IPW Working Papers 01 2007 Brand

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Institut fr Politikwissenschaft

ULRICH

BRAND

IPW Working PaperNo. 1/2007Institut fr PolitikwissenschaftUniversitt Wien

THE INTERNATIONALIZATION

OF THE STATE AS THE

RECONSTITUTION OF

HEGEMONY


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The Internationalization of the State

as the Reconstitution of Hegemony

Ulrich Brand

University of Vienna

IPW Working Paper No. 1/2007

Department of Political Science

Faculty of Social SciencesUniversity of Vienna

October, 2007

Ulrich Brand is Professor of International Politics, Department of Political Science, Uni-

versity of Vienna, Universitatsstrae 7, 1010 Wien. E-Mail: [email protected]; Web:

http://politikwissenschaft.univie.ac.at/index.php?id=17066.


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Abstract

This article focuses on one aspect of the reconstitution of hegemonyin a Gramscian

sensesince the 1970s, i.e. the internationalization of the state. It is argued that the

Neo-Gramscian approach to International Political Economy has severe state-theoretical

shortcomings. Therefore, insights of historical-materialist state theory are sketched out,

especially Nicos Poulantzas state theory, in order to develop the concept of the interna-

tionalization of the state. A better understanding of the international state apparatuses can

be gained when they are understood as material condensation of relationships of forces

of second order. Moreover, the multi-scalarity of socio-economic and political processes

must be considered. This is shown in a brief overview of central elements of the restruc-

turing towards post-Fordism. The actual constellation is understood as one of fragmented

hegemony.

KEY WORDS: fragmented hegemony; Gramsci; Poulantzas; international state appara-

tuses; post-Fordism.


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Ulrich Brand

The Internationalization of the State as the Reconstitution of

Hegemony

On an international level, investigations linked to the work of Antonio Gramsci have made

possible many conceptual-theoretical and empirical insights. However, while such ap-

proaches open up considerable avenues for the study of international relations, their general

weakness in adequately conceptualizing and theorizing on the state has been criticized. In

an effort to overcome such state-based theoretical inadequacies, I will use and further de-

velop the theoretical considerations of the state found in the work of Nicos Poulantzas as

doing so may assist in expanding the theoretical, conceptual and empirical reach of Neo-Gramscian approaches.

The present contribution wants to define this extension more precisely. A central question

arises concerning the role that internationalization of the state plays in the process of the

reconstitution of hegemony. In the crisis of the Fordist model of development during the

1970s, this internationalization, with its different facets, became the hegemonic strategy

and the hegemonic project of the bourgeoisie in the capitalist centers. The globalization

of capitalism is, therefore, not only an economic process, but also closely tied to political-

institutional developments. The internationalization of the state is characterized by the

paradox of a nationally dominated global rule (Gorg and Wissen 2003: 626; original em-

phasis). At the same time, on an international level, the importance of international state

apparatuses is growing: this refers to the ones which had already existed (World Bank, IMF,

NATO, and EU), others which have been reshaped (from GATT to WTO), and also the ones

which have only recently been created (e.g. environmental agreements). Here, however,

I do not mean the apparatuses of a supposedly emerging global state, which is gradually

attaining more and more autonomy from the national states (for criticism that adopts this

perspective, see: Hardt and Negri 2000). Rather, it is contended that these apparatusesmaintain strong links with the national states, especially with those which are powerful,

such as the USA. To begin with, it must be underlined that changes also include those

pertaining to socio-economic reproduction and the associated relations of forces. What is

explored here is hence the concept of hegemony as the form of bourgeois domination. In

The author is grateful to Martina Blank, Sonja Buckel, Dan Hawkins, Andreas Fischer-Lescano, John Kan-

nankulam, and Nicola Sekler for helpful comments. Additionally, he would like to thank Stefan Armborst

and Marisa Garca for the excellent translation.

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chapter 2, I will go through the central discernments of the historical-materialist theory

of the state and I will apply them to Neo-Gramscian perspectives of international politi-

cal economy. The reconstitution of hegemony concerns a multi-scalar process which, as

such, must also be theoretically embraced. The concept of the material condensation of

societal relations of forces of a second order and the related international state apparatuses

(INTSA) are central to an understanding at an international level. In chapter 3, after hav-

ing elucidated the fundamental theoretical concepts of a Neo-Poulantzian approach, I will

demonstrate, along the lines of my hypothesis, how the internationalization of the state is

the result of the transformation of the Fordist historical block. Drawing upon actual devel-

opments, I will start from a complex, conflict and power-related, open process in search of a

global hegemonic constellation. I will elaborate as to why I consider the actual constellationto be a fragmented hegemony.

1 International hegemony from a (Neo)Gramscian perspective

and some of its short-comings

Gramsci intended to elucidate, in depth, the complex mechanisms of the agreement of

the associated wills (Gramsci 1991: H. 13, 1, 1536). So, for him, hegemony is a newcategory for the interpretation of history, the state and the bourgeoisie (Buci-Glucksmann

1981: 478). Hegemony does not have to be produced by all means; thus, permanent pro-

cesses of crisis or non-hegemonic relations of domination, with some significant repres-

sive components, are also conceivable. Nevertheless, it is within hegemonic constellations

where bourgeois-capitalist society can develop in the most dynamic way, because the exclu-

sion of parts of the population can simultaneously either be reduced or carried out without

noise. In such a situation, political, economic, cultural, daily life and subjective constel-

lations are widely accepted; they make permanent processes of adaptation possible. In

order to explore the concept of international hegemony, it is useful to draw upon the work

of Robert Cox.1 Cox introduced the concept of the internationalization of the state: On

one hand, under the leadership of a globally hegemonic state or an alliance of political

and economic forces, certain responsibilities assigned to the state are outsourced and re-

defined within the framework of international regimes. On the other hand, these changes

involve a reorganization of nation-state regulation, since, in view of the changes of power

relations, the mutual weight relations among the particular state apparatuses shift (Cox

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Ulrich Brand

1992). In general, the concept of the internationalization of the state remains vague. Cox

defines the process as nebulous, as a constellation which emerged from within an ideo-

logical cloudiness and in which the elites are increasingly orientating their thoughts and

behavior to the world market (Cox and Sinclair 1996: 301; see also the critique made by

Baker 1999: 79 f.). Thereby, according to tendency, the state is interpreted in the sense of a

political-institutional system which operates as a transmission belt for international power

constellations into the national societies (Cox 1992: 31). It is from such perspectives that

we can point to three aspects in which the Neo-Gramscian approaches remain insufficient,

which in turn has consequences in terms of an analysis of the political and socio-economic

processes of internationalization: Firstly, concerning the comprehension of social forces;

secondly, regarding the conceptualization of the state; and thirdly, concerning the recipro-cal relationship among the spatial levels.2

An important insight of Gramsci is, firstly that domination cannot only be understood as

successful strategies and the production of consensuses from above, but also as a compre-

hensive social relation and, hence, also as a relation of forces. Accordingly, Drainville

criticizes Neo-Gramscian approaches in the way that these start from a coherent, non-

contradictory and thoroughly operating hegemony (1994: 125), and Scherrer (1998) does

the same concerning their fixation with the elites. However, following Demirovic, in theprocess of hegemony it is important to produce a long-term durability of a certain power

constellation, which makes it possible to settle conflicts in a rule-guided way among the

parties of compromise; which determines the conditions of possible polarisations; and

which monopolizes the power to define what might emerge as opponency and hostility

against the balance of compromise; [. . .] (Demirovic 1987: 97). It has to be added that, in

a hegemonic constellation, societal transformations and the emerging problems related with

them, are respectively made and treated in a rule-guided way. Secondly, the Neo-Gramscian

approaches fixation with processes in civil society effectively means that classes are ana-

lytically privileged to states. Inverting the Neorealist paradigm [in political sciences a sub

department of international relations; added by the author], for the comprehension of inter-

national relations, states are conceptually subordinated to international processes of class

formation (Scherrer 1999: 27). Consequently, Neo-Gramscian works are characterized

by a double functionalism concerning the state. On one hand, the internationalization of

the state is interpreted as a complement to the internationalization of production, which, as

Cox argues, represents first of all an ideological consensus as well as a coherent institutional

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form. On the other hand, international political institutions and organizations are seen more

or less as instruments of the dominant classes and their strategies. Panitch (1996: 89-96)

criticizes, accordingly, the underestimation of the state and an outside-in way of thinking

in which international processes have effects on national processes, turning the state into

a passive transmission belt or into a victim of international developments. As a result, the

active role of state and its internal struggles are underestimated even though, at least from

my point of view, it is absolutely necessary to take this into account in order to understand

the internationalization of the state. Last but not least, the Neo-Gramscian approach is close

to the weakness of conventional theories: Even though the shift among local-regional, na-

tional and international-transnational levels is stated, these different levels are merely taken

for granted.

By way of countering such oversights, certain authors within critical geography use the

concept of spatial scale, in order to explicitly investigate the levels on which social and

therefore also political interactions take place. The spatial levels of social interaction are

not presupposed a priori. Rather, they are constituted in social conflicts as consequences

of social praxis. Social relations, specific forms of capital accumulation and political reg-

ulations as well as resistance actions are so far dimensioned as they are embedded in a

framework of spatial unities: from very comprehensive ones - especially international andEuropean -, to very small ones, i.e. the local level (Keil and Brenner 2003; with regard

to the interpretation of space in Poulantzas, see: Wissen 2006). Therefore, what comes

into view are the power-shaped processes producing this scale, i.e. the levels and their mu-

tual relationship. Critical geography tries to elucidate this with the concept of politics of

scale or politics of scaling. In this way, a functionalistic comprehension of the constitution

and reproduction of the levels of social praxis can be avoided. Furthermore, the fact that

counter-hegemonic actors, strategies and projects are practicing such politics of scale can

also be illustrated.

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Ulrich Brand

2 Theoretical extensions: the international state as a

condensation of societal relations of forces of a second

order

The approach of historical-materialist state theory, which was decisively influenced by

Gramsci, has already been developed by Nicos Poulantzas, and it is being further elabo-

rated and worked on, especially by Alex Demirovi?, Joachim Hirsch and Bob Jessop. This

approach lends itself to the purpose of defining, more exactly, the Neo-Gramscian investi-

gation program (with respect to the topicality of Poulantzas, see: Bretthauer et al. 2006).

Poulantzass theory cannot be directly connected with Gramscis as he underestimates the

importance of civil society, in the sense of societal self-organization, and does not investi-

gate how the separation between state and society is continuously and concretely generated.

Inversely, however, Poulantzas has worked out a substantially more accurate analytical tool-

box for the analysis of the state. Notwithstanding, it might be useful to adopt a Gramscian

hegemony theoretical perspective which makes use of Poulantzass insights and consecu-

tive investigations. On the one hand, in many places Poulantzas himself made references

to Gramsci (for example, concerning the concepts of hegemony, see: Poulantzas 1975: 135

ff.; 1978: 60). On the other hand, both theories are not conclusive, but, as such, they have

many interpretations and, due to the considerably altered circumstances of today comparedto the respective periods in which they developed their work (1920s/1930s for Gramsci,

1960s/70s for Poulantzas), they have to be very carefully updated. Gramsci placed em-

phasis on the fact that the production, but also the reproduction, of hegemony takes place,

above all, in the realm of the integral state. This notion might not be interpreted in the way

that all social processes are part of the state. Rather, this category indicates that the state, in

the sense of an institutional ensemble-as the terrain for conflict settlement and compromise,

as well as actor, discourse and praxis-is a preconditioned societal process. In this case, and

this is a fundamental achievement of the Neo-Gramscian approach, central consideration

has to be given to processes in civil society which make it possible to implement specific

state policies. Under bourgeois-capitalist conditions, it is an essential task to guarantee

the socio-economic dynamic. For this complex institutional process, regulation theory has

introduced the concept of succeeding regulation of contradictory societal relations (see:

Lipietz 1985, Hubner 1989, Esser et al. 1994). Hegemony, as a form of social domination,

is made possible by a succeeding regulation and it is, vice versa, the constitutive factor of

the latter.

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A productive transposition of the Gramscian notion of civil society to the investigation of

international circumstances presupposes an understanding of (global) society, although not

as being in relative coexistence with the three relevant sectors, i.e. state, market and civil

society. Indeed, international civil society is not an intermediate sector, but an interna-

tional relation of societal forces. It deals with a space of struggle which is decisive for

the restructuring of socio-economic and political conditions (Brand 2005b). As the ter-

rain where hegemony is disputed, international civil society is at the same time the object

and the medium of struggle (Haug 1985: 174). Such a perspective emphasizes the pro-

cessing and contested character of hegemonic projects. In accordance with the hegemony

apparatuses (Gramsci 1991: H. 6, 137: 815 ff.) which consist in economic, cultural

and political private initiativesBuci-Glucksmann gives this concept an operative placein Gramscis thoughts (1981: 55, 80, ff.)on an international level, the following argu-

ment could be elaborated: The consensual mechanism, with its universal goals exposed

by the leaders towards the led, operate, above all, via generalizing norms of production

and consumption, as well as via cultural patterns on the socio-economic level, which do

not exclude difference. The multiple private initiatives are articulated, in a narrow sense,

within intergovernmental politics, which take place in the inter-governmental politics and

governance modes. Thus, the question, taken from the standpoint of a Gramscian theory

of hegemony, becomes: What are the most relevant insights of the historic-materialist statetheory? According to the central assumption of Marx, the different fractions of the bour-

geoisie compete among each other and therefore, in the long run, are not able to pursue their

interests as a whole. A main interest consists particularly in the planned framework con-

ditions and lawful-state conditions for permanent capital valorization. Securing the overall

conditions of reproduction imposes itself through conflicts, for which the state represents

the adequate institutional terrain. Therefore, the state has the monopoly of legitimized

physical violence (Weber 1921: 815 ff.) at its disposal. With such control, the state can be

seen as a coercive power which is materialized separately from all social classes and which

maintains a rather contradictory relationship with the interests of capital and with those of

the dominant classes.

An important theoretical innovation of the 1970s consisted of interpreting the state neither

as a neutral actor nor as an instrument of the ruling classes and forces, but rather, as a social

relation. The capitalist class relation is not external or preexistent to the state; rather, it is in-

serted in the form of the capitalist state. The production relations, the division of labor and

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Ulrich Brand

the economic structure do not stand outside the struggles or the classes (Poulantzas 1978:

46 f.). The interests of the power bloc, as a conflictual unity of alliance, are not unilat-

erally pushed through within the state. Instead of this, fragile equilibriums of compromise

emerge. As a result of the conflictuary character of the numerous social group interests,

this happenshere Poulantzas agrees with Gramsciunder the hegemony of certain frac-

tions. Against this background, the material structure, and the discourses linked with it, of

the capitalist state can be conceived as specific and material condensation of a relation of

forces between classes and class fractions (ibid. 159; emphasis added).

The condensation of social relations of forces does not mean that the state is merely their

expression. At the contrary, the state itself stabilizes and changes societal power relations

throughout its existing materiality, i.e. apparatuses, means of action, discourses etc. The

state secures the hegemonic conditions and represents the decisive terrain of the organized

settlement of social conflicts. The state is the central institutionalization and thus perpetua-

tion of political leadership and domination, wherefore it represents the main target of very

different strategies. Here lies the essential dimension of consensus, which turns the open

use of violence during conflict settlements into an exception rather than the rule. The state

consists of different political, economic and ideological apparatuses such as governments

and administrations, parliaments, justice system, police and armed forces, school, etc. With

its material apparatuses, the state is also an amalgam of actors, which not only formulates

and executes certain policies, but also organizes the interests of the dominant classes and

disorganizes those of the dominated ones, as well as moulds the societal relations of forces

into a specific form.3 This means that in the state apparatus, the interests of the ruled classes

and fractions are also present. However, the state apparatuses are not equally accessible to

all social forces, or for their numerous strategies and aims; instead, they create structural

selectivities (Poulantzas 1978: 165 f.). Bob Jessop has expanded upon this idea with his

concept of strategic selectivity which is not only founded on the state: Instead it de-

pends on the relation between state structures and the strategies which various forces adopttowards it. The bias inscribed on the terrain of the state as a site of strategic action can only

be understood as a bias relative to specific strategies pursued by specific forces to advance

specific interests over a given time horizon in terms of a specific set of other forces each

advancing their own interests through specific strategies (Jessop 1990: 10).

In Jessops theory, the competing strategies for societal development elaborated by the dif-

ferent forces, as well as the process influencing the degree to which specific strategies be-

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come hegemonicnaturally through both disputes and compromisesplay a greater role

than in other approaches. Specific state forms privilege certain strategies, interests, coali-

tions, access possibilities and time horizons over others. The strategic selectivity exists

concerning specific configurations in the state apparatus, with its own power and acting

modes, domination and submission forms, relative autonomies and their unity.

In order to harness these quickly sketched out insights into the framework of a program of

state theory on an international level, I will start with the following basic hypothesis:

The international state apparatuses (INTSA) are parts of an embracing network of interna-

tional regulation, i.e. the institutional handling of societal contradictions which are more or

less successfully and over a certain period of time stabilized. This network adopts a power-

like form and is asymmetrically structured. The same is valid for the INTSA themselves. 4

They can be understood as power dispositives in a transnational network (Wissel 2007),

which is materialized in specific forms. The notion of INTSA may not suggest a fixed

constellation, but a specific materiality of international politics. The consideration of so-

cial power relations is important, in which the different forces struggle for the perpetuation

of their interests, identities and values, develop the corresponding strategies and coherent

projects, make alliances, and agree on compromises.

The central form in which international conflicts are settled consists of their transforma-

tion in conflicts between national states and their representatives, as well as of the political

grounds created for this purpose (see: Brand 2005a: 237305). The economic and societal

actors, which operate first and foremost on an international level, settle parts of their con-

flicts as political ones; correspondingly, they accept the settlement modes associated with

this and constitute the modes and terrains in specifically political forms. This does not hap-

pen for all conflicts, thus direct labor struggles, for example, also exist on an international

level, and besides, wars are not usually conflicts which have been previously arranged by

the fighting parties. Nevertheless, one can say that the settlement of the different social con-flicts as intergovernmental ones is the main moving form of international policieseven in

the mode of (global) governance.

Moreover, the different non-state actors have to orientate themselves politically towards

the mode of state politics, although theyand particularly the powerful private economic

actorshave an influence on it. However, inter-governmental politics take place not only

directly among governments, but also over more or less permanent networks, regimes and

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Ulrich Brand

organizations. INTSA tend to have an increased importance in order to secure the existence

and the dynamics of global capitalism. No analogy should be made here with the central-

ized national state, thus the international apparatuses are not equipped with the monopoly

of violence. It is more related with the idea of understanding a particular form of institution-

alizing international policy which goes beyond traditionally diplomatic-intergovernmental

policies. The INTSA are not so new, but they have experienced dynamic development

particularly since 1945. Nevertheless, in the actual constellation, their importance is ever

increasing. From this perspective, with the concept of the condensation of a second order

(see: Brand 2005a, Brand et al. 2008), a central theoretical argument of Poulantzas can be

expanded upon for the understanding of international policies.

The metaphor of the condensation of societal relations of forces of a second order refers,

first of all, to an international level, but not to a hierarchy of international over national

policies or vice versa. Rather, the point is that particular interests in the national states

condense, within specific relations of forces, into state policies which are always integrated

into interiorized international power constellations (condensations of a first order). These

policies are expressed internationally in the sense of pursuing general or national inter-

ests. These are not necessarily directed against other states, but can be cooperative and/or

orientated towards the management of global problems. Those interests, ethical values and

identities, which are represented on an international level and which are quite changeable in

every situation, meet, on international political terrains, with other national interests and

in particular interests of civil society. With this, specific strategies or even more embrac-

ing projects of singular states, groups of states or more complex alliances are formulated.

Not only multi-scalarly condensed relations of forces are of concern, i.e. interdependent

condensations of a first and of a second order, but also their material condensations.

The condition of materiality can be briefly described as follows: The INTSA are not cen-

tralized, but they are organized and institutionalized in certain forms; they are specialized

and specifically political, because their functions are made permanent through laws and

rules, as well as distributed throughout the different areas and formally separated from

economic power. At the same time, the INTSA have their own density and power of re-

sistance (Poulantzas 1978: 162) vis-a-vis the (global) societal powers; and they cannot

be reduced to one relation of forces. Accordingly, institutionalizations take place in multi-

ple ways. This happens not only in the sense of a unilateral carrying-through of dominant

interests, but through conflicting search processes and compromises.

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This density is also produced by the fact that the forms and contents of political controver-

sies inserted in the INTSA, on one hand, essentially correspond to the power constellations

existing at a certain time among countries, classes, genders and ethnical groups and, on the

other hand, make these constellations perdurable in time. Problems are defined; the legiti-

mate actors of compromises are determined (and others are excluded); and the conditions of

tense negotiation processes, rule-settings and policy implementation are established. Within

the INTSA, modes of policy are shaped, as are structural and strategic selectivities, and

there is a determination of priorities and a filtering of measures; something which today is

becoming clearly obvious in relation to neoliberal policies. Under conditions which are dy-

namically changing, it is possible to determine the character of transformation, to perform

changes in regulated channels and thus, to promote hegemony. Although the apparatusesare formally equipped with equal rights, their adjudicated and indeed emerging significance

has to be taken into consideration. Hence, apparatuses which claim to be dominant, like the

WTO or the IMF, become so because the ruling forces see their interests as being especially

represented by them. Those apparatuses and institutions that guarantee a dynamic repro-

duction have a more central position than the ones with less fundamental significance for

political-economic stabilization and, in that case, they may even attain greater autonomy

in some sectors. Centers of power have emerged within the apparatus of the international

state on the international and national state level. These centers of power are more stronglyisolated against the critiques and alternative purposes of the dominated social groups than

is the case in other apparatuses.

The individual INTSA, in the sense of organizations, agreements and regimes, keep up a

relationship of mutual support and complementation, but sometimes even a relationship of

competition, and, in total, they stand in a mutually asymmetrical relationship in the form

of a network. Overlapping competencies, competing interests, disputes over resources, uni-

lateral or mutual non-recognition also exist. International policies themselves are a result

of the inherent relations of forces and contradictions in the international apparatuses. The

latter constitute the material framework of the state and are reproducedalso at an inter-

national levelinside of the state. The tensions and contradictions of the different forces

are expressed by the tensions and contradictions within the different apparatuses and their

sectors. This can be shown empirically in the specific policy fields: international trade

and social policies, trade and environmental policies or defense and human rights policies,

as well as the corresponding apparatuses which are competent or which demand compe-

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Ulrich Brand

tence. Thus, the asymmetrically structured mutual relationship of the apparatuses cannot be

blamed on the lack of political planning or on the lack of political will; instead, it represents

a structural characteristic of international policies. The relationship among the apparatuses

is not predetermined and can vary over the course of time. It may happen that some strong

apparatuses, previously established, are weakened while others are accorded more value.

It is also possible that apparatuses are eliminated and new ones are created which compete

with existing institutions.

The reasons for changes can be found, apart from the functionality of institutions, in the

(global) societal constellations of forces (whereby functionality is not external to the rela-

tions of forces). The existence of different institutions, which are sometimes competent or

are made responsible for the same area, is less a question of functioning politics and more

a power strategy adopted by ruling actors in order to strengthen their interests. Influential

national state actors are able to change the terrain, for example in the case that a problem

is inconveniently politicized for them, or in case the strategic orientations of an institu-

tion change as a consequence of specific controversies. This process can be called forum-

shifting (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000: chapter 24). However, only the mighty states can

allow themselves such changing of political forums, something which can be emphatically

illustrated, from a historical perspective, particularly by the USA, which has fallen back

upon this praxis because it is always able to threaten with bilateral negotiations.5 Indeed, it

can be observed how, in certain cases, the US government, and also certain European ones,

try to side-step specific blockaded terrains and jump across to others. Current prominent

examples are the increasing importance of bilateral and inter-regional trade agreements due

to the politicization of the World Trade Organization (WTO), as well as the revaluation of

the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) caused by the growing critiques of

the WTO-Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS) (see:

Wissen 2003).

If we are to summarize the argument made so far, one could state that: A critical approach

orientated to state theory focuses on how the political and social forces contribute to the

structure of the international political terrain, i.e. how (global) societal interests and re-

lations of forces are materially condensed in the apparatuses. This would not only be in-

vestigated in the sense of efficient problem-solving, like in the mainstream of international

relations, but would be connected again with socio-economic processes of reproduction and

with socialand not only politicalstruggles and constellations. A comprehension of the

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state on an international level as the material condensation of social relations of forces of

a second order opens a theoretical perspective for the analysis of international politics. It

is self-evident that the specific politics, policies and polities are different. The increasingly

multi-scalar structures and processes of condensed relations of forces in the specific sectors,

and this should be made clear, are not fixed, per se.

3 The internationalization of state in the post-Fordist period

The following argumentation does not correspond to the temporal carrying-through of new

circumstances in the sense that only the ruling classes have created their own and general

societal consensuses on the level of civil society, and that these, subsequently, have become

part of the state. It is rather a question of analytical differences. Here, the methodically

relevant hypothesis shall be emphasized that the state takes part in the configuration of

societal circumstances, but that these are also condensed in state policies. Therefore, I will

first sketch out the societal transformation processes and then I will treat the political and

state-related field in a more specific sense.

3.1 Socio-economic changes

Since the 1970s, in a societal search process, new modes of regulation and regimes of

accumulation have emerged.6 In multiple contributions, this has been elaborated under

the notions of globalization, post-Fordism, high-tech-capitalism, etc. Essential stages of

the restructurings are the quicker circulation of capital, the new international division of

labor, the reorganization of the formerly Taylorist labor process and a modified access to

labor force, up to a partial recommodification included in a stronger differentiation between

core and marginal staff. In this process, the societal standards of production, reproduc-

tion and consumption are transformed, especially on the bases of new types of rationaliza-

tion and microelectronic technologies. A further aspect is the opening up of new profitable

sectors for capital, for example through the privatization of formally state-run-and-owned

firms or the valorization of nature. The restructuring also implies a modification of gender

relations, hence concerning the gender-related division of labor or the hegemonic gender

roles (Brenssell and Puhl 2003, Young 2001). The current advance of globalization should

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Ulrich Brand

also be understood as a process of reorganization of spatial circumstances. The different

spatial levels are mutually more strongly connected and they become dependent on each

other as parts of the power-overformed politics of rescaling (Jessop 2001: 8694). For that

reason, it has to be underlined that the current internationalization is especially a process

which first of all happens within the nation states (Wissel 2006: 246). In this process,

neoliberal strategies are articulated with neo-imperial, i.e. openly violent strategies (Rilling

2004, Klutsch 2006). The changes of the last decades are based on the modifications of

societal relations of forces and, in return, these are pushing them further. A central aspect

was the weakening of trade unions and the strengthening of transnational capital together

with their pressure groups (Plehwe et al. 2005). The internationalization of production

leads to the splitting up of capital into nationally and transnationally orientated fractionsand to the emergence of a class of transnational managers (Cox 1987: 25365), as well

as to a transnational inner bourgeoisie (Wissel 2007). Additionally, wage-earners are split

up along the national/international line. Vis-a-vis the internationalization of political, eco-

nomic and cultural processes, the societal relations of forces are also internationalized. It is

not only that, in particular, the capital itself is transnational, but also that the requirements

which are mediated by the world market, as well as the related interests and relations of

forces, are interiorized into specific local and national constellations. This becomes clear

when the trade unions are called to accept cuts in wages in order to guarantee the competi-tiveness of a production site.

Through shifting power constellations, the forms of political and societal leadership grad-

ually change. It is not only that the dominated are forced into specific transformation

processesfor example over flexibilization, intensification or the loss of wage laborbut

more than this, they are educated to accept this with their common intellect. The macro and

micro-economic criteria of competitiveness are enlarged onto the individuals. Here lies one

of the central sources of the stability of the neoliberal capitalism. The point of the so-called

lack of alternatives to globalization, as well as the submission to world market constraints,

the relative powerlessness of the state in the field of the economic and social policy, consists

of the fact that this is a highly accepted and pervasive notion. Wendy Larner and William

Walters (2004) refer to a global governmentality, according to which notions like global-

ization and globalism not only contribute to the comprehension of the changes which have

taken place during the last three decades, but also constitute a particular (geo)political

rationality (ibid.: 11).

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With regard to the politics of hegemony, a characteristic of the current processes of restruc-

turing is, therefore, that in the whole society the fundamental orientations, e.g. towards

competitiveness and efficiency in the international struggle of competition, are not ques-

tioned. In certain ways, these have been imposed consensually, i.e. in the sense of col-

lective praxis; they have become common interest based on what Gill terms a market

civilisation (Gill 2003).

The neoliberal-imperial project, turned hegemonic, is contested and contradictory, but as an

overall societal transformation, it is mightily effective. It is not simply and widely imposed,

but articulates itself in particular sectors with environmental, gender-specific and ethnical

questions. Its imperial dimension consists of the fact that, in the capitalist centers as well

as in the growing middle class of the countries of the global South, the leading forms of

the international division of labor and their political defense are not questioned. Indeed,

one could even talk of a generalized imperial way of living which includes a corresponding

common sense.

3.2 The transformation of the state

Particularly in historic-materialist theories, there is an indication that capitalist globaliza-tion is distinguished by the fact that, on the one hand, competition among national states

is increasingly significant, and that, on the other hand, the need for internationally valid,

generally binding and sanctionable rules is growing in order to make capital accumulation

achievable. What lies at stake is, therefore, not only the solution of specific political prob-

lems, but the regulation of multiple capitalist circumstances (and their articulation with

non-capitalist ones; see: Alnasseri 2003). For the diverse and competing capitals, all of

which are struggling for hegemony, the process of internationalization is not trouble-free;

rather, it produces its own conflicts and contradictions, for example those between produc-

tive and speculative capital, affect even more as long as there exists no stable national and

international regulation. Hence, formulating a successful regulatory regime and perhaps

hegemonic circumstances implies the need for a reorganization of the state on various lev-

els without going so far as to pave the way for the emergence of a centralized international

state. In this process, national states are also transformed. They change into internation-

alized competition states (Hirsch 2005: 145151) because they are becoming more and

more dependent on international capital and financial markets.7 What changed in the 1990s

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Ulrich Brand

areembedded in the societal reorientationsthe overall criteria of the acting of the state:

competitiveness, efficiency and, accordingly, a realpolitik which is disavowing all kinds

of alternatives. As such, adequate local and national conditions have to be created for a

capital which has become more flexible because of the 1970s deregulations. This has been

achieved by pushing forward product, process, organization and market innovation. That is

the main reason why governance processes, i.e. the greater participation of societal actors

in political decision making processes, are of increasing relevance. Other rationalities of the

Keynesian welfare state, for example, those concerning redistributive politics, are pushed

into the background as they are regarded as being prejudicial for competition. In accordance

with the emergence of the competition state, we can observe an increased masculinization

of the state (see: Sauer 2001), in particular, the re-arming of the violent apparatuses of thestate (armed forces, police) is strengthening the patterns of masculinity. The deconstruction

of the welfare state, which formerly implied, at best, only an incomplete feminization of

politics, has a greater negative impact on women. Within the state apparatuses, the execu-

tives and those apparatuses which are especially relevant for pursuing competitiveness are

broadly strengthened. Also, many institutions have been transformed into neoliberal appa-

ratuses, such as the central banks and the finance ministries, and they are then reinforced

and closely related with the neoliberal institutions dealing with the world economy (IMF,

OECD, World Bank). Here, the points of converging national neoliberal policy take on amanaging role, something which is illustrated by the German Ministry of the Economy in

the WTO. Something similar happens within the national military apparatuseswhich at-

tain growing significance, in terms of their relationships with the NATO and the EU, as

well as the simultaneous tendency of withdrawing decisions on military engagement from

parliaments. In accordance with Poulantzas, it can be argued that in this process certain

centers of decision, dispositives and points of intersection within the state apparatus are

becoming more and more permeable to certain interests. Structural selectivity, the deter-

mination of priorities and the filtration of measures are focused on the neoliberal trend of

politics.

All this does not mean that we are experiencing a retreat of the state. In some policy

fields, such as security or migration policy, activities of the state are even increasing. Cer-

tain functions are reinforced, and Poulantzass diagnosis that in the 1970s an authoritarian

statism was emerging, something which reinforces the undermining of liberal-democratic

processes, maintains validity today (Poulantzas 1978, Kannankulam 2006: Chapter 4).

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3.3 International state apparatuses and state projects

In this transformation process, new INTSA emerge and existing INTSA are transformed.

Their creation and functioning are part of the hotly contested politics of rescaling. Partic-

ularly the dominant or hegemonic actors try to fortify their interests and to impose their

strategies, not only through changed relations of forces on the existing levels, but also

through the shift of spatial scaling.

On a substantial level, in the sphere of international politics, prevalence is givenboth as

discourse and as praxisto a global constitutionalism, according to which the central

reference point of international politics is the shielding of private property through inter-

national rule setting (Bieling 2007). This is the reason why it is increasingly relevant to

the G-8 (the group of the most powerful economies), which dates back to the mid 1970s

and whose members have been more and more closely interacting. The influential na-

tional states play a decisive role for the working out of transnational interests, alliances and

consensuses. More above, it has been argued, following Poulantzas, that the state cannot

be reduced to one relation of forces. The European Union and the institutions concerned

with economic policies, all of which comply with central functions for the world economy

(WTO, IMF, World Bank), in particular, develop a particular density and relative autonomy.

The IMF and the World Bank, institutions strongly structured by the USA in the 1950s and

1960s, moreover, have given proof of their sturdiness, in spite of the changes in economic

and political relations since the 1970s. Both have given decisive support to the objective of

restructuring the international dominance of the USA (and the Global North in general vis

a vis the Global South).

Furthermore, as mentioned in the second section above, there has been a growing tension

within and among the, partially competing, apparatuses. Political institutions, such as the

WTO, are indeed much more significant than, for example, the Framework Convention on

Climate Change, because there the dominant actors are exerting explicit pressure to ensure

that their interests receive preferential treatment, pushing forward their interests, which,

via compromises, can be turned into common interests of (global) society. On the one

hand, we can identify the weak and supposedly globally supported interest in climate pro-

tection, which moreover is undermined by the US government; on the other hand, the inter-

est in free trade, unrestricted fossil-based economic growth and the protection of property

rights, which pervades institutional and daily praxisin spite of all the Sunday preaches

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Ulrich Brand

and earnest diplomatic efforts to promote climate protection (Brunnengraber 2002). The

differentiated political-institutional significance becomes evident when we look at the cor-

responding ministerial competences: the Environmental Ministries for the Framework Con-

vention on Climate Change and the Economic Ministries for the WTO. In the process of

societal regulation on a global scale, the WTO plays a pre-eminent role. In the case of

explicit political conflicts of competence, preference is given to the strong INTSA. Nev-

ertheless, in specific constellations certain margins can arise which might make specific

politics possible and which might shift political terrains or modify their relationship to oth-

ers.

Hegemonic and state projects, as well as global constitutionalism, increasingly emerge in

a multi-scaled manner, i.e. in different places and on different levels they are formulated

and secured by negotiated compromises. Here the dominant national states are of funda-

mental importance. However, the international projects pushed forward by them and by

other powerful actors are progressively more significant in guaranteeing the coherence of

national projects, for the international political system and for the specific functioning of

the world market. That is why the neoliberal-imperial state project is also established within

the INTSA. Nevertheless, both the hegemonic and the state projects are not rigidly imposed

prearrangements; rather, they are constantly renegotiated and adapted to the changing cir-

cumstances, such as crisis or critique. In this way, on an international level the aspects of

the capacity and willingness of leadership of the ruling state and social forces are most im-

portant. As a result of the strong spatial and social-structural fragmentations of the actors

on an international level, the terrains on which compromises are elaborated have an even

more important significance. The World Economic Forum, which in the 1970s began to

meet annually in Davos, Switzerland, as well as countless conferences, publications and

network meetings have contributed to establishing consensuses among the elites, which,

more or less effectively, were based in every single society as well as internationally.

3.4 Fragmented hegemony

We come, finally, to the question as to whether the actual constellation is or is not hege-

monic. There are good reasons to doubt it is. Indeed, Gill (2003) speaks of supremacy

instead of hegemony, as the real or threatened use of open violence is becoming more pro-

nounced than consensual moments. To be sure, the National Security Strategy of the US

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Government from 2002 onwards demonstrates that the world order shall be more protected

by military means. Hirsch emphasizes that the visible differentiation of the apparatuses and

the fragmentation of societies, as well as the lack of resources, make it more difficult to

formulate coherent alternative policies (2005: 197 ff.).

Nevertheless, I start off from a somehow fragmented hegemony on an international level-

provided that it is still possible that such complex social circumstances can be subsumed un-

der one concept (see: Brand 2004). In the capitalist centers, domination through hegemony

can be assumed, because the growing competition within societies and on the international

arena is grounded on a consensus which is at least passive.

The political-institutional dimensions, i.e. the forms of dispute settlement mediated by the

state, seem to be quite stable. Also, the economic base of succeeding capital accumulation,

such as the capital-labor-relation, the competition among companies, the way of integration

into the world market or the money relation are less constant than during Fordism, but the

direction of their development is widely accepted. Particularly on the level of daily life, the

prevailing circumstances, with their political, social-ecological, discursive and economic

implicationsespecially the international division of labor and its significance for the re-

production of the labor force in the centers, can be considered as hegemonic. It is these

imperative forms of post-Fordist societalization which are decisive in order to preserve theoverall conditions of domination. Furthermore, by the way of changed governmentalities,

new forms of integration and creation of passive consensus are appearing. These new gov-

ernmentalities apparently seem to keep up social reproduction (e.g. through commodifica-

tion processes) even though its forms are weaker in comparison with those of Fordism.

However, hegemony means not only the passive acceptance of the currently dominant so-

cietal relations; it also necessitates the political and societal capacity and willingness of

leadership to grant material concessions to the dominated. At that point, the present con-

stellation of fragmented hegemony could become fragile. Thus, the neoliberal promise ofprogress faces ever-growing criticism. This statement refers to the societal relations in the

countries of the triad, i.e. the capitalist centers.

However, the fragmented nature of hegemony becomes obvious beyond the consensus-

based situations in the centers, i.e. in the inadequate capacity (or willingness) of the ruling

powers, especially the USA, to defend world order militarily. It seems to be impossible to

win the war in Iraq, and the recent Israeli war against Lebanon (or specific forces there),

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Ulrich Brand

which was supported by the USA, resulted in not only significant hardship and material

impoverishment for the Lebanese population but also widespread criticism and a loss of

political and military respect for the Israeli government and its army. The moral supremacy

of the USA struggling for Democracy and Human Rights seems no longer to be effective.

That is why this slogan has been amplified or even substituted by the so-called War on

Terrorism. How long this formula will be widely accepted, is currently an open question.

So far, the use of military violence in other regions of the world has been widely accepted,

especially in the USA. The argument behind the notion of the fragmentized hegemony is

based on the fact that, particularly in the North-South-relationship, there is no hegemony

in the (Neo)Gramscian sense. In many countries, the neoliberal model of structural ad-

justments has led to such polarization and open violence in daily life, that it is hardly everpossible that people link that model with improvements in individual and collective life

(progress). On the contrary, the Asian crisis of 1997 has shown, in a similar way to the

debts crisis of the 1980s that political mechanisms help to externalize crisis into peripheral

societies (see: Brand 2004). This leads to more nationalist-oriented governments, above all

in Latin America, although, in the present situation, they possess a more or less restricted

scope of action. In spite of all the differences in detail, the export orientation is maintained

by the elites of the Southern countries, even though it is coming more and more under cri-

tique. An important indicator for this is the failure of the WTO-Development Round inthe summer of 2006, which was created at the 4th WTO Ministerial Conference. Conse-

quently, these recent events show that complex circumstances are never concluded; rather,

they continue existing as a historical chance discovery (Alain Lipietz), and in this sense,

it is perplexing how, under bourgeois-capitalist relations, social coherence is over and over

again established.

As shown, domination based on consensuses is produced in multiple sectors of society as a

result and as a part of conflicts in bourgeois societies: this concerns the condition of wage

labor, specific gender arrangements, the appropriation of nature, the form of integration intothe world market, the forms and contents of politics and much more.

Therefore, the concept of counter-hegemony also implies that in multiple sectors start-

ing points exist from which social relations can come under political critique, i.e. the fact

can be made visible that just these relations are historically created, that they do not nat-

urally or necessarily exist, that they are power over-formed and that they can be changed.

Such counter-hegemonic perspectives take into consideration that identifying contradic-

23


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tions may bring analytical benefits, but that they are also exposed to the danger of drawing

attention uniquely to certain sectorsin disregard of others. Political criticism and a ques-

tioning of hegemonic relations can come out everywhere, and indeed emerge not only in

the public realm of citizenship (which is structured along the lines of domination), but also

seize people in situations of their daily life. Having this in mind and relating it with the

sketched-out process of the internationalization of the state, as an always precarious project

of the reconstitution of hegemony, is a task which lies before us.

Notes

1See Cox 1993, 1987; see also Gill 1993.

2Overview in Bieler and Morton 2003; for more critique and alternative views see Scherrer 1998, Germain

and Kenny 1998, Morton 2003.

3Naturally, the state arenas are not the only terrain of social struggle. A fundamental material condensation

of social power relations in favour of the bourgeoisie is taking place in the production unities (Poulantzas

1975: 236). Societal discourses, in the sense of more or less accepted truths, are also such condensations,

from which the state is only a part.

4The idea of asymmetrical network, on the one hand, aims to avoid the concept of hierarchies for the

description of the INTSA, which already makes little sense for the nation-state apparatuses in case that it

suggests too much rigidity. Vice versa, the concept of heterarchy is not useful: It implies more or less equal

rights structures and processes of self-regulation and self-determination, as well as decentralised bottom-up-

processes. Therefore, it underestimates the interests and the power of national states, particularly the powerful

ones, which intervene in the regulation and in the constitution and functioning of the INTSA. Moreover, the

notion of heterarchy connotates more situative forms of network-building.

5Nevertheless, the authors recommend that the weak actors, in the sense of a counter-strategy, also need

to be present in various forums and to act there with similar strategies (ibid.).

6See for example Hirsch 1995, Candeias 2004, Brand and Raza 2003, Jessop 2003, Scharenberg and

Schmidtke 2003.

7This concept and the related general developments deal with trends which are specifically developed

according to the historic constellations, power constellations and through conflicts.

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Ulrich Brand

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