JOINT REVIEW PANELacee-ceaa.gc.ca/050/documents/p17520/80929E.pdf · Nuclear Safety Commission to...

DEEP GEOLOGIC REPOSITORY

JOINT REVIEW PANEL

HEARING HELD AT

Public Hearing Room 14th floor

280 Slater Street Ottawa, Ontario

Wednesday, July 18, 2012

JOINT REVIEW PANEL

Ms. Stella Swanson Dr. Gunter Muecke Dr. Jamie Archibald

PANEL CO-MANAGER Ms. Kelly McGee

COUNSEL Mr. Denis Saumure

Transcription Services By:

International Reporting Inc. 41-5450 Canotek Road Gloucester, Ontario

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TABLE OF CONTENTS / TABLE DES MATIÈRES

PAGE Opening Remarks 1 Oral presentation by Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission 8 Questions by the panel 28 Oral presentation by OPG and NWMO part 1 55 Questions by the panel 72 Oral presentation by OPG and NWMO part 2 103 Questions by the panel 117 Oral presentation by OPG and NWMO part 3 134 Questions by the panel 142 Oral presentation by OPG and NWMO part 4 169 Questions by the panel 180 Oral presentation by OPG and NWMO part 5 193 Questions by the panel 217

1

INTERNATIONAL REPORTING INC.

Ottawa, Ontario

--- Upon commencing on Wednesday, July 18, 2012

at 9:00 a.m.

Opening Remarks

MS. MCGEE: Bonjour mesdames et messieurs.

Bienvenu à la réunion publique de la Commission d’examen

conjointe pour le projet de stockage de déchets

radioactifs à faible et moyenne activité dans des

formations géologiques profondes. Welcome to the first

technical information session of the Joint Review Panel

for the Deep Geologic Repository Project for Low and

Intermediate Level Radioactive Waste.

My name is Kelly McGee. I am the co-manager

for the joint review panel. J’aimerais aborder certains

aspects touchant le déroulement de cette réunion. The

Joint Review Panel was appointed on January 24, 2012. The

public review and comment period began on February 2,

2012. Today’s meeting is a technical information session

with presentations by the applicant and Canadian Nuclear

Safety Commission staff regarding the proposed design,

construction and operational details relating to the DGR

project.

During today's business we have

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simultaneous translation. Des appareils de traduction sont

disponibles à la réception. La version française est au

poste 2, the English version is on channel 2 (sic).

Please keep the pace of your speech relatively slow so

that the translators can keep up.

La réunion est enregistrée et transcrite

textuellement. Les transcriptions se font dans l'une ou

l'autre des langues officielles compte tenu de la langue

utilisée par le participant. Les transcriptions seront

disponibles sur le site web de la commission dès la

semaine prochaine. Please identify yourself before

speaking so that the transcripts are as clear and complete

as possible.

I'd also like to note that this session is being video

webcasted live and that the webcast will be archived on

the CNSC website.

Please silence your cell phones and other

electronic devices.

Dr. Swanson, the Chair of the Joint Review

Panel, will preside at today’s meeting.

Dr. Swanson.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Good morning everyone.

Just a quick correction, the English translation --

English version of today’s session is on channel 1.

Good morning, and welcome to the technical

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information session of the Deep Geologic Repository Joint

Review Panel. My name is Stella Swanson. Welcome to all

those here today and to those joining us via the webcast.

I would like to begin by introducing the

Members of the Joint Review Panel. On my right is Dr.

Gunter Muecke and on my left is Dr. Jamie Archibald. You

have heard from the Panel’s co-manager Kelly McGee. Seated

to my right is counsel Denis Saumure.

I would like to address a few matters

before we begin today’s presentations.

At the Panel’s public orientation session

which was held in February 2012, I stressed the utmost

importance that the Panel members place on our

impartiality, neutrality, and transparency. Since that

February 2012 session, all submissions to the Panel and

all of the information requests originating with the Panel

are publically available on the CEAA website for this

project. We welcome and encourage the participation of all

interested parties, including federal, provincial and

municipal government organizations, Aboriginal groups, and

members of the public.

The Panel encourages everyone with an

interest in this project to regularly visit the website

for the latest additions. If you have not already done so,

please take a minute to visit and register as an

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Interested Party. This will ensure that all major

announcements by the Panel are automatically forwarded to

you by email.

The goal of today’s information session is

to provide new details regarding design, construction and

operation of the proposed deep geologic repository. This

information is needed for the Panel to evaluate whether

the requirements of the EIS Guidelines have been met. The

Panel expects straightforward, detailed answers to the

specific subjects and questions that were identified for

today’s session.

I wish to remind everyone watching this

webcast or reviewing the written transcript that the

project under review is a proposed repository for low and

intermediate level radioactive waste near Kincardine,

Ontario. This review is not connected to a separate

project for the siting and construction of a geologic

repository for used nuclear fuel.

If at any time during the review you have

questions for the Panel or wish to communicate with us,

please direct your correspondence to the Panel’s co-

managers. Alternatives for contacting the Panel

Secretariat are available on the Canadian Environmental

Assessment Agency website for this project. The Panel co-

managers, together with other members of the Panel

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Secretariat, will ensure that information for the Panel’s

consideration is brought to our attention and all

submissions are posted on the public registry.

While the Agenda for today’s technical

information session has generous allotments of time for

questions from the Panel, our questions will be limited to

those associated with the purpose of today’s meeting.

Today’s technical information session was organized to

provide an efficient, and effective presentation of new

information that the Panel requires as part of our public

review. The purpose of this session is not to test either

the validity of information already on the public record

or the new information presented today.

The public was invited to attend this

session either in person or by watching the webcast. The

Panel encourages anyone that has questions arising from

today’s session to forward the questions in writing to the

Panel Secretariat. The Panel will review all questions

relating to information presented at today’s session and

determine if an answer to the question is required in

order for Ontario Power Generation to fulfill its

obligations under the Environmental Impact Statement

Guidelines.

In addition to submitting questions arising

from today’s session, the public review and comment period

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is an opportunity for everyone to provide their views to

the Panel on whether the Environmental Impact Statement

and documents submitted in support of the licence

application adequately address the Guidelines issued to

Ontario Power Generation.

I wish to take this opportunity to

acknowledge and thank everyone who has already submitted

their views and requests for additional information.

The end of the review and comment period

was originally scheduled for August 3, 2012. This has been

extended to accommodate the time required by OPG to

respond to information requests from the Panel. The new

comment period deadline will be announced at a later date

and interested parties will be given one month’s notice

before that end date.

Thank you.

I would now like to call upon the Canadian

Nuclear Safety Commission to bring their -- to begin their

presentation. In the interest of time, I would ask the

CNSC to begin their presentation on their slide 9, since

the panel is well aware of the information presented on

slides 3 to 8.

Mr. Elder the floor is yours.

MR. ELDER: Thank you Madame Chairman and

good morning, members of the panel. For the record, my

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name is Peter Elder, I’m the Director General of the

Directorate of Nuclear Cycle and Facilities Regulation.

With me today at the front are Mr. Don

Howard, who’s Director of our Waste and Decommissioning

Division, and Mr. Jean LeClair, who’s the Director of our

Uranium Mines and Mills Division. In addition, we also

have other members of our licensing team with us today to

answer questions.

Before I turn over to Mr. Howard to start

the presentation on Slide 9, there’s a couple of points I

would like to make about the first slides that were

provided just for context and in terms of anybody who’s

not watching today and just looking at the Slide Deck on

the website.

One thing, the important point that I’d

like to make is that in terms of how we have traditionally

viewed who the licensee should be for a project has always

been the point that it is the first -- the organization

that will be in day-to-day control of the operations once

there is nuclear material in the facility so we have

traditionally said, you know, the role of that may or not

be the construction -- the construction organization, so

they -- what is important for that operator to understand

during the construction case phase is that they have made

a solid safety case, they understand the key parameters

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that have to be controlled during construction to make

sure that safety case remains valid and there are

appropriate mechanisms in place to protect workers, the

public and environment during construction.

So that’s basically the philosophy that

we’ve always operated on and how we’ve approached this

project as well.

So with that, I’ll turn it over to Mr.

Howard to start at Slide 9.

ORAL PRESENTATION BY CANADIAN

NUCLEAR SAFETY COMMISSION

MR. HOWARD: Thank you, and good morning.

For the record, my name is Don Howard, Director of the

Waste and Decommissioning Division.

I’ll start with Slide 9 of the CNSC staff’s

presentation this morning. And we’ll start with -- this

slide presents the steps being undertaken under the Deep

Geologic Repository project process, which merges the

public hearing phases for both the environmental

assessment and the licensing phase of this project.

Currently, CNSC staff are evaluating the

documentation with respect to the environmental assessment

as well as OPG's licence application for a licence to

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prepare a site and construct.

Much of the information obtained to support

the environmental assessment is also applicable to

satisfying the requirements for licensing.

So the DGR project is also currently, as I

said, undergoing an environmental assessment which

identifies any likely adverse environmental effects over

the life cycle of the project, possible mitigation

measures and the significance of any remaining adverse

effects after considering the mitigation measures.

So this presentation will not discuss

environmental assessment any further. Our focus today is

to talk about the licensing aspects of the DGR.

So the CNSC takes a -- basically a cradle-

to-grave approach to licensing nuclear facilities such as

the DGR. This staged approach allows for life cycle

considerations for each stage of development and

regulatory controls appropriate to each stage. For

example, an application to construct a facility needs to

show consideration of the planned operation and the

subsequent decommissioning.

Nuclear facilities such as the DGR are

considered Class 1 facilities under the Regulations. The

licences needed for the development of this class of

facility include site preparation, construction,

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operation, decommissioning and a release from CNSC

licensing or a licence to abandon at the end of the day.

It should be noted that where nuclear

substances remain in at a location as part of a

decommissioning plan, release from CNSC licensing would

not occur until the appropriate institutional controls

were in place.

So site preparation and construction

activities can also be addressed as a single licensing

step, as in the case of the DGR project, where OPG

submitted an application for a licence to prepare a site

and construct, so we can combine those two phases.

In summary, the DGR project licensing

aligns with the CNSC multi-step licensing process and

would require separate licences for the following phases.

So basically, we’re -- the phase of prepare a site and

construct is one phase, then they would be required to

apply and obtain a licence to operate and, subsequently,

for decommissioning and an application to obtain a licence

for abandonment at the end of day. So there are steps

involved here.

So generally, licensees must demonstrate in

their application and, if they are licensed, continue to

demonstrate that they are qualified and they have made

adequate provisions to protect the environment and the

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health and safety of persons.

To do so during the licence application

phase, OPG obligations include submissions of a complete

application that shows they understand the safety issues

associated with the possession and use of the nuclear

energy their application concerns.

CNSC obligations include an evaluation of

all application information for sufficiency and for that

demonstration of understanding by the Applicant.

Following the issuance of a licence, OPG’s

obligations include the requirements under the Regulations

under licence and all commitments made during the

licensing process.

CNSC’s obligations include oversight by

compliance verification which may include inspections,

enforcement and ongoing evaluation of the OPG safety

assessment.

So this slide provides an overview of some

of the regulatory information used in assessing that --

the adequacy of the licensing information provided. This

includes the Act and its associated Regulations as well as

numerous regulatory and guidance documents that pertain to

the DGR project. As I said, this is just a sample of some

of the regulatory requirements that we would use.

As part of this licence application, OPG

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must also address the requirement from other federal,

provincial and municipal approvals, permits that will be

necessary to carry out site preparation and construction

activities. Examples are provided on this slide.

The CNSC expects the Applicant to comply

with all federal, provincial and municipal requirements so

long as they do not conflict with the requirements of the

Nuclear Safety and Control Act and associated Regulations.

If conflicts between the Act and other

legislation arise, CNSC staff will address these issues on

a case-by-case basis by working collaboratively with other

regulatory agencies in order to minimize duplication or

conflicting requirements and to harmonize regulatory

oversight.

While CNSC is the sole agency responsible

for nuclear energy and substances, others have

jurisdiction in relation to some aspects or activities.

As such, there is a need for cooperation, coordination

with other departments and agencies.

CNSC has and may enter into agreements with

other federal and provincial departments and agencies.

Federal partners include, but are not

limited to, Natural Resources Canada, Health Canada,

Environment Canada, Fisheries and Oceans and the Major

Projects Management Office. Partners at the provincial

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level include Ontario Ministry of the Environment, Ontario

Ministry of Health.

So the CNSC also employs what we term as a

joint regulatory group approach where joint regulatory

inspection and regulatory events in depth which is

complementary, harmonizing and respects everyone’s mandate

is employed at our licensed site, so we do engage other

agencies.

So regulatory documents that are used

explain to licensees and applicants what they must achieve

in order to meet the requirements set out in the Nuclear

Safety and Control Act, the Regulations made under the Act

and the regulatory documents.

Specifically, regulatory documents provide

detail and clarification of the requirements of the

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission with respect to the

Nuclear Safety and Control Act, Regulations made under the

Act, and licence conditions. Regulatory documents become

legally enforceable when referenced in a licence.

Guidance documents are a key component of

the CNSC’s regulatory framework. These documents provide

practical information and suggestions to licensees and

applicants on how to meet the regulatory requirements of

the Commission.

Such guidance may include, but is not

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limited to, information on possible approaches to the

design of nuclear facilities, the design and

implementation of required management and operational

programs, and forms for applying for licences or reporting

information to the Commission Tribunal.

With respect to the DGR Project, the CNSC’s

regulatory approach for radioactive waste is described in

-- in regulatory guide G320 and regulatory guide P290. In

developing these documents, CNSC drew upon recommendations

of the International Atomic Energy Agency and best

practices from the international and national community.

And the CNSC’s commitment to Canadian and international

standards and best practices, ensures that the management

of radioactive waste in Canada meets the highest standards

for health, safety, security, and environmental

protection.

In the case of the Uranium Mines and Mills

Regulations -- although this regulation does not apply

because DGR is not a uranium mine -- CNSC has indicated

that these regulations provide some clarity as to the

types of information to be supplied in submissions to the

CNSC. As such, it has been adopted as a guidance for the

DGR Project.

So now we’ll talk about the CNSC licensing

process. As discussed earlier, the DGR licensing process

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is phased to address the entire life-cycle of the DGR

Project, with the current licence application being

limited to site preparation and construction activities.

A licence contains clear and concise

licence conditions grouped by safety and control areas

which identify programs that must be implemented and

maintained by the licensee. These are based on

information submitted in the licence application and

require the applicant to have measures in place to fulfill

all licensing requirements.

Typical licensing conditions in existing

licences are -- such as the licensee shall implement and

maintain safety and control measures for environmental

protection in accordance with the requirements of CNSC

Regulatory Standard S296 which is environmental protection

policies, programs, and procedures at Class 1 nuclear

facilities in uranium mines and mills. So this was an

example of a licence condition and I can provide a couple

more but, as per brevity, I’ll skip that part.

So in the case of the DGR Project, proposed

licence may also include the requirements for OPG to

provide additional documentation; detail in site

preparation and construction for acceptance by CNSC staff

prior to the commencement of those activities.

Finally, all recommendations outlined in

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CNSC staff’s Commission Member Document for the DGR

Project will be captured in the proposed licence.

The licence condition handbook contains

compliance verification criteria, information on

delegation of authority, references to licensees’

documentation, references to standards and CNSC regulatory

documents, and any commitments made by the applicant to

ensure compliance with regulatory expectations. The

overall purpose of the licence condition handbook is to

provide compliance verification criteria to the applicant

and CNSC staff on how to ensure compliance with the

licence.

In the case of the DGR Project, a detailed

list of key OPG documentation will be listed in the

licence condition handbook. For example, the licence

condition concerning environmental protection is detailed

in the licence condition handbook to require, amongst

other things, emissions management, spills management,

radiological emissions limits, and action limits

monitoring of radioactivity and hazardous substance in

effluence, and offsite radiological environmental

monitoring program. Some of these may not be completely

germane to the DGR during construction, but the licence

condition handbook often identifies the required

environmental reporting of the province for the licensing

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activities.

For the condition on the management system,

the licence condition handbook identifies such things as

the management system documents and positions under which

the licensee is managing the project and states

requirements for notification of changes and principles

under safety culture will be evaluated.

So the intent here is that the licence

condition handbook references are listed with document

version control unlike the licence which cannot be

modified without undergoing an approved amendment by the

Commission, the licence condition handbook can be updated

over time and, as deemed necessary, to incorporate

recommendations of CNSC specialist staff and such things

as updates to licence condition handbook references.

So in the previous slide, I mentioned

safety and control areas. Safety and control areas are

technical topics CNSC staff apply across all regulated

facilities and activities to assess, evaluate, review,

verify, and report on regulatory requirements and

performance. This framework is used throughout our core

processes. The safety and control areas are presented in

a comprehensive framework consisting of 14 areas which are

grouped into three primary functional areas; management,

facility and equipment, and core control processes. The

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safety and control area framework provides us with a

common set of safety and control terms that are applicable

across the entire CNSC. By consistently using the same

terms when referring to the same safety and control area,

we will improve communications externally with licensees,

the Commission, and the public.

In the licensing phase, CNSC compliance

verification activity confirms compliance with licence and

regulatory requirement.

When it comes to documentation for the DGR

Project that have direct licensing and regulatory

requirements, that list includes, but is not limited to,

the following licensing documents: design and construction

management system, environmental policies and program,

conventional health and safety program, EA follow-up

monitoring program, emergency preparedness, geo-scientific

verification.

With the exception of workplace health and

safety, it is federal acts, regulations, and codes applied

to all aspects of the DGR facility. With respect to

workplace health and safety during the construction and

operation of the DGR facility, this will be regulated

under the Ontario Occupational Health and Safety Act and

its associated regulations. When referenced in a licence

or a licence condition handbook, licensees are -- are

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obligated to adhere to other safety codes and standards as

well as applicant commitments. In the case of the DGR

Project, this is described in the licensing applications

submittal entitled “Project Requirements”. The latest

version of all regulations, standards, and codes have been

used for the construction of the DGR facility.

I should point out, on the side, we

mentioned codes -- National Building Codes, 2005. We’d

just like to indicate that we should have indicated the

most recent version of those codes, which is 2010, and

those will be the ones that will be referenced in the

licence condition handbook. So in the event of any

conflict or inconsistencies between any requirement of the

Nuclear Safety Control Act and its associated regulations

and any requirement of the regulations, code, or standards

listed in this section, the conflict or inconsistency will

be directed to the CNSC for resolution.

So this slide provides some information on

compliance -- the compliance process. Compliance --

defines compliance as conformity with the legally binding

requirements of the Act and the CNSC regulations,

licences, decisions, and orders made under the Act. So

the CNSC’s compliance activities are measures of

promotion, verification, and enforcement, if required, and

are used to assess a licensee’s conformity with their

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licence and regulatory requirements.

These requirements include limits such as

action limits associated with releases and worker doses.

Action limits established by the licensees are typically

set to a fraction of the regulatory limits. If breached,

they trigger a review to ensure that activities are

functioning appropriately and regulatory limits will not

be breached. CNSC staff has various tools to verify

compliance including, but not limited to, phased onsite

inspections, conducting their own monitoring and sampling

for compliance, their review and evaluations of licensee

reporting as well as onsite records and documentation.

Some licensee reporting is annual, but others may occur at

key project milestones. The scope, location, and

frequency of inspections and other compliance verification

activities are established on a risk-informed basis.

Higher risk facilities and safety-significant activities

are subject to more frequent and detailed compliance

verification by the CNSC.

The inspection scope, location, and

frequency for the DGR Project will be established based

upon key project milestones and, therefore, will align

with planned construction activities, likely including

stormwater management pond construction, the sinking of

the main and ventilation shafts, as well as lateral

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underground development and the excavation of the

emplacement rooms and tunnels.

Compliance verification will mesh with key

-- as I said, with key project sequencing milestones.

Mechanisms for verification include, but are not limited

to, Type 2 baseline compliance inspections and Type 2

augmented inspection. These are our focused inspections

on particular programs or activities.

Records made pursuant to Section 29 and 30

of the general nuclear safety and control Regulations.

Quarterly operations reports and any reports submitted

pursuant to a licence condition. These are just some

examples of our compliance verification.

CNSC inspection plans typically consist of

baseline compliance activities which may be supplemented

by additional risk-informed inspections. The scope,

frequency, complexity of inspections are commensurate with

the nature and inherent risk of the facility and/or the

activity.

The higher the risk for the facility or

activity, the more frequent and detailed compliance

verification.

Inspections include a snapshot inspection

focused on immediate observations. An investigation

following an event or incident can be -- an inspection can

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be a detailed evaluation or audit consisting of document

review, site inspection and interviews.

In selecting enforcement approaches and

tools, the CNSC also applies a graduated enforcement basis

where risk significance and urgency will be considered.

Inspectors are empowered under various

sections of the Nuclear Safety and Control Act to inspect

and to enforce regulatory requirement. The Act includes

provisions in regards to designation of officers,

authority for inspections, search and seizure, powers of

the inspectors, disposal or return of seized property,

orders of the inspectors.

The Regulations also permit the CNSC to

request tests, analysis, reviews or install or modify

equipment or procedures.

Reporting requirements are described in the

Licence Condition Handbook that accompanies a licence.

CNSC staff analyze the results of compliance activities in

order to identify potential areas of non-compliance and

potential areas of risk or concern.

There are two types of reporting; scheduled

and unscheduled. Scheduled reporting includes annual

reporting requirements as well as milestone reporting

requirements at the start or end of key project phases.

This will set out -- these will be set out in the licence

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with specific requirements further described in the

Licence Condition Handbook.

Unscheduled reporting includes reporting of

incidents or significant developments to the Commission.

For reasons of transparency and as part of the CNSC's

regulatory defence and in-depth approach, CNSC staff

provide access to relevant compliance reports to the

Government of Canada, the International Atomic Energy

Agency, to the public and other stakeholders.

One major example of required reporting as

an outcome of the environmental assessment process is the

EA Follow-Up Monitoring Program. This program is designed

to ensure that the predictions of effects are validated

during the implementation of the project and, if effects

are adverse, then further mitigation and contingency

procedures are to be considered.

As part of their licence application, OPG

has provided a proposed EA Follow-Up Monitoring Program.

This document may be modified or enhanced during the EA

process, and based upon input from the CNSC, other

regulators, the public and other stakeholders and from the

JRP itself.

This is but one example of the reporting

requirement that will be captured in the licence and the

Licence Condition Handbook whereby CNSC staff will verify

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OPG's compliance to this program during the current and

proposed licensing period.

Regulatory activities during proposed

licensing period of the site and construction are

described on this slide.

OPG compliance activities during the

proposed licence period include reporting to demonstrate

adherence to licence conditions, self-assessment of

licence programs, geoscientific verification activities,

OPG -- the EA Follow-Up Monitoring Program and the

development and documentation of requirements necessary to

operate.

CNSC compliance verification activities

during the proposed licensing period will include the

conduct of inspections and the evaluation of OPG's

reporting to determine if licence requirements are being

met.

The level of enforcement action taken is

commensurate with the risk, significance of the non-

compliance, the circumstances that led to the non-

compliance, and compliance history.

The inspector has the authority to

recommend, suggest potential improvements, request actions

to be taken, request -- issue a request under the Section

12(2) of the Act for more information and/or can issue an

25


order, whereas the Commission itself may summon the

licensee to appear before them, impose restrictions or

revoke a licence, issue orders and/or -- and recommend

prosecution.

While the DGR will extend into a multi-

decade operational phase, the currently-proposed licence

period is limited to site preparation and construction.

To be clear, there is no possession of

radioactive waste allowed under this proposed licence. To

receive radioactive waste, OPG will be required to submit

to the Commission an application for a licence to operate

and the Commission would need to make a decision to issue

a licence for OPG to begin operation and emplace

radioactive waste at the DGR site.

Now, with this application for -- to

operate, OPG will be required to accumulate all the data

that was acquired during the construction period, to look

at the safety case and update the safety case as required

or necessary to supplement the application for a licence

to operate.

CNSC staff's evaluation of the current

licensing application and its requirement focuses upon

proposed activities during the period of site preparation

and construction while also requiring some considerations

of the subsequent operation and decommissioning closure in

26


the future. As such, compliance verification will mesh

with key project milestones that will occur at various

stages or phases throughout the entire project timeline.

CNSC staff have various tools to verify

compliance, as indicated in the previous slides, and

basically, annual -- you know, basically, on-site

inspections, review of documentation and reporting

requirements and a review of key project milestones such

as the end of the site preparation phase and prior to the

initiation of the construction phase.

CNSC staff have various tools to verify

compliance during the site preparation/construction phase.

DGR project-specific examples of site preparation

activities include development of adequate site access and

infrastructure as well as the development of stormwater

and waste rock management areas.

During this phase, compliance verification

tools include planned on-site inspections and the

verification of licensing reporting documentation that

support the construction activities prior to the

initiation of the construction phase.

The DGR project-specific examples of

construction activities include shaft sinking of the main

headframe and ventilation shaft as well as construction

activities associated with lateral development underground

27


such as the construction of underground facilities as well

as the emplacement rooms and tunnels.

During this phase, compliance verification

tools may include planned on-site inspection and the

verification of licensee submittals include aspects under

the geoscientific verification plan as well as the EA

Follow-Up Monitoring Plan.

During the public review period, CNSC

staff's role during this period is to evaluate all the

technical, scientific and regulatory information provided

under OPG's licence application. This includes all

submissions to the Panel thereafter, including responses

to regulatory, Panel and public information requests as

well as the new information provided by OPG as part of

today's technical information session.

CNSC staff will also continue to provide,

as requested, technical and scientific information and

advice to the Joint Review Panel throughout the process.

Prior to any hearing called by the Panel

for this project, CNSC staff will provide our evaluation

to the Panel in the form of a Commission Member Document

submittal.

CNSC staff’s CMD will include a

recommendation to the Panel with respect to OPG’s

application for a licence to prepare a site and construct.

28


CNSC staff’s CMD will also include a

licensing recommendation and a draft licence and licence

condition handbook.

This concludes CNSC staff’s presentation,

and I will pass the microphone back to Mr. Elder.

MR. ELDER: Thank you.

There’s just one point I’d like to stress

on this one, is when we’re talking about verification

checkpoints, these can be defined in the licence or in the

licence condition handbook as very hard points. There’s a

100 percent verification before you continue.

And this is what we’ve done on many

projects to say before you start this one, you show that

you’re really ready and if -- you know, it’s a -- and we

have all the enforcement powers to stop them if we don’t

think they’re ready.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much.

I’ll now open the floor to questions from

the Panel, beginning with Dr. Archibald.

QUESTIONS BY THE PANEL

MEMBER ARCHIBALD: Thank you very much.

On Slide 13 where you illustrate the

regulatory and guidance documents, you had given examples

29


of a variety of different documents that are shown, two of

which focus upon financial guarantees for decommissioning

of licensing activities.

For the particular case of the DGR project,

being unique in terms of licensing requirements for

nuclear facilities due to its very long-term nature, it

will have an exceptionally long operational period

requirements relative to conventional nuclear facility

operations. Are there any special regulatory or guidance

or guideline features needed to be developed or revised in

order to reflect the special aspects of the DGR, that

being the temporal extensions?

MR. ELDER: Peter Elder, for the record.

We have not, at this point, identified a

need to update those guidance. We believe there’s enough,

I guess, flexibility in the guidance to ask for what we

need in terms of the long-term period.

One of the things that is -- you should

know is that all these things are reviewed on a periodic

basis. So the financial guarantees and the

decommissioning plans are reviewed, at minimum, every five

years.

So while the -- you know, when you’re

looking well into the future, yes, you’re trying to

predict something that’s many years -- you know, maybe 50

30


to 100 years in the future on this one.

We do constantly review them and this is

one of the things we’ve been writing into the licences

now, that they will be reviewed on a routine basis.

So one of the things that we will need to

consider, I think, whether at this stage but certainly --

not necessarily at this stage, but when you get further

closer to that decommissioning is how you do the guarantee

for the long-term monitoring after closure.

But right now, we’re looking at making sure

that there are -- there’s adequate plans, that there is a

way to decommission it, that there’s some funding

associated with that one and that it’s reasonable. But

these are reviewed periodically, every five years.

MEMBER ARCHIBALD: Thank you.

I think that in terms of the standard

operational features, I was specifically looking to the

very long-term decommissioning periods which will have to

be looked at in the future. Thank you for your answer.

The second part is on page 25, proposed

activities during the licensing period. You note that OPG

compliance activities will include several areas, one

being the self-assessment of licence programs and

geoscientific verification activities.

Now, I’m not sure whether I should be

31


asking you or OPG this, but could you explain how the OPG

will self-report geoscientific information in terms of

frequency of reporting and types of reporting?

In terms of self-assessment, is this

regulated or is this up to the Proponent to recommend and

suggest the reporting activities?


I guess there are two different ones. On

the geoscience verification activities, that program we’ll

have to identify when key reports are required. So the

report itself should have a timeline of when things are

reporting.

In terms of the self-assessments, these are

required under a management system. So for the management

system, we usually -- they’re following the Canadian

Standards Association standard on management system for

nuclear facilities, which is N286. And this requires them

to develop an internal self-assessment program.

And then again, that would be documented,

the frequency of how often these are done. It’s up to the

applicant to propose a schedule, but we would look at it

and make sure it matches the key program elements and key

milestones that they’re supposed to be doing in that

period.


32


On your page -- on your Slide 27 where you

illustrate the project sequencing for the next 50-odd

years -- this not being the current licensing phase under

way, but the entire sequence where you show three

licensing intervals.

In the environmental impact statement, it

had been mentioned that additional decommissioning waste

beyond the current plan waste volume may be installed

within the DGR that would require expansion of the DGR

through creation of more lateral development changes to

the infrastructure and so on.

This is one of the aspects of the project

that is proposed. This could be in the plan, but is

currently not under review.

At what stages in your project sequencing

timeline that’s shown on your Slide 27 would new licensing

activities for this particular stage be initiated and what

steps would be required to be taken to address changes in

the current conceptual plan if, for example, the use of

decommissioning wastes are going to be operational?


So that would require -- in terms of the

licences, how we’re currently structuring them, the

licence application, the basis of the application defines

-- and the envelope that comes out of the environmental

33


assessment combines what we call the licensing basis. So

this is the large parameters that you are supposed to

operate within.

If you -- if they were looking at anything

that requires -- that would be considered as going outside

that licensing basis which actually requires a licence

amendment, so they would have to apply.

If they wanted to expand the facility, they

would actually have to apply to the Commission for an

amendment to their operating licence, and in that

amendment they would have to demonstrate that they were

not going beyond the impacts that were assessed in the

environmental assessment and in the safety case. Again,

the expansion is always consistent with the long-term

safety case.

So it’s not -- it’s some time in that

operations period they would require -- they would be

required to come back and do a licence amendment.

MEMBER ARCHIBALD: In your opinion, then,

if this were to take place -- and this is shown as being

51 years down the road as being completed for the current

plan -- would there be a kick-off stage where you would

require some licensing application or re-application to be

made, and how early in this particular process would you

want this to be done?

34


MR. ELDER: So again, I’ll explain the

normal process on that one.

For these facilities currently -- I won’t

say these facilities. For the major facilities, licences

are issued for a period between five and 10 years. So an

operating licence would only be for five and 10 years. So

in that 50-year period, there would be a number of

renewals of the licence. And part of the reason we want

the renewals is to be able to prompt those discussions

about the next phase.

And I’ll give you a concrete example in

terms of for the Pickering Nuclear Power Station, which

OPG has said the end of life is in 2020. We then said,

“All right, when you come for licence renewal in, I

believe, it’s 2014 or 2015 we want a lot of documentation

on how you’re going to do that transition from operation

to decommissioning for that licence renewal well in

advance of -- for your last operating licence renewal in

advance of when you come in and discuss decommissioning.”


That appears, then, that the interval that

would require this new application would be at least five

years before the end of the current scheduled time. Thank

you.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much, Dr.

35


Archibald.

Dr. Muecke.

MEMBER MUECKE: Would it be possible to

have some of the slides back on the screen? It just would

make it easier to ask the questions.

Slide 14. Thank you very much.

Now we are addressing here the regulatory

requirements in terms of federal and provincial

jurisdictions. And my question is, which regulatory

bodies are responsible for the regulatory requirements and

commitments that are listed here?

And I would like to follow that up with --

by saying how does CNSC lead the coordination of how these

requirements are met?

And perhaps you could give me some concrete

examples about -- on that respect.

MR. ELDER: So Peter Elder for the record.

So I'll go through the federal ones. The first two, the

Migratory Birds and Species at Risk Act, are Environment

Canada. The Explosives Act is Natural Resources Canada.

Fisheries Act, there’s actually some is under Department

of Fisheries and Oceans and some aspects are actually done

by Environment Canada as well.

Environmental Protection is mostly

Environment Canada. The National Building Code and

36


National Fire Code are HRDSC, so it’s the Human Resources

and Skills Development Canada. On those last two, we also

have -- well most of these, we have in-house expertise as

well about these aspects.

To give you a concrete example of how we

approach it is that when we are doing inspections on

environmental protection, we contact Environment Canada.

We have an agreement; we have an MOU with Environment

Canada that sets out the framework to do this. And we

actually invite them to come along on inspections. So we

do a joint inspection and we will bring in not only the

federal, but the provincial player, you will bring them as

well.

So we have inspections and we’ll have CNSC,

Environment Canada, and provincial Ministry of the

Environment, and you do a common inspection. Normally on

those ones, we will then take the lead on the follow-up

actions but they are also free to pursue things under

their own act and their own enforcement schemes as well.

And that’s the same thing with the

provincial. We work very closely and have MOUs with the

Ontario Ministry of Labour that’s looking at how we apply

those labour laws. And in this case, certainly for -- in

the mines in Saskatchewan, we work very closely with the

inspectors from Ministry of Labour. So if the sort of

37


conventional mining safety is their expertise, we will do

joint inspections. If they’re not joint inspections, we

share inspection reports. If we see something during one

inspection, our inspection, which is more than their

expertise, we have arrangements to pass that information.

We tell the licensees always right away,

but we also pass the information to the lead regulator.

And we have, again, informal agreements in Saskatchewan

with the provincial government as to how we govern those

arrangements.

But I note that they also do -- I think

I’ve said that -- they also do their own inspections. So

not only our inspections or joint inspections; they also

do their own inspections. And really the arrangements are

to make sure that we are passing information between the

agencies.

MEMBER MUECKE: Okay, thanks very much.

That clarifies it.

Could we go to slide number 20?

This slide concentrates on obligations by national and

provincial agencies. What is the regulatory jurisdiction

for municipal codes? I have in mind here regulations

regarding noise, emergency management, et cetera.

MR. ELDER: So Peter Elder for the record.

The general expectation, I think we said it before, is

38


that they will adhere to all appropriate codes,

provincial, municipal and federal. Obviously,

occasionally, you will get a licensee saying, "Well this

is federal jurisdiction, I only have to follow federal

rules." And at this point we said, "Fine, our instruction

is follow the municipal rules." And we have done that in

the past.

Just to clarify, if they want us, so a

general instruction is -- some of them are easy, the

National Building Code and National Fire Code are applied

regardless of everything -- but we would look that say

they do apply the appropriate municipal, follow the

appropriate municipal rules as well.

MEMBER MUECKE: Okay, thank you. In other

words, all levels of jurisdiction –--

MR. ELDER: All appropriate levels of

jurisdiction should apply. Again, we’ll always put the

caveat "as long as there’s no conflict between them".

MEMBER MUECKE: Thank you. Could we then

move on to slide number 23, please?

And I’m looking at the first bullet here.

In terms of inspection scope, location and frequency, they

are said to be risk-informed. Could you tell us how risk

is assessed in this instance?

MR. ELDER: So I’ll start at the general

39


level of how we approach the risks. We have a standard

framework that I use throughout the directorate that looks

at all the facilities. And then we look at these safety

control areas. And it’s essentially -- it's an expert

judgment process, but we have a workshop, you have a

number of experts on various grounds who come back in and

is this area high, medium, and low. It's -- but it’s

following actually a CSA standard on risk-ranking and how

we do it.

And we come up with a table that says,

here’s the baseline risk you would see for this facility.

So if you say, an area that’s unique to a facility that’s

let’s say, radius protection you’ve ranked as high because

of the activities, then you’re going to inspect it more

often than an area that’s ranked low.

In this type of project, then you would

overlay the milestones and what are the key activities and

so things like is it the first time they’ve done

something? So you may come back in. The first time they

make an emplacement room, you’re probably going to and

inspect and watch it very closely. You may or may not do

that the 50th time. But then afterwards you go to sort of

spot checks.

So we overlay those risks, what’s unique,

what are the key aspects of -- the other way we look at

40


the inspections is performance-based. So if there's a

problem that we've observed the problem in one area, you

will go back and check more often that one.

We also require -- I think, we should be

clear. On the reporting, we require them to self-report a

lot. So any minor events, any incidences, they must have

a mechanism to record all minor deviations. This is as

part of their corrective action process. So we can go in,

and at certain significance, then they formally report it

to the regulator.

But we can also go into their databases of

all their minor events and look for trends or ask them to

do trend analysis. And again that will form where you

decide to concentrate your inspections.

MEMBER MUECKE: Thank you. That covers it

very nicely. Could we go on to slide number 26?

And here, we’re dealing with enforcement

and compliance. And my question is do other regulatory

bodies, such as Labour and Mining for instance, have

enforcement authority outside CNSC jurisdiction.

MR. ELDER: The quick answer is: Yes,they

do.

So they can. The Ministry of Labour are on

the sites and we’ve seen them do it so I know they can on

the Bruce site and other places can issue a stop work

41


order to do investigations.

Environment Canada has their own

enforcement process as well.

So, again, we like to be informed and

understand how they’re approaching this one but, yes, they

have their own enforcement powers as well.

MEMBER MUECKE: And lastly, slide 29.

And here we have the project sequencing and

the various bullets and we are wondering: Do these

bullets indicate the milestones that CNSC proposes for the

project?

MR. HOWARD: Don Howard for the record.

We put this slide up as an example of

potential points. Until we conclude our full assessment

and come up with what we would consider are verification

points.

So we’ve put this up as examples of what we

see very early on right now and we say potential and

probably likely verification point but they’re not -- the

list hasn’t been completed yet.

MEMBER MUECKE: Okay, I understand they’re

the likely ones.

And so once the likely milestones are

identified, could you elaborate a little bit about the

action that each of these milestones triggers?

42


MR. ELDER: Peter Elder for the record.

I can tell you, in general, how we would

approach it and this is where we use the licence condition

handbook very distinctly.

If we decide that this is a keen

verification point then the licence condition handbook

would have explicit list of everything that must be

demonstrated to be done at that before you proceed beyond

that point.

So if you want to say, before sinking the

shaft, there will be a list of: Here’s the documentation

you have to get done, here’s what going back in and as

well here’s what we are going to qualify.

And I think Mr. Leclair has something he

wants to add as well.

MR. LECLAIR: Thank you. Jean Leclair for

the record.

Perhaps just to provide a little more

concrete examples, so for instance when you’re looking at

storm water management for instance, there’s a point in

time where it’s absolutely essential that that storm water

management be in place because if, in fact, there’s a

major rain event that there has to be capability in order

to deal with that.

So for instance, if the storm water

43


management was absolutely essential to ensure the

protection of the shaft for potential flooding, I’m just

throwing these things out as ideas, we still need to look

at it in further detail but you would want to ensure that

that is in place before you begin to do those activities.

Similarly, if you have an activity where,

for Waste Rock Management, it was identified that there

was a potential for contamination of water that would need

to be treated prior to release into the environment then

there would be a whole point or a verification that would

say to verify and ensure that the water treatment system

is in place, that the capabilities are already there

before you start undertaking certain activities that are

going to generate water that needs to be treated prior to

release in the environment.

So these are all things that can be looked

at in the stage basis and really comes down to ensuring

that the controls are in place and the verifications have

been done before an activity that could lead to potential

impact on health, safety and environment are in place.

Similarly, underground developments you

often will look at things like the mine refuge station,

the mine refuge stations have to be in place before you

have a lot of workers underground. There reason why it’s

there is to provide a safe place for workers in the event

44


of a major event underground.

So this is another example where you would

be looking and saying you cannot proceed with significant

lateral development where you would need a lot of workers

underground because refuge stations are not fully in place

yet.

So these are all things that we can look at

that can be established up front as part of the licence,

licence conditions handbook and also can be supplemented

as part of regular verification activities.

So even through our verification

activities, we may identify a situation or particular

thing that’s going on and we’ll say: We’ll issue an

action notice that says do not proceed with the following

activity until these actions have been taken and then

there’s a supplemental verification to confirm those

things are done before proceeding with those activities.

MEMBER MUECKE: Thank you very much. That

finishes my questions.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. I

have a few questions of my own.

On slide 12, there is a mention among many

other items of financial guarantees and the Panel were

wondering about the specific situation where construction

is halted and the project is basically halted or

45


abandoned, in other words at a very early stage.

Could you, please, clarify the requirements

for a financial guarantee in this particular instance

where the project simply does not go ahead at quite an

early stage?


So we do a phased approach to the financial

guarantees as well.

So for -- if you have a licence to

construct, you know, operate and construct, you’re

financial guarantee is based on what you need to do to

back out at that point.

We would want to see to your plan for if

everything goes ahead but, really, you’re main guarantee

is: Do you have enough resources there to safely back

out?

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

I have another question with respect to the

contents of the licence; particularly around licencing

conditions that reflect the incorporation of adaptive

management.

Could you give us a bit more information

regarding how a typical licence would incorporate the

provision for adaptive management, for example, in

response to so called triggers during follow-up

46


monitoring?

MR. ELDER: I’ll try to give you a concrete

example of how we would do it and this is -- it’s very

similar to how we would do with the financial guarantees.

You write in to the condition that you

review it on a routine -- on a financial guarantee, we’ll

say: You must maintain a financial guarantee that is

satisfactory to the Commission and this one must be

reviewed every five years or more often if required, at

the request of the Commission.

And you can do the same thing on an

environmental monitoring program or following program in

saying you schedule periodic reviews but you also put into

that one the power for the Commission, which can be the

Commission Tribunal itself or staff, to actually request

more frequent update.


I have a general question around mention --

among many other things -- on slide 24. One of the

bullets on slide 24 is “Social or Economic Studies” and

the Panel is interested in whether there is a specific

regulatory agency responsible for the follow-up program

regarding socioeconomic impacts.


We will get back to you with a defining but

47


we can’t think of something right away other than whatever

is in the follow-up program must be done.

In the past, on some of these things -- and

we’ve seen something actually in Saskatchewan on some of

the mines where there were some requirements but that was

-- they were more provincial so it was the Province who

took the lead on making sure that the socioeconomic

impacts they had: target -- you know, things like target

employment and things like that we followed up on.

Our experience has been they have been

Provincial and we’ll have to get back to you in saying if

it’s a federal need how would that be done.

Other than we would have the power to do it

and then we would, in this case, we may need to go out and

get some consultants to help us do those evaluations.


So I would note that is undertaking number

1 where CNSC will provide the Panel with

more information regarding follow-up on

socio-economic impacts and benefits.

Also with respect to this slide, the final

bullet on the right-hand side is “Aboriginal Interests” so

my question is: How does the CNSC intend to coordinate

its activities, as Crown consultation coordinator, with

the activities of OPG as well as NWMO regarding Aboriginal

48


consultations and this position of issues during the

licensed period?

MR. ELDER: One of the key mechanisms that

we’ve been using on the Aboriginal consultations ongoing

through the project is the fact that there are licence

renewals throughout that phase.

So it’s not like you get the operation and

you say: Okay, you have 40 years and come back for a

decommissioning licence.

Again, there’s a 5 to 10 year licence

renewal and we have been looking at making sure that we’re

fulfilling our duty to consult around those licence

renewals like we would do for environmental assessments as

well.

So there would be continual dialogue

throughout the licence period and then, at some point at

the licence renewal, you have the opportunity to again

present -- collate all the information and present it to

the Commission to make sure that the duty to consult has

been fulfilled.


Just a follow-up question just for

clarification. I think one of the key words in my

question was “coordination with OPG and NWMO” because I

think the Panel has already expressed some concerns

49


regarding the left hand and the right hand knowing what

they’re doing with respect to interacting with Aboriginal

peoples?

MR. ELDER: And I’ll go back in and saying

that the same -- once what we’ve been doing and maybe Mr.

Leclair will give the example of how it’s working in

Saskatchewan because I think it’s a good example of how it

does work, where there is good coordination.

And our expectation, again, would be when

you’re applying for -- our expectation and this is in our

rules would be, when you’re applying for licence renewal,

the Applicant must come and explain what they have done on

the Aboriginal engagement during the licence period as

well.

MR. LECLAIR: So if I can provide perhaps a

concrete example, it would be the situation in

Saskatchewan where with the uranium mines in Northern

Saskatchewan there’s very important component of

Aboriginal consultation and Aboriginal involvement.

This one is perhaps -- in the situation of

DGR -- the situation in Saskatchewan is quite a bit

broader ‘cause there’s several mines involved, different

mining companies, so it’s a little more complex.

But, fundamentally, what is in place is

there are mechanisms that have been established to engage

50


Aboriginal communities as part of the process.

In the case of Saskatchewan, they have what

they call an “Environment Quality Committee” which has

representations from various Aboriginal communities

throughout Northern Saskatchewan who meet on a set

frequency.

And at those meetings, in fact, the

Applicant, the Licensee, is present as well as the

regulators. In the case of Saskatchewan, both provincial

and federal regulators are present because, often in those

discussions, their issues are perhaps more directed

towards the licensee while others may be directed more

towards the regulators.

So when we’re there, we often make

presentations. We will provide information in terms of

performance, explain what the performance has been at the

operating mines, seek some input with regards to potential

issues of concerns that they may have.

Even, sometimes, getting information

because in those situations often several of them are

employed by the mines so we’ll also use that as an

opportunity to get some -- another independent source of

information with regards to performance issues that may

exist at those sites.

The other key thing is the importance of

51


public information programs that are essential and part of

that is -- in case of Saskatchewan, they have annual

Northern tours where the licensee goes out, visits

communities, presents their performance, what they’re

doing, what they’re plans are.

Often, discussions do revolve around socio-

economic aspects as well because it’s an important issue

and CNSC staff are actually present.

So we participate in those tours, of

course, in a different role and different capacity but

that way there we can ensure that there’s -- as observers

so that, when we’re commenting and when we’re providing

our recommendations and our conclusions to the Commission,

we can tell them that we were present, we know what the

issues that were raised and we have some of idea how those

issues were resolved.

So again, we’re providing some further

information to support the Commission in its decisions.


That was very interesting and useful.

A follow-up then is: Where might the Panel

and interested parties find more information on the

Saskatchewan example you just gave?

MR. LECLAIR: Certainly, one would be: we

have some information on our website with regards to

52


requirements for public information programs, information

on Aboriginal consultation.

I’d have to get back to you, actually, with

further details.

We do know as well, even in all our staff

CMDs, when we’re making our recommendations in -- whether

it’s with regards to an environmental assessment or a

licencing hearing, there’s an entire section that is

actually dedicated to Aboriginal consultation and public

information that lays out all the activities that were

undertaken as part of the decision that’s being made.

So it provides a pretty good overview of

those aspects.

MR. ELDER: Just as a follow-up -- Peter

Elder -- we will get back to you in terms of this one

because I think there is information on the Environmental

Quality Councils and also we’ll dig out -- those Quality

Councils came, actually, from a recommendation from a

Joint Review Panel so we’ll dig out the actual logic

behind their recommendation on how to engage -- this wide

approach to engaging the Aboriginal groups in this manner.


So I will note that as Undertaking No. 2

from the CNSC and the undertaking is to provide the Panel

with additional information on the Saskatchewan

53


Environmental Quality Council case.

With respect to both undertakings 1 and 2,

may I ask the CNSC when the Panel may expect the response?


We should be able to provide that by the

end of this month.


That concludes the questions that I have.

Dr. Archibald, Dr. Muecke, did you have any other

questions?

Thank you very much. I am looking at the

clock, it is now a quarter past ten (10:15), I suggest

that we take a 15-minute break and reconvene promptly at

10:30 when we will then hear from OPG.

--- Upon recessing at 10:15 a.m.

--- Upon resuming at 10:31 a.m.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much for

being so prompt to get back after the coffee break.

Before we proceed with OPG, the Panel does

have one follow-up question for Mr. Elder of the CNSC.

This is with another follow-up on the

financial guarantee question.

We require a little bit more clarity on

54


when financial guarantees are required, how they are

determined and when they must be in place, including the

period before nuclear material is actually present on

site.

So if you would answer that, that would be

helpful.


Just to be clear, we require a financial

guarantee from -- for every single licence.

So before there is nuclear material

present, the financial guarantee would be able would be to

reverse what you’ve done. Let’s say if you’ve done site

preparation and you need to make sure that that’s left in

a stable place, it would be to remediate the site.

Or if you dig the -- you know, if you dig

underground and decide not to put the material there, it

would be to safely seal up the shafts not as a repository

but just as it’s not being an hazard.

So the guarantee would be based on the

activity that would be authorized by the licence but we

require them from the get-go, from the very first licence.

And Don Howard will add something.

MR. HOWARD: If I can add to that response

is that the -- basically, we require that the

decommissioning plan, which is in accordance with

55


Regulatory Guide G-219 for decommissioning nuclear

facilities, and a financial guarantee has to follow,

Regulatory Guide G-206, which is financial guarantees,

and, basically, that forms part of the licensing

information that is submitted to the CNSC for

consideration by the Commission Tribunal or a Panel in

issuance of the licence.


We will now continue by receiving the first

part of the presentation by Ontario Power Generation and

the Nuclear Waste Management Organization.

The overall presentation is quite lengthy,

so the Panel has asked that it be divided into five parts.

So we will now hear Part 1, the subject of which is Site

Preparation, Initial Construction, and Shaft Sinking.

Mr. Sullivan, the floor is yours.

ORAL PRESENTATION BY OPG AND NWMO PART 1:

MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you, Dr. Swanson, and

good morning.

For the record, my name is Gord Sullivan,

Project Manager for the Deep Geologic Repository Project

at Ontario Power Generation. I am accompanied here today

by Derek Wilson, Vice-President, Design and Construction,

56


Nuclear Waste Management Organization, and Frank King,

Vice-President and Chief Engineer, Nuclear Waste

Management Organization. We also have other individuals

supporting us today and they will be introduced later.

We are pleased to be here to provide the

Joint Review Panel with additional information on site

preparation and construction sequencing, and on other

subjects as requested in your June 13th letter to Ontario

Power Generation.

Derek Wilson will be making the first

presentation on behalf of OPG.

MR. WILSON: Thank you, Gord.

Part 1 in the following slides will cover

site preparation, initial construction, and shaft sinking

as mentioned. Following each part of the presentation, we

will pause and address any questions that the Panel may

have.

The construction phases as shown will be

covered over Part 1 and Part 2 of the presentation,

identifying key features and constraints, and although

presented as discrete phases there are overlaps to some of

these phases and that will be discussed in each of their

respective presentations.

The following nine slides will further

detail the sequencing and key features of site

57


preparation, as shown on Slide 4.

Slide 5 shows a flyover photo of the DGR

Project site in May of 1980 and its use as a laydown area

for the construction of the heavy water plant at the Bruce

Nuclear Site, and it shows the extent of disturbance of

the site as part of these activities.

Key features shown are interconnecting

road; the DGR shaft locations are shown at the bottom of

the slide, and the DGR site boundary is illustrated.

Slide 6 shows the current DGR site. The

interconnecting road is shown again and the main shaft

locations, the key feature being the 44 kV line which is

shown to the south of the project site which is to be

removed prior to construction and, again, the DGR site

boundary.

The Western Waste Management Facility is

shown to the south and you can just see at the bottom of

the slide portions of the Western Waste Management

Facility.

In 2011, a site geotechnical investigation

program was undertaken on the site which consisted of 25

shallow boreholes, 23 test pits, and two geophysical

lines, as shown on Slide 7.

The test program was tailored to the design

features of the site to further support detailed design

58


activities.

The geophysical lines, which are shown in

red, were used in the areas of the waste rock management

area, as well as the stormwater management pond to

minimize subsurface disturbance.

The work that was done in 2011 was

documented in a geotechnical factual report which was

posted to the registry as part of our Package 3,

Information Request Responses on July 9th as Golder’s

2012.

Profiles A-A as shown, and B-B, will be

further discussed as part of later presentation material.

Site preparation begins with the

mobilization to site and the fencing and field office

establishment. The site preparation activities are

expected to be completed over a period of six to nine

months and will be dependent on the time of year that site

access is available.

Controlled site access is shown off of

interconnecting road and there is a secondary site access

proposed at the south portion of the site off of the

abandoned railway line, with the field offices being shown

just to the north of the main and ventilation shaft areas.

Note should be made of the modified

construction island through the fencing around the north

59


marsh area to protect that area during the construction

phases.

Once the site is established and fencing is

in place, site grubbing and grading activities will

commence. We do have a constraint of May 1 through July

31st for grubbing activities to address the bird-nesting

season.

The shaft collar elevations, or the

elevation at which the shaft access is at ground level,

sets the elevation of the site and the shaft collars

themselves are set above the maximum probable flood event,

and sets the highest elevation to allow gravity drainage

through the stormwater management system.

The site grading will initially be

established for construction purposes and will later

incorporate materials excavated from the shafts for the

final site grading.

At this point, the 44 kV line that was

shown previously will be removed from the site.

Slide 10 shows the water management system

for the overall project site, which consists of the

permanent stormwater management pond and the associated

gravity drain ditch system that feeds from the various

active areas of the site to the stormwater management

pond. The pond discharges to the north of the site

60


through an existing drainage infrastructure on the Bruce

Nuclear site to Lake Huron through MacPherson Bay.

Noted on the slide is the location of the

oil/water separator which will be installed and

established early to be available to support all

construction phases.

And it should be noted that there may be

need for some temporary intermediate sumps around the

shaft areas during the initial shaft construction, until

such a time as the shaft collar elevations are set.

Further discussion on water management will

be as part of Part 3 of the presentation.

The preparation of the temporary and the

permanent waste rock management areas will also be done as

part of site preparation activities and they establish the

stockpile base grading.

Noted here are the shale, dolostone and

overburden piles, which are the temporary stockpiles. And

also it should be noted the dolostone pile will be used as

part of initial construction as a laydown area.

The permanent limestone waste rock

management area will be further discussed in Part 2 of the

presentation.

The final component of site preparation is

the establishment of site services and infrastructure in

61


support of further construction activities.

These include the connection of service

water, as well as fire water connection for the site; this

allows for the site water -- fire water ring to be

established early in construction and fire hydrants

established to support fire response during construction.

The 13.8 kV electrical substation will be

installed and provide power to both temporary and

permanent infrastructure on the site.

Concrete batch plant will be established

onsite and will remain for the duration of construction

activities, until such a time as all facilities are

constructed.

A temporary construction diesel station

will be established and will be the main location from

which fueling will occur onsite and the establishment of

the emergency generator will also be done in conjunction

with the electrical substation.

The following five slides will further

discuss the initial construction activities. As noted as

part of the initial construction activities we have ground

treatment at the shaft locations and the ground treatment

would be done in advance of collar excavation and will

consist of either a freezing or grouting program.

Noted as part of the shaft collar

62


excavations mentioned near surface blasting practices and

during the shaft collars when the rock is exposed to

surface, daylight blasting practices will be employed.

Similarly, flyrock handling practices will be in place

until such a time as the headframes are established.

Mention of the galloway and winches for

initial shaft sinking equipment -- a galloway is a working

stage custom designed for each shaft and contractor

preferences. It’s typically three to five levels in

height and will be discussed in more detail as part of the

shaft sinking discussion.

Similarly, the winches that would be

associated with the galloways are used to raise and lower

the galloway within the shaft.

Another point of note from this slide is

the main shaft collarhouse. The main shaft collarhouse

will ultimately become the waste package receiving

building but will be established early in construction to

support equipment for lateral development.

The majority of the initial construction

activities will be focused in the southwestern quadrant of

the site, as shown in the red box on Slide 14. And again

as mentioned, the Dolostone pile will be used as an

initial lay down area during this phase.

Looking at the area in the southwest

63


quadrant and referring back to Slide 7, Slide 15 shows the

profile of Section BB on the site. And this profile was

selected as it provides a view of the subsurface

conditions in the area of the main and ventilation shafts

which are shown on the slide.

There’s approximately 12 to 14 metres of

dense till between the existing ground surface and

bedrock. The shaft collar themselves will be excavated to

approximately 20 metres below the bedrock surface.

Looking at the southwest quadrant in a bit

more detail, the headframe foundations shown as the main

shaft headframe and the ventilation shaft headframe will

be constructed down to bedrock with foundations

established directly into the bedrock in shaft collar for

maximum stability.

Once the headframes are installed the shaft

sinking hoist houses and hoisting equipment will be

installed. You can see on this slide the main shaft

sinking hoist house is shown to the south of the main

shaft headframe and the shaft sinking lateral development

hoist for the ventilation to the east.

We have -- the emergency generators may be

refined to reflect the hoisting equipment selected and you

can also notice on that slide the reference to the water

treatment plant which would be available to deal with the

64


water being extracted from either shaft.

Following the shaft sinking phase and just

staying with the southwest quadrant of the site, there’ll

be some modifications required to transition from sinking

configuration to lateral development configuration at

surface. These include the removal of the main shaft

hoist house and reconfiguration of the main shaft

headframe with the installation of the large Koepe hoist

and the auxiliary Koepe hoist in the tower of the

headframe.

The main shaft collarhouse -- or the future

waste package receiving building -- will be installed and

the permanent ventilation systems for both the main shaft

intake and the ventilation shaft exhaust system will be

put in place.

The following eight slides will further

discuss shaft sinking.

As noted, the shafts will be developed in

parallel and as the shafts are developed the geotechnical

verification plan will be conducted to confirm modelling

predictions and support the implementation of

observational ground support program.

The geoscientific verification plan will be

conducted in the main shaft and it’s intended to support

the prediction of the rock performance and the excavation

65


damage zones to further optimize shaft seal design.

Shaft equipping refers to the installation

of shaft infrastructure to support the operation of the

shaft. These would include the steel sets to align the

conveyances in the shafts. And these will be installed as

the shaft progresses.

There’s also lateral development

requirements from the shafts which is further discussed in

part 4 that again ties to the transition of some of the

phases and the interconnection of those.

As well, the loading pocket, which is the

waste rock handling station below the repository level

that allows for efficient waste rock handling during

lateral development, will be installed.

The next couple of slides I will walk

through the sequence for shaft sinking and then we’ll get

into some of the geomechanical work and ground support

recommendations that have come out of that. And I’ll ask

Dr. Joe Carvalho of Golder and Associates to support me in

those slides.

The two figures shown here are the initial

stages of developing a round or developing a portion of

the shaft. A drill is suspended from the galloway, and

again, I mentioned previously, the galloway is the working

stage from within the shaft.

66


For the ability to show as much as we could

on the slide I’ve just shown a three-stage galloway but we

expect the galloway for both the main and ventilation

shaft will be four to five levels.

The suspended drills will drill a five-

metre round. A round is a term that describes the advance

per cycle. See, in the figures that we show a liner

variance, the thickness of the liner varying, and this is

varying to deal with the changes in the varying strata in

groundwater conditions throughout the shaft columns.

The upper 200 metres is the most permeable

section of the shaft and will be contained with a

hydrostatic liner. The lower section of the shaft will

have a leaky liner or a liner that allows water behind the

liner to drain to the shaft bottom.

Other items of note on this slide is the

emergency personnel cage. Personnel are typically

transported in and out of the shaft using the mineshaft

bucket but in both the main and ventilation shafts during

construction personnel and emergency personnel cage will

be available in both shafts for secondary egress purposes.

Looking at the picture to the right, the

galloway, at the time that the round has been drilled and

loaded with explosives, is raised approximately 30 metres

from the face and the ground is blasted and the blasted

67


rock settles at the bottom of the shaft. The ventilation

system clears the air and the dust, and the workers return

to the shafts.

Slide 20 shows the installation of initial

ground support. And ground support is initially installed

off the muck pile to ensure that the workers will not be

working under unsupported ground. The muck pile is the

blasted rock that remains at the end of the cycle. As the

blasted rock is removed using the excavation equipment

suspended from the galloway and loaded into buckets for

transport to surface, additional ground support is added.

The figure to the right shows, once the

full round has been extracted, the ground support is

installed, the galloway is lowered, a five metre extension

to the shaft liner is installed and the cycle will then

continue again.

A dimension of note is, we have the shaft

liner nominally trailing the face by approximately 10

metres.

So, I would like to turn over to Dr. Jose

Carvalho now to speak to some of the shaft modelling that

was done and the ground support recommendations.

DR. JOSE CARVALHO: Thank you. For the

record, my name is Jose Carvalho. Geomechanical analysis

of the shafts were conducted for all the formations that

68


the shaft will intersect. There are about up to fourteen

formations with sub units that will be intersected by the

shaft.

Slide 21 shows a typical set of results for

one of the formations. Analyses were conducted first for

unsupported ground to assess the extent of overstress.

And then further analysis were done following the sequence

that was presented in slides 19 and 20, namely, first

installation of bolts and subsequently the installation of

concrete liner. You will notice on the lower picture that

the bolts are not present and they were removed from the

analysis to simulate the event that they might rust in

time.

As a result of the analysis, three types of

support were identified and they are shown in slide 22.

Support type A is for formations that do not show any sign

of overstress and basically consists of short bolts half a

metre long, whose purpose is to pin the mesh to the wall

of the shaft for the protection of the workers.

Support type B is for rock formations that

show overstress but do not have any potential for slaking

or swelling. In that case, rock bolts of 25 mm diameter

of 2.5 or 3.0 m length depending on whether they are for

the ventilation shaft or the main shaft, are installed

along with mesh.

69


And in the case of Support Type C, those --

that support is for formations which can slake, and those

are mainly the shale and shaly units, and the support is

similar to support type B with the addition of 75 mm of

plain shotcrete to protect the surface of those formations

from weathering.

I just want to note that the concrete liner

comes very shortly behind -- 10 metres behind the face --

so, those measures are for a very temporary purpose. And

at this time I will send the presentation back to Mr.

Wilson.

MR. WILSON: Derek Wilson, for the record.

Thank you, Jose.

Shaft sinking is going to be done through

controlled drill and blast techniques. And the parameters

identified on slide 23 show the required inputs to

optimize drill and blast patterns for this purpose. As

Dr. Carvalho mentioned, there is varying strata which we

are going to be intersecting through both of the shafts

and these will require varying excavation requirements to

support minor thickness as well as the strata that will be

intersecting themselves and will require many different

drill and blast rounds.

Optimization of these drill and blast

patterns will be completed well in advance of shaft

70


sinking activities and will be further optimized in the

field. Some of the above parameters have not been

finalized; however, the following slide shows a typical

layout for the main shaft.

Slide 24 shows a pattern -- again, not

optimized -- for spacing and burning or selection of

explosives, but shows a typical layout with a higher

density of perimeter holes which would require low density

explosives that assume standard drilling technology, 44mm

drill jumbo bits.

And the figure on the right shows the

potential sequencing of a typical blast pattern using

electronic detonators to isolate and control the blasting

sequence and to minimize the amount of explosives that are

available per delay.

Alternative methods were also considered in

the excavation of the shafts. Mechanical excavation

techniques considered were: roadheader as well as boring

technologies, both blind and raise boring. I’ll speak to

roadheader in a little bit, but with respect to boring

technologies, blind boring is boring from the top down,

whereas raise boring is from the bottom up. In the case

of blind boring, both the ventilation shaft and the main

shaft, with the type of materials that they are going

through, are beyond the practical dimensions of existing

71


blind boring technology. For that reason, it was not

considered for further evaluation.

Similarly, in raise boring, although there

are raise borer applications of similar sizes, there is

still the requirement to go in and conventionally develop

one of the shafts, develop an extensive amount of lateral

development underground to depth, assemble a large cutting

head, and then raise that cutting head to surface. So,

given that we’ve conventionally approached the repository

one time, it was considered to continue in that range for

both shafts.

The roadheader was further evaluated, and

more specifically in the areas of shales. And, in the

case of the roadheader, there is still a requirement for

conventional shaft sinking down to the level of the

shales, and would require a significant changeover in the

sinking configuration, or the infrastructure required to

support a roadheader for that limited application, which

would then have to be reconverted back to a conventional

shaft sinking arrangement to get into the limestone and

finalize the shafts.

We also believe that, through controlled

drill and blast techniques, that we can minimise the

damage within the shales and will have the geosciences

verification plan to provides us evidence to support that

72


assumption.

With this slide, that concludes Part 1 of

our presentation. I welcome any questions or comments from

the panel at this time.


I’ll begin the panel questions by asking

Dr. Archibald for his.

QUESTIONS BY THE PANEL:

DR. ARCHIBALD: Thank you very much for

your presentation. I do have a couple of questions that

concern, and not greatly of concern, but I do need a

ratification of some information. From your written

documents presented to us, and I believe this is on page 2

of 18 of your written documentation, under section 2.2

“Initial construction”, it is mentioned that from LPSC-01-

03 in 2011, an initial trial was conducted at the proposed

location of the ventilation shaft to determine the

feasibility of a surface-based grouting program to adapt

the 200 metres. This trial will be continued in 2012.

Now this is information that is mentioned

in the LPSC documentation, but we have no information on

this. Have any results of these two separate trials of

surface grouting operations been done to support the grout

73


curtain concrete liner scenario for ground improvement at

shallow depth. This is for water inflow reduction.

Is this data going to be made available to

the Panel?


The ventilation shaft grouting program is

currently underway as part of the second phase of that

grouting trial. In 2011, a trial was done at the Bruce

site in a local area -- localized area -- to determine the

validity of maintaining accurate drilling to 200 metres

and the ability to -- for the formations to take on grout

to that 200 metres.

The criteria was to achieve a 2-Lugeon

result across the overall column of the shaft for water

inflows, and it was demonstrated to be viable. This year,

as part of the 2012 program, we are now expanding that

program to encase the ventilation shaft through a series

of five primary holes as well as five secondary holes.

The primary holes have been completed. We’re just

underway with the secondary holes at this time.

A pump test will be completed at the close

of that program to determine whether or not through that

arrangement we’ve had the reduction of water inflows that

we’ve expected, or if we’d have to look at expanding the

pattern.

74


However, at this time the grouting program

appears to be successful in the trials that we’ve

conducted in the whole -- the whole water reduction that

we’re seeing, but until such a time as we do the pump

test, that information is still pending.

MEMBER ARCHIBALD: Thank you very much for

that.

I do realize that you had mentioned in your

documentation that there are two methods, both ground

freezing and ground grouting, as mitigation techniques for

the near-surface -- the 200 metre profile -- to restrict

water inflow.

Should this grouting phase be very

successful, will you discontinue your concept of ground

freezing or will you also be looking at that as a possible

viable alternative?


Should we have a successful grouting

program at the close of this year’s trials, our intent

would be to focus our attention on expanding the grouting

program to the main shaft as well, as the primary -- as

the primary means to limit the inflow of the water.

However, we have not -- we’re not going to

abandon the idea of freezing, and we will allow some

flexibility with the contractor to select their preferred

75


option as well because freezing is a known technology. It

will provide the water inflow egress that we’re expecting.

However, we prefer to see the long-term

benefit of a grouting program -- that the grouting program

be carried forward.

MEMBER ARCHIBALD: Good, thank you very

much. Considerable detail has been presented -- and I

thank you very much for this, Dr. Carvalho -- on the

support types around the shaft.

In particular you have suggested three

general support types for different conditions of stress

in the area and different conditions of geologic impact.

This is not exactly a two-part question.

It’s a single question, depending upon the types of

materials.

The primary supports that you were

suggesting generally consist of either mechanical rock

bolts or grouted rock bolts in place. Will primary

support structures, such as the rock bolts, be removed

from the shaft surface prior to liner installation to

minimize eventual corrosion damage effects, or will they

be left in place until final liner removal occurs at the

shaft sealing time?

DR. CARVALHO: Joe Carvalho, for the

record.

76


It’s the latter that we’ve opted for. So

the rock bolts will be left in place until such a time

when closure takes place and the shaft liner is removed.

I just would like to add that we have

looked at ways to -- during removal -- to couple a short

portion of that bolt through a couplet. These are details

for the installation, such that when you remove that and

part of the damaged rock, you can take a short section of

that wall out as well.

MEMBER ARCHIBALD: Thank you. That’s not

my part of question. We do have other particular

questions. We do have other particular questions for

information requests that I think would govern that, so I

didn’t get into that level of detail here.

Coincidentally, you had also mentioned that

in many cases, and in practically every case, short

utility bolts, half-metre long, would be used to emplace

the weld mesh around the surface to stop small elements of

rock from falling out and so on. And I imagine that is

because you were also going to be stripping off a 500

millimetre length zone around the shaft annulus at the

time of shaft sealing.

So these particular bolt elements would

also be left in place during the installation of the liner

until -- at the point of shaft sealing?

77



record.

That is correct. The short bolts will also

be left in place and removed at the time of shaft closure.


Just a follow-up to my first question

concerning the grouting trials, when can we expect to see

the initial information based either on 2011 trials or on

the current trials?


We expect that the grouting trial will be

completed in the latter part of September, by which time

we’ll analyze the results, look at the information that

has been collected as part of the program, the hole-to-

hole testing as well as the pump test, and look to

finalize that report before the end of the year.


In consideration of the rock bolts, I

believe in the modelling phase that you had mentioned, Dr.

Carvalho, the rock bolts were removed from the model to

give the presumption that complete corrosion had taken

place; the rock bolts no longer existed.

Now, in certain formation levels in the

upper 200 metres you have highly saline waters that will

affect corrosion potential on these rock bolts.

78


Have any other forms of rock bolts, such as

fibreglass or polymer-coated ones, being considered for

use to overcome the effects of potential corrosion and,

therefore, the inducement of an extended damage around the

shaft?


record.

We did look at fibre bolts, just more for

the ease of extraction during the closure rather than for

support -- for long-term support. The shaft liner, the

concrete shaft liner, is designed to provide the full

required support once it’s installed, so the bolts are not

required long-term for that purpose; just for the

temporary purpose.

MEMBER ARCHIBALD: My implication here is

not so much for the support but for an extension of the

damage zone.

If you have corrosion of those rock bolts

and they no longer exist, you in fact have passageways up

to three metres long into the rock mass around the

periphery of the shaft surface. Because you have an

extensive web of rock bolts being emplaced, if they

disintegrate over the 50-year period that we were talking

about before shaft sealing occurs, would it be a

consideration to look at non-corrosion -- corrodible

79


bolts?


record.

Even with corrosion of the metal bolts,

those are holes that are not connected to each other. So

any flow would be contained and they do not provide a

continuous flow path through the rock around the shaft.

The primary path would be damaged from blasting and

overstress.

MEMBER ARCHIBALD: Good, thank you very

much. I’d have one other question -- actually, two other

questions.

This is a question based upon a statement

made on page 4 of the written document submitted by OPG,

in which a comment is made, “Refer to OPG’s initial and

supplementary responses to LPSC-01-17”. And this concerns

the base of the liner trailing the face in the shaft.

Could you explain why the stated liner

trailing distance from the shaft face of 10 metres is

twice that that is mentioned in the LPSC reference 01.17

that states that:

“In the distance the liner trails the

sinking face, it’s likely to match the

steel spacing of 5 metres, not 10

metres. The distance offset has a

80


considerable implication for potential

liner blast damage and needs to be

better defined.”

So in the LPSC document, the trailing

distance appears to be 5 metres, whereas in your document

you have a trailing distance of 10?


I think the response in the LPSC response

is the length of the liner placement being five metres to

match that of the steel spacing. The modelling and all

the work that has been done in terms of the trailing of

the liner to the face has been consistent to 10 metres.

So maybe there was a misinterpretation in

how it was written to reflect how the liner was actually

placed, trailing the process as opposed to trailing the

face.


And my final question in this particular

phase would have to do with your Figure 24, in which

you've shown the blast layout design and the timing of

sequencing.

Would you be able to provide an explanation

of the types of explosives that will be used for both the

primary and perimeter holes?

What types would be used for these to

81


conduct your controlled blasting operations?

And for each 5-metre advance, as shown in

Figure 24, what will be your total charge weights used and

approximate charge weights per delay?


The selection of explosives for the low-

density perimeter holes or the main production holes has

not been finalized at this time.

This is just, again, a representation of a

typical layout and will be modified for the various strata

that we're going to be intersecting through.

Conservatively, for the purposes of

supporting the EIS, we've looked at a higher percentage

use of ANFO product, as opposed to going into higher

density emulsion type products and that has just been to -

- to be somewhat conservative in terms of the amount of

emission potential from the blasting activities.

There is a wide range of densities of

explosives which has an impact on your powder factor.

Again, the powder factor is a typical kilogram per cubic

metre of blasted rock.

But the densities of the explosives

themselves, as opposed to the amount of heave generation

of those explosives, is why we've gone back to trying to

keep more to an ANFO equivalent in a range of 1.4 to 2

82


kilograms per cubic metre of the ANFO equivalent based on

some of our historical work done with the cooling tower at

Darlington -- cooling tunnel, sorry.

So we haven't gone to the -- through the

exercise yet of optimizing some of the higher density

emulsion products for use in these areas and, again, I'm

just trying to, at this point, look at equivalencies to

ANFO for a comparative basis.

MEMBER ARCHIBALD: By way of example, are

you maybe able to provide an example calculation of the

total bulk weight of ammonium nitrate that you would have

to use if that would be your preferred product per

sequenced blast?

MR. WILSON: Yes, we could do that.


So I understand we now have Undertaking

No. 3, this time from OPG, and that Undertaking is to

provide to Panel -- Dr. Archibald help me here -- the

sample calculation for the ANFO per blast.

THE CHAIRPERSON: If I could ask when might

we expect an answer to that question?


Could we get back to you on the date of

supply before the end of this session?

83


THE CHAIRPERSON: Certainly. Thank you.

I will now ask Dr. Muecke for his

questions.

MEMBER MUECKE: I would, first of all, like

to concentrate on the new Golder 2012 report that you have

produced, which concentrates on the surficial geology.

And could you bring up slide 15 first?

Thank you.

So I'd like you to note one of the -- a

couple of features here. One is this shows the surficial

deposits in the Section B-B -- which is on the southern

margin of the site and it shows lithologic units which

extend, if you look at the horizontal scale, which are

generally below 100 metres in size.

And you also note that there is quite a

diversity of lithologies in this particular section.

Could we now switch over to Slide 7 which

shows the distribution?

This shows the distribution of -- the

current distribution of all bore holes, test bits, et

cetera. And if you look at the Waste Rock Management Area

and the scale on this -- I believe it's squared off in 400

metre quadrants -- in many -- over the waste rock area, we

have a separation of test bits and bore holes which often

exceeds 200 metres.

84


And so this leads me to my question: What

confidence do you have that features that show up in B-B

-- in that B-B section do not exceed the 100 metres that

you would pick them up just a current survey?


Unfortunately, we haven't seen the slides

that relate to cross-section A-A, but the 2011 program was

structured in such a way that the profile A-A, we didn't

want to excessively disturb that area because of the

sensitivity of having a Waste Rock Management Area above

it as well as having the storm water retention pond

located along that profile.

And we wanted to keep the integrity of the

sub-surface condition as intact as possible, which is why

the geophysical lines were established in the areas that

they have been.

And we also have historical information

from the site to categorize the till thicknesses.

In the event that there are localized areas

such as shown on -- if I could just go to Slide 50. If we

encounter localized sand and gravel lands, as shown here

in Section B-B, they would be -- from all the other

information that we've been able to establish from the

site, they are infrequent, they are discrete and they are

localized and not continuous along major lines.

85


Should they be encountered, we would deal

with those accordingly and, if there was a need, we would

essentially line certain areas of the area that intersect

one of those features.

MEMBER MUECKE: Could I just follow that up

in saying that one of the things that I'm missing in the

current picture is a genetic interpretation of the

environment in which these deposits were established.

They are glacial deposits. Are these

ablation tills? Are these ice margin deposits?

Because if you have a genetic and

environmental concept of these deposits then you can draw

conclusions about continuity of these bodies.

As there been any attempt to do this?


There has been an extensive amount of work

done on the Bruce nuclear site with respect to the

subsurface conditions in the in situ tills.

Unfortunately, the individuals who are best

knowledged in those areas are not with us today.

I would suggest we take an undertaking to

provide you further information with respect to the

genetic concept development for these tills.

MEMBER MUECKE: Okay, so I take that as an

undertaking and which will concentrate on the environment

86


of deposition and the genetic aspects of the deposits

found on the site.

MEMBER MUECKE: It leads me on to another

question. We have Section B-B up here, Slide 40, if you

could go to that. You notice the complexity of -- in

terms of the various bodies. Keep that just in mind until

we flick to Slide number 40.

Could we go to Slide 40, four zero?

MR. WILSON: Derek -- Derek Wilson, for the

record.

We did actually prepare with the

expectation that there may be some discussion in this

area, so I’ll ---

MEMBER MUECKE: Okay.

MR. WILSON: --- pull up the three relevant

slides, which will facilitate maybe a quicker back and

forth.

MEMBER MUECKE: Okay. Let’s see profile A-

A, right, which goes right through the site.

There are two -- two features here which I

would like to have explained.

One is A at B-B, which we have just seen,

showed a lot of diversity in terms of the deposits. In

this slide, it’s notable by the uniformity of the

subsurface deposits.

87


Oh, dear. Could you explain to me how this

was achieved?


Again, as -- as previously mentioned, the

geophysical lines that were -- were done in these areas

did not identify discernible areas of interest in those --

in -- with respect to those features.

Similarly, the boreholes that are shown

there are -- were very consistent in -- in the exception

of -- in consistency of those tills.

Maybe as a -- a subsequent to that, the

shallow groundwater well network that was part of the

Environmental Monitor Follow-Up Program are currently

being installed, and being installed in these areas and

receiving exactly the same type of -- of till arrangement.

So that we have -- we have not intersected

anything to indicate other than that this continuous till

nature. And we expected to see that as we went to the

north and to the east of the site where -- where the

thickness and the consistency of the till was expected to

be very much as shown.

MEMBER MUECKE: Now, the -- and the other

thing of note that I think we need an explanation is,

accepting for the moment that we have a uniform till mass

here, it -- and it is characterized as being -- make sure

88


from my notes that I got this right because of the -- I

can’t read the fine print there -- is that in the B-B

section, the majority till or, fortunately, most prominent

till, okay, the major is characterized as a sand silt

till.

And then -- then we go to the other

section. It is characterised as a silt clay till.

Could you -- could you explain why, in

adjacent sections, we should have a different till --

major till type?


The characterisation of the till at the

site over the last 40 years has -- has indicated the shift

of tills and the natural deposition of the tills over the

-- over the period of glaciation, and it was expected that

we would see a transition from the sandy tills to the clay

tills in this north and east quadrant.

Any further detail, unfortunately, I’m not

the one to speak to and would -- would take an undertaking

to provide you a more wholesome response in that area.

MEMBER MUECKE: I raise the possibility

that we’re dealing with a different nomenclature here, and

so it would be helpful in your undertaking to make clear

what nomenclatures were used in -- in the establishment.

I realize that the date it was acquired

89


over a considerable time period and -- by different

people. And so it -- maybe some clarification on -- in

that area would be very useful.


The nomenclatures that have been used, as

reported in the Golder 2012 Report, did make an attempt to

mesh previous nomenclatures with those used as part of the

2011 program, but I will -- I will make sure that those

connections are made and were referenced in the response.

MEMBER MUECKE: Just I’d like to mention

that I -- I’ve looked at the correlations of the -- that

Golder has done, but it -- when I talk about nomenclature,

it is basically calling something a silt clay till or a

sand silt till. It is normal to base that terminology on

grain sands analyses and basically plotting sand versus

silt versus clay, and then deciding which portion of that

diagram the till falls.

So I am -- in the Golder Report, I did not

see any indications of that. So it would be very useful

to have them.


That undertaking, as well as the one

previously, we will come to again before the end of this

session with a date for delivery.

MEMBER MUECKE: Continuing with the new

90


work, has there been any attempt to map out the -- using

all the new wells that have been drilled and test pits,

has there any attempt to map the groundwater table or,

even better, the piezometric surface that exists under the

-- under the site? And has there been any attempt to use

the piezometric surface to establish flow lines for the

groundwater?


My apologies, but again, we are -- we’re

found -- we find ourselves to be the wrong people around

the table to be able to provide you with a wholesome

response in this respect, Dr. Muecke.

So again, we would -- we’d like to take an

undertaking to provide you with the -- with a wholesome

response in that area.

MEMBER MUECKE: So I take it that in this

undertaking there will be information on using the new

data to establish the piezometric surface for the site --

for the shallow groundwater and using that data, then, to

establish groundwater flow lines.


We will go back and see if previous mapping

has been done and whether or not the information that was

provided as part of the 2012 program affirms or modifies

those previous assumptions.

91


MEMBER MUECKE: Could I go now to Slide

Number 11?

And my question is regarding the temporary

waste rock piles, one for shale, one for dolostone, one

for overburden.

And later in the presentation, you indicate

that these temporary piles will be removed at some stage

to -- for grading of the -- of the site.

Is the material that we have in these

temporary piles, in particular the shale pile, suitable

for ground cover, keeping in mind that some of the

excavated units which come from the shaft have a

substantial sulphite content?

I've seen numbers up to 7 percent pyrite

for instance. So basically my question is if this

material would be suitable for grading over the site?


The overall site grading material balance

has identified shales primarily in use in the perimeter

berming around the property. So it will not be used in

any structural fill unit and will be essentially used in

the in-site berming which would then be covered by proper

materials and seeded accordingly.

The dolostones themselves, we expect that

they have some load-bearing capacity and will be used in

92


areas where they can be suited to their material

properties.

MEMBER MUECKE: So there are no concerns

about acid drainage and metal mobilization?


The shales have been accounted for and the

leach from the shales have been accounted in the water

balance in the constituent makeup of the water, which is

further discussed in Part 3 of the presentation.

At this time, there is no concern. It’s

the volume of the shales and the placement that they would

provide a significant concern to the external water

management discharge.

MEMBER MUECKE: Okay. And perhaps we'll

come back to that then at that time.

In -- if you go to Slide 10, perhaps? This

is about site preparation. And so my first question here

is, during the grading of the site ditching and the

construction of the stormwater retention pond, what

measures are proposed to protect the north marsh, which is

in very close proximity to some of these activities?


As shown in Slide 10, the construction

island outlined, being the yellow line around the site,

has established the construction on it in such a way that

93


we maintain a 30-metre offset from the north marsh area.

Then we have further separation between the construction

island and the formation of the retention pond itself.

So all the construction activities,

grading, and any excavations with respect to the eastern

water management pond construction, are maintained in safe

working distance from that marsh.

MEMBER MUECKE: You say it's a separation

of 30 metres. In terms of a major storm and

precipitation, flow over that sort of distance is

conceivable, right? And it would seem that some sort of

protection might be necessary.


The timing of the site preparation

activities will obviously lend itself into potential

mitigation requirements around that area.

However, at this time, the purpose of

establishing the water management system, the ditching

system, early in construction is just for that purpose so

that we can manage water on the site through the various

stages of construction. The -- if these activities were

to occur in the fall, probably different mitigation

measures would be taken than if it was being done in

spring time.

So at this time we haven't identified any

94


specific mitigation measures to protect that north, other

than to keep it a working distance and maintaining a grade

distance, which is -- there's actually assumedly a grade

differential between the north marsh and where the major

activities would be occurring. We would have to consider

that at that time.

MEMBER MUECKE: The ditching itself is an

activity, a disturbance. And could I ask you, what depths

these ditches are?


That number escapes me at this time, but I

-- we can provide that to you before the end of this

session.

MEMBER MUECKE: I also have a question

about the shaft liners. If you go -- could go to Slide

20?

Okay. Now, you state that a hydrostatic

liner will be installed down to a depth of 200 metres,

right? And -- but if you look at the distribution of

aquifers, there are at least 2 aquifers below the 200-

metre depth, 4A and 4B, at about 320 metres.

My question is, at the moment the estimated

inflow from these aquifers is deemed low enough so that it

can be handled by a leaky liner. Considering the time

period over which the shaft will exist and given the

95


precautionary principle applied to climate change, what

confidence do you have that the flow rates from these

aquifers will remain at the level that they are at the

present time?


As you stated, Dr. Muecke, we have assumed

that the inflows from the lower aquifers are manageable

within the shaft. And we've actually, as part of Part 3,

we’ve identified the assumptions in the preliminary safety

report of two litres per second are likely in the order of

magnitude four for above what we expected to see based on

more recent modeling work that's come up the out of DGR-8

work.

So that we feel is well manageable and if

we found that for reasons other than flow, but the

salinity of the water required us to take remedial action.

We have the ability built into the shaft liner to go and

seal and grout those two aquifer levels.

With respect to climate change, we don't --

we haven't modelled climate change to that depth. We have

taken consideration of climate change in the environmental

impact assessment.

But with respect to those aquifers at those

elevations, I don't -- we don't have any information to

suggest it would be any different than what we have now.

96


MEMBER MUECKE: Would it be advisable to

have some expert opinion on how groundwater at that depth

could be affected over the time that you're talking about?


Dr. Muecke, we'd have to take an

undertaking to look at that and see if there is the

potential of an impact as those aquifer levels were --

and, again, we will provide a date for which we feel we

can provide that information before the end of this

session.

MEMBER MUECKE: Okay, so we have an

undertaking that we will receive some information on the

possibility of aquifer flow being influenced by climate

change considerations.

My next and last question is more

clarification because of a statement if -- which occurs in

Section 2.4.1 of the accompanying written submission.

And it concerns control of drilling and

blasting. And in Section 2.4.1 it states:

“The control of overbreak and EDZ is

less important for lateral development

because there are no plans to

construct engineered seals in the

access tunnels and seals.”

Can you explain the rationale of that

97


statement to me?


Unlike the shafts where it is the -- the

seals will be installed as part of the decommission

activities to limit the major pathway through radionuclide

to surface. There is no need to have a similar seal

system in advance of the shafts in the lateral development

areas for the same purpose.

So there is no intention to try to seal the

transport of radionuclide before the shaft seal system.

The shaft seal system is reasonable and integral to the

whole long-term safety assessment.

I would invite Dr. Paul Gierszewski to

provide a comment.

DR. GIERSZEWSKI: Paul Gierszewski, for the

record.

So for the long-term safety concept we have

the shaft seal as the primary engineered barrier. We

aren’t putting in barriers in the room tunnels and the

rooms themselves. And there’s some discussion on that and

the backfilling of those areas later in this presentation.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much, Dr.

Muecke.

So I have a few questions of my own. The

first one is what is OPG’s mitigation plan for the removal

98


of nesting habitat for birds? Obviously there will be

some habitat removed from the area.


I’d like to ask Diane Barker if she could

answer this question, please, Diane.

MS. BARKER: Diane Barker, for the record.

OPG has a program in place at the site and

throughout the organization for tree planting, and I

believe the expectation is that that program would be used

to replace habitat, not necessarily in the same location.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Just a follow-up question

then. So the tree planting program, is that both on and

off site or strictly on site?


OPG’s tree planting program is a corporate-

wide program and I don’t recall the number but over the

last number of years they’ve planted in excess of million

trees at sites surrounding their -- in communities

surrounding their facilities.


My next question refers to site preparation

activities. And I would like, if possible, to obtain from

OPG more specific information regarding erosion protection

measures planned for the early site preparation phase.

This is a bit of a follow-up from what Dr.

99


Muecke was asking.

In particular, will there be a requirement

for any temporary settling basins?


There will be, as I mentioned previously,

the potential for intermediate settling areas,

intermediate sumps during the establishment of the overall

site infrastructure to manage localized activities until

such a time as they can be introduced into the overall

system.

In terms of erosion control, the standard

use steel fencing and proper management of material

movements and so on will be implemented on the site.

So yes there will be some of those

activities undertaken.

The information that was provided from the

2012 report will be integrated into the design and the

locations where temporary accommodation may need to be

taken will be identified as further refinement to the

overall grading plan takes place.


Further to that question, therefore, so if

we are to expect some information in the future regarding

this topic, would that information include a detailed

topographic map so that we can understand the potential

100


for the surface flow direction and the associated

appropriate erosion protection measures?


The answer is yes, those topographical and

grading plans will be available and they’ll be staged for

the various phases of the initial site preparation through

initial construction into final surface construction and

cover the various aspects of placement around the waste

rock management area and so on.

Those again are being informed by the

information that we are receiving through the various site

activities on them now. We’ll be further informed as we

are able to identify construction approaches from

contractors. Although the plans are fairly well-

established there is still consideration that needs to be

accounted for, for contractor approach as well.

So those will be available. The timing for

that design element hasn’t been finalized at this time.


And my final follow-up on this topic is

would those topographic maps include the run-on from

immediately adjacent areas of the Bruce site onto the DGR

project site?


We do have a slide in Part 3 of the

101


presentation which talks about the existing site drainage

of the Bruce Nuclear site and the site drainage that will

be occurring once the project site is implemented and the

grading planners are taking place.

However, the project site is isolated in

receiving drainage flows from other parts of the Bruce

Nuclear site. It surrounded by ditches and that ditch

system is established and we’re not influencing those

ditches around the site.

So I think if perhaps if your question

isn’t answered as part of Part 3 we could revisit it and

provide more detail if required.


With respect to the mitigation measures

during site preparation and construction, I was

particularly interested in your water treatment options.

You have specifically mentioned oil/water

separation and I have also seen reference to of course

settling to remove suspended solids.

During site preparation and construction is

there also at least some planning provision for potential

necessity of treating for ammonia or other nitrogen

compounds or perhaps other chemicals of concern that you

would -- those were actually contingency plans for

treatment?

102



We do have planning in place for the

treatment of effluent discharge through various phases as

well as contingency planning, which we will speak to as

part of Part 3 of the presentation.

During the site preparation activities,

however, we don’t anticipate that we’re going to be

introducing any construction equipment or materials that

would require specific treatment until such a time as we

start to get subgrade and start to do boxing activities.


I only have one final question and again

this certainly can be addressed again in more detail in

the water management section.

But with emphasis on site preparation in

the very early stages when you’re first starting to move

large machines around, the Panel is interested on any

specific measures that you will have in place to prevent

deleterious substances moving directly to the north marsh

or McPherson Bay.


Until such a time as we have the grading

plans by sequence, the handling of the effluent discharge,

use of temporary sumps and movement of equipment and the

types of support structures for the equipment, such as

103


diesel fueling and handling of materials and so on will

have to be assessed as part of those -- as part of those

plans but the intent is that we would have self-contained

within the site and only be discharging those activities -

- those effluents that meet criteria for discharge.


That concludes my questions.

Dr. Archibald, Dr. Muecke, did you have any

follow-up questions?

All right, looking at the time, we have a

couple of choices; we can proceed with Part 2 of the

presentation which we understand will last about 20

minutes and then break now or break now and get the

presentation plus the questions.

I think my preference is let’s hear your

presentation and then we’ll break for lunch and then we’ll

have questions right after lunch.

So if we could please proceed with Part 2

of the presentation, which covers lateral development,

waste rock management and final surface facilities.



Thank you, Dr. Swanson.

104


The DGR project in the lateral development

therein will be developed in its entirety prior to being

commissioned and movement of low and intermediate level

waste into the facility.

Initially the development is constrained by

ventilation and waste rock movement within the shaft

sinking equipment. In the initial developing using the

shaft sinking all the lateral development would be -- the

excavated rock would be brought back to the shaft, would

have to go back into the sinking bucket and moved to

surface, which is not as efficient as the use of the

loading pocket.

We have a period of time where we would

hold the shaft development to do a period -- to do lateral

development in such a way to create infrastructure

underground to facilitate more efficient movement before

the shafts are finally sunk.

So again, we have a transition of phases

that complement each other and the establishment of the

loading pocket is ultimately required for the efficient

waste rock transport to surface and the loading pocket

itself is located below the repository level.

Looking at Slide 28; the ventilation shaft

is expected to arrive at the repository horizon well in

advance of the main shaft. Primarily because the main

105


shaft has the geoscience verification program, as well as

the construction of the main shaft headframe is expected

to take longer due to the fact that it’s a large concrete

structure versus the steeled structure of the ventilate

shaft headframe.

In the initial construction off of the

ventilation shaft we’re assuming daily production rates of

about 100 cubic metres of material or a 3.5 metre advance,

whichever is less, and the initial development will be

done primarily through hand tools, being pneumatic

jacklegs and -- jacklegs and Stauffers, pneumatically held

-- hand-held drilling tools and slushers to get the

material back to the shaft bucket. So there’ll be slow

development, to say the least.

As the main shaft arrives at the repository

horizon we now have the ability to advance off of both the

main shaft and the ventilation shaft with the goal to

connect them.

The next slide provides a bit more of the

infrastructure that would be associated with these two

activities. But I think it should be noted -- we’ll speak

to it in both Section 4 -- Report 4, the ventilation

requirements and the mine safety requirements of working

from the shaft will be addressed in those sections.

At this point with the two shafts being

106


available, a bit more space available after the

ventilation shaft allows more mechanized equipment to be

brought underground. We’re assuming a development rate of

about 250 cubic metres per day at this stage.

Once the main shaft and the ventilation

shaft have been tied in some of the key infrastructure --

initial infrastructure can be put into place, primarily

the refuge station, as indicated on Slide 30; the

geoscience area where we can start to do some of the

initial geomechanical verification programs and set

ourselves up for some of the longer term geoscientific

verification programs.

We have the ability now to increase the

ventilation rates within the underground and mobilize

larger equipment, more equipment down to the repository.

The loading pocket would be considered now

and the shafts would move to final depth. Once this

initial development was done and the shafts were tied

together we can install the loading pocket. And we have

the conversion at surface of the ventilation hoisting

house to a skipping arrangement or a waste rock transport

arrangement, and once the shafts are completed as well the

main shaft Koepe hoist would be decommissioned -- would be

commissioned and the auxiliary Koepe hoist of the main

shaft would be commissioned to move personnel and

107


equipment in and out of the repository.

The main shaft ventilation sinking hoist

would also be removed at this point.

As well, permanent ventilation

installations on surface are now able to be materialized

at this phase.

Once we have the loading pocket in place

and we have our rock waste pass system, development now

has the ability to increase production based on the

available space in which multiple crews could be advancing

simultaneously.

And we focus the initial construction -- or

the initial lateral development once we get back into that

phase in the underground surfaces area to provide adequate

space for servicing equipment, fuelling of equipment,

storage of supplies and have less of a reliance on those

activities at surface.

And development rates would progressively

increase until they reach the 2100 tonnes per day or 780

cubic metres per day.

Slide 32 shows the repository in full

development. One of the key considerations in the

development of the panels is to continue the return -- the

return air tunnel to tie both the access and the return

air of the placement rooms together. And we’ll discuss

108


that from a ventilation perspective more in Part 4 and as

well from a mine egress perspective as part of Part 4 as

well.

But again, you can see on this -- on Slide

32 that there’s multiple areas that could be working in

parallel, and the assumption on the 780 cubic metres per

day is that we have an effective four development rounds

in equivalent of placement room per day.

In the final development the repository

openings have been completed, the tie-ins to the access

tunnels and the exhaust -- or the return air tunnels have

been completed.

And at this point the configurations for

the operational phase will be developed, which would

include the finalization of concrete floors throughout the

repository. This would be one of the final activities

because they would be severely challenged to maintain

their integrity during development activities.

There would be rail access placed in the

concrete floors in the areas of the main shaft, as well as

the access rooms that have gantry crane, which are the --

immediately adjacent to the shafts which remain open for

large packages. And we’ve configured the underground

services area for operational purposes.

Slide 34 just provides an isometric to give

109


indication of development below the repository level,

including the ramp to shaft bottom which ties into the

loading pocket, as well as the bottom of the main end

ventilation shafts and shows just the extent of

development of Panel 1 and Panel 2.

As with the shafts, controlled drill blasts

will be the reference excavation method for all of the

lateral development. The advantage of the underground

repository versus the shafts is that we have a continuous

relatively homogenous horizon to work from, so we have

consistent patterns repeating themselves and not going

through variations of those patterns, other than to deal

with room dimensioning.

The technology available today, with

computerized laser-aligned drills, various ranges of

explosives available and techniques therein allow for a

very repeatable and consistent performance in the

development of the underground openings.

Again, experience was sought from the

Darlington Cooling water tunnel, which is driven in very

similar formation to the Cobourg and the lateral

development will really be an issue of maintaining

quality, because it is a repeatable pattern, time and time

again.

Slide 36 shows a typical emplacement room

110


layout, again, not optimized for spacing or burden; hasn’t

been optimized in terms of use of different explosives

selections or powder factors. But, again, just shows a

higher density of drill holes around the perimeter, with

the use of lower-density explosives to maintain a minimum

amount of damage.

Although not required for the overall long-

term safety program, it is still good practice to maintain

as controlled as -- in group patterns, which we do. And,

again, on the right hand side, shows the pattern with the

electronic detonators to minimize the charge per hole.

And, again, as with the shaft development,

alternative methods were considered for the lateral

development. Initially, on a very small sample set of the

Cobourg formation properties, we looked at roadheader

technology.

As the sample set of information on the

Cobourg became larger, it became very evident that the

average performance of the Cobourg formation with respect

to the -- actual compressive strengths, it was really

getting close to the practical limit of roadheader

technology at the time.

Similarly, it requires a large volume of

drill and blast in the area around the shafts to open up

enough development to be able to mobilize roadheader

111


technology to do the types of openings in the scale of

opening that the DGR has. And we just haven’t seen the

proven application of roadheader in a similar scale to

that of the DGR.

Similarly, there are health and safety

considerations with any method, but the continuous nature

of a roadheader does bring up -- specifically in the

limestone -- consideration for dust generation and the

handling of that dust.

Looking at slide 38, it just shows the

scale of roadheader equipment that would be required to do

the type of development that we have in the repository to

match the room dimensions and the height of the various

rooms. So you can see again a significant amount of

lateral development that would have to occur in order to

be able to facilitate mobilization of roadheaders into the

underground.

On that, the next few slides will discuss

the waste rock management area in a bit more detail.

Slide 39 shows a vertically exaggerated

view of the waste rock management area. This being the

limestone pile.

And it shows the pile being 5-metre lifts

to a total height of 15 metres with 2.5:1 side slopes and,

extending over the period as show, of approximately 350

112


metres.

The existing ground surface is shown as the

base of the pile will sit on the dense till. And we’ll go

to slide 40 in a second, which we’ve already discussed

briefly, but it shows again we expect that we’re going to

be in contact with the dense till formations.

If we go to that slide and just take a

reference point of 182 metres above mean sea level, you’ll

see here the relevant positioning of the limestone pile in

relation to profile AA, which shows again the base of that

pile would be sitting in -- on the dense till across its

entire footprint, and with a nominally 10 metres or more

of the dense till separating the waste rock management

area from the bedrock surface and the groundwater surface.

The waste rock management pile will be

constructed from the southwest portion of the pile, which

is closest to the shafts, and will be developed in 5 metre

lifts to the north and to the east from that southwest

corner.

And the next few slides just provide an

illustration of how the pile will be built. The initial

1:10 slope of the access ramp to the southwest. The

material will be transport by off-highway truck and

deposited on the pile and pushed into position by the

bulldozer. And the pile will just progress in lifts

113


similar to that until such time as the pile is fully

constructed.

At this point, you see the natural angle of

repose by the -- by the bulldozer is about 1.5:1, but the

final slope -- side slopes of the pile will be battered

down to the 2.5:1 ratio as shown in the final slide.

The final three slides of Part 2 will

discuss the final construction activities for the surface

facilities prior to moving to an operational phase. This

includes the removal of temporary structures, such as the

ventilation hoist house, the establishment of the

amenities facility, the establishing a connection to

Western Waste Management Facility -- to the south of the

project site.

We will be establishing permanent

operations services and decommissioning those that were

used for construction. Final paving and radiological zone

fencing will be installed, and commissioning of

operational requirements for various key infrastructures.

So, on slide 43, points of note are the

temporary stockpiles have been used in the final site

grading and are no longer shown on the site. We’ve made

the assumption that the limestone stockpile remains in its

entirety, and is in its location as shown. And the

connection to Western Waste Management Facility is shown

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at the bottom of the slide.

Looking in a bit more detail in that south-

western quadrant, again, we see that the construction

offices have been removed, the diesel fuel station has

been removed. Ventilation hoist house and the concrete

batch plant are all removed from site. We have some

additions of the operational-required compressor building,

and the permanent emergency generator would be installed,

if different than that used during construction.

See the positioning of the amenities

facility to the north of the main shaft, and now the main

shaft collar house is converted into its operational

requirements as the waste-package receiving building.

And, finally, the radiological zone fencing is put in

place to differentiate the Zone 2 requirements of the

site.

With this slide, this concludes part two of

the presentation, and I welcome questions that the Panel

has at this time or deferred for the future.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. We

will, indeed, now adjourn for lunch. If everyone could be

back promptly at 1 p.m. Thank you.

--- Upon resuming at 1:02 p.m./

L'audience est reprise à 13h02

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THE CHAIRPERSON: Good afternoon, everyone.

I'd like to reconvene this technical information session

for the afternoon.

Before the panel gets into its questions

based on Part 2 of OPG's presentation, I'd like to call on

Mr. Saumure to give us a review of the undertakings that

have been made up to now just so that we are all clear of

the number of them and the general topic.

And we understand that OPG has indicated

they will tell us when they might be able to get back us

by the end of the day, so this would be another way for

you to keep track as well. Thank you.

MR. SAUMURE: Undertaking Number 1 was to

CNSC, and it's information and follow-up on

socioeconomics.

And Undertaking Number 2 to CNSC is on info

regarding the activities approach and regarding

consultation in Saskatchewan on the EQC. And the timeline

to provide the information to the Panel was by the end of

the month.

Undertaking Number 3 was to OPG to provide

the Panel with a sample calculation and info per blast.

Timeline to provide the information to the Panel to be

confirmed by the end of the day.

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Number 4, the undertaking is for

clarification on sedimentary analysis and genetic concept

analysis. Again, timeline to be confirmed before the end

of the day.

Undertaking Number 5 relates to the -- to

clarify the substrate nomenclature.

Number 6, provide maps showing hydraulic

surface and flow lines for shallow groundwater.

Undertaking Number 7 is to provide the

Panel with information on the data regarding the aquifer

below 200 metres and how climate change may affect the

flow of those aquifer.

Again, timeline for all the undertakings by

OPG to be specified and confirmed before the end of the

day.

And just to note also there was some -- an

information regarding the depth of peripheral ditching to

be provided to the Panel before end of day.


So the next undertaking will be Number 8 in

the sequence. Good.

I would like to begin the Panel's questions

this afternoon by calling on Dr Muecke for your questions,

please, on Part 2.

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MEMBER MUECKE: Basically one question on

that, and it has to do with road headers.

And in the lateral development of the

repository -- and you made the statement that there are no

proven and similar applications of road headers that would

compare to the DGR. And so my question is, what

equipment, to your knowledge, is used in Schacht Konrad in

Germany where they are developing a repository of -- at

similar depths and for the similar purposes?


Our understanding of the use of road header

at Konrad and, for the same perspective, the use of road

header at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in the U.S. as

well, in both those instances the use of road header is in

a much softer material.

The volume of excavation required is

similar to the DGR but, again, the material properties of

the host rock are significantly different, which allow

road header technology to be in a range of strength of

rock that it's practical to do so.

MEMBER MUECKE: Particularly with respect

to Schacht Konrad, could you provide us with information

about the difference in strength that we see -- that they

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see versus what would be applicable to the DGR?


Yeah, we can provide you a comparative of

the materials that are being excavated at Konrad facility

versus those that are expected at the DGR facility.

THE CHAIRPERSON: So that will be

Undertaking Number 8.

MEMBER MUECKE: Those are all the questions

I have for this.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Dr. Muecke.

I'd like now to call on Dr. Archibald for

your questions.

MEMBER ARCHIBALD: I would like to continue

in exactly the same vein because my next question is on

road header use also.

You had mentioned in your presentation in

the text that the road headers would be used at the upper

-- in the upper range of strength of rock materials.

What I would need from you is an

explanation of the practical limitations of road header

use in terms of rock strength condition, what would be the

upper limits of rock strength in which these units could

be used, excavation size limitations, would the expected

underground repository rooms be too large for them to

excavate, advance rates, other items.

119


A little bit more physical detail about the

use of road headers and their limitations in view of what

you have stated in your documentation.

Similarly, would there be any significant

differences in operational features such as dust handling

requirements with spray-down, worker safety aspects

because road headers are able to install rock bolts

automatically as they proceed, waste rock removal, all

features that under manual mining operations, drill and

blast, for example, could offer more deleterious worker

safety aspects?

So these particular items of interest could

potentially make road header excavation a preferred option

over drill and blast, and I would appreciate some

explanation of some of the limitations of road header use,

if it's available.


We can provide that information to the

Panel. I would request that the information as requested,

we have the transcript available to make sure that we have

the items identified covered. But yes, we can provide

that information.

MEMBER ARCHIBALD: And I would suggest that

that be also taken as Undertaking Number 8.

Could it not be added to Dr. Muecke's?

120


It's both in the area of road-header application.

All right. Second question.

If I could have either Slide 32 or Slide 33

shown, please. That one's suitable.

For panel room number 1, for example, in

the views shown and lateral development of the rooms

between access and ventilation drifts, there appears to be

a connection shown at each end between the entry and the

exhaust drift elements.

Will these remain open until waste

emplacement begins, or will these be closed at any time

before waste emplacement starts?

My question, basically, is when will the

closure walls be emplaced in the emplacement rooms?


The ends of the emplacement rooms and the

walls used to moderate ventilation flow will be installed

as the rooms are being developed in order to be able to

manage the ventilation system through the construction, so

there may be some delay in terms of the construction of

those as the evolution of the emplacement rooms tie into

the -- to the return-air drifts.

But the end walls at the end of the

emplacement rooms would be done at that time.

MEMBER ARCHIBALD: Sorry, what would be the

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dimensions of these connections between the emplacement

rooms and the exhaust airways?

Is there a physical size that you -- you

indicate on your diagrams?


The connections of the emplacement rooms to

the return air tunnel is essentially a 5x5 opening at the

-- at the close of the emplacement room tying into a 5x5

opening.

It’s five metre by five metre at the end of

the emplacement rooms intersecting into a five-metre by

five-metre opening to return-air tunnels.

MEMBER ARCHIBALD: And in these emplacement

walls at the back end, your ventilation louvers -- these

would be your duct work restrictions -- where would they

be placed?

In the upper portion? In the central

portion? Bottom portion?


The louver placement, it will be in the

upper middle section of the -- of the emplacement or the

end wall and we’ll have personnel access down at the -- at

the -- likely, the bottom left of the end wall but will be

accessible in each of the end walls.


122


That was roughly what I was trying to get

around to. I was saving another question for Section 4 of

your presentation.

In no section of the EIS is it mentioned

that there is personnel egress from these emplacement

walls. Simply, that there would be a ventilation louver

and so a lot of our questions were revolving around the

accessibility or the egress capability of personnel from

these rooms should that have to occur.

In that case, I will leave it at that.

Thank you very much.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Dr. Archibald.

So I have a number of questions. My

questions will focus on the Waste Rock Management Area.

My first question is with respect to the

maximum total available surface area for the Waste Rock

Management Area relative, first of all, to your total

expected volume and to any potential expansion room that

may be required for the waste rock should -- as stated in

the EIS -- additional nuclear waste materials become part

of the DGR Project.

In other words, how much room for expansion

do you have vis-à-vis waste rock?


To answer, I guess, the first question in

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terms of the expanse of area on the DGR Project site for

the expected waste rock volumes, the pile is -- is

currently occupying approximately nine hectares of space

on the DGR Project site.

It has the ability, should there be

additional volume required at future stages, to expand

that pile to the west and -- and if I could, let me just

go to a slide on the Waste Rock Management Area.

This provides a good -- a good view of it

on Slide 12.

There is available space as you move to the

west to expand the pile should there be a need to do so.

There’s also the ability to bring up additional levels and

raise the height of the pile to accommodate additional

waste rock volumes.


So just for clarification for those people

who may not be clear on their directions, if you expand

west, you’re expanding away from the north wetland area?

MR. WILSON: That is correct.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Good. Thank you.

My next question is: How’s the waste rock

placement plan that you’ve presented on this slide, which

is Slide 39, where you are proceeding in five-metre lifts

as you’ve described there -- does this plan reflect your

124


ultimate closure plan for the Waste Rock Management Area?


The current plan for the Waste Rock

Management Area during the operations phase is as we’ve

presented: the pile will remain in its entirety in this

configuration as shown on Slide 41.

At the time of decommissioning the

facility, the Waste Rock Management pile will be closed

and will have appropriate cover and vegetation and it will

be closed according to the requirements of the regulations

for closing stockpiles.

THE CHAIRPERSON: So a follow-up question

on that: At this time, do you have a conceptual closure

plan for the Waste Rock Management Area?


The closure of the Waste Rock Management

Area is covered in our decommissioning plan for the site.

THE CHAIRPERSON: I thought so.

So here are some detailed questions on

that: So how does that design for closure reflect any, if

any, plans for a naturalized drainage from the surface of

this pile which -- as illustrated -- when it’s being

constructed, it’s simply a geometric series of rising

lifts?

In other words, I’m looking for whether you

125


have already, in the conceptual phase, planned for --

while you’re placing your materials, planning for

deliberate drainage channels off so that it makes,

ultimately at closure, your reclamation in re-vegetation a

little bit more of a straightforward operation?


The level of planning for the

decommissioning of the stockpiles at the closure of the

facility has not gone to that level of detail in terms of

considering drainage at the pile for the long-term as

compared to consideration for drainage in the pile during

the operating phase.

So they are, at this point, not connected.

THE CHAIRPERSON: So if I understand it,

the ultimate closure of the Waste Rock Management Area

will wait until the closure of the DGR facility

underground?


That is correct. The current configuration

of the pile is expected to be available as shown during

the operations phase.

Should there be a need to -- to utilize the

material, have future uses of that material for use on the

Bruce site or off of the Bruce site, those considerations

haven’t been finalized at this time.

126


So the pile will not be closed in a sense

until such a time as the facility is decommissioned.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Okay, thank you.

I recall from the EIS that there’s a

planned depth of cover of, I believe -- correct me if I’m

wrong -- around -- what was it -- 20 centimetres or so of

top soil on the cover for the waste rock.

Can you help me understand the basis for

the selection of that relatively shallow cover on the

waste rock pile at closure?


The reference to top soil cover on the

Waste Rock Management Pile is actually 150 millimetres and

I would have to -- I would have to get back to you with

the rationale for the use of that.

It is consistent with the closure of waste

rock piles in other industries but I will have to get back

to you on the -- the nature of that dimension.

THE CHAIRPERSON: So that will be

Undertaking No. 9 and it will be to provide further

rationale for the top soil cover of 150 millimetres on the

waste rock pile at closure. Thank you.

Getting back to the near future rather than

the closure plan, I understand that there’s that

overburden pile that will be produced during site

127


preparation and construction.

What happens to that once you start

building the main Waste Rock Management Area?


The overburden pile will be removed and it

will be removed from the east towards the west.

And it is intended that we -- there may be

an imbalance of natural in situ overburden for the final

grading plan of the site and we may have a need to import

some top soil to finalize grading plans in various areas.

So the expectation is that the entire

overburden pile will be consumed prior to placement of the

waste rock management area.


Then, if we proceed to the slide that

illustrates -- the slide 39, please. There you are. So you

have the little dotted line that shows the existing ground

surface, approximately, so, does this illustration include

materials that were placed there during site preparations,

so, limestones, for example, that were placed there during

site prep? And then you would further grade that material

-- am I correct there?

MR. WILSON: Derek Wilson for the record.

The hatched line that is showing the existing ground

surface is the current existing ground surface elevation

128


as it is -- excuse me -- as it exists on the site today.

THE CHAIRPERSON: So, my question is, what

is going to be there, in terms of placement of materials

during site preparation that, in turn, you would be

placing additional waste rock on top of when you get into

the main waste rock placement activities.

MR. WILSON: The area around the waste rock

management pile will actually be -- have to be excavated

to the point to maintain the grading shown and have the

minimum fall. So, the material that’s shown as existing

will be removed and will actually be excavated down, which

is why we have a connection to the in situ tills at that

elevation where the base of the rock pile is. So the

looser material or the overburden material that’s shown as

part of the existing ground surface will be excavated. So

that entire area will have to be graded to this elevation

-- to the elevations that are shown to maintain and to

serve as a base for the waste rock management area.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you for that

clarification.

Are you intending to do any compaction once

you have graded?

MR. WILSON: The expectation and the word

that is coming out of the 2011 field investigations

suggest that we will be in very dense tills over the

129


entire surface of the waste rock base, at which point the

results that we’re seeing out of the compaction potential

of that material is very, very strong. And therefore, we

will do field measurements to determine the compaction of

those areas. We don't anticipate that there will be a

need in the areas of the tills to do any further

compaction.

THE CHAIRPERSON: OK, thank you.

And now I’m going to move to the perimeter

ditches around the waste rock management area in

particular. So, I’d like a bit more information regarding

the design capacity for those ditches, and which

particular storm event they are designed for.


The waste rock management -- sorry, -- the storm water

management system is designed to handle and contain a six

hour, 25 mm storm event, and the waste rock -- sorry --

the storm water management pond itself is designed to

safely pass a one - 100-year storm event. So, the

ditching and subsequent storm water management pond design

are designed to handle the six hour, 25 mm event.

THE CHAIRPERSON: What was the basis for

selecting that particular storm event, And does it reflect

-- how does it reflect per cautionary principle in this

regard?

130


MR. WILSON: I’d like to ask David Maarse

of Golder Associates to respond to that question.

MR. MAARSE: David Maarse, for the record.

There are a few different criteria that have been used.

Your question was specifically linked to the ditches, and

the ditches have been sized both from the perspective of

frequent storm events as well as the consideration of

extreme storm events. So, for the extreme storm events,

for design purposes we’ve been looking at a 100-year, for

frequent events it’s generally something lower than that.

There has also been work done from a safety

perspective on probable maximum floods. That’s not part

of the conventional design work that we’re doing, but it

is something that is considered -- has been considered in

the original design. It's linked back to the collar

elevations and that type of thing. So, I think that --

but, to answer the question directly, it's a 100-year

criteria for flood purposes.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. So as a

follow-up, just to be perfectly clear in the Panel’s mind,

so, those perimeter ditches, how are they going to be

handling a 100-year event, or would there be over-topping,

particularly with respect to that north wetland?

MR. MAARSE: The elevation of the north

wetland is, well, there’s a couple different issues. The

131


storm water management pond itself is excavated from the

existing ground and is several metres below the existing

ground. The ditches are graded to enter into the storm

water management facility, and the flood levels in the

pond and in the ditches are lower than the elevation of

the marsh itself. Does that answer the question?

THE CHAIRPERSON: So what you are saying

is, because of the storm water pond being excavated down

and therefore the ditches also having to be excavated down

so they can discharge by gravity, therefore, even in a

100-year storm event, the water would not reach the top of

the ditch and flow into the wetland.

MR. MAARSE: That is correct. It will not

flow into the wetland. The flood elevations of the 100-

year are lower than the water elevations in the marsh.

The marsh itself is elevated and drains out in a separate

way to the ditch to the north and then ultimately comes

back and rejoins a culvert that’s located at the outlet of

the storm water facility.

THE CHAIRPERSON: OK, thank you.


Just in a clarity for that as well: the profile of the

retention of the storm water pond in Part 3 might provide

you some of the elevation perspective with respect to the

existing ground area in those -- in that upper area, if

132


you look at slide 40, you can see the existing ground

conditions and the existing ground surface are about 182

metres above mean sea level, whereas you will see the

elevations of the pond in Part 3 provide a basis where the

elevation of that pond level would be in respect to the

north marsh area.

THE CHAIRPERSON: That concludes my

questions. Dr. Muecke, Dr. Archibald, did you have any

follow-up?

MEMBER. MUECKE: Could we come back to

slide #39, and I concentrate again on the salt-clay cover

that the (inaudible) is going to be put on. In the EIS it

states that the upper part of the till blanket is

weathered. It has a weather component. And in the

previous mapping that was usually indicated, and in this

case it's been left out. And in the EIS it states that

there are fractures in the weathered till which reach to a

depth of three metres. And so, my concern here is the

interaction of precipitation and infiltration into the

waste stock piles, and the depths to which, given, if that

till cover is indeed fractured, the depths of infiltration

into that cover, and the ground water that has travelled

through the waste stock pile would actually flow under the

perimeter ditch, allowing possible contamination, let’s

say, by explosive residues, okay, of the groundwater to

133


travel beyond the confining ditches.


In discussions with colleagues with respect to some of the

undertakings we’ve taken from the first -- from part 1

presentation materials with respect to the continuity of

the tills, the composition, the nomenclatures, and so on,

I think when we respond to those, we will -- we can make

note of your concerns around the -- whether nature of the

tills in the upper surface and the potential for that to

migrate through, perhaps below the ditch elevations. And

address that in terms of how the hydraulic connectivity of

that whole lens lends itself to the existing conditions

and the future conditions.

I think we’ll be able to tie those all

together for you at the same time.

MEMBER MUECKE: Thank you. I feel if it

could all be tied together, it would be wonderful.

THE CHAIRPERSON: So I think that concludes

the Panel’s questions on part 2. So I would ask OPG to

now proceed with their presentation on part 3, which

covers water management.


MR. WILSON: Thank you, Dr. Swanson. Derek

134


Wilson for the record.

Water management for the DGR facility will

look at the site repository drainage, underground

dewatering, water sources, some additional information on

the stormwater management pond, the expected water

quality, as well as contingency treatment options for

specific parameters.

Slide 47 shows the DGR project site in

relation to the Bruce Nuclear Site in terms of the

existing drainage -- the existing drainage pattern showing

in the red sections of isolation and the directional flow

of those various catchments into the existing waterways.

If you look at the DGR Project Site, right

in relation to the word "DGR", you’ll see a yellow

demarcation line, which extends that existing drainage a

bit to the south to coincide with the DGR project site.

And that is the one area where the project itself is

impacted -- or, will impact the natural drainage course at

the Bruce Nuclear Site.

All of the other components within the DGR

Project Site are within that drainage system, and move

towards the north through the McPherson Bay discharge.

So, it is just in that area where we will

be redirecting. Some of the flow that will normally go to

the south through the north railway ditch will now be

135


diverted up to the northern portion of our project site

through the stormwater management line.

So that is the only change in the natural

drainage courses. And, as you can see, there is also --

there is no potential for drainage from other areas within

the Bruce Site infiltrating into this site. It drains

away from the project site.

Slide 48 shows the DGR Project Site itself,

with the grading plans in place, and shows the grading

drainage for the construction and operational phases of

the DGR.

The shaft areas are graded in such a way

that they travel to the north and south ditching. And the

waste rock management areas themselves are isolated and

graded such that all runoff from all the piles are

collected from within the ditch system and transported to

the stormwater management pond and discharged offsite

through the McPherson Bay and Lake Huron, as previously

discussed.

Slide 49 shows the underground drainage of

the repository during the construction phase, and is

primarily drainage of -- resulting from construction

activities, lateral development being, drilling, water for

drilling, and for depth suppression.

It should be known that during operations,

136


the expectation is that the emplacement panels themselves

will be dry due to the nature of the rock and of the low

permeability of the formations above it.

There will be water in both phases, though,

that flow down the shaft, as previously discussed, in the

sections of the shaft liner that are below 200 metres.

And all the repository water, whether it be from the

shafts or from the emplacement panels themselves report to

the main sump underground, which is shown on the -- on

figure 49 and pumped to surface.

Looking at the dewatering process flow

diagram from underground, again, we have water reporting

from the bottom of the shafts as well as from the

emplacement areas through the access tunnels to the main

sump, at which point the sump will be -- will have

settling.

Clean water will then be discharged to the

positive displacement lift pumps during the operations

phase and will report into a water separator system and

through the ditching system to the stormwater management

pond during operations.

During construction, however, there will be

an intermediate step where the water discharge from

underground will go through a temporary water treatment

plant on surface. And then introduced into the natural

137


course through the oil water separator and into the ditch

system.

The -- it should be also noted that the

underground dewatering system has redundancy in pump

capacities as well as backup pumps in place, should there

be failure of a pump or series of pumps, and that the

dewatering system is tied to the emergency diesel

generation power in the event of power loss at the site.

Slide 51 is a bit of the constituents that

make up the underground discharge. The process water rate

of 21 litres per second has been estimated conservatively

as being the water needed for construction activities and

accounts for the use of a wide range of equipment,

including very high-efficiency, high-throughput drilling

jumbos, which aren’t likely required in the type of

formation that we would be drilling through.

But we’ve accounted for that, as well as

very generous amounts for dewatering and depth suppression

activities in underground openings. As mentioned

previously as well, the estimate of shaft water inflows at

2 litres per second -- our recent modelling has indicated

that it’s likely more in the range of less than a litre --

less than half a litre per second.

And, again, there is the ability to grout

those formations within the shaft so that they’re

138


producing no water at the bottom of the shafts.

The other point around the volume of water

at 21 litres per second: it hasn’t included any provision

for rehandling of water underground during construction

and doing closed-circuit water supply in the underground

development.

Again, settlement of total suspended solids

within the sump as well as dealing with suspended solids

in the treatment plant at surface, and then discharged

into the natural stormwater management system at the

surface.

Slide 52, for the construction, shows the

water flows and sources of the overall water management

system at surface with the predominant contributor being

the underground dewatering activities, accounting for

surface facilities runoff as well as runoff on the waste

rock management areas, including the shales and dolostones

as well as the limestone permanent piles.

Looking at an annual discharge, it’s about

756,000 cubic metres of water we’re forwarding through the

system in a given year. And again, being somewhat

conservative with those estimates for the underground

dewatering rates.

The next slide, being slide 53, looks now

at the operation period where we expect water flows in the

139


average of six litres per second to the stormwater

management pond. And, again, taking into account a third

of that being two litres a second for shaft infiltration.

This number could actually be closer to four litres a

second on average.

As discussed in the last round of questions

and answers, this Slide 54 shows an exaggerated vertical

axis of the retention pond. And, as mentioned, it’s

designed to contain a six hour, 25 millimetre storm event

and safely pass the one in 100 year event.

There is low and high flow discharge

capabilities at the outflow structure with the water

coming in to the sediment forebay and going over the weir

to the active storage pond and then discharging into the

existing interconnecting road culvert section and through

the site plan.

The relative elevations shown to the left

of the page show the bottom of the stormwater management

pond below 178 metres above mean sea level with the one in

100 year event just over 180 metres above mean sea level.

And if we go back to profile A-A, the

existing conditions in this area are at 183 metres. So

there is a vertical differential between the existing

ground surface where we’ll have the high water pond level.

If we go to that section and look at again

140


where we have the profile shown, the profile in its

specific location, the retention pond with existing

surface conditions are about 181 to 182 metres and then if

we were take a section to the north where the north marsh

is it’s elevated from this elevation as well.

Again, from the base of about 178 metres

above mean sea level to where the existing bedrock is, we

have between seven and 10 metres of the dense till between

the base of the retention pond and the groundwater flow.

In terms of expected water quality,

discharge out of the pond, if we look at the waste rock

management area and in some of the conservative

assumptions that were put into the leachate analysis of

the waste rock, the lab testing indicated that there was

five metals, salinity and un-ionized ammonia that may be

slightly above provincial water quality objectives.

We expect that the actual values in the

pond discharge will be lower and will be confirmed through

extensive monitoring programs during the construction

phasing.

Should we see elevated ammonia or un-

ionized ammonia levels within the pond structure, we can

use many contingency options and treatment such as

aerators or reverse osmosis to address the ammonia levels.

Similarly, if we see high salinity through

141


the inflow primarily from the shafts -- and this is more

of an operational concern than during construction due

just to the contribution of it to the overall percentage

of discharge -- again there’s potential contingency

options for inflow treatment, options which will be

discussed in the coming slides.

Also the planning for temporary water

treatment plants during construction for suspended solids

plus the extensive network of ditching in the forebay

within the stormwater management pond, we don’t expect

that suspended solids will be an issue in the pond

discharge

This is a just a market-ready option to

treat ammonia through oxidation and this can be done in-

line. It can be done at various stages within the

stormwater management system itself. And if we go back to

the pond discharge we always have the ability to close the

discharge valves at the stormwater management pond until

such a time as conditions can be mitigated prior to

reopening the discharge -- the pond.

Similarly with salinity, the system very

much at this, which is reverse osmosis for removal of

total dissolved solids, it is readily available and these

are part of contingency plans that would be in place and

readily available to implement in the field should our

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monitoring program indicate the need for such a treatment.

This brings an end to Part 3 of our

presentation. We welcome questions from the Panel.


Dr. Archibald, did you have some questions?


MEMBER ARCHIBALD: Yes, I do. Thank you

very much.

I just want to do a quick continuation of

what I had led you through the last time, and this is

concerning the use of roadheader’s, should that be an

option that is acceptable for use rather than drill and

blast.

If that is opted for, what would be the

total difference in process water usage underground

relative to the current case which is set now at

approximately 25 litres per second?

Will there be a substantially higher

process usage of water that would require greater handling

if a roadheader case were adopted?


I can likely get you the response to the

contribution of the 21 litres per second to the drilling

143


equipment prior to the close of this session. I don’t

have it off the top of my head, but we should be able to

provide that to you.

There would be a lessened impact obviously

in the discharge of water because of the volume of water

required to support the drilling activities. It would

still be a high volume of water used for suppression

purposes.

But the contribution of the drilling water

and in the context of 21 litres per second, I don’t have

that percentage off the top of my head, but I will provide

it before the close of this session.

MEMBER ARCHIBALD: Good. Thank you.

I’m looking at the total contribution

drilling and whatever depth suppression would have to come

in to see whether that would obviate this consideration.

A second question then and this is in terms

of contingency water treatment -- obviously there will be

a standard water treatment facility being prepared and

used. But as you just mentioned, at the end of your

presentation, should contingency water treatment plans be

required, and these may require the use of aerators or

reverse osmosis skids, what typically do these skids

comprise? What do they consist of?


144


The typical off-the-shelf suite, I’m not

completely familiar with personally. However, the

expectation would be that the requirements would be

tailored to the expected conditions at the site through

monitoring.

Again, we don’t anticipate that this is

going to be a concern in the overall water balance and the

constituent outlet at the discharge end. Similarly, it

will also depend on where we choose the potential for

treatment.

In the case of salinity, if we were to look

at a treatment for salinity, it may make more sense to do

that at the shaft bottom sumps prior to discharging the

main sump which would have one configuration.

If we were to do it at the top of the

discharge prior to introduction of the overall stormwater

system, it would look different.

So we haven’t gone through the permutations

of what that treatment might look like. Similarly, the

surface treatment during the construction phase will be

heavily dependent on the ultimate configuration of the

construction activities.

There has been a lot of progress in these

areas for recent projects that are underway. So the

configurations are variable and there are enough suppliers

145


out there that are quite willing to augment a system to

meet specific requirements.

MEMBER ARCHIBALD: It would be my

understanding then that for each contaminant of concern,

you would require probably a separate treatment skid,

unit, or would these be able to be stacked? Are any of

these multipurpose units?


There is actually the ability to stack

units based on the requirements and set on the flows. So

depending again on the volume that you intend to put

through a system, some of them can be used in series, in-

line, some of them are standalone. So again it would

depend greatly on the location and the specific element or

condition that we’d be looking to treat.

MEMBER ARCHIBALD: Are you in any position

at this time to estimate roughly the number of skid units

that you may require for an operation of this size,

knowing full well the rate of water flow that you

anticipate?


We have not gone through the exercise to

identify what that ultimate configuration would be. I

couldn’t speak to that at this time.

MEMBER ARCHIBALD: One last question then.

146


You had mentioned that there would be by-products

involved; that there will be treatment by-products to be

managed, for example, brine from the removal of totally

dissolved solids. How would these be handled and disposed

of.


Again it will depend on what the conditions

that we observe are and the concentrations of those

brines. However, they would be -- they would be handled

and utilized in the existing project, hazardous and waste

management procedures and they would be dealt with offsite

through licensed handlers for waste product.



DR. Muecke, do you have any questions?

MEMBER MUECKE: Slide 49, please. I

believe we were looking at the drainage at the repository

level. Now, maybe it’s just the way I read this diagram

but if you look at Panel 2 and you look at the ventilation

shafts, there’s an arrow coming towards us, right? And

then that water supposedly has to get into the main access

tunnel and it goes via one of the emplacement room.

And I’m trying to visualize this because

the emplacement (inaudible) of an end wall -- is this

water supposed to flow through the emplacement room?

147



The flow -- the flow of water in the

emplacement rooms and the grading of the emplacement rooms

also coincides with the natural dip of the cover formation

at about 1.5 percent.

And the -- we try to maintain in the

grading of the overall repository, minimum grades of .25

to .5 percent across the fault of the emplacement room so

that they run back through to the access tunnels and as

you can also see through the return air drifts there is

(inaudible) to bring water back through.

So the emplacement rooms will -- will drain

towards the access panels, the access tunnels both in

Panel 1 and panel 2, so the two of them are offset from

each other and elevated to the high end, at the end -- the

end rooms.

There are no end walls at the -- where the

emplacement room meets the access tunnels. The end walls

are on the return air side which are the high side of the

emplacement room.

MEMBER MUECKE: I understand that but the

drainage -- I understand that but the drainage as it’s

shown there, it’s from the air tunnel to the access tunnel

via the emplacement room. And that -- because it has to

get from the air tunnel -- okay -- into the emplacement

148


room, it has to get by the (inaudible) tunnel.

MR. WILSON: In the closest emplacement

room to the shafts. Yes, that is correct. The end -- the

return air tunnel drains to that location and there is

accommodation at that emplacement to move the water then

through to the access panel tunnel and up to the main

(inaudible). That is correct, yes. At that front panel,

correct.

MEMBER MUECKE: Okay.

MR. WILSON: You are correct.

MEMBER MUECKE: So once you start

emplacement of the waste, in that particular access -- in

that particular emplacement room you have water going

through?


During the operations phase we don’t expect

any water in the repository itself at all.

The tightness of the over formation --

formations above it, the only area that we expect to see

any contribution of water to the repository during

operations is through the shafts. The emplacement rooms

themselves will be -- will be dry.

And we had very similar observations in the

Darlington cooling water tunnel where once the development

water was taken away those tunnels were dry.

149


MEMBER MUECKE: Which brings me to the

precautionary principle; that -- everything is going to be

dry once you have stopped drilling, it’s based on good

scientific data, I agree with that.

But, you are predicting -- okay --

something that is 600 metres down and sometimes these

predictions don’t pan out. I can cite you lots of

evidence of geologists being wrong when it comes to

predicting what’s under the ground.

So if one invokes a precautionary

principle, do you have any contingency plans in place if

the dry condition doesn’t materialize and that during the

operational phase you will actually have at least maybe in

some of the tunnels, the intrusion of water?


We do have -- we do have contingency

planning already as part of the design through the DGR

with respect to drainage.

So the drainage that is existing is part of

the construction phase, the principles of that drainage

remain for the operations phase. And we’ll have

accommodation in the -- because the rooms will be concrete

floored, there will be -- there will be grading of those

concrete floors to allow drainage along the edge of the

emplacement rooms.

150


Down to the access tunnels there will be

consideration for draining and ditching in the access

panel tunnels and all of that will feed back to the main

sump just as it is during construction.

So the drainage operation during operations

is identical to that of construction. Similarly, the

pumping capacity for the system during the operating phase

is the same as that of construction. We’ve modelled the -

- we’ve modelled shaft liner failures, seismic events

where we have multiple failures in the shaft liners, large

inflows of water through the shafts; to be able to handle

that water the same capacity pumping that we have for

construction remains during the operating phase of 21

litres per second, which is in excess of what we’ve

modelled in terms of upset scenarios.

So -- but the infrastructure will be there

and it will be maintained during the operating phase.

So the conditions would be managed, however

unlikely they are.

MEMBER MUECKE: Sorry to be persistent here

but I’m also looking at the case once emplacement of the

waste (inaudible). And so the contingency -- I think that

you have -- as far as I can see you have addressed so far

is when we have the emplacement rooms empty, then the

drainage will proceed in the manner.

151


But once your emplacement rooms start

getting filled how is -- would any intrusional water be

handled at that stage?


Again, the water would be handled in a very

similar manner; the water would run along the tunnels,

through allocation for ditching within the emplacement

rooms and the access panels to direct the water to sumps,

the sumps would then report to the main sump and be

transported to surface.

So the -- it’s not intended that it would

be a free-flow through the emplacement rooms; it’s

channelled and it’s directed to two sumps -- intermediate

sumps in the access panels tunnels themselves to the main

sump and then handled in a similar way to surface.

So -- so there’s not a concern of

contamination of water as it’s going through emplacement

rooms. So that has been considered in the design and in

the layout of emplacement rooms.

MEMBER MUECKE: So if I understand you

rightly, the emplacement of the waste will not impede the

flow of water through channels that already exists?

MR. WILSON: To answer your question, that

is correct, yes.

The emplacement of the waste is such -- the

152


emplacement of waste within the rooms allows for the

drainage.

I think the other point would be outside of

an unknown event we would have experience through the

construction and getting prepared for operations where we

have no drilling activities we’d be able to get a good

sense of the observation of inflows of water prior to any

waste emplacement activities.

MEMBER MUECKE: Thank you.

Could we go to Slide Number 54?

If I understood this correctly, is that the

pond, though there’s a lot of -- the bottom is at an

elevation which is lower than the wetland?


MEMBER MUECKE: And, I presume -- and we

also show a ditch here which may or may not be lower than

the wetland?


The culvert -- the existing culvert that’s

shown at interconnecting road is below the elevation of

the marsh. The marsh actually drains towards that ditch

system.

MEMBER MUECKE: Okay, so then you have a

wetland and you’re intersecting the water table. That’s

the intersection with the water table.

153


If you have a ditch or, in this case, a

pond which lies below the water table, what would be the

expectations?


The area of -- between the wetland and the

pond is very dense -- very dense tills. We do have some

recorded areas in -- it’s part of the geotechnical

investigation program in that area.

We also have the recent ongoing stormwater

shallow groundwater well installations up in that area

where we’re tilling consistently in excess of 10 metres of

continuous till from the surface.

So our expectation is that the difference

in the gradient between the pond and the base of the --

sorry, the wetland and the base of the pond, we do not

expect a connectivity between the two.

So we don’t expect to be draining from the

wetland into the stormwater management pond.

MEMBER MUECKE: Has that been modelled?

MR. WILSON: We’ll have to get back to you

on that. We do have work on the stormwater management

plan ongoing as we speak. So I’d take that as an

undertaking and come back to you, Dr. Muecke, on ---

MEMBER MUECKE: Yes, I would appreciate

that.

154


And it has to -- what we have to keep in

mind here is the time periods involved, in terms of

although the groundwater flow may be slow, over the time

period, it may be important.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Dr. Muecke, I just want

to ask Mr. Saumure to please confirm the number of the

undertaking and the timing, please.

MR. SAUMURE: That will be Undertaking

Number 10.

THE CHAIRPERSON: And I understand, Mr.

Wilson, that you will be getting back to us on the timing

of the response?



Dr. Muecke, you can proceed.

MEMBER MUECKE: There’s just one small

little point. In terms of influx, once operations start

-- influx of water, it’s -- you say it’s new calculations

now that it’s going to be less than half a litre per

second. Is there documentation that is available to the

Panel?

MR. WILSON: Derek Wilson, for the

record.

That work that we’ve been doing in terms of

the infiltration around the shafts is part and parcel with

155


the grouting program and the grout work that we’re doing

currently at the site and some of the supporting evidence

for the work that’s been going there.

I don’t believe that the report is in a

public state at this point. I would have to go back and

look at the timelines from which that information might be

available to the Panel.

MEMBER MUECKE: So would that be another

undertaking?

MR. WILSON: Yes.


Number 11.

MEMBER MUECKE: That concludes my ---

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Dr. Muecke.

So I also have some questions, Mr. Wilson.

First is just more of a reiteration of a request I had

made earlier, with a bit more context. So I understood

from your presentation that water drains away from the DGR

site when you get past to the DGR boundary.

Therefore, I would simply reiterate the

Panel’s request for a detailed topographic map, not only

for the project site, but also for the surrounding

terrain, to the edge of the Bruce Nuclear Site. And we

would request that that map use 50 centimetre contours,

please.

156



Just for clarity, the topographical map

you’re referring to -- to the extent of the Bruce Nuclear

property line? Is that ---

THE CHAIRPERSON: That is correct, yes. So

we can understand that there is actually zero potential

for run-on from the surrounding terrain.

MEMBER WILSON: And just one further

clarification of that, if I could. That is for existing

conditions or proposed conditions that the -- at the time

of DGR operation?

THE CHAIRPERSON: Both, if you wouldn’t

mind.

MR. WILSON: Thank you.

THE CHAIRPERSON: So, Mr. Saumure, I think

we just have an elaboration on an earlier undertaking.

Which number was that, on the topo map?

We’ll make sure we have our record straight

on this end. Okay, so we’ll add the topo map officially

to the undertaking.

Okay, so could we please move to Slide

Number 48?

Now, it takes a bit of squinting, but I was

keying in on the shale temporary storage area. As Dr.

Muecke had pointed out earlier, this is the material that

157


is most likely to be problematic from a point of view of

potential for acid-generating materials.

I did not see that there was a monitoring

station right at that point. Is there a plan for a

monitoring station there?


The ultimate locations of monitoring have

not been finalized. The locations that are identified on

the Slide 48 right now are considerations for monitoring

locations.

However, we don’t anticipate acid rock

drainage from the shales.

And, perhaps, Diane Barker, could you maybe

speak a little bit more about potential for that?


The work that was done by Golder Associates

in 2011 in predicting the characteristics -- the short-

term leach characteristics of the waste rock piles -- it

was done in three horizons, including the shale horizons.

The preliminary results of that leach test

suggest that there’s little potential for acid leaching

from the shale pile in particular.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Dr. Muecke is indicating

he has a follow-up.

MEMBER MUECKE: The leaching tests that

158


have been done on the samples are short-term leach tests,

and I think even in the report that was submitted, it is

stated that these are no true indication that they are --

that they are no true reflection, okay, of the actual

amount of asset that may be generated or the metal

content. But the short term leachate tests simply are

indications but they do not really allow for a true

estimate of the amount of leachate that may come off a

waste rock pile like that.

So my question is: are there plans to have

more extensive work done on this material to confirm that

indeed there is no concern with the -- when this material

gets weathered and exposed to precipitation?


We currently do not have a plan to do

longer term leachate analysis in the shales.

As indicated previously, the intent is to

consume the shales as part of the overall sort of grading,

likely again into the berming around the site which would

then be covered by over burdens and (inaudible) the soil.

In the event that a stockpile sits for in

excess of a year after placement we would then -- it

hadn’t been consumed, it would be covered.

So we’re going to take the precautionary

measures in that case to cover it and to properly isolate

159


it from that potential.

So at this time there is no immediate

commitment to do additional leachate tests.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr. Wilson.

I’m surmising but I ask you to confirm

therefore that because your conclusion to date at least is

that there is very little potential for acid generation

from the shale materials, there in turn is no contingency

plan for dealing with problematic drainage from those

areas, especially low Ph high metal situation.

I’m referring specifically to enhanced

monitoring but also the contingency for treatment.


The ultimate configuration of contingency

treatment is yet to be finalized. We have -- again, we’ve

focused primarily on those that are -- have a higher

potential currently based on the information that we have

available to us, such as, you know, (inaudible) ammonia

through blasting practices, improper handling practices of

blasting agents and so on. And those have been the

primary focus.

The extensive monitoring program, although

we have made commitments in terms of the environmental

follow-up monitoring program, the specific locations of

those monitoring stations and so on have not yet been

160


finalized and they will be finalized as we progress

through the monitoring program itself.

To say that we wouldn’t put in a treatment

or contingency treatment for the shale pile at this time

is -- we have not ruled that out.


My next question pertains to Slide 56, if

we could move to that slide, please.

So the first bullet states that

conservative assumptions based on those leachate analyses

are the basis for the water quality and below.

We’ve already heard from Dr. Muecke in

terms of his concerns around the reliability of short term

leachate tests. So in addition to those concerns that

have already been expressed, my question is how sure are

you that you have made adequate provision for constituents

of concern beyond total suspended solids, oils and greases

and blasting residues, notably the metals, petroleum

hydrocarbons, et cetera.

What I’m looking for is further

justification for the statement that these are indeed

conservative.


I’d like to ask David Maarse from Golder

Associates to respond.

161


MR. MAARSE: Dave Maarse, for the record.

Generally speaking, short term leachate

tests are considered to be conservative in their nature,

they’re quite aggressive; they’re intended to be

aggressive to achieve high values and they’re used

typically as a screening measure to determine whether

there is the necessity to do connect tests down the road

which give you a more accurate view of what the

constituents are.

So they are -- they are qualified. Of

course, but they tend to be on the aggressive side.

They’re not necessarily going to give you the exact

indication of the longer term but they’re intended as a

screening exercise.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you for that

clarification.

So that certainly takes care of one part of

the rationale regarding potential chemicals of concern

associated with sulphide minerals, et cetera.

However, I also mentioned in my question

other contaminants of potential concern, such as petroleum

hydrocarbons go well beyond the simple catchall phrase

oils and greases.

So I guess I’d like a little bit more

information on the screening -- the total screening

162


exercise that was used by OPG to produce a master list of

chemicals with potential concern and then how you screen

them down to the ones you’re focusing on, TSS, oils and

greases and blasting residues.


Dr. Swanson, we’d like to take that as an

undertaking and hope to provide you with a date which we

could provide that.


Number 13.

And I would just like to take this

opportunity to clarify that Undertaking Number 12 will be

the Dr. Swanson’s undertaking with regard to the

topographic map.


Okay, so can we move back actually to

slides -- well, let’s just pick 53. My question pertains

to 51 through 53, where in each of these slides there is

an average flow rate presented, in this case it’s 6 litres

per second.

My question is; this average obviously

comes from a distribution of hydrologic data. What is the

seasonal and annual distribution of surface flows and

underground flows, where are those data presented in terms

of illustrating them as distributions? And how long a

163


period of time did you have reliable data for developing

those distributions?


Again, I’d like to ask Dave Maarse to

respond.

MR. MAARSE: Dave Maarse, for the record.

The information that’s there represents

average annual information. Okay, so what’s up there, and

the runoff volumes were based on a continuous simulation.

I have to double-check on the length of time but it is

decades.

For a number of stations there’s a fair bit

of rainfall data available, climatic data available in the

area that was all considered in the development of the

input to that.

Information on distribution, again, I’d

have to double-check but it is probably available in the

hydrology TSD in terms of the details of it. We haven’t

presented it here but if it’s not in there then I’m sure

we can arrange to get it to you.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much, Mr.

Maarse.

I don’t think it is in the TSD because I

was -- as you know -- probably one of the more likely

people to hone in on that.

164


I am particularly interested in clear

information on the length of time over which you had

reliable -- you know -- where your gauging station data

are coming from in addition to your rainfall data; in

other words, just have a better idea of the confidence we

have in your estimates, average estimates. That would be

most useful.


We would -- we'll take an undertaking to

provide that information to you if it's not already

presented somewhere in the materials. If it is, we'll

point you in the right direction. If not, we'll provide

it for you.


MR. SAUMURE: Sorry, Dr. Swanson. That

will be Undertaking Number 14.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. We're getting

quite a list.

My next question gets back to monitoring.

Does OPG plan to include toxicity testing

in your monitoring program to reflect effects of the

overall constituents of the water acting together?


I'd like Diane Barker to respond, please.


165


The EA Follow-Up Monitoring Program that is

proposed for the project includes a number of parameters.

It is a preliminary program.

At this point, I don't believe that

toxicity testing is proposed for the effluent but, as I

said, it is a preliminary program.


We have the slide up still that I have

another question on. In the little turquoise box on the

right-hand side there that says that it's the

rehabilitated land and it is, in the illustration,

contributing 11 percent of the flow -- surface flow; when

would this occur?

Like obviously it's going to be a while

before the land is, indeed, rehabilitated. I'm just

trying to get a feel for pre and post rehabilitation

flows.


I believe by the reference to rehabilitated

land it is the final graded site condition because it is

the operations phase, whereas if we go to the slide

before, they are shown as individual contributions from

the waste piles themselves.

So that is just we're accounting for the --

we're accounting for the content of the dolostone and the

166


shales and the contribution in the overall site plan

because the grading has changed from the construction

grading and overall topography of the site to the

operating phase.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. So I might

suggest you change the label to make that a little more

obvious. That would be great, thank you.

MR. WILSON: Noted.

THE CHAIRPERSON: One final question.

Slide 54, please.

So this is the illustration on the storm --

or on the stormwater management pond and associated

infrastructure. Does this continue to exist on into the

closure landscape?


The stormwater management pond is not

intended to remain post-closure period. The site would be

graded to allow for a natural flow of groundwater movement

into the existing ditch structure of the waste site at

whatever point that looks like at the time of closure, but

it is not intended to maintain the use of the system and

just more return to a natural drainage for the final

topography of the site.


Dr. Archibald, Dr. Muecke, do you have any

167


further questions?

MEMBER MUECKE: Well, since we have this

slide up, maybe some clarification here about the culvert

that is being put in here.

There's a number beside it which I assume

has something to do with capacity, and it doesn't specify

units. And the question, really, is, you know, what is

the capacity of that culvert, particularly regarding storm

events?

And is the road ditch intended as a storage

facility in the case of storms?


That is reflected in the current condition

of the Bruce nuclear site when the existing culvert

underneath interconnecting road that ties in between the

stormwater management area and the existing Bruce ditch

network.

The capacity of that culvert has -- had

been initially assessed and we will continue to look at

that culvert as well as there's a secondary downstream

culvert section within that ditch system that is currently

being assessed.

There may be a requirement to increase the

size of ditch at interconnecting road as well as the

downstream ditch system, but the overall ditch system

168


itself is consistent and is taking the majority of that

flow currently in the Bruce nuclear site. And we're just

more focusing that transition to the point of the culvert

system.

MEMBER MUECKE: So will we, at some time,

receive an update on this?


The -- further assessment of the storm --

of the downstream stormwater management system is still

currently under development and, as I said, the

preliminary shows that the culvert system is sufficient;

however, there may still be some optimization that would

be done.

The timing of that I don't have directly in

front of me, and I don't expect that it would be in the

short term just looking at the evolution of some of the

ongoing optimization that we have on the project.


Dr. Archibald, no further questions?

I did have one comment that I forgot to

make earlier, but it's -- now that we're talking about

surface water management, I think it is germane at this

point.

The Panel had asked CNSC in this case to

describe the process for the development of discharge

169


criteria from the outlet of the stormwater pond into

MacPherson Bay. The response came in writing, and it's

extremely useful. It's very lengthy.

The response will be posted on the CEAA

registry for the review of everyone who's interested.

Mr. Wilson, then can we now proceed with

your presentation of Part 4, which covers ventilation and

mine safety?

And I would suggest that after you've

finished your presentation, we take a break and then

reconvene for questions afterwards.

ORAL PRESENTATION BY OPG AND NWMO PART 4


Wilson, for the record.

The ventilation for DGR takes into

consideration all the various phases of construction that

we've discussed as well as operational considerations.

And the next series of slides, we'll go through each one

of those in a relatively consistent manner that we've

described the various phases of development.

Starting with the shaft sinking operations,

both of the main shaft and the ventilation shaft,

temporary surface fans and heater systems will deliver air

170


down through the shafts, through ducted fresh-air ducting

to the face and the exhaust air will return back up

through the openings of the shafts and exhaust to surface.

The ultimate flow of fresh air requirements

will be dependent on the equipment being utilized

underground and the configuration that the contractor

proposes for the shaft development. Typically, though, in

the range of 25 to 40 cubic metres per second, with the

higher value likely contributing to the main shaft.

At the repository horizon and during the

initial lot of developments off the shafts, the same

existing surface ventilation system provides fresh air

down to the repository level and is ducted to the

construction phase or the development phase. And again,

the return air goes back through the openings, up through

the ventilation of the main shaft and exhausts to surface.

In the initial development, this

ventilation can become somewhat limiting until such a time

as the main shaft and the ventilation shaft are connected

because the amount of the equipment operated will have to

be gauged to the fresh air that's available through the

shaft sinking fan system.

Once the main and ventilation shaft are

connected there’s a greater variability of equipment

selection and the volume of fresh air that can be provided

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underground increases significantly because we have fresh

air coming down the main shaft, and it is return aired up

through the ventilation shaft.

And we maintain a ventilation bulkhead with

the doors closed and back up in fans to monitor and avoid

the short circuiting of the fresh air up through the

ventilation shaft. It is fan-assisted and ducted to the

various operating phases during this phase of development.

It should be noted that the ventilation

system will be variable and will be modified to suit

equipment requirements, and the design has modelled peak

ventilation requirements of up to 290 cubic metres per

second, or 650,000 CFM, and provides a great bit of

flexibility for the various types of equipment that could

be used for lateral development.

The initial development, again, as the

development starts to move away from the shaft stations,

we still have the need for the ventilation bulkhead with

the doors closed between the main shaft and the

ventilation shaft. But there’s also a need to create an

additional bulkhead just to the south of the ventilation

shaft to avoid short circuiting of the air in that

location.

And as can be seen on Slide 64, we’re

starting to see now we have a flow-through back to the

172


ventilation shaft and we’re starting to see ventilation

loops that will be predominant in the final configuration

for ventilation.

Once the return air tunnel is developed far

enough to connect in to the emplacement panels -- and this

ties back to the previous -- not over-development slides -

- but we were starting to optimize our efficiencies and be

able to provide higher volume production rates.

It allows now for the flow-through

ventilation scheme to take its final form with the

establishment of the main underground fans just to the

north of the ventilation shaft and the services area and

the emplacement rooms themselves that have connected in to

the return air now no longer have a requirement to be

ducted and the flow-through ventilation provides us a

means to be able to do that.

Any air required at a dead end working

phase is to be ducted until such a time when it connects

in to the return air tunnel.

And I know it’s very difficult to see on

this slide, and I do apologize for this scale, but at the

end of the -- you see the installation of the room and

walls is shown here -- as soon as the connection is made

to the return air tunnel. And then to continue the return

air tunnel we can actually fan-assist ducting to the

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return air phase until such a time as the next emplacement

room is connected into that.

In its ultimate configuration we see that

the overall system is tied in, the end walls are

established at each of the emplacement rooms, the

ventilation scheme is completely flow-through to the

return air tunnels, and we have the ability to modify

airflows, both in terms of the flow and the volume of flow

within any given emplacement room through the manipulation

of the louver system.

And in this particular snapshot it has a

series of placement rooms in panel two, at the bottom of

the page, being active with the others being closed; all

of panel one closed with the exception of the last room --

or the room closest to the return air tunnel -- and that

provides for a secondary means of egress through fresh air

should there be a disconnect and personnel have to retreat

from panel two up into panel one to gain access into the

shaft areas for egress to the surface.

So that concludes the mine ventilation.

And looking over to mine safety, I think it should be

noted that the DGR project is very committed to safety

with the goal of zero harm.

Adherence to the mining regulations and the

development of a robust project, health, safety, and

174


environment program supports this commitment.

The risks that have been identified for

both the shaft sinking phases as well as the lateral

development phases -- and I really just speak to those two

areas -- this obviously goes across all surface

construction activities as well, but more specifically to

the mine safety components. The risks have been

identified through several iterations of design, design

evolution, risk and hazard reviews with a wide variety of

stakeholders, including expert peer reviewers.

And as well as looking at the operating

experience within OPG, within the mining industry and

international repository programs, as well as safety

organizations and safety agencies such as Safety North,

and other organizations whose main mandate is to ensure

the safety in the mining areas.

Looking at the key hazards that were

identified through these phases -- and these, although

they’re numbered, aren’t necessarily ranked -- but rock

fall, obviously working at heights are considerations, the

explosives use and handling, falling objects, specifically

the shaft sinking, and just being able to deal with fire -

- fire prevention and fire protection.

Equipment use and transportation

considerations are very significant, maybe not so much in

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the shaft sinking but as you’ve seen in the subsequent

slide in the underground development and obviously the

body mechanics and ergonomics of what we’re doing in the

business.

Many mitigation measures have been

considered in the design and the design continues to

evolve and optimize around the risks that have been

identified.

In addition to administrative areas, as

discussed, there’s been the identification of many

mitigating measures, including, but not limited to,

emergency power; fire water systems during construction;

mine rescue; and the establishment of mutual aid

agreements and emergency response commitments from the

Bruce Nuclear, from Bruce Power.

Fire suppression and equipment

requirements, such as non-combustible oils and fluids

being used in the shafts and water equipment; onboard

suppression systems and the like; egress assessments and

use of auxiliary personnel cages as discussed in the shaft

sinking discussions; the use of portable refuge stations;

the training of personnel and safe work practices, and

ongoing training in communication of safety for all levels

of the organizations supporting the program; and the

communication systems for the project.

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Looking again at the key hazard during

lateral development -- very similar but again we’ve looked

at equipment and transportation, looking at some of the

critical injuries within the mining industry over the last

30 years, fatalities around equipment are predominant.

And it’s something that in such a

relatively tight working environment, although it’s a

fairly massive expansive repository horizon, it is a

single horizon and there’s a lot of activity associated

around the main shaft areas and the ore pass -- waste pass

system.

So those would be well informed by traffic

assessments and by utilizing best practices and moving

personnel and equipment around with each year.

Run of muck considerations as well. Of

recent, there’s been several incidents of run of muck and

we do have the potential for that with the waste pass

system into the loading pocket. And design considerations

have been taken into account to try to minimize the

potential for these, and there’s definitely a heightened

awareness of the requirement to design for it.

And the other items, again, are relevant to

both phases of when we do that. The egress we have spoken

about somewhat, with the shaft sinking, you know,

obviously when we have the shaft sinking simultaneously

177


there are really only one way to egress and we’ve taken

into account the ability to have a secondary personnel

cage. Once the shafts are connected, we have a bit more

flexibility in terms of being able to access either shaft.

But again, depending on where you are,

multiple ways to access back to one or the other shafts

and just trying to maximize as best as possible. But

there is always going to be the need to be developing in

dead-end horizons and, therefore, administrative barriers

are critical and how we do business and how we do lateral

development activities is critical in those areas.

Looking again -- and again talking a bit

about the dead-end development, but we see the -- as the

space opens up and the permanent refuge station has been

established as part of the initial connection with the

shafts, as we start to move ourselves away from those

areas, being the egress shafts and the main shaft, the use

of portable refuge stations will start to play in and will

move with the development phase and will be in such a way

as it minimizes the safe distance to travel, to remain to

have refuge or there may be some intermediate stations of

safety supplies, emergency fire suppression equipment,

breathing apparatuses as required through our more

detailed assessment of the fire hazard assessments.

Again, as we continue to move forward and

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we get into multi-panels -- right now we only intend to

utilize two portable refuge stations, one for each panel.

This happens to show, you know, three potential locations

for those. But the intent is to have two portable refuge

stations plus the main refuge station and the two would

then follow with each of the panels.

And in the final configuration in looking

at the operating phase, again, the use of the portable

refuge stations will remain in place. And as opposed to

trying to separate the distance to where the activities

are going to be, they would be positioned more closely to

where there is the potential for entrapment or potential

to be isolated, which is the active emplacement rooms at

the time.

So they will be moving back towards the

shafts as opposed to away from them during development as

the emplacement activities occur, again to try and

minimize the distance to get to safe refuge in the event

that their transportation route is severed.

But again, with the multi-room approach,

the flow through ventilation, getting back to the next

closest open emplacement room in any panel provides access

back through to either of the panels to get to other

egress potentials.

Again, we have the permanent refuge

179


station. And the ultimate configuration of fire

protection equipment and the use of self-breathing

apparatuses and so on will be further refined as we go

through the detailed fire hazard analysis that’s been

planned as part of our detailed design activities.

So with this slide, that concludes Part 4

of the presentation.

We welcome questions from the Panel after

we return from a break. Thank you.


So we will now take a break, being back

promptly at 3:00 p.m.

Thank you.

--- Upon recessing at 2:45 p.m./

Upon resuming at 3:02 p.m.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Welcome back everyone.

We'll now proceed with the panel's question regarding the

presentation on Part 4 covering ventilation and mine

safety. Dr. Archibald, can I call on your first please?


MEMBER ARCHIBALD: Thank you. I actually

180


only have a couple of questions. I'm going to refer most

of my last questions for the next presentation. But this

concerns slide 65 at the beginning.

We had heard earlier during the day that in

the emplacement excavations, it was stated that louvers

would be placed in the end walls to permit airflow passage

into the exhaust air drifts. This is one mechanism for

getting a chain circuit for the ventilation airflow. And

in these particular walls, you would also have egress

capacity built in.

In the diagram shown on page 65, if you

will look at the service bay areas, it appears that there

is a closure between each of those embayment areas and the

return airflow passage. If you proceed on to slide 69,

the same areas appear to be open.

Now, I'm just going to ask whether that was

a drafting error or is that some sort of a feature of the

process that was shown here?


The -- slide 69 is more illustrative and ties directly to

the same slides that were used for lateral development

sequencing. So it is just to show the extent of the

development, not to show the specific features. Whereas

in the ventilation, they are critical to the ventilation

flow control, that's why they're shown in the ventilation

181


slide.

MEMBER ARCHIBALD: My question is at the

end of each of these embayment areas, there will be direct

access into the exhaust airways by at least a ventilation

louver?

MR. WILSON: That is correct. In the shaft

service's area, there's actually going to be at the end

walls larger openings to be able to gain access into the

ventilation fan arrangement to the north of the

ventilation shaft.

So there will be personnel doors at the

end, there will be louvers. But there will also be larger

bay doors that will allow access for maintenance

activities through the ventilation shaft main vent.

MEMBER ARCHIBALD: Good, thank you for

clearing that. That has not been mentioned in the IS, so

we needed confirmation on that.

Could you give me a description of what the

egress -- the personnel egress doors would look like -- or

would consist of? Sorry, I don't need a diagram at this

point.


The -- depending on where they are located, they would be

designed such that they'd be standard ventilation doors,

controlled, vacuumed-type doors so that -- sliding doors -

182


- you're not changing the overall ventilation of the room

and allows personnel to move through so they're not trying

to overcome the ventilation flows and the change in

pressure between the two locations. So it would be a

typical -- it will be a typical ventilation-type personnel

door used in an underground mine.

MEMBER ARCHIBALD: I'm sorry, these doors

would facilitate both safety egress and this would be for

worker performance, because I believe they were measures

taken for reviewing the exhaust airways, inspecting the

exhaust airways also for putting concrete works in the

emplacement walls and so on. So these would facilitate

movement through and into the exhaust airways?

MR. WILSON: That is correct. The

personnel doors would be -- that -- more so for just

personnel movement. There would also be considerations

specifically in the shaft services area for larger

doorways. For equipment that may be required to go in for

maintenance activities and so on.

MEMBER ARCHIBALD: Are there any specific

plans for the portable refuge stations that you have shown

being put in place? And I have no contention with where

they would go, they basically follow the order of the

development and so on. Are there any specific regulations

for the design of portable refuge stations that are

183


necessary, or are those under review at this point?


The portable refuge stations, there are many existing

configurations of portable refuge stations available in

the marketplace. The considerations that we've taken in

the portable refuge stations, the size and the number of

personnel to be accommodated with them will be finalized

once we have a better feel for construction crew sizing

for the lateral development.

But our expectation is, is that we would

have the ability of connecting with compressed air as

compressed air will run through the system, as well as

having a scrubbing system, an on-board scrubbing system,

should there be a sever in the compressed air service to

those portable refuge stations.

So there is -- we haven't finalized the

ultimate configuration of them. We have looked at many of

the existing systems that are readily available in the

marketplace. And, depending on the ultimate

configuration, there may be a few more of the

considerations that may be seen as niceties that will find

their way into the portable refuge stations for use both

during construction and during operation. They will be

directed by the project; they will not be left to the

contractor to decide their preference.

184


MEMBER ARCHIBALD: One last question. In

the event that people are -- or workers are undergoing

emplacement operations in individual rooms and say, for

example, there's a ground fall or a rock fall behind them

to the entry drift, is there provision or is there

capability for people or workers to escape through these

emplacement rooms, through the packaging already in place,

and through the egress ports?


The access through to the end-wall personnel doors is

assumed to be non-existent once the emplacement activity

within an emplacement room.

The configuration of packages -- some

configurations of packages do have enough room for

personnel to move, but there are multiple different

configurations and packages in any different room.

The low and -- the low-level waste, very

structured bin-type waste, is maximizing the packing

efficiency such that there's six inches of room between

the side wall, you know, the side of rock and the package

themselves.

So as soon as waste is emplaced in a room,

we need it to be consistent with the dead-end development

room and we treat it as such.

MEMBER ARCHIBALD: And would I assume that

185


at that point in time, all of the egress ports would be

sealed on the exhaust airway sides? Or would they be left

in place as is?

MR. WILSON: The egress on the end walls

would remain in place, but would be closed from a

radiological protection perspective. But would still

remain should there be a need to access the louver in a

short period of time if the radiological conditions would

allow such activities.



Dr. Muecke.

MEMBER MUECKE: Just one clarification on

egress during the operational phase.

If you could have 71 up.

Now, if I understand you rightly, one

always tries to have two egresses. Obviously, if

emplacement is taking place, whoever is in that particular

chamber will have to get through the access tunnel. And

then there are two egresses.

Now, clarify for me, what happens in panel

2, which is the closest to us, right, when you start

filling the last emplacement? You've filled all the

others, it doesn't matter which way you go at it, you get

to the last one, you start filling. Do you still have two

186


groups of egresses?


That is the one condition where the placement activities

essentially create the dead-end environment on panel 2.

You'll have the refuge available to them -- the portable

refuge available to them, which would be located

downstream. But that is the exact scenario that we have

the final emplacement room for panel 2 and it becomes a

dead-end emplacement of condition, that is correct.

And there would be administrative controls

in place to limit access and to be able to deal with that

to minimize the risk of entrapment. But it is essentially

the -- a long extended dead-end emplacement activity,

correct.

MEMBER MUECKE: In which direction are the

panel 2 to be filled; the last one first or the first one

first?

MR. WILSON: The intention is to fill the

panels from the bottom of the slide towards the shaft; so

from the furthest point and retreating towards the shafts.

THE CHAIRPERSON: I have a couple of

questions. This has to do more with the environmental

consequences of the mine ventilation, which of course has

to be extremely efficient and does indeed exhaust a rather

large quantity of air in a rapid pace.

187


So remind me again, the air quality

mitigation provisions on the exhaust, what does that

entail?


The air quality or the air requirements for the DGR are

set by the mining regulations and are set on the brake

horsepower requirement of the equipment running, which is

100 cfm for the brake horsepower of the equipment

operating underground.

And that is a consistent approach to fresh

air supply to the DGR mine or to any mine that's operating

and deals with the ability to exhaust the fumes and the

contaminants that are in the air.

Further to that, we've taken into

consideration peak flows or the velocity of the air

through the repository, such that it's not generating dust

and it's sufficient to move and to move particulate but

not to create particulate. So the velocities within the

tunnels and the emplacement rooms themselves are managed

and are less than six metres per second, but greater than

half a metre per second.

Similarly, the fresh air conditions of the

air coming into the repository are monitored. And

positioning of the shaft is such that we don't have -- we

have a minimal potential for re-introduction of exhaust

188


air back in through the intake side.

So with those considerations in place and

following the mining regulations in terms of fresh air

supply, so that we'll meet the air quality requirements

for those working within the (inaudible).


So you've answered it with respect to the

safety of the workers, thanks.

Now, up on the ground, with respect to the

exhaust going out into the environment, my question is two

parts. What equipment will you have in place to mitigate

the potential effects on air quality in the vicinity of

your exhaust?

And number two, what kind of monitoring do

you have in place for monitoring particularly the

particulates that are going to be exhausted out into the

environment and then settle down onto the land?


As part of the environmental impact assessment and the

(inaudible) statement, the modelling of the exhaust of the

ventilation shaft did not indicate the need to mitigate

the exhaust flow from the DGR at all phases of

construction. However, there is ongoing monitoring of

various aspects within the ventilation system through

various phases, including at the discharge point.

189


But as part of the air modelling, there was

no indication that there was a need to mitigate beyond

just discharging in a normal fashion.

Subsequent analysis is being conducted to

determine whether or not a stack discharge from a

dispersion perspective is warranted and the elevation in

the height of that stack. And that's currently being

considered as optimization work in the discharge.

But there is no specific mitigation plans

for the discharge itself.


My next question pertains to noise. What

provision has OPG made during site preparation and

construction and on into operation for a noise abatement

on the fans?


One of the key considerations in the design around noise

specifically for the fans is the installation of the main

fan station on the ground.

So the main ventilation fans that are

driving all the ventilation requirements at the repository

horizon for the equipment, other than making up for the

friction losses in the main shaft to bring fresh air down

in, those fans are all located underground.

So there would be minimal fan installation

190


at the surface. Those fans would be installed and would

be enclosed and baffled accordingly such that we'd not

exceed 85 decibels at the outside portion of those fan

enclosures.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Since most of the fans

will be located underground, I therefore assume that you

will have abatement for your workers re the noise from the

fans underground?


There is abatement underground around the main fan

station. However, the main fan station is not a location

where workers would be present for any duration of time

other than for maintenance activities and inspection, in

which time the administrative barriers and personal

protective equipment may be required to access it and be

properly isolated as such.

There is also, in the area of the

ventilation shaft, bulkheads there to protect those that

are working in that main access corridor between the main

shaft and the ventilation shaft.

So there is abatement of some noise and

also the fans underground would still be baffled, would

still be having the same types of control available to

abate noise. But it's not as critical in the underground

fans as it is, obviously, with the surface construction.

191



I believe that's all of our questions for

now on Part 4.

So -- oh, sorry, Dr. Muecke.

MEMBER MUECKE: Since we are talking about

noise, this may not be quite the appropriate place, but I

hope it is.

A concern about noise during the

construction of the facility; it's, I understand, a 24/7

operation, including the dumping of the waste rocks on

waste rock pile.

Are there any provisions to -- for

nighttime disturbance? Because as you all know, during

the night, noise tends to travel rather further and be

rather more disturbing.


Noise considerations have been taken into account in the

various construction activities. As you mentioned, this

is a 24-hour, seven-day-a-week operation, as is typical to

maximize efficiency in construction schedules.

The critical areas for immediate noise, as

the people can relate to are, as you say -- is the

movement of trucks hauling waste rock to the waste rock

management area, the bulldozers working there, the initial

site capture with a large amount of equipment.

192


And those activities are being structured

in such a way that we can minimize the noise impacts. The

movement of the waste rock management pile from the

southwest to the north and to the east was actually

designed in such a way that it minimizes the dust

generation, because of the east prevailing wind direction,

as well as it provides some protection by pushing back on

the back side of the pile, where the enclosure receptors

are to the north of you.

So all of those considerations are being

taken into account. We’ll also be monitoring for noise,

and we are also constructing within a facility that

operates 24 hours a day, and there is a low-level

background noise that I think is not necessarily there in

some other projects that might be more isolated.

So all those being considered, the noise --

noise abatement is of a key consideration. And the use of

berming and the use of physical structures will be

considered to further abatement.

MEMBER MUECKE: Is there any provision if

the nearest neighbours find night noise to become a

nuisance? That the plans can be changed to eliminate it?


I think the presentation this morning and your comments

too on the CNSC with respect to municipal guidelines will

193


come very much into play. These municipal guidelines are

there primarily to monitor and control noise concern.

So we will abide by the municipal

guidelines and the municipal requirements for noise and,

of course, if there is any concerns that are raised -- we

will be monitoring for ourselves -- but if there are

concerns that are raised, there is a very clear

communication channel that we have with the community on

how to deal with any concerns that they have with respect

to the project.


THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. So

I think we can now proceed with your final presentation of

the day, which will be covering backfill. Thank you.



Wilson for the record. In backfill, I will briefly

discuss the use of backfill in the DGR, and I will also

ask for further assistance in the balance of the

presentation.

Dr. Paul Gierszewski, Director of

Repository Safety Assessment at the NWMO will speak to the

long-term safety aspects of backfill.

194


Dr. Joe Carvalho of Golder Associates will

speak on the stability of underground openings during the

construction and operations phases, and Professor Mark

Diederichs of the Geological Engineering Department at

Queens University will discuss long-term stability of the

rock mass, enclosing waste after the repository has been

closed.

On slide 74, it shows the areas that the

DGR intends to use backfill. Backfill in these cases are

more in terms of seals through long-term decommissioning

of the facility as well as some operational considerations

for the closure walls that will isolate panels or

groupings of emplacement rooms for -- during the

operations phase.

So we have the shaft seals at both the main

shaft and ventilation shaft, as well as the concrete

monolith which underlays the main ventilation shaft seals.

Slide 75 illustrates where the closure

walls will be formed and poured in stages and grouted to

close any gaps between the mass concrete and the rock.

Closure wall set number essentially isolates panel 2 and

will be installed after the backlog waste that is sitting

at the westernmost end of the facility is replaced within

panel 2.

Closure wall set 2 would follow in a period

195


time thereafter, after taking ongoing operational waste,

and then closure wall number 3 -- although redundant in

terms of being installed almost simultaneously with

decommissioning activities -- it at least isolates the

waste and allows the waste to be separated from the

ventilation systems and not be a contribution to the

ongoing decommissioning activities are part of

radionuclide coming out through the ventilation system.

The closure walls themselves, as I

mentioned, would be formed and poured in series, using

conventional concrete, conventional forming techniques,

and, again, grouted to close in the gaps between the

closure walls themselves and the side rock.

And they’ll be designed as mass concrete

plugs to be able to withstand the explosive pressures that

could form from off-gassing (inaudible) this is actually

being severed from ventilation activities.

Slide 76 shows the shaft seal concepts that

are presented in the preliminary safety report. And the

concrete monolith at the base of the shaft seal structures

is essentially a mass concrete pour filling the

repository.

Below the repository horizon, all openings

-- the ramp, the sumps, the loading pocket -- would be

filled with concrete. The repository horizon itself

196


within 60 metres of the shafts would be enclosed in

concrete, and a small portion up into the actual shaft

opening.

And the concrete monolith is there to

provide structure for the shaft seals above it. The shaft

seal itself is a combination bentonite/sand mixture,

asphalt, concrete bulkheads, and engineered fill, and are

placed in such an arrangement so as to provide a long-term

barrier to radionuclide travel up through the shafts.

And this just gives the indication of the

types of the horizons of the various materials, with the

concrete bulkheads separating both as a structural element

between the various complexes, as well as, in the case of

the aquifers below the 200 metre level -- the plug for the

aquifers as well.

The bentonite sands, asphalts and concrete

wall, the lower portions, the shaft liner would be

removed. The portion of the damaged rock of the shaft

walls will be excavated, and it’s been assumed that

there’s a 500 millimetre annulus around the shaft to get

competent rock in behind, and then the bentonite sand,

asphalt, and the concrete will be put into lifts and the

process will be repeated.

All the shaft infrastructure we’ll have

pulled-out, and subsequent equipment brought in to be able

197


to provide working stages and material transport of the

bentonite, asphalt, and concrete down to the shaft levels.

The other key component of the concrete

bulkhead is that they’re keyed into the rock and, again,

provide the structure required to hold the elements above.

The long-term -- the long-term safety is really sitting

with the layers of bentonite/sand mixture.

I’m going to pass the presentation over now

to Dr. Gierszewski to discuss the long-term safety of the

repository in the absence of backfill in the emplacement

rooms and access tunnels.

DR. GIERSZEWSKI: Thank you. Paul

Gierszewski for the record. So, I’m going to talk about

the implications of the backfill or no backfill with

respect to the rooms and tunnels.

I can go first to the next slide, 77. So,

this slide discusses some of the unique features of the

DGR that are relevant to discussion of room and tunnel

backfill.

First point is that there’s potentially a

large amount of gas generated in this facility, and that’s

because of the inherent content -- the organic and metal

content in the low and intermediate level waste and metal

containers.

Second point is that at this site, we have

198


extremely low-permeability rock, and the host cover of

basalt(sp) has very low porosity, and that’s very

favourable for retention radionuclides, but it does mean

that it would also retain gas.

So, the third point is that there’s a

significant carbon-14 content, so from a safety

perspective we’re interested in retaining that carbon-14

containing gas until it decays. And because for nominal

ten half-lives that would be approximately 60,000 years.

The fourth point is that this site relates

to the strength of the rock and the design of the facility

to take advantage and provide a very long-term stable

design without backfill.

So those are four points. And as a result

of consideration of these points for this facility, we do

have backfill in the shafts sealing the shafts, as

previously presented, but we are not planning to backfill

the rooms and tunnels.

Now, in support of that recommendation or

design basis, we have looked at and specifically analysed

a case that has a fully backfilled repository and that’s

our -- and our terminology -- is the NE-BF Case.

If we go to the next slide, Slide 78, that

stands for normal evolution back fill. And what slide 78

shows you is just where you can find more details about

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that particular quantitative analysis in support of that

case within both the preliminary safety report and then

the lower tier of supporting documents.

If we can go to slide 79, this just

illustrates the key results of the analysis. So this is a

graph that shows gas pressure within the rooms and

tunnels. Within the repository as a function of time.

I’ll point out that time is on a

logarithmic access from 10 years to one million years.

There’s some horizontal lines there that

are essentially representative of the background

hydrostatic pressure, equilibrium pressure at the Cobourg

formation level.

And the green lines in this curve -- in

this figure show you the gas pressure evolution within the

repository for essentially we call it the reference case,

the most likely case. There’s actually two curves there

with some slight variations in the definition of reference

case.

And they show that basically there’s

significant gas production, waste degradation occurring

over the first several thousand years, and then the rate

slows down and the gas pressure calibrates at around the

equilibrium pressure level of that horizon.

In addition, this figure shows you two

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curves which are related to a fully backfilled repository.

So by fully backfilled, in this case we assume that all of

the room and the tunnels, all of that void space, was

backfilled with crushed rock so that that left about 30

percent void. So 70 percent of the space was filled with

rock, 30 percent was void.

There are two curves here, there’s a red

and a blue. They both represent different assumptions

about -- a range of assumptions about water availability

within the facility. I think that the reality is going to

be between those two lines.

And a key point here is that there’s a

potential with the backfill repository to have high gas

pressures. Essentially, that’s simply because you’ve

taken away volume.

So if we go to the next Slide 80 just to

sort of summarize again the nature of the arguments. So

the low and intermediate level waste containers do have

significant organic and metal content. In the long term

in our safety assessment we assume -- we expect that these

will degrade and we assume that they essentially fully

degrade into their basic gaseous elements, CO2, methane,

hydrogen.

Because of very low permeability of both

the enclosed and host rock and the shaft seals, they

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significantly limit gas migration away from the

repository. As a consequence, that gas will build up in

the timeframes that are relevant here.

Without backfill in the design, there is

enough space that the gas pressure will equilibrate at

around the natural hydrostatic pressure of the surrounding

host rock.

To the next slide, 81, with backfill the

available void space is reduced significantly. Reducing

the volume means that you have the corresponding higher

gas pressure. Higher gas pressure could result in

development of fractures -- probably horizontal fractures

because of the nature of the stressors seen here -- a

potentially increased rate of gas release from the

repository, and associated with that, potentially higher

doses from the carbon 14 and gas should these releases

before the carbon 14 had decayed.

Therefore, for long-term safety, we judged

it better to provide more space to ensure that the gas

pressure remains low, and supported by that we’ve

developed a repository design that’s very mechanically

stable, and that’s also supported by the rock strength,

the properties of the rock around it that allows us to

have, in this environment, a stable facility without

backfilling.

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So at this point I’d like to turn it over

to some speakers who will talk more about the mechanical

stability.

MR. CARVALHO: Jose Carvalho, for the

record.

Just like for the shaft, the mechanical

models were developed for the repository, and they were

developed to assess stability of the openings and the

ground support design during the construction in the

operating phases.

These model parameters were based on the

rock mass characterization and result from fill

investigations and laboratory testing from the eight bore

holes drilled on site.

The parameters were also developed through

a series of reviews and workshops and the parameters were

agreed to and the models that were going to be used to

assess were also agreed to during these workshops. These

workshops were attended by an external technical review

group who were able to make recommendations as well.

So in terms of the modelling, the

methodology was to first analyse the repository-wide model

to assess the level of stress in the pillars between the

emplacement rooms themselves and the pillars separating

the panels, and then subsequently analysing emplacement

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rooms as in a two-dimensional situation and follow-up with

a detailed analysis were areas were identified for further

analysis.

The next slide shows the repository-wide

model -- slide 83. You can see this is a top view, a

planned view of the repository, with contours of the

vertical stress at the repository level. The green on the

outside represents the insidious stresses, which is around

17 megapascals.

And you can see that the pillars between

the rooms suffer an increase in stress up to about 25

megapascals, and the larger pillars between the panels get

up to about 20 megapascals. This is a marginal increase

from the vertical insidious stress and it’s still at about

a quarter of the -- in the actual strength of the rock.

So it’s very low in terms of the strength of the rock.

Also in this slide you can three red

circles, which identify areas that we decided we should

take a closer look in a three-dimensional setting. And

these areas are the intersection between the access tunnel

and the emplacement room, and the rooms that connect the

end of the emplacement rooms with the ventilation tunnels,

both on the north panel and south panel.

And the reason for looking at both of those

is that the connecting tunnel in one panel sits on one

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side of the emplacement room and on the south panel sits

on another side, so two different geometric situations.

So the next one; so in Slide 84 we are

showing to the mesh that was used in the two-dimensional

analysis of the rooms. The rooms are laid out in a series

parallel to each other, and the pillar between the rooms

is typically twice the width of the rooms.

So we took advantage of symmetry, and the

lateral expanse of the numerical model represents the

centre line of the pillars. The formations above and

below the horizon where the repository were also included

in the analysis.

The next one; so Slide 85 shows the results

of the numerical analysis on the emplacement rooms. This

is the contours of the major stress. And you might see

some small crosses at the very corners of the rooms which

represent a state of overstress, which is very localized,

and it’s also in a very confined area of that geometry.

I should point out that the rooms were

aligned with the major horizontal in situ stress to

minimize the impact of stresses on the room.

During the investigations, it was

identified in the Cobourg that there were planes of --

incipient planes of weakness that -- horizontal planes of

weakness -- which could part. So those were also modelled

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explicitly and in subsequent models.

Next slide please.

So Slide 86 shows the same model, but with

those incipient planes of weakness represented. And

because the position of those planes is somewhat random,

it has an average spacing of about 70 centimetres, but

there’s some randomness to their position.

Two realizations of those horizontal planes

were created simply to identify or assess what the

proximity of those planes to the back or the roof of the

rooms would do.

So on the left, we have a situation where

one of those planes is quite close to the back of the

room. On the left, sorry. And on the right we have a

situation where there’s a thicker layer above on the roof.

The figure shows that there is potential

for delamination or separation of those layers up to

beddings or to partings above the room. And because of

that, then we had considerations for bolting those layers

to provide the support required during operations and

construction.

Next slide, please.

So this is a slide showing the effect of

the support. The contours that are shown on this slide

are deformation or displacement contours.

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The shaded areas above the roof of the

emplacement room show the loads on the bolts. The maximum

bolt loads that we observed in the analysis were of the

order of six, seven tonnes. The bolts that are used in

the support have a capacity of 25 tonnes.

The bolts are pre-stressed to -- with a

force of about two tonnes to ensure that the layers do not

delaminate and stay tight and prevent slippage on the

layers. So basically, this maintains the integrity of the

roof beam.

The next slide shows the support as

designed. This is a typical support on the emplacement

rooms. This one is showing three-metre long bolts with

mesh for immediate protection. The bolts on the side

walls are not really required for stability, but they’re

there just to pin the mesh to the side walls and bring the

mesh down to a level that is safe.

Next slide.

Alternatively, one can use a shotcrete,

fibre-reinforced shotcrete or plain shotcrete and bolts to

provide the immediate support. Ultimately, all of the

rooms will have a bolting in the roof.

The bolting will be with CT bolts. These

are hand-anchored bolts. They can be tightened to the

proper pre-tension right away, and they can grout -- they

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can be grouted either right away during the cycle or they

can be grouted one or two rounds behind the face at a

later date, at a later time.

Next slide, please.

I said we looked at a three-dimensional

analysis of those intersections. I want to, for the

record, make a correction on the captions on the next

three slides. Slide 90, 91 and 92, the captions are not

correct.

Slide 90 actually shows the intersection

between the access tunnel and the emplacement room, so

this is the entry side of the tunnel of the emplacement

room. The Slides 91 and 92 show the ventilation side.

So with that correction noted, you can see

that the mesh is represented on the left side. That’s the

mesh that was used in the analysis. On the top right

figure in yellow, you have a representation of the zones

of overstress, and you can see that they are quite

consistent with the two-dimensional analysis in which the

corners of the rooms are the ones already experiencing

some overstress, very localized.

The access tunnel, as you can see in the

next slides -- the ventilation tunnel -- are slightly

arched. The roof is slightly arched because they are not

in the optimum orientation of the -- of stress. So that

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is to mitigate the higher stress across those roofs.

The bottom figure on the left is to

represent zones of tensile -- of tension that exceeded

tensile strength of the rock. You can hardly see a small

red spot on the corner. Where those zones exist, they are

extremely localized but they’re basically not -- not

distributed.

Next slide, please.

The connection to the ventilation tunnels

from the emplacement rooms, as was pointed out before, is

through a five-metre by five-metre connection which is of

the same size as the ventilation room. And, again, the

same observations are noted here.

The corners of the emplacement rooms are

the zones that are slightly overstressed and very

confined. And again, the ventilation room has the same

configuration in the roof, slightly arched, to mitigate

the fact that it’s now oriented in the optimum stress

orientation.

You can see that on the left bottom figure,

there is a small zone of tensile stress but, again,

they’re very localized on the side walls.

Next slide, please.

This is a similar picture to the previous

one, but it’s with the connection room positioned on the

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opposite side of the emplacement room, but the conclusions

are the same. The overstress on the emplacement room,

again, is in the corners and just a slight zone of

overstress on the roof of the access tunnels.

So the connections present no concerns in

terms of stability of the layout.

With that, I will pass the presentation

back to Derek.

MR. WILSON: Thank you, Jo.

I’d like to ask Mark Diederichs to speak to

the long-term stability of the repository.

DR. DIEDERICHS: For the record, Mark

Diederichs.

This analysis was done as part of the geo-

synthesis work prior to this current design stage, and it

looks at the long-term stability -- what I call ultra

long-term stability beyond the 100-year timeframe out to a

million years.

The analysis that was performed for

excavation stability considered a number of complicating

factors. One is the time-dependent strength degradation.

So there were some long-term tests done on the Cobourg,

and we combined that with various other data from other

rock types to look at work that’s been done to look at

what we call long-term strength degradation, which is not

210


necessarily crete.

It’s the reduction in strength of a rock

over time and that’s a function of how much the rock is

overstressed or how close it is to being overstressed, and

the confinement. Depending on whether you’re talking

about rock right adjacent to the wall of an excavation or

slightly into a pillar, the rock takes approximately 10 to

60,000 years to reach its minimum strength, which I’ll

discuss in a minute.

We also considered effects of gas pressure

build-up. We’ve had a discussion on why that’s important.

The gas pressure build-up also affects the stability of

the rock mass over time near the excavation.

We looked at seismic ground shaking

according to the design events that were specified.

Glacial loading and unloading. The

million-year timeframe puts us in about eight glacial

cycles overall, where we modelled three kilometres of ice

coming over top of the excavation and back again, which is

a very conservative assumption. And we combined those

effects.

So I’ll run through a summary of that,

Slide 94. I’ll discuss some of this in detail, but the

long-term state after one or two glacial and interglacial

periods, which is roughly about 100-150,000 years or so,

211


we start to see progressive damage to the walls, roof and

floor, but the pillars remain functional.

As the glacier comes over top and recedes

again, the stresses rotate through 90 degrees and back

again, creating increased damage each time to the

excavation. And during this period, the strength is also

decaying around the excavation as per our predictions.

The ultra long-term state somewhere in the

order of eight or so glaciations and up to a million

years, we start to see the roof and the walls lose their

integrity immediately around the openings. And that

material moves into the voids created by the excavations

and the degrading waste. And the pillars ultimately, by

the end of the million years, will lose their load-bearing

capacity. These are the 20-metre pillars between the

rooms.

The key to the stability of the system

overall, however, is that these broken beds will create

what we call a bulking, a bulked mass, that is, a mass

that increases in volume as the rocks break up from their

in situ state, and this will choke off further collapse.

And if we can analyze that and then look at the effects of

those displacements on the overlying shale beds and we can

see that the displacements predicted will not cause any

significant disturbance to the overlying barrier shales,

212


which is the primary geosphere barrier.

Next slide, please, 95.

So essentially, the way we model long-term

strength is we set a lower bound limit that is related to

the stress at which cracks first begin to form in the

material. And these are cracks at a grain scale, micro

scale.

If there's no damage being done, then the

rock is as stable as it has been over geological time.

So this is a real conservative lower bound

that we're using. The advanced model combines a decay

rate which is, as I said, a function of overall stress and

confining stress. But this -- the lower bound for the

rock is assumed to be in the order of 45 megapascals for

the Cobourg. This is approximately 40 percent of the

unconfined compressive strength. And this really is a

lower bound.

The performance that I just discussed is at

this lower bound. If we raise this to a more realistic 50

percent, which was what one might use for, say, 100 or

1,000 year construction, the repository actually remains

fairly stable throughout the entire million-year period.

So we're really being conservative here in

our estimation.

Slide 96.

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In order to accommodate the failure

processes involved, not just the prediction of yield and

damage, we've incorporated both the bedding, as Dr.

Carvalho summarized in his modelling, but we've also

included the ability of the rock to come apart physically

in the model.

This is called a Voronoi model where the

blocks can fail and actually move around as discrete

blocks as they move in to the opening. And this is to

important to simulate the bulking effects.

What you see here is a model that's later

in the process, after long-term strength degradation. You

can see that there's some bedding separation and some

minor disturbance in the walls. So this is pre-glacial

performance.

Next, please, Slide 97.

So again, keeping in mind that we're using

an ultra-conservative value for long-term -- ultra long-

term strength, this is what -- this is a symmetrical model

of two halves of the openings. And what you see in

between is the pillar.

And you can see after one glacial cycle --

that's out more than 50,000 years or 60,000 years or so --

you can see that the walls start to degrade and you see

some disturbance. The dark lines in the roof are not

214


failure, but they are the beds delaminating to some

degree.

As we go through two cycles and three

cycles -- now we're out to about 300,000 years -- you can

see there's increased damage as the glaciers advance and

then increased damage again as they recede, as the

stresses rotate back to horizontally dominant.

Not a lot of difference after about the

Glacial Cycle 4 all the way through to the end of the

consideration period, which is a million years, and that's

because the blocks have choked off the volume. The roof

is allowed to settle down upon that volume and we can

predict the amount of displacement that that process

incurs.

Next slide, please.

Just so -- just to clarify what we're

talking about here, on the left is a short-term -- the

presumed short-term response. These photographs are

actually from Norton Mine, which is also a limestone mine

at 600 metres in Ohio.

And you can see -- and roughly the same

dimensions as we're talking about. And you can see on the

left some minor cracks in the walls starting to show up.

This mine's been open for about 100 years, I think. And

you can see that kind of damage.

215


So this is what the repository might look

like at the very end of operation.

What I'm showing on the right is the model

and some photographs from some dry caves that have been

around for several hundred thousand years and the rock

breaking up and bulking and choking off, so that

excavation -- that cave on the right is fully choked.

And what I'm showing on the bottom right

are some assumptions, typical blasted rock bulks about 30

percent, 35 percent.

What you see there is the maximum failure

volume. Those ellipses around the opening are the maximum

failure volume given certain assumptions for bulking.

And the model shows bulking in the 15 to 25

percent range, so that's -- those are the numbers we're

working with in terms of choking off the excavation.

That model -- again, the red model in the

left of the -- the right side of the picture there shows

the repository completely choked off and all displacements

have stopped. And this was around about the fourth or

fifth glaciation.

Next, please. Slide 99.

So what we do is take that deformation that

occurs over every room and through each pillar and we

apply it as a whole to the repository in a three-

216


dimensional model with all of the stratigraphy above

represented to have a look at the three-dimensional

effects and also to look at the effects of the revised 40-

metre barrier pillars that you see.

You can see the blue zones there stepped

out from the original footprint to provide barrier pillars

between the main panels.

So we can look at the effects of the

deformation during this process of choking and see what

effect that has on everything above.

Next slide, please. Slide 100.

Here you see the worst-case scenario,

minimum strength. Case 2 is with no barrier pillar. This

is the deflections in the -- at the base of the Georgian

Bay, which is one unit above the repository.

And you can see that the maximum

displacement's there about 45 centimetres over --

distributed over about 300 metres or so on either side.

With the barrier pillar, that number

reduces to about 25 or 30 centimetres. And the Case 1 and

2 there are based different assumptions of the in situ

stress inside the Blue Mountain, which was a very

difficult unit to sample. And so we've made some

bracketing assumptions there, and the sensitivity is

relatively minor.

217


You can see 25, 30 centimetres of movement

there. If you look at the response of the shales, there's

no indication of yield for the Case 1 and 2. Small

amounts of yield without the barrier pillars, so the

barrier pillars are very important to the design.

But otherwise, with -- this is without

backfill. There's no longer-term yield in the overlying

shales of the Georgian Bay and Queenston out to a million-

year timeframe, so that's the -- that's all I have for

you.

Thank you very much. Back to Derek.


With that, that concludes Part 5 and all

parts of the presentation today, and I'd welcome any

questions that the Panel may have at this time.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. So let's

start with Dr. Archibald.


MEMBER ARCHIBALD: Thank you very much for

that presentation and all your guest presenters. It was

excellent.

My first question, and this is specific to

comments made here and what we saw on our Kincardine

218


visit, was that models were developed for the eight

boreholes drilled on site. We currently have only seen

geotechnical results for boreholes DGR 1 through 6 to

date.

My question is, when will the results for

holes DGR 7 and DGR 8 be made public, where appropriate,

and has additional testing of the cores been performed to

provide additional geomechanical information, particularly

strength -- strength determinations?


The -- there are two reports that have been

generated out of the DGR 7 and 8, work that was done in

the field in 2011, one prepared by Entara for the aquarium

results and the other prepared by Golder's for the

geomechanical aspects of the work.

We can undertake to provide a summary or a

copy of those documents to the Panel.

MEMBER ARCHIBALD: Thank you. That would

be very useful because the amount of information that we

have on hand so far to describe the -- or to characterize

the strength properties of the Cobourg formation, at the

least, is very, very limited, and if more information is

available, that would go a long way to substantiate,

especially in the area of the actual repository itself,

that the data is reproducible.

219



Number 15.

MEMBER ARCHIBALD: Now, if I may, this is

coming to backfill again.

I realize the case that you are presenting

for stable mitigation, the comment was "design is stable

without backfill". And as I've heard from Dr. Diederichs,

this is over the period of at least three glacial cycles

before fall-ins begin to occur.

I would wonder if you could identify

potential benefits that might result from the use of

backfill in the long term in the emplacement rooms at the

least in terms of minimizing potential structural damage

such as restricting the development of the EDZ.

So one particular case is that if you are

applying backfill to these rooms you are in fact

immediately putting the bulking effect in place.

I realize that one of the problems is that

you will reduce the volume and you can enlarged gas

pressure being developed but you also get the benefit of

having instant bulking and therefore reducing any

displacements, you reinforce the rock mass on the pillars,

the roof, the back, if you prevent any displacements and

so on. So there are potential benefits that may be

realized from the use of backfill.

220


I suppose what I would suggest is or my

question is; what degree of damage will result for the

non-water limited backfill case relative to the no-fill

case in terms of long-term performance?

There has been no discussion nor comparison

of the two extreme cases that we have seen so far.

MR. GIERSZEWSKI: For the record, Paul

Gierszewski.

I think the question is to me but I’m

sorry, I wonder if you could just repeat the particular

question.

MEMBER ARCHIBALD: The particular question

is; what degree of damage will result -- and this is to

the repository rooms of the repository in general -- for

the non-water limited backfill case relative to the no-

fill case in terms of long-term performance?

MR. GIERSZEWSKI: Okay, so in the

calculations -- sorry, Paul Gierszewski, for the record.

So we would be predicting in that case the

possibility of a high-gas pressure, the calculations

suggest on the order of 16 MPA which is roughly on the

order of the static pressure in the system.

As the gas pressure increases, at some

point and I don’t know exactly, but certainly I would

anticipate around these numbers you would get to gas --

221


you’ll get horizontal fracture along the bedding planes or

you could get the gas to push past the concrete monolith

and through the shaft seals and therefore be a release of

gas from the system.

So I think those would be the downsides

that we’re trying to avoid by not backfilling.

MEMBER ARCHIBALD: On the other hand, the

benefits for putting the backfill in, have those ever been

considered? For that I mean if you were putting a bulking

-- an immediate bulking agent in what you have is the

immediate potential induction of stress that will

reinforce the wall rock, the excavations, and prevent any

collapse or vertical displacement of the back that would

eventually cause this bulking and extension of the

excavation damage. And that would be in the long-term.

MR. GIERSZEWSKI: Paul Gierszewski, for the

record.

So I don’t actually think that there would

be a benefit. From the modelling we’ve seen the extent of

the bulking -- the rock fall that occurs in the long-term

-- just to be clear, although that has occurred and has

enlarged the volume that is affected by the repository

zone the void volume is still there so from a gas pressure

point of view we still have the same amount of volume and

therefore pressure is bounded as we’ve suggested.

222


The extent of that damage, it remains

within the Colbourg formation and it’s in the area of the

emplacement room so it’s not propagating over towards the

shafts, which is one of the -- for example, one of the

reasons why we islanded the shafts a distant away from the

panels themselves.

So again, the existing design without

backfill, that yes it does in the long-term occupy a

larger volume but that is confined within the low

permeability of rock and the gases are retained.

Whereas in the other case where you did

backfill, yes, you don’t get any extension into that

volume but then you have the risk of the high gas pressure

in the long-term.

MEMBER ARCHIBALD: So what I’m hearing is

that the major problem would be because of the high gas

pressure. It would be the lateral extension of the

bedding planes and possible leakage through the seals

would be the major problem that you would consider?

MR. GIERSZEWSKI: That’s correct.

MEMBER ARCHIBALD: On the other hand, we

haven’t seen a comparison case, for example. If you were

looking at the non-water limited backfill case is there --

is there a case or a model develop that shows the actual

extent and the progression temporally and spatially of

223


these fracture zones with -- over the long-term interval?

There’s no method or capability for

comparison with the existing cases that you have. There

are operational benefits, for example, of backfill and

this is why mining companies now use it.

You have a waste rock facility on surface

that’s going to be here in perpetuity, if that can be

consumed by manufacturing backfill be put back in place

you also ease up on one of your surface environmental

problems.

You also -- if you are concealing --

confining these rooms with backfill one of the potential

problems that you would have in your operational phase

would be explosions, and this is the reason for the

closure walls being put in place.

If you have backfill in place you have a

mitigative barrier against explosions.

These are all considerations not just for

the long-term repository stability but for operational

safety.

And my particular question; what degree of

damage will result for the backfill case, relative to the

non-backfill case, I would request a review of the two

cases in terms of spatial and temporal boundaries so they

can be directly compared rather than simply having a

224


conclusion saying this is not valid.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Just to intervene a

little bit here.

I think what Dr. Archibald is trying to get

across is he’s asking whether or not there has been a

quantitative model to comparison between the two

scenarios.

We understand from the responses we’re

getting so far is that backfill was eliminated for further

modelling earlier on. And so what we saw in the last few

slides was the chosen scenario for the detailed modelling.

Is that correct? And that backfill was

never actually modelled all the way through so that we can

have a comparison of backfill versus not.


I’d ask Mark Diederichs to respond to that,

please.

MR. DIEDERICHS: For the record, Mark

Diederichs.

For the ultra long-term case the effects of

backfill in the model are difficult to quantify because as

soon as the waste begins to degrade the confining effects

that Dr. Archibald are referring to effectively disappear,

which is one reason we left -- we decided to proceed

without the backfill in the modelling.

225


Where it may -- backfill may provide some

reduction in EDZ in the very short term. In the long-term

however once -- and by long-term, certainly past the first

glaciation, by then the waste has degraded and the void is

effectively free to be refilled at that point.

And so the long-term EDZ is unaffected by

the presence of backfill. What the backfill would do is

add volume to the hole, to the void, and that would

probably reduce the maximum volume required for choking by

something on the order of 20 percent, 15 percent, which in

turn reduces the settlements in the shales by the same

amount.

So we’re talking rather than 30 -- 25

centimetres of deflection in the shales you might be

talking about 20 centimetres in deflection of the shales.

So that in my mind quantitatively that’s

the influence geotechnically, the backfill.

MEMBER ARCHIBALD: The interesting part was

the mention that there would be a lateral extension of the

fracture zone that we had not heard in any of the previous

modelling and that was the part of the comparison that

would be very, very interesting to see.

Even if it were for a case early on, if the

gas pressures were very rapidly induced and then you could

see the extension of these fractures.

226


That is information that is currently not

available in the EIS or has not been mentioned. And for

that reason we would ask for a comparison case between the

two modelling ends.

MR. DIEDERICHS: For the record, Mark

Diederichs.

Just to clarify what you’re referring to.

There is an example in the geosynthesis document referring

to the effects of gas pressure where the extensional

fracture is out along bedding is modelled and simulated

discreetly.

MEMBER ARCHIBALD: I will look at that and

then we’ll get back.

I have another question on Slide Number 90,

these are the ones with the modified titles. Actually

this is Slide 90, 91, and 92. It doesn’t matter which one

of these is being pushed in.

Are the models shown or the model diagrams

assessed with or without end wall structures in place? Do

they have any effect on the stress distributions that you

got?


record.

No, the models, as analysed here are just

the openings, there is no -- any kind of wall installed or

227


-- it’s just as excavating. These are excavation.

MEMBER ARCHIBALD: Good, thank you. That’s

a worst-case assumption.

On Slide 98 where we see the fabulous

failure diagrams, the caving diagrams, and this is

probably reduced to mining activity.

The limits of caving show most of it to

occur from the -- from the roof. In the diagram, the

long-term diagram of the limits of caving and bulking

sketch on the right-hand side.

How does this confirm to the model shown on

Slide Number 97, where after the second and third glacial

cycles, most of the bulking appears to become lateral

rather than vertical from the back of these repository

rooms.

So most of the movement in the multiple

glaciation modeling effects appears to be lateral rather

than vertical as shown from the bulking diagrams.

MEMBER ARCHIBALD: Is this an accurate

illustration of the process that should be expected to

occur?

MR. DIEDERICHS: If we can go back to --

sorry, what slide was that last one? If we can go to 98?

The illustration -- and that’s all it is,

it’s an illustration on the right -- is a worse case in

228


terms of where the material would come from and how close

it would get to the shales.

So that’s an assumption that most of the

material is coming from the roof just to test the worse-

case assumption; but what we do know is the volume.

So the volume in this case is assigned to

the roof to test -- to test how far up it would propagate.

If you back now to 97, you’re absolutely

correct, with the given stress field and the glacial

history and the bedding, the pillars seem to be ejecting

most of the material as we go through the glacial cycles.

And that does actually have an impact on

deformations. The overall settlement is the same but, in

fact, the failure gets -- does not -- the actual

disintegration does not approach the shales in the same

way. The settlement is similar.

MEMBER ARCHIBALD: Could I ask: In the

modeling assumptions, does the presence of waste packaging

in the rooms in any way restrict roof collapse?

Has any consideration or favour been given

to the waste package materials even though we know they

will collapse and degrade with time?

MR. DIEDERICHS: Only -- if you look at the

-- closely at the left-hand picture, you’ll see some

slightly darkened zones in the floor. That’s the

229


assumption of maximum decomposition of the waste and

forming a solid -- or a volume in the floor.

The assumption here is that the waste will

degrade long before the rock does and, therefore, would

not be available to hold the wall up.

And that’s also the assumption that

pertains to the backfill is that the backfill which is

just filling in the annular space around the containers

would also just simply collapse onto the floor with the --

with the waste over time.



Dr. Muecke.


Could we go to Slide number 79, the gas

generation and I would just like some clarifications on

these graphs.

For the backfill case showing the maximum

gas pressures, only one curve is shown. However, if you

look at the scenario for the closure of the repository,

it’s not one volume. Because of the closure of walls,

there are actually three discrete areas which don’t

interact with each other.

So my question is: What does this curve

represent? Is it one of these enclosures -- one of these

230


compartments or is it all three compartments?


record.

I think I would also -- this is related to

-- I think the answer to this can be aided by one of the

IR requests. It was EIS01-19 which was some details.

But just to kind of summarize the key

point, the closure walls are of concrete. They are

designed for operational safety purposes. They’re not

designed for -- as long-term barriers. We’re not planning

extensive keying or grouting or sealing off the normal

damage zone that would be around them.

And, over the long term, we also don’t

generally expect concrete to be a very low permeability

material. In the short-term, it can be but, in the long-

term, it wouldn’t be.

So we’ve done some calculations that show

that, yes, if you do divide into three different panel

areas and because you have got different volumes and

different gas generating potential in each panel, you

could theoretically have higher gas in some panels than in

others.

However, given the permeability of the

degraded concrete alone, never mind any damage zone around

it and the long times that we have here, the gas would be

231


able to calibrate on time scales that are relevant to us.

So we expect that, realistically, from a

gas pressure point of view, the repository can be

adequately represented by -- by a single averaged pressure

to be -- the gas will be able to move between it.

MEMBER MUECKE: At a single volume.

But to be totally correct, okay, if you

included in this there should be the time limit for the

closure walls because the closure walls is a logistic

access; right?

Do they disappear after 1,000 years, 5,000

years?

So, you know, I mean, you’re going to have

three discrete areas for a reasonably long time. For what

lengths of time? That’s what I’m asking.


record.

So we haven’t modeled the specific

degradation of concrete to give you that kind of a

resolution in time dependence.

We have modeled the kind of gas flows that

you would get through the concrete alone and they suggest

that you wouldn’t be able to maintain gas pressures more

than about 1 MPa difference between the different panels.

I think the maximum gas pressure that we

232


calculated that you might get between the panels -- again,

the IR response has information -- I think the maximum is

about 4 MPa.

But we don’t think that the -- the concrete

would let you -- would maintain more than 1 MPa over

1,000-year timeframe.

So you could take this -- this blue curve

here and if you plotted the different curves in it --

again, we’d have to ask you to do the hard calculation --

but I don’t expect it would make a large difference in the

results if you plotted it individually, for those reasons.

MEMBER MUECKE: Now, this is probably

somewhere in what we have been given but in terms of the

actual chemical reactions produced, the gases, usually, if

we’re dealing with equilibrium reactions of some sort

which involve gas generation, as you push up the pressure

-- this is High School chemistry; right? -- as you

increase the gas pressure, you slow down the reaction in a

reversible reaction.

So what sort of reactions are envisioned

here? Are they able to go on basically linear?


record.

So again, from a long-term safety point of

view, we have basically assumed that these reactions go

233


essentially to completion.

So we’re maximizing the amount of gas

that’s being produced. So we’re taking a conservative

approach because of -- I think to be sure that we’ve got

the gas safety case clear.

MEMBER MUECKE: So by taking that approach

and not actually looking at the reactions, what you’re

telling me is that, yes, it’s the worse-case scenario but

you haven’t really evaluated the probability, okay, that

you’re ever going to reach that stage.

Because, if you looked at the actual

possible reactions, they may cease before that pressure

could ever build up.

Is that a possibility?

MR. GIERSZEWSKI: So I guess there’s two

points. One is whether at these gas pressures, these

reactions would significantly decrease?

I don’t know the answer to that question.

I would have to do some checking on that.

The reactions are pretty simple. It’s just

metals in the presence of anaerobic with water --

conditions will react.

The others are microbial anaerobic

reactions that do occur underground under anaerobic

conditions.

234


Sorry, that was one point.

Secondly, I think that -- I think, again,

this question of timing here, we’re looking at long

timeframes and so I believe that if the reactions here are

energetically favoured that they would -- they’d be

appropriate for long-term safety assessment to assume that

they can and would occur and that’s, I would suggest,

perhaps -- you know, the reaction rate might slow down

something relative to what we’ve assumed here.

If there is a gas pressure effect that,

over timeframes that are of interest to us, you still

would get substantive conversion off the materials into --

into their degradation products.

I do believe that’s an appropriately

conservative assumption.

MEMBER MUECKE: Could you ask for some

information on this? An evaluation, basically, of what

are the possible reactions, and how these reactions will

proceed, what their kinetics are, under -- what are we

talking about? -- 15 megapascals? My recollection is that

high pressure reactions -- under high pressure, okay,

chemical reactions, look quite different sometimes than

they do under low pressure.

MR. GIERSZEWSKI: Okay, so we will get back

to you on that. We take that as an undertaking.

235



MR. SAUMURE: That would be undertaking

number 16.

MEMBER MUECKE: I have one more question.

And it’s regarding the 2D models and, if we could have

slide number 86, please. Yes, that’s the one I want. In

this modelling you included horizontal planes of weakness,

bedding planes, right, at 70 cm spacing. I was wondering

why you didn’t include overbreak and the EDZ zone, which

is probably -- which may be even more significant when it

comes to stress distributions.


record. The overbreak and EDZ zone is a result of the

excavation process. The planes of weakness that I’ve

shown in there are in situ before we start the excavation.

So, that EDZ and that overbreak is not something I would

include in a model. It is something that the model would

have to return to me as a result. So, if you are

referring to blast damage, that’s a different concept.

But, damage created by the excavation process -- I’m

actually waiting for the model to show me whether that’s

going to occur. The -- as far as the excavation process

and the excavation damage, that’s going to depend on the

care during the blasting and the perimeter blasting and

the mitigations that are going to be taken to minimize

236


that damage. That’s a very thin skin around the

excavation.

MEMBER MUECKE: We are looking at, in terms

of the bedding planes, we're looking at 70 cm distance,

and, you know, in terms of the damaged zone as a result of

explosives, is that minimal, or well to 70 cm?

MR. CARVALHO: Jose Carvalho for the

record. Yes, that depends on the practice, but in civil

situations, the expectation is that the damage zone from

blasting will be smaller than 70 cm. That’s correct.

THE CHAIRPERSON: I just have one question,

and this is more from a layperson’s perspective, so I

apologize if it’s a naive question. This is on page 79

again. Or slide 79. So, over that timescale, when would

saturation -- water saturation of the repository -- 100%

saturation occur such that you have anaerobic conditions?

MR. GIERSZEWSKI: Paul Gierszewski for the

record. So, they’re actually -- they’re separate

processes. So, anaerobic conditions is a consumption of

oxygen. That will probably occur within a few years of

putting in the closure plugs. So, during the operational

period, the oxygen that’s present in those closed panel

areas would then be consumed by rust and microbial

processes, so that those would then become anaerobic, and

would essentially stay that way indefinitely.

237


Saturation is then, of course, the slow

seepage of water back in from the rock or perhaps down

from the shaft. It is modelled, and is described of

course in more detailed modelling. But what we find,

again because of the very low permeability of the host

rock here that that's first of all a slow process.

Secondly, as the water comes in, it is consumed. These

anaerobic degradation reactions are water consuming

reactions generally.

And then thirdly, as the gas pressure

builds up to the hydrostatic pressure, it basically pushes

out, or balances the water. So in fact, we anticipate

that the repository would have some degree of water,

perhaps on the bottom of it, but, depending on the exact

scenario, but in general will be a largely dry facility

over these long time frames. But it would be anaerobic.

So it would be anaerobic but not saturated.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Okay. So this helps me

understand the comment that was made that, in reality, we

are going to be between the blue and the red curves in a

backfill scenario, because you are never really going to

have much of a -- like a completely waterlogged

repository. Was that the main reason why, in reality, the

lines would be in the middle?

MR. GIERSZEWSKI: Paul Gierszewski for the

238


record. So, the modelling does take into account that

water has to come from somewhere, and has to come from the

rock or the shaft and has done self-consistently. That

balance between the repository and the rock. There are

also reactions that are occurring within the repository.

And so really, the difference here is about how idealized

that the model assumptions are with respect to the

availability of water. The red curve is the best case

where the water is only available strictly from the rock

and the shaft. The other one, we can make the slightly

more conservative assumption that water is available to

support the reactions themselves. Again, it’s just kind

of how idealized that the models are. We think that the

value is between those two cases.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. I think, with

respect to explaining this to the layperson, some -- the

transcripts of this will be most useful, because the main

question on these kinds of projections far into the future

is, “So, how sure are you about that?” And so, you’ve

just helped really explain why we are having these sort of

two idealized conditions, and where reality might actually

fall. And I think that’s in turn coming back to Dr.

Archibald’s questions regarding the comparison of backfill

versus not, And where the true backfill scenario might

fall, versus no backfill.

239


We’ve had a chance to develop a couple of

extra questions on some of the earlier presentations, so,

with your indulgence over the next couple -- few -- five

or ten minutes, if we could please ask a couple more.

I have two that have to do with the water

management system. The first question is, does OPG have a

site-wide water budget for the site preparation and

construction phases?


The overall site water balance has not been finalized at

this time. We’re looking at the contributions as presented

here and are optimized and further refined. From an

annual perspective or from a seasonal perspective, those

water balances have not been finalized at this time.

THE CHAIRPERSON: When might we expect

those balances to be finalized?


As we've discussed through several of these processes,

we're talking about taking conservative approaches to

identifying peak demands, either ventilation or water

management and so on. It will really ultimately require

the input and selection of techniques of processes to be

able to finalize the water balance. We can generalize the

water balance within a band, we can do it to a low and

expected low and expected deak, but to get to a final

240


water balance that would be supported through different

types of equipment, different types of processes to be

used, that would have to be done in advance of

construction, but with some input from the contractor that

would be supporting.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Okay, understood.

There’s a follow-up question to that that

would perhaps provide a bit more context for why I am

pressing you on the water budget, which is sufficient

information to allow confident calculation of loading to

McPherson Bay, which in turn has very high-degree of

relevance to the development of discharge criteria.

So this is why I'm pressing you on the

timing because it is very relevant to the licensing in

particular.


Could we have an undertaking to get back to

the Panel in terms of providing perhaps water balances and

a range for now to be able to make those initial

assessments?

And then, we can refine the water balance

moving forward.

THE CHAIRPERSON: That would be most

appreciated, thank you.

MR. SULLIVAN: That will be Undertaking

241


number 17.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Dr. Muecke, do you have

additional questions?

MEMBER ARCHIBALD: In that case, I'll just

ask one question.

From the G Mechanical crew, is there any

level of confidence in the assumption that rock bolts in

the roofs of the emplacement rooms could be affected for

periods greater than the operational days?

We have a very short human history of

operating with modern mining techniques, but would any

contribution to the in-place supports be worked into your

calculations for overall stability in the long-term?

MR. CARVALHO: Joe Carvalho, for the

record.

Beyond the operation phase? I don't think

so.

MEMBER ARCHIBALD: That's the answer.

So it falls the same way as the waste, it

will disappear. Thank you.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Okay, I think that

concludes the questions from the Panel.

I suggest that we take a very brief break

just for the members of the Secretariat to assist me in

coming up with a recap of all of the -- sort of some of

242


the main points that have arisen during today, which will

comprise my final statement.

So if we could reconvene at 20 minutes to

five and I promise I'll keep my remarks very brief.

--- Upon recessing at 4:32 p.m.

--- Upon resuming at 4:42 p.m.

THE CHAIRPERSON: Before I provide my

closing remarks, Mr. Sullivan, I believe, you have two

technical questions to respond to as well as providing

deadlines for provision of the undertakings for us.

So if you could, first of all, we had

questions on depth of ditches. And secondly was a

question regarding the -- which -- was it the 21 litre per

second question on Slide 57/58?

So did we get answers to those?

MR. SULLIVAN: Gord Sullivan, for the

record.

I'll have Derek Wilson respond to your

questions.

MR. WILSON: Thanks, Gord. Derek Wilson,

for the record.

With respect to the ditches, the minimum

ditch depth for this site is one metre with a 3.5 to 4-

243


metre horizontal extend at the base of the ditching and a

2.5 to 1 sloping on the outside.

I think it should also be noted that the

location of the ditching, in order to maintain gravity

feed, in many cases, is keyed well below the existing

ground surface. So -- but from a minimum depth ditching

perspective, it's a metre.

With respect to the contributions of

drilling activities to the overall underground discharge

of 21 litres per second, 25 percent or just over five

litres a second has been attributed to drill water usage.

Again, the comparison, that's just assuming

that the suppression would be equalized at 25 percent

allocated to that activity.

With respect to the undertakings, we will

undertake to respond to most of the undertakings by August

15th. That's assuming that we are informed by the

transcripts.

We'll inform the Panel by August 1st if

some of the assessment work or some of the preparation

work, in order to respond in a wholesome manner, will take

beyond the August 15th deadline.

And again, if the transcripts provide

clarity that require a longer time or such as availability

of contour information.

244


So we'll get back to the Panel by August

1st, but our target would be to respond to most by August

15th.


The Panel would like to thank the CNSC as

well as OPG and NWMO for their participation in the

technical information session today. We acknowledge the

hard work that goes into preparation for a session such as

today's and we very much appreciate it.

We would also like to thank the people that

observed the session live here in Ottawa and those that

followed the session on the webcast.

The Panel were very pleased to receive a

lot of various, new information today. Some of our key

questions have been resolved. And we look forward to

receiving the results of the undertakings as well.

Interested parties are reminded that they

may send follow-up questions on what was heard here today

to the Panel for its consideration. Key to the current

review and comment period is for the Panel to obtain

sufficient information to determine if the requirements of

the EIS guidelines have been addressed.

When the transcript of today's session is

available, the Panel will verify its notes and make a

compilation of the undertakings assigned to CNSC and OPG.

245


The list of undertakings will be posted on

the project registry along with the session transcript and

a link to the archived webcast. I understand that all of

this information should be available by the end of the

next week.

Additionally, after reviewing its notes and

the transcript, the Panel may have other undertakings to

assign to CNSC or OPG or may issue new information

requests to OPG.

We encourage all participants in the review

to keep up to date by regularly visiting the online

registry for this project.

You may have already noted the changes that

have recently been made to the registry website. The

secretariat has advised me that you'll may locate all of

the documents in relation to today's session by searching

the key word phrase “Technical Information Session”.

Please contact the secretariat if you have

any difficulty finding the documents or, as always, if you

have any questions about this review process.

Thank you very much to all of you and have

a good rest of the day.

--- Upon adjourning at 4:47 p.m.

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