JS S BARRIS TERS RULES · js s barris ters rules ˝˙ ˝ ˇ ˛ ˇ ˇ˘ ... • transamerica life...
Transcript of JS S BARRIS TERS RULES · js s barris ters rules ˝˙ ˝ ˇ ˛ ˇ ˇ˘ ... • transamerica life...
ADVOCACY IS OUR BUSINESS
Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP
JSS BA RRI STERS RULES OCTOBER 2019
Volume 2 Issue 15
Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP is pleased to provide summaries of recent Court Decisions which consider the Alberta Rules of Court. Our website, www.jssbarristers.ca, also features a Cumulative Summary of Court Decisions which consider the Alberta Rules of Court. The Cumulative Summary is organized by the Rule considered.
Below is a list of the Rules (and corresponding decisions which apply or interpret those Rules) that are addressed in the case summaries that follow.
1.2 • BECKVARRESCAPITALINC,2019ABQB523
• WOODBRIDGEHOMESINCVANDREWS,2019ABQB585
• METISNATIONOFALBERTAASSOCIATIONLOCALCOUNCIL#63VALBERTA(CORPORATEREGISTRY),
2019ABQB614
• TIGERCALCIUMSERVICESINCVSAZWAN,2019ABQB623
• SCHREIBERVCANADA(ATTORNEYGENERAL),2019ABQB641
• ANCTIMBERLTDVALBERTA(MINISTEROFAGRICULTUREANDFORESTRY),2019ABQB653
• TIGERCALCIUMSERVICESINCVSAZWAN,2019ABQB665
• REYESVDYCK,2019ABQB667
• TRANSAMERICALIFECANADAVOAKWOODASSOCIATESADVISORYGROUPLTD,2019ABCA276
1.4 • BECKVARRESCAPITALINC,2019ABQB523
• TIGERCALCIUMSERVICESINCVSAZWAN,2019ABQB623
• SCHREIBERVCANADA(ATTORNEYGENERAL),2019ABQB641
1.5 • ATBFINANCIALVCOREDENTPARTNERSHIP,2019ABQB680
• CWCWELLSERVICESCORPVOPTIONINDUSTRIESINC,2019ABCA331
2.6 • CLARKBUILDERSANDSTANTECCONSULTINGLTDVGOCOMMUNITYCENTRE,2019ABQB706
2.10 • ALBERTAUNIONOFPROVINCIALEMPLOYEESVALBERTA,2019ABQB553
2.22 • UBAHVCANADIANNATURALRESOURCESLIMITED,2019ABQB692
2.23 • UBAHVCANADIANNATURALRESOURCESLIMITED,2019ABQB692
3.2 • TIGERCALCIUMSERVICESINCVSAZWAN,2019ABQB623
3.15 • HAZKARDEVELOPMENTSINCVCOCHRANE(TOWN),2019ABQB552
• LEAVITTVCANADIANCOUNCILOFINDEPENDENTLABORATORIES,2019ABQB589
• IRVINEVKRISTENSEN,2019ABQB607
• METISNATIONOFALBERTAASSOCIATIONLOCALCOUNCIL#63VALBERTA(CORPORATEREGISTRY),
2019ABQB614
• ALBERTA’SFREEROAMINGHORSESSOCIETYVALBERTA,2019ABQB714
3.16 • ALBERTA’SFREEROAMINGHORSESSOCIETYVALBERTA,2019ABQB714
3.22 • ALLERGANINCVALBERTA(JUSTICEANDSOLICITORGENERAL),2019ABQB610
• ALBERTA’SFREEROAMINGHORSESSOCIETYVALBERTA,2019ABQB714
3.23 • MBBVALBERTA(CHILDANDFAMILYSERVICES),2019ABQB621
• ANCTIMBERLTDVALBERTA(MINISTEROFAGRICULTUREANDFORESTRY),2019ABQB710
3.26 • REYESVDYCK,2019ABQB667
ADVOCACY IS OUR BUSINESS 2
JSS BARR IST E RS RULES
Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP
3.27 • MACLEODVTRIBECAINNERCITYCUSTOMHOMESINC,2019ABQB524
• REYESVDYCK,2019ABQB667
3.30 • BROWNVBLISS,2019ABQB530
3.31 • BECKVARRESCAPITALINC,2019ABQB523
3.45 • BODNARCAPITALCORPORATION(301831ALBERTALTD)VSYNERGYPROJECTSLTD,
2019ABQB528
3.62 • SWEETLANDVMACINNIS,2019ABQB736
3.65 • WOODBRIDGEHOMESINCVANDREWS,2019ABQB585
• HUFFVZUK,2019ABQB691
• SWEETLANDVMACINNIS,2019ABQB736
3.68 • RDXTECHNOLOGIESCORPORATIONVAPPEL,2019ABQB477
• OUELLETTEVLAWSOCIETYOFALBERTA,2019ABQB492
• HUGHESVSTEWART,2019ABQB494
• DEVINEVALBERTASUPPORTS,2019ABQB502
• BILEYVINTERNATIONALALLIANCEOFTHEATRICALSTAGEEMPLOYEES,2019ABQB506
• PEETSVALBERTA(JUSTICE&SOLICITORGENERAL),2019ABQB507
• LAIRDVALBERTA(TRANSPORTATIONSAFETYBOARD),2019ABQB567
• DEVINEVALBERTASUPPORTS,2019ABQB568
• KNAKEVPERERA,2019ABQB581
• IRVINEVKRISTENSEN,2019ABQB607
• METISNATIONOFALBERTAASSOCIATIONLOCALCOUNCIL#63VALBERTA(CORPORATEREGISTRY),
2019ABQB614
• YAREMKEVICHVJACULA,2019ABQB620
• BAHADARVREALESTATECOUNCILOFALBERTA,2019ABQB633
• SMITHVCANADA(CORRECTIONALSERVICECANADA),2019ABQB639
• GACIASVEQUIFAXCANADACO,2019ABQB640
• ANCTIMBERLTDVALBERTA(MINISTEROFAGRICULTUREANDFORESTRY),2019ABQB653
• ATBFINANCIALVCOREDENTPARTNERSHIP,2019ABQB680
• UBAHVCANADIANNATURALRESOURCESLIMITED,2019ABQB692
• BELCZOWSKIVREID,2019ABQB709
• ORRVALOOK,2019ABQB713
• KOZINAVREDLICK,2019ABQB749
3.69 • BROWNVBLISS,2019ABQB530
3.74 • SWEETLANDVMACINNIS,2019ABQB736
• HEVAPEGAAPPEALBOARD,2019ABCA298
3.75 • HAZKARDEVELOPMENTSINCVCOCHRANE(TOWN),2019ABQB552
• LEAVITTVCANADIANCOUNCILOFINDEPENDENTLABORATORIES,2019ABQB589
4.1 • BECKVARRESCAPITALINC,2019ABQB523
• TRANSAMERICALIFECANADAVOAKWOODASSOCIATESADVISORYGROUPLTD,2019ABCA276
4.2 • BECKVARRESCAPITALINC,2019ABQB523
• TRANSAMERICALIFECANADAVOAKWOODASSOCIATESADVISORYGROUPLTD,2019ABCA276
3
OCTOBER 2019
Volume 2 Issue 15
www.jssbarristers.ca
4.22 • HLFNINDUSTRYRELATIONSCORPORATIONVHORSEMAN,2019ABQB564
• ATBFINANCIALVCOREDENTPARTNERSHIP,2019ABQB680
• RDXTECHNOLOGIESCORPORATIONVAPPEL,2019ABCA338
4.29 • FJNVJK,2019ABCA305
• LAYVLAY,2019ABCA355
4.31 • LAUGHRENVMCALEER,2019ABQB501
• BECKVARRESCAPITALINC,2019ABQB523
• EDGARVSECURITYNATIONALINSURANCECOMPANY,2019ABQB628
• ALSTONVHAYWOODSECURITIESINC,2019ABQB634
• SCHREIBERVCANADA(ATTORNEYGENERAL),2019ABQB641
• NAHALVGOTTLIEB,2019ABQB650
• KENSINGTONMASTERBUILDERSINCVKRUGER,2019ABQB661
• TIGERCALCIUMSERVICESINCVSAZWAN,2019ABQB665
• TRANSAMERICALIFECANADAVOAKWOODASSOCIATESADVISORYGROUPLTD,2019ABCA276
• CWCWELLSERVICESCORPVOPTIONINDUSTRIESINC,2019ABCA331
4.33 • LAUGHRENVMCALEER,2019ABQB501
• BECKVARRESCAPITALINC,2019ABQB523
• ALSTONVHAYWOODSECURITIESINC,2019ABQB634
• SCHREIBERVCANADA(ATTORNEYGENERAL),2019ABQB641
• NAHALVGOTTLIEB,2019ABQB650
• ROYALBANKOFCANADAVJ&SENGINEERINGSOLUTIONSINC,2019ABQB693
• WIEBEVWEINRICHCONTRACTINGLTD,2019ABCA323
• CWCWELLSERVICESCORPVOPTIONINDUSTRIESINC,2019ABCA331
5.2 • TIGERCALCIUMSERVICESINCVSAZWAN,2019ABQB500
• RIEGERVPLAINSMIDSTREAMCANADAULC,2019ABQB666
• PEMBINAPIPELINECORPORATIONVCONEY,2019ABQB699
5.6 • CHARUKVTERRAVESTINDUSTRIESLIMITEDPARTNERSHIP,2019ABQB747
5.7 • CHARUKVTERRAVESTINDUSTRIESLIMITEDPARTNERSHIP,2019ABQB747
5.10 • WOODBRIDGEHOMESINCVANDREWS,2019ABQB585
5.12 • ARCHERVRIBBONCOMMUNICATIONSCANADAULC,2019ABQB481
5.13 • TIGERCALCIUMSERVICESINCVSAZWAN,2019ABQB500
5.17 • RIEGERVPLAINSMIDSTREAMCANADAULC,2019ABQB666
5.19 • PEMBINAPIPELINECORPORATIONVCONEY,2019ABQB699
5.25 • RIEGERVPLAINSMIDSTREAMCANADAULC,2019ABQB666
• PEMBINAPIPELINECORPORATIONVCONEY,2019ABQB699
5.30 • RIEGERVPLAINSMIDSTREAMCANADAULC,2019ABQB666
6.3 • ATHWALVMATHER,2019ABQB676
6.7 • RIEGERVPLAINSMIDSTREAMCANADAULC,2019ABQB666
6.11 • ANCTIMBERLTDVALBERTA(MINISTEROFAGRICULTUREANDFORESTRY),2019ABQB653
ADVOCACY IS OUR BUSINESS 4
JSS BARR IST E RS RULES
Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP
6.14 • P&CLAWFIRMMANAGEMENTINCVSABOURIN,2019ABQB537
• OWNERS:CONDOMINIUMPLANNO7721985VBREAKWELL,2019ABQB674
• CLARKBUILDERSANDSTANTECCONSULTINGLTDVGOCOMMUNITYCENTRE,2019ABQB706
• CHARUKVTERRAVESTINDUSTRIESLIMITEDPARTNERSHIP,2019ABQB747
6.28 • TIGERCALCIUMSERVICESINCVSAZWAN,2019ABQB500
6.31 • CHEMTRADEELECTROCHEMINCVSTIKEMANELLIOTTLLP,2019ABQB562
6.32 • TIGERCALCIUMSERVICESINCVSAZWAN,2019ABQB500
• CHEMTRADEELECTROCHEMINCVSTIKEMANELLIOTTLLP,2019ABQB562
• ATHWALVMATHER,2019ABQB676
6.34 • CHEMTRADEELECTROCHEMINCVSTIKEMANELLIOTTLLP,2019ABQB562
7.3 • P&CLAWFIRMMANAGEMENTINCVSABOURIN,2019ABQB537
• KENSINGTONMASTERBUILDERSINCVKRUGER,2019ABQB661
• OWNERS:CONDOMINIUMPLANNO7721985VBREAKWELL,2019ABQB674
• ATBFINANCIALVCOREDENTPARTNERSHIP,2019ABQB680
• UBAHVCANADIANNATURALRESOURCESLIMITED,2019ABQB692
• CLARKBUILDERSANDSTANTECCONSULTINGLTDVGOCOMMUNITYCENTRE,2019ABQB706
• KOZINAVREDLICK,2019ABQB749
7.9 • ARNDTVSCANDINAVIANCULTURALSOCIETYOFCALGARY,2019ABQB475
8.7 • NAHALVGOTTLIEB,2019ABQB650
9.4 • HUGHESVSTEWART,2019ABQB494
• BILEYVINTERNATIONALALLIANCEOFTHEATRICALSTAGEEMPLOYEES,2019ABQB506
• PEETSVALBERTA(JUSTICE&SOLICITORGENERAL),2019ABQB507
• DEVINEVALBERTASUPPORTS,2019ABQB568
• YAREMKEVICHVJACULA,2019ABQB620
• GACIASVEQUIFAXCANADACO,2019ABQB640
• UBAHVCANADIANNATURALRESOURCESLIMITED,2019ABQB692
• BELCZOWSKIVREID,2019ABQB709
9.13 • MAKVTJK,2019ABQB547
• 1905393ALBERTALTDVSERVUSCREDITUNIONLTD,2019ABCA269
9.15 • HAMMONDVHAMMOND,2019ABQB522
10.2 • WALSHVSTEPHENMKHOPEPROFESSIONALCORPORATION,2019ABQB516
10.7 • WALSHVSTEPHENMKHOPEPROFESSIONALCORPORATION,2019ABQB516
10.9 • WALSHVSTEPHENMKHOPEPROFESSIONALCORPORATION,2019ABQB516
10.10 • P&CLAWFIRMMANAGEMENTINCVSABOURIN,2019ABQB537
10.18 • WALSHVSTEPHENMKHOPEPROFESSIONALCORPORATION,2019ABQB516
5
OCTOBER 2019
Volume 2 Issue 15
www.jssbarristers.ca
10.29 • STACKARDV1256009ALBERTALTD,2019ABQB480
• BILEYVINTERNATIONALALLIANCEOFTHEATRICALSTAGEEMPLOYEES,2019ABQB506
• DEVINEVALBERTASUPPORTS,2019ABQB568
• CALLAWAYVOFFICEOFTHEELECTIONCOMMISSIONER(ALBERTA),2019ABQB573
• STEERVCHICAGOTITLEINSURANCECOMPANY,2019ABQB670
• MANSONINSULTATIONPRODUCTSLTDVCROSSROADSC&IDISTRIBUTORS,2019ABQB684
10.30 • LAYVLAY,2019ABCA355
10.31 • CALLAWAYVOFFICEOFTHEELECTIONCOMMISSIONER(ALBERTA),2019ABQB573
• STEERVCHICAGOTITLEINSURANCECOMPANY,2019ABQB670
• MANSONINSULTATIONPRODUCTSLTDVCROSSROADSC&IDISTRIBUTORS,2019ABQB684
10.33 • STACKARDV1256009ALBERTALTD,2019ABQB480
• CHEMTRADEELECTROCHEMINCVSTIKEMANELLIOTTLLP,2019ABQB562
• CALLAWAYVOFFICEOFTHEELECTIONCOMMISSIONER(ALBERTA),2019ABQB573
• STEERVCHICAGOTITLEINSURANCECOMPANY,2019ABQB670
• MANSONINSULTATIONPRODUCTSLTDVCROSSROADSC&IDISTRIBUTORS,2019ABQB684
10.44 • ALBERTAHEALTHSERVICESVWANG,2019ABCA328
• LAYVLAY,2019ABCA355
10.45 • ALBERTAHEALTHSERVICESVWANG,2019ABCA328
11.21 • ARCHERVRIBBONCOMMUNICATIONSCANADAULC,2019ABQB481
11.25 • BROWNVBLISS,2019ABQB530
11.27 • REYESVDYCK,2019ABQB667
11.31 • BROWNVBLISS,2019ABQB530
12.49 • STALZER(ESTATE)VSTALZER,2019ABQB658
13.4 • SLAWSKYVEDMONTON(CITY),2019ABCA302
13.5 • ALBERTA’SFREEROAMINGHORSESSOCIETYVALBERTA,2019ABQB714
• LAYVLAY,2019ABCA355
13.6 • STALZER(ESTATE)VSTALZER,2019ABQB658
• KENTVMACDONALD,2019ABQB669
• CLARKBUILDERSANDSTANTECCONSULTINGLTDVGOCOMMUNITYCENTRE,2019ABQB706
13.7 • KENTVMACDONALD,2019ABQB669
• HUFFVZUK,2019ABQB691
• BELCZOWSKIVREID,2019ABQB709
13.8 • BECKVARRESCAPITALINC,2019ABQB523
13.18 • ANCTIMBERLTDVALBERTA(MINISTEROFAGRICULTUREANDFORESTRY),2019ABQB653
• REYESVDYCK,2019ABQB667
• ATHWALVMATHER,2019ABQB676
• CLARKBUILDERSANDSTANTECCONSULTINGLTDVGOCOMMUNITYCENTRE,2019ABQB706
14.4 • KAUFMANNVEDMONTON(CITY)POLICESERVICE,2019ABCA272
• SANTOROVBANKOFMONTREAL,2019ABCA322
ADVOCACY IS OUR BUSINESS 6
JSS BARR IST E RS RULES
Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP
14.5 • UBAHVCANADIANNATURALRESOURCESLIMITED,2019ABQB692
• RANAVRANA,2019ABCA278
• ALANENVELLIOTT,2019ABCA290
• SRGTAKAMIYACOLTDV58376ALBERTALTD,2019ABCA301
• ALBERTAHEALTHSERVICESVWANG,2019ABCA328
• MAKISVCOLLEGEOFPHYSICIANSANDSURGEONSOFALBERTA(COMPLAINTREVIEWCOMMITTEE),
2019ABCA341
• LAYVLAY,2019ABCA355
14.8 • RANAVRANA,2019ABCA278
• SLAWSKYVEDMONTON(CITY),2019ABCA302
14.32 • SANTOROVBANKOFMONTREAL,2019ABCA322
14.36 • SLAWSKYVEDMONTON(CITY),2019ABCA302
14.37 • 1905393ALBERTALTDVSERVUSCREDITUNIONLTD,2019ABCA269
• SLAWSKYVEDMONTON(CITY),2019ABCA302
14.47 • TEMPLANZAVFORD,2019ABCA309
14.57 • HEVAPEGAAPPEALBOARD,2019ABCA298
14.59 • BRUENVUNIVERSITYOFCALGARY,2019ABCA275
• LAYVLAY,2019ABCA355
14.67 • RDXTECHNOLOGIESCORPORATIONVAPPEL,2019ABCA338
14.88 • BRUENVUNIVERSITYOFCALGARY,2019ABCA275
• FJNVJK,2019ABCA305
• LAYVLAY,2019ABCA355
15.5 • WALSHVSTEPHENMKHOPEPROFESSIONALCORPORATION,2019ABQB516
15.6 • SCHREIBERVCANADA(ATTORNEYGENERAL),2019ABQB641
SCHEDULE C • BILEYVINTERNATIONALALLIANCEOFTHEATRICALSTAGEEMPLOYEES,2019ABQB506
• MANSONINSULTATIONPRODUCTSLTDVCROSSROADSC&IDISTRIBUTORS,2019ABQB684
• FJNVJK,2019ABCA305
BECK V ARRES CAPITAL INC, 2019 ABQB 523 (MASTER PROWSE) Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules), 1.4 (Procedural Orders), 3.31 (Statement of Defence), 4.1 (Responsibility of Parties to Manage Litigation), 4.2 (What the Responsibility Includes), 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay), 4.33 (Dismissal for Long Delay) and 13.8 (Pleadings: Other Contents)
TheDefendantsappliedtodismisstheActionforlongdelay
pursuanttoRules4.31and4.33.ThePlaintiffs’Statement
ofClaimwasfiledinMayof2013.TheDefendantshad
neverfiledaStatementofDefence,buthadrespondedto
andbeeninvolvedinvariousApplicationsintheAction
andinrelatedActions,includingarelatedforeclosure
Actionandinsolvencyproceedingsrespectingoneofthe
Defendants.
RegardingdismissalfordelaypursuanttoRule4.33,
MasterProwsefoundthattheDefendantshadcontinued
toparticipateintheActionatthesametimethattheyhad
filedandpreparedfortheirdismissalApplication.Assuch,
theMasterheldthattheActionshouldnotbedismissed
onaccountofRule4.33(2)(b),whichstatesthattheCourt
mustdismissanActioniftherehasbeenover3yearsof
delayunless“anapplicationhasbeenfiledorproceedings
7
OCTOBER 2019
Volume 2 Issue 15
www.jssbarristers.ca
havebeentakensincethedelayandtheapplicanthas
participatedinthemforapurposeandtotheextentthat,in
theopinionoftheCourt,warrantstheactioncontinuing”.
RegardingtheDefendants’Applicationtodismissthe
ActionforprejudicialdelaypursuanttoRule4.31,Master
Prowsefoundthat“relevantevents[had]continuedtooccur
subsequenttotheinitialflurryofactivityfrommid-2013
toearly2014”,includingoneoftheDefendantsbeingput
intoreceivershipin2015andintobankruptcyin2017,and
anotheroftheDefendantsbeingstruckfromthecorporate
registryforaperiodoftime.Asaresult,therelevantfactsin
theActiondidnotalloccurpriortothefilingoftheStatement
ofClaimin2013andthengostale:theycontinuedasthe
Actioncontinued.MasterProwsenotedthatpursuanttoRule
13.8(1),eventsoccurringaftertheStatementofClaimwas
filedmayberelevanttoincludeinpleadings.
MasterProwsealsonotedthatpursuanttoRule1.2(3)
(a),thepartiesaretomanagethelitigationquicklyand
economically.Further,Rule4.1statesthattheparties
areresponsibleformanagingtheirdispute,andRule4.2
requiresthemtorespond“inasubstantivewayandwithin
areasonabletimetoanyproposalfortheconductofan
action”.GiventhattheDefendantshadwaited6yearsto
fileaStatementofDefence,whenRule3.31(3)(a)says
theyshoulddosowithin20days,MasterProwsefoundthat
theDefendantshadnotmettheirobligationtomovethe
matterforward,andalsoheldthattheyhadnotestablished
significantprejudiceasaresultofdelaysintheAction.The
Rule4.31Applicationwasaccordinglyalsodismissed.
Finally,MasterProwseaddressedadisputebetweenthe
partiesrespectingtheDefendantmortgageadministrator
trustee’sfees,whichwasnotcurrentlypartoftheAction.
MasterProwsenotedandthatpursuanttoRule1.2,the
Rulesshouldbeusedtoidentifyissuesindisputeand
facilitatethequickestmeansofresolvingthem;and
pursuanttoRule1.4,theCourtmaymakeOrdersand
directionstoimplementthepurposeoftheRules.Assuch,
MasterProwsedirectedthepartiesto“considerandcome
forwardwithproposalsastohowtoadjudicatethefees
issueinthequickestwayattheleastexpense”pursuantto
Rule1.4.
WOODBRIDGE HOMES INC V ANDREWS, 2019 ABQB 585 (MANDZIUK J)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules), 3.65 (Permission of Court to Amendment Before or After Close of Pleadings) and 5.10 (Subsequent Disclosure of Records)
Thiscaseinvolvedadisputeoverpaymentforservicesand
materialsprovidedfortheconstructionofamodularhome.
TheCourt’sconsiderationoftheRulesinitsDecisionwas
largelyconfinedtothepreliminarymatterofamending
pleadings.
ThePlaintiffarguedatTrialthattheDefendanthadbeen
unjustlyenrichedbyconstructionservicesandmaterialsit
hadfurnishedtotheDefendant.TheDefendantrebutted
thisallegationbyarguingthattherewasa“donative
intent”withrespecttotheservicesandmaterialsprovided,
whichisajuristicreasonforanyenrichment.ThePlaintiff
counteredbypointingoutthattheDefendanthadnotpled
donativeintentorlegitimateexpectationsinitsStatement
ofDefencewhichpromptedtheDefendanttopointoutthat
thePlaintiffhadalsoneglectedtopleadunjustenrichment
initsStatementofClaim.Thepartiesbothsoughttoamend
theirpleadingstoincludetheseclaims.
TheCourtdecidedthatitwouldadjudicateonallofthe
mattersandargumentsraisedregardlessofwhetherthey
hadbeenincludedinthepleadings.TheCourtstatedthat
thisapproachisconsistentwiththespiritofRule1.2to
facilitateproceedingsinajustandcost-effectiveway.
Moreover,theCourtconfirmedthatRule3.65allowsthe
Courttoacceptamendmentstopleadingsregardlessof
theirlateness,subjecttofourexceptions:wheredoingso
wouldcauseapartyprejudicenotcompensablewithCosts;
whereanamendmentis“hopeless”;wheretheamendment
seekstoaddapartyorcauseofactionaftertheexpiryofa
limitationperiod;orwherethereisanelementofbadfaith
associatedwiththeamendment.Noneoftheseexceptions
appliedtoanyoftheamendmentssoughtbyeitherparty.
Therefore,alloftheamendmentswereallowed.
Afterdecidingonthemeritsofthecase,theCourt
addressedtheissueofCosts.AttheoutsetofTrial,the
CourtwasadvisedthatthePlaintiffhadfailedtoproduce
ADVOCACY IS OUR BUSINESS 8
JSS BARR IST E RS RULES
Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP
sought.LocalCouncil#63wasabletomeetthistest,and
HoJ.determinedthatdeclaratoryreliefwassuitablein
thiscase.
AstheRegistrarhadsuspendedLocalCouncil#63
pendingadeclarationfromtheCourtastothevalidity
ofthedissolution,HoJ.determinedthattheOriginating
Applicationwasanappropriatemethodtoobtainresolution
ofthisissue.TheCourtfoundthatRule1.2supportedthis
methodofresolutionasitwas“themosttimelyandcost-
effectivewaytoprovidetheRegistrarwithdirection.”
TheApplicationunderRule3.68tostriketheOriginating
Applicationwasdismissed.
TIGER CALCIUM SERVICES INC V SAZWAN, 2019 ABQB 623 (SHELLEY J)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules), 1.4 (Procedural Orders) and 3.2 (How to Start an Action)
TheApplicantsoughtanassessmentofdamagesresulting
fromthegrantingandexecutionofinjunctiveandAnton
PillerreliefwhichwasoverturnedonAppeal.Notingfactual
disputesandcredibilityissues,theRespondentscross-
appliedtohavetheassessmentofdamagesconvertedintoa
separateAction,pursuanttoRule3.2(6).
TheCourtrecognizedthediscretionavailabletoitin
controllingitsownprocess,asmanifestedthroughthe
widearrayofproceduralOrdersauthorizedunderRule1.4,
andthebreadthofthedirectiveinRule1.2“toprovidea
meansbywhichclaimscanbefairlyandjustlyresolved
inorbyacourtprocessinatimelyandcost-effective
way”.Inexercisingthatdiscretion,theCourtdeclinedto
directthattheApplicationbeheardbywayofaseparate
Action.AstheexistingActionhadbeendiscontinued
againsttheApplicant,theApplicant“shouldnotbeput
throughtheexpense,time,andenergyrequiredofafull
action.”JusticeShelleyfoundthatthefactualdisputesand
credibilityissuescouldberesolvedbyCourtdirectionshort
ofcompellingaseparateActionandsetoutaprocesstobe
followedinarrivingatthosedirections.
some250pagesofrelevantrecordswhichresultedinextra
TrialtimeandinconveniencefortheDefendant’scounsel.
TheCourtreiteratedthatRule5.10requirespartiesto
continuouslydiscloserelevantandmaterialrecordsevenif
theyarediscoveredorcreatedafteranAffidavitofRecords.
TheCourtthereforeawarded$1,000inCoststothe
Defendantforthelatedisclosurewhileotherwiserequiring
thepartiestobeartheirownCostsbecausetherewas
mixed-successonthemeritsoftheAction.
METIS NATION OF ALBERTA ASSOCIATION LOCAL COUNCIL #63 V ALBERTA (CORPORATE REGISTRY), 2019 ABQB 614 (HO J)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules), 3.15 (Originating Application for Judicial Review) and 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies)
TheMetisNationofAlbertaAssociation(“MNAA”)was
registeredasanon-profitsociety.LocalCouncil#63was
arelated,incorporatedsociety.Duetotheformationofan
alternativeMetisassociationinthearea,themembersof
LocalCouncil#63actedtodissolveLocalCouncil#63.
MNAAdisputedthedissolution,sendingnoticetothe
Registrarthatthedissolutionwasexecutedinaccurately.
Inresponse,theRegistrarsuspendedLocalCouncil#63,
pendingadeclarationbyCourtOrderastothevalidityof
thedissolution.TheDirectorsofLocalCouncil#63then
filedanOriginatingApplicationunderRule3.15toobtain
theCourtOrderrequiredbytheRegistrar.
MNAAthenmadeanApplicationpursuanttoRule3.68to
striketheOriginatingApplication.
MadamJusticeHofoundthatthedirectorsofLocalCouncil
#63hadstandingtobringtheOriginatingApplication.The
directorsweremembersanddirectorsatthetimeofthe
attempteddissolutionandhadamaterialinterestanddirect
stakeintheissue.Further,HoJ.notedthattheCourthas
absolutediscretiontodecidewhethertograntdeclaratory
relief.DeclaratoryreliefmaybegrantedwheretheCourt
hasjurisdiction,thedisputeisrealandnottheoretical,the
Applicanthasagenuineinterestinthedispute,andthe
Respondenthasaninterestinopposingthedeclaration
9
OCTOBER 2019
Volume 2 Issue 15
www.jssbarristers.ca
dismissalunderRule4.33.Schreiberarguedthat
dismissingtheActionwouldoffendhisrighttodueprocess
whichhealsoarguediscodifiedintheRules,asRule1.4
allowstheCourttosetasideanyprocessmandatedbythe
Rulesthatisanabuseofprocess.
TheCourtrejectedSchreiber’sarguments,reiteratingagain
thatRule4.33ismandatoryafterthreeormoreyears
havepassedwithoutasignificantadvance.TheCourt’s
assessmentunderRule4.33doesnotincludeaninquiry
intoprejudiceorthereasonforthedelay.Theobligationis
onthePlaintifftoadvancetheActionandtheDefendantis
undernoobligationtoassistwiththatapartfromrefraining
fromdeliberatelyobstructingtheprocess.ItwasSchreiber’s
responsibilitytoeitheradvancetheActionortoobtainan
agreementoraCourtOrdersuspendingthepassageoftime.
Schreiberhaddoneneitherofthesethings,andtherefore,
theCourtdismissedtheActionpursuanttoRule4.33.
ANC TIMBER LTD V ALBERTA (MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY), 2019 ABQB 653 (TOPOLNISKI J) Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules), 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies), 6.11 (Evidence at Application Hearings) and 13.18 (Types of Affidavit)
TheApplicant,theMinisterofAgricultureandForestry(the
“Minister”),soughtanOrderstrikingportionsofandentire
AffidavitsfiledinsupportofANCTimberLtd.’s(“ANC”)
intheunderlyingmotionforaninteriminjunctionand/or
interimstayofaforestrydirective(the“Directive”).The
DirectiveprimarilyconcernedrestrictionsonANC’sability
toharvesttimberunderthetermsofaforestmanagement
agreement(“FMA”).Afteranunsuccessfulbidtoobtain
regulatoryapprovaltoharvesttreesinanareacontemplated
bytheFMA,butprohibitedbytheDirective,ANCfileda
motionseekingtheabovenotedrelief(the“Underlying
Motion”).
ANCinitiallyreliedonvoluminousAffidavits,totalling
1576pages,intheUnderlyingMotion(the“Affidavits”).
TheMinisterrespondedwithamotiontostrikesome
43paragraphsoftheAffidavitsaswellasnumerous
SCHREIBER V CANADA (ATTORNEY GENERAL), 2019 ABQB 641 (MASTER BIRKETT)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules), 1.4 (Procedural Orders), 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay), 4.33 (Dismissal for Long Delay) and 15.6 (Resolution of Difficulty or Doubt)
ThePlaintiffinthisAction,Schreiber,attemptedto
resumetheActionfollowinghisextraditionfromCanada
andimprisonmentinGermanyforaperiodofyears.The
DefendantAttorneyGeneralthenappliedtodismissthe
ActionduetodelaypursuanttoRule4.33or,inthe
alternative,Rule4.31.Schreiberrespondedbyarguingthat
heshouldnotbeheldresponsiblefordelayresultingfrom
hisimprisonmentandthatdoingsowouldinterferewithhis
Charterrighttodueprocess.
TheCourtbeganbyconfirmingthatthedelayRulesmust
bereadinconjunctionwithRule1.2whichstatesthatthe
purposeoftheRulesistoprovidefairandjustresolutions
inatimelyandcost-effectivemanner.Moreover,theCourt
notedthatthisActionstraddledthetransitionfromthe
oldRulestothenewRules,andthatRule15.6allowsthe
Courttosuspendormodifytheapplicabilityofthecurrent
Rulestoavoidanunduedifficultyorinjusticearisingfrom
thetransition.However,theCourtalsonotedthatthe
now-expiredtransitionalRule15.4clarifiedthatthedelay
periodforActionspredatingthecurrentRuleswouldbe
eitherthreeyearsfromthecomingintoforceofthecurrent
Rules,orfiveyearsaspreviouslystatedintheformerRules,
whicheveroccurredfirst.Therefore,Schreiberhadthree
yearsfromthecomingintoforceofthecurrentRulesto
advancetheActioneveniftherehadbeenapreviousdelay
notexceedingafurthertwoyears.
Rule4.33requiresaCourttodismissanActionthathas
notbeensignificantlyadvancedforthreeormoreyears,
andinthiscasebothpartiesconcededthatadelayofmore
thanthreeyearshadoccurred.Therefore,therewasno
needfortheCourttoconsiderRule4.31whichallowsthe
CourttodismissanActionfordelayofanunspecificperiod
wherethedelayhascausedsignificantprejudice.Thekey
issuefortheCourttodeterminewaswhetherSchreiber’s
incarcerationamountedtoanexceptiontomandatory
ADVOCACY IS OUR BUSINESS 10
JSS BARR IST E RS RULES
Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP
exhibitsonthegroundsthattheevidencewasirrelevant,
unnecessary,hearsay,argument,conclusoryand/or
expertopinionevidence.Thecontestedexhibitsincluded
numerousthird-partyreports,newspaperarticles,maps,
andsomesummariespreparedbyunidentifiedsources
(the“ContestedEvidence”).TopolniskiJ.foundthatthe
overarchingissuewaswhethertheContestedEvidencewas
properlyadmissibleevidence,orwhetheritshouldbestruck
underRule3.68(4)(a).
JusticeTopolniskinotedagrowingtrendoflitigants
conductingresearchontheinternetandattaching“what
spewsforthtoanaffidavitwithoutregardtoitspropriety.”
Accordingly,HerLadyshippromptlydissuadedlitigantsof
anynotionthatthisconductwasappropriateorhelpful.
TopolniskiJ.reviewedRule13.18andfoundthatwhile
typicallyAffidavitsmustbeswornonthebasisofpersonal
information,theRulesdoallowforhearsayevidenceifit
isaccompaniedbyastatementprovidingthesourceof
theevidenceandthedeponent’sbeliefinitstruth.Her
LadyshipnotedthoughthattheCourtisnotmandatedto
acceptsuchevidence.
TurningtotheargumentofwhethertheContestedEvidence
wasexpertopinionevidence,TopolniskiJ.founditwas
tritelawthatexpertevidenceispermissibleoninterim
motionsandidentifiedRule6.11asspecificallyallowing
expertevidenceinAffidavitform.Indeterminingwhether
toaccepttheevidence,JusticeTopolniskithoroughly
reviewedtheseminalfactorsinR v Mohan,[1994]2SCR
9andconcludedthatthebenefitofadmittingsomeofthe
ContestedEvidenceoutweigheditscost.
Accordingly,incompliancewiththefoundationalRule1.2
forexpedientandcost-effectivehearings,JusticeTopolniski
struckseveralparagraphsandexhibitswithintheContested
Evidenceforbeingargumentative,conclusory,irrelevant,
and/orexpertopinionevidencewhileallowingsomeofthe
evidencetoremaininsupportoftheUnderlyingMotion.
TIGER CALCIUM SERVICES INC V SAZWAN, 2019 ABQB 665 (SHELLEY J)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules) and 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay)
TheDefendantsappliedpursuanttoRule4.31todismiss
theActionfordelay.TheStatementofClaimhadbeenfiled
inDecemberof2016,andasofAugustof2019,theAction
hadnotproceededtoPart5Questioning.TheStatementof
ClaimoriginallynamedthirteenDefendants,andincluded
allegationsoffraudandconspiracywhichwerehotly
contested.TheDefendantshadfiledthirtyApplicationsin
theAction,whilethePlaintiffshadfilednine.
JusticeShelleyappliedthesixconsiderationsfor
ApplicationspursuanttoRule4.31setoutbytheCourtof
AppealinHumphreys v Trebilcock,2017ABCA116:1)
whetherthenon-movingpartyfailedtoadvancetheAction
tothepointthatalitigantactingreasonablywouldhave
attained;2)whethertheshortfallofprogressqualifiedas
inordinate;3)ifthedelaywasinordinate,didthenon-
movingpartyprovidedanexplanationforthedelay;4)if
thedelaywasinordinateandinexcusable,hasthedelay
impairedasufficientlyimportantinterestofthemoving
partytowarrantdismissaloftheAction(hasthemoving
partydemonstratedsignificantprejudice);5)ifthemoving
partyreliedonthepresumptionofsignificantprejudice
createdbyRule4.31(2)wherethedelaywasinordinate
andinexcusable,hasthenon-movingpartyrebuttedthe
presumption;and6)ifthemovingpartymetthecriteria
todismisstheActionunderRule4.31(1),wastherea
compellingreasonnottodismisstheAction?
TheDefendantsnotedthatthenatureoftheAction,
includingallegationsoffraud,requiredtheActiontobe
prosecutedwithgreaterdiligenceandexpediencythan
not.ThePlaintiffsreliedonRule1.2,whichrequiresboth
partiestoidentifytherealissuesindisputeandfacilitate
thequickestmeansofresolvingtheclaimattheleast
expense.
JusticeShelleynotedthattheActionwascomplexand
hotlycontested,andthattherewasnodelayconsidering
thecomplexityandcircumstancesoftheAction.Shelley
11
OCTOBER 2019
Volume 2 Issue 15
www.jssbarristers.ca
J.notedthatiftherewasdelay,itwouldnotconstitute
inordinatedelay,andinanyevent,thePlaintiffshad
explainedthedelay,notingthesheervolumeofsteps
taken.JusticeShelleyconsideredwhethertheDefendants
hadsufferedsignificantprejudice,andnotedthatthe
Defendants’bareassertionofprejudicewasinsufficientto
establishlitigationornon-litigationprejudice.
JusticeShelleyfoundthattherewasnodelayorinordinate
delay,andthusnoremedieswereavailabletothe
Defendants.TheApplicationwasdismissedwithCoststo
thePlaintiffs.
REYES V DYCK, 2019 ABQB 667 (MASTER SCHULZ) Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of these Rules), 3.26 (Time for Service of Statement of Claim), 3.27 (Extension of Time for Service), 11.27 (Validating Service) and 13.18 (Types of Affidavit)
ThePlaintiffappliedforanextensionoftimetoservea
StatementofClaimpursuanttoRule3.27,notwithstanding
thatthe1-yearperiodforserviceunderRule3.26(1)had
alreadyexpired.Alternatively,thePlaintiffsoughtanOrder
validatingservicepursuanttoRule11.27.TheStatement
ofClaimrelatedtoinjuriesresultingfromamotorvehicle
accident.ThePlaintiffhadservedacourtesycopyofthe
StatementofClaimontheDefendant’sinsurer,andthen
engagedinnegotiationswiththeinsurer,butdidnot
personallyservetheDefendant.
MasterSchulzreviewedRule3.27andfoundthatthe
PlaintiffcouldapplyforanextensionpursuanttoRule
3.27(1)(c),whichpermitsanextensionoftimeforserving
aStatementofClaimwhere“specialorextraordinary
circumstancesexistresultingsolelyfromthedefendant’s
conductorfromtheconductofapersonwhoisnota
partytotheaction”;orpursuanttoRules3.27(a)(ii)or
3.27(a)(iii),whichapplywhere“liabilityisorwillnotbe
contested”,orwhereatimeperiodintheAction“willnot
bereliedonorwillbewaived”.
MasterSchulzfoundthatthePlaintiffreasonablybelieved
thatliabilitywasnotbeingcontestedbytheinsurer.The
Masterexplainedthatwheresuchareasonablebelief
exists,theCourtmayexerciseitsdiscretiontodetermine
whethertimeforserviceshouldbeextended.Sincethere
hadbeennounduedelay,andthe“goaloftimely,cost-
effectiveresolution”setoutinRule1.2wasbeingmet,
MasterSchulzexercisedhisdiscretiontorenewtimefor
serviceoftheStatementofClaimfor3months,pursuantto
Rule3.27(a)(ii).However,theMastercautionedcounselto
communicateclearlytoavoidsuchissuesarising.
TheMasternextconsideredwhether,inthealternative,
servicecouldbevalidatedpursuanttoRule11.27given
thatthePlaintiffhadservedtheDefendant’sinsurer.Under
Rule11.27(1),servicemaybevalidatedwherethemethod
ofserviceused“broughtorwaslikelytohavebroughtthe
documenttotheattentionofthepersontobeserved”.
MasterSchulznotedthattheevidencebeforetheCourtwas
locatedinthePlaintiff’sAffidavit,butmuchtheAffidavit
evidencewasnon-compliantwithRule13.18andcouldnot
berelieduponbecauseitwasbasedoninformation,and
thePlaintiffdidnotstatethatshebelievedtheinformation
tobetrue.Asaresult,theCourtwasnotsatisfiedthatthe
StatementofClaimwasbroughtorwaslikelytohavebeen
broughttotheDefendant’sattention,soservicecouldnot
bevalidated.
TRANSAMERICA LIFE CANADA V OAKWOOD ASSOCIATES ADVISORY GROUP LTD, 2019 ABCA 276 (SLATTER, O’FERRALL AND SCHUTZ JJA)Rules 1.2 (Purpose And Intention Of These Rules), 4.1 (Responsibilities Of Parties To Manage Litigation), 4.2 (What The Responsibility Includes) and 4.31 (Application To Deal With Delay)
TheAppellants(Defendants)appealedtheChambers
Judge’sOrderwhichaffirmedaMaster’sDecisionto
dismisstheAppellants’ApplicationtodismisstheAction
forinordinatedelaypursuanttoRule4.31.Atthetime
oftheApplication,theActionwasover10yearsold,and
Questioninghadnotyetbeencompleted.TheMasterand
theChambersJudgebothfoundthattherewasinordinate
delay,butbothdeterminedthatthedelaywasexcusableon
accountoftheAppellants’contributionstothedelay.The
MasterandChambersJudgebothalsofoundthattherewas
notsignificantprejudicetotheAppellants.
ADVOCACY IS OUR BUSINESS 12
JSS BARR IST E RS RULES
Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP
TheAppellantsassertedthattheChambersJudgeerredby
departingfromthesixstepanalysissetoutinHumphreys
v Trebilcock,2017ABCA116.ThePanelheldthat“there
isnouniversalmandatoryformula”fordeterminingthe
applicationofthedelayRules,andthattheessential
elementsofthetestaresetoutinthetextofRule4.31
itself.ThePanelheldthattherewasnoconceptualerrorin
thewaytheChambersJudgeanalyzedtheApplication.
ThePanelalsoconsideredtheAppellants’assertionthat
inactionbytheDefendantcannotcreateanexcusefordelay
bythePlaintiff.ThePanelnotedthatthePlaintiffdoeshave
the“primaryobligation”tomovethelitigationforwardand
thattheDefendantdoesnothavetotakeactionintheface
ofPlaintiffinaction;however,thePanelnotedthatthisdid
notdisplacetheDefendant’sdutytodischargeitsprocedural
obligationsandtocooperateinaneffectivewaywiththe
Plaintiff’seffortstoprogresstheAction.ThePanelnotedthat
Rules1.2and4.1bothestablishthegeneralobligationfor
allpartiestomanagelitigationandtoplanforitsresolution
inatimelyandcosteffectivemanner,andthattherewere
numerousexamplesofspecificdutiesonDefendantstotake
stepswithinaspecificorreasonableamountoftime.The
PanelthusconfirmedthataDefendant’sdelayisrelevantto
anApplicationunderRule4.31.
ThePanelheldthatthequestionofwhetherdelayis
excusableisaquestionoffactwhichisentitledto
deferenceunlessbasedonanerroroflaworprinciple.
ThePanelfoundthattheChambersJudgedidnoterrin
laworprinciplebyrelyingontheAppellants’conductto
findthatthedelaywasexcusable.TheAppellantsasserted
theChambersJudgeerredbyfindingthattherewasno
prejudiceonaccountofthedelay.ThePanelnotedthat
aChambersJudge’sconclusionastowhetherthereis
significantprejudicewhichwouldjustifydismissalofan
Actionisdiscretionaryandentitledtodeference.ThePanel
foundthattheChambersJudge’sfindingsweresupportable
ontherecordanddidnotdiscloseanyerrorsthatwould
justifyappellateintervention.
TheAppealwasdismissed.
ATB FINANCIAL V COREDENT PARTNERSHIP, 2019 ABQB 680 (NIELSEN ACJ) Rules 1.5 (Rule Contravention, Non-Compliance and Irregularities), 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies), 4.22 (Considerations for Security for Costs Order) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)
TheApplicantsoughtSummaryJudgmentagainstoneof
theDefendantsregardingadebtandcontractualinterest
arisingfromapersonalguarantee,andanOrdersummarily
dismissingoralternativelystrikingtheDefendants’
Counterclaimagainstitasanabuseofprocessand
impropercollateralattack.TheApplicantalternatively
soughtSecurityforCostsiftheCounterclaimwasnotstruck
ordismissed.
NielsenA.C.J.notedthatRule3.68governsthestrikingof
claims,andthatthetestforgrantingSummaryJudgment
pursuanttoRule7.3wasrecentlyclarifiedbythe
AlbertaCourtofAppealinWeir-Jones Technical Services
Incorporated v Purolator Courier Ltd,2019ABCA49.
TheburdenisonthepartyseekingSummaryJudgmentto
demonstratethattheDefendanthasnomeritoriousdefence
totheAction;whilethepartyresistingSummaryJudgment
mustshowthatthereisagenuineissueforTrial,orthatthe
mattercannotbeproperlydeterminedonasummarybasis.
NielsenA.C.J.grantedtheApplicant’sApplicationfor
SummaryJudgmentregardingthedebtandcontractual
interestowedtoit.HisLordshipnotedthattheDefendant
hadnottakenissuewiththetermsorexecutionofthe
guarantee,but“simplyraisedspeculation”astothe
Applicant’sactions,andresistancetoSummaryJudgment
mustbegroundedintherecord,andnotspeculation.
NielsenA.C.J.alsosummarilydismissedtheCounterclaim
andexplainedthatitwas“fatallyflawed”becauseit
advancedclaimsonbehalfofseparatelegalentities,
andbecausetheallegationsintheCounterclaimwerea
collateralattackonotherCourtproceedings.
AstheCounterclaimwasdismissed,NielsenA.C.J.wasnot
requiredtoconsidertheApplicationforSecurityforCosts,
however,HisLordshipexplainedthathewouldhaveordered
SecurityforCostspursuanttoRule4.22.HisLordship
13
OCTOBER 2019
Volume 2 Issue 15
www.jssbarristers.ca
notedthatanon-exhaustivelistoffactorsshouldbe
consideredtodeterminewhetherSecurityforCostsshould
beordered,includingwhethertheRespondenthasany
assetsinAlberta;theirlikelihoodofsuccessintheAction;
whethertheApplicanthassoughtsecurityforstepsalready
taken;theriskthattheApplicantmaynotbeabletorecover
anyCostsaward;andwhethertheApplicantappliedfor
SecurityforCostsattheearliestopportunity.NielsenA.C.J.
foundthatSecurityforCostswouldhavebeenappropriate
becauseeachoftheDefendantswereeitherinsolvent,
orappearedtobeinsolvent;becauseitwasunlikelythat
theRespondentswouldbesuccessfulinadvancingthe
Counterclaim;andbecausetheApplicantwasnotseeking
securityforstepsalreadytakenintheAction.
CWC WELL SERVICES CORP V OPTION INDUSTRIES INC, 2019 ABCA 331 (SLATTER, HUGHES AND FEEHAN JJA)Rules 1.5 (Rule Contravention, Non-Compliance and Irregularities), 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay) and 4.33 (Dismissal for Long Delay)
ThePanelheardanAppealofaDecisionofaChambers
Justice,whichhadupheldtheDecisionofaMasterto
dismissanApplicationforlongdelaynotwithstandingthe
factthatthreeyearshadpassedwithouta“significant
advance”.ThoughRule4.33(2)requiresanActiontobe
dismissedafterthreeyearsofdelay,theChambersJustice
andtheMasterfoundthattheexceptionprovidedinRule
4.33(2)(b)applied.
ThePanelnotedthatRule4.33(2)(b)isamanifestation
ofthegeneralrulethatproceduralobjectionsmustbe
raisedinatimelyway.Moreover,Rule1.5addresses
contraventionsofproceduralrequirementsandrequires
anApplicationtobefiledundertheRulepromptly,andit
prohibitsanApplicationundertheRulewhentheapplying
partyhasacquiescedtoacontravention.ThePanelstated
thattheexceptioninRule4.33(2)(b)shouldbeinterpreted
holisticallyinaccordancewithitswording.TheCourtcan
allowanActiontocontinuewhere“intheopinionofthe
Court”aPlaintiffhasreasontobelievethatdelayhasbeen
waivedbyaDefendant.
Inthiscase,thepartieshadfiledadetailedlitigationplan
andmadesincereattemptstofollowit.Therefore,thePanel
ruledthattheChambersJusticeandMasterwereentitledto
concludethattheexceptioninRule4.33(2)(b)applied.
Inclosing,thePanelalsoaddressedtheChambersJustice’s
andMaster’sconclusionthattheActioncouldnotbe
dismissedpursuanttoRule4.31.ThoughbothCourts
foundthatinordinateandinexcusabledelayhadoccurred
triggeringapresumptionofsignificantprejudice,they
bothfoundthattherewasnoactualsignificantprejudice
sufferedbecausethecasewaslargelydocumentbased.
ThePanelruledthatthiswasafindingfactontherecord
deservingofdeference.
TheAppealwasdismissed.
CLARK BUILDERS AND STANTEC CONSULTING LTD V GO COMMUNITY CENTRE, 2019 ABQB 706 (RENKE J)Rules 2.6 (Representative Actions), 6.14 (Appeal From Master’s Judgment or Order), 7.3 (Summary Judgment), 13.6 (Pleadings: General Requirements) and 13.18 (Types of Affidavit)
TheDefendantshadunsuccessfullybroughtanApplication
forSummaryDismissal.OnAppealoftheMaster’s
DecisionbeforeJusticeRenke,thepartiesagreedthatthe
standardofreviewonallissuespursuanttoRule6.14was
correctness.JusticeRenkesetouttoconsiderSummary
DismissalunderRule7.3throughtheframeworkas
clarifiedinWeir-Jones Technical Services Incorporated v
Purolator Courier Ltd,2019ABCA49.
ThePlaintiffreliedonanunswornreportappendedtoan
Affidavit,somethingtheDefendantsarguedwasoffside
Rules7.3(2)and13.18,bothofwhichrequirethatan
Affidavitsubmittedinsupportoffinalreliefbeswornon
thebasisofpersonalknowledge.TheCourtnotedthatthe
PlaintiffwasrespondingtotheApplicationforfinalrelief,
andwasthereforeentitledtorelyonhearsayevidence.
Ultimately,theCourtwassatisfiedthatSummaryDismissal
wasappropriategiventhatthePlaintiffhadno“beneficial,
proprietary,orpossessoryrights”inthepropertywhichwas
thesubjectoftheloss.Thisfindingwasapplicableboth
ADVOCACY IS OUR BUSINESS 14
JSS BARR IST E RS RULES
Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP
theCourt.MacklinJ.foundthatUNAwouldbespecially
affectedbytheStayApplicationandhadspecialexpertise
orinsightpertainingtoitsperspectiveonthedutyto
consultrequirementundertheCharter.
Accordingly,JusticeMacklingrantedtheApplicationby
UNAtointerveneintheStayApplicationsubjecttothe
conditionsthat:(1)UNA’ssubmissionswouldbelimited
tothequestionofwhetherthereisaseriousissuetobe
tried;(2)writtensubmissionsbyUNAwouldbelimitedto
nomorethanfivepages;and(3)oralsubmissionswouldbe
limitedto10minutes.
UBAH V CANADIAN NATURAL RESOURCES LIMITED, 2019 ABQB 692 (ROOKE ACJ) Rules 2.22 (Self-Represented Litigants), 2.23 (Assistance Before the Court), 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies), 7.3 (Summary Judgment), 9.4 (Signing Judgments and Orders) and 14.5 (Appeals Only with Permission)
ThePlaintiff,Ubah,hadinitiatednumerousclaimsin“all
threetiersofAlbertaCourts”andtheFederalCourt.In
February2019,RookeA.C.J.struckUbah’sStatement
ofClaimagainstCanadianNaturalResourcesLimited
(“CNRL”)andotherspursuanttoRule3.68andCivil
PracticeNote#7(“CPN7”).Atthetime,RookeA.C.J.
notedthattheCPN7processpermitstheimmediate
impositionofCourtaccessrestrictionsuponapparently
vexatiouslitigantsbutinvitedthepartiestoprovide
submissionsrespectingwhetherfurtherCourtaccess
restrictionswereappropriate.ThisDecisiondealtwiththe
impositionofCourtaccessrestrictions.
RookeA.C.J.firstreviewedUbah’s“troublingrecord
ofabusiveandunsuccessfullitigationandhisother
interactionswithCanadian[C]ourts”.Inadditionto
Ubah’sinteractionswiththeCourtofQueen’sBench,His
LordshipnotedthatUbahhadinitiatedeightcivilActionsin
ProvincialCourt.OneofthoseActionswasstruckpursuant
toRule3.68,andanotherwasdismissedasunmeritorious
pursuanttoRule7.3.UbahhadalsoinitiatedeightActions
inFederalCourt.Rooke.A.C.J.foundthatUbahhada
totheexpressclaiminnegligence,aswellastheclaimin
negligentmisrepresentationwhichtheCourtheldhadbeen
putinissuebythefactspleadedpursuanttoRule13.6.
Thisresultwasnotavoidedthroughcharacterizationofthe
claimasarepresentativeActionpursuanttoRule2.6,asthe
PlaintiffhadnotcompliedwiththeformalitiesofthatRule.
ALBERTA UNION OF PROVINCIAL EMPLOYEES V ALBERTA, 2019 ABQB 553 (MACKLIN J)Rule 2.10 (Intervenor Status)
IntheunderlyingAction,theAlbertaUnionofProvincial
Employees(“AUPE”)broughtanActionagainstHer
MajestytheQueeninRightofAlberta(“HMQ”)seekinga
declarationthatthePublic Sector Wage Arbitration Deferral
Act,RSA2019,cT-41.7(“Bill9”)breachestheAUPE’s
freedomofassociationasprotectedbys.2(d)ofthe
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms(the“Charter”).
OnJuly29,2019,JusticeMacklinwastohearan
ApplicationbyAUPEforaninteriminjunctionstayingthe
implementationoroperationofBill9untilitsconstitutional
challengecouldbedeterminedonitsmerits(the“Stay
Application”).
TheUnitedNursesofAlberta(“UNA”)appliedforintervenor
statusintheStayApplicationonthegroundsthatitwould
bespeciallyaffectedbyHisLordship’sdecisioninthe
StayApplicationduetoitspotentialimpactonUNA’s
parallelconstitutionalchallengeofBill9.Further,theUNA
statedthatithadspecialexpertiseorinsighttobringto
bearontheissues.HMQopposedtheApplicationbythe
UNAtointerveneonthegroundthatithadnotmetthe
requirementsnecessaryforthegrantingofintervenorstatus.
MacklinJ.notedthatRule2.10providesthataCourtmay
grantstatustoapersontointerveneinanActionsubjectto
anytermsandconditionsandwiththerightsandprivileges
specifiedbytheCourt.Notingtherelevantjurisprudence,
JusticeMacklinfoundthatanintervenor’sApplication
maybeallowedwhere,amongotherthings,theproposed
intervenoris(1)speciallyaffectedbytheDecisionfacing
theCourt;or(2)theproposedintervenorhassomespecial
expertiseorinsighttobringtobearontheissuesfacing
15
OCTOBER 2019
Volume 2 Issue 15
www.jssbarristers.ca
patternof“knowinglyignoringandbreaking[C]ourtrules
andinstructions”,andsuggestedthathebelievedhehad
an“absoluteright”todoso.
HisLordshipexplainedthatCourtaccessrestrictionsmay
beimposedwherefuturelitigationabuseisplausibleand
emphasizedthatonlyoneabusiveproceedingmaybe
sufficienttotriggerCourtaccessrestrictions.Inthiscase,
Ubahhad“conducteddozensofabusivelawsuits,judicial
reviews,applications,andappeals”.HisLordshipfound
thatgatekeepingwas“obviouslyrequired”,andthatonly
globalCourtaccessrestrictionsacrossallAlbertaCourts
couldmitigatehisconduct.
Assuch,pursuanttotheCourt’sinherentjurisdiction,
RookeA.C.J.declaredUbahavexatiouslitigantand
imposedCourtaccessrestrictions.Inadditiontoother
restrictions,Ubahwasprohibitedfromcommencingor
continuinganyAppeal,Action,Application,orproceeding
inanylevelofCourtinAlbertawithoutleavefromthe
Court;wasrequiredtoberepresentedbyamemberin
goodstandingoftheLawSocietyofAlbertatorequest
leave;andwasprohibitedfromactingasagent,next
friend,orMcKenzieFriendtoanyotherpersoninCourt
proceedingspursuanttoRule2.22or2.23.Further,Ubah
wasrequiredtoapplybeforeasingleAppealJudgefor
leavetocommenceorcontinueaproceedinginProvincial
Court,andnotedthatifthesingleAppealJudgegranted
himleavetocommenceanAppeal,hemaystillberequired
toapplyforpermissiontoAppealpursuanttoRule14.5(1)
(j),andindoingsowasrequiredtoappendacopyofthe
OrderdeclaringhimavexatiouslitiganttotheApplication
anddepose“fullyandcompletelytothefactsand
circumstancessurrounding”theproposedproceedingto
satisfytheCourtthattheAppealisnotabusive.
PursuanttoRule9.4(2)(c),RookeA.C.J.dispensedwith
Ubah’sapprovalastotheformandcontentoftheOrder.
HAZKAR DEVELOPMENTS INC V COCHRANE (TOWN), 2019 ABQB 552 (MCCARTHY J)Rules 3.15 (Originating Application for Judicial Review) and 3.75 (Adding, Removing or Substituting Parties to Originating Application)
TheApplicant/Cross-Respondent,HazkarDevelopments
Inc.(“Hazkar”),broughtanApplicationforJudicialReview
ofadecisionbytheRespondent/Cross-Applicant,the
TownofCochrane(the“Town”),refusingalandusere-
designationofaparceloflandtoaccommodateupto11
single-detachedhomes.TheTowncross-appliedtodismiss
Hazkar’sJudicialReviewApplicationonthebasisthatit
hadnotserved“directlyaffectedparties”withnoticeofthe
JudicialReviewApplicationwithintherequisitetimeframe.
TheissuebeforetheCourtwaswhetheragroupofresidents
(the“Residents”)wholiveneartheproposeddevelopment
were“directlyaffected”persons.Rule3.15requiresthat
“everypersonorbodydirectlyaffected”byaJudicial
ReviewApplicationbeservedwithit.TheTownarguedthat
becausetheMunicipal Government Act,RSA2000,c21
(the“MGA”)requiresadjacentlandownerstobenotified
forlandusere-designations,theymustalsobeservedwith
anApplicationforJudicialReviewofadecisionregardinga
landusere-designation.
TheCourtdisagreedandconfirmedthattherequirements
undertheMGAshouldnotbeconflatedwiththe
requirementsundertheRules.CaselawcitedbytheTown
wasdistinguishedonthebasisthatitdealtwithRule3.75
whichgovernswhenapersoncanbeaddedasaRespondent
toanOriginatingApplication.TheCourtconfirmedthat
determiningwhethersomeoneisan“affectedperson”for
thepurposesofRule3.15isafactualexercise.
However,theCourtruledthattheResidentswere“affected
persons”underRule3.15.Theyhadpresentedremarksat
theoriginallandusehearingandraisedlegitimateconcerns
abouthowtheproposeddevelopmentwouldimpacttheir
lives.ThiswassufficientintheCourt’sviewtorequirethat
theybenotifiedoftheJudicialReviewApplication.The
Cross-ApplicationtostriketheJudicialReviewApplication
wasgranted.
ADVOCACY IS OUR BUSINESS 16
JSS BARR IST E RS RULES
Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP
LEAVITT V CANADIAN COUNCIL OF INDEPENDENT LABORATORIES, 2019 ABQB 589 (YUNGWIRTH J) Rules 3.15 (Originating Application for Judicial Review) and 3.75 (Adding, Removing or Substituting Parties to Originating Application)
TheAssociationofProfessionalEngineersandGeoscientists
ofAlberta(“APEGA”)appliedtobeaddedasapartyto
aJudicialReviewinwhichtheApplicanthadsought,
amongotherthings,adeclarationthataprofessional
technologistshouldbeconsideredan“engineer”underthe
Respondent’srules.APEGAarguedthattheActionrelated
toissuesunderitsregulatorymandate.
JusticeYungwirthnotedthatpursuanttoRule3.15(3)
(c),anOriginatingApplicationforJudicialReviewmust
beservedoneverypersonorbodyaffecteddirectlyby
theApplication.APEGAhadnotbeenservedwiththe
OriginatingApplication.HerLadyshipalsonotedthaton
Application,theCourtmayaddapartytoanActionifit
issatisfiedthatsuchanOrdershouldbemade,pursuant
toRule3.75(2)(b).However,theCourtmaynotdosoifit
wouldcauseprejudicetoapartynotcompensablethrough
aCostsaward,pursuanttoRule3.75(3).
HerLadyshipthenexplainedthattheCourtmustfirst
considerwhethertheApplicanthasa“legalinterestinthe
outcomeoftheproceeding”.Ifso,thentheCourtmust
thenaskwhetheritis“justandconvenient”toaddthe
Applicantasaparty,andwhethertheApplicant’sinterests
wouldonlybeadequatelyprotectedifitweremadeaparty.
HerLadyshipfoundthatAPEGAhadalegalinterestinthe
proceedings,thatitwouldbejustandconvenienttoadd
APEGAasaparty,andthatAPEGA’sinterestswouldonly
beadequatelyprotectedifitweremadeaparty,asthere
wascurrentlynopartyinvolvedintheActionrepresenting
theinterestsofprofessionalengineers.Finally,Justice
Yungwirthheldthatitwouldnotbeprejudicialtoadd
APEGAasaparty.Assuch,APEGA’sApplicationwas
granted.
IRVINE V KRISTENSEN, 2019 ABQB 607 (JEFFREY J)Rules 3.15 (Originating Application for Judicial Review) and 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies)
TheRespondentbroughtanOriginatingApplicationtoquash
acommonlawpeacebondandstaycriminalproceedings.
TheApplicantssoughttostriketheActionpursuanttoRule
3.68,characterizingitasanApplicationforJudicialReview,
whichtheRespondenthadfiledbeyondthesix-month
deadlinesetoutinRule3.15.TheCourtagreed.
WhiletheRespondentarguedtheconstitutional
inapplicabilityofRule3.15,theCourtnotedthatthe
constitutionalissueshadnotbeenproperlyadvancedby
wayofaNoticeofConstitutionalQuestion.Inanyevent,
theCourtwaspreparedtostriketheActionwithoutreliance
onRule3.15,astheremedysoughtintheActionwas
impossible;thepeacebondwasnolongerofanyforce
andeffect,andthecriminalproceedingshadalreadybeen
stayed.TheRespondent’sActionwasboundtofail,and
thereforeconstitutedanabuseofprocess.
ALBERTA’S FREE ROAMING HORSES SOCIETY V ALBERTA, 2019 ABQB 714 (MILLAR J) Rules 3.15 (Originating Application for Judicial Review), 3.16 (Originating Application for Judicial Review: Habeas Corpus), 3.22 (Evidence on Judicial Review) and 13.5 (Variation of Time Periods)
UnderAlberta’sStray Animals Act,RSA2000,cS-20
andHorse Capture Regulation,AR59/1994,horses
maybecapturedforreasonsofpublicsafety,thehorses’
safety,ortoconserveorprotectlands.TheApplicants
allegedthatwildhorsecapturehadbeenoccurringin
Albertawithoutaproperdecisionastowhetheritwas
necessary.TheApplicantssoughtdeclarationsthat:(a)
thegovernmentmustproperlyreachanopinionaboutthe
necessityofthecapturebeforeauthorizingit;and(b)that
anyactivelicensesissuedtoremovehorses,andanypublic
landdesignation,isvoid.TheyalsosoughtanOrderof
mandamusrequiringthegovernmenttoprepareandpublish
awrittenopinionbeforedesignatinganylandsaspublic.
17
OCTOBER 2019
Volume 2 Issue 15
www.jssbarristers.ca
Asapreliminaryissue,MillarJ.consideredwhetherthe
ApplicantshadstandingtobringtheApplication,and
determinedthattheApplicantsdidhavestanding.
Next,MillarJ.consideredtheadmissibilityofanAffidavit
providedbytheApplicants(the“TicknorAffidavit”).The
ProvincearguedthattheTicknorAffidavitwasinadmissible,
aspursuanttoRule3.22,onlyevidencebeforethe
decision-maker(includingQuestioningpursuanttoRule
3.21ifpermissible)isadmissibleonJudicialReview.
However,HisLordshipdeterminedthattheCourtcould
useitsdiscretiontoadmittheTicknorAffidavitpursuant
toRule3.22(d).ItnotedthatthisJudicialReviewwas
atypicalinthattherewasnotarecordofproceedingsto
review;rather,thequestionwaswhethertheMinisterhad
properlyexercisedhisjurisdiction.TheTicknorAffidavit
wasnecessarytoreviewthebackgroundandcontextofthe
legislationandApplication.
MillarJ.thenconsideredwhethertheApplicationhad
beenfiledintime.TheProvincearguedthatpursuantto
Rule3.15(2),Applicationstosetasideadecisionoract
ofaMinistermustbebroughtwithin6months(otherthan
habeas corpusApplicationswhichmaybebroughtatany
timepursuanttoRule3.16).TheApplicantsarguedthat
theywerenotseekingtosetasidetheMinister’sdecision,
butratherseekingdeclarationsinrespectofanomissionby
theMinister.
MillarJ.notedthatRule3.15specificallystatesthatRule
13.5,whichpermitstheCourttogranttimeextensions,
doesnotapplytothe6-monthtimeperiodinRule3.15.
HisLordshipnotedthatlimitationsperiodsbringfinality
andcertaintytoevents,andemphasizedthattheimposition
ofahardlimitationperiodintheRulessignalsthatthe
legislatureintendedforthetimelimittobeafixedone.
MillarJ.alsoemphasizedthat,whereadeclarationis
sought,theeffectofthedeclarationmustbeconsidered.
Iftheeffectisto“setasideanadministrativedecision,
thetimelimitdoesapply”.SincetheApplicants’intention
wasnottosetasidethelegislation,butrathertoeffectively
setasidetheMinister’sdecision,MillarJ.determinedthat
theApplicationwas“welloutsideofthelimitationperiod”
imposedbyRule3.15.
ALLERGAN INC V ALBERTA (JUSTICE AND SOLICITOR GENERAL), 2019 ABQB 610 (ROMAINE J)Rule 3.22 (Evidence on Judicial Review)
TheApplicantpharmaceuticalmanufacturerappliedfor
JudicialReviewofadecisionoftheRespondentMinisterof
Health.
ContrarytoRule3.22,whichlaysouttheevidenceaCourt
mayconsiderwhenconductingaJudicialReview,the
Applicantattemptedtoadduceevidencenotpreviously
submittedtoAlbertaHealthduringtheoriginaldecision-
makingprocess.TheCourtconfirmedthatJudicialReview
isnotaTrialde novoandrefusedtopermitevidencethat
wasnotbeforetheadministrativedecisionmaker.
MBB V ALBERTA (CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICES), 2019 ABQB 621 (LEMA J)Rule 3.23 (Stay of Decision)
TheApplicantinthiscase,MBB,appliedtoresumeliving
withhisfosterparentsuntilaJudicialReviewofadecision
whichhadchangedhisresidencetoagrouphomehadbeen
decided.TheApplicationwassupportedbyMBB’sfoster
parentsbutopposedbytheDirectorofChildandFamily
Services(the“Director”).TheDirectormadethedecision
tochangeMBB’splaceofresidencepursuanttotheChild,
Youth and Family Enhancement Act,RSA2000,cC-12
(the“CYFEA”).
OneoftheissuesconsideredbytheCourtwaswhether
MBBwas,insubstance,seekingastayoftheDirector’s
decision.MBBandhisfosterparentsspecificallyraised
Rule3.23whichallowstheCourttograntastayofa
decisionoractpendingaJudicialReviewofthatdecisionor
act.However,theCourtdeterminedthattheJudicialReview
Applicationwasprematureinthiscase,astheCYFEA
providesitsownappealmechanismforreviewingdecisions
bytheDirector.MBBshouldhaveusedthisappeal
mechanismpriortofilingtheJudicialReviewApplication.
TheApplicationwasdismissedandMBBwasdirectedto
pursuetheappealsprocessundertheCYFEAifhesochose
to.ThepartieswerealsodirectedtobeartheirownCosts.
ADVOCACY IS OUR BUSINESS 18
JSS BARR IST E RS RULES
Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP
ANC TIMBER LTD V ALBERTA (MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY), 2019 ABQB 710 (TOPOLNISKI J)Rule 3.23 (Stay of Decision)
TheMinisterofAgricultureandForestry(the“Minister”)
hadputguidelines(the“Guidelines”)intoplacetoprotect
caribouandcontrolforestharvestbythelumberindustry.
TheGuidelinesaffectedANCTimberLtd.(“ANC”)licenses
forforestharvestandANC’spapermillbusiness.ANCmade
anApplicationtostaytheGuidelines.
TheCourtattemptedtodefineANC’sApplication,but
ultimatelyfoundthattheApplicationcouldnotproceed.
TheCourtfoundthatinteriminjunctionswerenotan
availableagainsttheCrownpursuanttosection17ofthe
Proceedings Against the Crown Act,RSA2000,cP-25.
TheCourtheldthatstayofproceedingsandinterlocutory
injunctionsareofthesamenatureandtherefore,a
mandatoryinterlocutorystayisalsonotanactionthatcan
betakenagainsttheCrown.TheApplicationwastherefore
dismissed.
DespitethattheApplicationcouldnotbemadeagainst
theCrown,theCourtthenalternativelyconsideredwhether
ANChadmettheonustoestablishastayasanappropriate
remedysetoutinRule3.23.Rule3.23givestheCourtthe
abilitytostaytheoperationofadecisionoractpendingthe
outcomeofanoriginatingApplicationforJudicialReview.
Inordertoobtainastay,theApplicantbearstheburden
ofmeetingthetestsfromR v Canadian Broadcasting
Corp,2018SCC5(“CBC”),whichprovidesthatwherean
Applicantseeksamandatoryinjunction,theApplicantmust
establishastrongprimafaciecase;andRJR MacDonald
v Canada (Attorney General),[1994]1SCR311(“RJR”),
whichprovidesthatwhenanApplicantseeksaprohibitive
injunction,theApplicantmustestablish(1)astrongprima
faciecaseorthereisaseriousquestiontobetried;(2)the
Applicantwillsufferirreparableharmifthestayisrefused;
and(3)onabalanceofconvenience,theApplicantwill
suffergreaterharmwithoutthestay.
TheCourtconsideredthetestinCBCandfoundthatANC
hadnotestablishedastrongprimafaciecase.
AsfortheelementsofthetestfromRJR,theCourtfound
thatANChadmetthe“lowthreshold”ofthefirstelement
ofthetest.IndeterminingwhetheranApplicantwould
sufferirreparableharm(thesecondpartofthetest),the
CourtstatedthatANCmustshowtheywouldsufferactual
harmwhichcouldnotbecompensatedbydamages,but
acknowledgedthisdidnotrequirecompleteimpossibility
ofcompensationbydamages.TheCourtwasunconvinced
byANC’sargument,whichtheCourtfoundwasmere
speculationorconjecture,andANCfailedthesecondpart
ofthetest.TheCourtthenconsideredthethirdaspectof
thetest,consideringthepublicinterestandthestatusquo.
AsnotedinRJR,theMinisterhasalowbartomeettoshow
harmtopublicinterest.TheGuidelinesandchangesto
ANC’soperationswereputforwardinresponsetothreatsto
thecariboupopulationandanefforttoexercisesustainable
forestmanagementprinciples.Thebalanceofconvenience
favouredtheMinisterwhenconsideringthepublicinterest
factor.TheCourtalsoconsideredthestatusquoargument
putforwardbyANC,buttheCourtfoundthattheycould
notidentifywhatwouldbethestatusquoandhencethis
factorwasneutralinregardtothebalanceofconvenience.
TheCourtthereforefoundthatastaypursuanttoRule3.23
wouldalsonotbeappropriate.
MACLEOD V TRIBECA INNER CITY CUSTOM HOMES INC, 2019 ABQB 524 (MASTER PROWSE)Rule 3.27 (Extension of Time for Service)
ThePlaintiffs’processserverattemptedtoserveaStatement
ofClaimonthefinaldateforservice,oneyearafterthe
StatementofClaimhadissued.Theprocessserverattended
ataresidenceknowntobetheindividualDefendant’shome
andthecorporateDefendant’sregisteredoffice.
Theprocessservereffectedserviceoftheregistered
officebyleavingtheStatementofClaimattheresidence;
however,theindividualDefendantwasnotpresentto
acceptpersonalservice.Theprocessserverspokewiththe
individualDefendantbyphone,whocommittedtomake
arrangementsforservicethatevening.Theindividual
Defendantdidnotfollowthrough,anditwasnotuntilthe
followingmorning,onedayaftertheStatementofClaim
hadexpired,thatpersonalservicetookplace.
19
OCTOBER 2019
Volume 2 Issue 15
www.jssbarristers.ca
ThePlaintiffsbroughtanApplicationforadeclarationthat
theyhadservedtheindividualDefendantonatimelybasis,
oralternatively,foranOrderextendingthetimetoserve.
Insupportofvalidatingservice,thePlaintiffsreliedona
casewhereintheCourtdeclinedtostrikeaStatementof
Claimforfailuretoserveintime,asthelate-servedparties
hadknowledgeoftheexistenceoftheStatementofClaim
andthegeneralnatureoftheclaimbeingadvancedbefore
theStatementofClaimexpired.MasterProwsewasnot
persuaded,asitwasnotclearthattheindividualDefendant
hadbeenadvisedofthegeneralnatureoftheStatementof
Claim.
InsupportofanOrderextendingtimeforservice,the
PlaintiffsreliedonRule3.27(1)(c),whichpermitsthe
Courttoextendthetimeforservicewhere“specialor
extraordinarycircumstancesexistresultingsolelyfrom
thedefendant’sconductorfromtheconductofaperson
whoisnotapartytotheaction.”TheCourtacceptedthat
theprocessserverwasapersonwhowasnotpartytothe
Action,andthattheprocessserver’scarelessnesswasa
specialorextraordinarycircumstance.Itwasalsosignificant
thattheindividualDefendanthadagreedtomake
arrangementstoacceptservicepriortotheexpiryofthe
StatementofClaim,butultimatelyfailedtodoso.Master
ProwseextendedthetimeforserviceoftheStatementof
ClaimontheindividualDefendanttothedateservicehad
beenaffected.
BROWN V BLISS, 2019 ABQB 530 (MASTER SCHLOSSER) Rules 3.30 (Defendant’s Options), 3.69 (Joining Claims), 11.25 (Real and Substantial Connection) and 11.31 (Setting Aside Service)
AfteroneoftheDefendantsappliedtostaytheAction
becauseanew,earlierActionhadalreadybeenbroughtin
Ontario,theCourtconsideredwhetherithadjurisdiction
tohearthematter,andwhetherornotOntariowas,
nevertheless,themoreconvenientforum.TheOntarioand
Albertaclaimsdiffered,butrelatedtothesamefacts.
InconsideringwhetherAlbertahadjurisdictionsimpliciter
overthemattersintheAlbertaAction,MasterSchlosser
consideredthenon-exhaustivelistofcircumstancesin
whicharealandsubstantialconnectionwithAlbertais
presumedtoexist,setoutunderRule11.25(3).TheMaster
notedthatserviceofaclaimwithoutarealandsubstantial
connectiontoAlbertamaybesetasidepursuanttoRules
3.30and11.31.MasterSchlosseralsonotedthatRule
3.69,whichgovernsthejoiningofclaims,speakstothe
desirabilityofkeepingrelatedActionstogethertopreserve
judicialeconomyandavoidinconsistentJudgments.
TheMasterfoundthatwhiletheDefendantwasnota
“necessary”partytotheAlbertaAction,hewasa“proper”
party,andthereforethatAlbertahadjurisdictionoverthe
ActionpursuanttoRule11.25(3)(i).
MasterSchlossernextconsideredwhetherOntariowas
amoreconvenientorappropriateforum.Indoingso,
theMasterconsideredanumberoffactorsincludingthe
comparativeexpensetothepartiesofproceedingineither
province,thelawineachprovince,enforcementofan
eventualJudgment,thedesirabilityofavoidingmultiple
proceedings,andtheefficiencyandfairnessofthe
Canadianlegalsysteminitsentirety.MasterSchlosserheld
that,onbalance,itmadesensefortheAlbertaandOntario
ActionstoproceedtogetherinOntario.TheAlbertaAction
wasthereforestayedontheconditionthattheDefendant
consenttoaddingaCounterclaimintheOntarioActionto
dealwiththePlaintiff’sclaimagainsthim.TheDefendant
wasawardedCosts.
BODNAR CAPITAL CORPORATION (301831 ALBERTA LTD) V SYNERGY PROJECTS LTD, 2019 ABQB 528 (MASTER SCHLOSSER)Rule 3.45 (Form of Third Party Claim)
TheApplicant(Defendant)appliedtoextendthetimefor
filingandserviceofaThirdPartyClaimsetoutinRule
3.45.Rule3.45requiresaThirdPartyClaimtobefiled
andservedontheThirdPartyDefendantwithin6months
ofthefilingoftheDefendant’sStatementofDefenceor
DemandforNotice.ThedeadlineunderRule3.45had
expiredinMarchof2016,andtheApplicantfiled,but
didnotserve,aThirdPartyClaiminJulyof2017.The
StatementofClaimwasfiledinJanuaryof2011and
allegedtheApplicanthadinstalledadefectivegeothermal
ADVOCACY IS OUR BUSINESS 20
JSS BARR IST E RS RULES
Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP
heatingsystem.TheproposedThirdPartyDefendantswere
theApplicant’ssubcontractorsontheproject.
MasterSchlossernotedthattoextendthetimeforaThird
PartyNotice,theCourtmustconsider:i)thelengthofthe
delay;ii)theexplanationforthedelay;andiii)therelative
prejudicetotheparties.MasterSchlosseralsonotedthat
theApplicantmustalsodemonstratethattheproposed
ThirdPartyClaimhas“anairofreality”suchthatitisnot
“hopelessand[…]doomedfrom[its]inception”.
MasterSchlosserheldthattheStatementofClaimmade
itapparentthattherewerepotentialclaimsagainstthe
proposedThirdParties,suchthatthelimitationperiodfor
theproposedThirdPartyClaimstartedtorunonthedate
theStatementofClaimwasserved.MasterSchlosserfound
thattheproposedThirdPartyDefendantsdidnothave
sufficientnoticeoftheproposedThirdPartyClaimwithin
theperiodrequiredbysection6(4)oftheLimitations Act,
RSA2000cL-12toallowtheThirdPartyClaimstobe
addednotwithstandingtheexpiryofthelimitationperiod.
MasterSchlosserheldthatthe“limitationsdefencewould
almostcertainlysucceed”andthatthe“extensionofthe
timeforserviceofahopelessclaimisnottobepermitted”.
MasterSchlossernotedinobiterthatcaselawhad
indicatedthatthethresholdthataRespondenthadtomeet
wasthatitwas“plainandobvious”thattheclaimwould
fail,however,suggestedthatfollowingWeir-Jones Technical
Services Incorporated v Purolator Courier Ltd,2019ABCA
49,“itmaybemoreappropriatetospeakintermsofa
meritoriouslimitationsdefence,provedonabalanceof
probabilities.”
TheApplicationwasdismissed.
SWEETLAND V MACINNIS, 2019 ABQB 736 (LEMA J)Rules 3.62 (Amending Pleading), 3.65 (Permission of Court to Amendment Before or After Close of Pleadings) and 3.74 (Adding, Removing or Substituting Parties After Close of Pleadings)
JoanSweetland,aPlaintiffintheunderlyingAction
(“Ms.Sweetland”),wasseverelyinjuredinabuscrash
in2012(the“Action”).Ms.Sweetlandappliedtoamend
herStatementofClaimagainstthebusdriverand
transportationcompaniestoaddallegationsofbad-faith
treatmentbyandconspiracyonthepartoftheirinsurerand
adjuster(the“AmendmentApplication”).TheDefendants
andproposednewDefendantsopposedtheAmendment
Applicationongroundsincludinglimitations.
Ms.SweetlandpointedtoRule3.62(1)(b)whichdirects,
amongotherthings,thatapartymayamendapleading
afterthecloseofpleadingswiththeCourt’spriorpermission
inaccordancewithRule3.65.LemaJ.referencedRule
3.74forthepropositionthat,onapplication,theCourtmay
orderthatapersonbeadded,removed,orsubstitutedas
apartytoanActioniftheCourtissatisfiedthattheOrder
shouldbemade.
JusticeLemaoutlinedthe“classicrule”thatpleadingscan
beamendednomatterhowcarelessorlatethepartyseeks
toamendsubjecttofourexceptions:(1)seriousprejudice
notcompensableinCosts;(2)a“hopeless”amendment
(whichwouldhavebeenstruckifpleadedoriginally);(3)an
amendmentsoughtafterexpiryoflimitationperiod;and(4)
afailuretopleadearliertaintedbybadfaith.
Afterreviewingtherelevantjurisprudenceandthe
applicableprovisionsoftheLimitations Act,RSA2000,
cL-12(the“Limitations Act”),JusticeLemafound,
inter alia,thatthetwo-yearlimitationperiodinss.3(1)
oftheLimitations Acthadexpiredastheproposednew
Defendantsandtheirrespectiveimpugnedactionsand
decisionsalloccurredpriortothesummerof2017.AsMs.
Sweetlanddidnotraiseanydiscoverabilityissuesorinvoke
anyotherexceptionordefenceundertheLimitations Act,
LemaJ.dismissedtheAmendmentApplication.
HUFF V ZUK, 2019 ABQB 691 (NIXON J)Rules 3.65 (Permission of Court to Amendment Before or After Close of Pleadings) and 13.7 (Pleadings: Other Requirements)
ATrialhadbeenheldinthismatterwhichincludedclaims
bythePlaintiffthattheDefendanthaddefamedhim.
SomeoftheimpugnedstatementsraisedbythePlaintiff
duringtheTrialhadnotbeenincludedintheStatement
21
OCTOBER 2019
Volume 2 Issue 15
www.jssbarristers.ca
ofClaim.AtthecloseoftheTrial,theDefendant’scounsel
submittedthatheneednotaddressthesestatements.
CounselreliedonRule13.7whichrequiresthatthe
particularsofdefamationbepled.
NixonJ.notedthatthepurposeofRule13.7inthecontext
ofdefamationistoensurethataDefendanthasadequate
noticeofallegeddefamatorystatements.Moreover,the
overallintentoftheRulesistoensurethatallegationsare
sufficientlypledpriortoTrial.ADefendantshouldknowthe
caseheisrequiredtomeetinordertoprepareadefence
andavoidsurpriseatTrial.However,NixonJ.alsonoted
thatamendmentstoaStatementofClaimcanbemade
evenattheendofTrialpursuanttoRule3.65.Thekey
questionaCourtwillconsideriswhetheraDefendantwill
sufferprejudiceiftheamendmentsareallowed.
TheCourtruledthattheDefendantwouldnotsuffer
prejudiceifcertainstatementsnotincludedinthe
pleadingswereconsideredbytheCourt.Someofthe
statementshadbeenincludedintheagreedexhibitsprior
totheTrialsotheDefendantwasmadeawareofthemand
addressedthem.
TheCourtruledthatothercertainstatementsnotpled
thatwouldcauseprejudicetotheDefendantiftheywere
consideredbytheCourt.Specifically,thePlaintiffalleged
thattheDefendanthadmadedefamatorystatementsina
letterofcomplainttotheAlbertaDentalAssociationand
College.Formalcomplaintstoprofessionaldisciplinary
bodiesaresubjecttoabsoluteprivilege,anditwas
thereforelikelythattheDefendantwouldhaveamended
hisStatementofDefencetoincludethisdefencehadthe
allegationsbeenproperlyincludedintheStatementof
Claim.NixonJ.ruledthattheallegationsregardingthe
letterofcomplaintwouldnotbeconsideredbytheCourt.
RDX TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION V APPEL, 2019 ABQB 477 (MAHONEY J)Rule 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies)
ThePlaintifffiledaStatementofClaiminAlbertaalleging
fraudandmisrepresentation.Agroupoftheseveral
Defendants(“CWT”)respondedwithanApplicationtostay
theAlbertaActiononthebasisthattheStateofNewYork
wastheappropriateforum.CWTlaterfiledanApplication
allegingthattheAlbertaActionwasres judicataonaccount
ofaJudgmententeredinNewYork.TheCourtfoundthat
theres judicataApplicationfellunderRule3.68(2)(d),
engagingthemeritsoftheAlbertaAction,andconstituting
attornmenttoAlberta’sjurisdiction.Assuch,CWTwas
precludedfromchallengingjurisdiction,andtheCourt
wentontoconsidertheres judicataApplication,aswell
asarelatedApplicationbroughtbythePlaintifftorestrain
CWTfromseekingrecognitionoftheNewYorkjudgmentin
Ontario.
OUELLETTE V LAW SOCIETY OF ALBERTA, 2019 ABQB 492 (PHILLIPS J)Rule 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies)
TheAppellants(the“Ouellettes”)appealedtheDecision
ofMasterRobertsonstrikingtheirAmendedStatementof
Claim(the“Claim”)againsttheLawSocietyofAlberta(the
“LSA”),pursuanttoRule3.68onthegroundsthatthere
wasnoclaiminlaw.
ThePlaintiff,Mr.ChristianSylvaOuellette(“Mr.Ouellette”)
isaformermemberoftheLSAandwasdisbarredin2016
followingadisciplinaryhearing.Mr.OuelletteandMr.
Ouellette’ssonweresuingtheLSAintheunderlyingAction
seekingadeclarationthatthedisbarmentdecisionwas
voidab initio(duetotheactualbiasor,inthealternative,
reasonableapprehensionofbias),reinstatement,Charter
damagesaswellasotherrelief.Mr.Ouellette’ssonwas
alsosuingfordamagesarisingoutofthelossofparental
guidance,whichheclaimswascausedbytheproceedings
againsthisfather.
JusticePhillipsnotedthatgenerallyitisdifficulttosucceed
inanActionfordamagesagainstaregulatorsuchasthe
LSA.First,Charterbreachesdonotnecessarilyleadtoan
awardofCharterdamages.Second,policyreasonsmay
militateagainsttheexistenceofaprivatedutyofcareowed
byaregulator.Protectionfromlawsuitsisimportantto
controlthedepletionofresourcesandthepotentialchilling
ADVOCACY IS OUR BUSINESS 22
JSS BARR IST E RS RULES
Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP
effectthatitcouldhaveonaregulatororgenerallywith
respecttoquasi-judicialdecisionmaking.Thesepolicy
reasonscannegateaprimafaciedutyofcareowedbya
regulator.
PhillipsJ.alsonotedthatstatutoryandcommonlaw
immunityfurtherrestrictstheabilitytosuearegulatorand
that,inordertoovercometheimmunitygrantedunder
theLegal Profession Act,RSA2000,cL-8(the“Act”),a
Plaintiffmustfirstestablishasupportableclaimaswellas
anabsenceofgoodfaith,forinstancebyprovingmalice
orbadfaith.Inotherwords,andasstatedbyMaster
Robertson,aregulatorcannotbesuedwhendoingitsjob.
JusticePhillipsreviewedtherelevantjurisprudenceand
foundthatthecaselawmadeitclearthattheLSAdid
notoweaprivatelawdutyofcaretoMr.Ouelletteorhis
son.Additionally,JusticePhillipsfoundthatthecaseof
Merchant v Law Society of Alberta,2008ABCA363was
instructiveforthepropositionthattheusualruleisfora
litiganttoexhaustallappealprocesseswithintheActprior
tocommencingaclaim(whichhadnottakenplace).In
otherwords,fortheCourttogooutsidetheAppealprocess
oftheLSAinthiscasewouldbeacollateralattackand
thereforeanabuseofprocess.
Accordingly,JusticePhillipsdismissedtheAppeal,and
MasterRobertson’sOrderstrikingtheClaimwasupheld.
HUGHES V STEWART, 2019 ABQB 494 (NIELSEN ACJ) Rules 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies) and 9.4 (Signing Judgments and Orders)
TheApplicant,Hughes,filedanOriginatingApplication,
whichwasbroughttoNielsenA.C.J.’sattentionforreview
asapossiblevexatiousproceeding,pursuanttoCivil
PracticeNoteNo.7(“CPN7”).NielsenA.C.J.explained
thatCPN7isadocument-basedreviewpursuanttoRule
3.68,whichwasrecentlyintroducedtomanageapparently
vexatious,abusive,orunmeritoriouslitigationinacost-
effective,proportionate,andtimelyway.CPN7employs
“restrictedformsofevidence”andhasanarrowfocus.It
shouldonlybeusedinthe“clearercasesofabuse”,and
wherethepleading’sdefectsareapparentonitsface.
NielsenA.C.J.reviewedHughes’Application,and
determinedthatitwassuitableforreviewunderCPN7.His
LordshipcametothisconclusionbecausetheApplication
containedbaldallegationsofabuse,perjury,andother
misconductbutdidnotappearto“provideabasisforthe
RespondentsandCourttorespond”;andbecauseitsought
“disproportionateorimpossibleremedies”withoutproviding
abasisforthem.Assuch,NielsenA.C.J.stayedtheAction
andrequiredHughestofilewrittensubmissionspursuantto
paragraph3(b)ofCPN7.
Finally,HisLordshipnotedthatHugheswasalreadysubject
toaFinalOrderRestrictingAccesstoPrivateInformation
(the“Order”),whichimposedgatekeepingprocedures
respectingprivateinformation.GiventheOrder,itappeared
thatHughes’litigationwasabusive,soNielsenA.C.J.
imposedinterimCourtaccessrestrictionsonHughes,and
heldthatHughes’approvaloftheOrderwasnotrequired
pursuanttoRule9.4(2)(c).
DEVINE V ALBERTA SUPPORTS, 2019 ABQB 502 (THOMAS J)Rule 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies)
JusticeThomasreviewedtheApplicant’sOriginating
ApplicationpursuanttoCivilPracticeNoteNo.7(“CPN7”)
asbeinganApparentlyVexatiousApplicationorProceeding
(“AVAP”).TheCPN7protocolwasinitiatedbycounselfor
theRespondentswritingtotheCourttoindicatethatthe
OriginatingApplicationwasanAVAP.
JusticeThomasnotedthattheCPN7protocolisdesigned
tomanagelitigationwhichonitsfaceappearstobe
unmeritorious,hasnoprospectofsuccess,orisotherwise
abusiveandvexatious.TheCPN7protocolprovidesa
mechanismforanAVAPtobereviewedbytheCourt
which,ifconvincedthatthepleadingmaybesubjecttobe
struckpursuanttoRule3.68,willinitiatea“showcause”
procedurewhichprovidestherespondentwith14daysto
providewrittensubmissionstotheCourttodemonstrate
whytheAVAPisalegitimateactionandshouldbe
permittedtocontinue.JusticeThomasnotedthattheCPN7
protocolisreservedfor“clearercasesofabuse”.
23
OCTOBER 2019
Volume 2 Issue 15
www.jssbarristers.ca
JusticeThomasconcludedthatonitsface,theOriginating
Applicationdisclosedthreeissueswhichsuggestedthat
itwasanAVAPwhichcouldbestruckpursuanttoRule
3.68.First,theApplication’spleadingswereincomplete,
astheonlystatedgroundfortheApplicationwas“Forall
thebasis’soutlined”intheApplicant’sAffidavit.Rule3.68
requirespleadingstobeevaluatedwithoutreferenceto
externalevidence,andthus,JusticeThomasconcludedthat
thepleadingitselfwasfatallyincomplete.
Second,JusticeThomasconcludedthateveniftheAffidavit
wasconsidered(“inanexcessofcaution”)theApplication
didnotprovideabasisforameaningfulresponseasit
requestedtheCourtto“strikedown”thelegislationand
regulationbehindgovernmentprogramswithoutspecifying
whichlegislationorprovisionsshouldbestruckdown,and
didnotprovideafactualfoundationorlegalbasisforwhy
thoseprovisionsshouldbestruckdown.TheAffidavitalso
disclosedanintentiontopursueexpandingandescalating
litigation,itselfanindiciaofabusivelitigation.
Third,JusticeThomasfoundthattheApplicationappeared
toseekimpossibleremediesdirectedatremedying
perceivedgovernmentalshortcomings,ratherthanenforcing
theApplicant’sindividualrights.JusticeThomasnotedthat
requestingtheCourttooperateoutsideitsproperauthority
andtoacknowledgeperceivedgovernmentshortcomingsis
animproperpurpose.
JusticeThomasconcludedthattheOriginatingApplication
wasanAVAP,andinitiatedtheshowcauseprocedurefor
theApplicanttoprovideawrittenresponsejustifyingwhy
theproceedingshouldnotbestruckinwholeorinpart
pursuanttoRule3.68.
BILEY V INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE OF THEATRICAL STAGE EMPLOYEES, 2019 ABQB 506 (THOMAS J) Rules 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies), 9.4 (Signing Judgments and Orders), 10.29 (General Rules for Payment of Litigation Costs) and Schedule C
TheCourtinitiatedareviewofthePlaintiff,Biley’s,Action
pursuanttotheprocesssetoutinCivilPracticeNoteNo.
7(“CPN7”)whichconductsadocumentbasedreviewof
apparentlyvexatiousorabusiveproceedingstodetermine
iftheyshouldbestruckpursuanttoRule3.68.Biley
submittedwrittensubmissionsinaccordancewithCPN7’s
requirementsthroughwhichheattemptedtoexplainthe
allegationsandremediessoughtinhisclaimagainstthe
Defendants,aswellasanAffidavit.Theotherpartiesalso
submittedwrittensubmissions.
ThomasJ.notedthatpursuanttoRule3.68,theCourt
maynotconsiderevidenceindeterminingwhetherallor
partofanActionshouldbestruckundertheRule,and
thereforedeclinedtoconsiderBiley’sAffidavit.HisLordship
concludedthatBileyhadfailedtorebutthepresumption
underCPN7thathisclaimwasabusiveandhopeless,and
thereforestruckitout.
WithrespecttoCosts,ThomasJ.notedthatpursuantto
Rule10.29,Biley’sclaimpresumptivelyfellunderColumn
5ofScheduleC,butalsocommentedthatlump-sumCosts
awardsareappropriateinabusivelitigationsituationsto
concludetheproceedingsandsendamessagethatsuch
litigationwillbe“dealtwithswiftlyanddecisively”.As
such,HisLordshipawarded$4,000inCoststobepaid
forthwith,anddispensedwithBiley’sapprovalastothe
formandcontentofhisOrderpursuanttoRule9.4(2)(c).
PEETS V ALBERTA (JUSTICE & SOLICITOR GENERAL), 2019 ABQB 507 (NIELSEN ACJ)Rules 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies) and 9.4 (Signing Judgments and Orders)
ThePlaintiff,DavidAndrewPeets(“Mr.Peets”),fileda
StatementofClaim(the“Claim”)againstAlbertaJustice.
TheClaimwasbroughttotheattentionofAssociateChief
JusticeNielsenpursuanttoparagraph5ofCivilPractice
NoteNo.7(“CPN7”)forreviewasapossibleApparently
VexatiousApplicationorProceeding(“AVAP”).
UnderCPN7,if,oninitialreviewbytheCourt,anAVAP
appearstobeunmeritorious,hasnoprospectofsuccess,oris
otherwiseabusiveandvexatious,thentheCourtissuesafirst
writtendecisionthatidentifiestheapparentissue(s)whichmay
beabasistoapplyunderRule3.68tostrikeoutthefiling.
ADVOCACY IS OUR BUSINESS 24
JSS BARR IST E RS RULES
Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP
TheClaimasserted,amongotherthingsthat,thatMr.Peets
wasunlawfullyincarceratedwithoutlawfulexcuseand
receivedcruelandunusualpunishmentinviolationofthe
Criminal CodeandtheCharter,forwhichMr.Peetssought
$25millionindamages.
NielsenA.C.J.foundthattheClaimmayhavebeenan
AVAPforanumberofreasons,including:(1)theClaimdid
notappeartoprovideabasisfortheDefendantsandCourt
torespond;(2)whileMr.Peetsindicatedthatmanyofhis
Charterrightswerebreached,theClaimdidnotindicatethe
factsofthoseallegedbreaches;and(3)theClaimsought
impossibleordisproportionateremedies.
Accordingly,NielsenA.C.J.orderedthatMr.Peetshad14
daysafterthedateoftheDecisiontofileandservewritten
submissionspursuanttopara3(b)ofCPN7.HisLordship
furtherorderedthattheCourtwouldprepareandservethe
interimOrderstayingtheActionandthatMr.Peets’approval
ofthatOrderwasnotrequiredpursuanttoRule9.4(2)(c).
LAIRD V ALBERTA (TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD), 2019 ABQB 567 (ROOKE ACJ)Rule 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies)
TheCourtwasaskedbytheDefendant,theAlbertaSerious
IncidentResponseTeam(“ASIRT”),toengageCivil
PracticeNote7whichallowstheCourttoevaluatewhether
aStatementofClaimrepresentsanApparentVexatious
ApplicationorProceeding(“AVAP”).ThePlaintiff,Laird,
allegedintheStatementofClaimthathehadbeenavictim
ofhundredsofunprovokedattacksbythepoliceincluding
numerousunwarrantedarrests.
TheCourtconsideredLaird’sStatementofClaimand
concludedthereweremultipleproblemswithitthatcould
begroundsfordismissalunderRule3.68.TheStatement
ofClaimdidnotprovideenoughinformationtoallowthe
Defendantstorespondtoit;thedetailsandspecificsof
theallegationswereeitherabsentorseverelylacking.
Moreover,theStatementofClaimappearedtobehopeless
innumerousrespects.ManyofLaird’sclaimscouldbe
consideredhighlyimprobable,absurd,orhyperbole.
TheCourtconcludedthatareviewpursuanttoCivilPractice
Note7waswarranted.Lairdwasinvitedtomakewritten
submissionswithin14daysastowhytheStatementof
Claimshouldnotbestruck.Followingreceiptofthose
writtensubmissionsandthoseoftheDefendant’s,theCourt
confirmedthatitwouldthenevaluatewhethertostrikethe
StatementofClaimfollowingananalysisofRule3.68.
DEVINE V ALBERTA SUPPORTS, 2019 ABQB 568 (THOMAS J)Rules 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies), 9.4 (Signing Judgments and Orders) and 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs)
UponreceiptoftheApplicant’sdocumentsentitled
“OriginatingApplication”(the“Application”)counselfor
theRespondentswrotetotheCourttoindicatethatthe
ApplicationmaybeanApparentlyVexatiousApplication
orProceeding(“AVAP”),asdefinedunderCivilPractice
NoteNo.7(“CPN7”)andmaybestruckunderRule3.68.
JusticeThomasagreed,notingthattheApplication:(1)was
irregularinthatitallegednofacts,butinsteadreferenced
anAffidavitasprovidingthebasisforthelitigation;(2)
didnotappeartoprovideanadequatebasisfortheCourt
andRespondentstomakeameaningfulresponse;and
(3)soughtimpossibleremediesandwasfoundtohavea
politicalratherthanpersonallitigationpurpose.
Accordingly,pursuanttoCPN7,JusticeThomasstayed
theApplicationuntilafterreviewoftheApplicant’swritten
submissionsastowhytheApplicationshouldnotbestruck
pursuanttoRule3.68.
Afterreviewingthewrittensubmissions,ThomasJ.
concludedthattheApplicationwasanabusiveproceeding
andthereforeshouldbestruckpursuanttoRule3.68.
ThomasJ.foundthatsincetheCPN7processwasinitiated
bytheRespondents,Rule10.29applied,andtheApplicant
waspresumptivelyliabletopayCosts.HisLordshipalso
notedthattheApplicanthadobtainedafeewaiverto
initiatetheproceedingandthereforedidnotincurany
expensetocommencetheApplication.JusticeThomas
foundthatmisuseofthefeewaiverprocedurecanopen
AlbertaCourtsuptoabusivelitigation.Accordingly,Justice
25
OCTOBER 2019
Volume 2 Issue 15
www.jssbarristers.ca
Thomasorderedalump-sumCostawardof$500.00to
eachgroupofRespondents.Finally,HisLordshipordered
thatcounselfortheAlbertaGovernmentRespondents
wouldprepareanOrderforthestepsindicatedinHis
Lordship’sDecisionandthatpursuanttoRule9.4(2)(c)the
Applicant’sapprovalofthatOrderwasnotrequired.
KNAKE V PERERA, 2019 ABQB 581 (NIELSEN ACJ)Rule 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies)
UponreceiptofaStatementofClaim,severalDefendants
jointlyrequestedthattheCourtengageCivilPracticeNote
No.7andreviewtheActionasapossibleApparently
VexatiousApplicationorProceeding.
InreviewingtheStatementofClaim,AssociateChief
JusticeNielsennoted:i)baldordeclaratoryallegations
whichdidnotappeartoprovideabasisforameaningful
response;ii)requestsforimpossibleordisproportionate
remedies;andiii)requestsforremediesonbehalfofother
thirdpartieswhoarenotinvolvedinthislawsuit,i.e.,
“busybody”litigation.
HisLordshipconcludedthattheStatementofClaim
exhibitedindiciaofhopelessandabusiveproceedings,and
thereforeshouldbesubjecttotheshowcause,document-
basedreviewcontemplatedinCivilPracticeNoteNo.7.
Assuch,theActionwasstayedpendingafinaldecision
onwhethertheStatementofClaimshouldbestruckout
pursuanttoRule3.68,whichwouldfollowabriefwindow
ofopportunityforthePlaintifftorespondtothedeficiencies
identifiedbytheCourt.
YAREMKEVICH V JACULA, 2019 ABQB 620 (MICHALYSHYN J) Rules 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies) and 9.4 (Signing Judgments and Orders)
AfterthePlaintifffiledaone-lineStatementofClaim
seeking$250,000forperjury,MichalyshynJ.reviewed
itpursuanttoCivilPracticeNoteNo.7(“CPN7”)to
determinewhetheritshouldbestruckashopeless
andabusive.MichalyshynJ.explainedthatCPN7was
implementedtomanageActionsthatappearontheirface
tobeabusive.ThroughCPN7,theCourtissuesawritten
DecisionsettingouttheissuesuponwhichtheStatement
ofClaimmaybestruckpursuanttoRule3.68.Theparty
filingtheapparentlyabusiveStatementofClaimmaythen
providewrittensubmissionsdemonstratingwhytheAction
islegitimate.MichalyshynJnotedthatCPN7hasanarrow
focusandistobeusedonlyin“clearercasesofabuse”.
AfterreviewingtheStatementofClaim,MichalyshynJ.held
thatitappearedsuitableforreviewunderCPN7.TheAction
wasstayed,andthePlaintiffwasinvitedtoprovideawritten
submissionexplainingwhyitshouldnotbestruckoutin
wholeorinpartpursuanttoRule3.68within14days.
MichalyshynJ.alsonotedthatthePlaintiffhadfiledseveral
documentscontainingOrganizedPseudolegalCommercial
Arguments(“OPCA”),whichwarrantimmediateandbroad
Courtintervention.MichalyshynJ.gavetheparties14days
toprovidewrittensubmissionsaboutwhetherthePlaintiff
shouldbesubjecttoCourtaccessrestrictions.HisLordship
alsoimposedinterimCourtaccessrestrictionsduetothe
Plaintiff’suseofOPCA,anddispensedwiththePlaintiff’s
approvaloftheOrderpursuanttoRule9.4(c).
BAHADAR V REAL ESTATE COUNCIL OF ALBERTA, 2019 ABQB 633 (MASTER PROWSE)Rule 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies)
ThePlaintiffrealtorbroughtanActionagainsttheReal
EstateCouncilofAlberta(“RECA”)andalawfirmalleging
thattheDefendantswereliableformaliciousprosecutionas
aresultofconductproceedingstakenbyRECAagainstthe
Plaintiff.TheDefendantsappliedtostriketheStatementof
ClaimpursuanttoRule3.68onthebasisthatitdisclosed
noreasonableclaimagainstthem.
TheCourtdismissedtheApplicationconcludingthat
theDefendantshadnotestablishedthattherewasno
reasonableprospectthatthePlaintiff’sclaimwould
succeed.Specifically,theCourtfoundthat,inlightofthe
ADVOCACY IS OUR BUSINESS 26
JSS BARR IST E RS RULES
Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP
pleadings,whicharepresumedtobetrueunderRule3.68,
itwasnotclearthatRECA’sallegationsagainstthePlaintiff
werenotrootedinmalice.
TheMasteralsodeclinedtoexercisediscretionunderRule
3.68tostrikepartsoftheStatementofClaimcontaining
allegationsofnegligence,whileleavinginallegations
ofmaliciousprosecution.Todosowouldbeanearly
impossibletaskgiventhat“thequestionofwhatisand
whatisnotmaliceissufficientlymurky.”
SMITH V CANADA (CORRECTIONAL SERVICE CANADA), 2019 ABQB 639 (NIELSEN ACJ)Rule 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies)
ThePlaintiff,Smith,filedaStatementofClaimforpoor
treatmentofhistenniselbowwhileincarceratedatthe
BowdenInstitution.TheStatementofClaimwasbrought
beforetheCourtforreviewunderCivilPracticeNote7
whichprovidesproceduralguidanceindealingwithan
ApparentVexatiousApplicationorProceeding(“AVAP”).
NielsenA.C.J.statedthattheCourtmaystrikethe
StatementofClaimwhenitisaclearcaseofabuseor
hasapparentdefects.NielsenA.C.J.firstconsidered
thequantumofdamagesappropriatetoclaiminthe
circumstanceofpoorlytreatedtenniselbow.Theamount
ofdamagesclaimedbySmithwasexcessive,and
NielsenA.C.J.notedthatexcessiveordisproportionate
claimsare“abasistoconcludetheactionisanabuse
ofcourtprocesses.”NielsenA.C.J.alsonotedthatwhen
aproceedingseeksaglobalcorrectionofagovernment
shortcoming,itisgenerallyaproceedingwithanimproper
purpose.ForthesereasonsAssociateChiefJusticeNielsen
stayedtheAction.NielsenA.C.J.orderedthatSmithhad
14daystoprovidenomorethan10pagesofwritten
submissionstodefendhisActionortheCourtwouldstrike
theActioninwholeorinpartpursuanttoRule3.68.
GACIAS V EQUIFAX CANADA CO, 2019 ABQB 640 (NIELSEN ACJ) Rules 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies) and 9.4 (Signing Judgments and Orders)
ThePlaintiff’sStatementofClaim,whichallegedthatthe
DefendanthadreportedthePlaintiff’screditinformation
inaccurately,wasforwardedtoNielsenA.C.J.inaccordance
withCivilPracticeNoteNo.7(“CPN7”),sothatitcouldbe
reviewedasapossibleApparentlyVexatiousApplicationor
Proceeding(“AVAP”).HisLordshipexplainedthatCPN7is
aprocessthroughwhichtheCourtinterveneswhenamatter
appearstobeclearlywithoutmerit“onthefaceofthe
pleading”.Onlyrestrictedformsofevidenceareconsidered
duringaCPN7review.
NielsenA.C.J.reviewedthePlaintiff’sStatementof
Claimandnotedthatit“appear[ed]tobeanattemptto
implementapseudolegalschemetoeliminatedebt”.As
theStatementofClaimcontainedapparentOrganized
PseudolegalCommercialArguments(“OPCA”),it
constitutedanabuseoftheCourt’sprocessesandwas
thereforesuitableforreviewunderCPN7.Inaccordance
withCPN7,HisLordshipthereforeprovidedthePlaintiff
with14daystoserveawrittensubmissionexplainingwhy
theStatementofClaimshouldnotbestruckoutinwholeor
inpartpursuanttoRule3.68.
BecausethePlaintiffhademployedOPCAstrategies,His
LordshipalsoimposedinterimCourtaccessrestrictionson
thePlaintiffpursuanttoCPN7.ThePlaintiff’sapprovalof
theOrderimposingthoserestrictionswasdispensedwith
pursuanttoRule9.4(2)(c).
BELCZOWSKI V REID, 2019 ABQB 709 (NIELSEN ACJ)Rules 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies), 9.4 (Signing Judgments and Orders) and 13.7 (Pleadings: Other Requirements)
TheCourthadpreviouslydeterminedthattheStatement
ofClaimfiledinthisActionwasanApparentlyVexatious
ApplicationorProceedingbecausethePlaintiffhadmade
bald,unsupportedallegationsand,specifically,failedto
giveparticularsofallegeddefamationasrequiredunder
27
OCTOBER 2019
Volume 2 Issue 15
www.jssbarristers.ca
Rule13.7.Furthermore,thePlaintiffrequestedexcessive,
impossibleordisproportionateremedies,includingCharter
reliefforwhichtheStatementofClaimcontainednofactual
foundation.
TheCourtorderedthatthePlaintiffbesubjecttoashow-
causedocument-basedreviewunderRule3.68andstayed
theActionwithoutthePlaintiff’sapprovalpursuantto
Rule9.4.
ORR V ALOOK, 2019 ABQB 713 (FRIESEN J)Rule 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies)
ThePlaintiffappliedunderRule3.68(4)tostrikeallorpart
ofanAffidavitsworninsupportoftheDefendant’sposition
foraSummaryTrial.TheActionrelatedtothePlaintiff’s
claimforcompensationasamemberofacommitteetasked
withinstructingcounselandadvancingclaimsonbehalf
oftheDefendantIndianBand(the“Band”)regarding
aboriginallandandlegalstatusclaims.Theimpugned
AffidavitwasswornbythelawyerfortheBandinthe
aboriginallandandlegalstatusclaimsandconcernedthe
lawyer’sopinionregardingthesuitabilityofthematterfor
determinationbywayofSummaryTrial.ThePlaintiffargued
thathereasonablybelievedhimselftobethelawyer’s
formerclientandthatthelawyerwasactinginaconflict
ofinterestandinbreachofthedutyofloyaltybyproviding
evidenceagainsthim.Further,thePlaintiffarguedthatthe
Affidavitwasfrivolous,irrelevant,andimproperargument
andopinionwhichshouldbestruckbeforeTrial.
JusticeFriesenheldthatRule3.68(4)allowsapartyto
seekaninterlocutoryorpreliminaryrulingtostrikeallor
partofanAffidavit,butthattheapplicationoftheRule
isdiscretionary.FriesenJ.notedthatRule3.68wasnot
intendedtoencourageinterlocutoryApplicationsregarding
evidentiaryexclusionspriortothembeingheardand
assessedbytheTrialJudge.
JusticeFriesennotedthattheimpugnedAffidavithadbeen
filednearlytwoyearsbeforethepresentApplicationwas
brought,indicatingtherewasnourgentneedtostrikethe
AffidavitpriortotheSummaryTrial.JusticeFriesenheld
thatthequestionsofadmissibilityandweighingofevidence
raisedbythePlaintiff’sApplicationwerebestdetermined
bytheTrialJudge,whowouldbeinthebestpositionto
knowthefactsofthematterandconsidertheargumentsin
thebroadercontextoftheAction.
ThePlaintiff’sApplicationwasdismissedwithoutprejudice
tothePlaintiff’srighttoaddresstheissuesattheSummary
Trial.
KOZINA V REDLICK, 2019 ABQB 749 (MASTER SMART)Rules 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)
ThePlaintiffallegedtheDefendantpoliceofficers,police
chiefandpoliceservicehadcoveredupanincidentof
policebrutalitywhichoccurredduringhisarrest.The
DefendantsarguedtherewasnogenuineissueforTrial
andappliedtostrikeallorpartoftheStatementofClaim
pursuanttoRule3.68,oralternatively,SummaryDismissal
pursuanttoRule7.3.TheCourtdeclinedtogranteither
Application.
InrefusingtoexercisehisdiscretionunderRule3.68to
strikethepleadings,specificallytheCharterreliefsought,
MasterSmartfoundthattherewasareasonableprospect
thatthePlaintiff’sclaimforCharterdamagesagainstthe
DefendantscouldsucceedatTrial.Furthermore,Master
SmartfoundthattheStatementofClaimwasnotanabuse
ofprocessnorwasitadvancedinbadfaithandshould
thereforenotbestruck.
HE V APEGA APPEAL BOARD, 2019 ABCA 298 (KHULLAR JA)Rules 3.74 (Adding, Removing or Substituting Parties After Close of Pleadings) and 14.57 (Adding, Removing or Substituting Parties to an Appeal)
AregulatedmemberoftheAssociationofProfessional
EngineersandGeoscientistsofAlberta(“APEGA”)was
thesubjectofdisciplinaryproceedings.Heappealedthe
findingsofAPEGA’sAppealBoardtotheCourtofAppeal.
ByvirtueoftheEngineering and Geoscience Professions
Act,RSA2000,cE-11(the“Act”),theAppealBoard
ADVOCACY IS OUR BUSINESS 28
JSS BARR IST E RS RULES
Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP
wasnamedasaRespondent.TheAppealBoardthen
appliedtoaddAPEGA’sInvestigativeCommitteeasan
additionalRespondent,pursuanttoRule14.57,whichRule
incorporatesRule3.74intoappellateprocedure.
TheregulatedmemberresistedadditionoftheInvestigative
Committee,arguingthattheAppealBoardwastheonly
RespondentnamedintheAct.JusticeKhullarfoundthat
theActdidnotgosofarastodirectthattheAppealBoard
betheonlyRespondentandnotedthattheAppealBoard’s
participationintheAppealwassignificantlycircumscribed
giventhegeneralrulethatanadjudicativetribunalis
prohibitedfrommakingargumentsinsupportofitsown
decisioninastatutoryAppeal.TheCourtorderedthe
additionoftheInvestigativeCommitteeasaRespondent
totheAppeal,asitwouldnotcausetheregulatedmember
prejudice,andwouldensureanadversarialprocess.
HLFN INDUSTRY RELATIONS CORPORATION V HORSEMAN, 2019 ABQB 564 (ROSS J)Rule 4.22 (Considerations for Security for Costs Order)
TheCourtconsideredanApplicationforanOrderfor
SecurityforCostsagainsttwoindividualRespondentswhom
theApplicantsclaimedwereinsolvent.
TheCourtfollowedatwo-stepprocess:first,considering
thefactorsinRule4.22;andsecond,consideringwhether
itwasjustandreasonabletogranttheOrder.JusticeRoss
firstdeterminedthatthefactorssetoutinRule4.22
supportedanOrderforSecurityforCosts.JusticeRoss
foundthatiftheApplicantssuccessfullydefendedthe
CounterclaimbroughtbytheRespondents,theRespondents
wouldnotbeabletopayaCostsawardandtheApplicants
wouldbeunabletosatisfyaCostsOrderagainstassetsin
Alberta.Furthermore,inanalyzingthemeritsoftheAction,
HerLadyshipfoundtheevidencesuggestedthattherewas
astrongcaseagainsttheRespondents.
JusticeRossalsoconfirmedthat,giventheevidencewhich
suggestedtheRespondentshadimproperlyusedmoney
meanttobenefittheApplicants,itwasjustandreasonable
togranttheApplicationforSecurityforCosts.
RDX TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION V APPEL, 2019 ABCA 338 (FEEHAN JA)Rules 4.22 (Considerations for Security for Costs Order) and 14.67 (Security for Costs)
UponappealingseveralDecisionsmadebytheCase
ManagementJusticeinrelationtoanongoingdispute
overforum,theDefendantssoughtastayoftheCase
ManagementOrderpendinganAppeal.ThePlaintiff
thereafterbroughtaCross-ApplicationseekingSecurityfor
CostsoftheAppeal,pursuanttoRules4.22and14.67.
TheApplicationforastaywasdismissed,saveforasmall
portionoftheCaseManagementOrder.
WithrespecttoSecurityforCosts,theCourtobservedthat
suchOrdersasagainstDefendantsarerare,“particularly
wheretheplaintiffhaschosentolitigateinajurisdiction
wherethedefendantshavenopresenceandhavenochoice
inbeingpartiestotheaction”.Notingtheimportanceofthis
considerationwhere“thereisaseriouscontestbetweenthe
partiesastotheappropriateforumforthelitigationbetween
them”,theCourtdeclinedtograntSecurityforCosts.
FJN V JK, 2019 ABCA 305 (WATSON, SLATTER AND O’FERRALL JJA)Rules 4.29 (Costs Consequences of Formal Offer to Settle), 14.88 (Cost Awards) and Schedule C
TheAppellantappealedaCostsDecisionoftheTrial
JudgefollowingaTrialregardingchildsupportobligations.
TheTrialJudgefoundthattheAppellanthadengagedin
litigationmisconductbybeinguncooperativeasawitness,
byattemptingtomisleadtheCourtthroughhisevidence,
bynotbeingforthcomingwithfinancialdisclosure,andby
failingtoadmitparentagewhichledtoapreviouscontested
Application.
IntheCostsDecision,theTrialJudgeappliedColumn4
ofScheduleC,consideringtheamountatissuewasto
includetheamountofchildsupporttobepaiduntilthe
childturned18.TheTrialJudgealsodoubledtheColumn
4Costsonaccountoflitigationmisconduct,forbothTrial
CostsandforpriorstepsandApplications.TheTrialJudge
alsodisregardedasettlementoffermadebytheAppellant
29
OCTOBER 2019
Volume 2 Issue 15
www.jssbarristers.ca
onthebasisthatitincludedarequestfortheRespondent’s
husbandtoadoptthechild.
TheAppellantallegedthattheTrialJudgeerredbyapplying
thewrongcolumnofScheduleC,byawardingmisconduct
Costs,byalteringpriorCostsorders,andbyignoringa
genuinesettlementoffer.
TheMajoritynotedthatCostsawardsarediscretionary
andshouldonlybesetasidewheretherewasanerrorin
principle,ortheawardwasplainlywrong.TheMajority
foundthattheTrialJudgeerredbyincludingallchild
supporttoage18inthecalculationofthequantumfor
thepurposesofdeterminingtheappropriateScheduleC
column.TheMajorityheldthatColumn2ofScheduleC
wastheappropriatecolumn.
RegardingtheenhancedCostsaward,theMajoritynoted
thattheTrialJudgecitedthecorrectprinciple,whichis
thatCostsfortheTrialareinfluencedbyTrialconduct,
notgeneralconduct.However,theMajorityfoundthatthis
principlewasnotapplied,astheTrialJudgeconsidered
pre-TrialconductasjustifyingadvancedCostsincludingfor
stepswhereCostshadalreadybeenruledonbyprevious
Courts.TheMajorityalsodeterminedthattherewasnothing
objectionableabouttheAppellant’sdisclosurewhichwould
justifyenhancedCosts.TheMajorityalsoheldthatthe
TrialJudgeerredbyapplyingdoubleCostsbasedupona
rejectionoftheAppellant’sevidence,notingthatdoing
sowould“virtuallyjustifydoublecostsagainsttheloser
ineverycase”.TheMajorityalsoheldthattheTrialJudge
erredinlawbydoublingfixedCostsamountswhichhad
alreadybeencalculatedbypriorJudges.
RegardingthesettlementoffermadebytheAppellant,the
MajoritynotedthattheofferwasnotgovernedbyRule4.29
orCalderbankprinciples,thatthefinancialoffermadeby
theAppellantwasfoundtobe“reasonable,evengenerous”,
andwouldhavebeenbetterthanthesumsultimately
awardedbytheCourtofAppeal.TheMajorityheldthatit
wasnot“unseemly”fortheAppellanttoincludearequest
fortheRespondent’shusbandtoadoptthechildasitwould
bringfinalitytohisfinancialobligations.TheMajority
foundthattheofferwasabonafideofferwithadequate
timeforconsideration,whichshouldbefactoredinthe
determinationofCosts“toaffirmthepolicysupporting
settlementoffers”.TheMajorityheldthatCostsshould
bepayableonColumn2ofScheduleCuptothedateof
theoffer,andthatthepartiesshouldbeartheirownCosts
thereafter.
TheMajoritynotedthatthedefaultpositionforAppeal
CostsunderRule14.88isthatCostsareawardedtothe
partywhohadsubstantialsuccessonAppeal.TheMajority
alsocommentedthatorderingnoCostsonAppealsinfamily
lawcasesdiscouragespartieswithgoodcasesbutweak
resources.TheAppellantwasfoundtobesubstantially
successfulonAppealandwasawardedCostsfortheAppeal
onColumn2ofScheduleC.
LAY V LAY, 2019 ABCA 355 (ROWBOTHAM, WAKELING AND CRIGHTON JJA)Rules 4.29 (Costs Consequences of Formal Offer To Settle), 10.30 (When Costs Award May Be Made), 10.44 (Appeal to Judge), 13.5 (Variation of Time Periods), 14.5 (Appeals Only With Permission), 14.59 (Formal Offers to Settle) and 14.88 (Cost Awards)
TheAppellantshadbeenunsuccessfulontheirAppeal.
TheAppellantssoughtarulingfromtheCourtofAppeal
onCostsoftheActionortovarythedecisionofan
AssessmentOfficeronCosts.TheCourtofAppealnoted
thatanAssessmentOfficerdecisionmaybeappealed
pursuanttoRule10.44.UnderRule10.44theAppeal
oftheAssessmentOfficer’sdecisionistotheCourtof
Queen’sBenchandnottotheCourtofAppeal.Oncethe
CourtofQueen’sBenchissuesaDecisionfollowingthe
AssessmentOfficer’sdecision,thenthatDecisionofthe
CourtofQueen’sBenchmaybeappealedtotheCourtof
AppealifthepartyisgrantedpermissiontoAppealunder
Rule14.5(1)(e),asaCostsDecisioncanonlybeappealed
ifpermissiontoAppealhasbeenobtained.
TheCourtofAppealthereforeheldthatitdidnothave
jurisdictiontomakeadeterminationonCostsandthe
Applicationwasdismissed.
ADVOCACY IS OUR BUSINESS 30
JSS BARR IST E RS RULES
Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP
InobitertheCourtofAppealmadeanumberofcomments
aboutCostsdeterminations.Rule14.88(3)statesthat
thedefaultruleisthatCostsinanAppealwillbeatthe
samescalethatappliestotheJudgmentappealedfrom.
Generally,asperthe“InformationNote”associatedwith
Rule14.88,arequestforspecificdirectiononCostsmust
bemadewithintwo-monthsoftheDecision.Thetwo-month
periodcanbevariedbyRule13.5(2)whichallowsthe
CourttoextendatimeperiodspecifiedintheRules.As
aresult,CostscanbespokentoatanytimeiftheCourt
extendstimepursuanttoRule13.5.ThisCourtstated
thatthisconclusionisfurthersupportedbyRule10.30(1)
whichstatesthataCostsawardmaybemadeafterand
Applicationhasbeendecided,afteraJudgmentorfinal
Orderisgranted,orinrespectofasettlement,Application
orproceedinguponagreement.TheCourtfoundthatthese
Ruleswereirrelevant,astheAppellantswerenotseekinga
rulingonCosts,butwereinfactappealingtheAssessment
Officer’sdecision.
TheCourtfurthercommentedonthedoublingofCostsin
obiter.TheCourtofAppealconsideredtheinterpretation
ofRules4.29and14.59.Inthiscase,priortoobtaining
aJudgment,theDefendanthadmadeasettlementoffer
tothePlaintiffs.TheCostsawardfollowingtheJudgment
wasdoubledforallstepstakenaftertheoffer.Thiswas
inaccordancewithRule4.29.Rule4.29allowsfora
doublingofCostsforstepstakenafteranoffertosettleis
madethatismoregenerousthantheJudgmentorOrder.In
thiscase,theAssessmentOfficerhadalsodoubledCosts
forAppealstepstaken.TheCourtofAppealreiterated
thatRule14.59(4)providesthatwhereaformalofferto
settleanAppealismade,thenCostswillbeawardedin
accordancewithRule4.29.Noformaloffertosettlean
Appealwasmadeinthiscase.TheCourtofAppealmade
nodeterminationontheamountofCosts,butimpliedthat
theamountshouldnothavebeendoubledforAppealsteps
taken.
LAUGHREN V MCALEER, 2019 ABQB 501 (MASTER FARRINGTON)Rules 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay) and 4.33 (Dismissal for Long Delay)
TheDefendantbroughtanApplicationtodismissthe
Action,commencedin2003,fordelaypursuanttoboth
Rules4.31and4.33.
ThePlaintiffallegedthatfollowingthecommencementof
theAction,therewasanagreementbetweentheparties
thattheActionbeheldinabeyanceuntilasecondAction
wasresolved.TheActionwasadvancedbetween2011and
2014.FollowingQuestioningoftheDefendantonApril
15,2014,nofurtheractivityoccurredfornearlythree
years.DaysbeforeApril15,2017,Plaintiff’scounselsent
anAppointmentforQuestioning.TheDefendant’scounsel
rejectedtheAppointmentonthebasisthatinsufficient
noticehadbeenprovided.ThePlaintiffthenfiledtwo
ApplicationsrelatingtoTrialreadiness.ThePlaintiffalso
sworeanAffidavitassertingreadinessforTrial,presumably
waivingtherighttofurtherinterlocutorystepssuchas
Questioning.
WithrespecttothedelayApplication,MasterFarrington
foundneithertheunsuccessfulattempttoschedule
Questioning,northePlaintiff’sapparentwillingnessto
foregofurtherQuestioning,tobeasignificantadvancein
theAction.ItwasknownbyallpartiesthatQuestioning
oftheDefendantwasofminimalassistancebecause
theDefendanthadsufferedaninterveningbraininjury.
Moreover,theApplicationsrelatingtoTrialreadinessdidnot
constituteasignificantadvance,asonehadbeendismissed
andtheotherhadbeenadjourned.MasterFarrington
dismissedtheActionpursuanttoRule4.33.
Inthealternative,MasterFarringtonwouldhavealso
dismissedtheActionforinordinatedelayunderRule
4.31.ThedelayApplicationwasfiled14yearsafterthe
commencementoftheAction.DespitethePlaintiff’sclaims
thattherewasanagreementbetweenthepartiespermitting
delayinproceedingwiththeAction,therewasnoevidence
ofawrittenstandstillagreement.TheMasterstated:“Itis
onethingtoholdamatterinabeyanceforpracticalreasons
31
OCTOBER 2019
Volume 2 Issue 15
www.jssbarristers.ca
forareasonableperiodoftime.Itisquiteanotherthingto
holditinabeyanceforeightyearswithoutsomethingmore
formal.”
EDGAR V SECURITY NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 2019 ABQB 628 (MASTER SCHLOSSER)Rule 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay)
TheDefendantbroughtanApplicationtodismisstheAction
fordelaypursuanttoRule4.31.InAugustof2017,the
partieshadagreedtoalitigationplan.Despitetheeffortsof
theDefendant,thePlaintifffailedtomeetanyofdeadlines
inthelitigationplan.
MasterSchlosserappliedtheRule4.31testsetoutin
Humphreys v Trebilcock,2017ABCA116.Thefirstpart
ofthetestrequiresthattheCourtconsiderwhetherthe
PlaintiffhasadvancedtheActiontothepointoflitigation
thatareasonablelitigantwouldhaveattained.Master
Schlosserfoundthepartieswerebestabletodecidewhere
themattershouldbe,andtheydidsoviathelitigationplan.
Ifthelitigationplanhadbeenfollowed,thematterwould
havebeenconcludedbythetimetheApplicationtodismiss
wastobeheard.Asthelitigationplanwasnotfollowed,the
PlaintiffhadfailedtoadvancetheActionsufficiently.
MasterSchlosserfoundthedelaytobeinordinate;the
Plaintiffhadnotprovidedanyadequateexcuseforthe
delay;therewasnocompellingreasonnottodismiss;and
thePlaintiffhadnotrebuttedthepresumptionthatdelay
causedsignificantprejudicetotheDefendants.Master
SchlosserdismissedtheActionfordelayunderRule4.31
withCoststotheDefendant.
ALSTON V HAYWOOD SECURITIES INC, 2019 ABQB 634 (MASTER PROWSE)Rules 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay) and 4.33 (Dismissal for Long Delay)
TheDefendantsmadeApplicationstodismisstheAction
fordelay.ThePlaintiff’sclaimallegedthattheDefendant
Flowerandhisemployer,theDefendantHaywood,as
financialadvisors,failedtofollowherinstructionsand
breachedtheirfiduciaryduty.
MasterProwsefirstconsideredRule4.31.TheCourt
setoutthefactorsthataCourtwillconsideronan
applicationbroughtpursuanttoRule4.31fromHumphreys
v Trebilcock,2017ABCA116:(1)Hastherebeen
“inordinate”delay?(2)Ifso,isthedelay“inexcusable?”;
(3)Ifso,hasthenon-movingpartyrebuttedthe
presumptionthatsignificantprejudicehasoccurredasa
resultofthedelay?and(4)Ifnot,isthereacompelling
reasonnottodismisstheAction?
MasterProwsefoundtherehadbeeninordinatedelay:the
StatementofClaimwasgreaterthannineyearsoldand
wasstillnotreadytobesetdownforTrial.Thedelaywas
alsoinexcusableleadingtoapresumptionthatsignificant
prejudicehadoccurredasaresultofthedelay.ThePlaintiff
hadfailedtorebutthispresumptionandtherewasno
compellingreasonforMasterProwsetoallowtheActionto
continue.TheApplicationtodismisstheActionpursuantto
Rule4.31wasgranted.
Inthealternative,MasterProwseconsideredRule4.33
whichrequiresanActiontobedismissedifthreeormore
yearshavepassedwithouta“significantadvance.”After
reviewingthechronology,MasterProwsefoundthatthelast
significantadvanceintheActionwasoneoftheDefendant’s
answerstowritteninterrogatoriesservedonMarch8,2016.
MasterProwsefoundthatApplicationstoproducefurther
documentsandtosetaTrialdatethatwerefiledsubsequent
toMarch8,2016werenotsufficienttoresetthethree-year
periodbecausetheywereneveractuallyheard.
WithregardstoRule4.33,theActionasagainstthe
DefendantHaywoodwasdismissedastheirApplication
wasmadethreeyearsafterthelastsignificantadvance.
However,theDefendantFlower’sApplicationfordismissal
oftheActionfordelaypursuanttoRule4.33wasdismissed
forbeingpremature.
MasterProwsedismissedtheActionagainstboth
DefendantspursuanttoRule4.31,andasagainstthe
DefendantHaywoodpursuanttoRule4.33.
ADVOCACY IS OUR BUSINESS 32
JSS BARR IST E RS RULES
Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP
KENSINGTON MASTER BUILDERS INC V KRUGER, 2019 ABQB 661 (MASTER SCHLOSSER)Rules 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)
KensingtonMasterBuilders(the“Builder”)wascontracted
tobuildahomeforKrugerandFick(the“Purchasers”).
Upondemandforthefirstprogresspayment,thePurchasers
refused.ThePurchasersbelievedthereweredeficiencies
whichweresignificantenoughtowithholdpayment.
In2013theBuildersuedunderthecontractandthe
Purchaserscountersued.TheBuilderappliedforSummary
JudgmentpursuanttoRule7.3,andthePurchasersmade
across-ApplicationtodismisstheActionfordelaypursuant
toRule4.31.
Rule4.31allowsforanActiontobedismissedfor
delaywhenthedelayisinordinateandinexcusable,as
determinedinthediscretionoftheCourt.MasterSchlosser
foundthatthedelayswereattributabletoboththeBuilder
andthePurchasers.Thesedelayswerenotinexcessof
whatisordinary,andtherewasnoevidenceofserious
prejudice.MasterSchlosserwouldnotdismisstheAction
fordelayunderRule4.31andhencedismissedthe
Purchaserscross-Application.
Rule7.3allowstheCourttoassesstheamountofthe
awardandissueJudgment.MasterSchlossergrantedthe
Builder’sSummaryJudgmentApplication.MasterSchlosser
quicklysummarizedthevaluesasclaimedbytheBuilder,
implicitlyacceptedthevaluesasclaimed,andorderedthe
Purchaserspaytheoutstandingamountfortheworkas
completedincludinginterestpursuanttothecontract.
ROYAL BANK OF CANADA V J&S ENGINEERING SOLUTIONS INC, 2019 ABQB 693 (MASTER PROWSE)Rule 4.33 (Dismissal for Long Delay)
TheApplicant,aThird-PartyDefendantintheAction,
appliedtodismissthethird-partyproceedingsagainstit
duetolongdelaypursuanttoRule4.33.Theissuetobe
decidedbytheCourtwaswhethertheApplicant’sThird-
PartyStatementofDefencerepresenteda“significant
advance”.Ithadbeenfiledwithinthepastthreeyears.
NAHAL V GOTTLIEB, 2019 ABQB 650 (MASTER PROWSE)Rules 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay), 4.33 (Dismissal for Long Delay) and 8.7 (Confirmation of Trial Date)
TheDefendantsbroughtanApplicationtodismissthe
Actioncommencedin2011fordelaypursuanttoboth
Rules4.31and4.33.
TheDefendantsfiledtheirRule4.33ApplicationonApril
11,2019.Inthethreeyearsprior,severalstepshad
occurredincludingthesettingofaTrialdate:theTrial
CoordinatorhadcancelledtheTrialasneitherpartyhad
compliedwithRule8.7byconfirmingTrialreadiness.The
PlaintiffhadsubsequentlybroughtanApplicationtoseta
newTrialdate.ThelatterApplicationdidnotproceedasthe
DefendantsappliedtodismisstheActionfordelaybeforeit
washeard.
Withrespecttothe4.33delayApplication,MasterProwse
foundthatcommencingastepthatisthennotcompleted
doesnotsignificantlyadvancetheAction.Furthermore,
theMasterconsideredthatthetwomethodsofsettinga
matterdownforTrial,eitherthroughcompletionofaForm
37orthroughCourtdirection,areessentiallyinterimsteps
inadvanceofTrial.TheMasterfoundthatiftheTrialisnot
held,thentheinterimstepdoesnotconstituteasignificant
advanceintheAction.MasterProwsedismissedtheAction
pursuanttoRule4.33.
Inthealternative,MasterProwsewouldhavealsodismissed
theActionforinordinatedelaypursuanttoRule4.31.The
Actionhadbeenunderwayforalmosteightyears,which
delayMasterProwsefoundtobeinordinate;thePlaintiff
hadnotprovidedanyadequateexcuseforthedelay;and
thePlaintiffhadnotrebuttedthepresumptionthatthe
delaycausedsignificantprejudicetotheDefendants.
33
OCTOBER 2019
Volume 2 Issue 15
www.jssbarristers.ca
preservedandthatlegalclaimswouldnotbeaffectedby
theCCAAproceedingsforfailingtomeettimelines.
IntheirApplicationforleavetoAppealtheSaleOrdermade
pursuanttosection13oftheCCAA,WiebeandParkland
expressedconcernthatpriortotheSaleOrder,partsof
theWeinrichclaimwere“vulnerabletobeingstruckunder
thedrop-deadrule”undertheStayOrders.TheApplicants
arguedthattheSaleOrdercreatedagreaterscopeforthe
claimtocontinuebytheapplicationofRule4.33(2)(a).
Rule4.33(2)(a)carvesoutanexceptionforthedrop-dead
ruleofthreeyearsunderRule4.33(2)iftheActionisstayed
oradjournedbyanOrder.Rule4.33(10)wasalsoplead,
whichstatestheCourtcannotextendthedrop-deadperiod.
SlatterJ.A.consideredthetestthataCourtwillconsider
whenanApplicationforleavetoAppealismade:(1)
WhetherthepointonAppealisofsignificancetothe
practice;(2)Whetherthepointraisedisofsignificance
totheActionitself;(3)WhethertheAppealisprimafacie
meritoriousorfrivolous;and(4)WhethertheAppealwill
undulyhindertheprogressoftheAction.
JusticeSlattergrantedleavetoAppealtheSaleOrder.
SlatterJ.A.foundthataretroactivestaywasofsignificance
tothepracticeofinsolvencylaw,ofsignificancetothe
Weinrichclaim,andwasanarguableand/ormeritorious
issuewhichwouldnotundulyhinderprogresssincethe
CCAAproceedingshadlargelyconcluded.
TIGER CALCIUM SERVICES INC V SAZWAN, 2019 ABQB 500 (SHELLEY J)Rules 5.2 (When Something is Relevant and Material), 5.13 (Obtaining Records from Others), 6.28 (Application of this Division) and 6.32 (Notice to Media)
ThePlaintiffsweregranted,andactedupon,severalex
parteAntonPillerOrders.MNPLLPhadbeenappointed
bytheCourttoassistinthecomputerforensicsearch
providedforintheAntonPillerOrders;itwasnotaparty
totheAction.TheCourtofAppealoverturnedtheOrders,
promptingseveralaffectedparties(the“Applicants”)to
seekanorganizedreturnofmaterialthathadbeenseized
MasterProwsefoundthattheThird-PartyStatement
ofDefencedidconstituteasignificantadvanceforthe
purposesofRule4.33(2)becauseitputontherecordthe
specificdefencesbeingadvanced.Moreover,MasterProwse
rejectedtheApplicant’sargumentthattheStatementof
DefencewasfiledsimplytoavoidaNotinginDefaultand
wasthereforenotasignificantadvance.Theavoidance
ofaNotinginDefaultshowedthattheStatementof
Defencehada“substantialfunctionalresult”whichwasa
significantadvanceintheAction.
TheApplicationtodismisstheActionforlongdelay
pursuanttoRule4.33wasdismissed.
WIEBE V WEINRICH CONTRACTING LTD, 2019 ABCA 323 (SLATTER JA)Rule 4.33 (Dismissal for Long Delay)
TheApplicants,RoyWiebe(“Wiebe)andParklandAirport
Development(“Parkland”)appliedforleavetoAppeal
pursuanttosection13oftheCompanies’ Creditors
Arrangement Act,RSC1985,cC-36(the“CCAA”).
WeinrichContracting(“Weinrich”)hadconstructedan
airportrunwayforParklandbuthadnotbeenpaidinfull
pursuanttothecontractwithParkland.Inmid-2014,
WeinrichfiledaStatementofClaimagainstParkland
fortheirunpaidbillandagainstWiebeforfraudulent
misrepresentationleadinguptotheformationofthe
contract,amongotherthings.
BeforeWeinrich’sclaimsweredealtwith,Parklandbecame
insolventandenteredCCAAproceedingsinlate2016.
UponenteringtheCCAAproceedings,allActionsagainst
Parklandwerestayed,andtheOrderstayingtheActions
wereextendedmanytimes(the“StayOrders”).Limitation
periodswerealsosuspendedbyvirtueoftheStayOrders.
Arguably,onlypartsofWeinrich’s2014Actionfellwithin
thescopeofsomeoftheStayOrders.
InAprilof2019,theCaseManagementJusticeforthe
CCAAproceedingsgrantedanOrdertoapprovethesaleof
Parkland’slandstoitsfirstmortgagee(the“SaleOrder”).
TheSaleOrderalsostatedthatclaimsagainstotherswere
ADVOCACY IS OUR BUSINESS 34
JSS BARR IST E RS RULES
Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP
ThelimitedscopeofQuestioningpursuanttoRule6.7
wasemphasizedbyreferencetotherelativelybroader
scopeofQuestioningunderPart5oftheRules.Through
Rule5.17,Part5engagesthepartiesorrepresentatives/
affiliatesofpartiestothesubjectmatteroftheAction.
Part5Questioningisfortheinformationalbenefitofthe
questioningparty,andassuch,thequestionedindividuals
areexpectedtobefullyinformedonallmattersrelevant
andmaterialtotheissuesintheActionpursuanttoRules
5.2and5.25,failingwhichRule5.30providesaccessto
informationnotwithinaquestionedindividual’simmediate
knowledge.
Ultimately,theCourtconcludedthattheinformation
soughtbythePlaintiffsbywayoftheUndertakingswasnot
sufficientlyrelatedtotheissueofcertificationwhichwas
thesubstanceoftheApplication,andtheApplicationto
compelresponsestoUndertakingswasdismissed.
PEMBINA PIPELINE CORPORATION V CONEY, 2019 ABQB 699 (ROMAINE J)Rules 5.2 (When Something is Relevant and Material), 5.19 (Limit or Cancellation of Questioning) and 5.25 (Appropriate Questions and Objections)
TheApplicant,PembinaPipelineCorporation(“Pembina”),
appliedtolimitthenumberofitscurrentandformer
employeesthattheDefendants(collectivelyreferredtoas
“Coney”)wouldbeallowedtoquestionintheunderlying
litigation.Specifically,PembinasoughtanOrderdeclaring
thatfouroftheemployeesthatConeysoughttoexamine
shouldnotbeproducedforQuestioning(the“Proposed
Witnesses”).
JusticeRomainenotedthatwhiletheRulesdonotexpressly
limitthenumberofcorporatewitnessesanadverseparty
mayquestion,Rule5.19(a)allowstheCourttolimitthat
number.HerLadyshipnotedthattheissuefortheCourtto
grapplewithwaswheretodrawthelinebetweenlegitimate
andnecessaryquestioningandquestioningthatismerely
“fishing”forevidencewithoutareasonablebasisorthat
hasbeenproposedforillegitimatestrategicreasons.
orsourcedfromseizedmaterial.TheApplicantssoughtthe
returnofscannedelectronicimagesheldbyMNPLLP.
MNPLLPargued,andtheCourtaccepted,thatsuchnon-
partyproductionwasgovernedbyRule5.13,asinformedby
thescopeofrelevanceandmaterialitydefinedinRule5.2.
MNPLLPwasorderedtoproducethescannedelectronic
images.TheCourtfoundthatMNPLLPwasentitledto
reimbursementfortheCostsofproduction,andindicated
thatthePlaintiffsweretheappropriatepartiestobearsuch
expense,butacknowledgedthattheRulesrequirethe
partiesrequestingproductiontopayassociatedCosts.
TheApplicantsalsorequestedasealingOrderovera
portionoftheCourtrecord,ascontemplatedbytheseries
ofRulesbeginningwith6.28.JusticeShelleywasinclined
tograntasealingOrder,asthepersonalandconfidential
informationatissuehadonlybeendisclosedasaresult
oftheimproperlyobtainedOrders.However,HerLadyship
requiredthatproofofnoticetothemediafirstbeprovided,
asrequiredunderRule6.32.
RIEGER V PLAINS MIDSTREAM CANADA ULC, 2019 ABQB 666 (POELMAN J)Rules 5.2 (When Something is Relevant and Material), 5.17 (People Who May be Questioned), 5.25 (Appropriate Questions and Objections), 5.30 (Undertakings) and 6.7 (Questioning on Affidavit in Support, Response and Reply to Application)
ThePlaintiffsbroughtanApplicationtocompelresponses
toUndertakings.TheUndertakingshadbeenrefusedby
theDefendant’sdeponentinAffidavitsfiledwithrespect
toaclassactioncertificationhearing.TheCourtreviewed
theprinciplesapplicabletocross-examinationonan
AffidavitpursuanttoRule6.7,notingthatadeponent
actsaswitnessforthepurposeofapendingApplication.
Accordingly,thescopeofUndertakingobligationsborne
byadeponentislimitedtoinformationordocuments
referencedorrelieduponinthedeponent’sAffidavit,
orinformationrelatingtoanimportantissueinthe
Application,thecollectionofwhichwouldnotbeunduly
onerous.
35
OCTOBER 2019
Volume 2 Issue 15
www.jssbarristers.ca
RomaineJ.reviewedRules5.2and5.25andheldthat
duringQuestioningapersonisonlyrequiredtoanswer
relevantandmaterialquestions,andthataquestionis
deemedrelevantandmaterialonlyiftheanswertothat
questioncouldreasonablybeexpectedeither:(a)to
significantlyhelpdetermineoneormoreoftheissuesraised
inthepleadings,or(b)toascertainevidencethatcould
reasonablybeexpectedtosignificantlyhelpdetermineone
ormoreoftheissuesraisedinthepleadings.
Inthiscontext,JusticeRomainereviewedeachofthe
ProposedWitnessesanddeterminedthatConey’sproposed
QuestioningoftheProposedWitnessescouldnotbe
justified.HerLadyshipconcludedthatConeyhadnot
establishedthattheProposedWitnesseshadanyrelevant
andmaterialinformationontheissuesintheunderlying
litigationandgrantedPembina’sapplicationaccordingly.
CHARUK V TERRAVEST INDUSTRIES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 2019 ABQB 747 (FRASER J)Rules 5.6 (Form and Contents of Affidavit of Records), 5.7 (Producible Records) and 6.14 (Appeal from Master’s Judgment or Order)
TheDefendanttoaclaimofwrongfuldismissalproduced
anAffidavitofRecordsdisclosingaverylargenumberof
e-mails.ThePlaintiffbroughtanApplicationchallenging
therelevanceandmaterialityofthevoluminousdisclosure,
ultimatelyreceivinganOrderfromaMasterdirectingthe
DefendanttoparticularizeitsStatementofDefenceand
totakefurthereffortstobetterfilteritsproductionfor
relevanceandmateriality.
TheDefendantappealedtheMaster’sDecision,arguing
thatitsAffidavitofRecordsproperlydisclosedallrelevant
andmaterialrecordsasrequiredpursuanttoRule5.6,
inthedescriptive,bundledformatcontemplatedinRule
5.7.JusticeFraser,uponnotingthestandardofreviewof
correctnessonanAppealfromaMaster’sDecisiononall
issuespursuanttoRule6.14,agreedthattheStatement
ofDefenceshouldbeamended.JusticeFraserwasnot,
however,preparedtoupholdthedirectiononrelevance
andmateriality,remarkingthatHisLordshipwasnotina
positiontodeterminerelevanceandmateriality,andrather,
findingthattheDefendanthadmetthelowthresholdof
establishingaplausiblelineofargumentthatthee-mailsas
awholewouldprovidecircumstantialevidencerelevantand
materialtowrongfuldismissal.Accordingly,JusticeFraser
deferredaDecisiononCoststotheTrialJudge,suggesting
that“severelyenhanced”Costsbeawardedintheeventthe
e-mailsaredeterminednottoberelevantandmaterial.
ARCHER V RIBBON COMMUNICATIONS CANADA ULC, 2019 ABQB 481 (MASTER FARRINGTON)Rules 5.12 (Penalty For Not Serving Affidavit Of Records) and 11.21 (Service By Electronic Method)
ThePlaintiffbroughtanApplicationtocompelthe
productionoftheDefendant’sAffidavitofRecordsand
seekingpenaltyCostsforlateserviceofanAffidavitof
RecordspursuanttoRule5.12.ThePlaintiffhadsenthis
AffidavitofRecordsviafaxtotheDefendant’scounsel.Six
monthslater,thePlaintiffbroughttheApplicationwithout
anyfurtherfollowupcallsorcorrespondencerequestingthe
Defendant’sAffidavitofRecords.TheDefendantprovided
alegalassistant’sAffidavitadvisingthattherewasno
recordofthePlaintiff’sAffidavitofRecordhavingbeen
received.ThePlaintiffassertedthatserviceofhisAffidavit
ofRecordstriggeringthetimelinefortheDefendant’s
AffidavitofRecordswasestablishedbyRule11.21and
thepresentationofthedeliveryconfirmationprintout.The
DefendantconsentedinadvancetoanOrdersettingadate
fortheproductionofitsAffidavitofRecords,disposingof
thataspectoftheApplication.
MasterFarringtonnotedthatRule11.21requiresthe
documenttobereceivedbytherecipient“inaformthatis
usableforsubsequentreference”anditwasnotclearon
theevidencewhetherthathadoccurred.
MasterFarringtonnotedthatRule5.12containsmore
discretionthanitspredecessorRule190,asitstatesthat
theCourt“may”imposeapenaltyifthenon-movingparty
failedtoserveanAffidavitofRecordswithoutsufficient
cause.MasterFarringtonalsonotedthatestablishing
sufficientcauseforneglecttoserveanAffidavitofRecords
isahighbar,butcanbemadeoutbyextraordinary
circumstancesoverwhichthepartyhadnopractical
ADVOCACY IS OUR BUSINESS 36
JSS BARR IST E RS RULES
Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP
JusticeDunlopalsocommentedonthefiledandunfiled
AffidavitswhichwereprovidedtotheCourt,andnoted
thatoneAffidavitwasswornbythePlaintiff’scounselbut
couldhavebeenswornbyaparty,anddidnotprovide
theevidentiarybasisforaRestrictedCourtAccessOrder.
ThePlaintiffprovidedapartyswornAffidavit(the“Party
Affidavit”)followingJusticeDunlop’srequestatthehearing
ofthematter,resolvingtheevidentiaryissueswiththe
counselswornAffidavit.DunlopJ.notedhowever,thatthe
PartyAffidavitcontainedmuchmoreinformationthanis
requiredtoobtainaRestrictedCourtAccessOrder.
DunlopJ.notedthatconfidentialityOrdersshouldonlybe
grantedwhere(a)itisnecessarytopreventaseriousrisk
toanimportantinterest;and(b)thesalutaryeffectsof
theOrderoutweighthedeleteriouseffectsincludingthe
righttofreeexpressionandthepublicinterestinopenand
accessibleCourtproceedings.JusticeDunlopalsonoted
thatanyconfidentialityOrdershouldberestrictedasmuch
asreasonablypossiblewhilepreservingtheinterestin
question.
JusticeDunlopfoundthattherewereimportantpublic
intereststobeprotectedthroughaRestrictedCourtAccess
Orderwhichweretheconfidentialityofthesettlement
processandtheprivacyinterestsofminorsinthejustice
system.JusticeDunlopnotedhowever,thattheStatement
ofClaimandsubsequentmediacoveragehadalready
disclosedtheminorPlaintiff’smedicalinformationthatwas
soughttobeprotected.JusticeDunlopalsofoundthatonly
thesettlementamountandrelatedinformation(suchas
thecontingencybasedlegalfeespaid)neededtobemade
confidentialtoprotecttherelevantinterests.JusticeDunlop
notedthatthePartyAffidavit,whichwasunfiled,contained
muchmoreinformationthanwasrequiredtosupportan
Ordertoapprovethesettlement.JusticeDunlopnoted
thatthePlaintiffwasfreetore-craftthePartyAffidavit
toremovetheunnecessaryinformation,andtosubmit
onewhichexcludedthesettlementamountandrelated
information,andaseparateAffidavitwhichincludedthe
settlementamount,andthatonlythelatterAffidavitwould
besealed.
TheApplicationwasgrantedinpart.
control.Lastly,MasterFarringtonstatedthatthepurpose
andintentofRule5.12istoencouragetheprompt
productionofdocuments,andtopenalizea“dilatory
defendantthathasdefaultedinitsproductionobligations”,
butthatitwasnotagoalinandofitself,citingtheLaw
SocietyofAlberta Code of Conductwhichdiscourages
partiesfromattemptstogainadvantagesbasedonslipsor
oversightsnotgoingtothemeritsofthedispute.
MasterFarringtonfoundthatthepenaltyinRule5.12was
notwarranted,anddismissedtheApplication.
ATHWAL V MATHER, 2019 ABQB 676 (DUNLOP J)Rules 6.3 (Applications Generally), 6.32 (Notice to Media) and 13.18 (Types of Affidavit)
TheActionstemmedfromaseverebraininjurysustained
bytheminorPlaintiff.Thepartieshadreachedasettlement
andintendedtoapplyforCourtapprovalpursuanttothe
Minor’s Property Act,SA2004,cM-18.1.Theminor
Plaintiff’sLitigationRepresentativealsoappliedfora
RestrictedCourtAccessOrdertosealcertainAffidavits,
restrictpublicaccesstothesettlementapprovalhearing,
andtorestrictaccesstothetranscriptofthathearing.
JusticeDunlopnotedthatRules6.28-6.36applytothe
procedureforaRestrictedCourtAccessApplication,and
thatRule6.32requiresnoticebeprovidedtothemediavia
theCourt’seNoticesystem.DunlopJ.notedthatRules6.3
and13.18alsoappliedtothisApplication.
JusticeDunlopnotedthatthereliefrequestedinthe
Applicationwassimplyfora“RestrictedCourtAccess
Order”withoutparticulars,andthatparticularswereonly
providedbywayofaproposedformofOrderwhichwas
notfiled.JusticeDunlopfoundthatthiswasdeficientand
incontraventionofRule6.3whichrequiresspecifying
the“remedyclaimedorsought”.Failingtospecifythe
particularsoftheOrderresultedininsufficientnoticebeing
giventotheRespondentsandthemedia.Further,Justice
DunlopnotedthatthegroundsstatedintheApplication
simplydeclaredthatthereliefsoughtwasintheminor
Plaintiff’sbestinterests,butdidnotaddressthelegaltest
foraRestrictedCourtAccessOrder.
37
OCTOBER 2019
Volume 2 Issue 15
www.jssbarristers.ca
raisedargumentssurroundingtheparolevidenceruleand
that,atthetimethepromissorynotewassigned,nothing
wasexplainedbythelawyertheymetwith.
JusticeLeenotedregrettablythat,anyeffortsbyVickeato
taxorreviewthestatementsofaccountwouldlikelybe“out
oftime”giventhesixmonthlimitationofRule10.10(2).
JusticeLeeconcludedthatthefactualissuesindispute,
theexceptionstotheparolevidenceruleandtheconceptof
anyoralagreementsmadeinthecasebetweenVickeaand
theRespondent,possiblylimitingtheextentandamount
ofthepromissorynote,madethecasenotsuitablefor
SummaryJudgment.Accordingly,JusticeLeeallowedthe
Appeal,setasidetheSummaryJudgment,andawarded
CoststotheAppellants.
OWNERS: CONDOMINIUM PLAN NO 7721985 V BREAKWELL, 2019 ABQB 674 (MANDZIUK J)Rules 6.14 (Appeal from Master’s Judgment or Order) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)
InanActionbroughtbyacondominiumcorporationto
recoveraninsurancedeductiblefromacondominium
owner,competingApplicationsforSummaryJudgmentand
SummaryDismissalwerebroughtbeforeMasterWachowich.
Theownerwassuccessful,andthecorporationappealed
pursuanttoRule6.14.
Onappeal,JusticeMandziukobservedthenowwell-settled
standardofreview:“ThestandardofreviewforanAppeal
fromaMastertoaJusticeoftheCourtofQueen’sBench
iscorrectnessonallissues.DeferencetotheMaster’s
Decisionisnotrequired.TheCourthearingtheAppealis
abletoconductadenovoanalysis,reviewingallrelevant
andmaterialevidence,submissionsandtherecordinorder
toreachadecision”.TheCourtproceededtoconducta
fullre-hearingoftheApplications,anddeterminedthat
therecordwassufficienttofairlyresolvethematterona
summarybasis,referencingthetestforSummaryJudgment
whichhadbeenclarifiedbytheCourtofAppealinWeir-
Jones Technical Services Incorporated v Purolator Courier
Ltd,2019ABCA49subsequenttoMasterWachowich’s
decision.JusticeMandziukallowedtheAppealandfoundin
favourofthecorporation.
P & C LAWFIRM MANAGEMENT INC V SABOURIN, 2019 ABQB 537 (LEE J)Rules 6.14 (Appeal from Master’s Judgment or Order), 7.3 (Summary Judgment) and 10.10 (Time Limitation on Reviewing Retainer Agreements and Charges)
LeeJ.consideredanAppealfromtheMaster’sDecision
tograntSummaryJudgmenttotheRespondent/Plaintiff,
P&CLawfirmManagementInc(“P&C”),againstbothof
theAppellants/DefendantsVickeaSabourin(“Vickea”)and
RobinSabourin(“Robin”)(collectively,the“Appellants”)
pursuanttoapromissorynote.
JusticeLeeaddressed,asapreliminarymatter,the
Appellants’provisionofadditionalevidencefortheAppeal.
P&Cobjectedonthebasisthattheadditionalevidencewas
notrelevantandmaterialonthebasisthatitcontained
inadmissibleparolevidence,wasirrelevant,orwassimply
argumentative.JusticeLeenotedthatRule6.14(3)allows
foradditionalevidenceif,intheopinionoftheJudge
hearingtheAppeal,itisrelevantandmaterial.Inthis
regard,LeeJ.concludedthatthetwonewAffidavitswere
relevantandmaterialastheyaddressedthetimingofthe
deliveryofthestatementsofaccount,taxation,andthe
scopeoftheAppellant’sinvolvement.Accordingly,Justice
LeeallowedthetwonewAffidavits.
JusticeLeenotedthattheprimaryissuebeforetheCourt
waswhethertheSummaryJudgmentshouldhavebeen
grantedinthismatterunderRule7.3.Bothpartiesagreed
thatthestandardofreviewonAppealfromaMaster’s
Decisionis“correctness”.
JusticeLeeconcludedthatSummaryJudgmentwasnot
appropriateinthisinstance.JusticeLeenotedtheseminal
jurisprudenceofHryniak v Mauldin,2014SCC7and
Weir-Jones Technical Services Incorporated v Purolator
Courier Ltd,2019ABCA49emphasizingthattheremust
be“fairness”intheprocessforbothparties.JusticeLee
noted,asanexample,thattheMasterfoundthatVickea
wasresponsiblefortaxingP&C’saccountseventhough
atthetimetheaccountswereissued,shehadnolawyer
representingheranddidnotknowtheaccountsexisted,
whichwasherpresentdefence.Additionally,theAppellants
ADVOCACY IS OUR BUSINESS 38
JSS BARR IST E RS RULES
Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP
ARNDT V SCANDINAVIAN CULTURAL SOCIETY OF CALGARY, 2019 ABQB 475 (GROSSE J)Rule 7.9 (Decision After Summary Trial)
From2004throughto2007thePlaintiff(“Mr.Arndt”)
servedasacaretakerattheScandinavianCulturalCentre
inCalgary(the“Defendants”).Mr.Arndtcommenceda
seriesoflegalActionsarisingoutofhistimeworkingforthe
Defendants.IneachofthetwoActionsbeforetheCourt,
the“0901Action”andthe“1001Action”,theDefendants
raiseddefencesthat,ifsuccessful,wouldhavebeena
completeanswertoMr.Arndt’sclaims.Ultimately,through
casemanagement,themeritsofthesedefenceswere
orderedtobeheardbySummaryTrial.
JusticeGrosseheardtheSummaryTrialwithamix
ofAffidavitandviva voceevidence.The0901Action
was,ineffect,anActionforwrongfuldismissal.Justice
Grossenotedthat,accordingtoRule7.9(2),aJudgemay
declinetograntJudgmentafteraSummaryTrialif,onthe
evidence,theJudgeisunabletofindthefactsnecessary
todecidetheissuesoffactorlaw.JusticeGrossefound
thattheexistenceofavalidsettlementagreementbetween
thepartiesdealtwiththemajorityoftheissuesinthe
0901Action.Nonetheless,pursuanttoRule7.9(2),Her
Ladyshipwasunabletodecidevariousissuesofabsolute
privilegeontherecordbeforetheCourt.Accordingly,
JusticeGrossestayedtheseportionsofthe0901Action
pendingimplementationofthenowenforceablesettlement
agreement.
Turningtothe1001Action,JusticeGrossenotedthatthe
DefendantsargumentsweregroundedintheLimitations
Act,RSA2000,cL-12(the“Limitations Act”).Justice
Grossefoundthat,initsoriginalform,the1001Actionwas
aclaimfornegligence,stemmingfromaprolongedphysical
injurytoMr.Arndt’shandsandarmswhichultimately
requiredsurgery.GrosseJ.foundthatinhistestimonyat
theSummaryTrial,Mr.Arndtdescribedexperiencingpain
anddiscomfortinhisshoulders,elbowsandforearmsin
2006andlinkingthatpaintohisworkfortheDefendants
asearlyas2007,butdidnotcommencethe1001Action
until2010.Accordingly,JusticeGrossedismissedthe1001
ActiononbasedontheapplicationoftheLimitations Act.
CHEMTRADE ELECTROCHEM INC V STIKEMAN ELLIOTT LLP, 2019 ABQB 562 (ROOKE ACJ)Rules 6.31 (Timing of Application and Service), 6.32 (Notice to Media), 6.34 (Application to Seal or Unseal Court Files) and 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award)
TheApplicantinthismattersoughttosetasideaConsent
Orderwhichtemporarilysealedmaterialsfiledwithrespect
toanApplicationtosetasideserviceexjuris.TheApplicant
wasnotapartytotheConsentOrderbutwasinvolvedina
relatedAction.TheApplicantarguedthatbothitandthe
mediawereentitledtoadvancednoticeofanApplication
foraRestrictedCourtAccessOrderpursuanttoRules6.31
and6.32.
TheCourtnotedthat,whilethetermsoftheConsentOrder
requiredboththeApplicantandthemediabeprovided
copiesoftheConsentOrder,theApplicantwasnotprima
facieentitledtonoticeoftheApplicationundertheRules.
Moreover,whilethemediawasentitledtonotice,no
responsehadbeenobservedfromanymediaorganization.
TheApplicant’slackofentitlementtonoticeaside,the
Courtconsiderednon-complianceasagroundforsetting
asidetheConsentOrder.RookeA.C.J.notedthatthe
Applicanthadprovidednoauthorityestablishingthatfailure
tocomplywithRules6.31and6.32renderedaRestricted
CourtAccessOrderanullity.Rather,suchacontravention
ornon-compliancewiththeRuleswaspresumablyamatter
tobeconsideredinmakingaCostsaward,ascontemplated
inRule10.33(2)(f).
Inanyevent,RookeA.C.J.wasnotconvincedthatthere
hadbeenacontraventionornon-complianceingranting
aRestrictedCourtAccessOrderbywayofConsentOrder.
Inadditiontoinherentjurisdiction,Rule6.34(3)givesthe
CourtthediscretionindeterminingwhoanApplication
mustbeservedupon,and“anyothermatterthatthe
circumstancesrequire”.Accordingly,itwassuggestedthe
Courtcouldimplicitlyexerciseitsdiscretiontowaivenotice
upongrantingaConsentOrder,andRookeA.C.J.expressly
exercisedthatdiscretioninthiscase.
39
OCTOBER 2019
Volume 2 Issue 15
www.jssbarristers.ca
anApplicationandCross-Applicationinrespectofthe
ApprovalandVestingOrdertoconfirmorissueastay,and
todenyorliftastay,respectively.
InfirstaddressingvarianceoftheApprovalandVesting
Order,theCourtobservedthattheentryofaformalOrder
actedtoousttheCourt’sabilitytomodifyanOrderunder
Rule9.13.TheCourtthennotedthatSection187(5)of
theBIApermits“everycourt[to]review,rescindorvary
anyordermadebyitunderitsbankruptcyjurisdiction”,
however,thepartieshadconcededthatmerevariance
oftheOrderwasnotdesired,andrather,theysoughtto
determinewhetherornotanAppealwasavailableasof
eitherrightorleave.
JusticeWatsonacknowledgedthatasingleAppealJudge
mayonlymakerulingsthatareincidentaltotheoperation
oftheCourtofAppeal,pursuanttoRule14.37,and
thereforedeclinedtoruleontheavailabilityofAppealasof
rightontheauthorityofSection193oftheBIA.However,
HisLordshipdidgrantleavetoAppealvariouspointsof
law,includingwhetherornotanAppealasofrightwas
available.
HAMMOND V HAMMOND, 2019 ABQB 522 (LEMA J)Rule 9.15 (Setting Aside, Varying and Discharging Judgments and Orders)
ThePlaintiffinamatrimonialpropertyActionappliedfor
anOrderforchildsupportandrelatedrelief.TheDefendant
wasproperlyservedwiththeApplicationandAffidavit,
butfailedtoattendthehearing.TheOrdersoughtbythe
PlaintiffwasgrantedintheDefendant’sabsence.The
DefendantappliedunderRule9.15(1)(b)tosettheOrder
aside,claimingthathedidnotappearbecauseofan
“accidentormistake”.TheDefendantsworeanAffidavit
whichdescribedthemistakeasfailingto“properlynotethe
dateofattendance”andnotingthathedidnot“intendto
allowanOrderofthekindgranted”togouncontested.
LemaJ.heldthatfailuretoappearonaccountofan
accidentormistakemustdemonstratethatnon-attendance
wasinadvertentorunintentional,andthattheinterfering
eventmustsatisfythe“butfor”test.Therationaleofthe
MAK V TJK, 2019 ABQB 547 (BERKOV J)Rule 9.13 (Re-opening Case)
FollowingtheconclusionofevidenceduringafamilyTrail,
butpriortotheCourtissuingaJudgmentorDecision,the
Applicant’scounseldiscoveredanew,relevantdocument.
TheApplicantappliedtoreopentheTrialunderRule
9.13(b).TheRespondentreliedonR v Palmer,[1980]1
SCR759(“Palmer”),arguingthattheApplicationshould
bedismissedastheimpugneddocumenthadbeenprovided
totheApplicant’scounselpriortotheTrial,andtherefore
couldhavebeendiscoveredwithduediligence.
InreviewingRule9.13,theCourtnotedthattheRule
islargelyaimedatanAppealCourt’sexerciseofits
jurisdictionratherthanthatofaTrialJudge.Thecaselaw
advancedwithrespecttoRule9.13consideredsituations
whereanApplicationwasbroughtafteraJudgmentor
Decisionhadbeenrendered.Despitethis,theCourtfound
theprinciplesfromthosecaseshelpful.JusticeBerkov
reasonedthataTrialJudgeexercisingdiscretiontore-open
theTrialmustemphasizefairnessinconsideringwhether
newevidenceiscredibleandmaterial,andwhetherthere
isariskofamiscarriageofjustice.TheJusticefoundthat
whilethePalmercriterionwasrelevant,HerLadyship’s
discretionasTrialJudgeinvokedabroaderanalysis.
Ultimately,theCourtnotedthattheimpugneddocument
hadbeeninaccuratelyreferenced,whichmisledthe
Applicantintonotconsideringtheimpugneddocument’s
relevance.TheCourtgrantedtheApplication,butallowed
theRespondenttoprovidefurtherevidencetoexplainthe
impugneddocument.
1905393 ALBERTA LTD V SERVUS CREDIT UNION LTD, 2019 ABCA 269 (WATSON JA)Rules 9.13 (Re-Opening Case) and 14.37 (Single Appeal Judges)
AnApprovalandVestingOrderwasgrantedbytheCourt
ofQueen’sBenchundertheBankruptcy and Insolvency
Act,RSC1985,cB-3(the“BIA”)andaformofOrder
wasfiledshortlythereafter.OnAppeal,thepartiesbrought
ADVOCACY IS OUR BUSINESS 40
JSS BARR IST E RS RULES
Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP
andsupplementedthefactorssetoutinRule10.2
withrespecttoreviewofthereasonablenessoflawyer’s
fees.Ultimately,theCourtheldthatenforcementofthe
agreementwasreasonable.
STACKARD V 1256009 ALBERTA LTD, 2019 ABQB 480 (JONES J)Rules 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs) and 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award)
TheApplicationsoughtthereturnofamortgagewhich
theApplicanthadtransferredtotheRespondents.Itwas
alsoallegedthattheRespondentshadimproperlyusedthe
mortgageproceedsincontraventionofaConsentOrder.The
Applicationwasdismissed,andtheCourtwasaskedtorule
onCosts.
TheRespondentscitedtheirentitlementtoCostspursuant
toRule10.29,andfurtherreliedonthefactorslistedin
Rules10.33(1)and(2).Inthisregard,theRespondents
arguedthattheissuesandcircumstancesoftheAction
werenotfavourabletoresolutionbysummaryprocess,a
conclusionthatshouldhavebeenequallyapparenttothe
Applicant,andmoreover,thepursuitofSummaryJudgment
andallegationsregardingthemisappropriationofmortgage
fundscausedanunnecessarydetourintheAction.
TheApplicantarguedthattheCourtshoulddeclineto
awardCosts,awardreducedCosts,ordeferanOrderwith
respecttoCosts.TheApplicantexpressedthataCosts
awardpayableforthwithcouldfinanciallyimpairherability
toproceedwithanApplicationforcontemptofCourt.
ThoughtheCourtdisagreedwiththeRespondents’
suggestionthattheissueswerenotsuitableforsummary
determination,itwasnotconvincedthattheRespondents’
presumptiverighttoCostshadbeendisplaced.TheCourt
orderedthatCostsbepayableforthwith,astheApplicant
couldhavechosentopursuecontemptofCourtinsteadof
SummaryJudgment,butdidnot,andshouldnotthenbe
permittedtodefertheconsequencesofthatchoice.
RulewasdescribedbyLemaJ.asbeingtoremedythe
injusticeofanOrdergrantedagainstapartywhowould
haveappeared,butfortheinterferingevent.JusticeLema
notedthatchoosingnottoattend,or“effectivelychoosing
nottoattendasreflectedinalackofdiligence”wasnot
sufficient.
JusticeLemafoundthattheDefendanthadfailedto
describewhatcausedhimtofailtoproperlynotethedate
ofthehearing,andinferredthatitwasasaresultofeither
alackofdiligence,oraconsciousdecisiontoallowthe
litigationtoproceedwithouthimuntilhesawtheOrder
grantedagainsthim,neitherofwhichwereanaccidentor
mistakepreventingattendanceforthepurposesofRule
9.15.TheApplicationtosetasidetheOrderwasdismissed.
WALSH V STEPHEN M K HOPE PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION, 2019 ABQB 516 (WOOLEY J)Rules 10.2 (Payment for Lawyer’s Services and Contents of Lawyer’s Account), 10.7 (Contingency Fee Agreement Requirements), 10.9 (Reasonableness of Retainer Agreements and Charges Subject to Review), 10.18 (Reference to Court) and 15.5 (Contingency Fee Agreements)
AdisputearosebetweenthePlaintiffandherlawyer
regardingacontingencyfeeagreementthatwasentered
intoin2009.Indeterminingtheenforceabilityofthe
agreement,theCourtrevieweditscompliancewiththe
specificrequirementsofcontingencyretainerssetoutin
Rule10.7,notingthattransitionalRule15.5(1)excepts
theapplicationofsubsection(2)ofRule10.7wherea
contingencyagreementismadeunder,andcomplies
with,theoldRules.TheCourtfoundthattheimpugned
agreementmettherequirementsoftheformerRules,and
wasanenforceablecontingencyfeeagreement.
AsthePlaintiffhadallegedthatenforcementofthe
agreementwouldbeunreasonable,theCourtreviewedthe
reasonablenessoftheagreement.Insodoing,theCourt
tooknoteoftheframeworkforreviewbyanAssessment
Officer,ascontemplatedinRule10.9,andtheauthority
oftheCourtinconsideringassessmentmattersreferredto
it,pursuanttoRule10.18.Moreover,theCourtconsidered
41
OCTOBER 2019
Volume 2 Issue 15
www.jssbarristers.ca
STEER V CHICAGO TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, 2019 ABQB 670 (HOLLINS J)Rules 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs), 10.31 (Court-Ordered Costs Award) and 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award)
ThePlaintiffsintheunderlyingAction,Wayneand
AntoinetteSteer(the“Steers”),initiallyboughtahouse
inCalgarywhichhaddefectsthatcausedseverewater
leakage.TheSteersunsuccessfullysuedtheirtitleinsurer,
ChicagoTitleInsuranceCompany(“CTIC”),forthe
remediationcosts.CTICtookthepositionthattheloss
wasnotcoveredunderthesubjecttitleinsurancepolicy.
MasterProwseagreedwithCTICanddismissedtheSteers’
ApplicationforSummaryJudgment.JusticeHollinsheard
theSteers’AppealfromMasterProwse’sDecisionalong
withCTIC’scross-ApplicationforSummaryDismissalits
favour.JusticeHollinsdismissedtheSteers’Appealand
grantedSummaryDismissaltoCTIC.CTIC,inthewithin
Application,appliedforitstaxableSchedule“C”Costsof
thatproceeding.
HollinsJ.notedthat,subjecttoHerLadyship’sdiscretion,
thesuccessfulpartyisgenerallyentitledtoitsCosts
pursuanttoRule10.29(1)(a).JusticeHollinsreviewed
thefactorssetoutinRules10.33andRule10.31(1)for
determiningtheappropriateCostsaward.JusticeHollins
furtherconsideredwhenitmightbeappropriatefora“no
costs”award.
HerLadyshipemphasizedthata“nocosts”awardmay
beappropriateininstanceswhereaDecisionistruly
publicinterestlitigationandthelitigantshavenoorlittle
pecuniaryinterestintheoutcome(whichdidnotapply
inthiscase)orwhenthecaseinvolvesanovelpointof
law.JusticeHollinsfoundthat,priortoMasterProwse’s
Decision,theonlyreportedcasedealingwiththescopeof
titleinsuranceinsimilarcircumstanceswasMacDonald
v Chicago Title Insurance Company,2015ONCA842
(“MacDonald”),whichfoundthattheCTICpolicy(identical
totheSteers’)didcovertheirhome’sphysicaldefects.
HerLadyshiphighlightedthatwhileitwasnotcorrectto
saythattheSteershad“nodecidedcasesonpoint,”it
CALLAWAY V OFFICE OF THE ELECTION COMMISSIONER (ALBERTA), 2019 ABQB 573 (KIRKER J)Rules 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs), 10.31 (Court-Awarded Costs Award) and 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award)
IntheunderlyingApplication,JusticeKirkerdismissedan
interlocutoryinjunctionApplication(the“Application”)
broughtbytheApplicantsnotingthat,whilesatisfiedthere
wasaseriousquestiontobetried,theApplicantshad
failed,inter alia,toestablishtheywouldsufferirreparable
harmiftheApplicationwasrefused.
KirkerJ.notedthatpursuanttoRule10.29,thesuccessful
partytoanApplicationisentitledtoaCostsaward.Justice
KirkerreviewedthediscretionaryprovisionsofRule10.31
andthefactorstoconsiderwhenutilizingdiscretionunder
Rule10.33.
HerLadyshipnotedtherelevantjurisprudenceandfound
that,pertheRespondent’ssubmissions,aninjunctionis
anintense,compactproceedingwhichcanandoftendoes
consumemanylawyerhoursoveraveryshorttimeperiod
andthatpartieswhocommencesuchproceedingsmust
understandtheriskofasubstantialCostawardagainst
themiftheyfail.
JusticeKirkerfurthernotedthatCostordersaremadeto
indemnifythesuccessfulpartyforonlyaportionofitslawyer’s
feesandthatonlyinexceptionalcaseswillaCourtdirect
thepayortopayasumthatsubstantiallyorfullyindemnifies
theothersideforitslegalfees.GiventhattheRespondent
didnotprovidetheCourtwithevidenceoftheexpensesit
incurredtorespondtotheApplication,intheabsenceofthat
evidence,KirkerJ.wasreluctanttoawardCostsintheamount
claimedbytheRespondentasitmaytoocloselyapproximate
asubstantialorfullindemnityCostsaward.
BalancingtheseconsiderationsJusticeKirkerconcluded,
guidedbythetariffamountsforwrittenargumentset
outinitem12ofScheduleC,thatCostsof$5,000for
theApplicationBriefand$1,000fortheCostsBrief
plusreasonabledisbursementswereappropriateinthe
circumstances.
ADVOCACY IS OUR BUSINESS 42
JSS BARR IST E RS RULES
Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP
fallsshortofwhatisexpectedofaresponsiblelitigant.”
Furthermore,theuseofamultipliermaybeappropriateto
reflecttheamountandcomplexityoftheclaim.
TheCourtdeterminedthatthecontractinissueallowed
forsolicitorandclientCoststobeawardedtothePlaintiffs
becauseitallowedforrecoveryof“reasonableattorneys’
feesandexpenses.”However,theCourtstillassessed
whetherenhancedCostscouldbeawardedifthisfinding
wasinerror.InthecaseofthePlaintiffs,ThomasJ.found
thatamultiplierof2.5timestheSchedule“C”amount
wouldbeappropriategiventheamountandcomplexityof
theAction.
WithregardstotheDefendantsbyCounterclaim,Thomas
J.ruledthatCostsbasedonamultiplierof3.5times
theSchedule“C”amountwaswarrantedbecausethe
Defendants’/PlaintiffsbyCounterclaim’sconduct“fellshort
ofwhatisexpectedofaresponsiblelitigant.”Theyhad
includedcertainpartiesinthelitigationwithoutanybasis
fordoingso.
ALBERTA HEALTH SERVICES V WANG, 2019 ABCA 328 (ANTONIO JA)Rules 10.44 (Appeal to Judge), 10.45 (Decision of the Judge) and 14.5 (Appeals only with Permission)
ThisAppealrelatedsolelytoCosts,andtherefore
permissiontoAppealtoafullAppealPanelpursuantto
Rule10.5(1)(e)wasrequired.TheApplicantsappealed
theDecisionofaChambersJudgewhohaddenied
theirApplicationunderRule10.45(3)(c)towaivethe
requirementtofilethetranscriptofCostassessment
proceedingsbeforeanAssessmentOfficerforacertification
ofCostswhichtheApplicantshadappealed.TheChambers
JudgedeniedtheApplication,relyingonRule10.44(2),
astheAppealwasatrueAppealontherecordandwas
necessarytodetermineiftheAssessmentOfficer’sdecision
wasreasonable.TheApplicantsallegedthattheywere
deniedproceduralfairnessinfrontoftheChambersJudge
andthattheChambersJudgeexhibitedbiasagainstthem.
JusticeAntonionotedthatthetestanApplicantseeking
permissiontoAppealmustmeetrequiresdemonstrating:
wastruethatlimitedauthoritiesexisted.JusticeHollins
foundthatHerLadyshipwouldhaveawardedCTICitsfull
taxableCostsonthismatterbutforthefactthat,whenthe
SteersdecidedtocommencetheirAction,MacDonaldwas
theonlycaseonwhichtheycouldreceivelegaladviceand
evaluatetheiroptions.JusticeHollinsreasonedthatifCosts
areawarded,inpart,toencouragepartiestotakealong,
hardlookattheirchancesofsuccessbeforeemployingthe
processesoftheCourt,thenHerLadyshipcouldnotfault
theSteersforhavingbeguntheirAction.However,that
reasoningwasimpactedbytheSteersdecisiontogofurther
andunsuccessfullyAppealtheOrderofaMaster.
Accordingly,JusticeHollinsorderedtheSteerstopayone-
halfofCTIC’staxableCosts.
MANSON INSULTATION PRODUCTS LTD V CROSSROADS C&I DISTRIBUTORS, 2019 ABQB 684 (THOMAS J)Rules 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs), 10.31 (Court-Ordered Costs Award), 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award) and Schedule C
TheCourt,afteraTrialinvolvingmanydifferentparties,
addressedtheissueofCosts.ThePlaintiffshadbeen
largelysuccessfulwhiletheDefendantsbyCounterclaim
wereentirelysuccessful.TheCourtstatedattheoutsetthat
thepartiesarepresumptivelydueSchedule“C”Costsin
accordancewithRule10.29.TheCourtalsonotedthatit
hasbroadauthorityunderRule10.31tovarytheamount
suggestedinSchedule“C”toaccountfornumerousfactors
listedinRule10.33includingtheconductofpartiesto
litigation.TheCourtthenconsideredwhethertoaward
elevatedCosts.
ThomasJ.summarizedthecaselawprinciplesgoverning
elevatedCosts.HisLordshipconfirmedthatfullindemnity
Costsareawardedinexceedinglyrarecasesincivil
litigation,whereacontractspecificallyallowsforthemto
beclaimed.Moreover,solicitorandclientCostsarealso
rare.Theyareonlytobeawardedwherethereisafindingof
intentionalmisconduct.TheCourtalsohasfullauthorityto
awardCostsbasedonadifferentcolumnofSchedule“C”
orbasedonamultipleofSchedule“C”Costs.Enhanced
Costscanbejustified“wheretheconductofthelitigant
43
OCTOBER 2019
Volume 2 Issue 15
www.jssbarristers.ca
LoparcoJ.consideredtheparties’competingApplications
respectingthedivisionoftheirproperty.Thehusband’s
estatearguedthatthewifecouldnotseekanunequal
divisionofmatrimonialpropertybecauseshehadnotfiled
aCounterclaimseekingitonthebasisthat,pursuantto
Rule13.6(2),pleadingsmustincludethefactsuponwhich
eachpartyreliesaswellastheremedyclaimedbyeach
party.However,LoparcoJ.alsoexplainedthattheCourt
maydistributematrimonialpropertyunequallypursuantto
section7(4)oftheMatrimonial Property ActRSA2000,
cM-8,evenifithasnotbeenspecificallypleadedbya
party.However,thewifefailedtoestablishthatanunequal
divisionwasnecessary.Assuch,LoparcoJ.assessedand
dividedtheparties’matrimonialpropertyonanequalbasis.
SLAWSKY V EDMONTON (CITY), 2019 ABCA 302 (KHULLAR JA)Rules 13.4 (Counting Months and Years), Rule 14.8 (Filing a Notice of Appeal), 14.36 (Case Management Officers) and 14.37 (Single Appeal Judges)
TheApplicantattemptedtoapplyforanAppealofa
JudicialReviewDecision.TheCaseManagementOffice
(“CMO”)refusedtofiletheApplicant’sNoticeofAppeal,
claimingthatitwasfiledoutsideofthetimeallowed.The
ApplicantappliedunderRule14.36(3)torescindthe
CMOdecisionthattheAppealwasfiledoutsideofthetime
allowedandappliedtoextendtheAppealdeadline.
TheCourtconsideredRule14.8(2)(iii)incalculatingthe
timeforanAppeal,whereitstatesthatanAppealmust
bemadewithinonemonthafterthedateoftheDecision.
WhencountingonemonthfromthedateofDecision,the
CourtappliedRule13.4(1)whichsaysthedeadlineisthe
same-numbereddayinthesubsequentmonth.
Therewasadisputeastowhenthe“dateofdecision”
asdescribedinRule14.8(1)occurredinthiscase.The
ChambersJudgehadreleasedadditionalreasonstodismiss
anApplicationtoreopenCosts,lendingtotheconfusion.
TheCourtofAppealfoundtheseadditionalreasonsdidnot
extendthedeadlinefortheNoticeofAppealasthey“did
notcontributetoorchange”thesubstantivereasons.The
Appealwasfiledoutoftime.
i)agoodarguablecasehavingenoughmerittowarrant
scrutinybytheCourt;ii)importantissuestothepartiesand
ingeneral;iii)practicalutilityoftheAppeal;andiv)the
effectofdelayintheproceedingscausedbytheAppealwill
notbeundulyprejudicial.
JusticeAntoniofoundthattheAppealdidnothave
arguablemeritastheChambersJudge’scommentswere
directedatallowingallargumentstobemadeinanorderly
fashionwithoutinterruption-theydidnotraisefairness
concerns.Further,AntonioJ.A.foundthattheDecisionwas
notofimportancewithinthemeaningofthetest,asthe
DecisionunderAppealwasadiscretionaryoneforwhich
theDecisionandtheprocessbywhichitwasmadewould
havenoprecedentialvalue.JusticeAntonionotedthat
theApplicantshadalreadyobtainedthetranscriptofthe
proceedingsandfiledthemwiththeAppealmaterials,and
thus,therewasnopracticalutilitytotheAppeal.Giventhe
abovefactors,JusticeAntonioheldthattherewasnoreason
todelaytheAppealintheCourtofQueen’sBench.The
ApplicationforpermissiontoAppealwasdismissed.
STALZER (ESTATE) V STALZER, 2019 ABQB 658 (LOPARCO J) Rules 12.49 (Evidence in Summary Trials) and 13.6 (Pleadings: General Requirements)
TheestateofahusbandinamatrimonialpropertyAction
soughtdivisionofmatrimonialpropertyafterhisdeath.
ThewifeopposedtheApplicationandsoughtanalternate
divisionoftheirproperty.
LoparcoJ.notedthatalthoughthepartiesseparatedin
2006,theproceedingswerestillongoingatthetimeofthe
husband’sdeathin2016.Thepartieshadmadevarious
Applicationsagainsteachother,butthepresidingJustice
haddeterminedthatthefinaldivisionoftheirproperty
couldnotbeadjudicatedinChambers.Thematterof
separatingtheparties’matrimonialassetswasthendirected
tobeheardbyLoparcoJ.atSummaryTrialbasedon
Affidavitevidence,asthepartieshadnotsoughttoadduce
oralevidencepursuanttoRule12.49.
ADVOCACY IS OUR BUSINESS 44
JSS BARR IST E RS RULES
Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP
TheCourtnotedthatthePlaintiffpurchasersweretheones
takenbysurpriseinitiallyinthelitigation.ThePlaintiffs
onlydiscoveredthroughdocumentdisclosurethatthe
Defendantshadareportintheirpossessionthatshowed
thepresenceofconcretespalling,whichwouldexplainwhy
aclaimforfraudulentmisrepresentationwasnotincluded
intheoriginalStatementofClaim.However,theCourtalso
foundthatthePlaintiffshadenoughtimetoamendthe
StatementofClaimaftermakingthisdiscovery,butthey
neverdidso.Therefore,theCourtruledthatthePlaintiffs’
claimforfraudulentmisrepresentationwasbarred.
KAUFMANN V EDMONTON (CITY) POLICE SERVICE, 2019 ABCA 272 (BIELBY, WAKELING AND HUGHES JJA)Rule 14.4 (Right to Appeal)
TheApplicanthadbeenbannedbytheCityofEdmonton
(the“City”)fromusingtheCity’srecreationcentres,
outdoorpoolsandarenasforaperiodoftwoyears.Upon
JudicialReview,thebanwasvacated,asitwasdetermined
tobeunreasonableontherecordprovidedtotheCourt,and
thematterremittedbacktotheCityforreconsideration.
NotwithstandingtheApplicant’ssuccessuponJudicial
Review,theApplicantbroughtanAppeal.
OnAppeal,theAppellantdidnottakeissuewiththeform
ofOrderarisingoutofJudicialReview,buthadconcerns
withthereasonsoftheChambersJudge.TheCourtof
AppealdismissedtheAppeal,notingthatRule14.4(1)
allowsapartytoappealonlyfeaturesofanOrderor
Judgment.Intheabsenceofastatutoryprovisiontothe
contrary,apartycannotAppealreasoningoftheChambers
Judge.
SANTORO V BANK OF MONTREAL, 2019 ABCA 322 (CRIGHTON, HUGHES AND PENTELECHUK JJA)Rules 14.4 (Right to Appeal) and 14.32 (Oral Argument)
TheApplicantappealedseveralOrderstotheCourtof
Appeal.OneAppealconcernedtheOrderofaMaster.The
Appealwasdenied,asRule14.4prohibitsAppealsfrom
aMasterdirectlytotheCourtofAppeal.TheApplicant
alsosoughtanAppealofaChambersJudge’sdismissal
ofaMaster’sDecisionregardingforeclosureOrders.The
WhenaNoticeofAppealisfiledoutsideofthetimelimit,a
singleJudgehasthediscretiontoextendthedeadlineorto
striketheAppealunderRule14.37(2)(c).
Inconsideringwhethertoextendthedeadline,theCourt
statedthefactorstograntanextensioninthe“interestsof
justice”:(1)theApplicantmusthaveabonafideintention
toAppeal;(2)theApplicantmusthaveareasonablechance
ofsuccess;and(3)theApplicantmusthaveanexplanation
fortheirdelay.Further,theotherpartiestotheAppealmust
notsufferprejudicefromallowingtheAppeal,norcanthe
Applicanttakeanadvantagefromtheextension.
Underthesecondfactor,theCourtconsideredwhether
theApplicant’sAppealwouldhaveareasonablechance
ofsuccess.TheonusisontheApplicanttoshowthe
likelihoodofsuccess.Thisrequiresmorethanamere
assertionbytheApplicantbutisequivalenttoconsidering
whethertheAppealishopeless.TheCourtfoundtheAppeal
hadnoreasonablelikelihoodofsuccess,andtherefore,
itwasnotintheinterestsofjusticetograntthetime
extension.TheApplicant’sNoticeofAppealwasfiledoutof
timeandJusticeKhullarrefusedtogranttheextension.
KENT V MACDONALD, 2019 ABQB 669 (LOPARCO J)Rules 13.6 (Pleadings: General Requirements) and 13.7 (Pleadings: Other Requirements)
ThePlaintiffscommencedanActionafterpurchasinga
residentialhomefromtheDefendants.Shortlyafterthe
purchase,thePlaintiffsdiscoveredwateringressandmould
inthebasementaswellasconcretespallingthatrequired
repairs.
OneoftheissuestoberesolvedbytheCourtwaswhether
theDefendantscouldbeheldliableforfraudulent
misrepresentationeventhoughthePlaintiffshadnot
includedtheparticularsofthisclaimintheStatement
ofClaim.TheCourtnotedthatRule13.7requiresthe
particularsofaclaimforfraudormisrepresentationto
beincludedinpleadings,asdoesRule13.6(3).The
reasonforthisistopreventapartyfrombeingtakenby
surpriseatTrialbyaseriousallegationsuchasfraudor
misrepresentation.
45
OCTOBER 2019
Volume 2 Issue 15
www.jssbarristers.ca
andshouldnotberewardedwithafurtherlevelofAppeal.
Accordingly,HisLordshipdeniedMr.Rana’sApplicationto
Appeal.
ALANEN V ELLIOTT, 2019 ABCA 290 (HUGHES JA)Rule 14.5 (Appeals Only with Permission)
TheApplicantsoughtpermissiontoappealaDecision
oftheCourtofQueen’sBenchdecliningtosetasidean
interimarbitrationawardofCosts.
TheCourtreasonedthatCostsDecisionsarediscretionary
andareaffordeddeferenceonreview,andtherefore
permissiontoAppealCostsDecisionsunderRule14.5(1)
(e)shouldbegrantedsparingly.Thisresultwasnotedtobe
consistentwiththetestforpermissiontoAppealaCosts
awardestablishedundertheformerRules,whichremains
persuasive.
UponengagingtheanalysiscalledforbyRule14.5(1)(e),
JusticeHughesfoundthattheApplicant,havingadmitted
thattheCostsawardcausednofinancialhardship,failed
toprovethattheissueswereimportant(bothtotheparties
andingeneral)andthattheAppealhadpracticalutility.
HerLadyshipdeniedpermissiontoAppealtheCosts
Decision.
SRG TAKAMIYA CO LTD V 58376 ALBERTA LTD, 2019 ABCA 301 (ROWBOTHAM JA)Rule 14.5 (Appeals Only with Permission)
TheApplicantappliedforpermissiontoAppealaDecision
byasingleJudgeoftheCourtofAppealdenyingits
ApplicationforastaypendingAppeal.
TheCourtfoundthatinordertobesuccessfulunder
Rule14.5(1)(a),theApplicantmustshowthatitisin
theinterestsofjusticetohaveanAppealPanelreviewa
singleJudge’sDecision.Permissioncanbegrantedifthe
Applicantestablishesthatthereis(a)aquestionofgeneral
importance;(b)apossibleerroroflaw;(c)anunreasonable
exerciseofdiscretion;or(d)amisapprehensionof
importantfacts.
ApplicantdidnotappearatthatscheduledAppealhearing
andtheCourtelectedtoproceedbasedonwrittenmaterials
only,aspermittedbyRule14.32(3).
RANA V RANA, 2019 ABCA 278 (O’FERRALL JA)Rules 14.5 (Appeals Only with Permission) and 14.8 (Filing a Notice of Appeal)
Theself-representedApplicant,SalimRana(“Mr.Rana”),
soughtpermissiontoAppealO’FerrallJ.A.’sDecision
denyingMr.Rana’sApplicationtorestoretheunderlying
Appeal(the“RestoreApplication”).Mr.Ranacontended
thathewasdeniedafairhearingbecauseHisLordshipdid
nothearoralsubmissionsfromMr.Rana.
Mr.Ranahadinitiallyfiledacaveatagainsthismother’s
land.Hewasthenservedwithanoticetotakeproceedings
onhiscaveat.Hedidsoandinthecourseofthat
proceedinghesoughttohavehismother’sPowerof
Attorneydeclaredinvalid.ThatApplicationwasdenied.
Mr.Ranaappealed;buthisAppealwasstruckandlater
deemedabandonedforfailuretocomplywithdeadlinesin
theRulesforfilinganAppealrecordunderRule14.8.In
theRestoreApplication,JusticeO’Ferrallfoundthatthere
wasnoevidenceintheApplicant’smaterialthattheAppeal
recordhadbeenorderedorprepared,norhadtheOrderfor
theAppealrecordbeenfiledandservedontheRespondent,
asrequiredbytheRules.
JusticeO’FerrallnotedthatRule14.5(1)(a)requiresan
ApplicanttoobtainpermissiontoAppealtheDecisionofa
singleAppealJudge.Thisrequirementservesagatekeeping
functionandrequirestheApplicanttodemonstratewhyit
isintheinterestsofjusticetohaveafurtherlevelofreview.
O’FerrallJ.A.emphasizedthatthetestforpermissionto
AppealtheDecisionofasingleAppealJudgeiswhether
theApplicantisabletodemonstratethatthereis:(1)a
questionofgeneralimportance;(2)apossibleerrorof
law;(3)anunreasonableexerciseofdiscretion;or(4)a
misapprehensionofimportantfacts.
JusticeO’Ferrallfoundthatnoneoftheforegoingtestshad
beenmetandthatthepatternofdelayexhibitedbyMr.
Ranaoverthecourseoftheproceedingswasunacceptable
ADVOCACY IS OUR BUSINESS 46
JSS BARR IST E RS RULES
Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP
permissiontoAppealandnotedthatthetestforpermission
toAppealmaymanifestitselfdifferentlydependingonthe
subjectmatteroftheAppealandtheoverallcontextofthe
Appeal.HerLadyshipemphasizedthat,fundamentally,
iftheCourtisconvincedtheAppealhasnochanceof
success,permissiontoAppealshouldnotbegranted.
JusticeKhullarreviewedeachoftheApplicant’sarguments
andfoundthattherewasnoreasonablechanceofsuccess
inanyoftheargumentssavefortheonesgroundedin
proceduralfairness.NotingthattheCollege’spositionon
thisissueandtherelativelylowthresholdforanarguable
caseonthisbasis,JusticeKhullargrantedtheApplicant
permissiontoAppeallimitedtothequestionofprocedural
fairness.
TEMPLANZA V FORD, 2019 ABCA 309 (VELDHUIS JA)Rule 14.47 (Application to Restore an Appeal)
TheApplicantappliedunderRule14.47torestoreher
AppealafterithadbeenstruckforfailingtofiletheAppeal
recordintimeandsubsequentlydeemedabandoned.The
ChambersJudgehadgrantedtheRespondents’Summary
JudgmentApplications,dismissingtheApplicant’sclaimsas
beingoutoftimeandotherwisewithoutmerit.TheChambers
JudgealsodeclaredtheApplicantavexatiouslitigant.
JusticeVeldhuisnotedthatrestoringanAppealisa
discretionaryremedywiththerelevantfactorsbeing:i)
whethertheApplicantdemonstratedanintentiontoproceed
withtheAppealintime;ii)whethertheApplicantexplained
thedefectordelaythatcausedtheAppealtobestruckor
abandoned;iii)whethertheApplicantmovedwithreasonable
promptnesstocurethedefectandhavetheAppealrestored;
iv)whethertheAppealhasarguablemerit;andv)whether
theRespondentshavesufferedanyprejudice,including
consideringthelengthofthedelay.JusticeVeldhuisalso
notedthatthethresholdforrestorationishigherforan
Appealthathasbeendeemedabandoned,andthatthe
Applicantbearstheonustofurnishresponsiveevidence.
JusticeVeldhuisacceptedtheApplicant’sexplanationfor
thedelaybeingthatshehadfinancialdifficultypayingfor
thetranscriptsintime,andthatshehaddemonstratedan
Furthermore,theCourtnotedthatwhentheApplicantis
seekinganAppealofaproceduralApplication,suchasa
stay,permissiontoAppealshouldbegrantedonlyonsome
topicoflaw,jurisdiction,orpolicywhichisimportanttothe
public,totheCourt,ortocounselwhomayargueAppeals
later.Accordingly,ifthematterappealedisdiscretionary,it
willbedifficulttoachievepermissiontoAppeal.
GiventhatthestayDecisionwasdiscretionaryandwas
issuedinuniquefactualcircumstances,RowbothamJ.A.
foundthattherewasnoissuewarrantingtheattentionofan
AppealPanel.TheApplicationforpermissiontoAppealwas
dismissed.
MAKIS V COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS OF ALBERTA (COMPLAINT REVIEW COMMITTEE), 2019 ABCA 341 (KHULLAR JA)Rule 14.5 (Appeals Only with Permission)
TheApplicant,Dr.ViliamMakis(the“Applicant”),sought
permissiontoAppealaDecisionoftheCourtofQueen’s
BenchdismissinganApplicationforJudicialReviewofthe
decisionoftheComplaintReviewCommitteeoftheCollege
ofPhysiciansandSurgeonsofAlberta(the“College”).
TheApplicanthadfiledtwocomplaintswiththeCollege
pursuanttotheHealth Professions Act,RSA2000,cH-7,
allegingharassment,abuse,andcareersabotage(the
“Complaints”).TheComplaintsDirectordeterminedthere
wasinsufficientevidenceofunprofessionalconductand
dismissedtheComplaints.
OnApplicationforJudicialReview,theChambersJudge
determinedthattheApplicantdidnothavestandingto
challengethereasonablenessoftheComplaintReview
Committee’sdecision.Further,theChambersJustice
determinedthattheApplicantwasboundbyjurisprudence
whichheldthatapersonwhocomplainstoaprofessional
regulatorybodyhasthesameinterestasanymemberofthe
public.
OnAppeal,theCollegedidnotopposetheApplicationfor
permissiontoAppeal,butdidsubmitthattheApplicant’s
righttoAppealshouldbelimitedtoissuesofprocedural
fairness.KhullarJ.A.reviewedRule14.5pertainingto
47
OCTOBER 2019
Volume 2 Issue 15
www.jssbarristers.ca
CourtofAppealnotedthatthisisgenerallynotabasis
todenyCoststothesuccessfulparty.TheAppellantalso
arguedthatheshouldnothavetopayCostsbecausehe
was“effectivelywithoutaremedy”,havingbeenunableto
sueforcivildamagesoremploytheRespondent’sinternal
grievanceprocesses.TheCourtofAppealrejectedthis
argumentaswell.ThefactthattheAppellanthadnoclaim
againsttheRespondentwaswhatentitledtheRespondent
toCostsandcouldnotbeusedasabasistosuggestthatno
Costsshouldbeordered.
TheRespondentssoughtdoubleCostsafterthedateoftheir
CalderbankoffertosettletheAppealfor$1.00ontheeve
oforalargument.TheCourtofAppealnotedthatunder
Rule14.59,Costsmaybedoubledwhenaformalofferof
settlementismade,butsuchdoubling“isnotautomatic
orpresumed”.TheCourtnotedthattheCostsrulesexist
toencouragereasonablesettlementoflitigation,andthat
offersmustthereforebereasonable.Itheldthattheoffer
wasnotagenuineoffertosettleandthereforeshould
notimpactCosts.TheRespondentsalsosoughtCostsfor
secondcounselattheAppeal.TheCourtofAppealheld
that,whileitwasnotunreasonableforsecondcounsel
toappearattheAppeal,theissueswerenotsufficiently
complextojustifytheadditionalfees.Assuch,theCourtof
AppealawardedCoststotheRespondentonColumn5of
ScheduleC.
intentiontoproceedwiththeAppeal.However,Veldhuis
J.A.foundthattheotherfactorsweighedheavilyagainst
restoringtheAppeal,notingthattheApplicantdidnot
movewithreasonablepromptness,andthattherewasno
merittotheAppealoftheChambersJudge’sOrders.Justice
VeldhuisalsofoundthattheApplicanthadengagedin
conductexemplaryofavexatiouslitigantbeforetheCourtof
Appeal,andthatthe“Appealisthemostrecentinstallment
oftheApplicant’sever-wideninglitigationodyssey”.Justice
Veldhuisheldthatitwasnotintheinterestsofjusticeto
continuetheproceedings.TheApplicationtorestorethe
Appealwasdismissed.
BRUEN V UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY, 2019 ABCA 275 (SLATTER, BIELBY AND WAKELING JJA) Rules 14.59 (Formal Offers to Settle) and 14.88 (Cost Awards)
AfteranunsuccessfulAppealofaDecisiongrantinganon-
suitApplicationwhichstruckouttheAppellant’sclaim,the
partiesappliedforarulingonCosts.TheCourtnotedthat
pursuanttoRule14.88,thesuccessfulpartytoanAppeal
isentitledtoCostsinaccordancewithScheduleCunless
otherwiseordered.ThatmeantthattheRespondentwas
entitledtoCostsonColumn5ofScheduleC.
TheAppellantarguedthatheshouldnothavetopayCosts
becausethelitigationhadlefthimimpecunious,butthe
DISCLAIMER:No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior written consent of Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP (“JSS Barristers”). JSS Barristers and all individuals involved in the preparation and publication of JSS Barristers Rules make no representations as to the accuracy of the contents of this publication. This publication, and the contents herein, are provided solely for information and do not constitute legal or professional advice from JSS Barristers or its lawyers.
T4035711520F4035711528800,304-8AvenueSW,Calgary,AlbertaT2P1C2www.jssbarristers.ca