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FCO HISTORICAL BRANCH

OCCASIONAL PAPERS

No. 5

Korea

Foreign and Commonwealth 0, jfice April 1992

Foreign & Commonwealth Office

HISTORICAL BRANCH

Occasional Papers

No. 5 April 1992

CONTENTS

Papers presented at the Seminar held by the Editors of Documents on British Policy Overseas, in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, on 8 January 1992

Page

Foreword 3

Britain, Korea and the politics of power by proxy Heather Yasamee 4-21

Korea Sir James Cable 22-27

British political influence in the Korean War General Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley 28-31

The MacArthur factor in British policy towards the Korean War, 1950-1

Dr Peter Lowe 32-35

Command and co-ordination of UN forces in Korea Richard Bevins 36-41

Concluding Remarks 42

Note on Contributors 43

DBPO: Volumes published and in preparation 45

Copies of this pamphlet will be deposited with the National Libraries

FCO Historical Branch, Library and Records Department,

Cornwall House, Stamford Street, London SEI 9NS

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FOREWORD

The two latest volumes in the series Documents on British Policy Overseas were the basis

of discussion at a seminar held in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 8 January 1992.

The morning sessions were devoted to a volume on Eastern Europe 1945-6 and are published in a separate issue (No. 4) of this Occasional Papers series. This issue

contains the proceedings of the afternoon sessions discussing the volume on Korea 1950-1.

The two main papers by the Editor of the Korean volume, Heather Yasamee, and Sir James Cable were followed by comments from General Sir Anthony Farrar- Hockley and Dr Peter Lowe. The points raised in the ensuing debate form the basis of the conclusions. In addition there is an extra item on the implications of the Korean crisis for the UN.

I should like to thank the outside participants, the FCO's Historians and the other officials who took part in the seminar

Richard Bone Library and Records Department April 1992

3

BRITAIN, KOREA AND THE POLITICS OF POWER BY PROXY

Heather Yasamee

Korea in Global Strategy

`The vital mistake we made was in entering upon this commitment unprepared and unmobilised for the job. The United Nations had no forces available. It therefore became all along a big bluf

MacArdua, 23 Dec. 19501

When General MacArthur complained in December 1950 that owing to the lack of forces UN intervention in Korea had been all along `one big bluff' 1 for once he was not exaggerating, but merely stating in plain language what the British Chiefs of Staff had been saying for years. Even in Western Europe, the top defence priority, the Chiefs of Staff had long admitted that `Western military weakness as a whole is now such that, from the purely military point of view, Russia could march to the Atlantic

at any moment'. 2 How much worse then was the case in the Far East which the Chiefs of Staff considered to be the most serious gap in the Cold War front but

whose importance, they said, did not rate reinforcement in the event of full scale war.

One of the consequences of the Korean War was a greater appreciation of the importance of the Far East: reinforcing Allied forces there became a stated aim of British defence policy and global strategy in 1951. In their 1950 report, 2 written on the eve of the Korean War, the Chiefs of Staff defined the Cold War as a struggle against Russian communism. The Soviet aim they said was `quite clear-it is a communist world dominated by Moscow'. The Western aim should be to stop this in

the short term by halting any further spread of communism and in the long term by

achieving freedom for the satellite states and the withdrawal of the Soviet Union behind its own frontiers. The Chiefs of Staff saw the problem as a global one requiring global solutions at a time when none of the western powers-not even the United States (despite atomic superiority)-was said to have the capability to fight

the Soviet Union alone, should it decide to turn the Cold War into a Hot one.

The key to dealing with the threat posed by the Soviet Union was seen to lie in

ever closer collaboration and coordination of effort between the western powers. In

I Documents on British Policy Overseas (hereafter cited as DBPO), Series II, Volume IV, Korea 1950-1 (HMSO, 1991), No. 97: MacArthur to Bouchier, 23 Dec. 1950. 2 Ibid, Appendix I: Chiefs of Staff's report on global strategy, May June 1950. The text of their 1951 report is reproduced on microfiches as the calendar to Appendix I.

4

terms reminiscent of Sir Orme Sargent's famous 1945 Stocktaking paper, the Chiefs

of Staff spelt out that `Today it makes no sense to think in terms of British strategy

or Western European strategy as something individual and independent. Full

collaboration with the United States in policy and method is vital. ' 2

By collaboration they meant joint action designed to translate the paper plans of a

still embryonic Atlantic pact into men, money and equipment and to extend NATO's

reach by the creation of a twin organisation for the Pacific. The importance attached to building up positions of strength in vital areas and taking more of a Cold War

offensive derived from the assumption that the Russians would back down if

confronted.

Although Soviet policy was reckoned to be fundamentally aggressive and always looking to exploit weakness, the Chiefs of Staff thought the Russians were `essentially realists' who `understood force' and would always draw back when confronted with determined and superior opposition. 4 'The experience of Berlin was frequently cited as an example of this). According to the Chiefs of Staff the Soviet Union would not risk war until its defences were prepared (probably not until 1954). This was why it would not march to the Atlantic even though there were no western forces to stop it, since such a move could result in war with the United States and retribution in the form of the atomic bomb. In other words `the "Tax Atlantica" rests today on the atomic weapon as the Pax Britannica rested in the 19th century on the British Fleet'. 2 That having been said the Chiefs were quick to make the obvious point that the bomb was only effective as a deterrent as long as the Russians believed that the West would in fact use it.

The Chiefs of Staffs analysis of Soviet intentions produced the conclusion that the West ought to start taking the offensive in the Cold War, since failure to do so increased military difficulties and commitments. Britain's lack of resources to meet existing commitments led to a more rigorous definition of defence priorities in which Britain would attempt to defend only the really vital areas. Western Europe

accordingly replaced the Middle East as the top priority with the Far Last trailing in third place--even though it was recognised that of all the areas the Far East was the most vulnerable to a forward communist move.

Neither Western nor Asian solidarity existed in a Far Fast divided over China and where the old colonial powers faced the twin challenge of communism and anti- imperialism. (Sir Stafford Cripps was later to remark that western difficulties in the

3 DBPO, Series 1, Volume I, Tit Conference at Potsdam 1945 (HMSO, 1984), No. 102: Sargent memo. on `Stocktaking after VE-Day', II July 1945. 4 DBPO, Series II, Volume IV, No. 104. i: F. O. on `Russian strategic intentions and the threat to peace', Dec. 1950; cf also Appendix 1, global strategy, para. 11.

5

Far East owed much to the failure to come to terms with the newly emerging sense of nationalism there and to appreciate that `communism is much less offensive to the Asiatics than colonialism'5 ). The defeat of Japan had left a power vacuum in the Far East which five years of US drift in the Pacific had done nothing to fill. French difficulties in Indo-China, the British struggle in Malaya, and absence of any strong or stable government in Burma or Siam were all seen as danger signs that just one more communist push could lead to the rice-bowl of Asia falling into Communist hands and dealing a terrific blow to the Allied economy-particularly that of the Commonwealth. Nonetheless the Far East was not considered as vital to the survival of western civilisation as either Western Europe or the Middle East and consequently no reinforcements should be spared to defend it in the event of war. In a report which made no mention of Korea, the Chiefs of Staff suggested that the aim should be to achieve some unified policy to clear up the Far East and liberate forces tied up in the jungles of Indo-China and Malaya for the defence of more vital areas such as Europe.

The key here as in all things was to draw in the United States: in particular to get it to take responsibility for Pacific defence. In other words, to paraphrase Orme Sargent once again, to influence the US to use its power on British behalf: a policy recently described by David Reynolds as power by proxy. 6

The Chiefs of Staff's report was accepted by Ministers as the basis for future defence planning and action. On 20 June the Prime Minister approved a text for issue to the United States and older Commonwealth governments. Five days later North Korean forces swept into South Korea and for the next three years western resources were poured into defending a country which all were agreed was not in itself of any strategic importance.

The implications of Korea for British Foreign Policy

`The main issues are. (a) whether the invasion of South Korea can be stopped; (b) what action it is possible for the Security Council to take (c) repercussions elsewhere' Dixon, 26 Juni 19507

Sir Pierson Dixon's early reaction was the first of a series of assessments in the Foreign Office in which the main questions asked were:

Ibid., No. 22. i: minute by Cripps, 30 July 1950; cf also No. 33. i for remarks by Roberts, 5 Aug. 1950. 6D Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century (London, 1991), p. 296. ' DBPO, Series II, Volume IV, No. 2-ii: Dixon memo., 26 June 1950. (Dixon's prescient assessment led directly to the drafting of No. 19 on the implications of the situation in Korea for British foreign policy).

6

What was the Soviet Union up to and why? -and where did China fit in?

How to roll back communism on the march in Korea without diverting hard-

pressed forces from areas more vital to British defence interests?

Would the Korean glue hold the paper over the cracks in UN solidarity, flawed

as it was by a split over China?

How to confine the conflict to Korea-in particular how to restrain the Americans from embarking on limited war with China or threatening to use the

atomic bomb?

Even if the fighting remained localised in Korea-what would be the knock-on

effects in Japan, Malaya, Indo-China, Hong Kong and the rest of the Far East

and S. E. Asia?

If fighting failed what were the prospects of reaching a diplomatic settlement as long as the United States refused to pay the asking price of a seat in the UN for China and an end to support for the Nationalist regime in Formosa?

And last, but not least, what sort of settlement was the UN fighting for? A

return to the status quo ante or a free and united Korea? Either way was that a question for the UN or should it, as the Chinese and to some extent the Koreans insisted, be left to the Korean people themselves to decide?

Of course the Foreign Office by itself did not have the answer to all these questions but it did its best to find a way through, driven by ministerial concerns to settle Korea quickly and withdraw leaving behind the minimum commitment for the minimum time.

Information and consultation

`Communications are in disorder ...

lillie is known of what is going on' Gascoignc (! okyo),, 7uly 19508

A point to consider when trying to assess how well the Foreign O(lice dealt with some of these insoluble questions is how little direct or hard information British

officials had to go on. With the Soviet government saying next to nothing it was February 1951 before Stalin made any public reference to the Korean War9 -and no direct dialogue with North Korean or Chinese leaders, British officials could often do little more than guess at Sino-Soviet motives and intentions. This was even more

8 Ibid., No. 12, note 7: Gascoigne (Tokyo), July 1950. 9 Ibid., No. 130, note 6: The significance of the timing of Stalin's statement on foreign policy was briefly raised in seminar discussion on 8 January 1992. In 1951 the Foreign (Alice view on significance had more to do with an imminent World Peace Council meeting in Berlin and elections in Russia than developments in Korea.

7

true when it came to knowing what was happening on the ground in Korea. One of the remarkable features of the early phase of the war is how British Ministers were required to take quick decisions with far-reaching consequences on the basis of very little direct information. There was no warning of the imminent outbreak of hostilities. After the event surprised officials commented on the last full report from Seoul, written on 22 June, that it was `of interest precisely because it contains practically nothing'. 10

The first news of what was happening in Korea came from American, UN and press sources. After the transmission of the last telegram from Seoul on 28 June by Captain Vyvyan Holt, who was captured shortly afterwards, the Foreign Office had no direct link to Korea until the arrival of Henry Sawbridge's itinerant mission in the middle of July. Like other contributing countries to the UN effort in Korea, Britain was very dependent for information on the regular American briefings given to Ambassadors in Washington and on press reports. In London, the American Embassy

-itself occasionally behind the fast pace of events-did its best to keep the Foreign Office informed in the early stages. The appointment of Air Vice-Marshal Bouchier as British Liaison Officer with MacArthur in August was designed to fill the information gap but, unfortunately, Bouchier became so captivated by General MacArthur that the Chiefs of Staff soon complained that his reports gave little more than a MacArthur-view of the situation in Korea.

As for consultation, the British government was not consulted by its American partner in the first thirty-six hours of the war when the key decisions of American intervention in Korea, neutralisation of Formosa and reinforcements for Indo-China were taken-an omission which State Department officials were later at pains to apologise for. l l This set a pattern which ran throughout the course of the war---offset to some extent by the excellent personal relationship which existed between the British Ambassador, Sir Oliver Franks, and Dean Acheson, the American Secretary of State.

Origins of the Korean War

`Mr Gromyko said... that the hostilities had been `provoked' by South Korea: To my comment that I knew there was a difference of opinion, he said it was a difference of nature not of opinion'

Kelly (Moscow), 11 July 195012

Returning to the main questions preoccupying British policy-makers, it may be significant that the one question scarcely considered was whether the Korean War

10 Ibid., No. 6, note 2: Scott minute, 25 June 1950. 11 Ibid., No. 3, note 11: Kennan and Perkins to Franks, 27 June 1950. 12 Ibid., No. 16: Kelly (Moscow), 11 July 1950.

8

might not in origin be a purely internal affair. Tentative suggestions from British

representatives in Tokyo and Peking that the North Korean government of Kim Il

Sung might be acting on its own initiative were discounted as fighting, resumed in

earnest after an unaccountable lull on the second day, began to bear all the hallmarks of a carefully planned operation well-executed by Soviet trained and

equipped North Korean forces. Similarly North Korean charges that the South

Koreans had started the war were dismissed as propaganda.

Soviet Union

`It was possible that Mao Tse Tung wanted to try to involve Stalin in war with the United States, but he

thought that Stalin would get out of this' Berne to Attlee, 12 July 195013

`Without moving a single man, the Soviet Union had succeeded in embroiling the Democratic forces

increasingly in the Far East. This was a trap into which we must not fall Attlee to Bevin, 2 Dec. 195014

Although concerned not to accuse publicly the Soviet Union--or later China-of

aggression (for fear this would leave them with no way to climb down), privately both

British Ministers and officials were agreed that Soviet involvement was `virtually

certain'.? As the war developed the degree of this involvement became increasingly a

matter for speculation. Early British analyses of the situation concurred with the American view given by George Kennan that the Soviet government was making an important probe into a soft target which would stop short of general war. Although it

was quickly reckoned that without the expected `walk-over' in Korea, the Soviet

government would accept the setback and `keep out of the Korean mess', 15 it was still feared that Soviet policy could turn to indirect intervention either by involving

the Chinese in Korea or by staging a major incident elsewhere Berlin, Yugoslavia

or Iran were considered the most likely targets.

After Chinese intervention in October the Foreign Office became more doubtful as to whether China or the Soviet Union was the prime mover in Korea. On balance Ministers continued to assume that although Sino-Soviet policies were closely aligned, the Soviet Union was pulling all the strings. At the same time Ministers

continued to challenge the American view that China was nothing but a Soviet

satellite, taking orders from Moscow. Indeed at one point Foreign Office officials on the Russia Committee wondered whether the Soviet leadership might have been

against Chinese intervention, but was obliged to go along with it by a headstrong China which Ernest Bevin thought in 1950 had `overweening self-confidence' in its own powers. 16

13 Ibid., No. 18: Bevin to Attlee, 12 July 1950. 14 Ibid., No. 85: Attlee to Pleven, 2 Dec. 1950. 15 Ibid., No. 12: Gascoigne (Tokyo) to Dening, 5 JWy 1950. 16 Ibid., No. 73: Bevin, CP(50)267,10 Nov. 1950.

9

What lay behind the Korean War, whether Soviet, Chinese or even North Korean inspired, remained obscure. The Foreign Office could find no answer to the question they asked as to why the Soviet Union should have attempted in June 1950 to take by force an area of little strategic importance which if left alone might have been drawn to the Soviet orbit in a few years in the same way as Czechoslovakia had been. Apart from Sir Alvary Gascoigne's view from Tokyo that Korea had been a sitting rabbit whose seizure would have gained Russia the last remaining non- communist territory on the mainland of North Asia, no one thought that the acquisition of Korea was the primary object of the exercise. Gascoigne's own deputy, George Glutton, thought it could be a way of demonstrating to non-communist Asian

countries that neither the US nor the UN was capable of defending them. After four

years of `bluff', the Korean War had added `a bit of the real stuff' into the Cold War

preparing the way for a new Soviet initiative (possibly on Germany) to make a fresh

start in international affairs. 17

Soviet reactions to events in Korea were consistently low key. Neither British peace feelers in Moscow in July nor the surprise Soviet return to the UN in August 1950

shed any real light on Soviet intentions or involvement-tending to confirm a Foreign Office view that `It is always next to impossible to foretell what the Russians will do

or why they will do it. ' 18

China

`China needed at least 20 years of peace to set her house in order and had no warlike intentions but she could not tolerate any further extension of American aggression in Korea'

Chou en 1* 21 Sept 195019

When later trying to assess Chinese motives, officials were equally uncertain. Despite the clear warnings from Peking of intervention and intelligence reports at the beginning of October of `bumper to bumper' Chinese convoys moving into Korea, 20 Ernest Bevin maintained right up until the last moment that he doubted that the Chinese would think it in their interests to intervene.

On the basis of very little information about the new China and its leaders, Bevin talked about China's national interests and Chou en Lai's sense of statesmanship, while the Foreign Office remained divided as to the nature of Communist China and the prospects for an accommodation with the West. As Sir Pierson Dixon was to lament `We have a number of people who understand China and a number of people who understand Communism, but what we want is somebody or preferably a

17 Ibid., No. 12, note 2: Glutton (Tokyo), 4 July 1950. 18 Ibid., No. 30, note 4: Noble, July 1950. 19 Ibid., No. 53: Chou en Lai, 21 Sept. 1950. 20 Ibid., No. 62, note 3: Scott minute, 4 Oct. 1950.

10

group of experts who understand Chinese communism. '21 Meanwhile as Bevin was to say in November `Only the Chinese know why they have intervened in Korea. ' is

Reactions and Response

`In view of the happenings in Korea the inhabitants [of German border towns] fear quite suddenly they will find Russian tanks rolling westwards through their towns'

Adenauer, July 195022

Whatever the motives for the attack on South Korea, there was general consensus that if left unchecked it would trigger a chain reaction through the Far East and South East Asia right round to Europe, where Bevin feared that `next year the Soviet Government will seek to repeat in Germany what they have done in Korea'. 23 Reflecting their own particular areas of concern in the Far East the Americans spoke about repercussions in Japan, Formosa and the Philippines whereas British eyes focused on the vulnerability of Indo-China, Malaya, Hong Kong and Burma. The British Cabinet therefore agreed `at once' to rally to the US-lcd call for

assistance in Korea under the UN banner. 24 British support was readily given in the hope that this would be more moral than actual and that the deployment of a few naval vessels would suffice. Later the Cabinet was prepared to take the political decision-against military advice to send land forces to Korea even though this meant removing battalions from Hong Kong.

American Factor (partnership)

`The American people are not happy if they feel alone' Frank, 23,7uty 195025

British decisions to send land forces were taken in response to clear signals from the American Administration that a negative response would adversely all-(-(-t Anglo- American relations. Advice from Sir Oliver Franks in Washington played a significant part in this decision. Franks weighed in heavily on the side of making a land contribution arguing that the Anglo-American relationship rested on the American assumption that `we are the only dependable ally and partner'. 25 Franks went on to say that when the Americans are in a tough spot they look round for their partner and that a negative decision in the case of Korea would `seriously impair the long

21 Ibid., No. 123, note 1: Dixon minute, 31 Jan. 1951. 22 Ibid., No. 8, note 5: Adenauer,, July 1950. 23 DBPO, Series 11, Volume III, German Reannwnent 1950 (IIMSO, 1989), No. 3.1: Bcvin, 1)()(50)66,29 Aug. 1950. 24 DBPO, Series II, Volume IV, No. 2. i: Cabinet, 27 June 1950. 25 Ibid., No. 25: Franks to Younger, 23 July 1950; cf. also No. 21, note 7 for Franks to Strang and Attlee in similar vein.

term relationship'. Furthermore many nations were likely to follow a British lead and Franks asserted that the Americans saw this as the key to a situation in which a long

and difficult campaign was now anticipated and for which UN cover was regarded as

essential.

Asian Factor (Formosa)

`Though Korea became a world situation because of American action, in Asian eyes it remains primarily an Asian situation'

Dening, 22 Jan. 195126

At the same time following the Americans into Korea was not simply the act of a loyal or unquestioning lieutenant. As far as Britain was concerned it was also a case of helping to settle a conflict which threatened the stability of a much wider area in

which Britain had its own obligations to consider. It was also an area which British

policy-makers tended to think they understood in a way which their American

colleagues-with no century of imperial experience behind them-did not. It was therefore assumed that Britain had an important role to play in holding the UN

alliance together by getting the Americans to take more notice of the views of those Asian countries-particularly India-which came to feel that the US was trying to determine the future of Asia without taking the views of that region into account. Asian views were basically governed by the plain fact that China was too close and too powerful a neighbour not to be on some kind of terms with. In trying to represent this point of view to the Americans, Britain often fell into the role of uneasy and not altogether effective mediator. In the summer of 1950, for instance,

when British Ministers were more worried about a possible armed clash over Formosa than the actual conflict in Korea, British concern to represent the point of view of Asia took the form of annoying the American Adminstration by repeatedly telling it that it would not get the same sort of support as it had in Korea for a fight

with China over Formosa. In the end it was Chinese intervention in Korea rather than British representations which took the heat out of the Formosan issue.

Collective Security

`While both our countries are firmly convinced of the need for an effective system of collective defence against aggression, we in the United Kingdom are doubt, ful of the desirability of trying to make the United Nations

undertake this and prefer to see it realised by the machinery of the Atlantic Pact'

Younger, 31 March 195127

The early British decisions to send forces to Korea were also to some extent governed by the idea that this would give Britain some say in the conduct of operations. The Chiefs of Staff therefore tried to use the opportunity of Korea by

26 Ibid., No. 14, note 6: Dening, 22 Jan. 1951. 27 Ibid., No. 137: Younger to Jebb, 31 March 1951.

12

pressing for closer coordination of Anglo-American military planning not just in Korea

but on a global scale. A series of informal consultative meetings produced American

agreement to the principles if not the practice of British global strategy which was

after all closely in line with the principles of the more bellicose American policy

paper NSC 68 which had been drafted more or less at the same time. 28 However,

the Chiefs of Staff were disappointed if they hoped for a return to the structured

closeness of the old wartime Combined Chiefs of Staff organisation and Ministers

were dismayed by American plans to use the United Nations rather than the Atlantic Alliance as a means of providing for collective security.

American plans for `Uniting for Peace' at the United Nations- -which included

transferring power from the Security Council to the General Assembly and creating some kind of UN peace-keeping force worried the British lest `we might find

ourselves under very strong pressure, or even morally committed, to go to war on behalf of other member states before there had been time to consider, on its merits, the actual situation that had arisen'. 29 Typically, Bevin's proposed solution to this

was to try to come to some prior Anglo-American arrangement as to which categories of aggression and in which places the UN should or should not intervene.

Underlying British objections was the concern that Uniting for Peace at the UN

would be at the expense of NATO and also - taking American rhetoric about decision-sharing at face value-that widening the circle would diminish British influence.

The limits of influence

`Thu United States was a young country and the Administration was only too apt to take unreflecting plunges. We had made it our business to by to restrain them'

13evm co Nehru, , Ian 195/30

In regard to Korea the effectiveness of British influence as a restraining hand on American policy was limited not merely because of America's determination to go its

own way but also because of the reluctance of Ernest Bevin on more than one occasion to let military prudence prevail over the chance of political gain. I am

28 NSC 68 is printed in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950 Volume I (Washington, 1977), p. 234. The question of whether there was any Anglo-American consultation over the drafting of either paper was considered in seminar discussion on 8 January 1992. The Editors have not come across any direct link but think it likely that there would have been some informal soundings, especially in view of the easy relations between General Bradley (Chairman of the

, JCS) and Lord Tedder (I lead of 13JSNI,

Washington). 29 DBPO, Series II, Volume IV, No. 63. i: Bevin, 28 Sept_ 1950. 30 Ibid., No. 104, note 5: Bevin to Nehru, Jan. 1951.

13

thinking here in particular of Bevin's refusal to pay heed to the Chiefs of Staffs

warnings against crossing the 38th parallel in October. Bevin actively supported the decision to go north and persuaded more reluctant Cabinet colleagues to take the risk that the Chinese would not intervene, on the basis that this might gain them a free and united Korea (the resolution sanctioning the drive north was based on a British draft). Bevin was persuaded to ask for a delay between the passing of this resolution and the crossing of the parallel. It speaks volumes for the effectiveness of British influence that despite an assurance of a delay being readily given the two events took place on the same day. 31

MacArthur Factor

`Our principal d jcully, however, is General MacArthur' Morrison, 9 April 195132

The problem of influencing American strategy was partly of course the problem of controlling General MacArthur: for which see further Peter Lowe's contribution on pp. 31-34. British concern to control MacArthur and make sure that he was in fact as well as in name the agent of the United Nations33 highlights the problem of control and command in a multi-national force when contributing governments have different objectives. British and Commonwealth objectives were to bring the fighting to an end and come to some settlement with China whereas MacArthur's objective was suspected of being an extension of the war to China and the downfall of the Communist government there-whether this was also the American Administration's objective became a point of real concern: clearly there was a strong lobby within it for such a course and by the time of MacArthur's dismissal, British officials had begun to recognise that the personal issue of MacArthur was almost irrelevant to the policy battle going on in Washington.

How far Britain influenced the outcome of this policy battle is impossible to say. In the end the United States was prepared to settle for stalemate rather than, as MacArthur would have it, to take the wraps off-to clear up Korea and bomb China. How much this had to do with listening to what Britain had to say on the subject is another matter--perhaps very little if the outcome of the Attlee-Truman talks in Washington are anything to go by.

31 i. e. 9 Oct. 1950: see Volume IV, No. 64, note 8. 32 Ibid., No. 141: Morrison to Franks, 9 April 1951. 33 Ibid., No. 77: Bevin to Franks, 22 Nov. 1950.

14

Mr Attlee's visit to Washington

Atomic Bomb

`President Truman said today that the use of the atomic bomb was under active consideration' liess Tape, 30 Nov. 1950M

At the end of November the rout of UN forces ended hopes of troops being home by Christmas and MacArthur had to admit `we are now facing an entirely new war'. 35

At this critical point, concern about American intentions and strategy in Korea was intensified by President Truman's ambiguous remarks about the use of the atomic bomb. These remarks were clarified well before Mr Attlee set off for Washington

and discussion of the bomb was only one of a number of subjects which Attlee (who had been trying to arrange a meeting with Truman since August) wished to discuss.

In Washington President Truman told Attlee that he had never had any intention of using the atomic bomb in Korea. He said that he regarded the bomb as, in a sense, a joint possession of the United States, United Kingdom and Canada and gave an assurance that he would not authorise its use without prior consultation of the other two governments, save in an extreme emergency such as an atomic attack on the United States. 36

Subsequent American attempts at retraction were countered with some ingenuity by British officials and the end result was an oral and personal undertaking from the President to consult and a written statement in the official communique which spoke only of informing. The undertaking to consult was given in private conversation between President Truman and Attlee on 7 December and then announced in full

session of the immediately following fifth meeting. It was accordingly written into the British record of that meeting despite President Truman's stipulation that his

assurance should depend on no written agreement (`If a man's word wasn't any good'-he said--`it wasn't made any better by writing it down'). 37 Attlee accepted that this assurance was personal to President Truman and valid only so long as he

remained in office. Under the keen eye of Acheson, officials in the State Department maintained that the assurance to consult was superseded by the agreement to inform in the communique. They therefore refused to accept a copy of the British record for American files which included the President's assurance. On his return to London Attlee told the Cabinet that `President Truman had entirely satisfied him about the use of the atomic bomb'. 36 On learning the details of what had transpired Bevin, who had regretted the `boomerang' effect of President

34 Ibid., No. 81: note for Attlee, 30 Nov. 1950. 35 Ibid., No. 79, rote 3: MacArthur communique No. 14,28 Nov. 1950. 36 Ibid., No. 99, note 3: Attlee to Cabinet, 12 Dec. 1950. 37 Ibid., No. 90, note 7: Truman to Attlee, 7 Dec. 1950.

15

Truman's original remarks, was rather less convinced, pointing out that `From public point of view or from that of action in the future, does not this leave us just where we are now? '38 Certainly it did not prevent regular American consideration and threats of using the atomic bomb throughout the rest of the war.

US and China

`If we cannot effectively change American Far Eastern policy, then we must, it seems to me, resign ourselves to

a role of counsellor and moderator'

Dixon, 28 Jan. 195139

The most difficult and, from the British point of view, least satisfactory parts of the Washington discussions were those that related to American intentions and strategy in Korea. Attlee's main objective was to gain some assurance that the Americans

would fight it out in Korea with no spill-over, and at the same time would try to find

some basis for a negotiated settlement. On neither point did he receive satisfaction. Although both Truman and Acheson assured him that they wished to avoid war with China and to come to some kind of terms, it soon became clear that Acheson at least, who then had political difficulties of his own, was not reconciled to the concessions which might make this possible. These concessions were a seat at the UN for China and the promise of the return of Formosa. In this regard, neither Attlee nor his officials made any impression on the American view that China was already beyond the pale and little more than a Soviet satellite. Nevertheless they continued to work for a settlement with little or no appreciation of just how deeply divided the United States and China had become.

In September 1950 Bevin, encouraged by Sir Gladwyn Jcbb, had thought it possible that the American Administration was only a few months away from climbing down over China--by April 1951 this was extended to a forecast of two to three years. The British analysis recognised that bringing the Americans round was going to be an up-hill struggle and it was realistic enough to accept that in the long term China did not want friendship with the West and would probably break with it just as it would also break in time with the Soviet Union. In the short term there was some optimism that China might be willing to come to some modus vivendi with the West. Certainly China occasionally showed signs of this (Chinese reactions to the British buffer zone proposals may be a case in point). 40 Where the British analysis perhaps fell down was in its lack of any sense of the intensity of Sino-American hostility which led China to call America her public enemy No. 1,16 and which was to keep her from taking a rightful seat at the UN for more than twenty years.

38 Ibid., No. 111, note 2: Bevin minute. 39 Ibid., No. 121: Dixon minute, 28 Jan. 1951. 40 Cf. Ibid., Nos. 74-5 for this activity in November 1950.

16

In December 1950 Truman and Acheson countered Attlee's representations for

some softening of policy towards China by warnings that US public opinion would be

so disillusioned by any display of weakness in the Far East that support would not be forthcoming for building up a position of strength in Europe. The American plan for

the Far East was to try some `middle course'41 between action which might precipitate a major war and negotiation with the Chinese. This amounted to harrassment of China (eg by sanctions and subversive activity, which Attlee declared

was nothing but a makeshift policy and which would sooner or later lead to an outright shooting war. The arguments over whether `limited warfare would tend to become unlimited' and how to deal with China remained unresolved. Mr Attlee

thought that in the end the Americans had been shaken by British representations: an optimism not shared by Sir Pierson Dixon, who observed from London that the Washington talks were ending `without any satisfactory solution of the cardinal question of policy towards the Far East'. 42

Results of Washington Talks

`Throughout these talks, the United Kingdom was lifted out of "the European queue-, "

Allee, IO Ike. 195043

Despite continuing unease about operations in Korea, Attlee received some reassurance that the conduct of the war in Korea was not entirely in the hands of General MacArthur, although Acheson did at one point wonder `whether any government had any control over General MacArthur, a point on which he desired to express no view'. 44 Closer liaison was promised affording Attlee the satisfaction that Britain was being treated as a partner `unequal no doubt in power but still equal in

counsel'. 43

On other matters Attlee declared himself `well content' with the results of the Washington talks, which eventually included successful discussions on defence measures in Europe. On i8 December he told the Cabinet that he had `persuaded the Americans to accept Anglo-American partnership as the mainspring of Atlantic defence'. 45 He was especially pleased with indications that the United States thought that Britain was her principal ally because, as Truman had said, in the last resort only Britain could be relied upon to fight. In his assessment of the Washington talks, Franks agreed that the old wartime partnership was reviving, but warned that the United States might now expect rather more from the United Kingdom.

41 Ibid., No. 87: Franks conversation with Acheson, 4 Dec. 1950. 42 Ibid., No. 90: Attlee at 5th meeting 7 Dec. 1950, note 8 for Dixon minute of 8 Dec. 1950. 43 Ibid., No. 93: Attlee to Bevin, 10 Dec. 1950. 44 Ibid., No. 90, note 6: Acheson to Attlee, 7 Dec. 1950. 45 DBPO, Series II, Volume III, No. 143: Attlee to Cabinet, 18 Dec. 1950.

17

The value of Attlee's visit to Washington in terms of Anglo-American relations continues to attract much debate among historians, although most tend now to agree that its significance has probably been overrated. 46 The British documents support this conclusion about a meeting whose main outcome was little more than a greater sensitivity to each other's point of view. How much weight this carried in practical terms may be judged by American plans to press on with a UN resolution against China the very day after Attlee left Washington, which Attlee protested in vain was `hard to reconcile with my understanding' of what had been agreed. 47

UN Resolution against China

`Do we really want to risk a position in which we might be almost the only Power other than the Soviet bloc

giving an adverse vote? '

Slang, 25 Jan. 195148

The subsequent battle over this resolution which raged throughout January, with threats of Ministerial resignations, provides a telling case study of Anglo-American

relations of the period. Historians have described this as a moment when Britain

went to the brink in severing the special relationship only to draw back at the last

moment. 49 The internal battle within the Foreign Office and Cabinet between those like Kenneth Younger, who disliked dependence on the United States and those like Ernest Bevin, who accepted Britain had no choice, is revealing. The final

conclusion for British policy-makers as expressed by Sir Pierson Dixon was that when the limits of British influence had been reached `we must allow the United States to take the lead and follow, or at least not break with them' however wrong-headed the poll(-y. 39 I)ixon based these remarks on the premise that the United States was not dependent on British support in the Far East and was not therefore susceptible to British influence over policies there to any great degree. Dixon may have been

right about the influence but I wonder whether it is entirely true to say that the US had no need of British support. If this was the case why should the American Administration try so hard to carry Britain along with them over the resolution-- making a number of concessions along the way and displaying an uncharacteristic patience with their reluctant ally.

46 Cf. Rosemary Foot's article on the Historiography of the Korean war in Diplomatic History, vol. 15, No. 3, Summer 1991. 47 DBPO, Series 11, Volume IV, No. 92: Attlee to Bevin, 10 Dec. 1950. 48 Ibid., No. 117: Strang to Younger, 25

, Jan. 1951.

49 Callum MacDonald, Britain and the Korean War (London, 1990), eg p. 52.

18

Japan and Pacific Pact

`The treatment o, f Japan will determine whether in the future she is with us or against us' Btvin, 30 Aug. 195050

Whereas British support was, I think, clearly important to the Americans in Korea, the same cannot be said of policy in Japan, where the knock-on effects of Korea

resulted in an economic Korean Boom and a non-restrictive peace treaty. The

sudden American move towards a quick peace treaty for Japan after months of drift, in which it seemed to Bevin that the Americans had no clear idea as to the direction they were heading, was a direct consequence of events in Korea. At a time when things were going badly for the UN in Korea, the Americans at the end of 1950 became suddenly concerned to come to terms with Japan before its bargaining hand became unduly strong. Hand in hand with discussions for a Japanese peace treaty, which inevitably raised the spectre of Japanese rearmament, went discussions about a defence pact in the Pacific. Although this development fitted in to the Chiefs of Staffs global strategic plan, Ministers were unhappy at an ANZUS pact from which Britain was excluded. It was feared that this might be taken as a sign that Britain was renouncing responsibilities in the Pacific. At the same time it was pointed out that Britain had not the resources to meet these responsibilities. In the end British blessing was reluctantly bestowed upon the ANZUS pact on the understanding that this should be the first step towards a much wider pact on the model of NATO.

Korea

`What happens next? ' Axon, 21 July 195051

The Korean War had been on for a month before the Foreign Office, in company with the State Department, began to think what they were fighting for- a return to the status quo ante seemed the best to be hoped for. While the idea of crossing the parallel to unite Korea had obvious attractions, the risks were said in

, July to

outweigh the benefits and in any case with South Korean forces in full retreat it was not a practical possibility. MacArthur's follow-up to the brilliant success of the Inchon landings changed all that and by October UN aims had been extended to crossing the parallel with a view to achieving a unified, independent and democratic Korea. Ernest Bevin took a lead in promoting these aims otherwise as he said `the Russians will virtually have triumphed and the whole United Nations effort will have been in vain'. 52 One of the problems about planning for a united government of

50 DBPC), Series II, Volume IV, No. 42: Bevin, 30 Aug. 1950. 51 Ibid., No. 23: Dixon minute, 21 July 1950. 52 Ibid., No. 54: Bevin, 25 Sept. 1950.

19

Korea was what to do with Syngman Rhee, whose regime of `black reaction, brutality and extreme incompetence' was deplored in the Foreign Off ice. 53 In the face of clear American support for him, Bevin did not press British objections to his

reinstatement in South Korea but immediately weighed in to protest when Rhee began to make his own plans for extending his administrative authority to North Korea. While accepting that South Korea would have a role in policing North Korea in the interim period between UN military victory and nation-wide elections, Bevin insisted that the responsibility for administering North Korea did not lie with the South Korean government but with the unified command of the United Nations. This contrasted with Chinese terms for a cease-fire which included the stipulation that the settlement of Korean domestic affairs should be left to the Korean people to decide.

The UN commitment to a free and united Korea still stands but by the spring of 1951 it was accepted that it was no longer practicable to achieve this by force. The

prospects of a diplomatic settlement seemed as far away as ever with the Americans

refusing to unbend towards China and the Chinese willing to hold out even when suffering appalling casualties. By April the Foreign Office had to admit `We are in a jam in Korea... We can neither get out nor get on. '54

The volume ends at this point of stalemate in a war which was to drag on for

another two years before the signing of an armistice at Panmunjom on 27 July 1953. This later phase of the war will be treated fully by General Sir Anthony Farrar- Hockley in the second volume of his official history on the British part in the Korean War.

Meanwhile, the DBPO collection of documents concludes with a review by the Chiefs

of Staff of the changes in the world situation since the outbreak of the Korean War. The shock of the Korean War-described as a Soviet war by proxy---led them to reconsider whether the Russians might now be willing to force the Cold War to a hot conclusion sooner than they had expected. In line with American thinking the testing time was now brought forward to 1952. The importance of defending the Far East also assumed greater importance although the basic principles and priorities of 1950 remained essentially unchanged. For the rest the Chiefs of Staff recorded their satisfaction at the practical progress since Korea towards providing for collective security, by way of NATO developments, which included an American Supreme Commander in Europe and a measure of German rearmament. (As Averell Harriman was later to say, it had taken the Korean War to put the 0 into NATO). 55 Other welcome developments included a security pact for the Pacific and

53 Ibid., No. 23. i: Foreign Office memorandum, 9 July 1950. 54 Ibid., No. 142: Dixon minute, 9 April 1951. 55 Cited D Acheson, Present at the Creation. My Years in the State Department (London, 1970), p. 399.

20

even Uniting for Peace at the UN. The driving force in all of this was the United States which now seemed willing to take on the role of `policeman in the world'25--- a role Britain was only too willing to support despite the cost of political strains and military overstretch.

21

KOREA

James Cable

It is a pleasure to join in welcoming another contribution to history by the Foreign Office. We scribblers, particularly those of us who live in provincial seclusion, owe much to the kindness of the Library and Records Department. But none of their gifts is more valuable than the periodical publication of these volumes of Documents on British Policy Overseas. The journey to Kew lasts longer and grows more wearisome- as do the traffic jams with every year that passes. Each volume that reaches the University Library lessens the need for long distance travel.

Of course, we all wish the money was available to match the speed of American

production. "I'hey are already opening up the Sixties. It is on quality that our team scores. And Korea is a particularly welcome topic, even to those more concerned with other aspects of this period. That half forgotten war is at the root of so many of Britain's troubles-even today.

It is thus particularly interesting to receive confirmation from this volume-in the illuminating preface as well as in the admirable selection of documents--of the character of the decision-making that took Britain into this distant conflict. As so often happens, it was essentially a reflex action. No attempt seems to have been

made to analyse, in terms of British national interests, the situation created by the invasion of South Korea from the North or to consider which would be the most profitable policy for Britain to pursue.

Of course, in the doom-laden atmosphere and chronic anxiety of 1950, the opening moves must have been regarded as needing little thought. Voting for the American

resolution in the Security Council and placing at the disposal of the United States Naval Commander such British warships as happened to be in Far Eastern waters were natural, almost instinctive responses. They were also inexpensive.

That was an important consideration. Perhaps Britain's poverty then is most easily envisaged by those of us who experienced it. In the icy February of 1947, for instance, when I took the so-called country-house test for the Foreign Service, public buildings and private homes were often unheated, sometimes only candle-lit. Electricity cuts were frequent, because this island of coal then had no coal. People

queued with prams to buy coke from the nearest gas works. Food was short. Eggs, tea, sugar, fats, butter, cheese, meat and bacon were all rationed even in 1950-- meat and cheese more severely than in 1945. It was to scanty meals in cold houses --five years after the end of the war-that tired Britons trudged home through the

22

still visible ravages of German bombing. The continuing spectre of another fuel crisis haunted the government and was only averted by buying American coal with scarce dollars and by the unexpectedly mild winter of 1950-51.

The Second World War, after all, had not merely halted investment at home and liquidated assets abroad, but had burdened Britain with C4 billion (at least 50 billion in today's depreciated currency) of foreign debt. Lend Lease had ended in September 1945, the American Loan (with its damaging insistence on convertibility) had been exhausted in March 1948. Marshall Aid was approaching its end. A heroic

concentration on exports--at the expense of consumption and such urgent needs as house-building-had transformed the 1945 deficit on the balance of payments of nearly 900 million pounds (today that would be at least 11 billion) into a 1950

surplus of 300 million. But Britain was still inching herself out of the abyss by her finger-nails.

Now there were two conclusions that could be drawn from this wretched state of affairs. Averell Harriman, when he was United States Ambassador in London, formulated one of them in telling his staff:

`Having mortgaged her future to pay for the war, Britain is on the verge of bankruptcy. England is so weak she must follow our leadership. ' I

His doctrine had many British disciples. One of them was Sir Oliver Franks, whose long telegram of 23 July 1950, reproduced in this volume as document No. 25, is a striking example of the attitude which caused irreverent young men in London to describe him, most unfairly, as the American Ambassador in Washington. In this telegram Franks urged the British Government to offer ground troops for the war in Korea. One remarkable passage sounded a note which would echo again and again for the next forty years:

`The United States Administration know that our economy is only just

recovering-They know that we have these commitments all over the world- - that in many of them, especially in the rar East, we arc taking a heavy load in the same struggle. Nevertheless --despite the power and position of the United States, the American people are not happy if they feel alone. The American people will not understand it if they are alone on the ground in Korea. '2

Over fifteen years later, when I was Head of the South Last Asia Department, Dean Rusk, then the American Secretary of State, demanded to see the [_: nion

, Jack

beside the Stars and Stripes in Vietnam. If Britain could not provide coven a single

IW Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin (London, 1976), p. 531. 2 Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series II, Volume IV (IIMSO, 1991), F). 77.

23

battalion, he thundered, no American troops would be forthcoming when the enemy invaded the coast of Sussex. The Wilson Government stood firm in their refusal, but in 1950 the Attlee Cabinet, many of whose Ministers were as disposed to accept American leadership as Averell Harriman could have wished, readily yielded to the force of their own Ambassador's argument:

`I should expect the reaction of the United States Administration to a negative decision by us to be deep and prolonged-[it] would seriously impair

the long term relationship. '3

In spite of the reluctance of the Chiefs of Staff, fully conscious how over-stretched Britain's forces already were, first one, then another brigade was sent to Korea. Conscription was extended and an enormous rearmament programme initiated. The first tender shoots of economic recovery were blasted and a new sterling crisis was launched. The Stop-Go cycle would henceforth be the chronic British disease.

Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley, in his magisterial official history, has criticised as misleading the common belief that rearmament for the Korean War crippled the British economy. As he points out, `the decision to rearm was principally to meet obligations of the Atlantic Alliance. '4 It is obviously for this reason that the volume of British Documents we are discussing does not mention the pressure applied by the United States Government for British rearmament or the American offer--never actually implemented---to bear part of the cost. 5 It is nevertheless arguable that a rearmament programme recognised by the Cabinet to be economically devastating, a programme that could not be fully implemented for want of resources and that was drastically reduced by the Government's Conservative successors, would never have been adopted without, to quote the worlds of Elizabeth Barker in her book on the period:

`the panic atmosphere created by MacArthur's wilder vagaries and by fears that the Korean war would spread and that the Russians would let loose its counterpart in Europe. '6

It is also interesting to note the more relaxed attitude of some of the other clients of the United States. Germany and Japan, as defeated ex-enemies, had cast-iron excuses for inaction, though the sensible Japanese made a tidy profit by selling supplies to the Americans in Korea. Belgium, France and the Netherlands got away with a battalion apiece; Denmark, Italy and Norway with medical units. By

3 Ibid., p. 78. 4 Anthony Farrar- llockley, The British Part in the Korean War, Vol. I-A Distant Obligation (IUMSO, 1990), p. I 10. 5 DBPO, Series 11, Volume 111, (penman Rearmament 1950 (1iMSO, 1989) covers these points. 6 Elisabeth Barker, "1 he British Between the Superpowers, 1945-50 (London, 1983), p. 239.

24

continuing to give priority to their own national interest all these countries, much worse off than we were in 1950, have, with the single exception of Italy, since achieved a higher per capita GNP-twice as high in the case of Norway--than we have.

In London the conventional wisdom was-and, I believe, still remains that constant support for American policies offered Britain the best chance of influencing those policies and of being able to count on American support when this was needed for the protection or promotion of particular British interests. Such support was even more likely to be required in those days, when Britain, however, impoverished, still wanted to be a global power, with colonies and bases and assets and commitments and troops and ships all over the world.

This conventional wisdom did not always go unquestioned among the younger members of the Service, particularly those whose recent experience of war had a little eroded instinctive acceptance of the opinions received among their elders. I myself was in the Embassy at Djakarta in 1950, so I cannot say whether heresy was as conspicuous then in the Far Eastern Department as I had earlier observed it to be in the Eastern Department and would later discover in the South Fast Asia Department. I can only offer my personal reaction at the time. I thought our involvement in Korea was a mistake, believing that, until we had rebuilt our economy, we should be shedding overseas commitments, not taking on new ones at the other end of the earth.

I also wrote in my diary:

`I do not share the opinion-that we must at all costs avoid a split with the United States-a much more favourable position could he ours -that of an ally whose opinions must be consulted and whose support can only be expected for a policy mutually agreed. '

I was much too optimistic. The position to which I wanted us to aspire was the one the United States had reserved for their own use. In London, unfortunately, optimism was even greater, though it took a different form. "There it was believed that our support for the United States had created a fund of goodwill for Britain in Washington. Nine months later we tried to draw on it and, as I have described in my latest book, Intervention at Abadan, 7 our cheque bounced with a bang that echoed right across the Middle East. In international politics gratitude is not a negotiable security.

James Cable, Intervention at Abadan: Plan Buccaneer (London, 1991).

25

Curiously enough, it was only when brushing up my rudimentary knowledge of the Korean War in preparation for this seminar that I discovered we had, rather obliquely, been warned. Dr Peter Lowe, in his admirable essay on The Frustrations

of Alliance, quotes Acheson as telling Attlee in December 1950 that `with communist regimes you could not bank goodwill because they balanced their books every night. '8 Anyone who has had occasion to dip into Soviet strategic literature will be familiar

with the convention whereby doctrines it would be indiscreet to proclaim as one's own used to be attributed to the other Super Power.

We should remember that Franks, a sophisticated analyst of American political psychology, never suggested, in the telegram appearing as Document No. 25, that we could expect any future reward for sending troops to Korea. It was American

reaction to a negative decision that would, he argued, be deep and prolonged. 3 Favours denied, unfortunately, are remembered longer than favours granted. In April 1951

the Embassy in Washington were fending off complaints from London about the unsympathetic American attitude to British difficulties in Persia by reminding the Foreign Office that the State Department had had to endure much cautionary British advice about American conduct of the war in Korea. 9

Nor was this an isolated phenomenon. In October 1991 International Affairs published an interesting article by Professor Brenner describing the `aggrieved, at times outraged, feelings' of American public opinion at `the negligible contribution' of their allies to the Gulf War. The author recognised Britain as `a clear exception', but gave much more attention to the reprehensible behaviour of the other Europeans and of Japan. 10

Naturally we must beware of the temptations of hindsight. The documents Mrs Yasamee and her colleagues have chosen with such discriminating judgment do tend to confirm the impression derived from other sources. The British Government of the day do seem to have judged the Soviet Union to be readier for general war and the United States to be less disposed, of their own accord, to join in the defence of Western Europe, than later evidence suggests to us was actually the case. The Attlee Government and their advisers accordingly thought they had to pay twice over, in the Far East as well as in Europe, for an American commitment that now seems to us to have been an inevitable feature of the policy of the United States as a Super Power. We may think the Americans not only had a stronger hand, but played their cards better. But today we know more and we are naturally less

8 Peter Lowe, I'hc Frustration of Alliance: Britain, the United States and the Korean War 1950-51' in The Korean War in History (Manchester, 1989), p. 87. 9 jamcs Cable, oß. cit., p. 34. 10 Michael Brenner article `The Alliance: a Gulf post-mortem' in Int¬rnational Affairs, October 1991, pp. 669 and 672.

26

frightened. So we ought not to be too severe in condemning the exorbitant premium the Attlee Government chose to pay for military insurance, even if we now think they could have had it more cheaply.

I apologise for inflicting so many arguments on you. I know you would have preferred an impressionistic sketch of the climate of opinion and sentiment in the Office and in Whitehall. Unfortunately I was sweltering in Indonesia, distantly but ignorantly disgruntled, all through the period covered by Volume IV. I will make what amends I can by finishing with an anecdote-dubiously relevant, but authentic.

In the autumn of 1953 I was back in the Office and went to a party perhaps in the Resident Clerk's flat. There I heard two colleagues exchanging reminiscences of their war-time experience in the army-no longer a usual topic by that time. Struck by something unexpected, almost off-key, in what they were saying, I listened for a minute or two. Then light broke through the clouds that had darkened my mind. They were discussing a different war, the Korean War. I finally understood why I had begun to think all the policemen were so young.

27

BRITISH POLITICAL INFLUENCE IN THE KOREAN WAR

Anthony Farrar-Hockley

Publication of select British policy documents relating to the first six months of the Korean War is a welcome addition to the history of that event, not least in illumination of the relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States.

More than forty years have passed since the opening of the war. In one sense, it is

part and parcel of the early period of the cold war; as such, almost lost to view within a mass of inter-connected events during those anxious years. The European democracies were struggling to recover from their impoverishment in the Second World War, and to survive the growing pressures of Stalinist expansionism. The

pound sterling was a `soft' currency; notwithstanding the benefits of Marshall Aid, the British Government was frequently obliged to seek dollar loans to meet its

obligations. The formation of NATO in 1949 deterred Soviet aggression but it

required huge expense in rearmament in the fielding of a British component. Though diminishing, imperial responsibilities continued to absorb considerable political, economic, and military resources. As a consequence, the notion has grown in recent years that the Labour government of the United Kingdom was so beholden to the United States for financial assistance as to become an American pawn in international politics. Thus it has been inferred that the two members of Government most concerned with high policy in foreign relations, Mr Attlee, the Prime Minister, and Mr Bevin, the Foreign Secretary, had no option but to follow the Americans in resisting politically and by force of arms the invasion of South Korea by the armed forces of the North in the summer of 1950.

Official documents published earlier make it apparent that the United Kingdom was not America's client. Mr Bevin was the inceptor of the Atlantic Alliance. Having accepted the mutual advantage of denying Soviet expansion into western Europe, the United States looked to Britain as her principal ally in the partnership, a relationship resumed naturally by both sides following such an association in the Second World War.

The documents now published on the Korean War show several discrete reasons for British support of the initial American response. President Truman believed the invasion of South Korea had been inspired by the Soviet Union as an element of its strategy to extend Communist influence throughout Asia. China was assumed to be involved in this. While judging this view to be simplistic, Mr Bevin reminded his colleagues that American support was needed against Communist insurgency in Malaya and Indo-China. But there was more to the Prime Minister's and Foreign Secretary's response than that consideration: neither could escape the experiences of

28

the 1930s. In asides to members of their staff, they separately identified the North

Korean invasion as an act of international aggression. Whether it was inspired by the Soviet Union as an item of deliberate policy or not, it had to be checked. "I'his view is confirmed in the reviews of policy during the run of military operations.

The importance of action to stem aggression explains the substantial nature of the British military contribution to the United Nations Command formed to assist South Korea, sea and land forces considerably greater than any other foreign nation apart from the United States, I highly valued by American commanders. Partly due to her longstanding and close alliance with the United States in the Second World War, but also because of the resumption of that alliance in containment of the Soviet Union, Britain was expected to engage actively in the political action to counter aggression. America accepted this, and was to an extent reliant upon it during

recurrent crises. The fact that politicians and officials in Washington and London

were at times exasperated by differences of view did not detract from the partnership.

At the outset, British representation persuaded the United Sates Government to modify the wording of President Truman's declaration and that of the second United Nations resolution on the conflict. As originally drafted, these aimed widely at `centrally directed Communist imperialism', including by implication the Soviet Union. It was British policy to confine action to those manifestly engaged in hostilities.

There were further disagreements between Washington and London on this perspective during the next six months as the military fortunes of the United Nations

waxed, then waned with the entry of Chinese Communist forces at the end of 1950. None was more critical than the argument between the two allies concerning the People's Republic of China following that intervention. America regarded the Peking government as the tool of the Soviet Union; Britain believed that Mao Tse-tung could be persuaded to distance himself from Stalin, to become indeed the "I'ito of the Orient. The United States Government contemplated encouragement of Nationalist China in Taiwan to raid the Chinese mainland, and an economic blockade of the People's Republic as a consequence of intervention in Korea. The British Government apprehended that the first might widen the war in Asia, and that the second was impracticable. The grounds of the dispute widened in the pursuance of peace negotiations with Peking. The Foreign Office warned the State Department that Britain would not vote with America in the General Assembly to condemn Communist China as an aggressor outside the context of Korea, or support

I These comprised a naval squadron of 15 warships, including a light fleet carrier with support ships, and two infantry brigades rising to the greater part of a division. The Royal Air Force provided (lying boat support, and air crew seconded to the United States Air Force.

29

proposals to widen operations against the mainland of China. Despite pressure from

the American public and the Republican Party to penalise Communist China, the State Department slowly made concessions to the British point of view, winning over inter alia in the process Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa.

Either unaware or careless of being increasingly isolated, Mr Attlee's government then began to overplay its hand as a moderating power, due partly to disenchantment with America among some of its members, 2 and the faltering

judgment of Mr Bevin, who was grievously ill. Although the People's Republic of China, whose forces were initially triumphant on the battlefield, was demanding

precisely the concessions for cessation of hostilities in Korea which Mr Attlee and Mr

Truman had agreed they should not be granted, the British Government flirted with a reversal of policy. In this, as in the matter of condemnation of Communist China,

they were in danger of being marginalised in the United Nations.

If Britain had really been of no account to the United States, the State Department

at this juncture had all the necessary means to proceed with its condemnation of and progress to sanctions against the People's Republic. The Secretary of State, Mr Acheson, with the agreement of the President, chose not to do so. Though he was a prime target of public criticism, which he felt acutely, he offered further concessions to the British viewpoint. At the end of it all, the People's Republic was condemned as an aggressor in Korea, rather than in Asia. The matter of sanctions was stood over while further options for peace negotiations were considered.

In this struggle, as the policy papers now published disclose, in the absence of the Foreign Secretary, so long a dominant influence in the formulation and conduct of policy, the principal officials of the Foreign Office in London and en poste in Washington and New York, played a prominent part in avoiding a breach with the United States and an important element of the Commonwealth. Such a breach

would have resulted in a reduction to one degree or another in British status as an international power.

After the Chinese were finally contained and the line stabilised in the late spring of 1951, the Korean issue lacked immediacy; both sides settled to the long process of bargaining at Panmunjom. Britain and the Commonwealth partners were involved in

this. But the United States had the role of executive director and majority shareholder; its partners those of non-executive directors with minority shareholdings.

2 There was resentment in the Labour Party at the abrupt ending of dollar credits to Britain in 1945, and the terms of resumption, subsequent Marshall Aid notwithstanding. These feelings were exacerbated by American pressure on Britain to spend large sums for rearmament in connection with the formation of NATO.

30

Their agreement was essential to any solution but they left the conduct of negotiations to the principal.

The world lost interest during these years, 1951-53; and this greater term of the war tends to veil the events of the opening months, when the political influence of the United Kingdom was notable, occasionally crucial.

31

THE MACARTHUR FACTOR IN BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-1

Peter Lowe

I would like to say at the outset how warmly I welcome the publication of this

volume which so admirably covers the complexity and rapidly changing character of the Korean conflict and British responses to it. I read it with the pleasure of

recalling very familiar events-even though some of tragic dimensions-in that I have

researched this area for over ten years and I have read most of the documents

reproduced. The volume entirely fulfils what I had anticipated, if not surpassing it in

terms of what is included in total (and, yes, I have read the microfiches).

In my brief remarks, I want to focus on the `MacArthur factor' in the formulation of British policy. This is one of the principal themes running through the volume which ends with President Truman's dismissal of MacArthur in April 1951. The British

government regarded the appointment of MacArthur as inevitable once it was clear that American forces would be committed, under the authority of the UN, to the defence of South Korea. MacArthur's record was unrivalled in length, scope, and achievement. The British view of his role as SCAP in Japan was positive in the main: Gascoigne said, in a document reproduced from February 1951, that MacArthur's direction of the occupation had been effective and largely successful. ' Of course, he was known to relish an independent approach and to harbour presidential ambitions but it was felt that these potential difficulties could be surmounted through the issuing of explicit instructions not leaving the General too much freedom of manoeuvre. The gravity of the situation was such in July 1950 that it was imperative to concentrate on holding the North Korean offensive and to reverse it without pondering unduly what problems could be associated with MacArthur's command. It was felt in London that MacArthur handled matters as capably as could be done between July and September 1950: he stabilised the situation, restored morale and commitment, and then implemented the masterstroke of the Inchon landing in mid-September. The British view towards MacArthur was at its warmest in September 1950.

Indeed, there was then a close coalescence between MacArthur's approach and that of Clement Attlee and Ernest Bevin but not, it should be stressed, between MacArthur and the British Chiefs of Staff. When the success of the Inchon landing became clear, the question as to how UN policy in Korea would develop and what would happen to North Korea loomed large. This was a complicated matter, more

Documents on British Policy Overseas (hereafter cited as DBPO), Series II, Volume IV, Korea 1950-1 (HMSO, 1991), No. 112: Gascoigne to Bevin, 6 Feb. 1951.

32

so than was appreciated by MacArthur or the British government. Britain had been

committed to the attainment of a unified Korea since 194.5 if not 1943 and this was underlined by decisions reached by the UN in 1948. Kim 11 Sung's regime had

refused to cooperate with the UN and had resorted to blatant aggression in a bid to

enforce Korean unification. As seen in London and Washington, this aggression occurred almost certainly with the support of the Soviet Union and probably China. MacArthur saw Korea very much in East Asian terms. If North Korea could be liquidated and an anti-communist unified Korea established under UN protection, this would be seen as a severe check to the advance of communism in Asia and would render the defence of Japan more viable, in addition to making it far less likely that Taiwan would fall to the Chinese communists. MacArthur was not much concerned with the Soviet Union. The British government was deeply concerned with the Soviet Union and saw the defeat of North Korea as an important part of the process of standing up to Stalin and of achieving success in reversing communist expansion. Attlee succumbed, as did Truman and Acheson, to the seductive yet extremely dangerous appeal of `rollback'. This explains Bevin's enthusiasm for

advancing beyond the 38th parallel and unifying Korea in late September and early October 1950, fully endorsed by Attlee. The British Chiefs of Staff disagreed,

appreciating more acutely than anyone else the great dangers inherent in advancing north. They favoured an approximation to the restoration of the status quo ante rather than unification by force. Their fears that China could well be drawn into military action in Korea, brushed aside by MacArthur and, originally by Attlee and Bevin

were fully justified. The Chiefs of Staff showed growing doubt regarding MacArthur's

reliability.

The COS doubts communicated themselves more forcibly to the government in the second half of October and in the first half of November with the emergence of the British proposal for a buffer zone to obviate full-scale Chinese intervention. Doubts about MacArthur sharply intensified and were greatly exacerbated by the events of late November. Full-scale Chinese action totally transformed the Korean War: this was one conclusion shared one hundred per cent by MacArthur and the British government. It was all they agreed on, however, and British criticism of MacArthur increased markedly and consistently between November 1950 and April 1951. The British government believed that the Korean War should be dealt with by stabilising the fighting rather than of continuing a protracted retreat and then of endeavouring to reach a negotiated solution. MacArthur appeared to favour escalating conflict to the point of war with China and to abandon the Korean peninsula if necessary. The- most dangerous phase of the Korean War occurred in December 1950 and January 1951, as regards Anglo-American relations. British opinions were expressed directly and, at times very powerfully by Attlee (when in Washington for talks with Truman), by Oliver Franks as ambassador (more diplomatically), and by Marshal of the RAF Sir John Slessor, who was the most important individual within the Defence establishment in Britain in conveying the full extent of British anxiety over

33

MacArthur and American strategy. The whole subject area was particularly delicate,

since it implicitly questioned the political leadership and control exercised by

President Truman. Truman had long doubted MacArthur's role in East Asia but

Truman was a shrewd political operator and knew the considerable risks involved in

taking the only form of action which would curb MacArthur effectively (that is,

dismissing him). The immediate British anxiety in January 1951 was met by an improvement in military direction following General Ridgway's appointment and by

the British reluctantly compromising in the American determination to secure

passage in the UN General Assembly of a motion condemning Chinese aggression in

Korea.

The British feeling was that, although MacArthur's power was clearly waning following the potent blows he had suffered since November 1950, he possessed

considerable nuisance value and it was essential that the absurdity of having two different approaches enunciated by American spokesmen must be ended. It was MacArthur himself who solved the problem by deliberately torpedoing Truman's

attempt to begin an exchange with China in March 1951 and then with Congressman Joseph Martin's release of correspondence with MacArthur in which the General made clear his disapproval of the policy of his own government. Herbert Morrison had now succeeded the dying Bevin and Morrison felt that British views must be conveyed far more emphatically; this was linked with Morrison's own

ambition to succeed Attlee as Labour leader and prime minister which, in turn,

meant that he wished to establish his contribution to the formulation of policy. By

this time Truman had reached the decision that MacArthur must go. The

announcement was welcomed with relief by all in Britain-the Labour government, the COS, the Conservative and Liberal opposition parties. Statesmanlike tributes to MacArthur's past achievements were made but there was no disguising the elation accompanying MacArthur's departure from East Asia.

To conclude, the `MacArthur factor' both complicated and personified the arguments between Britain and the USA in 1950-1. The deeper components of Anglo-American friction comprised the changing relationship between the two powers with the USA

more in the ascendancy and Britain more in decline (illustrated by the issue of a Pacific pact and ANZUS referred to in a number of the documents), 2 by the acrimony within American domestic politics in 1949-51 and the growing attacks on the Truman administration and Dean Acheson in particular. MacArthur's

contribution sharpened these matters but the personal side should not be carried too far. There was much that the British and American governments shared in common down to November 1950. Where Britain diverged most sharply from MacArthur was over China and the roots of this went back to the British decision to recognise Communist China in January 1950 while the USA continued to recognise Chiang

2 Ibid., Nos. 127,131 and 138.

34

Kai-shek's regime in Taiwan. What Oliver Franks referred to in April 1951 as `MacArthuritis' was largely but not entirely brought to an end in April 1951 which is where this volume appropriately ends.

35

COMMAND AND CO-ORDINATION OF UN FORCES IN KOREA

Richard Bevins

This paper highlights three elements of Volume IV's coverage of the United Nations'

involvement in the Korean War: the UN's place in the organisation created to

command UN forces in Korea; the part played by the UN in co-ordinating member

governments' offers of assistance to these forces; and the debate over the future of the UN prompted by its effective response to the invasion of South Korea.

Command Structure

News of the invasion of South Korea on 25 June produced several almost instinctive

reactions in the West. General MacArthur despatched a plane load of observers despite the fact that `he has no authority of any kind in Korea; nor is the American

military mission under his orders' and the US referred events to the United Nations Security Council. 1 Resolutions calling on UN member states to render every assistance in the execution of the UN's call for an end to hostilities and withdrawal to the 38th parallel (25 June) and recommending that members furnish assistance to

aid the Republic of Korea (27 June) were the basis for the UN's continuing involvement in the course of the Korean War. 2 The UN was quick to follow the American lead since, as the UN Secretary General, Trygve Lie, said, `developments in Korea were an affront to the United Nations more than to anyone else-more even than to the United States----since the United Nations had been so very largely

3 responsible for the formation of the Republic'.

As a result of the 27 June resolution cover for Western assistance to Korea rested on a recommendation of the Security Council and the Foreign Office accepted that `it therefore seems reasonable that the Council should wish to be as actively associated with the progress of operations as is possible'. 4 Quite how this was to be done

produced some early tensions within the UN. Ensuring that `the necessary action should be taken under the United Nations "umbrella"' so as to gain legally,

politically and in the eyes of world opinion conflicted with the operational need to place the actual conduct of military affairs `squarely in the hands of General

I Documents on British Policy Overseas (hereafter cited as DBPO), Series II, Volume IV, Korea 1950-1 (HMSO, 1991), No. 1, notes I and 2. 2 For the texts of these resolutions see Cmd. 8078 of 1950 and Rosalyn Higgins (hereafter cited as Higgins) United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967 (London, 1970), pp. 160 and 162. 3 DBPO, Series II, Volume IV, No. 3, note 10: Lie, 25 June 1950. 4 Ibid., No. 10: Younger to Jebb, 2 July 1950.

36

MacArthur with the minimum possible interference from outside'. 5 The possibility of a Soviet return to the UN highlighted the inadequacies and potential dangers of the machinery available to the UN for upholding collective security.

Initial American proposals to establish a UN enforcement committee to control action in Korea were not pursued after objections from both the UK and the American Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Neither was it possible to make use of the existing Military Staff Committee (MSC)- the institution provided for in the UN Charter to implement the Security Council's plans for the use of armed force in the event of breaches of the peace. 6 For as Ernest Gross, US Deputy Permanent Representative, pointed out, `Quite apart from the fact that the Military Staff Committee was not capable of doing any practical work an impossible situation would arise if the Russians suddenly turned up and demanded to see any plans which the Military Staff Committee had been preparing. '? In addition to endorsing these arguments the Foreign Office thought that the use of the MSC was probably not legally applicable except in cases where the Security Council was conducting its own military operations using forces put at its disposal by means of special agreements under Article 43 of the Charter.

The structure which US, UK and French representatives eventually settled on (incorporated in a resolution adopted on 7 July) owed much to the JCS' concern to interpose themselves between the UN and the forces fighting under its banner in Korea. The Foreign Office was similarly concerned to keep the Security Council at arm's length from actual operations while at the same time proposing that the Council should meet as often as necessary to consider reports on the military situation. This would `achieve our first objective by demonstrating that the Council is taking an active interest in developments in Korea'. 8

It was subsequently agreed that the reports to the Security Council from the unified command established under the United States by the resolution of 7 July would pass from General MacArthur to the JCS, who would review them for transmission to the Security Council via the Secretary of Defense and State Department. After overcoming constitutional difficulties raised by the UK and military objections from the JCS, the resolution specified that the unified command would be able to fly the UN flag. Accordingly on 14 July the US Army's Chief of Staff, General Collins, formally presented the UN flag to General MacArthur, who raised it at his

5 Ibid., No. 10. 6 Ibid., No. 9, note 10: Jebb to Younger, 29 June 1950 and No. 10. Cf. James F Schnabel and Robert J Watson, The History of the joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume III, Part I (Wilmington, 1979), pp. 133 and 137. The UN Charter is printed in British and Foreign State Papers (London, 1953), Volume 145, pp. 805-32). 7 DBPO, Series II, Volume IV, No. 10, note 7: Gross to Jebb, 28 June 1950. 8 Ibid., No. 10.

37

headquarters in Tokyo. General MacArthur was to be responsible to the US Government (acting as the agent of the UN) from whom he would receive his instructions. In discussion with Sir Oliver Franks in April 1951 Dean Rusk, American Deputy Under-Secretary of State, commented that despite press speculation to the contrary, the fact was General MacArthur had got directives restricting his actions. 9

The procedures devised to give UN cover to what was effectively a US controlled

command structure worked well enough in the early phase when the North Koreans

were first held and then routed by UN forces. Subsequent setbacks after Chinese

intervention led to much criticism of the command structure. Concern was expressed both in the British Parliament and Cabinet that General MacArthur and possibly the US government, or elements within it, were pursuing objectives not shared by other

contributing countries or endorsed by the UN. Existing machinery did not allow the UN to have any say in the instructions issued to General MacArthur and Ernest

Bevin was particularly troubled by the need to `be careful not to leave the impression that the reason why the instructions are not made public is either because

these give General MacArthur more latitude than a strict fulfilment of the United Nations Resolutions would justify or that quite simply we have no knowledge of their

contents'. 10

British concern focussed on the political implications of a possible extension of the war to China-if MacArthur chose this course and took `action going beyond his Mandate' it would occur without the UN considering its effects and without the UK having any right to be consulted. Bevin accordingly asked Franks to press the US to agree to consult and obtain the agreement of `at least' those Security Council

members with forces in Korea before taking any such action. Dean Acheson replied that `there would be some difficulty in our undertaking a formal commitment not to proceed... without the express agreement of individual members of the Security Council' but reassured Bevin that the problem may be `more theoretical than practical' in view of US determination to act closely with its friends in accordance with UN policy. Il

Offers of Assistance

The adoption by the UN of a co-ordinating role rather than a controlling one is illustrated by the part played by the UN in considering offers of assistance. 12 Trygve

9 Ibid., No. 134, note 3. 10 Ibid., No. 77: Bevin to Franks, 22 November 1950. 11 Ibid. and note 4 for Acheson's response, 24 November 1950. 12 Full details of the offers of assistance in 1950 from 39 UN member states are given in the 1950 Yearbook of the United Nations, pp. 226-8. For a summary of the position in January 1953 see Higgins, pp. 198-9.

38

Lie, had appealed to all UN members on 29 June for offers of assistance in Korea;

an appeal which he repeated to 52 members on 14 July, highlighting the `urgent'

need for ground forces. Sir Pierson Dixon, Deputy Under Secretary of State, viewed Lie's second appeal as `unfortunate as it would confirm the recent charges against him that he was a "stooge of Wall Street". ' Lie had in fact indicated at a press conference on the morning of l4 July that his action resulted from conferences held

with the American delegation in New York. 13 More welcome was the fact that the latest appeal included a request to direct offers of assistance to the Secretary General- a course which the Foreign Office approved for it helped to preserve the appearance of a UN co-ordinated response. The JCS were anxious, however, that offers should not be accepted without some examination of their military effectiveness and consequently acceptance of an offer of assistance was dependent on the outcome of detailed exchanges conducted directly between Washington and the member government concerned. The British government's subsequent decision to send land forces was in fact communicated first to Washington and only later to Trygve Le. 14

Uniting for Peace

Awareness that the robust reaction from the UN had been `possible only owing to the fortuitous absence of the Soviet Delegate from the Security Council and the willingness of the United States to take prompt steps to meet aggression' had resulted in the Americans producing a `three-way programme' designed to strengthen the United Nations. 15 This plan, unveiled in August 1950, envisaged (a) procedures to empower the General Assembly to respond to cases of aggression when the Security Council was paralysed by use of the veto including (b) the despatch of a fact- finding or peace observation commission and (c) plans for a UN force or legion to be coordinated in the first instance by a 14-member Collective Measures Committee. 16 Although British Ministers had some sympathy for moves to get round the abuse of the veto which had `gravely impaired the effectiveness of the United Nations as an instrument for preserving world peace', they were concerned about strengthening the Assembly at the expense of the Security Council and, in particular, sharing the decision-making process with those powers who bore least responsibility for world peace and security. 17 Bevin foresaw dangers in relaxing the power of veto held by the United Kingdom as well as the Soviet Union and the Cabinet agreed that the

13 See DBPO, Series II, Volume IV, No. 4, note 6 and No. 21, note 2 for Lie's appeals. Ibid., No. 21 for Dixon's comments of 15 July 1950. 14 Ibid., No. 27, note 7. 15 Ibid., No. 98: UK Brief for Commonwealth Prime Ministers Meeting, 27 December 1950. 16 Ibid., No. 43: Memorandum by Mr Bevin, 31 August 1950. 17 ibid., No. 44: Cabinet Conclusions, 4 September 1950. Cf. No. 33, note 7.

39

British government could not accept a position in which it would have no right to

veto action incompatible with vital British interests.

Equally it was recognised that the safeguarding of British interests could depend on supporting the United States in its new found role as `policeman in the world'. 18

Bevin and most of his colleagues thought that the most effective way of giving this

support was by developing the Atlantic pact (`the heart of our defence') and making a series of regional arrangements rather than by turning the UN into something approaching a world-wide security pact. 19 The idea of raising a UN force of

volunteers so as to gain a contribution from as many members as possible was

regarded by Sir Gladwyn Jebb as `not nearly so lunatic as it appears at first sight',

especially since Lester Pearson, Canadian Minister for External Affairs, was already

attracted to the idea in principle. 20 However, the British Chiefs of Staff considered

that proposals to establish a military organisation within the UN `must be suppressed

at all costs... [Sir W Slim] could imagine no more unsuitable body to discuss such

matters--or less capable of doing so efficiently or expeditiously'. 21

At the same time it was appreciated that American plans for the UN, however

idealistic, gave `every country, great or small, a chance to organise its military

resources so as to be able to contribute physically and not only morally to the defence of world peace' and perhaps, more significantly, it was clear that this was a

course on which the Americans were determined. The Foreign Office's view was that `the resolution in its conception was fundamentally political and designed to give political cover to United States or other countries' military action' and it was felt

that `it should as far as possible be confined to the political side, and the military side soft-pedalled'. The Cabinet had therefore agreed to support the least

objectionable features, eg Peace Observation commission and earmarking national contingents for UN service, while discouraging moves to relegate questions of peace and security to the General Assembly: `a body representing fifty-nine nations in which we have only one vote'. Some modifications to the original proposals were secured, but the essential features remained and in Britain's view the final product left much to be desired, `as is almost inevitable in a resolution fashioned in a Committee of 60

members'. It was with `some apprehension' that Britain was prevailed upon to co- sponsor the `Uniting for Peace' resolution passed by the Assembly on 3 November. 22

Anglo-American differences over the future purpose of the UN were crystalised in discussions provoked by the Korean War. Disagreements over Chinese representation

18 Ibid., No. 25: Franks to Bevin, 23 Ju1y 1950. 19 Ibid., No. 37, note 1, Bevin to Franks, 14 August 1950. Cf. No. 80 for Acheson's endorsement. 20 Ibid., No. 43. ii: Jebb to Sir A Noble, 3 August 1950. 21 Ibid., No. 98, note 3: Chiefs of Staff meeting, 19 December 1950. 22 Ibid., Nos. 43,63 and 98.

40

were the obvious expression of this divergence but it was also reflected in respective attitudes towards `Uniting for Peace'. The Foreign Office saw the Americans as cherishing `a conception of the United Nations as an effective international police organisation' which would `accelerate the division of the world into two armed and hostile camps'. The UK would rather regard the UN `as a world organisation whose

23 primary function is the peaceful settlement of disputes'.

23 Ibid., No 137: letter from Younger to Jebb, 31 March 1951.

41

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Was British involvement in the Korean War a mistake? (Sir James Cable dixil).

The discussion barely covered this basic question. Few disagreed that the Western

response was a reflex action: a predictable response to a war which correctly or not was judged to be a move by the Soviet Union to raise the stakes in the Cold War. The question of Soviet intentions-or rather British and allied perceptions of these intentions-remained the key.

One possibility was that Stalin needed a low cost success for Soviet foreign policy after the setbacks in Berlin, Yugoslavia and Greece. The basis for a series of risings in the Far East had already been laid by the 1948 Calcutta Cominform-with some success in Malaya. At the time of Kim Il-Sung's approach to Moscow for assistance these factors might well have had some impact on Stalin's thinking when giving the green light. Equally, Stalin probably had no wish to become directly involved in Korea-still less in armed conflict with the Western Powers. This may have

contributed to continued Soviet absence from the UN in June when the key votes were taken.

British analysis at the time tended to the view that the Soviet Union had made a mistake in not returning sooner to the UN so as to block UN involvement in Korea. On the other hand it could have been, as Ales Bebler, the Yugoslav representative at the UN, suggested in June 1950 that it was done deliberately to continue to embroil China with the UN. According to Bebler, the Soviet Union was already apprehensive of the growing power of China, a country which the JIC considered was invulnerable to attack. In 1950 British planners thought the Chinese leadership was less predictable, and possibly less rational, than Stalin's. Moscow may have made a similar appreciation.

It was agreed that, forty years on, the evidence to determine with any certainty the reasons for, or degree of Sino-Soviet involvement in Korea, was still lacking. Unless the Russian archives can shed some light on the question, it will remain, as it did at the time, a matter for speculation.

Historical Branch

42

NOTE ON CONTRIBUTORS

Sir James Cable

General Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley

HM Diplomatic Service 194.7-80

Cabinet Office Historian

Dr Peter Lowe Reader in Modern History, Manchester University

Richard Bone Head of Library and Records Department, FCO

Heather Yasamee Head of Historical Branch, L RD, FCO

Richard Bevins Historical Branch, LRD, FCO

43

DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH POLICY OVERSEAS

This collection of documents from the archives of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is published by authorization of Her Majesty's Government. The Editors have

been accorded the customary freedom in the selection and arrangement of documents.

SERIES I (1945-1950) Published

Volume I The Conference at Potsdam, July---August 1945.

Volume II Conferences and Conversations 1945: London, Washington and Moscow.

Volume III Britain and America: Negotiation of the United States loan, August--December 1945.

Volume IV Britain and America: Atomic Energy, Bases and Food, December 1945---July 1946.

Volume V Germany and Western Europe, August- -December 1945.

Volume VI Eastern Europe, August 194.5--April 194.6.

In preparation

Volume VII The United Nations, 194.6.

Published SERIES 11 (1950---1955)

Volume 1 The Schuman Ilan, the Council of Europe and Western European Integration, May 1950-December 1952.

Volume 1I The London Conferences, January --, June 1950.

Volume III German Rearmament, September-- December 1950.

Volume IV Korea, June 1950----April 1951.

In Preparation

Volume V Germany and European Security, 1951-- 1954.

Volume VI The Middle East, 1951-----1953.

Free lists of Titles (state subject/s) are available from Her Majesty's Stationery Office, HMS() Books, 51 Nine Elms Lane, London SW8 5I)R.

45

FCO HISTORICAL BRANCH

OCCASIONAL PAPERS

No. 1

Valid Evidence

No. 2

Meeting of Editors of Diplomatic Documents

No. 3

Germany rejoins the Club

No. 4

Eastern Europe

Foreign and Commonwealth Office