Investigations where heworked on criminal investigations, terrorism issues, counter intelligence and counterespionage,- He went to work for the FAA in 1987 as an analyst in the agency's intelligence division.The division was under the Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security and had 5or 6 staff members. (Manno noted that before 1986, FAA had no ability to receive,analyze or disseminate intelligence. FAA relied exclusively on other agencies for threatintelligence.) He helped the agency to build a SClF, train air marshals, and establishliaison with other agencies.-In 1990, he managed an FAA security field office in Rome, Italy that predominantlyconducted foreign airport assessments.-In 1992, he became Manager of the FAA Intelligence Operations Division working on"indications and warnings." He managed the Watch, handled liaison with CIA, State,later FBI, and much later NSA. .- In 1995, he became Deputy to the Director of the Office of Civil Aviation Intelligence(ACI) (Pat McDonnell). He served in that capacity until August of2001 when he becamethe Director of ACI.

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COMM IS SION S EN SIT IV E~ ~ t . . . .- His office was transferred to the authority of the'''rSA when the agency was created inNovember, 2001. -...Origins of ACI[U] The FAA Intelligence division was established pursuant ..o the recommendations of acommission headed by Vice President Bush on the issue of anti-terrorism. The office wastasked with setting up Intelligence requirements and following-up on issues bearing onthreats to civil aviation. \,Intelligence Collection Goals~ Manno was asked what the aviation collection requirements were beginning in theearly 1990's for ACI.Manno reported that ACI asked the Intelligence Community forassessments of the threat from terrorists, and information about terrorist groups who hada demonstrated an interest in targeting aviation, such as HezbolIah, Abu Nidal andPalestinian groups. ACI tasked the IC to look for capabilities and intentions to target civilaviation. \'. ....

.J:S8ffThe requirements w~re transmitted to the IC, particularly the FBI and CIA, inwriting. In these communications ACI indicated what the categories of material theywanted made part f their "reading list."ACI Liaisons to the[U] Following the Pan Am 103 disaster, ACI established liaisons with State Departmentand the CIA sometime (in 1990-91). Liaison was established with the FBI in 1996 andthen with the NSA sometime after that.~ The CIA liaison was established in the "Reporting" section of the eTC under theauspices of the Director of Operations where information from the agency's collectionspoints came into the CIA Headquarters. Manno indicated that he and his colleaguessurmised they weren't getting everything that the IC has so they placed the liaisonofficers at the CIA and other agencies to help facilitate the flowofinfonnation.~ The liaison officers reviewed the reporting that flowed into the CIA; advocated forFAA to receive the information they desired, and worked the "tearline" to developunclassified information that the federal government could share with the industry aboutthreats to civil aviation .

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[~ The CIA liaison received a full background check and was fully integrated into theCTC. While priority one for the t.o. was to work on FAA issues, any leftover timecould be used to work on issues for the CIA.~] While FAA paid for the billet, Manno remembers that CIA was attempting toreimburse FAA for the cost, but this effort was scrubbed because ofbudget/administrative reasons.[~The FBI L.O. was assigned to the Counter-Terrorism unit at FBI Headquarters.~ Manno said that while the CIA liaison was able to review a steady stream ofintelligence data flowing into the CIA, the FBI did NOT have any stream of reportingthat went out to the various agencies.~ Manno mentioned the "splintering" and "compartmentalization" that made liaisonwith the FBI problematic. The FBI liaison was not a full-time billet at first. The liaisonworked at FBI two or three times a week. The job was made full time after 1996.

As for the liaison with the State Department, DoS has automatic "slugging" (e.g.PTER for Political Terrorism) which assured that reports with particular headings weresent to ACI.~ Manno stressed that the liaisons were high quality personnel, ...c_it_in........._...,.._po.- ...who was the L.O. with CIA and was himself a former CIA officer.liaison to CIA leading up to and on 9-11). ,"""--_ ..~ Tom Arbutus (unsure of spelling of last name) is the TS~.'li~i~~n to CIA today.

~] Manno said he communicated with the liaison qffj6ers via a STU 3 teJe~hone.During these calls they would formulate questions and-task the CIA or to doparticular follow-up. Manno found the CIA to be y , t r y ' responsive. Manno indicated that~:~had been "pests for information."

[U] Manno mentioned the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism which was aforum for the IC and non-IC agencies to meet and share information and assessments.The nCT did produce written threat assessments. .......

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[U] Manno mentioned that the nCT had been folded into the TTIC, and th~~ latthe CIA would be familiar with their workings.' :// .....__Intelligence Assessment at ACI[U] ACI sifted through the intelligence they received from the Ie with "aviation glasses"to see what might constitute a threat to civil aviation. ...-[U] The information would flow in the ACI's 24-hour watch/where the analyst wouldtake important information and open an Intelligence Case rile (ICF). Investigativefollow-up on case files was done not by the FAA but by the FBI, CIA or local lawenforcement. ://~,About 200 ICF's a year were opened by AC~""


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~ Manno said there were times when liaison officers were dissatisfied by the limits oninformation to which they were subject on specific cases, but were turned down on theirrequest for greater access because of "need to know" reasons.~Manno said that to the the issue was about gathering intelligence. To theFBI the issue was about conducting an investigation, and thus the Phoenix memo (onflight school training by suspected terrorists) was a case, not intelligence.Intelligence Products[U] Manno was asked about the products that ACI prepared for FAA and DOTleadership.[U] ACI produced a Daily Intelligence Summary (DIS) to keep senior managementinformed of significant intelligence reporting. This included both a summary andcomments section that was given to the Associate Administration for Civil AviationSecurity (ACS 1).[U] A copy of the DIS was sent to the DoT Director for Security and Intel1igence withinthe OST. The DIS was used by the Director to create a briefing for the Secretary .[U] Manno said that after Pan Am 103, ACS 1 would brief the FAA administrator onceor twice a week, but the practice was dropped at some point-he wasn't sure when.Manno indicated that Admiral Flynn and Gen. Canavan would brief Administrator.Garvey on intelligence information when it was necessary rather than on a routine basis.[U] Another Intelligence product that ACI generated was "Intelligence Notes" thatcontained information on a particular subject such as a certain Method of Operation(MO) used by terrorists or a pattern of activity by terrorists or criminals that was ofconcern to commercial aviation. Manno reported he began the practice of issuing theseNotes after he became Manager 'of the FAA Intelligence Operations Division in 1992.[U] Manno indicated that the Intelligence Notes were used to backup InformationCirculars and Security Directives issued by the FAA.ICs and 80s

[U] ACS I was required to approve any Information Circular or Security Directive beforeFAA issued it to the industry.[U] ACI determined when an was necessary and would draft the wording of thecircular. (ACS 1 would have to sign off before it was issued). ACO and ACP would

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decide if in tellig en ce in fo rm atio n w arran ted a S ecu rity D irectiv e req uirin g th e in du stry totake som e coun ter-m easure. (A CS w ould have to sign of f before it wa s i ss ue d ).[U] P rio r to 1988 w hen SD 's requ irin g the in du stry to tak e co un ter-m easu res w as put in toplace, the F AA issued Security B ulletin s w hich sug gested action s, but d id n ot com peliliem . .

M an no said that IC 's were in tend ed to "sen sitize" the in dustry to p roblem s. A s theautho r of IC 's he said that A CI w as respon sible fo r stating the threat but they d idn 't haverespon sibility to say w hat you had to d o abou t it.

M anno ind icated that each SD and IC has a file to backup the com mun ication w hichw ill help explain w hy i t was is su ed .[U J M anno said he w asn 't aw are of any IC 's or SD 's recommended by AC I orthat w ere turned dow n by A CS 1 , b ut ind icated that we should talk to others who couldbe m ore d ef in itive. H e in dicated the In telligen ce d ivision w as n ever preven ted from"callin g them as w e saw them ," but it w as easier to state the threat than to im plem en tco un ter-m easu res, w hich w ou ld raise qu estio ns o f w heth er th e in du stry co uld han dle it.Th reat M atrixl Alert Levels

M an no in dicated that the an alytical jud gm en ts w ere in ad e by J am es Pad gett an d hisgroup . T he Strategic A nalysis D ivisio n as a grou p d iscu ssed w hat threats d em an ded w hata ctio n s u sin g ju d gm en ts .

A CI d id n't put tog ether the threat m atrix that m arried threats w ith respo nses, butw ou ld comm en t o n the cred ibility o f the threats, w hile o thers p rio ritized the co un ter-measures. M anno was not aware of any formal e ff or t to c on n ec t th re at w ith v uln era bilityt o d e te rm in e countermeasures,[U ] M an no in dicated that the 1993 W orld T rade C en ter bom bing ind icated to A CI that athreshold had been cro ssed an d the threat d om estically had grow n an d w as an issue.Summer 2001 FAA Rulemaking[U ] M an no w as ask ed abo ut the threat an alysis that acco mp an ied the FA A's ru lem ak in gin the sum mer of 200 1 on screen in g co mp an y certif ication an d screen er train in greq uirem en ts. M an no in dicated that the "eco nomists" d evelo ped the threat an alysis toad dress the co st-ben efit issu ed related to ru le-m ak in g .

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[U ] M an no 'in dicated that A CI d id n ot see Red T e,a~ results, but-n oted that at on e tim eRed T eam s operated un der the auspices o fA CI. /H e in dicated -that the R ed T eam sreceived all prod ucts, but that Red Team procedures < ; t , r r d testin g p ro to co ls w ere n otexamined by ACT. //.'Suspicious Activ'~ .~ies[ U ] M an no w as ask ed h ow su sp icio us ~ ttiv iti(f s"~ t airp orts an d o n aircraf t w ere rep ortedto A CI. H e in dicated that w hen A CI received such in form ation f rom a Fed eral SecurityM an ager or C ASF O ~ ~.IC F w ould be o p'eried on the in cid en t.

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Suicid e H ijack ing[U ] M an no in dicated that they d id n ot co nceive that hijack ers w ould use the aircraf t as aw eap on o f m ass d estru ctio n.~Referring to a 1 9 9 8 AC I documen t on "suicid e hijack ing" M anno said that whenthe report was j D uenJ /'[ .S 8.f f 'T he m ain h ijack in g threat th at A C I p erceived w as that terro rists w ou ld hijack a ,..:/p lane to a th ird coun try to try and release the B lind Sheik o r try to blow-up the plane/overa city (such as w ith the A ir France h ijack ing). /:/JMan no w as ask ed if th is co ncern abo ut a hijack in g to n eg otiate the release,:6 'fterro rists or to blow up a plane over a city resu lted in any In formation C ircularsor atask ing to the for more in formation . M anno replied that he d idn 't remember any IC 'sthe threat co ncern p rovok ed , but that an In telligen ce C ase F ile w as established on the A irFrance and A ir Ind ia hijack ings. ,/:/

...._ ..It\C I thoug ht al Q aed a w as becom in g m ore sophisticated in their techn iqu es, an dthey h ad no in formation on i ts use of k n ives. :/ ...'Red TeaI)1S//


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[U] Manno was not clear on whether there were routine procedures in place amongairport and air carrier personnel for identifying and reporting suspicious activities. Hebelieves that ACO may have had a suspicious activity report from air crews, but ACIdidn't see it.

[U] According to Manno, prior to 9-11 there was no such thing as a "no fly list."However, if the FAA wanted to restrict someone who posed a direct and credible threat toaviation a Security Directive would be issued directing the air carriers not to let the listedindividuals fly. He indicated that there was no such thing as a watch list before 9-11either.

~] Manno cited the 1995 intelligence estimate and the 1997 update as importantdocuments about the level of threat that helped convince air carrier executives andsecurity directors that the threat to civil aviation was real and substantial. Manno alsomentioned that Air Carrier security directors would come into ACI for classifiedbriefings, and that ACI would hold sessions for Ground Security Coordinators and othersecurity personnel.~I] May of 2001 Pat McDonnell toured civil aviation facilities providing a briefingon the security threat to civil aviation, mainly at CATX airports. Manno said that thistour was not intended to help sell the rulemaking that was pending in the summer of2001.

Manno indicated that suicide hijacking was "on our mind" after 1998 and wasincluded in a 2000 and 2001 CD ROM presentation on the terrorist threat to civilaviation, but again no specific, credible information was available. The Air India and AirFrance hijackings were the basis for the concern about the suicide tactic.

[U} The chatter in the Intelligence Community was that some type of attack was in theoffing, but no indication of what it was. They assumed there was a potential domesticthreat, but the few specific indicators they had, plus the historical pattern, pointed to agreater threat overseas.~ Manno said that the community would receive what they called "TenetGrams"about every two weeks outlining the various problems. The communications were SCI.In response to a question raised by the 9/11 Families, Manno was not aware of the "9warnings in July and 8 in August."


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Moussaoui[Manno said that the first he heard of the Moussaoui case was when ACI received acable from the FBI on September 4th , 2001 that laid out the fact that he was in a flightschool and that the FBI was seeking a warrant to search the subject's computer. OnSeptember 5th ACI prepared its DIS to ACS 1 and AC01 highlighting the information.He said that was aware the FBI was pursuing leads including with Frenchauthorities. (CHECK TO SEE IF THIS WAS IN THE DIS FOR THAT DAY)~] Manno was not aware of any accus~tion that Jack Salata liaison at the FBI)thought that Moussaoui memoranda had been watered down, or that Salata was worriedin any way about the case. He indicated that he's unsure whether Salata ever talked tohim about Moussaoui. Manno learned about the issue from the September cable, andthinks that's the only communication he ever had. Manno said that as far as ACI wasconcerned the subject was in custody and the matter was under investigation.Phoenix EC

Manno says that the first time he ever heard of the Phoenix Memo was when stafffrom the Joint Intelligence Committee Inquiry showed it to him. Manno said that ifhehad the memo he would have asked the FBI to investigate further.

He said they were aware of pilot training by Al Qaeda but thought it was fortransportation purposes. .The Day of9-11[U] Manno said that on the morning of 9-11 he was in a staff meeting at FAAHeadquarters when someone from the watch reported that there might be a hijack inprogress. This was sometime after 9:00 a.m.[U] Manno went to ACI's 3rd Floor watch office. He said his role was to supportoperations with what information he could. ACI was not able to provide any relevantintelligence information on the plot as it was unfolding.

After-Action Reports[U] Manno indicated that ACI did not conduct any after action reportsof'the office'sperformance leading up to and on 9-11. He stated that their threat assessments were stillvalid.

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[U ] The CIA an d State D epartm en t han dle m ost information-with resp ect to thein te lli ge n ce h eld by foreign c oun tries. \"'\Post 9-1 ~ Intelligence~ TSA 's In telligence of f ice is focused on all majo r mod es of tra~ 'sportation . M annoin d icated th at th e o ff ice is au th orized to d ouble the n um ber of analyststo 97, but thatgood , experien ced an alysts are hard to find , so that the off ice is n ot yet fu lly staffed ,~ e ind icated that TSA has been to ld to detail people to the IA IP atof Homeland Security. \,~ M anno men tioned that there is a lack of analyst talen t, and many agen cies arecom petin g fo r the poo l of peo ple available. H e stressed that w hile train in g an d educationw as im portan t, ex erien ce is vital. H e talk ed abou t som e of the train in facilities for \,in telli en ce

~ M anno stated that Sec. Hutchison an d Gen . L ibutti are look in g at the in telligen cestructure at DHS , such as the ind ependen t shops at TSA ; B lCE and C VP. O ne of thep oin ts of an alysis is to d eterm in e w hether these other sho ps should be fo ld ed in to IAIP.M an no believes there is value in m ain tain in g a un it w ith a fo cus on tran sportatio n threats.[U ] M anno observed that post in fo rmation is f low ing very f reely. N o one wan ts tosit on an ythin g so they are sharin g everythin g so that T SA is in un dated w ith in form ation ,and at som e poin t the p roper balance m ust be found .


~ ] TSA now has two liaison of f icers w ith the FBI which is u sef ul.~ Manno ' said his is participating in a work ing group on the Terrorist Screen ingcen ter-w atch lists an d no f ly lists are o n the list o f subjects they are w ork in g on .Risk Assessmen t[U ] M an no stated that the process of vu ln erability assessm en t is un derw ay at T SA . Pre1 1 A C I w as resp on sib le fo r threat assessm en t. V uln erability assessm en ts w ere d on eelsewhere and he wasn 't su re how the two were combin ed w ithin the FAA .


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Manno stated that the Office of National Risk Assessment (ONRA) is under TSA(Admiral Loy). He stated that ONRA is setting up its own SCIF and will have its ownanalysts. TSIS is not being consulted on the set-up of CAPPS II .Intelligence Reporting to TSA leadership

Manno believes TSA leadership understands the importance of intelligence and heprovides a daily briefing to a cadre ofTSA senior officials including Loy, McHale,Lunner; Robinson, Fulton, Tiege, DiBatiste and Quinn. He indicated that they are gearingup for the Olympics .

Secretary Ridge and Asst. Secretary Hutchison receive a more comprehensiveintelligence briefing that includes the DIS that TSIS gives to Loy.[U] Manno stated that the former CASLO's are now Transportation SecurityRepresentatives (TSR's)

He stated that there are no indications that the broader mandate to protect all modeshas diminished aviation capabilities.Future Threats

[U] TSA and ICE are working out an MOU on the Federal Air Marshall Service .

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Mfr Nara- t7- Tsa- Manno Claudio- 10-1-03- 00699

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