Lebanon, Syria and the PLO

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THE MIDDLE EASTEvents in the Middle East during 1976 were dominated by Arab politics. At both thebeginning and the end of the year the Arab states mounted diplomatic offensives directedtowards Israe l, but in the months in between they were sharply divided, notably by eventsin the Lebanon. The Palestinians started the year on the crest of a political wave, butfinish ed it in great disarray, disciplined by Syrian force. Israel watched these Arabquarrels attentively and built up her own military strength. By the turn of the year,however, she was under renewed political pressure bo th from the Arabs, who had closedranks under the strong influence of Saudi Arabia, and internally.In January 1976 the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) won a major diplomaticvictory when it was invited to attend a UN Security Council debate on the M iddle East.*Israel announced that she would boycott the meeting, and the session began after theUnited States failed to block PLO participation. A draft resolution was put forward at thedebate by Arab representatives aimed inter alia at recognizing the PLO as the legalPalestinian representative and at the establishing of a Palestinian state. Although thiswas vetoed by the United States, the UN discussions were a measure of the politicalisolation of Israel and the high-water mark, as it turned out, of the PLO.Arab DissentIt was Syria, in her search for political momentum for change in the Middle East, thatwas effectively the sponsor of the PLO at this point, and the direction and evolution ofSyrian policies became central to the year's events in the region. She sought closer co-operation with Jordan, suggesting the concept of a federated state to incorporate Syria,Jordan and a Palestinian authority on the West Bank, thus giving notice of her intentionto ensure tha t the emergence of a Palestinian state w ould be along lines that suited her ownnationa l in terests. Jordan welcomed further m ilitary and economic co-operation b ut wasclearly cautious about any step that might blur her own identity; her relations with Syriadid, however, improve markedly. At the same time, relations between Syria and Egyptgrew steadily worse, prompted by Syrian denunciation of the 1975 Sinai Interim Agree-ment.Syria was, of course, much preoccupied by events in the Lebanon and, fearful that theywould get out of control, moved from mediation in Lebanon to eventual large-scalemilitary intervention (see pp. 86-8). This was despite num erous Arab attempts, notablyby Saudi Arabia, to work out a policy for the Lebanon that would reconcile the conflictingviews of the participants and their supporters, but essentially to reach accommodationwith Syria, for whom the issue was a vital one. Meetings between Egypt, Syria, SaudiArabia and Kuwait were held in Riyadh in June and July (one in May was cancelledbecause of Syria's last-minute refusal to attend, occasioned by her dispute with Egypt),and an A rab emergency summit was called there by King K haled in October, when eventsin the Lebanon had reached a critical point. This meeting at last produced a degree ofharmony , above all between Syria and Egypt. It was clear that Saudi Arabia, long thefinan cial centre of gravity of the Arab world, had now become a powerful political centreas well, uniquely able to apply pressure in pursuit of her aim of strengthening Arabstability (see pp. 89-92).If disputes between Syria and Egypt followed an up-and-down course so did thosebetween other Arab states, often showing even greater volatility. In July, Egypt hadthreatened to cut diplomatic relations with Libya, and by September the situation grew

* See Strategic S urvey 1975, p. 78.


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8 2 THE M IDDLE EASTworse - with Libya accused of planting bombs in Cairo - but by the end of the year therewas an attempt at reconciliation. President Numeiry of Sudan called for the isolation ofLibya, claiming that Colonel Gaddafi had planned the abortive coup against him inJuly, while Tunisia was concerned over Libyan support for Tunisian dissidents. Jordanhad long been at loggerheads with Libya but, together with Tunisia, moved in the latesummer towards the restoration of more friendly ties. Iraq, however, stood out againstthis general trend towards Arab cohesion, maintaining strained relations with SaudiArabia and Syria throughou t, and w ithdrawing her ambassador from Syria in November.A t the roo t of m uch of this Arab dissension was, of course, the problem of the Pales-tinians, who themselves were riven by factional differences. During the year the PLO hadlooked wherever it could for support, essentially against Syria, but did no t find enough toavert military defeat in th e Lebanon. The Riyadh emergency summ it did finally set somelimits to Syrian actions, bu t many Arabs would no t have been disturbed to see the PLO'Sstature sharply reduced. At the end of the year, when calls were being made for thereconvening of the Geneva Conference on the Middle East, the Palestinians faced acrisis of leadership and of policy on the age-old issues of recognition of Israel and thenature of a Palestinian state.Israel's PositionWhile Arabs fought amo ng themselves, Israel used the year to bolster her military strengthand to keep a wary eye on events in Lebanon, particularly in the sensitive area south ofthe Litani river. She did, however, face during the year continuous unrest on the WestBank. Strikes, protests and demonstrations, sometimes set off by new (and often un-authorized) Jewish developments on Arab land, led to the use of Israeli troops to controlriots and to a number of deaths. The publicity given to this military action drew renewedattention to the Israeli occupation and, in particular, to settlement and land policy on theWest Bank and the Golan Heights, which attracted widespread criticism, not least fromthe U nited States.

Th e Israeli military position was improved steadily by arms deliveries from the U nitedStates, no dou bt facilitated by the climate of p residential election politics. Israel receivedapproximately $2*2 billion in military aid from the U nited States, and before the electionPresident Ford promised the transfer of several items of advanced equipment, newprecision weapons, target-acquisition equipment and concussion bombs. (In February1977 the Carter Administration announced that it was reviewing this arrangement, andin M arch the decision was taken t o cancel the transfer of the concussion bombs - fuel -air explosives. The first of 25 F-15 Eagle figh ters on order were delivered in December,and at the end of the year Israel and the United States were discussing the sale or co-production of the F-16 fighter, as well as the purchase of tank components. During th eyear attention was also drawn towards Israel's growing domestic arms industry by theunveiling on Air Force Day in July of a squadron of Kfir C-2 figh ters, built not only forher ow n use bu t also with an eye on possible export later (see p. 21). The flow of equipmentto the Israeli Defence Forces undoubtedly put Israel in a stronger position militarily thanin October 1973, despite chronic manpower problem s. But it was at the cost of consider-able financial strain: the Israeli pound was devalued in June for the tenth time within ayear. And military expenditure on such a scale meant dependence on heavy assistancefrom the U nited States, which in 1976 accounted for over 35 percent of the Israeli defencebudget.

Whatever immediate comfort the worsting of the PLO in Lebanon had given to Israel,she would inevitably have been concerned over the growth of Syrian influence in thatcountry. Given the obvious problem that in a new war the L ebanon could present a fourthmilitary front, Israel had a particular interest in the area south of the Litani. Both Syriaand Israel were at pa ins to exercise restraint here during the year, and Syrian forces were


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THE MIDDLE EAST 8 3kept no rth of the river, while Israel gave no overt provocation. She made it clear, how-ever, tha t Palestinian armed strength was jus t as unwelcome as tha t of Syria, who clearlyunderstood this. Syrian preoccupation with the Lebanon also led to the renewal of themandate for the UN contingent on the Golan H eights in M ay and November, and noattempt was made to use the threat of non-renewal to apply pressure to Israel, as hadhappened previously.Regional DiplomacyThe Sinai Interim Agreement of September 1975 was carried a stage further in 1976.The first substantial forward movement by Egyptian troops was made in January andcompleted on 23 Feb ruary, when the area west of the Giddi and Mitla Passes was handedover to them by UN personnel. The electronic early-warning stations to mon itor the twosides, manned by 200 Americans, had begun operation some two days beforehand. T herewere later protests by Israel to the UN that Egypt had moved forward more battalions thanthe agreement permitted, and they were moved out in August and September. In retro-spect, the Sinai agreement achieved its limited objectives of disengaging the two armies,restoring territory to Egypt, and breaking the twenty-two-year ban on the passage ofIsraeli shipping through the Suez Canal. One year after its signing, both countries hadreason to be satisfied with it.This may have been the reason for a num ber of Israeli consultations or initiatives th atwere made in the autumn, directed to promoting negotiations. But Israel's decision inDecember to table a resolution in the UN General Assembly for the first time came inresponse to mounting Arab peace moves. Israel formally requested the early reconveningof the Geneva Peace Conference with the original participants, Egypt, Syria and Jordan,but made no mention of the PLO. This move closely followed statements by PresidentSadat and Yassir Arafat, chairman of the PLO. Sadat was said to have offered a non-belligerency pact with Israel before a withdrawal from all occupied territories; YassirArafat spoke of his willingness to establish an Arab Palestinian State in land evacuatedby Israel under any agreement. Neither of these positions was new bu t, taken together,they d id p erhaps show some promise. Of course, what w as still needed was the Palestin-ians' acceptance of peaceful coexistence with Israel, bu t their altered and reduced circum-stances made it possible that at least the moderates among them could sooner or later bepressed in to this by the Arab governments. Arab moves were directed towards getting thePLO to a reconvened Geneva conference - if they wanted to go - and in late DecemberSyria and Egypt reversed their previous position that there should be a single Arabdelegation and announced that the PLO should go to Geneva in its own right. However,the purpose of the Israeli draft General Assembly resolution (which was soon withdrawn)had been to ensure that the PLO would be excluded from any talks, and Israel remainedadam ant th at she would not sit with the PLO anywhere, insisting th at Jorda n only shouldspeak for the Palestinians.

Despite deadlock on this familiar point, much else was happening politically. InDecember Syria and Egypt agreed to form a 'united political leadership', followinga similar agreement earlier in the month between Syria and Jordan; in each case thepurpose was to ensure a united Arab front in the search for a peace settlement. M ilitaryco-ordination was also discussed, and Saudi Arabia led talks of Arab leaders in the Gulfto co-ordinate financia l support for Egyptian military modernization. At the Decembermeeting of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) the Saudi OilMinister, Sheikh Yamani, stood out against the decision of eleven of the participants fora ten per cent oil price rise and announced tha t Saudi Arab ia, together with the U nitedArab Emirates, would increase prices by only five per cent while increasing production.Yam ani later said that the decision had been motivated by political considerations, andSaudi Arabia expected Western action to help to obtain a Middle East settlement


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8 4 THE MIDDLE EASTIsrael, conscious th at m uch of this Arab activity was pointed tow ards a new A dministra-tion in Washington, was herself preparing for American initiatives when they came. Butpolitical opinion within the governing coalition and the country at large was far fromunited on a number of issues, and skirmishing within the Knesset was rife. This wasbroug ht to a head on 21 December, when Prime M inister Rab in resigned after breakingup the ruling coalition by dismissing the three National Religious Party (NRP) ministers.This followed a motion of no confidence - which the government survived but on whichthe NRP abstained - over an alleged breach of the Sabbath caused by the government'spublic welcome of the arrival of the first three F-15 fighters. The country was thu s leftwith a caretaker government to hold office until elections in mid-May and with thecontinuing prospect of political dissension. Israeli law gives a caretaker governmentfull authority to conduct negotiations in response to any outside initiatives for peace,but it was doubtful whether the Prime Minister would have a sufficient political baseto make any major territorial concessions. It seemed clear that Rabin had chosen theoccasion to resign in a bid to strengthen unity within the somewhat discontented LabourParty (though his authority was challenged, he did win re-election as leader in February

1977), and th at he , like others, would use the election campaign to obtain a m andate fora settlement. In any event, the holding of elections some months earlier than expect-ed could m ake negotiations slightly easier, for the government h ad prom ised th at signi-ficant withdrawals from the West Bank would have to be approved by the electorate.At the year end the way was thus being cleared on both sides of the dispute for a newAm erican initiative. While American policy had understandably been m uted for a period,it had pursued its even-handed course during the year, and considerable care had beentaken to continue good relations with Egypt and Saudi A rabia in particular. Substantialsupplies of arms were made to the latter (see p. 91), despite the evident possibility thatsuch supplies could find their way into use against Israel in any new figh ting, in retu rn forSaudi Arabia's political and economic support of a moderate Arab position.The Middle E ast seemed likely to figu re fairly high on President Carter's priorities.The events of the year, distressing through their impact in the Lebanon, had clarified atleast some of the problems. The Soviet Union had found it hard to capitalize on them,torn between the desirability of supporting the PLO and the greater need to stay on goodterms w ith Syria. Israel's immediate security was no longer an issue, and the scene wasthus being set for an attempt to find further solutions. Something would have to be do neto defuse the situation on Israel's north-eastern front with Syria, and the Lebanon wouldhave to be prevented from becoming another ingredient in the Arab-Israel dispute.Perhaps further steps in the Sinai might also be necessary, but the central problem to begrappled with, and for which the time was perhaps m ore ripe than before, was that of thePalestinians. While progress was made in 1976, there remained appalling difficultiesahead - not least for Israel, because a settlement could only be built upon Israeli con-cessions. The question of establishing a Palestinian state figured largely in preliminarydiscussions with Arab leaders during the Febru ary 1977 Middle E ast visit of the new USSecretary of State, Cyrus Vance. One possibility, suggested by President Sadat, was aconfederated state linked w ith Jordan . But long and difficult negotiations seemed inevit-able before so many deep-rooted differences of opinion could be reconciled. However,no t to get negotiations under way was to risk yet another war in the no t-too-distant future.

LEBANON, SYRIA AND THE PLOThe causes of the 1975-6 conflict in the Lebanon can be traced to a number of divergentsources of friction in that country and the region as a whole. Lebanon had for some timebeen prone to crises culminating in political violence of varying degrees, particularly


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LEBANON, SYRIA AND THE PLO 8 5because the bulk of the Muslim minority continued to resent the pre-eminence and built-in privileges accorded to the Christian Maronites.* The attempt by the Druze leaderKemal Jum blatt to w rest the leadership of the indigenous Muslim community from themore traditional and conservative politicians and t o marshal rad ical groups, including thePalestine guerrilla movement, to challenge Christian political supremacy served as acatalyst for the ferocious civil war which in 1976 left the L ebanon ravaged, the guerrillasdefeated and the Syrian army in occupation under the auspices of the Arab league.The PalestiniansThe presence of non-indigenous Palestinian guerrillas in Lebanon aggravated all thesusceptibilities which had lain do rman t since the civil war in 1958. Their activities con-tributed to the radicalization of the political climate, especially among the M uslim popu-lation, and the guerrilla forces were perceived by many as an alternative military organi-zation to the Christian-led Lebanese army. This led the Muslims to press for greaterpolitical concessions from the M aronites, under thre at of disrupting the norm al processesof political life, so t ha t in the 1970s the guerrillas were able to gain a powerful positionin Lebanese politics. The revolutionary guerrilla organizations in particular, such as thePopular Fron t for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) under the Marxist-inclined GeorgeHabash, sought to exploit the Lebanese domestic struggle to further their own interest.The goal of dominating Muslim politics was not precluded by the growing disagreementin the ran ks of the guerrillas over policies for the creation of a Palestinian state.The fundamental schism in the guerrilla movement was between, on the one hand , theofficial PLO led by Y asir Arafat and the Syrian-backed Sa'iqa led by Zuhair Mohsen,and, on the other, the 'Rejection Front', made up of the PFLP, the PFLP General Com-mand under Ahmed Jibril and the Iraqi-backed Arab Liberation Front (ALF).The relationship between the guerrillas and the Lebanese S tate had never been cordial,and from the outset both sides realized they were on a collision course. An early seriesof clashes had been terminated by the Cairo agreement of 1969, which allowed theguerrillas extra-territorial rights over their camps and unham pered access to the southernborde r with Israel, bu t the agreement did little to assuage Christian resentment againstthese concessions. When the clashes were resumed in 1973, Arab political pressure forcedthe Lebanese army to suspend its operations against the guerrillas, and the result was moreconcessions. The Palestinians were granted the right to defend their camps againstoutside attacks (presumably those of Israeli forces), and this meant that they coulddeploy heavy weapons like mortars, heavy machine guns and an ti-aircraft missiles withinthe cam ps. In securing these righ ts, Syria's intervention had been crucial: she put pressureon the Lebanese economy by closing her border with Lebanon to commercial traffic,while allowing continued movement of men and equipment in support of the guerrillas.She resorted to the same tactics in April 1975, when renewed clashes signalled the out-break of a civil war which lasted until October 1976 and claimed over 50,000 lives.Domestic ConsiderationsThe onset of civil war led to a realignment of Muslim politics when Kemal Jumblatt, theacknowledged leader of the leftist movement assumed the leadership of the Muslimcommunity. As a leader of a minority Muslim sect (the Druzes) he could not aspire tomore than a ministerial position under the old confessional system of the Lebaneseconstitution ,! and he now sought to extend his political base by appealing to the guerrilla

* See 'Lebanon', Strategic Survey 1975, pp. 82-6 (including map, p. 85). The confessional system allocated political power according to the size of the religious communitieswhen the constitution w as promulgated (see Strategic Survey 1975, p. 82).


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8 6 THE MIDDLE EASTorganizations. The Lebanese left quickly rallied to the g uerrillas' cause, so as to gain theprotection it needed against attacks by M uslim conservatives and Christians alike, and adiverse but formidable conglomeration of radical groups and social militants joinedforces with the guerrillas in an organization known as the Arab Front Supportingthe Palestine National Struggle. Jumblatt became its Secretary-General.The unwillingness, or inability, of the M uslim leadership to defy the guerrillas and jointhe Christians in a common defence of the country's territorial integrity during 1975enabled the Christian Maronite parties to present themselves as the defenders of Leban-on's sovereignty and independence. One of these, the Kata'ib, was prepared to allowsome changes to be m ade to the constitution in order to redress the political balance infavour of the Muslims, though it repeatedly condemned any proposal for partition. Butother Maronite groups, like Camille Chamoun's National Liberals, the Zgharta Libera-tion Army of former President Suleiman Franjieh and the fanatical Guards of the Cedars,were not so restrained about the possibility of partition; faced with radical changes inthe political system, they made plain their preference for a federal or confederal state inwhich the M aronites would enjoy autonom y. They also voted no t to allow the Palestinianguerrillas to remain in the country, and several calls were made for resettlement ofrefugees from the L ebanon in other Arab states. Implementation of this plan w ould haveleft behind but a fraction of the estimated 300,000 Palestinians in the Lebanon. Theimplied threat of partition was particularly serious for the Arab states, since it couldencourage other minorities occupying a definable geographical area to demand the rightto secede, which might portend the disintegration of the present state structure in theMiddle E ast; moreover, such a collapse would accord legitimacy to a Jewish state in theregion.Syrian ObjectivesIt w as Syria that became the champion of the guerrillas' right to operate in Lebanon andintervened to defend them against attacks by the Lebanese army and the Christianmilitias. But there were also other considerations as well which prompted her interest inthe country . After th e signing of the Sinai Interim Agreement between Israel and Egypt inSeptember 1975, Syria and the PLO drew together to discuss the setting up of a jointmilitary and political command. This move was intended both to protect Syria's flankagainst a possible Israeli military action and to form partjof a concerted effort to strengthenArab defences after the 'neutralization' of Egypt by the Sinai agreement. Syria had alsobecome alarmed abo ut the influence of the radical Palestinian groupings in the 'RejectionFro nt' supported by the Iraqi B a'athist regime, with which she had a long-standing feud.Moreover, since she was basically just as interested in a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute as E gypt, she could not look with favour on the rise in Beirut of a radicalregime dominated by the 'Rejection Front'. A radical Lebanon would make war withIsrael imminent and might also drive the Maronites to opt for formal p artition. PresidentAssad therefore faced the complex and sensitive political task of containing 'rejectionist'control of the PLO and reassuring the M aronites that there would be no major change in thestatus quo. By so doing, he would reduce the risk of war with Israel and be in a positionto allow the PLO to attend a resumed Geneva conference on the Middle East. The officialPLO leadership, which ha d no wish to see the 'rejectionists' trium ph, began by co-operatingwith Syria, but subsequently came under increasing pressures to change this stand.The Collapse of the ArmySyrian assurance to the Maronites came in the form of the Dam ascus Pact of F ebruary,which followed the introduction of 1,500 Syrian-controlled Palestine Liberation Armyregulars during th e previous m onth . The .pact, which reaffirmed the confessional system


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LEBANON, SYRIA AN D THE PLO 8 7in the Lebanon but promised equal parliamentary representation to Christians andMuslims, did not p lease all the parties. The Maronites were comforted by the maintenanceof confessionalism and the promise of the Presidency. They also welcomed Syrianguarantees that the provisions of the 1969 Cairo agreement, governing the presence ofthe guerrillas in Lebanon, would be strictly observed (Syria was to police the cease-fireand have a direct say in how and where the guerrillas were to deploy their forces). Theguerrillas and their leftist allies, however, could n ot accept such a settlement. With morethan two thirds of the country under their control, they embarked on a campaign toundermine the unity of the Lebanese armed forces as a first step. The result was a rebellionin March led by a young Muslim officer, Lt Ahmad al-Khatib, who called on his co-religionists to join what he called the Lebanese Arab Army. Within a few days, severalbarracks declared their allegiance to al-Khatib. Some of the 55 per cent of Muslim troopsarrested their officers (64 per cent of the officer corps was Christian) and installed Muslimreplacements.

The rebellion had a crucial impact on national politics. President Franjieh, supportedby the army, moved to bring charges of desertion and sedition against the mutineers,while other members of the government pressed for an amnesty to maintain the unity ofthe military establishment. Syrian mediation failed to break the impasse, and on 11 MarchBrigadier Aziz al-Ahdab, Commander of the Beirut garrison, announced a take-over ofthe government, calling on the President to resign and promising the formation of a newadm inistration. B ut the gesture proved to be an empty threat and served only to intensifythe war, as other officers declared themselves for Franjieh. It became obvious that theLebanese army had lost all semblance of unity, and by the end of March it was reduced toa multiplicity of factions which were to continue the civil war with the aid of the heavyarmaments at their disposal.Ahdab 's move coincided with the Palestinian and leftist offensive against the Maronites.The most spectacular action of this campaign was the bombardment of the presidentialpalace on 25 March, which forced Franjieh to seek refuge in the Maronite enclave ofJounieh , ten m iles north of Beirut. Syria stepped up her intervention with the dispatch of1,000 troops, ostensibly to prevent the forcible removal of the President. In fact, theconstitution was amended to allow a new presidential election to be held in M ay, insteadof September as outlined in the Damascus Pact. When the Syrian-backed candidate,Elias Sarkis, was elected, Syria mounted a massive security operation, but the crisiswas not thereby resolved.At the end of May, Syria sent an armoured column of 60 tanks and 2,000 troops(quickly reinforced by 3-4,000 men) into Lebanon to check Palestinian operationsagainst the Maronites. The move was frustrated not so much by armed resistance(although this was fierce in certain places, like Sidon) as by Arab and internationalpressure. President Sadat condemned the intervention and proposed a joint Arab forceunder the auspices of the Arab league. Under pressure from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait,representatives of Syria and Egypt met at Riyadh in June and agreed to send a peace-keeping force to the Lebanon. But in the absence of an effective cease-fire, the peaceforce found it impossible to carry ou t its task and remained passive. The arrival in Beirutof the 1,000-strong Syrian and Libyan Arab Force (followed by a Sudanese contingent)in late June coincided with concerted attacks by the Maronite forces against the refugeecamps of Jisr al-Pasha and Tal al-Za'tar on the south-eastern outskirts. These were theonly remaining Palestinian strongholds in the Christian enclave which ran along the coastfrom East Beirut northward as far as Jounieh and then turned eastward into the Maronitehinterland.The fall of Tal al-Za'tar in mid-July marked the turning point of the civil war. PLOrepresentatives, who had been discussing with Syria a possible formula to end hostilities,began to yield to Syrian and Saudi pressure. In September, three weeks before he was toassume office, President-elect Sarkis was invited to join the talks in Chtoura in eastern


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8 8 THE MIDDLE EASTLebanon. Although agreement was reached on the terms of a new cease-fire, Lebanese.Muslim factions, with the suppo rt of the Palestinian 'rejectionists', were not prepared toaccept its provisions, and the talks ended inconclusively. Syria saw no alternative but tomount yet another disciplinary campaign. A force of some 15,000 went on the offensivein the m ountain region and headed for the three areas under Palestinian control, Tripoliin the n orth, Sidon and Tyre in the south, and west Beirut. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait,meanwhile, stepped up their efforts at mediation between Egypt and Syria, and as aresult a summit meeting was held in October at Riyadh. Three weeks later a conferencemeeting of Arab heads of state was held in Cairo to endorse the agreement worked ou t atRiyadh.Apart from marking the reconciliation of Syria and Egypt, the Riyadh agreementprovided for an effective cease-fire to be policed by an Arab peace-keeping force, thistime of 30,000, and the Syrian forces in Lebanon were endowed with Arab Leagueauthority. It also ensured the strict adherence of the Palestinians to the provisions of the1969 Cairo Agreement and established a round-table conference, to be arranged byPresident Sarkis, to bring together all the Lebanese factions and representatives of Arabstates to work out a settlement. President Sarkis was to control an Arab fund for thereconstruction of the Lebanese economy.UncertaintiesBy the end of the year, Syria, by a masterful combination of diplomacy and force, hadessentially obtained Ara b recognition of her primacy in the politics of the fertile crescent.Her alliance with Jordan, her newly-acquired influence with the PLO and her powerfulposition in the L ebanon all gave her a crucial role to play in the conduct of M iddle Eastdiplomacy during 1977, and her co-ordination, and possible union, w ith Egypt presentedIsrael and the United States with a formidable challenge. It was not surprising, therefore,that the Arab leaders, in harmony once again, set their sights on the resumption of theGeneva conference and a comprehensive settlement of their conflict with Israel. WithinLebanon , however, the situation remained delicate, particularly following Jumblatt'sassassination on 16 March 1977. The coun try was virtually pa rtitioned, and the M aronitesremained intransigent over their status and the presence of the Palestinian guerrillas. TheMuslim community was resentful of the Syrian role (for example, the effort to have allthe factions turn over their weapons to the Arab peace-keeping force encountereddifficulties) and was still unwilling to co-operate with the Maronites. President Sarkispostponed the proposed talks on the future of the country's political system until essentialservices were provided and government institutions were functioning again.

The crucial question of Palestinian representation remained open too. In DecemberPresident Sadat, in an effort to meet Israeli objections about the status of the PLO,seemed to revive the proposal for a federal state of Jo rdan and Palestine made by KingHussein in 1972. But, in view of Arab League recognition of the PLO as the 'only legiti-mate representative of the Palestinian people', this was likely to meet strong resistancefrom Arafat. Finally, the situation in southern Lebanon remained explosive. In DecemberChristian militias, with the support of Israel, were fighting guerrilla forces who wereincreasingly concentrated in that region; at the same time, the Syrian-dominated Arabpeace-keeping force seemed reluctant to move into south Lebanon because of Israeliobjections. However, at the end of January 1977, Israel reported tha t Syrian units hadextended their positions south to the towns of Nabatiyeh, Aichiyeh and M arjayoun - allnine miles from the frontier with Israel. Christian Maronite militiamen warned thatSyrian forces would no t be allowed south of the Litan i River,, and the United Stateswarned that the movement of the Arab peace-keeping force closer to the border couldprovoke an Israeli attack. These forces were apparently withdrawn in m id-February, b ut,even so, Syria's position was not w ithout risks as the new year got under way.

Lebanon, Syria and the PLO

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