Institute for International INTRAREL 2 Barometer of ... second issue of the Barometer of...

This second issue of the Barometer of International Trade Relat ions (INTRAREL) presents the main results of the global poll on trade issues coordi-nated by the Institute for International Trade, University of Adelaide and the International Chair WTO/Regional Inte-gration of the University of Barcelona (Spain). It compiles and organizes the answers of 220 respondents from all the regions of the globe. Respondents are

trade negotiators based in the capitals or in Geneva, policy-makers, business people and representatives of business associations, academics and consult-ants, journalists and representatives from intergovernmental and non govern-mental organizations. The poll was con-ducted during February/March 2008.

INTRODUCTION

SUMMARY

As indicated in the first issue of INTRA-REL (September 2007), this set of well-qualified respondents does not expect much from the Doha Round. Perspecti-ves for new market access opportunities in goods and services arising from the current multilateral round are perceived as limited, especially when one turns to agricultural and (even more) to services negotiations. This second issue shows that the respondents have become even more pessimistic about the prospects of the Round since the previous poll, espe-cially for the NAMA and services nego-tiations and for the consequences of failure. If the Round does not deliver a substantial outcome, 71% now expect the number of disputes brought before the WTO’s dispute settlement mecha-nism in the post-Doha Round World to increase, up from 61% in the first poll.

The negotiation of bilateral agreements will be encouraged by the dificulties in the multilateral arena, but on this there

was little change, between the two polls. As observed in our comment on the first INTRAREL poll, to translate such negotiations into actual agree-ments may prove difficult. Only 51% of respondents (54% in the first poll) agree with the idea that the US will show a stronger interest in negotiating trade agreements with large developing coun-tries. However the majority of respon-dents expect major developing coun-tries (Brazil and India) to engage in pre-ferential negotiations with developed ones (62% in the current poll against 55% in the previous one). Some optimism can be perceived as far as perspectives for the transatlantic initiative are con-cern, despite the fact that evolution of domestic policies in the US and the EU is not seen as favouring new liberalization initiatives.

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INTRAREL #2 Barometer of International Trade Relations

April 2008

Executive Summary

Sponsored by:

Institute for International Trade, the University of Adelaide Level 1, Yarrabee House Cnr Botanic & Hackney Rds Adelaide, SA 5005 Australia T. + 61 8 8303 6944 F. + 61 8 8303 6948 www.iit.adelaide.edu.au

78% of all respondents (73 in the first poll) think that the potential for the agriculture negotiations to produce real improvements in market access will be seriously undermined by exceptions for sensitive products and special safe-guards. In this second poll, this percep-tion is shared by more than 80% of re-spondents in Latin America and Carib-bean-LAC (88%), in North America (84%), and in Australia & New Zealand (87%). Between the two polls, pessimism has grown significantly in LAC, North Amer-ica, the EU and Asia.

Only 26% of all respondents (a sharp decrease from the 42% in the previous survey) believe that NAMA negotiations will create new opportunities for ex-porters. As in the first poll, there are wide differences among regions. 75% of Asian respondents and 57% of African respondents share this perception. Among North American, Australian & New Zealand and Geneva-based res-

pondents this view is held by a small share of respondents, ranging from 3% to 13%. A remarkable deterioration of expectations concerning the output of the NAMA negotiations between the two polls can be observed among res-pondents of these regions and of LAC.

No more than 11% of all respondents (against 22% in the first poll) think that the outcome in the services negotiations is likely to provide a substantial in-crease in real market access. Only in the EU do many respondents (33%) see such an outcome as likely. In all other regions, this view gathers at most 15% of the opinions. In North America and in Australia & New Zealand the percen-tages are 2% and 0%, respectively. In all the regions (including Geneva) there is a drastic deterioration of expectations related to the outcome of the services negotiations in the WTO.

PROSPECTS FOR THE DOHA ROUND

Page 2 Intrarel #2 Barometer of International Trade Relations

In the case of the EU, pessimism has grown about the likelihood of a reform of protectionist policies, namely the CAP (45% of respondents consider this unlikely in the second poll, in contrast with 32% in the first). In case of the US, a large majority of all respondents (71%) agrees with the idea that the streng-thening of the Democrats enhances the likelihood of a protectionist trade poli-cy.

In sum, this second issue of INTRAREL reveals a growth of pessimism among

the respondents on both the Doha Round and the domestic environment for trade policies in the US and the EU. In general terms, the increase in pessi-mism has been particularly intense in North America and in Australia & New Zealand.

Most still believe that this will be an incentive for preferential negotiations, but domestic constraints in the US and the EU seems to be increasingly expec-ted to prevent these from being suc-cessful.

The results of the second poll leave no doubt on the prevailing mood of the vast majority of respondents in relation with the Doha Round outputs. Pes-simism has grown strongly and only a small number of respondents expect substantial improvements in market access from the current WTO negotia-tions.

THE POST-DOHA ROUND WORLD

Multilateral and bilateral initiatives

Page 3

The environment of trade negotiations

49% of all respondents (42% in the first poll) agree that the persistence of enor-mous trade and current imbalances in the world economy creates an environ-ment unfavourable to trade negotia-tions. In Asia, North America and Aus-tralia & New Zealand, this view is shared by more than 60% of respon-dents. In LAC and among Geneva-based respondents, this percentage is much lower: 38% and 32% respectively. Except for Africa and Asia, pessimism has grown in all regions. 65% of all respon-dents (58% in the previous poll) believe that pressures from the US and other countries will lead China to adopt mea-sures to comply with commitments on trade liberalization and transparency made during its accession to the WTO.

This view is unanimous in Australia & New Zealand and widely shared in Asia (88% of respondents), in North America (72%) and among Geneva-based respon-dents (78%). In Europe and Africa the percentage of agreement with this as-sertion is around 35%.

71% of all respondents (61% in the first INTRAREL) think that failure or a limited outcome from the Doha round would lead to a large increase in the number of disputes brought before the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism. This perception is held by 86% of North American (71% in the first poll) and 80% (71% before) of Australian and New Zea-land respondents. Support for this view has grown in all regions except the EU.

89% of all respondents (92% in the first INTRAREL) believe that failure or slow progress in multilateral liberalization will encourage bilateral trade nego-tiations around the world. In Asia and Australia & New Zealand, agreement with this assertion reaches 100%, and in all other regions this view is shared by at least 78% of respondents.

47% of all respondents (39% in the pre-vious poll) believe that the US and the EU will succeed through a variety of initiatives in liberalizing the trans-atlantic trade and investment environ-ment. In North America, this view is shared by 68% of respondents –an im-pressive change from the 45% in the previous survey.

Intrarel #2 Barometer of International Trade Relations

More respondents now fear the effects of international imbalances and more expect an increasing number of trade disputes. These expectations confirm the growing pessimism about trade. On the other hand, there is also a belief that China will nevertheless comply with its international obli-gations.

There is virtual consensus that difficulties in the Doha Round will foster re-gional or bilateral negotiations, but no confidence that these will lead to successful agreements, and it is striking that in some cases the regions most affected seem least optimistic about the possibilities. These are the questions where there are the widest differences among regions on the answers.

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Only 26% of respondents (34% in the first survey) believe that European busi-ness and government policy-makers are increasingly moving away from protec-tionist policies like those associated with the Common Agricultural Policy. 45% disagree, a sharp increase from 32% in the first survey. Fewer than 20% of respondents in LAC and Australia & New Zealand –the main regions affected by the EU’s CAP- or in Africa, Geneva, and the EU agree with the statement. No respondent in the EU believes it, down from 24% in the first poll. Significant reductions in support for this view are also observed among Australia & New Zealand and Geneva-based respondents.

71% (50% in the first poll) agree that Democratic Party control of the US Con-gress and the possibility that a Demo-crat may become President in 2009 are enhancing the strength of protectionist sectors in the US. This view is shared by 95% of North America respondents (against only 29% in the previous poll) and by 100% in Australia & New Zealand, a rise from 64%. There have been in-creases in fears of US protection in the EU and Africa as well. In contrast fewer now agree with the statement in Ge-neva, Asia and LAC.


In the EU this perception is adopted by one third of respondents (against 21% in the first INTRAREL), but none of them thinks that it is ‘most likely’. Africans have also moved towards this view (from 20% to 71%, and 50% of Asian res-pondents agree).

51% of all respodents (against 54% in the first survey) think that the US will show a stronger interest in pursuing bi-lateral trade negotiations with large developing countries like Brazil and In-dia. However, more than 31% of all res-pondents disagree with this view, in contrast with only 21% who disagreed in the first poll. North America is slightly below, the average percentage, LAC is average, and Asia and Africa are higher.

62% of all respondents (55% in the previous poll) agree that large deve-loping countries (e.g., Brazil and India)

will become more interesting in negoti-ating preferential agreements with ma-jor developed countries. This view reaches above-average percen-tages in Australia & New Zealand (87% of all re-spondents), among Geneva-based re-spondents (79%), in Asia (75%) and in the European Union (67%). In North America and LAC there is less agree-ment with this view.

28% of all respondents (21% in the first poll) think that African countries will become less interested in trade agree-ments with major developed countries because of their increasing trade with China. Approximately half the res-pondents consider this unlikely. Com-paring the results of the two polls, the level of agreement with this view has grown in all regions except Africa itself and among Geneva-based respondents.

Trade policy in the US and EU

The prospects for favourable changes in US and the EU trade policies are not bright. The chances of a liberal shift in EU policies are perceived as lower and lower, especially among the European themselves. In the US, a large majority of respondents, especially those from North America believe that a Democratic president or Congress would make protectionism more likely.

42.1

49.5 25.5

37

25

20.4

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

A (Sep. 07 - #1)

A (Apr. 08 - #2)

Most Likely + Likely Neither Likely nor Unlikely Very Unlikely + Unlikely


INTRAREL 2 — THE RESULTS AT A GLANCE

Question A. The persistence of enormous trade and current imbalances in the world economy creates an environment unfavourable for trade negotiations

GENERAL SURVEY

92.1

88.6

3.7

7.3

4.1

4.1

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

B (Sep. 07 - #1)

B (Apr. 08 - #2)

Question B. Failure or slow progress in multilateral liberalization will encourage bilateral trade negotiations around the world

38.9

47.3

30.1

23.2

31.1

27.7

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

C (Sep. 07 - #1)

C (Apr. 08 - #2)

Question C. The US and EU will succeed through a variety of bilateral initiatives in liberalizing the transatlantic trade and investment environment

33.8

26.3

33.3

25.5

32.4

45.4

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

D (Sep. 07 - #1)

D (Apr. 08 - #2)

Question D. European business and government policy-makers are increasingly moving away from protectionist policies like those associated with the Common Agricultural Policy

49.5

71

27.3

14.1

20.4

12.7

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

E (Sep. 07 - #1)

E (Apr. 08 - #2)

Question E. Democratic Party control of the United States Congress and the possibility that a Democrat may become President in 2009 are enhancing the strength of protectionist sectors

53.7

51.4

25

17.3

21.3

31.3

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

F (Sep. 07 - #1)

F (Apr. 08 - #2)

Question F. The USA will show a stronger interest in pursuing bilateral trade negotiations with large developing countries like Brazil and India

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21.3

28.2

20.4

20.9

55.5

47.3

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

H (Sep. 07 - #1)

H (Apr. 08 - #2)

54.6

61.8

20.8

24.1

22.2

14.1

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

G (Sep. 07 - # 1)

G (Apr. 08 - # 2)

Question G. Large developing countries (e.g., Brazil and India) will become more interested in negotiating preferential agreements with major developed countries

Question H. African countries will become less interested in trade agreements with major developed countries because of their increasing trade with China

58.3

64.6

21.8

21.4

19.5

12.8

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

I (Sep. 07 - #1)

I (Apr. 08 - #2)

Question I. Pressures from US and other countries will lead China to adopt measures to comply more strictly with commitments on trade liberalization and transparency made during its accesión to the WTO

58.3

64.6

21.8

21.4

19.5

12.8

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

J (Sep. 07 - #1)

J (Apr. 08 - #2)

Question J. The industrial market access negotiations will create significant new opportunities for exporters

ISSUE SURVEY: DOHA ROUND

72.7

78.2

11.6

7.7

15.2

10.9

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

K (Sep. 07 - #1)

K (Apr. 08 - #2)

Question K. The potencial for the agriculture negotiations to produce real improvements in market access will be seriously undermined by exceptions for sensitive products and special safeguards

21.8

10.9

29.6

18.6

47.7

68.6

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

L (Sep. 07 - #1)

L (Apr. 08 - #2)

Question L. The outcome in the services negotiations is likely to provide a substancial increase in real market access

60.6

71.4

21.8

10.5

14.8

15

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

M (Sep. 07 - #1)

M (Apr. 08 - #2)

Question M. The failure or a limited outcome from the Doha Round would lead to a large increase in the number of disputes brought before the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism


Annex GENERAL SURVEY

QUESTION A. The persistence of enormous trade and current imbalances in the world economy creates an environment unfavourable for trade negotiations

Question A

% within origin

Origin

Total Asia N. Amer. LA&C EU Africa Aus&NZ Geneva

#1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2

Most likely 5,4 24,6 9,8 15,4 34,3 35,7 21,4 20,0 13,3 7,1 12,0 16,8

Likely 72,7 62,5 37,5 38,6 24,4 23,1 31,0 41,7 28,6 14,3 21,4 46,7 13,3 25,0 30,1 32,7

Neither Likely ... 18,2 25,0 14,3 21,1 22,0 19,2 27,6 41,7 20,0 35,7 57,1 33,3 6,7 17,9 20,4 25,5

Unlikely 9,1 12,5 28,6 15,8 26,8 34,6 34,5 16,7 11,4 66,7 32,1 28,7 19,1

Very Unlikely 14,3 14,6 7,7 6,9 5,7 14,3 17,9 8,3 5,9

None (no opinion) 2,4 0,5 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Question A Frequency Percent Percent* Cum. Per.

#1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2

Most likely 26 37 12,0 16,8 12,0 16,8

Likely 65 72 30,1 32,7 42,1 49,5 42,1 49,5

Neither Likely nor Unlikely 44 56 20,4 25,5 20,4 25,5 62,5 75,0

Unlikely 62 42 28,7 19,1 37,0 25,0 91,2 94,1

Very Unlikely 18 13 8,3 5,9 99,5 100

None (no opinion) 1 0,5 0,5 100

Total 216 220 100 100 100 100

QUESTION B. Failure or slow progress in multilateral liberalization will encourage bilateral trade negotiations around the world

Question B Frequency Percent Percent* Cum. Per.

#1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2

Most likely 145 143 67,1 65,0 67,1 65,0

Likely 54 52 25,0 23,6 92,1 88,6 92,1 88,6


Unlikely 2 7 0,9 3,2 4,1 4,1 96,8 99,1

Very Unlikely 7 2 3,2 0,9 100 100

Total 216 220 100 100 100 100

Question B

% within origin

Origin


#1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2

Most likely 45,

5 75,0 80,4 84,2 51,2 42,3 65,5 58,3 48,6 64,3 85,7 100,

0 86,7 50,0 67,1 65,0

Likely 45,

5 25,0 14,3 7,0 36,6 42,3 34,5 41,7 31,4 14,3 7,1 13,3 28,6 25,0 23,6

Neither Likely ... 9,1 9,8 11,5 5,7 14,3 7,1 21,4 3,7 7,3

Unlikely 8,8 2,4 3,8 2,9 0,9 3,2

Very Unlikely 5,4 11,4 7,1 3,2 0,9

Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

*Cumulative percentages: Likely (Most likely+likely); Neither Likely nor Unlikely; Unlikely (Unlikely+Very Unlikely)


QUESTION C. The US and the EU will succeed through a variety of bilateral initiatives in liberalizing the transatlantic trade and investment environment

Question C

% within origin

Origin


#1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2

Most likely 18,2 37,5 23,2 22,8 7,3 7,7 28,6 17,9 8,3 16,4

Likely 27,3 12,5 21,4 45,6 26,8 23,1 20,7 33,3 20,0 42,9 50,0 13,3 23,3 21,4 25,5 30,9

Neither Likely ... 18,2 37,5 33,9 8,8 34,1 23,1 34,5 33,3 34,3 14,3 7,1 60,0 50,0 25,0 33,3 23,2

Unlikely 36,4 12,5 12,5 15,8 29,3 34,6 37,9 16,7 28,6 14,3 42,9 26,7 14,3 27,8 18,6

Very Unlikely 8,9 7,0 2,4 3,8 6,9 16,7 14,3 26,7 21,4 4,6 9,1

None (no opinion) 7,7 2,9 0,5 1,8

Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Question C Frequency Percent Percent* Cum. Per.

#1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2

Most likely 25 36 11,6 16,4 11,6 16,4

Likely 59 68 27,3 30,9 38,9 47,3 38,9 47,3


Unlikely 55 41 25,5 18,6 31,1 27,7 94,4 89,1

Very Unlikely 12 20 5,6 9,1 100 98,2


Total 216 220 100 100 100 100

QUESTION D. European business and government policy-makers are increasingly moving away from protectionist policies like those associated with the Common Agricultural Policy

Question D

% within origin

Origin


#1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2

Most likely 12,5 28,6 7,0 2,4 3,4 13,3 8,3 3,6

Likely 18,2 25,0 35,7 54,4 14,6 15,4 20,7 20,0 14,3 50,0 6,7 23,3 7,1 25,5 22,7

Neither Likely ... 54,5 25,0 12,5 24,6 48,8 34,6 37,9 8,3 34,3 21,4 7,1 33,3 50,0 25,0 33,3 25,5

Unlikely 18,2 37,5 23,2 14,0 29,3 42,3 31,0 58,3 28,6 42,9 42,9 46,7 26,7 57,1 27,8 38,6

Very Unlikely 9,1 4,9 3,8 6,9 25,0 14,3 14,3 10,7 4,6 6,8

None (no opinion) 3,8 8,3 2,9 7,1 0,5 2,7

Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Question D Frequency Percent Percent* Cum. Per.

#1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2

Most likely 18 8 8,3 3,6 8,3 3,6

Likely 55 50 25,5 22,7 33,8 26,3 33,8 26,4


Unlikely 60 85 27,8 38,6 32,4 45,4 94,9 90,5

Very Unlikely 10 15 4,6 6,8 99,5 97,3

None (no opinion) 1 6 0,5 2,7 0,5 2,7 100 100

Total 216 220 100 100 100 100


Page 9

QUESTION E. Democratic Party control of the United States Congress and the possibility that a Democrat may become President in 2009 are enhancing the strength of protectionist sectors

Question E Frequency Percent Percent* Cum. Per.

#1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2

Most likely 33 45 15,3 20,5 15,3 20,5

Likely 74 111 34,3 50,5 49,5 71,0 49,5 70,9


Unlikely 35 26 16,2 11,8 20,4 12,7 93,1 96,8

Very Unlikely 9 2 4,2 0,9 97,2 97,7

None (no opinion) 6 5 2,8 2,3 2,8 2,3 100 100

Total 216 220 100 100 100 100

Question E

% within origin

Origin


#1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2

Most likely 9,1 5,4 38,6 22,0 7,7 10,3 8,3 8,6 14,3 35,7 40,0 30,0 25,0 15,3 20,5

Likely 36,4 37,5 23,2 56,1 53,7 61,5 37,9 50,0 20,0 28,6 28,6 60,0 43,3 42,9 34,3 50,5

Neither Likely ... 27,3 37,5 37,5 14,6 15,4 37,9 25,0 25,7 28,6 21,4 20,0 10,7 27,3 14,1

Unlikely 18,2 12,5 28,6 5,3 2,4 11,5 10,3 16,7 31,4 21,4 6,7 17,9 16,2 11,8

Very Unlikely 12,5 5,4 4,9 5,7 14,3 4,2 0,9

None (no opinion) 9,1 2,4 3,8 3,4 8,6 7,1 3,6 2,8 2,3

Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

QUESTION F. The USA will show a stronger interest in pursuing bilateral trade negotiations with large developing countries like Brazil and India

Question F Frequency Percent Percent* Cum. Per.

#1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2

Most likely 31 38 14,4 17,3 14,4 17,3

Likely 85 75 39,4 34,1 53,7 51,4 53,7 51,4


Unlikely 27 41 12,5 18,6 21,3 31,3 91,2 87,3

Very Unlikely 19 28 8,8 12,7 100 100

Total 216 220 100 100 100 100

Question F

% within origin

Origin


#1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2

Most likely 27,3 37,5 15,8 9,8 19,2 6,9 42,9 35,7 28,6 20,0 10,0 14,4 17,3

Likely 27,3 25,0 35,7 28,1 34,1 30,8 48,3 58,3 37,1 50,0 28,6 20,0 56,7 28,6 39,4 34,1

Neither Likely ... 36,4 25,0 37,5 24,4 30,8 24,1 25,0 8,6 14,3 28,6 6,7 16,7 25,0 25,0 17,3

Unlikely 9,1 12,5 12,5 24,6 19,5 15,4 17,2 16,7 8,6 14,3 3,3 46,4 12,5 18,6

Very Unlikely 14,3 31,6 12,2 3,8 3,4 2,9 53,3 13,3 8,8 12,7

Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100


QUESTION G. Large developing countries (e.g., Brazil and India) will become more interested in negotiating preferential agreements with major developed countries

Question G Frequency Percent Percent* Cum. Per.

#1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2

Most likely 39 53 18,1 24,1 18,1 24,1

Likely 79 83 36,6 37,7 54,6 61,8 54,6 61,8


Unlikely 25 25 11,6 11,4 22,2 14,1 87,0 97,3

Very Unlikely 23 6 10,6 2,7 97,7 100


Total 216 220 100 100 100 100

Question G

% within origin

Origin


#1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2

Most likely 18,2 37,5 16,1 17,5 19,5 11,5 10,3 16,7 22,9 42,9 35,7 40,0 13,3 32,1 18,1 24,1

Likely 18,2 37,5 35,7 36,8 34,1 34,6 51,7 50,0 34,3 21,4 46,7 53,3 46,4 36,6 37,7

Neither Likely ... 45,5 12,5 12,5 29,8 24,4 26,9 27,6 25,0 22,9 21,4 21,4 13,3 13,3 21,4 20,8 24,1

Unlikely 9,1 12,5 8,9 8,8 17,1 26,9 3,4 8,3 8,6 7,1 14,3 20,0 11,6 11,4

Very Unlikely 23,2 7,0 4,9 3,4 8,6 7,1 28,6 10,6 2,7

None (no opinion) 9,1 3,6 3,4 2,9 2,3

Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

QUESTION H. African countries will become less interested in trade agreements with major developed countries because of their increasing trade with China

Question H Frequency Percent Percent* Cum. Per.

#1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2

Most likely 6 15 2,8 6,8 2,8 6,8

Likely 40 47 18,5 21,4 21,3 28,2 21,3 28,2


Unlikely 83 80 38,4 36,4 55,5 47,3 80,1 85,5

Very Unlikely 37 24 17,1 10,9 97,2 96,4

None (no opinion) 6 8 2,8 3,6 2,8 3,6 100 100

Total 216 220 100 100 100 100

Question H

% within origin

Origin


#1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2

Most likely 19,3 4,9 5,7 7,1 6,7 7,1 2,8 6,8

Likely 18,2 37,5 19,6 21,1 9,8 19,2 13,8 25,0 25,7 21,4 35,7 46,7 16,7 18,5 21,4

Neither Likely ... 18,2 16,1 8,8 29,3 23,1 20,7 33,3 28,6 28,6 14,3 33,3 10,0 28,6 20,4 20,9

Unlikely 45,5 37,5 42,9 38,6 41,5 38,5 41,4 41,7 8,6 21,4 35,7 56,7 57,1 38,4 36,4

Very Unlikely 18,2 25,0 21,4 12,3 7,3 7,7 20,7 28,6 21,4 7,1 6,7 10,0 7,1 17,1 10,9

None (no opinion) 7,3 11,5 3,4 2,9 7,1 13,3 2,8 3,6

Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

QUESTION I. Pressures from US and other countries will lead China to adopt measures to comply more strictly with commitments on trade liberalization and transparency made during its accession to the WTO


Question I Frequency Percent Percent* Cum. Per.

#1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2

Most likely 49 31 22,7 14,1 22,7 14,1

Likely 77 111 35,6 50,5 58,3 64,6 58,3 64,5


Unlikely 36 23 16,7 10,5 19,5 12,8 96,8 96,4

Very Unlikely 6 5 2,8 2,3 99,5 98,6

None (no opinion) 1 3 0,5 1,4 0,5 1,4 100 100

Total 216 220 100 100 100 100

Question I

% within origin

Origin


#1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2

Most likely 27,3 25,0 23,2 17,5 19,5 7,7 3,4 8,6 7,1 13,3 70,0 32,1 22,7 14,1

Likely 54,5 62,5 48,2 54,4 39,0 50,0 27,6 33,3 37,1 35,7 35,7 86,7 6,7 46,4 35,6 50,5

Neither Likely ... 18,2 14,3 19,3 24,4 26,9 34,5 50,0 34,3 28,6 35,7 7,1 21,8 21,4

Unlikely 12,5 12,5 3,5 14,6 11,5 27,6 16,7 17,1 21,4 14,3 23,3 10,7 16,7 10,5

Very Unlikely 1,8 5,3 2,4 6,9 7,1 14,3 2,8 2,3

None (no opinion) 3,8 2,9 3,6 0,5 1,4

Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

ISSUE SURVEY: DOHA ROUND

QUESTION J. The Industrial market access negotiations will create significant new opportunities for exporters

Question J Frequency Percent Percent* Cum. Per.

#1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2

Most likely 23 11 10,6 5,0 10,6 5,0

Likely 67 47 31,0 21,4 41,7 26,4 41,7 26,4


Unlikely 40 68 18,5 30,9 27,3 44,1 90,3 85,5

Very Unlikely 19 29 8,8 13,2 99,1 98,6

None (no opinion) 2 3 0,9 1,4 0,9 1,4 100 100

Total 216 220 100 100 100 100

Question J

% within origin

Origin


#1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2

Most likely 18,2 25,0 7,1 14,6 3,8 3,4 17,1 7,1 13,3 10,7 10,6 5,0

Likely 54,5 25,0 19,6 3,5 39,0 23,1 27,6 41,7 31,4 50,0 57,1 13,3 23,3 10,7 31,0 21,4

Neither Likely ... 18,2 37,5 42,9 29,8 26,8 30,8 34,5 16,7 31,4 35,7 35,7 26,7 6,7 17,9 30,1 28,2

Unlikely 9,1 7,1 38,6 12,2 34,6 27,6 33,3 17,1 7,1 7,1 20,0 50,0 53,6 18,5 30,9

Very Unlikely 12,5 23,2 22,8 4,9 7,7 6,9 8,3 2,9 40,0 3,3 7,1 8,8 13,2

None (no opinion) 5,3 2,4 3,3 0,9 1,4

Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

QUESTION K. The potential for the agriculture negotiations to produce real improvements in market access will be seriously undermined by exceptions for sensitive products and special safeguards


Question K Frequency Percent Percent* Cum. Per.

#1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2

Most likely 78 77 36,1 35,0 36,1 35,0

Likely 79 95 36,6 43,2 72,7 78,2 72,7 78,2


Unlikely 26 18 12,0 8,2 15,2 10,9 96,3 94,1

Very Unlikely 7 6 3,2 2,7 99,5 96,8

None (no opinion) 1 7 0,5 3,2 0,5 3,2 100 100

Total 216 220 100 100 100 100

Question K

% within origin

Origin


#1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2

Most likely 36,4 25,0 30,4 36,8 34,1 46,2 27,6 25,0 34,3 28,6 71,4 60,0 43,3 17,9 36,1 35,0

Likely 18,2 50,0 44,6 47,4 46,3 42,3 20,7 50,0 40,0 28,6 7,1 26,7 40,0 50,0 36,6 43,2

Neither Likely ... 9,1 10,7 10,5 9,8 3,8 31,0 16,7 14,3 14,3 3,6 11,6 7,7

Unlikely 27,3 25,0 14,3 9,8 3,8 13,8 8,6 14,3 21,4 13,3 3,3 21,4 12,0 8,2

Very Unlikely 3,8 6,9 2,9 7,1 13,3 7,1 3,2 2,7

None (no opinion) 9,1 5,3 8,3 7,1 0,5 3,2

Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

QUESTION L. The outcome in the services negotiations is likely to provide a substantial increase in real market access

Question L Frequency Percent Percent* Cum. Per.

#1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2

Most likely 12 3 5,6 1,4 5,6 1,4

Likely 35 21 16,2 9,5 21,8 10,9 21,8 10,9


Unlikely 49 98 22,7 44,5 47,7 68,6 74,1 74,1

Very Unlikely 54 53 25,0 24,1 99,1 98,2

None (no opinion) 2 4 0,9 1,8 0,9 1,8 100 100

Total 216 220 100 100 100 100

Question L

% within origin

Origin


#1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2

Most likely 9,1 7,1 1,8 4,9 3,4 8,6 7,1 3,3 5,6 1,4

Likely 27,3 12,5 1,8 31,7 15,4 24,1 33,3 25,7 21,4 7,1 16,2 9,5

Neither Likely ... 36,4 50,0 44,6 12,3 31,7 15,4 17,2 8,3 25,7 42,9 26,7 14,3 29,6 18,6

Unlikely 27,3 37,5 12,5 49,1 12,2 46,2 24,1 58,3 31,4 35,7 42,9 60,0 33,3 25,0 22,7 44,5

Very Unlikely 35,7 31,6 17,1 19,2 31,0 5,7 14,3 35,7 40,0 36,7 53,6 25,0 24,1

None (no opinion) 3,5 2,4 3,8 2,9 0,9 1,8

Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

QUESTION M. The failure or a limited outcome from the Doha Round would lead to a large increase in the number of disputes brought before the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism


Question M Frequency Percent Percent* Cum. Per.

#1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2

Most likely 75 56 34,7 25,5 34,7 25,5

Likely 56 101 25,9 45,9 60,6 71,4 60,6 71,4


Unlikely 16 26 7,4 11,8 14,8 15,0 89,8 93,6

Very Unlikely 16 7 7,4 3,2 97,2 96,8

None (no opinion) 6 7 2,8 3,2 2,8 3,2 100 100

Total 216 220 100 100 100 100

Question M

% within origin

Origin


#1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2 #1 #2

Most likely 9,1 48,2 40,4 34,1 30,8 10,3 8,3 22,9 14,3 35,7 26,7 56,7 25,0 34,7 25,5

Likely 36,4 50,0 23,2 45,6 26,8 46,2 51,7 41,7 17,1 42,9 35,7 53,3 6,7 46,4 25,9 45,9

Neither Likely ... 18,2 12,5 14,3 29,3 11,5 24,1 25,0 28,6 7,1 21,4 20,0 16,7 14,3 21,8 10,5

Unlikely 27,3 37,5 7,0 4,9 11,5 10,3 16,7 20,0 7,1 3,3 14,3 7,4 11,8

Very Unlikely 9,1 8,9 5,3 2,4 3,4 5,7 14,3 7,1 16,7 7,4 3,2

None (no opinion) 5,4 1,8 2,4 8,3 5,7 14,3 2,8 3,2

Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

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