1

Has the development of the co-decision procedure increased the opportunities for influence of

organised interests in the EU?

Katalin Jakucs

Lobbying and Policy making in the EU

King’s College London

April 2013

Since the beginning of the European integration, the gradual transfer of legislative competencies to

the EU institutions resulted in a huge expansion of lobbying activities. During the first three decades,

interest representatives centred their activities on the Commission and the Council, the institutions

that they associated with power.1 No attention had been devoted to lobbying the European

Parliament (EP), as according to the general wisdom of that time, the EP was a significantly weak

institution.2 This perception has started to change over the last decade as the Parliament has begun to

gain more and more power with successive treaty modifications.

It is the Maastricht Treaty3 that constituted a major turning point in the institutional history of the EU

by introducing co-decision, the legislative procedure that requires the Council to adopt legislation

jointly with the European Parliament.4 Successive treaties then have further extended the policy

fields where co-decision is applied. The process was culminated with the Lisbon Treaty that

designates co-decision as the „ordinary legislative procedure‟ and makes it applicable to 40

additional policy areas.5

The co-decision process in which the Council and the Parliament work together as equal co-

legislators has been in the centre of growing academic attention. On the one hand, many authors

(Coen,6 Beyers and Kerremans,

7 Kerremans and Princen

8) focus their attention on the empowerment

1 Henry Hauser. "European Union Lobbying Post-Lisbon: An Economic Analysis". Berkeley Journal of International

Law 29, no. 2 (2011):696. http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol29/iss2/6 (accessed 03/04/2013). 2 Ibid. p. 696.

3 The Treaty was signed on 7 February 1992 and ratified on 1 November 1993.

4 Michael Shackleton and Tapio Raunio. "Codecision since Amsterdam: a laboratory for institutional innovation and

change". Journal of European Public Policy 10, no.2 (2003):171. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1350176032000058982

(accessed 03/04/2013). 5David Earnshaw and David Judge. "Relais actors‟ and co-decision first reading agreements in the European Parliament:

the case of the advanced therapies regulation". Journal of European Public Policy 18, no. 1 (2011): 54.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2011.520877 (accessed 02/04/2013). 6David Coen. Lobbying in the European Union Briefing Paper. European Union Parliament, Constitutional Affairs. 1997.

2

of the EP and highlight that the Parliament has become an increasingly salient lobbying venue. On

the other hand, many academics (Shackleton,9 Farrell and Heritier,

10 Häge and Kaeding,

11 Settembri

and Neuhold,12

Rasmussen,13

Judge and Earnshaw14

) explore the development of the co-decision and

argue that it has lead to an increasing use of informal negotiations between the three institutions.

There also seem to be an agreement in the literature (Farrell and Heritier,15

De Clerck-Sachsse and

Kaczyński,16

Häge and Keading17

) according to which the EP has gained power over the Council

from the use of these trialogues. Authors (Kohler-Koch,18

Earnshaw and David,19

Neuhold and

Radulova,20

Marshall21

) also find that rapporteurs, shadow rapporteurs and committee chairs have

7 Jan Beyers and Bart Kerremans. "Critical resource dependencies and the Europeanization of domestic interest groups".

Journal of European Public Policy 3, no. 14 (2007):460-481. http://aei.pitt.edu/7698/1/beyers-j-12f.pdf (accessed

03/04/2013). 8 Bart Kerremans and Sebastiaan Princen. "Opportunity Structures in the EU Multi-Level System". West European

Politics 31, no. 6 (2008):1-19. http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/fwep20/31/6 (accessed 03/04/2013).

9 Michael Shackleton. "The Politics of Codecision". Journal of Common Market Studies 38, no. 2 (2000):325–342.

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-5965.00222/abstract (accessed 03/04/2013). 10

Henry Farrell and Adrienne Heritier "Formal and Informal Institutions Under Codecision: Continuous Constitution-

Building in Europe". Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions 16, no. 4

(2003):577-600. http://www.utsc.utoronto.ca/~farrell/governance.pdf (accessed 03/04/2013). 11

Frank M. Häge and Michael Kaeding. "Reconsidering the European Parliament‟s Legislative Influence: Formal vs.

Informal Procedures". Journal of European Integration 29, no. 3 (2007):341-361.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07036330701442356 (accessed 03/04/2013). 12

Pierpaolo Settembri and Christine Neuhold "Achieving Consensus Through Committees: Does the European

Parliament Manage?" Journal of Common Market Studies 47, no. 1 (2009):127-151.

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2008.01835.x/abstract (accessed 03/04/2013). 13

Anne Rasmussen. "Early Conclusion in Bicameral Bargaining: Evidence from the Codecision Legislative Procedure of

the European Union". European Union Politics 12 (2011):41-64. http://eup.sagepub.com/content/12/1/41.full.pdf

(accessed 03/04/2013). 14

David Earnshaw and David Judge. "Relais actors‟ and co-decision first reading agreements in the European

Parliament: the case of the advanced therapies regulation". Journal of European Public Policy 18, no. 1 (2011): 53-71.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2011.520877 (accessed 02/04/2013). 15

Henry Farrell and Adrienne Heritier. "International Negotiation and Intraorganizational Power in Shared Decision

Making: Early Agreements Under Codecision and Their Impact on the European Parliament and Council". Comparative

Political Studies 37, no. 10 (2004): 1184-1212. http://cps.sagepub.com/content/37/10/1184.full.pdf+html (accessed

03/04/2013). 16

Julia De Clerck-Sachsse and Piotr Maciej Kaczyński. "The European Parliament – More powerful, less legitimate? An

outlook for the 7th term". CEPS Working Document No. 314, May 2009. http://aei.pitt.edu/11176/ (accessed

12/04/2013). 17

Frank M. Häge and Michael Kaeding, "Reconsidering the European Parliament‟s Legislative Influence: Formal vs.

Informal Procedures". Journal of European Integration 29, no. 3 (2007):341-361.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07036330701442356 (accessed 03/04/2013). 18

Beate Kohler-Koch. "Organized Interests in the EC and the European Parliament". European Integration online Papers

1, no. 009 (1997). http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-009a.htm (accessed 02/04/2013). 19

David Earnshaw and David Judge. "No simple dichotomies: lobbyists and the European Parliament". The Journal of

Legislative Studies 8, no. 4 (2002):61-79.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13572330200870005 (accessed 02/04/2013). 20

Christine Neuhold and Elissaveta Radulova. (2006) "The involvement of administrative players in the EU decision

making process", in H.C.H. Hofmann and A H. Tu¨rk (eds), EU Administrative Governance, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar

Publishing.

3

became the main target of lobbying in the EP as they are the one participating in the informal

bargaining.

Building upon the existing literature, this paper argues that even though the co-decision procedure

opened up a new access point for lobbying groups by empowering the Parliament, it actually

narrowed the possibility of organised interest to influence EU policy-making. This hypothesis is

supported by the examination of the development of the co-decision procedure which has led to the

increased use of informal bargaining. It is argued that these negotiations - that take place behind

closed doors with a limited number of representatives - significantly restrict the room for manoeuvre

of organised interest to influence the legislative process. Approaching toward the end of the essay, a

case study on the Cosmetics Regulation is carried out in order to test the validity of the theoretical

argument.

Empowerment of the EP: From Phantom Parliament to Critical Lobbying Venue

During the first decades of the integration the European Parliament was considered to be a „phantom‟

institution by organised interest as it only had advisory competencies and could not influence policy

making at all.22

The Single European Act, entered into force on 1 July 1987, had brought a change by

introducing the co-operation procedure. It gave legislative competencies to the EP in the sense that

the Council had to take into consideration its position and could only reject its proposals by voting

unanimously. Some authors argue (Kohler-Koch,23

Bouwen,24

Lehmann,25

Hauser,26

Cirone27

) that

as a result of the new legislative procedure, the European Parliament started to receive more and

more attention from organised interest.

21

David Marshall. "Do rapporteurs receive independent expert policy advice? Indirect lobbying via the European

Parliament's committee secretariat". Journal of European Public Policy 19, no. 9 (2012):1377-1395.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2012.662070 (accessed 02/04/2013).

22

Henry Hauser. "European Union Lobbying Post-Lisbon: An Economic Analysis". Berkeley Journal of International

Law 29, no. 2 (2011):696. http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol29/iss2/6 (accessed 03/04/2013). 23

Beate Kohler-Koch. "Organized Interests in the EC and the European Parliament". European Integration online Papers

1, no. 009 (1997). http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-009a.htm (accessed 02/04/2013). 24

Pieter Bouwen. "The Logic of Access to the European Parliament: Business Lobbying in the Committee on Economic

and Monetary Affairs". Journal of Common Market Studies 42, no. 3 (2004):473–95.

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=591507 (accessed 03/04/2013). 25

Wilhelm Lehmann. "Soft law or no law ? The European Parliament's new role in the management of organized

interests". 10 May 2008. http://aei.pitt.edu/7948/ (accessed 03/04/2013). 26

Henry Hauser. "European Union Lobbying Post-Lisbon: An Economic Analysis". Berkeley Journal of International

Law 29, no. 2 (2011):680-709. http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol29/iss2/6 (accessed 03/04/2013). 27

Alexandra Cirone. "Patterns of Interest Group Lobbying at the EU: Examining How Group Characteristics Affect

Venue Choice". Columbia University. February 2011. http://www.princeton.edu/europe/events_archive/repository/05-04

2011Conference/Cirone_Princeton_May2011.pdf (accessed 05/04/2013).

4

The real change came in 1993 with the Maastricht Treaty that introduced the co-decision that further

strengthened the institutional role of the EP in the decision making process. Under this procedure,

the Parliament is placed on „an equal footing‟ with the Council and has the possibility to veto

legislation.28

However, at that time, it only applied to fifteen areas of EU activity. While the

following Treaties (Amsterdam, Nice) have extended the use of co-decision to a growing number of

policy areas, the Lisbon Treaty made it to be the „ordinary legislative procedure‟ expanding its

coverage to almost all policy fields.

Therefore, the European Parliament can no longer be considered as a weak institution but as a co-

legislator with significant veto power over the policy making process. As a consequence, following

the logic of „where power rests influence will be brought to bear‟29

, the EP has become „a decisive

target for lobbyists‟.30

Organized interest started to turn to the EP since the early 90s, and direct

lobbying of the Parliament had doubled between the year of 1994 and 2004.31

The estimated number

of individuals making contact with the Parliament each year is about 70,000.32

Over the year of

2006, the EP issued 4,435 annual passes to accredited interest representatives.33

Today, this number

has surpassed 5500.34

These figures clearly demonstrate that with the development of the co-decision

procedure, the European Parliament has become an „increasingly salient access point‟35

for organised

interest.

According to lobbyists, the Parliament is as accessible as the Commission.36

The reason behind

MEPs‟ receptiveness to lobbying is twofold. First, as Earnshaw and Judge point out, MEP‟s have to

28

European Parliament. "Co-decision and Consiliation. A Guide to how the Parliament co-legislates under the Treaty of

Lisbon". January 2012. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/code/information/guide_en.pdf (accessed 02/04/2013). p.24. 29

Vladimir Orlando Key. "American State Politics: An Introduction". Knopf, 1956, Greenwood Press, 1983. p.168. 30

Beate Kohler-Koch. "Organized Interests in the EC and the European Parliament". European Integration online Papers

1, no. 009 (1997). http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997-009a.htm (accessed 02/04/2013). p.5. 31

Directorate General Internal Policies, supra note 4, at p.10. 32

Sonia Mazey and Jeremy Richardson. "Interest groups and EU policy-making: organisational logic and venue

shopping". in J. Richardson (ed.), European Union: Power and Policy Making, London: Routledge, 2006. p. 247 -65. 33

Greenwood, supra note 8. at p. 11. 34

Statistics for Transparency Register

http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/statistics.do?action=prepareView&locale=en#en (accessed

18/04/2013). 35

Alexandra Cirone. "Patterns of Interest Group Lobbying at the EU: Examining How Group Characteristics Affect

Venue Choice". Columbia University. February 2011. http://www.princeton.edu/europe/events_archive/repository/05-04-

2011Conference/Cirone_Princeton_May2011.pdf (accessed 05/04/2013). p.5. 36

Wilhelm Lehmann. "Soft law or no law ? The European Parliament's new role in the management of organized

interests". 10 May 2008. http://aei.pitt.edu/7948/ (accessed 03/04/2013). p.16.

5

be open to organized interest because of their „information deficiencies and time constraints‟.37

Therefore, Kluger notes, lobbyists, who can translate the complex and technical issues into simple

language, are „welcome guests‟38

in the busy MEP‟s offices. Second, the EP, as the only directly

elected body of the EU, seeks out for information on the social impact of the Commission‟s proposal

in order to evaluate it from a European perspective.39

As Bouwen puts it, lobbyist can be granted

access to the Parliament by providing information about the „European encompassing interests‟40

.

After all, MEPs are politicians whose re-election depends on national voters.41

Therefore, MEPs

attempt to stay in touch with lobbying groups that are able to give information about wide support

for new policies.

Consequently, one effect of the development of the co-decision procedure is the empowerment of the

EP which therefore became a new access point for organised interest. It is important to note though

that access does not necessarily translate into influence. It is examined in the next part of this essay

that the development of co-decision has actually created hindrances for organised interest to translate

access to influence.

The increased use of trialogues

Besides enhancing the EP‟s power, the Maastricht Treaty also established a somewhat cumbersome

decision-making process by introducing the co-decision procedure. As it allowed three readings by

both the Council and the EP, it significantly prolonged the legislative process. In order to

counterweight this tendency, institutions started to turn to informal negotiations.42

The increased use

of these so-called trialogues helps enhancing the efficiency of the decision-making process but raises

37

David Earnshaw and David Judge. "No simple dichotomies: lobbyists and the European Parliament". The Journal of

Legislative Studies 8, no. 4 (2002):61-79.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13572330200870005 (accessed 02/04/2013). p.62. 38

Maja Kluger Rasmussen. "Lobbying the European Parliament: A necessary evil". Centre for European Policy Studies.

Policy Paper. no. 242, 10 May 2011. http://www.ceps.eu/book/lobbying-european-parliament-necessary-evil (accessed

03/04/2013). p.2. 39

Adam William Chalmers. "Trading information for access: informational lobbying strategies and interest group access

to the European Union". Journal of European Public Policy 20, no.1. (2013):42.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2012.693411 (accessed 05/04/2013). 40

Pieter Bouwen."The Logic of Access to the European Parliament: Business Lobbying in the Committee on Economic

and Monetary Affairs". Journal of Common Market Studies 42, no. 3 (2004):477.

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=591507 (accessed 03/04/2013). 41

Alexandra Cirone. "Patterns of Interest Group Lobbying at the EU: Examining How Group Characteristics Affect

Venue Choice". Columbia University. February 2011.

http://www.princeton.edu/europe/events_archive/repository/05-04-2011Conference/Cirone_Princeton_May2011.pdf

(accessed 05/04/2013). p.5. 42

Frank M. Häge and Michael Kaeding. "Reconsidering the European Parliament‟s Legislative Influence: Formal vs.

Informal Procedures". Journal of European Integration 29, no. 3 (2007):342.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07036330701442356 (accessed 03/04/2013).

6

questions of transparency and legitimacy.43

As negotiations are informal and take place behind

closed doors, they also reduce the ability of organised interest to lobby successfully the EP.

The first version of the co-decision, introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, consisted of three readings.

If no agreement was reached during the first two readings, the issue was referred to a Conciliation

Committee comprising of representatives from the Council and the Parliament. It was the task of this

committee to reach an agreement on a joint text. However, in case of a failure to come to an

agreement the Council could reintroduce its common position under the third reading, thus making a

„take-it-or-leave-it proposal‟44

to the EP. In response to the new cumbersome process, institutions

started to complement the formal decision-making procedure with informal practices.45

Informal dialogues - originally used to prepare for the conciliation after the second reading - became

institutionalised with the Amsterdam Treaty that made the adoption of legislation possible already at

the first reading.46

As actors reached an agreement during informal negotiations before starting the

formal process, the Parliament could vote on amendments - in which the Council‟s position was

already incorporated - by simple majority at its first reading.47

The Council then completed the

procedure by accepting the Commission‟s proposal by qualified majority voting. This practice has

led to a „fast track‟ legislative procedure with policy proposals being accepted at the first reading.48

As a result of the increased use of trialogues, setting up of conciliation committees has decreased

from 39% during the 1993-1999 legislature49

to only 4% between 2009-201150

. Accordingly, first

readings have risen from 28% in 1999-2004 to 78% in 2009-2011 and the average time of co-

43

Lukas Obholzer and Christine Reh. "How to Negotiate under Co-decision in the EU Reforming Trialogues and First-

Reading Agreements". Centre for European Policy Studies No. 270, May 2012. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2060107

(accessed 18/04/2013). p.1. 44

Frank M. Häge and Michael Kaeding. "Reconsidering the European Parliament‟s Legislative Influence: Formal vs.

Informal Procedures". Journal of European Integration 29, no. 3 (2007):344.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07036330701442356 (accessed 03/04/2013). 45

Ibid. p343. 46

David Earnshaw and David Judge. "Relais actors‟ and co-decision first reading agreements in the European

Parliament: the case of the advanced therapies regulation". Journal of European Public Policy 18, no. 1 (2011): 55.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2011.520877 (accessed 02/04/2013). 47

Ibid. 55. 48

Ibid. p.56. 49

European Parliament. "Activity Report 1 November 1993 – 30 April 1999 of the delegation to the Conciliation

Committee". (1999). http://www.europarl.europa.eu/code/information/activity_reports/activity_report_1993_99_en.pdf

(accessed 18/04/2013). 50

European Parliament. "Activity Report 14 July 2009 - 31 December 2011 of the delegation to the Conciliation

Committee". (2011). http://www.europarl.europa.eu/code/information/activity_reports/activity_report_2009_2011_en.pdf

(accessed 18/04/2013).

7

decision has decreased to 17 months from 22 during the 1993-1999 legislature.51

Between 1999 and

2007, 40% of all EU legislation and 76% of co-decision legislation went through at least one

trialogue.52

During the parliamentary term of 2004-2009, only 5 % co-decision procedure reached

the third reading.53

These figures demonstrate a clear and growing preference for early agreements

and for avoidance of conciliation.

The academic literature mentions several reasons behind the choice of legislators for fast-tracking

co-decision. First, it is often argued (Neuhold and de Ruiter,54

Farrell and Héritier,55

Shackleton and

Raunio56

) that the Council has a clear preference for trialogues because of its limited resources and

time constraints. The expansion of the co-decision procedure to many new policy fields after the

Lisbon Treaty significantly increased the work of the Parliament as well.57

Hence, MEPs also have

an increasing preference for early agreements in an attempt to save time and energy. Actually, co-

decision is beneficial for both institutions as it helps them to save time, avoid gridlock and therefore

enhance efficiency.58

Another reason is that the admission of 12 new member states makes it quite difficult to reach a

common position within the Council. An early input from the Parliament can help facilitating the

reach of an agreement among members.59

The literature also highlights that over the years

51

European Parliament. "Conciliations and Codecision, Statistics on concluded codecision procedures (by signature

date)". http://www.europarl.europa.eu/code/about/statistics_en.htm (accessed 18/04/2013). 52

Raya Kardasheva. "Trialogues in the EU Legislature". King‟s College London Department of European and

International Studies Research Paper 30 April 2012.

http://raya.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Trilogues_in_the_EU_Legislature.pdf (accessed 18/04/2013). p.11. 53

Christine Neuhold and Rik de Ruiter. "The European Parliament after Lisbon: The winner takes it all? An analysis of

some of the implications of the Lisbon Treaty on the EPs legislative role under co-decision". Paper for EUCE Conference

on Lisbon Treaty, Canada, June 2010. http://euce.dal.ca/Files/Neuhold__EUCE_Conference_paper1.pdf (accessed

18/04/2013). p.5. 54

Ibid. p.7. 55

Henry Farrell and Adrienne Heritier. "Formal and Informal Institutions Under Codecision: Continuous Constitution-

Building in Europe". Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions 16, no.

4(2003):590. http://www.utsc.utoronto.ca/~farrell/governance.pdf (accessed 03/04/2013). 56

Michael Shackleton and Tapio Raunio. "Codecision since Amsterdam: a laboratory for institutional innovation and

change". Journal of European Public Policy 10 no.2 (2003):174. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1350176032000058982

(accessed 03/04/2013). 57

Christine Neuhold and Rik de Ruiter. "The European Parliament after Lisbon: The winner takes it all? An analysis of

some of the implications of the Lisbon Treaty on the EPs legislative role under co-decision". Paper for EUCE Conference

on Lisbon Treaty, Canada, June 2010. http://euce.dal.ca/Files/Neuhold__EUCE_Conference_paper1.pdf (accessed

18/04/2013). p.8. 58

Raya Kardasheva. "Trialogues in the EU Legislature". King‟s College London Department of European and

International Studies Research Paper 30 April 2012.

http://raya.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Trilogues_in_the_EU_Legislature.pdf (accessed 18/04/2013). p.4. 59

Christine Neuhold and Rik de Ruiter. "The European Parliament after Lisbon: The winner takes it all? An analysis of

some of the implications of the Lisbon Treaty on the EPs legislative role under co-decision". Paper for EUCE Conference

on Lisbon Treaty, Canada, June 2010. http://euce.dal.ca/Files/Neuhold__EUCE_Conference_paper1.pdf (accessed

18/04/2013). p.8.

8

institutions went through a socialisation process and became familiar with the procedure which make

them more capable of achieving an agreement at the first reading.60

Even though early agreements help increasing the EU‟s legislative efficiency, they raise several

concerns as regards to the transparency of the process.61

There are no clear rules about who bargains

on behalf of the institutions. In the case of the Council, it is normally the Presidency who takes part

in the informal negotiations.62

As far as the EP is concerned, either a committee rapporteur or a

majority party leader can negotiate on behalf of the whole assembly.63

Therefore, smaller parties are

marginalised and individual legislators‟ ability to propose amendments is restrained.64

Furthermore,

there is no requirement to make publicly available records of the trialogue negotiations.65

As

Obholzer and Reh put it ‟negotiations take place behind closed doors; documents are not readily

available; and the plenary must rubberstamp the compromise between the EP and Council to allow

conclusion at the first reading‟.66

The opaqueness of the process creates challenges for organised interest to influence the outcome of

the legislative bargaining. As nowadays the majority of the policy proposals go through trialgoues

the possibility of interest groups to influence policy-making is significantly narrowed.

Lobbying legislation under co-decision

The development of the co-decision procedure left the Commission with the power to initiate

legislation. Therefore, at the early stage of the policy-making process, organised interest still has to

focus its lobbying efforts on the Commission. There is an agreement in the academic literature that

the Commission is „the most widely travelled EU lobbying channel‟67

and its consultations allow

60

Ibid. p.8. 61

Lukas Obholzer and Christine Reh. "How to Negotiate under Co-decision in the EU Reforming Trilogues and First-

Reading Agreements". Centre for European Policy Studies No. 270, May 2012. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2060107

(accessed 18/04/2013). p.1. 62

Frank M. Häge and Michael Kaeding. "Reconsidering the European Parliament‟s Legislative Influence: Formal vs.

Informal Procedures". Journal of European Integration 29, no. 3 (2007):344.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07036330701442356 (accessed 03/04/2013). 63

Ibid. p.344. 64

Raya Kardasheva. "Trialogues in the EU Legislature". King‟s College London Department of European and

International Studies Research Paper 30 April 2012. http://raya.eu/wp-

content/uploads/2012/08/Trilogues_in_the_EU_Legislature.pdf (accessed 18/04/2013). p.6. 65

Ibid. p.7. 66

Lukas Obholzer and Christine Reh. "How to Negotiate under Co-decision in the EU Reforming Trilogues and First-

Reading Agreements". Centre for European Policy Studies No. 270, May 2012. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2060107

(accessed 18/04/2013). p.4. 67

Henry Hauser. "European Union Lobbying Post-Lisbon: An Economic Analysis". Berkeley Journal of International

Law 29, no. 2 (2011):694. http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol29/iss2/6 (accessed 03/04/2013).

9

lobbyists to shape and steer a proposal. However, once the Commission tabled its proposal, lobbying

efforts have to be re-oriented towards the Council and the EP. According to many academics, access

to the Council is quite difficult.68

As the Council can easily gather information from national and

local governments, it relies less on information provided by private actors.69

This makes the Council

a less significant lobbying venue.

Therefore, at the later stages of the policy cycle, organised interest has to concentrate its lobbying

effort on the Parliament.70

As Marshall asserts, lobbying the EP takes place irrespective of the

success or failure of lobbying the Commission at the first stage.71

If interest groups could

successfully influence the Commission‟s proposal, they will lobby the EP to defend their position

against opposing lobbying groups. If they were unsuccessful in exercising influence on the

Commission, they will try to lobby the EP in the hope of securing a more advantageous outcome.

As argued above, under co-decision the big majority of legislation is accepted at first reading

preceded by informal tripartite negotiations. The Parliament is often represented by a committee

rapporteur in these negotiations whose influence has significantly increased since „real discussion

surrounding amendments have shifted from the committees into informal trialogues‟.72

As a

consequence, committee rapporteurs are identified „as the most important relais actors‟ in the

Parliament by Farrell and Héritier.73

Mahony also asserts that lobbying efforts through the EP are

largely restricted to the rapporteur, the shadow rapporteur and to the committee chair.74

68

Wilhelm Lehmann. "Soft law or no law ? The European Parliament's new role in the management of organized

interests". 10 May 2008. http://aei.pitt.edu/7948/ (accessed 03/04/2013). p.16. 69

Henry Hauser. "European Union Lobbying Post-Lisbon: An Economic Analysis". Berkeley Journal of International

Law 29, no. 2 (2011):698. http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol29/iss2/6 (accessed 03/04/2013). 70

Ibid. p.698. 71

David Marshall. "Who to lobby and when: Institutional determinants of interest group strategies in European

Parliament committees". European Union Politics 11, no. 4 (2010):559. http://eup.sagepub.com/content/11/4/553

(accessed 02/04/2013). 72

David Earnshaw and David Judge. "Relais actors‟ and co-decision first reading agreements in the European

Parliament: the case of the advanced therapies regulation". Journal of European Public Policy 18, no. 1 (2011): 56.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2011.520877 (accessed 02/04/2013). 73

Henry Farrell and Adrienne Heritier. "International Negotiation and Intraorganizational Power in Shared Decision

Making: Early Agreements Under Codecision and Their Impact on the European Parliament and Council". Comparative

Political Studies 37, no. 10 (2004): 1200. http://cps.sagepub.com/content/37/10/1184.full.pdf+html (accessed

03/04/2013). 74

Christine Mahoney. Brussels versus the Beltway: Advocacy in the United States and the European Union. Washington

DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008.

10

Marshall highlights that more than a third of all amendments that are accepted in the committee

originate from the rapporteur‟s proposal, therefore (s)he is „the single most influential EP actor‟.75

However, rapporteurs have limited resources and are responsible for quite technical aspects of the

legislative process. Therefore, they rely heavily on interest groups to provide them with the

necessary information.76

In the same time, rapporteurs have to be able to critically evaluate and

verify information provided by many different sources in order to credibly fulfil their tasks and

protect their reputation.77

As a consequence, they have a preference for independent expert policy

advice provided by the EP‟s secretariat.78

Neunreither‟s survey illustrates clearly rapporteurs‟ heavy

reliance on the secretariat which provides assistance „beyond technical and procedural questions‟ in

more than 80% of the reports.79

This has led to the flourishing of indirect lobbying targeting the

committee secretariats, the rapporteur‟s primary source for policy information.80

Once the Parliamentary committee adopts its report and gives a mandate to the rapporteur to

negotiate with the Council and the Commission, the rapporteur does not have an obligation to

formally inform anybody about what is going on until the trialogues are concluded and the report is

put to a vote in the plenary. Therefore, when institutions decide to struck a deal through trialogue,

lobbying groups have a significantly limited timeframe and a restricted number of actors to exercise

influence on. A senior partner from g+ (Europe), who has been in EU affairs for more than 20 years,

confirmed the difficulties of lobbying the Parliament once the informal negotiations have begun:

„Well, the lobbying is done before the committee in the EP votes. You have to be in the proposal of

the EP before the trialogues start. Afterwards it‟s very difficult to have an impact. Major condition to

lobby then is good contacts to the rapporteur and sometimes shadow rapporteurs.‟81

75

David Marshall. "Do rapporteurs receive independent expert policy advice? Indirect lobbying via the European

Parliament's committee secretariat". Journal of European Public Policy 19, no. 9 (2012):1379.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2012.662070 (accessed 02/04/2013). 76

Maja Kluger Rasmussen. "Lobbying the European Parliament: A necessary evil". Centre for European Policy Studies.

Policy Paper. no. 242, 10 May 2011. http://www.ceps.eu/book/lobbying-european-parliament-necessary-evil (accessed

03/04/2013). p.2. 77

David Marshall. "Do rapporteurs receive independent expert policy advice? Indirect lobbying via the European

Parliament's committee secretariat". Journal of European Public Policy 19, no. 9 (2012):1383.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2012.662070 (accessed 02/04/2013). 78

Ibid. p.1384. 79

Karlheinz Neunreither. "Elected legislators and their unelected assistants in the European Parliament". The Journal of

Legislative Studies 8, no. 4 (2006):49. http://aei.pitt.edu/7080/ (accessed 18/04/2013). 80

David Marshall. "Do rapporteurs receive independent expert policy advice? Indirect lobbying via the European

Parliament's committee secretariat". Journal of European Public Policy 19, no. 9 (2012):1377.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2012.662070 (accessed 02/04/2013). 81

The author of this paper conducted a telephone interview about lobbying the EU with a partner from g+ europe who

asked to stay anymous. G+ europe is one of the leading public affairs consultancies in Brussels.

11

Consequently, the development of co-decision, which has led to the increased use of informal

negotiations, has created significant hindrances for organised interest to influence later stages of the

policy-making.

Case study: Cosmetics Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009

Case selection and methodology

The Cosmetics Regulation, adopted on the 30th

of November 2009, is chosen as subject of this case

study. This regulation that is characterised as a file of clearly ‟political nature‟ in the ENVI‟s activity

report was, notwithstanding the political pressure, adopted at the Parliament‟s first reading.

Therefore, it is a good example to demonstrate legislators‟ preference for fast-tracking legislation.

The analysis of this Regulation is based on a profound examination of all related documents publicly

available starting with the Commission‟s impact assessment till the final version of the text adopted.

A great emphasis is put on the analysis of the negotiations between the Council and the Parliament

which helps understanding the way a compromise is reached and drawing conclusions about

probable lobbying efforts.

Background

The original Council Directive on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to

cosmetic products82

was adopted in 1976 with the intention of creating a single market for cosmetics.

Over the years, the Directive has been amended 55 times, has became cumbersome and outdated and

therefore does not provide the sufficient legal certainty any more needed for this quickly developing

field.83

As ex-Vice-President Günter Verheugen84

asserted ‟[t]he law on cosmetics is an example

how a piece of EU legislation can be “ripe” for simplification‟.85

The Commission therefore decided to simplify the Cosmetics Directive in the form of a recast as part

of its Lisbon strategy on simplifying the regulatory environment.86

The aim of the Commission was

82

Council Directive 76/768/EEC of 27 July 1976 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to

cosmetic products 83

European Parliament. Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety. "Draft Report on the proposal

for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on cosmetic products (recast) ". (COM(2008)0049 – C6-

0053/2008 – 2008/0035(COD)). http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-

//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-409.426+01+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN (accessed 23/04/2013). 84

Günter Verheugen was European Commissioner for Enterprise and Industry from 2004 to 2010 and one of the five

vice-presidents of the first Barroso Commission. 85

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-07-37_en.htm (accessed 25.04.2013) 86

European Commission. Healt and Consumers. http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/sectors/cosmetics/documents/revision/

(accessed 25.04.2013)

12

to remove legal uncertainties and inconsistencies, to avoid divergences in national transposition and

to increase the safety of cosmetic products placed on the market.87

From the Commission’s proposal to the informal trialogues

Before proposing a new legislation, the Commission engages in public consultation with the relevant

stakeholders. This is the best opportunity for organised interests to express their views and to

influence the Commission‟s plan. In the case of the Cosmetics Regulation, consultation was open

between 12 January and 16 March 2007. During this period, the Commission received input from 72

stakeholders, two-thirds of which came from industry, a quarter from national and regional

authorities and the rest from academics/health professionals, consumers and consumer

organisations.88

The impact assessment – that the Commission carried out based on these contributions –shows that

stakeholders agreed with many proposals of the Commission such as recasting the Directive in form

of a Regulation, including amendments in order to clarify legal terms, strengthening manufacturer‟s

responsibility and in-market control, and introducing the possibility of regulating CMR 1, 2

substances based on an assessment of their actual risk.

The comparison of the final proposal adopted on 5 February 2008 with stakeholder‟s responses

reveal that many of them actually succeeded in influencing the Commission‟s text and making their

views incorporated in the proposal.

Once the Commission tables its amendment, the key players who can influence the game are the

Parliament and the Council. Within the Parliament, it was the Environment, Public Health and Food

Safety Committee (ENVI) chosen responsible for drafting a report for the Plenary. On 26 February

2008 Dagmar Roth-Behrendt89

was appointed as rapporteur and Frédérique Ries90

and Francoise

Grossetête91

as shadow-rapporteurs.92

As explained above, lobbying efforts are done before the

87

Commission of the European Communities. "Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council

on cosmetic products". COM(2008)49 final, 2008/0035 (COD). 05 February 2008. Brussels. http://eur-

lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52008PC0049:EN:NOT (accessed 23/04/2013). 88

Commission of the European Communities. "Impact assessment report on simplification of the “Cosmetics Directive”

– Directive76/768/EEC" (COM(2008)49 final) (SEC(2008)118). 05 February 2008. Brussels. http://eur-

lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52008SC0117:EN:HTML (accessed 23/04/2013). 89

Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament, Germany 90

Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, Belgium 91

Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats), France 92

European Parliament. Legislative Observatory.

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2008/0035(COD)#tab-0 (accessed

23/04/2013).

13

committee in the EP votes. Therefore, organised interest had the possibility to exercise influence on

members of the ENVI Committee and mainly on the rapporteurs from late February until 2

December 2008, day of the vote in committee.

As Earnshaw and Judge assert it is a quite common phenomenon that MEP‟s table identical

amendments and it clearly indicates that MEPs have been successfully lobbied by an interest group.93

In the case of the Cosmetics Regulation, 95 amendments were proposed by ENVI Committee

members. In six cases two amendments were the same and in one additional case two amendments

were nearly identical. Not surprisingly, MEPs who tabled the same amendments were either from the

same country or/and from the same political group. Therefore, one can suppose that those MEPs

were lobbied by the same interest group.

The rapporteur tabled 29 amendments from which 12 were incorporated in the Report without

modification, and 10 additional were incorporated with some minor changes.94

The two shadow

rapporteurs proposed 27 amendments from which 10 were accepted without and 3 with some minor

modifications. All together 125 amendments were tabled from which 57 had been accepted. From the

57 amendments, 22 came from the rapporteur and 13 from the two shadow rapporteurs. Therefore,

35 out of the 57 amendments that were adopted at the Committees‟ vote were initiated by the

rapporteurs. It is quite difficult to trace whether lobbying efforts are behind some of those

amendments, but these figures clearly demonstrate that the rapporteur and the shadow rapporteurs

are the most important figures influencing the Report in the Committee.

Trialogues normally start once the EP Committee has voted and the Council has come to a

partial/full general approach.

The ENVI Committee delivered its vote on 2 December 2008 and tabled its report for plenary on 8

December.95

The report reveals that the ENVI Committee supplemented the Commission‟s proposal

with several new elements. Most importantly, the ENVI added amendments on the definition and

safety of nanomaterials, the fight against counterfeiting, the product information file and on better

labelling. It also strengthened the obligations of distributors, importers and retailers; tightened up the

93

Earnshaw, David and Judge, David. "Relais actors‟ and co-decision first reading agreements in the European

Parliament: the case of the advanced therapies regulation". Journal of European Public Policy 18, no. 1 (2011): 64.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2011.520877 (accessed 02/04/2013). 94

The author means by ‟minor changes‟ modifications which do not modify the substance of the text. Either the order of

the words is changed or some additional words are added that do not modify the core of the original amendment. 95

European Parliament. Legislative Observatory.

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2008/0035(COD)#tab-0 (accessed

23/04/2013).

14

derogation for CMR substances; established a higher level of consumer protection and human health

for products containing nanomaterials; added improvements regarding the claims companies make

for their products, increased Member States‟ obligation on in-market control and added an

amendment to the Annexes regarding the risk not only to human health but to the environment as

well.

As far as the Council is concerned, the Working Party on Technical Harmonisation examined the

Commission‟s proposal 20 occasions during the Slovenian, French, and Czech Presidencies.96

The

debate in the Council took place on 1 December 2008. It was then the new Czech Presidency that

prepared the document reflecting the Council‟s view while taking into account the discussion of the

Working Party and the amendments of the EP. The Council‟s document issued on 11 February 2009,

the subject of which was ‟preparation of an informal trialogue‟, highlights the issues on which the

Council had reservations. Namely the compliance with food law, in-market control, the amendments

on counterfeit products and on supply chain and sub-contractors and on the Commission‟s action in

case of risk to the environment both proposed by the EP.

Even though informal negotiations were already going on, it is officially at its meeting on 4 March

2009 that the COREPER invited the Czech Presidency to negotiate a first reading agreement with the

European Parliament based on the Presidency compromise text adopted on 03 March 2009.97

During

the informal negotiations the Council Presidency modified its proposal several times „in a joint effort

to reach agreement at first reading‟.98

The outcome

The comparison of the Council‟s documents and the ENVI‟s report with the final text clearly shows

how actors came step-by-step to a „well-balanced compromise that takes into account the major

concerns and priorities of both Institutions‟99

.100

96

Council of the European Union. "Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on cosmetic

products (recast) – Preparation of an informal trialogue". Interinstitutional File:2008/0035 (COD). 03 March 2009.

Brussels. http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st07/st07014-ad01.en09.pdf (accessed 23/04/2013). 97

Council of the European Union. "Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on cosmetic

products (recast) – Preparation of an informal trialogue". Interinstitutional File:2008/0035 (COD). 12 March 2009.

Brussels. http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st07/st07014-re01.en09.pdf (accessed 23/04/2013). 98

Council of the European Union. "Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on cosmetic

products (recast) – Preparation of an informal trialogue". Interinstitutional File:2008/0035 (COD). 11 February 2009.

Brussels. http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st06/st06343.en09.pdf (accessed 23/04/2013). 99

Council of the European Union. "Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on cosmetic

products (recast) – Preparation of an informal trialogue". Interinstitutional File:2008/0035 (COD). 12 March 2009.

Brussels. http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st07/st07014-re01.en09.pdf (accessed 23/04/2013). 100

The Parliament successfully pushed for the safety and labelling of nanomaterials and common criteria for product

claims but had to give up its ideas on the risk to the environment and protection against counterfeit products. The Council

15

The vote in the EP took place on 24 March when the Plenary adopted the resolution with 633 votes

in favour, 29 against with 11 abstentions.101

The act was then adopted by a unanimous vote in the

Council on 20 November 2009.102

The outcome of these votes also indicates that a compromise had

already been reached before the plenary debate.

The Cosmetics Regulation is therefore a good example of „fast-track‟ legislation. As the EP adopted

its report early December, institutions had four months to arrive to a compromise through informal

negotiations during which the rapporteur was mandated to negotiate on behalf of the whole Plenary.

Therefore, as the final agreement was reached in quite a short time with a limited number of actors

involved, lobbying groups‟ probably had limited opportunities to exercise influence on the final

outcome.

Conclusion

This essay demonstrated that the development of the co-decision procedure had two significant

consequences. First, it has enhanced the power of the European Parliament which has therefore

become a new target for lobbyists. Second, it has led to the increased use of trialogues by which

institutions aimed to by-pass the cumbersome process of co-decision. As the overwhelming majority

of the legislation now is passed at the first reading of the Parliament, lobbyists have limited

opportunities to influence the outcome. Once the proposal is tabled by the Commission, negotiations

take place behind closed doors with a limited number of actors. Therefore, the development of co-

decision created a new access point for organised interest by empowering the EP but the informal

negotiations that it entailed hamper organised interest‟s possibility to translate this new access into

influence.

The increased use of trialogues not only hampers lobbying efforts but also raises questions of

transparency. Legislators‟ preference for fast-tracking policy-making has entailed a growing amount

of criticism from the Parliament over the past years. Eija-Riitta Korhola, German MEP summarised

succeeded in incorporating its ideas about in-market control and about the use of CMR-substances in cosmetic products

provided they comply with food safety requirements, and also in eliminating the amendments on supply chain and sub-

contractors. 101

European Parliament. "MEPs approve new rules on safer cosmetics." 24 March 2009.

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=en&type=IM-PRESS&reference=20090323IPR52331 102

Council of the European Union. "Voting result − Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the

Council on cosmetic products (recast) (LA) (First reading) - Adoption of the legislative act − 2976th meeting of the

Council of the European Union (Agriculture and Fisheries)" Interinstitutional File:2008/0035 (COD). 20 November

2009. Brussels. http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st16/st16399.en09.pdf (accessed 23/04/2013).

16

very well the problem with trialogues: „[T]he compromises made at first reading during the last

legislative year have very quickly become commonplace, owing to pressures of time. Besides, that

suits the small groups, as the agreements made at the negotiating table make them more powerful

than befits their size. If this practice spreads, however, it will gnaw away at the credibility of

parliamentary democracy in this House.‟103

In the light of the growing number of legislation adopted at first reading, the EP accepted a new rule

last December which aims to make trialogue participants more accountable and the process more

transparent.104

According to the new rules, the rapporteur has to be given a clear mandate, has to

formally share documents with the negotiating team before the trialogues, has to formally report

back and share documents with the responsible committee which then has to approve the deal by a

vote. With the rules of trialogues being more transparent and the documents more available, one can

anticipate better chances for lobbyist to influence later stages of the policy-making process.

103

European Parliament. Debates. Monday, 23 March 2009 – Strasbourg

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20090323&secondRef=ITEM-

015&language=EN&ring=A6-2008-0484 (accessed 24.04.2013) 104

Rule 70, entered into force at the European Parliament plenary session on 10 December 2012: see Annex D of

the Guide to how the European Parliament Co-legislates under the Lisbon Treaty.

17

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http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2008.01835.x/abstract (accessed

03/04/2013).

Shackleton, Michael. "The Politics of Codecision". Journal of Common Market Studies 38, no. 2

(2000):325–342. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-5965.00222/abstract (accessed

03/04/2013).

Shackleton, Michael and Raunio, Tapio. "Codecision since Amsterdam: a laboratory for institutional

innovation and change". Journal of European Public Policy 10 no.2 (2003):171-188.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1350176032000058982 (accessed 03/04/2013).

22

Documents for the case study:

Commission of the European Communities. "Impact assessment report on simplification of the

“Cosmetics Directive” – Directive76/768/EEC" (COM(2008)49 final) (SEC(2008)118). 05 February

2008. Brussels. http://eur-

lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52008SC0117:EN:HTML (accessed

23/04/2013).

Commission of the European Communities. "Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament

and of the Council on cosmetic products". COM(2008)49 final, 2008/0035 (COD). 05 February

2008. Brussels. http://eur-

lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52008PC0049:EN:NOT (accessed

23/04/2013).

Council of the European Union. "Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the

Council on cosmetic products (recast) – Examination of the recast issue". Interinstitutional

File:2008/0035 (COD). 11 December 2008. Brussels.

http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st17/st17106.en08.pdf (accessed 23/04/2013).

Council of the European Union. "Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the

Council on cosmetic products (recast) – Examination of the recasting issue." Interinstitutional

File:2008/0035 (COD). 17 December 2008. Brussels.

http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st17/st17106-re01.en08.pdf (accessed 23/04/2013).

Council of the European Union. "Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the

Council on cosmetic products (recast)". Interinstitutional File:2008/0035 (COD). 29 January 2009.

Brussels. (accessed 23/04/2013).

http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st05/st05895.en09.pdf (accessed 23/04/2013).

Council of the European Union. "Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the

Council on cosmetic products (recast)". Interinstitutional File:2008/0035 (COD). 05 February 2009.

Brussels. (accessed 23/04/2013). http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st05/st05895-

re01.en09.pdf (accessed 23/04/2013).

23

Council of the European Union. "Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the

Council on cosmetic products (recast) – Preparation of an informal trialogue". Interinstitutional

File:2008/0035 (COD). 11 February 2009. Brussels.

http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st06/st06343.en09.pdf (accessed 23/04/2013).

Council of the European Union. "Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the

Council on cosmetic products (recast)". Interinstitutional File:2008/0035 (COD). 11 February 2009.

Brussels. http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st05/st05895-re02.en09.pdf (accessed

23/04/2013).

Council of the European Union. "Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the

Council on cosmetic products (recast)". Interinstitutional File:2008/0035 (COD). 19 February 2009.

Brussels. http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st05/st05895-re03.en09.pdf (accessed

23/04/2013).

Council of the European Union. "Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the

Council on cosmetic products (recast)". Interinstitutional File:2008/0035 (COD). 26 February 2009.

Brussels. http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st06/st06972.en09.pdf (accessed 23/04/2013).

Council of the European Union. "Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the

Council on cosmetic products (recast) – Preparation of an informal trialogue". Interinstitutional

File:2008/0035 (COD). 03 March 2009. Brussels.

http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st07/st07014-ad01.en09.pdf (accessed 23/04/2013).

Council of the European Union. "Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the

Council on cosmetic products (recast)". Interinstitutional File:2008/0035 (COD). 03 March 2009.

Brussels. http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st07/st07014-ad01.en09.pdf (accessed

23/04/2013).

Council of the European Union. "Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the

Council on cosmetic products (recast) – Preparation of an informal trialogue". Interinstitutional

File:2008/0035 (COD). 12 March 2009. Brussels.

http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st07/st07014-re01.en09.pdf (accessed 23/04/2013).

24

Council of the European Union. "Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the

Council on cosmetic products (recast) - Outcome of the European Parliament's first reading

(Strasbourg, 23 to 26 March 2009)". Interinstitutional File:2008/0035 (COD). 02 April 2009.

Brussels. http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st07/st07909.en09.pdf (accessed 23/04/2013).

Council of the European Union. "Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the

Council on cosmetic products (recast) [first reading] – Adoption of the legislative act (LA + D)".

Interinstitutional File:2008/0035 (COD). l3 November 2009. Brussels.

http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st12/st12682.en09.pdf (accessed 23/04/2013).

Council of the European Union. "Voting result − Proposal for a Regulation of the European

Parliament and of the Council on cosmetic products (recast) (LA) (First reading) - Adoption of the

legislative act − 2976th meeting of the Council of the European Union (Agriculture and Fisheries)"

Interinstitutional File:2008/0035 (COD). 20 November 2009. Brussels.

http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st16/st16399.en09.pdf (accessed 23/04/2013).

European Commission. "Explanatory note of the Commission's services regarding transitional

provisions and dates of application of the Cosmetics Regulation." 05 February 2008. Brussels.

http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/sectors/cosmetics/files/doc/cos_transitional_provisions_en.pdf

(accessed 23/04/2013).

European Commission. "Public Consultation Paper on the Simplification of Cosmetics Directive

76/768/EEC". 12 January 2007.

http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/sectors/cosmetics/files/doc/simpl_consult_doc_en.pdf (accessed

23/04/2013).

European Commission. Health and Consumers.

http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/sectors/cosmetics/documents/revision/ (accessed 25.04.2013)

Europa. "Commission moves on with simplification programme in the field of cosmetics." IP/07/37.

12 January 2007. Brussels. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-07-37_en.htm (accessed

23/04/2013).

25

Europa. "New cosmetic regulation to strengthen product safety and to cut red tape". MIP/08/184, 05

February 2008. Brussels. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-08-184_en.htm (accessed

23/04/2013).

European Parliament. "Activity Report of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and

Food Safety 2004-2009 Parliament". 14 July 2009. Brussels.

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/envi/dv/200/200907/20090716_envi

_act_rep_en.pdf (accessed 23/04/2013).

European Parliament. Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety. "Amendments

30 – 125". Draft report (Dagmar Roth-Behrendt) on the proposal for a regulation of the European

Parliament and of the Council on cosmetic products (recast). 22 September 2008. Brussels.

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/am/742/742694/742694en.pdf

(accessed 23/04/2013).

European Parliament. Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety. "Draft Report

on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on cosmetic products

(recast) ". (COM(2008)0049 – C6-0053/2008 – 2008/0035(COD)).

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-

409.426+01+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN (accessed 23/04/2013).

European Parliament. Legislative Observatory.

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2008/0035(COD)

#tab-0 (accessed 23/04/2013).

European Parliament. "MEPs approve new rules on safer cosmetics." 24 March 2009.

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=en&type=IM-

PRESS&reference=20090323IPR52331

Official Journal of the European Union. "Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009 of the European Parliament

and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on cosmetic products". http://eur-

lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32009R1223:EN:NOT (accessed 23/04/2013)