Introduction to Global Games - Economics · 2008. 9. 2. · Global Games: A First Look Model of...
Transcript of Introduction to Global Games - Economics · 2008. 9. 2. · Global Games: A First Look Model of...
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Introduction to Global Games
Hyun Song ShinPrinceton University
Lecture at University of Western Ontario5th September 2008
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Global Games: A First Look
Model of self-ful�lling currency attack.
Net bene�t to govt. of holding peg is B(+
�;�`), where
� is underlying strength of economy (reserves)
` is proportion of speculators who attack
For concreteness,B (�; `) = � � `
So, peg abandoned if and only if
� < `
) Potential for multiple equilibria
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� When � < 0, peg fails irrespective of speculators' actions
� When � � 1, peg survives irrespective of speculators' actions
� When 0 < � � 1, the peg is \ripe for attack". Outcome depends onaggregate actions of speculators.
The model can alternatively be interpreted as a \creditor grab race" whereindividual secured creditors can seize assets of a distressed �rm.
Fears that others would seize assets (and hence derail the �rm) justi�esseizing assets oneself.
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� Elements of model{ Speculators, indexed by [0; 1]{ Two actions: attack, refrain.{ Payo� to `refrain' is zero{ Cost of attack is t, but pro�t from collapse of peg is 1.
The cost of attack can be interpreted as the interest di�erential betweendollars and the target currency.
Payo� to `attack' depends on state �, proportion ` of creditors who attack
v (�; `) =
�1� t if ` > ��t if ` � �
Coordination problem when � 2 (0; 1). There are two equilibria for each �- \all attack", and \all refrain".
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Global GameNow suppose that � is not common knowledge. Instead, � uniformlydistributed over an interval that includes [0; 1].
Rather than knowing � for sure, speculator i observes noisy signal
xi = � + si
where si uniformly distributed over [�"; "], where " > 0 is small.
Now, strategies must be conditional on the signal xi, rather than �. Hence,strategy is mapping
xi 7�! fAttack, Refraing
Posterior density over � conditional on xi is uniform over
[xi � "; xi + "]
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As a �rst step, restrict attention to switching strategies.�attack if xi < x
�
refrain if xi � x�
Let \failure point" �� be the threshold value of � where the peg just fails.
� Failure point �� depends on switching point x�
� Switching point x� depends on failure point ��
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Failure point �� solves � = `. If all follow x�-switching, ` is the proportionwhose signal is below x� when the true state is ��.
` =x� � (�� � ")
2"
So, �� = ` if and only if
�� =x� � (�� � ")
2"
This gives a linear relationship between the switching point x� and thefailure point ��.
x� = (1 + 2") �� � " (Eq 1)
This equation gives �� as a function of x�.
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Now, consider reasoning of speculators. At switching point x�, speculatoris indi�erent between `attack' and `refrain'.
Pr (peg failsjx�) (1� t) + Pr (peg staysjx�) (�t)= Pr (peg failsjx�)� t= 0
Peg fails i� � < ��. So Pr(� < ��jx�) = t, or
�� � (x� � ")2"
= t
This gives another linear relationship between x� and ��. This time, thisrelationship gives x� as a function of ��.
x� = �� + " (1� 2t) (Eq 2)
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*x
*θ
1
ε21+
Two linear equations in two unknowns: ��; x�. There is a unique crossingpoint, as long as " > 0, however small. Solving,
��� = 1� tx� = 1� t� " (2t� 1)
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As a �nal check, we need to show that:�when xi � x�, speculator wants to attackwhen xi > x
�, speculator wants to refrain
Say xi < x�.
Pr (peg failsjxi) =�� � (xi � ")
2"
>�� � (x� � ")
2"
= Pr (peg failsjx�)
and conversely for when xi > x�.
So, switching strategy around x� is an equilibrium. In fact, we've shownthat it's the only equilibrium in switching strategies.
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As " ! 0, x� ! ��. So, the limit as noise tends to zero still gives us aunique switching equilibrium.
Three questions
� Where did all the other equilibria disappear to?
� Can we say more than simply that we have unique equilibrium whenrestricted to switching strategies?
� What's happening in the limit as "! 0 to give us discontinuity?
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Dominance Solvability
*0x
*θ
( )** xθ ( )** θxdominanceregion
no attack
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After two rounds of deletion, we have
*0x
*θ
( )** xθ ( )** θxdominanceregion(iterated)
no attack(after two rounds)
*1x
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Iterated deletion converges to switching equilibrium threshold
*0x
*θ
( )** xθ ( )** θxdominanceregion(iterated)
no attack(after iterated deletion)
*1x
*∞x
But there is an exactly symmetric argument \from below". Switchingequilibrium is dominance solvable (hence unique equilibrium).
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Recapping the Story So Far...
In unique equilibrium of currency attack model,
�� = 1� tx� = 1� t� " (2t� 1)
Note that as "! 0, we have x� ! ��.
Fundamental uncertainty (i.e. uncertainty about �) disappears as " ! 0.However, there is still uniqueness of equilibrium. So, there is a discontinuityof the equilibrium correspondence in the limit as "! 0.
Why?
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Strategic/Fundamental Uncertainty
A speculator's reasoning takes account of:
� uncertainty over true state �
� uncertainty over incidence of attack, `.
The fact that I am indi�erent between attacking and not attacking suggeststhat I hold certain beliefs about the the incidence of attack. What arethese beliefs?
Uncertainty over incidence of attack ` is over actions of others - i.e. it isstrategic uncertainty.
What happens to strategic uncertainty as "! 0?
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Density Over Incidence of Attack
Consider the following question.
(*) Question. My signal is exactly x�. What is the probability thatproportion z or less of the speculators are attacking the currency?
The answer to this question gives the cumulative distribution function overthe proportion who attack, conditional on x�, evaluated at z. Denote it by
G (zjx�)
If we can obtain G (zjx�), we can di�erentiate it to obtain density overproportion who attack.
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Two steps to answer question (*).
Step 1. If the true state � is higher than some benchmark level �0, then theproportion of speculators receiving signal lower than x� is z or less. Thisbenchmark state �0 satis�es:
x� � (�0 � ")2"
= z
Or�0 = x
� + "� 2"z
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�
z
G (zjx�)
�0 � " �0x�
�0x� x� + "
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Figure 1: Deriving G (zjx�)
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Step 2. So, the answer to question (*) is given by the probability that thetrue state is higher than �0; conditional on signal x
�. This is,
(x� + ")� �02"
=(x� + ")� (x� + "� 2"z)
2"= z
The cumulative distribution function over the incidence of attack is theidentity function ) density function over the incidence of attack is uniformover [0; 1].
As " ! 0, the uncertainty concerning � dissipates, but the strategicuncertainty is very severe.
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Back to Currency Attack Model Once More
In unique equilibrium of currency attack model, �� = 1 � t. This nowmakes sense, since density over ` is uniform.
l0 1
0
payoff toattack
t−1
t−1
t−
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Finite Example
Two players (e.g. Thai importer, Thai property developer)
Sell Baht Hold BahtSell Baht �w;�w 0;�2wHold Baht �2w; 0 r; r
(w > 0; r > 0)
� Both (Sell, Sell) and (Hold, Hold) are equilibria.
� (Sell, Sell) risk-dominant if w > r:
� (Hold, Hold) risk-dominant if w < r:
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Fundamentals, equally likely ex ante.
� � � � � � � � � � � � �0 1 2 3 � � � � � � N � 1 N N + 1
Fundamental 0 is \extremely bad". The game at 0 is
Sell Baht Hold BahtSell Baht �w;�w 0;�2wHold Baht �2w; 0 �w;�w
Fundamental N + 1 is \extremely good". The game at N + 1 is
Sell Baht Hold BahtSell Baht 0; 0 0; rHold Baht r; 0 r; r
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Information Structure
fundamental 0 1 2 3 � � � N � 1 N N + 1� � � � � � � � � �#& #& #& #& � � � #& #& #� � � � � � � � � �
signal 0 1 2 3 � � � N � 1 N N + 1
Pair (i; j): fundamental i, signal j
Prob (i; j) =
�12Prob (i) if i = j or j = i+ 10 otherwise
unless i = N + 1, when
Prob (N + 1; N + 1) = Prob (N + 1)
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Case 1 (w < r)
\Hold" is risk-dominant
Player 1's signal has no noise, but player 2's signal is noisy
0 1 2 3 � � � N � 1 N N + 1� � � � � � � � � � Player 1#& #& #& #& � � � #& #& #� � � � � � � � � � Player 20 1 2 3 � � � N � 1 N N + 1
Solution concept is iterated deletion of strictly interim dominated strategies.
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Case 2 (w > r)
\Sell" is risk-dominant, and same information structure as case 1.
0 1 2 3 � � � N � 1 N N + 1� � � � � � � � � � Player 1#& #& #& #& � � � #& #& #� � � � � � � � � � Player 20 1 2 3 � � � N � 1 N N + 1
Solution concept is iterated deletion of strictly interim dominated strategies.
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State Space
N + 1 � �N � �
Signal ... � � � ...3 � �2 � �1 � �0 �
0 1 2 3 � � � N N + 1Fundamental
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Event GG = f(i; j)jmiddle game is played at (i; j)g
N + 1 � �N � �
Signal ... � � � ...3 � �2 � �1 � �0 �
0 1 2 3 � � � N N + 1Fundamental
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Event K2 (G)
K2 (G) = f(i; j)j 2 knows G at (i; j)g
N + 1 � �N � �
Signal ... � � � ...3 � �2 � �1 � �0 �
0 1 2 3 � � � N N + 1Fundamental
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Event K1K2 (G)
K1K2 (G) = f(i; j)j 1 knows K2 (G) at (i; j)g
N + 1 � �N � �
Signal ... � � � ...3 � �2 � �1 � �0 �
0 1 2 3 � � � N N + 1Fundamental
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Event E is common knowledge at ! if
! 2\i
Ki (E)
and
! 2\i
Ki
\i
Ki (E)
!and
! 2\i
Ki
\i
Ki
\i
Ki (E)
!!...
Event G is never common knowledge.
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Public Good Contribution Gameaka Larry Summers Game
Continuum of players indexed by [0; 1]
Action set fContribute, Opt outg
� is proportion who contribute, but there is critical threshold �̂ necessaryto produce public good
Common cost of contribution c
Payo� to Contribute is �1� c if � � �̂�c if � < �̂
Payo� to Opt out is zero.
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Intuitions
In the benchmark case where c is common knowledge, there are twoequilibria for each c 2 (0; 1).
\all contribute" and \all opt out" are both equilibria for c 2 (0; 1). Bothequilibria are strict (trembling hands will not a�ect them).
Ostensibly, c is common knowledge, but behavior (say, in experiments)betrays lack of con�dence in this proposition.
Larry Summers's thought experiment
\Reverberant doubt"
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Intuitition suggests we can draw a (possibly fuzzy) boundary betweensuccessful provision and failure.
1 failure
c
success0 �̂ 1
Boundary should be downward sloping.
Suggestive of switching strategy around c�, but where c� depends on �̂.
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\Private Values" Global Game
Depart from benchmark model by introducing small heterogeneity in thecosts of provision (hence \private values" global game).
There are two components in the cost of provision - a population-wide term�, and idiosyncratic term si. Player only knows his own cost, and not �and si separately.
ci = � + si
�, uniform
si � U [�"; "], i.i.d.
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Look for equilibrium in switching strategies around common c�.�contribute if ci � c�not contribute if ci > c
�
Denote G (�̂jc�) = Pr (� < �̂jc�). Expected payo� to contribute is
�c�G (�̂jc�) + (1� c�) (1�G (�̂jc�))= (1� c�)�G (�̂jc�)= 0
So G (�̂jc�) = 1 � c�. We can solve for switching equilibrium if we knowG (�̂jc�).
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Suppose all players use switching strategy around c�:
Question: \My cost is c�. What is the probability that � is less than z?"In other words, what is G (zjc�)?
Answer: G (zjc�) = z.
) Density over � is uniform. As " ! 0, density over � stays uniform.Then
1� c� = G (�̂jc�)= �̂
So, we can solve for switching point c� as function of �̂.
c� = 1� �̂
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c�
�̂00 1
1
1=3
2=3
Figure 2: c� as function of �̂
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In Larry Summers's thought experiment, investor stakes 10 dollars, andeither gets 11 dollars or loses the whole stake.
) normalized cost: c = 10=11
) �̂ = 2=3 is too stringent.
Prediction is that there will be failure to provide public good. In general,
� There is large region of ine�ency: the whole upper triangle is regionwhere successful provision is feasible, but does not happen.
� Presumption (common in corporate �nance) that outcomes are alwayse�cient at the ex post stage may be too strong
{ bargaining may not be a good modelling tool{ gets worse as decisions become decentralized
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Uniform Density - How Restrictive?
A Gaussian example
ci = � + si
� � N (y; 1=�)
si � N (0; 1=�)
Question (*) once again. My cost is exactly c�. What is the probabilitythat proportion z or less contribute?
Let �0 be the such that, when � = �0 the proportion of players with costlower than c� is exactly z.
��p
� (c� � �0)�= z
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or
�0 = c� � �
�1 (z)p�
Next, what is the probability that � lies above �0 conditional on my costbeing exactly c�? Answer gives G (zjc�)
G (zjc�) = 1� ��p
�+ ���0 � �y+�c
�
�+�
��= �
�p�+ �
��y+�c�
�+� � �0��
= ��p
�+ ���y+�c�
�+� � c� + �
�1(z)p�
��= �
��p�+�
(y � c�) +q
�+�� �
�1 (z)
�6= z
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So, density is not uniform in the Gaussian case. But note that
G (zjc�)! z as � !1
In the limit as heterogeneity disappears, density over proportion whocontribute is uniform. Uniform density over proportion who contributeis a robust result.
Logistic approximation: � (x) ' 11 + e�mx
G (zjc�) ' 1
1 +�1�zz
�q�+�� exp
�m�p�+�
(c� � y)�
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0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
G(z|c*)
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1z
� = 1; � = 3, y = 0:2 (dark), y = 0:8 (faint)
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Densities
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
g(k|c*)
0 1k
� = 1; � = 3, y = 0:2 (dark), y = 0:8 (faint)
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Solve c� as a function of �̂ from indi�erence condition: 1� c� = G (�̂jc�)
�̂ ' 11+�
c�1�c� exp
�m�p�+�
(y�c�)��r �
�+�
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0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
c*
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1k^
Plot of c� (�̂) for y = 0:2 (dark),y = 0:8 (faint)
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Liquidity Black Holes
1987 crash, 1998 crisis...
� Not merely rapid adjustment of prices
� Feedback process
� Endogenous shortening of horizons: agency problems, bankruptcy andmargin constraints
� Severity depends on residual demand curve
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Global Game Model
� Asset trades at date 1 and date 2
� Liquidation value is v + z
{ v common knowledge at date 1{ z � N
�0; �2
�� Two groups of traders:
{ Risk-neutral traders, with loss limits fqig{ Risk averse, long-horizon traders (exponential utility)
) residual demand curve for asset where s is proportion of risk-neutraltraders who sell
p = v � cs
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Loss limit for trader iqi = � + �i
where� � U
��; ���; �i � U [�"; "]
Strategy is mapping(v; qi) 7�! fhold, sellg
Three cases:v � c � qi Hold is dominantv < qi Sell is dominantqi � v < qi + c Intermediate region
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Payo�s
Payo� when loss limit is breached is zero.
If trader i sells when aggregate sale is s, his place in queue is uniformlydistributed over [0; s].
Let ŝi be largest aggregate sale that does not breach trader i's loss limit.That is, ŝi is de�ned as
qi = v � cŝior
ŝi =v � qic
Probability of no breach in loss limit
ŝi=s
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Expected payo� to sell is
w (s) =
8>>>:v � 12cs if s � ŝi
ŝis
�v � 12cŝi
�if s > ŝi
Expected payo� to hold is
u (s) =
�v if s � ŝi0 if s > ŝi
Payo� di�erence u (s) � w (s) is non-monotonic in s. Hence, strategiccomplementarity fails, and dominance solvability cannot be guaranteed.
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s
v
0
qi
1bsi
p = v � cs
u(s)
w(s)
Figure 3: Payo�s
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Solving for Switching Equilibrium
Trader i uses switching strategy
(v; qi) 7�!�hold if v � v� (qi)sell if v < v� (qi)
At switching point v� (qi), the density over aggregate sale s is uniform overthe unit interval [0; 1].
Solve for switching point from
Z 10
[u (s)� w (s)] ds = 0
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s
v� (qi)
0 1
qi
bsi
u(s)
w(s)
A
B
Figure 4: Expected Payo�s in Equilibrium
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Substituting out u (s), w (s) and noting ŝ = (v � q�) =c,
12c
Z v�q�c
0
sds =(v�q�)(v+q�)
2cs
Z 1v�q�c
1
sds
or
v � q� = 2 (v + q�) log cv � q�
Theorem 1. There is an equilibrium in threshold strategies where thethreshold v� (qi) for trader i is given by the unique value of v that solves
v � qi = c exp�
qi � v2 (v + qi)
�
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There is no other threshold equilibrium.
c0 1 2 3 4 5
v
0
1
2
3
4
5
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v � c = qi
v = qi
v�hold dominant
sell dominant
Figure 5: v� as a function of c. qi = 1
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