Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) Document · 2019. 1. 3. · document of the...

Document of

The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No: ICR00004269

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

(4507-BD, 4819-BD and 53420-BD)

ON A

ORIGINAL IDA CREDIT 4507-BD (US$ 109 million) NOVEMBER 6, 2008

GLOBAL FACILITY FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION TF 93588 (US$ 3.1 MILLION) APRIL 16, 2009

ADDITIONAL FINANCING IDA CREDIT 4819-BD (US$ 75 million) SEPTEMBER 24, 2010

BANGLADESH CLIMATE CHANGE RESILIENCE FUND GRANT TF099305 (US$ 25 MILLION) AUGUST 8, 2011

ADDITIONAL FINANCING II IDA CREDIT 53420-BD (US$ 140 million) DECEMBER 30, 2013

TO THE

People’s Republic of Bangladesh

FOR THE

EMERGENCY 2007 CYCLONE RECOVERY AND RESTORATION PROJECT ( P111272 )

{Date}

Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience Global Practice

South Asia Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective {Jun 30, 2018})

Currency Unit = BDT

BDT 83.7 = US$1

US$1.406 = SDR 1

FISCAL YEAR

July 1 - June 30

Regional Vice President: Hartwig Schafer

Country Director: Qimiao Fan

Senior Global Practice Director: Ede Jorge Ijjasz-Vasquez

Practice Manager: Christoph Pusch

Task Team Leader(s): Masood Ahmad, Swarna Kazi

ICR Main Contributor: Atishay Abbhi

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AF Additional Financing

BCCRF Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund

BWDB Bangladesh Water Development Board

CAS Country Assistance Strategy

CEIP Coastal Embankment Improvement

CPP Cyclone Preparedness Program

DDM Department of Disaster Management

DMC Disaster Management Committee

DNA Damage and Needs Assessment

DPP Development Project Proforma

ECRRP Emergency Cyclone Recovery and Restoration Project

EMF Environment Management Framework

GFDRR Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery

GoB Government of Bangladesh

IDA International Development Association

ISR Implementation Status Report

JDLNA Joint Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment

KfW Kreditanstalt Fur Wiederaufbau

LGED Local Government Engineering Department

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

MDSP Multi-Purpose Disaster Shelter Project

MRVA Multi Hazard Risk and Vulnerability Assessment

MTR Mid-Term Review

PCMU Project Coordination and Monitoring Unit

PDO Project Development Objective

PFM Public Financial Management

RBIP River Bank Improvement Program

SMC School Management Committees

VSL Value of Statistical Life

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DATA SHEET .......................................................................................................................... 1

I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES ....................................................... 6

A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL .........................................................................................................6

B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE) ..................................... 10

II. OUTCOME .................................................................................................................... 11

A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs ............................................................................................................ 11

JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL EFFICACY RATING .......................................................................... 17

C. EFFICIENCY ........................................................................................................................... 17

D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING .................................................................... 20

E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY) ............................................................................ 21

III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME ................................ 21

A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION ................................................................................... 21

B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION ............................................................................. 22

IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME .. 24

A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) ............................................................ 24

B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE ..................................................... 25

C. BANK PERFORMANCE ........................................................................................................... 27

D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME ....................................................................................... 29

V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................. 30

ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS ........................................................... 32

ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION ......................... 44

ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT ........................................................................... 46

ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS ........................................................................................... 47

ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS ... 57

ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (IF ANY) ..................................................................... 59

ANNEX 7. MAJOR CYCLONES THAT HIT THE BANGLADESH COAST (1965-2017) ..................... 60

ANNEX 8. TYPES AND OPTIONS FOR MULTIPURPOSE CYCLONE SHELTERS DEVELOPED UNDER ECRRP ................................................................................................................................. 61

ANNEX 9: PROJECT M&E IMPACT EVALUATION SURVEY DESIGN ASSESSMENT ..................... 62

ANNEX 10: LEGAL LAND ACQUISITION PROCESS IN BANGLADESH ........................................ 63

The World Bank Emergency 2007 Cyclone Recovery and Restoration Project ( P111272 )

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DATA SHEET

BASIC INFORMATION

Product Information

Project ID Project Name

P111272 Emergency 2007 Cyclone Recovery and Restoration

Project

Country Financing Instrument

Bangladesh Investment Project Financing

Original EA Category Revised EA Category

Partial Assessment (B) Partial Assessment (B)

Related Projects

Relationship Project Approval Product Line

Additional Financing P122014-Emergency 2007 Cyclone Recovery and Restoration Project Additional Financing

24-Sep-2010 IBRD/IDA

Additional Financing P146500-Emergency 2007 Cyclone Recovery and Restoration Project-- AF II

30-Dec-2013 IBRD/IDA

Organizations

Borrower Implementing Agency

Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh

Project Coordination and Monitoring Unit, Programming

Division, Planning Commission, Departmnent of

Agricultural Extension, Ministry of Agriculture, Local

Government Engineering Department, MLGRD&C,

Bangladesh Water Development Board, Ministry of Water

Resources, Department of Disaster Management,

MoDMR, Department of Livestock Services, Ministry of


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Fisheries and Livestock, Department of Fisheries, Ministry

of Fisheries and Livestock

Project Development Objective (PDO) Original PDO

The PDO is to support the Government of Bangladesh efforts to facilitate recovery from the damage to livelihoods and infrastructure caused by Cyclone Sidr and to build long-term preparedness through strengthened disaster risk reduction and management.

FINANCING

Original Amount (US$) Revised Amount (US$) Actual Disbursed (US$)

World Bank Financing IDA-45070

109,000,000 108,868,170 106,014,452

TF-93588

3,009,368 3,009,280 3,071,246

IDA-48190

75,000,000 74,986,833 72,314,714

TF-99305

25,000,000 23,063,068 23,063,068

IDA-53420

140,000,000 140,000,000 119,512,282

Total 352,009,368 349,927,351 323,975,762

Non-World Bank Financing

Borrower/Recipient 0 0 0

Total 0 0 0

Total Project Cost 352,009,368 349,927,351 323,975,762

KEY DATES

Approval Effectiveness MTR Review Original Closing Actual Closing

06-Nov-2008 24-Dec-2008 16-Jan-2013 30-Jun-2013 30-Jun-2018


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RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING

Date(s) Amount Disbursed (US$M) Key Revisions

07-Sep-2010 12.76 Additional Financing Change in Results Framework Change in Components and Cost Change in Loan Closing Date(s)

27-Jun-2013 97.70 Change in Results Framework Change in Components and Cost Change in Loan Closing Date(s) Reallocation between Disbursement Categories

27-Nov-2013 114.92 Additional Financing Change in Results Framework Change in Components and Cost Other Change(s)

19-Dec-2015 204.62 Change in Results Framework Change in Components and Cost Change in Loan Closing Date(s) Change in Financing Plan Reallocation between Disbursement Categories Change in Implementation Schedule

04-Dec-2017 285.33 Change in Loan Closing Date(s)

KEY RATINGS

Outcome Bank Performance M&E Quality

Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Modest

RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived DO Rating IP Rating Actual

Disbursements (US$M)

01 15-Mar-2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0

02 10-Nov-2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 5.02

03 20-May-2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 8.93

04 12-Nov-2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 13.95

05 30-Apr-2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 19.03


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06 20-Dec-2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 36.25

07 02-Jun-2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 54.52

08 09-Dec-2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 79.81

09 15-May-2013 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 101.71

10 05-Nov-2013 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 129.49


12 05-Dec-2014 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 172.68



15 11-Jul-2016 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 272.13


17 19-Jun-2017 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 294.16

18 09-Jan-2018 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 315.95

19 25-Jun-2018 Satisfactory Satisfactory 323.77

SECTORS AND THEMES

Sectors

Major Sector/Sector (%)

Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry 15

Other Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry 15

Public Administration 3

Other Public Administration 3

Social Protection 30

Social Protection 30


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Transportation 10

Rural and Inter-Urban Roads 7

Other Transportation 3

Water, Sanitation and Waste Management 42

Public Administration - Water, Sanitation and Waste Management

29

Other Water Supply, Sanitation and Waste Management

13

Themes

Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3) (%) Finance 25

Finance for Development 25

Disaster Risk Finance 17

Agriculture Finance 8

Urban and Rural Development 59

Rural Development 8

Rural Markets 8

Disaster Risk Management 51

Disaster Response and Recovery 17

Disaster Risk Reduction 17

Disaster Preparedness 17

Environment and Natural Resource Management 18

Water Resource Management 18

Water Institutions, Policies and Reform 18

ADM STAFF

Role At Approval At ICR

Regional Vice President: Isabel M. Guerrero Hartwig Schafer


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Country Director: Xian Zhu Qimiao Fan

Senior Global Practice Director: Constance A. Bernard Ede Jorge Ijjasz-Vasquez

Practice Manager: Adolfo Brizzi Christoph Pusch

Task Team Leader(s): Masood Ahmad Swarna Kazi

ICR Contributing Author: Atishay Abbhi

I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES

A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL

Context

1. At Project appraisal, Bangladesh was ranked as the most climate-vulnerable country in the world (World Bank 2005)1. Cyclones, associated storm surges and floods were the most important drivers in terms of the loss of human life due to natural disasters, leading to almost all the nearly 520,000 natural disaster deaths recorded over the previous 40 years2. These average 1.4 events a year with nearly US$ 500 million in damages each year. If a 10-year return period cyclone (likely to become more intense due to climate change) hits Bangladesh, additional potential damage is likely to be US$2.437 billion and additional potential loss US$2.123 billion3. Cyclone impact is amplified by Bangladesh’s low-lying physical geography, high tide at landfall, climate change, high population density and poverty. Cyclones typically affect Bangladesh in the fall and spring, the intervals between the dry season and the monsoon season.

2. Between July and October 2007, right before Cyclone Sidr, two waves of flooding affected 46 districts, causing over 1000 deaths, affecting over 13 million people and damaging over 2 million acres of agricultural land and infrastructure4. On 15 November 2007, Cyclone Sidr struck the south‐west coast of Bangladesh with winds up to 240 kilometers per hour. The storm breached coastal and river embankments, flooded low‐lying areas and caused extensive damage to houses, roads, bridges, and other infrastructure. Overall, the cyclone affected about 9 million people across 30 districts. Over 3000 people were killed and 55,000 injured. The death toll of livestock was over 100,000. The cyclone hit at a time when aman rice, the predominant source of food in the area, was about to be harvested5. Almost 113,000 hectares (ha) of crops were totally damaged and about 1.3 million tons of crop was lost. Effects were highly concentrated in the districts of Bagherat, Barguna, Patuakhali, Pirojpur and Barisal, which have high population density and higher poverty rates than the national average.

1 Project Appraisal Document (PAD), ECRRP, December 2008 2 Bangladesh Climate and Disaster Risk Profile, GFDRR. https://www.gfdrr.org/bangladesh 3 Vulnerability of Bangladesh to Cyclones in a Changing Climate Potential Damages and Adaptation Cost, The World Bank Development Research Group Environment and Energy Team April 2010 4 World Bank. 2007. Bangladesh - Emergency 2007 Flood Restoration and Recovery Assistance Program (FRRAP). Washington, DC 5The aman season designates the cultivation of the rice varieties which are planted in mid-July and harvested in mid November-December

https://www.gfdrr.org/bangladesh


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3. The Government of Bangladesh (GoB) and the World Bank conducted a Joint Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment (JDLNA). JDLNA estimated total damage and losses from cyclone at US$ 1.7 billion, with recovery needs at around US$1.3 billion. The Emergency Cyclone Recovery and Restoration Project (ECRRP) was subsequently designed to support critical medium to long-term restoration and rehabilitation needs as identified in the JDLNA. Immediate/early-recovery efforts were financed by other donors like the European Commission (EC), Islamic Development Bank, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), and DFID. While the damages were high in the housing sector (US$840 million), the population was able to restore a significant portion of the houses with government rebuilding grants6. Thus, ECRRP prioritized the reconstruction of public sector infrastructure (embankments, roads, shelters). The Project was developed as part of a broader Bank program for cyclone assistance7 and was in line with the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS 2006-09) that emphasized disaster vulnerability reduction and improving the capacity of government institutions to respond to and manage disasters.

4. The Project was prepared in an environment of high fiduciary risk, with known systemic public procurement issues, especially given that the project involved procurement of large works. The country’s public financial management (PFM) and procurement systems, and public expenditure institutions needed to be significantly strengthened. There were concerns regarding governance and weak links in the public financial accountability chain.

6 As per JDLNA, this recovery was assisted by Government of Bangladesh’s distribution of small rebuilding grants and materials. 7 ECRRP was designed to complement the US$100 million financial support provided to GoB to reduce fiscal pressure arising from

the shock of a natural disaster (Sidr) and the US$50 million additional financing of the Social Investment Program Project (SIPP) to

restore livelihoods of affected households


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Theory of Change (Results Chain)

Project Development Objectives (PDOs) 5. The PDO stated in the Project Appraisal document (PAD) and Legal Agreements was to assist the Government of

Bangladesh to facilitate recovery from the damage to livelihoods and infrastructure caused by Cyclone Sir and to build long-term preparedness through strengthened disaster risk reduction and management.

Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators

6. The expected outcomes to be achieved with this proposed project were: a. Recovery from damage to livelihoods and building long-term disaster preparedness b. Recovery from damage to infrastructure and building long-term disaster preparedness.

Components A. Recovery of Agriculture Sector and Improvement Program: This component was primarily designed to

improve resilience of communities and households in cyclone prone areas through introduction of

technologies to improve land use during dry seasons when salinity levels are high, and introduction of high-


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yield crops. This component was to, only to a limited extent, provide short and medium-term agriculture

recovery assistance to Sidr-affected communities and thus improve livelihoods.

B. Reconstruction and Improvement of Multipurpose Shelters: This component was designed to provide

greater protection to vulnerable population and livestock in cyclone-prone areas against future disasters.

The component supported construction of new multi-purpose shelters, repairs and improvement of

existing shelters that were damaged and/or unusable, and reconstruction of road network to access

shelters.

C. Rehabilitation of coastal embankments: This component was designed to prevent saline inundation during

normal weather and to sustain crop production by reducing cyclone damage through rehabilitation and

improvement of coastal embankments damaged during Cyclone Sidr.

D. Long-term Disaster Risk Management Program: This component was designed to strengthen disaster risk

mitigation and reduction through (i) capacity building of the Disaster Management Bureau (DMB), support

for detailed multi-hazard risk vulnerability modeling and assessment, and strengthening of emergency

preparedness at the community levels, and (ii) preparation studies for future projects for River Bank

Improvement (RBIP) and Coastal Embankment Improvement (CEIP) and for disaster shelters.

E. Monitoring and Evaluation of Project Impact: The component was designed to provide oversight

monitoring and evaluation (M&E) activities for providing feedback to the Government, Project Steering

Committee (PSC), and implementing agencies on project performance and impact of its various

components, so that corrective actions could be undertaken in a timely manner. This included supervision

of ESMF and ESMP implementation.

F. Project Management, Technical Assistance, Strategic Studies and Training, and Emergency Support for

Future Disasters: This component was designed to support the Government in implementing the project

and coordinating all project related activities, and provide resources for needed strategic studies, technical

assistance and training. It would also provide support for emergency recovery if a future disaster were to

occur during implementation of ECRRP (emergency fund).


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B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE)

Revised PDOs, Components and Outcome Targets

The PDO was not revised throughout the project. Key changes in outcome indicators and targets during the course of the project are presented below. Table 1. Changes in Key PDO Indicators and Targets

PDO INDICATORS

CHANGES IN PDO INDICATORS CHANGES IN PDO

TARGETS TARGET ACHIEVED

Original/AF I Restructuring/AF II Restructuring II and III Original Revised Achieved % achieved

INDICATOR 1

Number of Vulnerable population benefitted from reduced risk due to project

interventions

Number of cyclone affected population benefitted due to

rehabilitation and construction of protective infrastructure (e.g.

embankments, disaster shelters)

Reduced risk to cyclone affected population due to rehabilitation of

protective infrastructure (e.g. embankments, disaster shelters)

1.7 million 4.36 million 4.8 million 110%

INDICATOR 2

Agricultural area benefitted from reduced risks from

cyclone damage and saline water inundation

Number of cyclone affected HHs whose livelihoods have been

recovered due to distribution of inputs, technology and training

Recovery of agriculture sector and livelihoods for cyclone affected

populations

57000 HH

283,700 HH 305,000 HH

107%

INDICATOR 3 Improved Capacity and

preparedness for disaster risk management

Improved Capacity and preparedness for disaster risk management in the

government (DDM) and Communities (DMCs)

Strengthened disaster risk management in the government

Satisfactory

Improved response

during emergencies

Emergency equipment in use

Early Warning System (EWS) set

up

100%

Table 2: Changes in key component indicators and targets

OBJECTIVE

KEY COMPONENTS AND INDICATORS

CHANGES IN KEY TARGETS

Original AF I Restructuring I AF II Restructuring II Restructuring III

Recovery of livelihoods Recovery of agriculture sector and livelihoods for cyclone affected populations (Beneficiary households)

107,500 283, 200

283, 200 283, 200

283, 200 283, 200

Recovery of damaged infrastructure and long-term preparedness

Number of newly constructed shelters with improved design standards and connectivity with the community (number)

250 350 240 460 460 460

Numbers of shelters repaired and improved upon with improved connectivity (such as access roads) with the community (number)

50 110 230 330 353 353

Length of coastal embankments including appurtenant structures rehabilitated and upgraded with improved design standards (kms)

100 180 270 460 502 502


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Rationale for Changes and Their Implication on the Original Theory of Change

7. The original project was designed as a US$200 million IDA credit, but lack of IDA availability at appraisal reduced

the project size to US$109 million, and hence covered only limited recovery needs. Additional financing (AF) was gradually sought to increase coverage of targeted agriculture beneficiaries, add more shelters and cover a longer stretch of coastal embankments for rehabilitation. Changes were also brought to adapt to beneficiary feedback, evolving GoB priorities and project progress. Reallocations and extension of closing dates also necessitated restructurings. Some of the key rationales for changes are discussed below.

8. Increase in availability of funds: After the US$ 109 million original credit, the project resources increased over

time with contribution from IDA (US$215 million), a GFDRR grant (US$ 2.96 million), a BCCRF grant (US$ 25 million), CRW8 funds (US$ 49.7 million) and KfW parallel financing (US$4.9 million), allowing for expansion of scope of the components at a total project cost of $349.9 million9.

9. Cyclones and extreme weather: Cyclone Aila hit Bangladesh in May 2009 and inflicted further damages to

infrastructure (especially embankments) and livelihoods in the project areas, necessitating an increase in scope to recover from additional damage. Additional construction of embankments due to river erosion (retired embankments) required additional land that increased the cost, requiring more funds. Severe cyclonic storm Mora in late May 2017 coupled with higher and prolonged rainfall compared to the historical average, rising water levels, tidal surges, and river erosion further compounded deteriorating embankments. The project thus had to be extended in December 2017 to be able to complete the remaining embankment works.

10. Government priority: Restructuring in 2013 reduced the scope of rehabilitation of shelters (from 350 to 240) to

reflect GoB priority of scaling up construction of the new cyclone shelters10 over rehabilitation. GoB also requested dropping sub-component F5 (to establish a financing facility to fund disaster recovery) during the MTR. The amount (US$ 20 million) was reallocated to fund construction of additional new shelters (165 to 230).

11. Cost increase, savings, price escalations and rate schedule revisions: Increase in construction costs (material,

labor, etc.) over appraisal estimates, increase in per unit cost of land area (by up to 150%), annual revisions in rate schedule of implementing agencies, and inclusion of a 15% price escalation clause for contracts over 18 months also contributed to the need for additional financing. Cost savings from a number of categories and price contingencies from contracts allowed funds to be reallocated (requiring restructuring) to construct more cyclone shelters, roads, rehabilitate more embankments and build the capacity of the Disaster Management Bureau.

12. Revised result indicators: The results framework in the original credit was developed as a “best guess” as the

project scope was not completely known during project design due to the emergency nature of the project. Indicators were gradually revised (Table 1) to align with and strengthen attribution to restructured project activities, enhance specificity and better monitor project progress. (See Quality of M&E section for a detailed discussion on results framework).

II. OUTCOME

A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs

Assessment of Relevance of PDOs and Rating 13. At the time of approval, the project was relevant to the CAS (2006-2009), which highlighted the vulnerability of

Bangladesh’s economy to natural disasters and acknowledged the overall improved capacity to respond achieved through interventions like rehabilitation of coastal embankments, polders11, and other cyclone mitigation measures. The CAS emphasized the need to continue supporting efforts to mainstream disaster management in relevant


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government institutions12. ECRRP also directly supported the implementation of the second pillar of the CAS FY 11-14 - reduce environmental degradation and vulnerability to climate change and natural disasters.

14. The project’s interventions remained highly relevant to the CPF (2016-2020) which outlines climate and environmental management as one of its three pillars13. The PDO was also firmly aligned with the GoB’s (i) National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction II (NSAPRII) for FY 09-11; and (ii) Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (2008). The ECRRP supports and contributes to the overall goal and outcomes outlined in these strategies viz.: food security; protection to people, livelihoods and assets; comprehensive disaster risk management, and institutional strengthening and capacity building of the agencies responsible for disaster and climate change risk management and mitigation.

15. The project’s objectives remain highly relevant to the GoB’s development priorities outlined in the current, 7th Five

Year Plan (FY2016-FY2020). The plan’s approach and goals for disaster risk management can be considerably attributed to the foundation laid by ECRRP’s activities. The Project has played a key role in introducing the shift in approach reflected in the plan - from “conventional response and relief” to a “comprehensive risk reduction culture”, in order to reduce the impact of natural disasters and climate change on development gains and make Bangladesh more resilient. Key rehabilitation and structural risk reduction activities under ECRRP have been institutionalized by the Five-Year Plan’s promotion of investments in disaster and climate resilient housing, roads, embankments, flood and cyclone shelters, other infrastructure and community-based risk reduction programs.

16. It must be noted that part of the PDO objective linked to “recovery of livelihoods” was achieved by 2014. The objective

linked to recovery of damage and long-term preparedness however remained relevant until project closing.

Rating: High

Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome

17. The expected outcomes to be achieved with this proposed project were:

a) Recovery from damage to livelihoods and building long-term disaster preparedness b) Recovery from damage to infrastructure and building long-term disaster preparedness

18. Building long-term preparedness appears common in both outcomes since almost all activities had resilience building

elements that contributed to building long-term preparedness. The Project achieved multi-sectoral long-term disaster

8 GFDRR = Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery; BCCRF = Bangladesh Climate Resilience Fund; CRW = Crisis Response

Window; KfW = Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (German Development Bank) 9 However, due to SDR and US$ exchange rate movements the value of the 3 IDA credits expressed in US$ terms shrunk compared

to the value at the time of approval from US$ 324 million equivalent to US$ 305.960 million equivalent (at the time of 2015

restructuring). 10 According to the project team, aim was to increase geographical coverage of shelters to bring more people to safety during

disasters. 11 The Dutch term “polder” is used to designate areas that are enclosed on all sides by dykes or embankments, separating them

hydrologically from the main river system and offering protection against tidal floods, salinity intrusion and sedimentation. Polders

are equipped by in- and outlets to control the water inside the embanked area. 12 Country Assistance Strategy (2006-09) 13 Under this pillar, WBG activities are focusing on boosting Bangladesh’s resilience to climate change and natural disasters,

improving the management of water infrastructure and promoting agricultural productivity with climate-smart farm practices and

technology, diversification and accelerating the move up the value chain.


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preparedness by improved farmer resilience through saline tolerant inputs, training and technology; constructing new disaster-resilient shelters, upgraded rehabilitation of embankments to prevent saline inundation and enhancing the disaster preparedness and risk mitigation capacity of national and local level disaster risk management institutions.

19. The project achieved all of its revised key PDO indicator targets, and in some case, surpassed them (See Table 1 and Annex I for achievement of PDO targets). ECRRP succeeded in the recovery and cyclone risk reduction of about 4.8 million people and protecting over 173,984 hectares14 of agricultural land in the areas affected by Cyclone Sidr and Aila. In addition, the project constructed 343 km of evacuation and connecting roads (above flood levels) that increased access to shelters, a meaningful indicator, though not captured in the results framework but critical to reducing disaster risk.

20. The project also significantly contributed to the transformation of Bangladesh’s Disaster Risk Management (DRM)

approach and preparedness. The ECRRP laid the foundation for GoB’s ongoing projects for critical protective infrastructure and DRM capacity building like Coastal Embankment Improvement Project (CEIP), Multipurpose Disaster Shelter Project (MDSP) and Bangladesh Modern Food Storage Facilities Project, (BMFSFP), all supported by IDA.

21. Split evaluation was not deemed necessary as the revision of the PDO indicators was not substantive and expanded

the scope of the Project by increasing the targets.

Outcome 1: Recovery from damage to livelihoods and building long-term preparedness 22. Agriculture is the main source of livelihood for the rural population and around 2.2 million farming families were

affected by Cyclone Sidr. Flooding and saline water inundation due to the cyclone had the most impact on the livelihoods of agricultural households, in addition to damage of property. The overall recovery and resilience of household livelihoods should thus be assessed through a combination of agricultural interventions and embankment protection. The ECRRP’s US$30.96 million investment contributed to restoration of livelihoods and improved resilience of over 230,000 households in the 13 target upazilas (sub-districts), as measured through increase in yield and income.

23. Resilient agricultural livelihood recovery was mainly achieved through improved land use during Boro season (dry winter season when the irrigation water becomes saline). Over 100,000 farmers produced approx. 53,621.6 metric tons (mt) of rice, including 2843.8 mt. produced using saline tolerant varieties, with maximum yields obtained during the Boro season. Distribution of machinery like power tillers reduced the time for land preparation, thereby increasing the cropped area and producing higher yields (increase by 112%), compared to baseline. Aquaculture packages provided to fish/shrimp farmers produced some 2,993.9-metric ton (mt) of fish/shrimp15 and contributed to an average annual income increase (excluding other sources of household/livelihood income) of 2.5 times compared to the pre-project period16. Livestock packages produced a total of 1051.8mt of meat, 26,505.4 million eggs, 825.9 thousand liters of milk, and 1422.1mt of by-products. A household survey revealed over 90% respondents felt there was an improvement in farming practice. The trainings had a multiplier effect where, on average, one project beneficiary had transferred knowledge to six neighboring farmers.

14 Information received from implementing agency BWDB. This indicator was present in the original credit results framework.

Target was revised to 377,000 ha benefitted from reduced risks from cyclone damage and saline water inundation; but was dropped

and replaced by the number of cyclone affected HHs whose livelihoods have been recovered due to distribution of inputs,

technology and training. 15 Carp production increased by 1,598 Kg/Ha (compared to a baseline of 872 Kg/Ha), Tilapia mono-sex production increased by

1,786 Kg/Ha (compared to a baseline of 627 Kg/Ha), Golda production increased by 445 Kg/Ha (compared to a baseline of 131

Kg/Ha) and Bagda production increased by 358 Kg/Ha (compared to a baseline of 210 Kg/Ha). 16 FAO and DAE implementation completion and evaluation reports


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24. Building long-term preparedness of farmers: The project enhanced resilience and long-term preparedness of farmers

in the cyclone affected areas through successful promotion of and enhancement of knowledge and skills of farmers through: improved saline tolerant rice varieties, sustainable mechanization and crop diversification, promotion of the use of fresh surface water by repairing/building small-scale irrigation structures during the dry Boro and winter Rabi seasons to increase the cropping intensity and the utilization of fallow land, resilient agronomic practices and use of rice silos. A total of 26,247 seed/grain silos were distributed to farmer households representing a potential storage capacity of 2,231 MT of paddy or 3,307 MT of rice grains. This expanded the genetic diversity of the local crops and the timely availability of seeds to farmers. This activity was later scaled up to provide seed/grain silos for vulnerable households in drought, flood and cyclone-prone areas of Bangladesh under the Bangladesh Modern Food Storage Facilities Project, (BMFSFP) being implemented by Ministry of Food.

25. ECRRP interventions contributed to increase in incomes of target households17; however, the ICR is unable to establish

a magnitude of household income increase or correlation with project interventions due to lack of proper baseline and completion data. Additional benefits from agriculture intervention were reported through household surveys include investment of increased income in children’s education, health and improved nutrition and an increase in the decision-making power of women due to their greater involvement in agricultural production. Some beneficiaries managed to engage in value addition activities such as planning for increased production and developing marketing plans and strategies for future growth.

26. Given that ECRRP’s livelihood interventions began over two years after the cyclone, self-coping mechanisms including

community support and support from NGOs were already contributing to people’s recovery. So, while the project achieved the desired objective on building resilience of farmers, a delayed start made it challenging to ensure that benefits reached the intended target beneficiaries18 and on time. Despite all intermediate targets being met, delays in kickstarting implementation and lack of adequate outcome-level data affected achievement of outcome related to recovery of livelihoods.

Outcome 2: Recovery from damage to infrastructure and building long-term preparedness

27. Rehabilitation of damaged shelters: The Project adopted a “build back better” approach to recovery and contributed

significantly to reducing risk of the cyclone affected population by provisioning multipurpose cyclone shelters for a combined 950,28019 people in the 9 districts affected by Cyclone Sidr. It achieved its revised target of rehabilitating 459 existing damaged shelters, benefitting at least 420,000 people. The shelters were rehabilitated and additionally equipped with toilets, rain water harvesting, solar panels for lighting, improved surface runoff and provision for adding another floor. ECRRP shelters (rehabilitated and new) have been used by beneficiaries during various subsequent disasters like Cyclone Mahasen (2013), Cyclone Mora (2017) and during the tidal surge in August 2017.

17 Household survey conducted by GoB shows that the percentage of households with annual income of BDT 60,000 increased 3.3

times from 27% in baseline (2010) to 98% in 2017, compared to 66% in control area. 99.4% respondents of the household survey

said their income increased by end of the project. 18 The project targeted the most affected people and those who required immediate support to recover livelihoods and agriculture activities in a sustainable manner. Target households were those who did not or were not receiving any similar assistance from other previous and ongoing projects or programs providing the same type of livelihood rehabilitation and agriculture support in the cyclone-affected areas 19 In reality, beneficiary numbers would be greater as it is observed that over 4,000 people can use these shelters and there is

overcrowding as opposed to the 1,500 for new shelters and 920 for rehabilitated shelters calculated based on per sq. ft space

occupied in rooms. They use the space in hallways and stairs.


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28. New Multi-Purpose Disaster Shelters: The Project constructed 352 new shelters that are expected to protect over 528,000 people from future cyclones in the most vulnerable areas. While the existing (pre-project) shelters could withstand 144-250 kmph windspeed, new shelters constructed under ECRRP can withstand cyclones with a windspeed of up to 260kmph. New shelters have an increased average capacity to provide shelter (1500 people)20 during cyclones compared to 900 in existing shelters. Shelter-cum-schools are equipped with rainwater harvesting, solar panels, separate rooms for pregnant women and ramps for the disabled. At least 38,200 livestock21 can be accommodated during a cyclone in 191 shelters (out of 353 shelters) due to separate spaces provided for livestock. This has reduced the need to have ‘killa’22 space for animals which was deemed costly and infeasible due to limited availability of land. Accessibility to shelters has been improved with the construction of a total of 343 kms of access and evacuation roads above flood levels and 1200 mts of bridges and culverts. Coordination between Local Government Engineering Department (LGED), Ministry of Primary and Mass Education (MoPE) and Department of Disaster Management (DDM) ensures that database on cyclone shelters is updated as when shelters are completed and available for use. School management committees (SMC) were trained by LGED to carry out minor repairs to ensure maintenance of shelters.

29. The shelter interventions have also had considerable spillover effect in the project areas. Construction created short-

term employment opportunities for communities. School enrolment has reportedly increased in areas where new shelter-cum-schools were built as the new constructions can accommodate 90-100 students in 3 classrooms, while rehabilitated shelter-cum-schools with 2 classrooms accommodate an average of 50-60 students. Qualified women were able to get employment as teachers, with construction of new school-cum-shelter in their area. In addition, these shelters are also being used for social meetings, cultural events and health camps.

Rehabilitation/upgrading of coastal embankments: 30. Rehabilitation was undertaken with improved standards to provide resilience against future storms of equivalent

strength. All embankment activities also contributed to long-term preparedness. The rehabilitation contributed to reducing the risk from future cyclones of over 3.8 million23 people including 848,700 farm families (exceeding the estimated 3.7 million target defined in the inception report) and over 173,000 hectares of agricultural land due to the rehabilitation (with build-back-better standards) and upgrading of 501 kilometers of coastal embankments including repair of damaged sluice gates and new additional water control structures (sluices) that are needed to drain the polders. Union Parishad24 and community members were trained by BWDB to operate the sluices for irrigation.

31. The embankments have also significantly contributed to the annual incremental agricultural production of around 75,000 metric tons at full operating condition, with an income generation of US$ 18.75 million, by preventing saline water inundation/intrusion during normal weather and sustained crop production in the wake of cyclonic storm surges. Safety provided by the embankments also allowed the local markets and schools to function regularly. The rehabilitation and improvement activity has therefore contributed not just to the recovery of damaged infrastructure but also recovery of livelihoods through increased productivity and income. There were some instances where embankment works were delayed due to factors detailed in later sections. These delays affected beneficiary farmers in terms of access to irrigation facilities, incurring loss of production and associated revenue25. Some works for embankments rehabilitation involved resettlement and land acquisition since 2016 due to emergency situations resulting from riverbank erosion. Constraints related to the land acquisition and payment process contributed to delay

20 This is for Type 3 shelters. Average capacity shelter type: Type 1 = 1300, Type 2 &3 = 1500, Type 5 = 1400 21 200 livestock per shelter for 102 shelters. 22 Killas are artificially built mounds or hillocks in the coastal regions traditionally used as cyclone shelter for livestock 23 Calculation by M&E consultants is based on 7075 persons per kilometer of completed embankment, which is a 2009 baseline

figure. The average growth rate of population in Bangladesh is around 1.4% (higher in southern Bangladesh). Considering this

growth trend, the benefited people per kilometer stands at around 7798 in 2017. 24 The smallest rural administrative and local government units in Bangladesh 25 Quarterly Progress Report, June 2017, BWDB


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in completion of works (see sections III and IV for detailed discussion on the issue, including arrangements made to complete payments).

Table 3: Achievement of infrastructure rehabilitation and reconstruction targets Infrastructure type Achieved Comments

New shelter constructed 352 nos. Target 353. 1 shelter dropped due to land dispute

Rehabilitated shelters 459 nos. Target 460. 1 shelter dropped due to unrepairable condition

Road network 343 kms Connecting 352 shelters to the nearest paved road

Embankment rehabilitation 501 kms Target achieved despite significant delays

New/repaired sluices 166nos., 191 nos.

Embankment protective works 17.7 kms

Improved disaster preparedness capacity and DRM strategy

32. After Cyclone Sidr 2007, Bangladesh needed not only immediate recovery and reconstruction, but also better resilience and preparedness towards onset of any future disasters. While GoB took the lead and made considerable efforts to undertake unprecedented recovery actions, disaster risk management and rehabilitation needs remained largely unfulfilled due to entrenched attitudes in disaster management being focused on relief and response as well as limited government capacity for handling extreme events.

33. ECRRP contributed to a paradigm shift in disaster management in Bangladesh from a conventional relief and response

practice to a more holistic risk reduction culture. In addition to supporting the GoB in multi-sectoral long-term disaster preparedness, the ECRRP also influenced policy reforms in the sector, including laying the foundations of the formulation of the National Disaster Management Plan 2010-2015 and Disaster Management Act 2012.

34. Improved national and local capacity: The project took a bottom-up approach towards building long-term preparedness by focusing on local risk reduction capacity building interventions. At the national level, the project strengthened disaster preparedness and capacity of the DMB26, and at the local level, that of the Disaster Management Committees (DMC) and Cyclone Preparedness Program (CPP) volunteers. A comprehensive approach of capacity enhancement focused on generating disaster risk and impact data and then utilizing that data, along with emergency equipment, for improved response. The Disaster Needs Assessment (DNA) cell and software established under ECRRP, has reduced the time from to collect impact data from three days to few hours and empowered citizens to directly report disaster impact. The software also contains critical cyclone shelter data that allows CPP volunteers to mobilize people at the time of the cyclone and to move them to shelters. Local capacity to conduct DNAs were enhanced through trainings to 2035 DDM staff across 64 districts. During Cyclone Mora in June 2017 and the following floods, data provided by the DNA cell was used to prepare and disseminate various flood situation and damage reports.

35. The Multi Hazard Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (MRVA) maps and risk atlas, developed by the MRVA cell27 established by ECRRP, provides districts & sub-district wise hazard risk and exposure maps. The Bangladesh Planning Commission is developing a tool to use MRVA data to determine hazard vulnerability of areas before approving development projects. A Geo-Node web-portal has been established for access at local level for visualizing the multi-

26 DMB was later merged with Directorate of Relief and Rehabilitation (DRR) to set up Department of Disaster Management (DDM)

under the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief in 2012 following enactment of the Disaster Management Act 2012. 27 The MRVA Cell is responsible for building and maintaining information and monitoring system for multi-hazard and vulnerability

assessments, including risk identification, quantification, mapping and monitoring.


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hazard risk information at district / upazila / union level and district level technical officials associated with Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) have been trained on multi-hazard modellings.

36. Emergency preparedness: Over 70 community-based cyclone preparedness simulation workshops were conducted for

CPP volunteers and local communities, imparting knowledge and skills linked to cyclone warnings, first aid, evacuation and shelter management. Emergency Search and Rescue Equipment, marine rescue boats, megaphones and other emergency items were provided by the Project to boost local level disaster preparedness. Rescue vehicles and public signage with disaster preparedness messages were used by the Red Cross, local DDM staff and CPP volunteers during Cyclone Mahasen and Cyclone Mora.

37. The network of cyclone shelters, combined with the community-based early warning system financed by ECRRP has

contributed to save lives and assets in the event of cyclones. Total fatalities from severe cyclonic storm in 2009 (Cyclone Aila) were estimated at around 190, whereas very severe cyclonic storm Roanu (May 2016) and Mora (May 29, 2017) affected only around 24 and 7 respectively, despite much higher wind speeds and storm surge patterns (see Annex 7).

38. ECRRP also supported planning and design of projects for long term disaster management such as (i) strategic study

of the coastal embankment network, providing recommendations for systematic upgrading over a period of twenty years. The study included preparing detailed design of infrastructures of economically important polders in order to increase safety against cyclonic surge of certain degree taking climate change considerations. The preparation and design (for CEIP) assumed a 20 percent increase in extreme precipitation and increase of 10 percent in tropical cyclone intensities by 2050; (ii) storage of food using modern silos; (iii) construction of new multipurpose disaster shelter; and (iv) River Bank Improvement Program to protect against flooding and river bank erosion, which are the main cause of loss of productive land in Bangladesh.

JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL EFFICACY RATING

39. Overall, the Efficacy is Substantial. The operation achieved its objectives and targets, and went beyond recovery, to build resilience of populations to future disasters. Delay in kickstarting implementation and pending safeguard concerns regarding resettlement, however, adversely affected achievement of outcomes.

C. EFFICIENCY

Assessment of Efficiency and Rating

40. Estimation of benefits in disaster recovery projects at best can be determined using probabilistic scenarios, e.g. probability of lives lost in an event, or probability of extreme event, uncertainty associated with extreme events and hence the impact on the efficiency of infrastructure due to various events. The key return on investment in recovery projects like ECRRP is the averted damage/loss or reduced risk to life. Recovery projects also have spillover effects, which are significant from a resilience building perspective but were difficult to quantify. The efficiency analysis here highlights both tangible and intangible benefits and considers 84 percent of the total project costs. Most benefit streams considered are conservative estimates as it does not quantify some of the spillover benefits and assumes least additional benefit from project interventions.

41. Benefits from livelihood recovery interventions include (i) increase in yield28 (ii) increase in household income (iii) resilience to future disasters due to access and use of improved technologies and silos. There is however not enough data to calculate dollar value of sustained benefits of the component. Table 1 shows almost 300,000 beneficiaries reported to have increased income resulting from the project component. Therefore, the economic benefit of this

28 A major proportion of marginal farmers (from 51 to 72%) indicated that their harvest and income had increased using the HYV seeds and improved farming implements and practices compared to traditional practices.


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component is substantial.29 Additional benefits from livelihood interventions include (i) knowledge sharing of technologies with non-beneficiaries (ii) utilization of earnings for investment in alternative livelihoods (iii) investment of increased income in children’s education, health and improved nutrition (iv) an increase in the decision-making power of women due to their greater involvement in agricultural production.

Table 4: Number of beneficiaries and benefits by livelihood type

Types of marginal household dependent on: Beneficiaries30 Percent of households reporting improvement in income

Crops 241,558 96%

Fisheries 37,089 100%

Livestock 37,928 76%

Total 316,575 94%

Source: ECRRP Household survey, 2014

42. Rehabilitation and construction of shelters provided two main benefits (i) Human lives saved or reduced risk to

population from future disasters; and (ii) reduced risk to livestock, a key productive asset for rural households. Roads constructed to connect shelters to the existing road network provided benefits of: (i) faster evacuation of people and livestock to the shelters; (ii) provision of emergency food and other supplies to the shelter before disaster (preparedness); (iii) faster relief delivery to the shelter after disaster; and (iv) effective access to the primary schools. For the purpose of this analysis, the only main benefit considered is saving of human lives. The benefits from road construction and education are not quantified and to that extent the benefits are underestimates.

43. Key assumptions to estimate the benefits include: (i) the 352 new shelters each have the design capacity based on the shelter types ranging from 1300 to 1750 individuals; (ii) the 459 existing shelters once rehabilitated are reinstated to their design capacity of 920 individuals per shelter. (iii) post-cyclone existing shelters were in condition to handle 50% capacity, and hence rehabilitating them would save 500 additional lives. Total cost of the shelter component was taken to be US$191 million, disbursed between 2010 and 2018. To calculate the economic benefits of saving human lives, the value of statistical life (VSL) was taken from Viscusi and Masterman (2017) at US$ 595,870. The justification of this VSL is in Annex 4.

44. The probability of occurrence and intensity of a cyclone would determine the use and effective benefits of the shelters. Sensitivity analysis was conducted by changing the probability of number of deaths among those seeking shelter during a one-in-ten-year super-cyclone if these people did not have access to shelter. As shown in Annex 4, assuming 2 per 1000 shelter capacity lives are expected to be saved in case of a 1 in 10-year super cyclone, and rehabilitation of existing shelters added 50 percent to the shelter capacity, the IRR is 22.4 percent. The NPV ranges between US$ 181 and US$ 691 million and BCR 2.3-3.7, using 12 and 6 percent discount rates respectively.

45. Rehabilitation of existing embankments totaling 501kms, protected 174,000 hectares of land and benefited 3.8

million people. The embankments and polders were designed to protect against upto 1-in-25 year return-period floods. The total cost of component C was US$ 85.7 million. The main benefits of preventing floods in the affected areas include protection of – agricultural crops, mainly rice; residential houses, businesses, and other private infrastructure; public buildings such as school and health care facilities; roads, bridges; and other communication structures. Only the protection of rice crop from flood damage was considered for this analysis and hence the benefits are underestimated.

29 The Main Survey Report does not quantify the amount of increase in income of the beneficiaries attributable to the project

benefits. The baseline survey with 3018 households was conducted in 2010. The final household survey with 960 households was

conducted in 2017. The same households were not sampled in the baseline and final surveys. 30 Total percent is the average of types weighted by the number of beneficiaries for each type.


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46. Assuming the return probability of 1-in-25 year flood is increased to one-in-five years, the IRR is calculated to be 20.9 percent. The NPV is in the range of US$ 46 million and US$ 166 million, with the BCR in the range of 2 and 3.5 assuming the discount rates of 12 and 6 percent respectively.

47. The overall economic performance of the project is based on the weighted average of the conservative estimates of

the IRR, and BCR for components B and C.

Table 5: Overall economic performance of the project

Component Cost IRR NPV BCR

Discount rates → 12% 6% 12% 6%

Component B: Shelters $190.8 22.4% 181 691 2.3 3.7

Component C: Embankments $85.7 20.9% 46 166 2.0 3.5

Overall $276.4 21.9% 227 857 2.2 3.7

Impact on efficiency due to delays, Cost-overruns and planned vs. actual timeframe

48. Restructurings and a ten-year implementation saw unit costs rise but they did not adversely affect achievement of outcome. Between 2008-2017, average unit cost for construction of new shelter increased by 52% and for rehabilitation by 41%31. These cost increases take into account the improvement in design32 as the project progressed. Unit costs also increased for embankment works (by 111%) and water control structure (by 37%) between 2008 and 2012. Eventual cost efficiency was achieved due to adjustment in scope, prioritization and effective technical design, and works were mostly completed within cost estimates.

49. There were delays in completion of contracts for embankment and shelter works. In areas vulnerable to recurring disasters, there were delays of up to 35 months for new shelters (avg. delay of 11.53 months) 33, and up to 46 months34 for embankment rehabilitation (avg. delay 12.3 months). This prolonged the vulnerability of populations, agricultural land and assets to disaster risk for longer than intended. For example, in some areas where installation of gates for repairing sluices/inlet structures were delayed, the target beneficiary farmers were deprived of irrigation facilities for one complete year incurring production loss of around 2000 metric tons of food grain with monetary value of around US$477,000 (BDT40.00 Million)35. It is important to recognize that there are inherent challenges associated with timely completion of large infrastructure works such as rehabilitation of embankments in remote and climate vulnerable areas, as outlined in the section on key factors affecting implementation.

31 Data based on 3rd revised DPP for LGED. 32 Upgrades included using floor tiles instead of CC patent stone, steel door shutters, aluminum sliding windows with glass, solar

panel and rain water harvesting. 33 Data from BWDB and LGED process monitoring reports and MPRs. 34 Two contracts were terminated in 2013 with 12%-38% work remaining. Work was resumed in 2014 and completed in Mar 2016. Target date of completion was May and Aug 2012 for the two contracts. This delay affected a considerably small portion of land and beneficiaries 35 Quarterly Progress Report, July 2017, BWDB


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Figure 1: Infrastructure works delay analysis

Rating: Modest

D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING

50. The overall outcome rating is Moderately Satisfactory. The ECRRP multi-sector operation achieved its intended outcomes in a complex environment and even after ten years, remains highly relevant due to Bangladesh’s high vulnerability to recurring disasters and climate change. With the additional financings, the project achieved more than three times its original goals – benefiting over three times the population and achieving 5-6 times the original shelter and embankment targets. It also laid critical foundation for disaster risk management and preparedness in Bangladesh. However, there were considerable shortcomings in efficiency. Being an emergency recovery project, a delayed start and progress in implementation deferred much-needed benefits to cyclone-affected vulnerable populations. In addition, there are residual safeguards risks related to pending resettlement compensation payments, that impact the ratings36.

36 The GoB and Bank team have put in place mechanisms like locking in and transferring funds to District Commissioners, who are legally required to make payments, along with a six-month grace-period and follow-up arrangements within CEIP-1 project, to reduce the risk of non-payment to the extent possible. (See sections III and IV for more details on this).

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E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY)

Gender 51. The disproportionate impact of disasters on women, children and vulnerable populations including the poor,

elderly and female-headed households is widely acknowledged. In Bangladesh, the gender gap in mortality rates shrunk from 14:1 in 1991 (Cyclone Gorky) to 5:1 in 2007 when Cyclone Sidr hit, by specifically addressing cultural reasons why women were reluctant to use cyclone shelters37. Through targeted livelihood interventions and disaster resilience building activities (shelter, embankments), the Project has had a direct and positive impact on strengthening resilience of women.

52. Since women play a key role in the production of rice - seed processing, storage and incubation before sowing into seedbed, etc. – trainings were provided to women farmers at Farmer Field Schools (FFS) on knowledge of proper seed/grain processing, nutrition messages and homestead gardening. FFS trainings and inputs also contributed to economic empowerment of women, illustrated by instances where female beneficiaries increased their annual income four-fold by using ECRRP livestock inputs and training, turning some into entrepreneurs, from daily wage laborer. Of the total agriculture beneficiaries, 23% were women.

53. ECRRP multi-purpose disaster shelter design addresses specific needs of women and children. Separate facilities have been designed for women and children during and after extreme weather events. Shelters have a dedicated room for pregnant and lactating women.

Institutional Strengthening 54. The multi-sectoral nature of the project facilitated strengthening the capacity of LGED, BWDB, DDM and Planning

Commission’s Project Coordination and Monitoring Unit (PCMU) to not only implement ECRRP but also prepare large-scale infrastructure projects like MDSP and CEIP, along with enhanced technical and fiduciary capacity. ECRRP enhanced the institutional capacity of LGED and BWDB through onsite training and overseas trainings on climate change and coastal resilience; information and communications technology (ICT); safeguards; works procurement/contract management and overall disaster recovery and management. PCMU had overseas and onsite training on procurement, financial and contract management through ECRPP. With this increased capacity, PCMU is now implementing another multi-ministerial project, World Bank financed US$173 million Urban Resilience Project(URP).

55. Activities under component D largely focused on strengthening the institutional capacity of DDM. The inputs and capacity building activities of ECRRP supported DDM for the first time to undertake an urban resilience initiative in Bangladesh under URP. In addition, DDM’s overall engagement in the global policy dialogue of the disaster risk management agenda was also strengthened with the support of ECRRP, jointly with JICA38.

III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME

A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION

56. Sound need-based and analytical foundation: ECRRP’s design and activities were built on robust needs analysis,

prioritization and a long-term plan to strengthen DRM as part of the JDLNA. Agricultural sector recovery activities in ECRRP were based on FAO’s emergency recovery program derived from a damage and loss assessment carried out by FAO on GoB’s request in December 2007. The basic design of shelters was based on a study carried out by

37 Gender Action Plan 2016-2021, GFDRR 38 2015, World Bank and JICA jointly launched two projects to increase urban resilience supporting DDM. Supported by the World

Bank, DDM presented the urban resilience approaches on building urban resilience at various international forums since 2015.


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Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET) and Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS) in 1993, with upgrades based on global experience. The project’s component on disaster risk reduction built upon the progress of GoB’s Comprehensive Disaster Management Program that was making significant progress in areas of institutional capacity building, especially at the local level, such as implementing Community Risk Assessments, community level risk reduction action plans and small-scale risk mitigation interventions

57. Adequacy of objective and targets: The Project objective was adequate given that it was designed to cover a portion of the recovery and restoration needs of livelihoods and critical infrastructure damaged after Cyclone Sidr, and to build preparedness capacity, given the country’s high vulnerability to disasters. The project focused on building capacity of critical agencies in the GoB and target communities instead of the piece-meal interventions. Original targets were ambitious given the limited funding and capacity of the implementing agencies at the time, known climate related challenges and poor contractual capacity in the country.

58. Institutional capacity: At the time of appraisal, LGED and BWDB had experience in implementing multiple Bank-funded projects, including a 2007 emergency flood project, but its FM capacity required strengthening. The Planning Commission, agency responsible for coordinating a complex multi-sectoral project had not implemented any Bank funded project.

59. Government commitment: The Project benefitted from high-level government commitment during preparation and implementation. There were challenges related to agency-level commitment during preparation primarily due to lack of experience in recovery projects. Approval of all DPPs (development project proforma) by the GoB before administrative changes in 2009, helped mitigate any potential delays. To enable implementing agencies to procure quickly, the GoB issued General Procurement Notices (GPN) well before Board approval.

60. Readiness for implementation: At the time of preparation, the government did not have adequate capacity to undertake a multi-sectoral project spanning multiple ministries. A special PCMU was created by GoB to deal with capacity and coordination issues. Emergency preparation allowed safeguards requirements to be deferred until implementation. Many aspects of the project like sub-project locations, results framework including intervention targets, etc. were kept flexible until all implementation arrangements were in place. Issuance of the GPN prepared agencies to issue expression of interests. However, ECRRP took almost two years until all implementation arrangements were in place, for reasons discussed below.

B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION Factors subject to government and/or implementing entities control

61. Delays in initial contracting for works and consultancies significantly delayed implementation after effectiveness. For example, consultants for embankment works were only mobilized in November 2009 and the first contract package was awarded in October 2010, almost two years after effectiveness. Despite single-source hiring of FAO, the contract was signed 13 months after board approval, mainly on account of efforts to align processes among FAO, GoB and the Bank. Recruitment of project’s technical and administrative staff in the PCMU was also only approved by June 2010. Some of the delays were also attributed to application of regular implementation procedures in selecting consultants and developing ESMFs and, building fiduciary capacity of Project staff to comply with Bank procedures39.

62. Contract management issues: Contractor capacity, seasonality and remoteness posed considerable challenge to smooth implementation. These were accompanied by several contract management issues that slowed down

39 Restructuring Paper 2010.


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project progress, especially for shelter and embankment works. For example, fraudulent practices by bidders were found in a few shelter works packages and concerned bidders were debarred by LGED40. Contract management issues were especially pronounced in the embankment rehabilitation works, contributing to slow implementation progress. The MTR found the remedial action against non-performing contractors (for embankment) inadequate. Poorly performing contracts were later terminated with penalty41 and contracting for 11 polders had to be stopped in 2013 due to poor performance of contracts. Due to slow progress of physical rehabilitation works, US$ 25 million was curtailed from the embankment works component and diverted to other components42.

63. Progress of three embankment works contracts awarded in 2014-15 suffered from issues like shortage of

resources, skilled personnel (engineers and site managers) and equipment, contractor inexperience in construction and repair of water control structures, delay in geo-bag dumping, and restrictions linked to import of hard rocks. Lack of progress was also attributed to high staff turnover, multiple approval layers leading to inflexibility, insufficient fiduciary capacity and, inadequate performance and resources for consultancy contracts. Land acquisition and river erosion issues also contributed to the delays (discussed below). BWDB strengthened its procurement and FM mechanisms over time, addressing some of the constraints. Cost-neutral time extensions were given to complete works, along with strong technical support from BWDB and World Bank teams to improve speed and quality of works.

64. Flexibility in procedures and adaptability of design: During implementation, the project undertook a dynamic

feedback-based adaptation approach and made improvements. For example, technological inputs to farmers like mechanical rice dryers and new boat designs were dropped due to low adoption, packages were increased from 1 cow per 3 households to 1 cow per household and the number of target beneficiaries was increased based on household survey feedback. Community feedback was also critical in improvement of design of shelters. Achievement of outcomes despite various revisions was aided by efficient use of a Project Steering Committee (PSC) that expedited approvals for revisions in the DPPs.

65. Resettlement and Land acquisition: During project implementation, following the dynamic coastal processes and

large-scale riverbank erosion, it was necessary in several instances, to change the alignment of the retired embankments, where embankment was eroded away. Given the emergency nature of the works and the vulnerability of the people in the coastal region to disasters, the affected people requested that works be carried out soon. They agreed to make land available for civil works while land acquisition, top-up, and resettlement payments were being processed43. However due to delay in resettlement and land acquisition payments, completion of rehabilitation work was delayed44. The project had to be extended in 2017 to allow completion of all works and payment of all expenses related to land acquisition. A six-month extension of the disbursement grace period was granted to BWDB to complete the compensation payments to the titled land owners.

66. The legal process for land acquisition and resettlement payment is slow and multi-layered. It takes about 12-15

months, from the initial surveys to compensation delivery. Complexities linked to land titling due to incomplete and faulty ownership records delay it even further. The Deputy Commissioner (Head of District Administration) is the sole authority to acquire land on behalf of the Government of Bangladesh. Once the resources are allocated to the Deputy Commissioner’s office, it is legally obliged to carry out payments. When embankments show clear signs of imminent breach, or when breaches already begin occurring, local communities and authorities demand immediate protective measures. This leaves insufficient time for land acquisition and compensation payment

40 As recorded in the Aide Memoire for the Mid-Term Review Mission (November 8-19, 2012 and January 8-16, 2013) 41 Contractors obtained court stay order but after having failed to deliver on time, contracts were again terminated. 42 Quarterly Progress Report No. 23, BWDB 43 Community consent was recorded in meeting minutes and consent forms signed by affected land owners and local representatives present at the time of those consultations. 44 See safeguard section for detailed discussion on the land acquisition and payment issue


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before starting civil works. Factors outside the control of government and/or implementing entities

67. Strikes and blockades: Numerous hartals (strikes) and blockades during the course of the project, with maximum between January 2013 – January 2014, hampered project implementation, supervision, monitoring and financial and operational delivery.

68. Natural disasters, extreme weather and seasonal issues: Cyclone Aila hit the Southern Coastal belt on 25 May 2009 which caused additional damages to polders targeted by ECRRP, requiring additional financing and time extensions. Cyclone Mora, heavy and incessant rainfall between March and November 2017, high tide and flooding affected infrastructure works, especially embankment rehabilitation, washing away under-construction embankments, inundating work sites, delaying earthwork and transportation of labor and material, requiring further extension of the closing date by six months, to June 2018. The monsoon and long rainy season limits construction window in Bangladesh to seven months45.

69. Accessibility: Difficulty in transporting material to remote locations, that were only accessible by boat, emerged

as a significant challenge, only exacerbated during heavy rains and floods. In some cases, contractors are reported to have dug sections of their own canals to get materials to site.

70. Contractor experience: Local contractors that were awarded the contracts had relatively less experience and

capacity to undertake works of this magnitude. Some contractors, especially those mainly operating in non-coastal areas, did not have adequate experience to deal with construction challenges in coastal areas. Even in ICBs, the lack of participation on the part of joint venture partner resulted in the inadequate capacity of contractors particularly in adopting the standard contract management processes46.

IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)

M&E Design 71. The M&E design of the project was inadequate to start with and gradually improved to a moderately satisfactory

level. Due to the emergency nature of the project, the original results framework was designed as a “best guess” in terms of the project’s proposed achievements47. The original outcome indicators were neither defined nor adequately aligned with the PDO in order to measure the “recovery of livelihood and infrastructure” or long-term preparedness building. The results framework was improved, better aligned and made more measurable with each additional financing and restructuring. The improved indicator for livelihoods was only partially helpful in measuring the PDO outcome as “recovery of livelihood” was not defined by the Project, nor were recovery proxies like improvement in yield or income were used as targets. The target for the PDO indicator 3 was not well defined which made it difficult to measure the achievement of the PDO. Intermediate indicators were also refined gradually and were helpful in measuring the implementation and achievement of project interventions.

45 The dry season is from November to February. The monsoon season is from June through August. In a given year, the main construction

season especially for embankments and associated concreting works is only about seven months. Completion of works depended on when

contracts began. 46 Quarterly Progress Report – BWDB (September 2015) 47 Project Paper, ECRRP Additional Financing 2013


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72. There were discrepancies between the indicators and target numbers recorded in the PAD results framework and those reported in the ISR. For example, the protective infrastructure indicator does not appear until the first restructuring in 2013. However, it was being reported on since October 2010. While the 2015 restructuring paper records no changes in the indicator and only in targets to align with the revised scope, the result frameworks in the ISRs indicate changes in the PDO indicators.

M&E Implementation 73. Data collection for the assessment of intermediate outcomes and component-wise activities was carried out

during implementation through agency-based reporting, centralized at the independent M&E consultancy firm housed at the PCMU. The firm was responsible for overall monitoring and supervision of the implementation of various components including sub-project level social and environmental management plans. M&E consultants were only mobilized in March 2010. This led to the baseline study being concluded June 2011, 2.5 years into credit effectiveness. Hence the baseline provided could not be used to determine the full impact of the project.

74. Consolidated Quarterly and Annual Progress Reports were prepared and submitted to PCMU and the Bank regularly. A Project Monitoring Information System (PMIS) was to be established for project use but due to limited stakeholder access, the project resorted to M&E consultants responding to data queries from implementing agencies, instead of using PMIS. Post-MTR, field surveys were conducted in 2013, 2014 and 2017 (requirement was to conduct one every year) to assess the impacts of the project intervention through household surveys and FGDs. Impact evaluation reports went beyond assessing indicators outlined in the results framework and included more relevant indicators like income, expenditure, poverty incidence, effectiveness of utilization of shelters and embankments, etc. However, the impact evaluation survey design was inadequate (see annex for detailed discussion on M&E design and methodology).

75. M&E implementation was hampered by poor M&E firm performance. The original firm hired for M&E (SMEC) was

replaced with a national firm in September 2014 after SMEC’s refusal to continue the consultancy services without foreign consultants and Project’s dissatisfaction with the firm’s performance, especially with respect to sub-standard reporting, tracking of key indicators and monitoring of implementation for EMPs. In addition to the M&E firm, implementing agencies also carried out regular M&E through regular beneficiary and stakeholder feedback and regular reporting which helped in M&E utilization and improvement in intervention designs.

M&E Utilization 76. Consolidated monthly, quarterly and annual progress reports (QPRs, MPRs and APRs), and impact surveys

prepared by M&E consultants were shared with implementing agencies and PSC for reporting on and improving operations. In response to feedback from beneficiaries as reported in M&E QPRs, internal agency reporting mechanisms and robust Bank engagement with the agencies, changes in resource allocation, modification in project implementation, and remedial measures were made.

Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E 77. The overall rating of Quality of M&E is Modest. There were shortcomings in the M&E system’s design and

implementation, making it somewhat difficult to assess the achievement of the outcomes.

B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE

Social Safeguards Compliance

78. Being processed under OP 8.50, a full-fledged Environmental and Social Assessment was not carried out during appraisal. The project used a Social/Resettlement Policy Framework (S/RPF) prepared during early implementation stages. The only social safeguards policy triggered by the project was OP 4.12 – Involuntary Resettlement applicable for components A, B and C. Social issues associated with the project refer to inclusion,


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participation, grievance management, land acquisition and population displacement. Social management plans (SMP) following the S/RPF were prepared and followed during implementation of subprojects under component B. Resettlement action plans (RAP) were prepared for all 28 polders and largely implemented.

79. Challenges in Land Acquisition and Compensation Payment: Rehabilitation of coastal embankments under

component C involved acquisition of land and displacement of people. Works for rehabilitation of coastal embankments by BWDB involved involuntary resettlement in 28 out of 29 polders and land acquisition in 12 of them (which started in 2016 due to emergency situations resulting from riverbank erosion). Resettlement of involuntarily displaced squatters was largely completed. Land acquisition compensation payment was complete in 7 polders and as of loan closing on June 30, 2018, 2,614 out of the 4,225 eligible land owners and 983 out of the 995 eligible squatters were paid. At the time of finalizing the ICR, payment for land acquisition compensation was at around 65% as of November 2018 (from 61% as of loan closing). This lengthy process, added with the vulnerability of the coastal riverbanks to erosion, posed a challenge for land acquisition and compensation payment to the affected land owners.

80. Measures undertaken by Bank and GoB to mitigate risk of non-payment of pending compensation: For ECRRP,

all landowners have been identified and responsible DCs have received the specified funds from BWDB, and are accordingly making land compensation payments. In addition, BWDB has also developed a system to monitor household-wise compensation payment status for each affected person against their legal land records. This also includes person-specific reasons constraining compensation payment. Based on the analysis, BWDB has also developed a time-bound action plan to address case-specific tailbacks in land acquisition (LA) payment. A six-month extension of the disbursement grace period until April 2019 was granted by the Bank to BWDB to complete the compensation payments to the squatters and titled landowners. While the amount has been transferred and locked in the account of District Commissioner’s office, the additional monitoring of all payments to remaining affected squatters and land owners had been assigned to the Project Management Unit (PMU) of BWDB for the ongoing IDA-financed CEIP-I. The PMU will track, catalyze and coordinate with the DC offices for completing payments to the remaining affected landowners and report to the World Bank on a monthly basis.

Procurement

81. A procurement risk assessment carried out during preparation phase assessed the risk as substantial. In the initial stage of the project implementation, the procurement capacity of the project office was weak in terms of procurement planning and bid evaluation. In the implementation stage, the procurement risk was substantial and procurement performance was moderately satisfactory through most of the implementation. The contract packages were designed as large value contracts, which sometimes resulted in a single bid and in other cases, in repetitive and rotational bidders.

82. BWDB had significant issues in contract management. Contractors did not submit monthly statements of works progress. Monitoring of contractors’ work progress by implementing agencies was initially inadequate but improved with strengthened capacity and technical support. This resulted in substantial delay in work completion. BWDB had to amend three large contracts for time extensions. In 2016, LGED started using e-GP for procurement, which accelerated LGED’s procurement process. Procurement post review (PPR) did not flag any major issue concerning procurement activities carried out by BWDB, LGED or DDM.

83. Lessons learnt from the two terminated contracts (see para 60) were applied during implementation to significantly improve procurement processes in BWDB. BWDB largely began using ICB contracts, established use of procurement planning and set up procurement panel consisting of international and national consultants (procurement and technical). The Bank is also encouraging the use of similar procurement mechanisms for other infrastructure projects in Bangladesh.


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Financial Management: 84. A robust financial management assessment of all the implementing agencies under ECRRP was carried out during

the preparation phase of the project in accordance with OP/BP 10.02 to identify financial management risks and mitigation measures with the view to design an appropriate set of financial management arrangements, designed to provide assurance that project proceeds were used for the purpose intended. FM risk was rated Substantial at preparation stage and remained the same mainly due to the complex nature of the project activities and fund flow mechanism.

85. Based on the initial risk assessment at the preparation stage, a time-bound FM action plan was prepared and agreed with the implementing agencies, then followed up on during the supervision missions. FM performance of the project was found Moderately Satisfactory for a large part of the project life and there are no material pending issues from the agreed FM action plan. The interim unaudited financial reports were submitted to the Bank in a timely manner and the Bank found them acceptable based on its desk reviews in most cases. Annual project financial statements were audited by the Foreign Aided Project Audit Directorate [FAPAD] under C&AG and the auditors have expressed mostly unqualified audit opinions though there were a number of audit observations reported in each year’s audit report, with no pending material audit observations. As implementation progressed, the FM capacity of all the agencies was observed to have significantly increased.

C. BANK PERFORMANCE

Quality at Entry

86. The Bank team worked closely with GoB to ensure that ECRRP’s design had disciplined adherence to address the needs emerging out of JDLNA and the country’s long-term DRM needs. The Bank incorporated lessons learnt from its past disaster recovery projects in Bangladesh and made use of existing GoB programs like CDMP48 and complementarity with other MDBs. For example, rehabilitation of roads, despite a major road network being damaged in the cyclone, was not included in the design due to the lessons learned from 2004 floods where the sector faced significant implementation challenges. The Bank concluded that ADB had an ongoing project in the sector and had better arrangements to address that need.

87. While the project was processed under emergency procedures, it is unclear why the Bank team envisaged Bank

Approval not before September (7 months from concept), as noted by the Bank team in the preparation mission note (April 2008). However, the Bank regularly guided GoB during preparation for quick implementation readiness. For e.g. the team worked with the client to expedite the General Procurement Notice to call for EOIs that would allow LGED and BWDB to engage firms immediately after credit approval. The draft GPN was submitted by the client before Board approval on 30th September 2008.

88. Flexibility in design, allocations and project areas at the time of appraisal gave the Project significant adaptability

in a highly climate vulnerable environment. Given the well-known seasonality issues in Bangladesh that could impact implementation of works (which later delayed most works completion), inclusion of climatic/hazard contingencies would have strengthened the technical appraisal.

89. The team recognized lessons from 2004 and 2007 projects on use of simple designs for emergency recovery

operations and implementation arrangements for a project like ECRRP were simplified to the extent possible. However, with 6 components, involving 6 different ministries, the implementation arrangement of the project was complicated by the fact that Planning Commission, entrusted with coordination through the PCMU, had never implemented a Bank project. This was however mitigated to an extent by designing separate components/sub-components on and allocations for supervision and consultations which provided adequate

48 Comprehensive Disaster Management Program


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resources, monitoring efficiency and clear guidance to the PCMU and concerned agencies while implementing various components. Clear guidance was provided by the Bank to counterparts for preparing the project. For example, guiding LGED to coordinate with MoPE and DMB to identify schools to be converted into shelters and initiating a process to get design and supervision consultant onboard before credit effectiveness. The Bank did well to identify the need for single-source arrangement with FAO early on during preparation mission, in order to expedite implementation right after Board approval. However, challenges like reconciliation of procurement and auditing rights issues between FAO and the Bank were not addressed at the time, contributing to substantial implementation delay (13 months) of the agriculture component.

90. Risks were adequately identified during appraisal, including some key risks related to FM capacity, beneficiary

targeting, governance, etc. that surfaced during implementation. However, widely known critical risks related to seasonality, inaccessibility and low capacity of local contractors could have been included, which could have put in place ready mitigation measures during implementation. Higher price and physical contingencies could have been included in cost estimates to make allowances for future escalations, as the team, during preparation, did envisage an increase in scope if additional funding became available and cost escalations did become a factor later.

91. Robust M&E arrangements were envisaged during appraisal and including a well-defined component on M&E

provided the necessary focus, resources and clear impact-oriented terms of reference for the M&E firm. However, M&E quality at entry was weakened as the original outcome indicators were neither defined nor adequately aligned with the PDO in order to measure the “recovery of livelihood and infrastructure” or long-term preparedness building.

Quality of Supervision 92. The team provided regular and close supervision, undertaking 28 support missions and frequent technical

missions. This is despite accessibility challenges due to remoteness of project locations. The ISRs and Aide Memoires were candid about the project's performance across components. The team remained responsive to changes in circumstances during implementation and worked with GoB counterparts to make the adequate design, contract management, and other relevant changes based on field visits, consultation with implementing agencies and M&E feedback. Supervision was strengthened by appointing dedicated Bank staff for coordination and support to each implementing agency. Component A supervision was aided by the inclusion of an agriculture expert who had vast experience working in Bangladesh’s agriculture sector and with FAO and GoB’s implementing departments.

93. The MTR was delayed by over two years, close to completion of the original credit. This left little scope to adjust

activities that were nearing completion under the original credit, like the agriculture component. For example, needs were identified during the MTR to better integrate crops, livestock and aquaculture activities since rural farmers carry out more than one activity. However, cross-training of farmers was recommended only during the supervision mission in January 2014, four months before the extended closing date and completion of the component. The Bank worked closely with GoB to improve FM capacity of counterpart, but challenges remained. Despite need for another FM specialist in DDM being identified during the MTR, the Planning Commission did not clear the recruitment (September 2014) and the Bank agreed that a separate FM specialist was no longer required. However, by December 2014, with the resignation of FM and procurement specialists, the Bank deemed that recruitment of FM specialist was an urgent need.

94. The Bank team provided regular technical and contract management guidance to LGED and BWDB in order to accelerate the project’s physical and financial progress. Measures recommended and adopted included enlarging work packages, strengthening FM capacity at district levels and reducing contract period for timely completion. BWDB’s slow progress, primarily due to inadequate contract management, led to the component


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being rated “Unsatisfactory” by the Bank thrice between 2013-2016. The Bank team, in some cases, guided the implementing agencies on remedial measures like closing non-performing contracts; penalties and liquated damages etc. Contract sizes were increased which attracted experienced and technically qualified bidders (due to 2% bid security). Some contracts were shifted from local to ICB procurement.

95. Between 2016-18, the Bank team undertook 16 technical missions (in addition to the required Supervision

missions) to accelerate progress, follow up on the safeguards issues, land acquisition and involuntary resettlement process. Eventually, these efforts led to improved progress in works on BWDB part and the targets were achieved.

96. The Bank provided regular support to BWDB, both in Dhaka and on project sites, to expedite the payment

progress for resettlement and land acquisition. As described in Section B above, this included supporting the BWDB in establishing a rigorous monitoring mechanism and developing a time-bound action plan to address case-specific tailbacks in LA Payment, a six-month extension of the disbursement grace period to complete pending compensation payments, and arrangements for additional monitoring of payments by the Project Management Unit (PMU) of BWDB for the ongoing IDA-financed CEIP-I.

97. In absence of inadequate evaluative material provided by the M&E firm, the Bank teams worked directly with implementing agencies to get the required data and conducted evaluative studies to examine effectiveness of project activities. For example, improvements were made to the shelter design based on a human-centered design study commissioned by the Project to assess challenges to shelter utilization after a cyclone in 2013.

Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance 98. Overall Bank performance is considered Moderately Satisfactory. Complex project design and implementation

arrangements, longer timeframe to Board despite use of emergency procedures, lower benchmarks for implementation readiness, results framework and client capacity reflected shortcomings in quality at entry that delayed initial implementation, a crucial phase in emergency recovery. Inadequate evaluation data, pending safeguard issues and extended project timeframe also affected implementation. Nevertheless, the Bank’s strong and relentless technical supervision and guidance to implementing agencies, especially in the latter half of the project, helped achieve the outcome targets.

D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME 99. As of loan closing, 2,614 out of the 4,225 eligible land owners and 983 out of the 995 eligible squatters were

paid for land acquisition and resettlement undertaken during the project. Payment progress is 65% for land payments as of November 2018 (from 61% as of loan closing). While risks of non-payment remains, considerable efforts have been made by the Bank and GoB to mitigate those risks, as detailed in the compliance section above, to minimize the risk of non-payment. The CEIP-1 PMU will closely attend and coordinate with the DCs and BWDB has committed to complete the payments by end April 2019. Given the lengthy government procedures and barriers for remotely located eligible recipients and those with poorly recorded land inheritance, the likelihood of completion of a small portion of payments remains uncertain.

100. Operations and maintenance provisions were supported by the Project for shelters and embankments. For

shelters, the O&M has been carried out by the School Management Committee (SMC) and completed shelters are handed over to MoPE. BWDB engaged the contractors to conduct emergency/O&M works regularly throughout the project period. In case there is insufficient O&M budget allocation from respective ministries, it is likely to pose a risk to the effectiveness of protective infrastructure in reducing risk to future disasters.

101. Climate change and recurring natural disasters in project areas situated in vulnerable coastal Bangladesh are

likely to pose risk to infrastructures where emergency repairs were undertaken.


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V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

102. Supporting country systems to better prepare for emergency projects is critical for timely and impactful response. For countries like Bangladesh that are vulnerable to recurring disasters and climate change, it is critical to provide them support to put in place expedited procedures for emergencies, corresponding with Bank’s emergency procedures. There is a need to establish capacities and efficient institutional arrangements to have a well-functioning government system rapidly responding to emergency recovery needs. This can be done through measures like having a Disaster Recovery Framework to ensure that post-disaster recovery is quicker, stronger and more inclusive. This implies the strengthening of recovery systems by ensuring that institutional arrangements, financing mechanisms, recovery policies, and accelerated implementation measures (procurement, FM, M&E) are in place before a disaster strikes. The Bank can support the government in developing strategic planning/operation manual for safeguard and fiduciary processes, including guidance on framework agreements to be place in advance. Country systems can also be strengthened through improved safety nets and financial preparedness mechanisms like Catastrophe Drawdown Options (Cat DDOs).

103. Multi-sectoral projects require adequate planning for multi-sectoral coordination and implementation

arrangements: The ECRRP had six agencies, each under a different ministry, responsible for implementing various components. The project demonstrated that building strong capacity of Coordination and Monitoring Units (PCMU) to support line ministries can help mitigate risks associated with complex implementation arrangements. Efforts must be made to streamline emergency processes (including fiduciary) through an institution within the government that leads central coordination during emergencies. This includes the need for a clearer delineation of roles between the coordination unit and among the different actors involved. Within the concerned Ministry, a streamlined implementation procedure for different implementing agencies, instead of multiple arrangements, must be established. Multi-sectoral interventions should also take into account government’s fiduciary clearance procedures to enable most efficient decision making.

104. There is a need to accelerate and strengthen land acquisition procedures for emergency situations. In

Bangladesh, current legal land acquisition and compensation process can take at least 12-15 months, which poses a challenge when undertaking critical emergency works. In order to balance the need for urgent infrastructure works and following due process, the Bank should support country-level reforms in the land acquisition process, or at the minimum, agree with the government to allow accelerated procedures for emergency works. Use of technology to support digitization and updating of land ownership records and identity verification should also be explored.

105. Preparing a well-defined results and M&E framework for emergency projects enhances achievement of

outcome. There is a linear and positive correlation between M&E quality and project outcomes. While preparing emergency projects, teams find it challenging to focus on establishing a robust M&E framework. Institutions in countries like Bangladesh can immensely benefit from development of standardized guidelines/products to help prepare more nuanced and fine-tuned M&E for disaster recovery projects. Use of technologies like remote sensing, social media and data analytics, mobile data collection through apps like Kobo toolbox or Open Data kit for M&E should be encouraged. This can help develop real-time feedback loop and identify areas of concerns and inefficiencies, which can be addressed faster, making interventions more dynamic and cost-effective. Since emergency projects are prepared rapidly, baseline studies must be conducted before or immediately after project approval to capture the pre-project data required to measure the impact of the project. In addition to developing SMART indicators, clear definition of terms like “recovery” and “resilience” in the PAD and results framework is important for measuring outcomes and linking inputs with outcome-level impact.


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106. Regular community consultations throughout the project can guide the appropriate choice of investments

and generate practical improvements to increase impact. Early involvement of project beneficiaries and multiple stakeholders in the rehabilitation and construction of disaster shelters was crucial to the appropriate design and usefulness of the shelters, in particular for expecting mothers. In livelihood recovery activities, constant beneficiary feedback led to continuous improvements in design, change in inputs.

107. In order to reap the benefits of using UN agencies for some specialized project activities, it is essential to

identify and streamline fiduciary and oversight arrangements early. Financial Management Framework Agreement (FMFA) and Fiduciary Principles Accord (FPA) are in place between the UN and the World Bank. Despite FPAs and FMFAs, it is critical that fiduciary processes are streamlined and specifics worked out at respective HQs to help country-level offices focus on rapid implementation.

108. Timely completion of projects in climate vulnerable and remote regions require enhanced contract

management measures. Contractors are expected to build seasonality into their work plan and unit rates, e.g. including cost of idle machinery and extra resources to compensate for lack of progress in rainy period. While seasonal rains can be planned for, the project experienced extreme weather events that delayed completion of works. Climate-risk informed work planning at the early stages of the project can help the client draw contractor’s attention to challenges in climate-vulnerable areas49. Critical Path Based Planning (CPB) can be undertaken with seasonality built into it. Well-trained and dedicated contract management capacity at all levels, separate from procurement, is critical to timely delivery of project outcomes. Training on FIDIC type contracts and contract management training for relevant personal including project directors and procurement staff must be encouraged (through OLC or at ILO’s Turin center for advanced contract management).

49 World Bank’s Climate and Disaster Risk Screening, GFDRR’s Think Hazard and use of downscaled climate risk analytics platforms

can help provide this information.


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ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS

A. RESULTS INDICATORS A.1 PDO Indicators Objective/Outcome: Facilitate recovery from damage to livelihoods and build long-term preparedness

Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Formally Revised

Target

Actual Achieved at Completion

Direct project beneficiaries Number 0.00 1300000.00 4360000.00 4800000.00

28-Dec-2008 28-Jun-2013 31-Dec-2017 15-Jun-2017

Comments (achievements against targets): Project exceeded overall targets


Target


Recovery of agriculture sector and livelihoods for cyclone affected populations

Text 0 107,500 farmers

Crops: 224,000 HH

Livestock: 33,000 HH

Fisheries: 26,700 HH

Crops : 230,000 HHLivestock : 38,000 HHFisheries: 37,000 HH

24-Dec-2008 28-Jun-2013 31-Dec-2015 30-Jun-2014


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Comments (achievements against targets): Project exceeded targets

Objective/Outcome: Facilitate recovery from damage to infrastructure and long-term preparedness


Target


Direct project beneficiaries Number 0.00 1300000.00 4360000.00 4800000.00

28-Dec-2008 28-Jun-2013 31-Dec-2017 15-Jun-2017



Target


Reduced risk to cyclone affected population due to rehabilitation of protective infrastructure (e.g. embankments, disaster shelters)

Text 0 1300000 4360000 4800000

24-Dec-2008 28-Jun-2013 31-Dec-2017 15-Jun-2017



Target


Strengthened disaster risk management in the

Text Limited capacity Satisfactory

Improved response during emergencies

Emergency equipment in use, community


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government based early warning system set up

24-Dec-2008 28-Jun-2013 31-Dec-2017 15-Jun-2017

Comments (achievements against targets): Target achieved

A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators

Component: Recovery of Agriculture Sector and Improvement Program


Target


Number of Agriculture Equipment (Power tillers, Power threshers, Hand sprayer) distributed

Number 0.00 0.00 2530.00 2969.00

24-Dec-2008 28-Jun-2013 30-Jun-2014 30-Jun-2014

Comments (achievements against targets): Target achievement exceeded. Indicator did not exist in the original credit


Target


Improved rice seeds distributed (in MT)

Number 0.00 0.00 500.00 501.00

24-Dec-2008 28-Jun-2013 30-Jun-2014 30-Jun-2014

Comments (achievements against targets): Target achievement exceeded. Indicator did not exist in the original credit


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Target


Total fertilizers distributed (in MT)

Number 0.00 0.00 6682.00 6894.00

24-Dec-2008 28-Jun-2013 30-Jun-2014 30-Jun-2014

Comments (achievements against targets): Target achieved. Indicator did not exist in the original credit


Target


Number of livestock (cow, goat/sheep) distributed

Number 0.00 0.00 280500.00 240681.00

24-Dec-2008 28-Jun-2013 30-Jun-2014 30-Jun-2014

Comments (achievements against targets): Target partially achieved. Indicator did not exist in the original credit


Target


Number of dairy production facilities (cattle sheds and portable poultry sheds) distributed

Number 0.00 0.00 32300.00 30957.00

24-Dec-2008 28-Jun-2013 30-Jun-2014 30-Jun-2014

Comments (achievements against targets): Target partially achieved. Indicator did not exist in the original credit


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Target


Number of Aquaculture packages (Carp, Golda, Bagda+Tilapia) distributed

Number 0.00 0.00 24850.00 24850.00

24-Dec-2008 28-Jun-2013 30-Jun-2014 30-Jun-2014



Target


Mechanized fishing boats distributed

Number 0.00 0.00 93.00 93.00

24-Dec-2008 28-Jun-2013 30-Jun-2014 30-Jun-2014



Target


Number of Farmers’ Field School (FFS) formed

Number 0.00 0.00 2848.00 2848.00

24-Dec-2008 28-Jun-2013 30-Jun-2014 30-Jun-2014

Comments (achievements against targets): Target achieved. Original target not defined in the original credit

Component: Reconstruction and Improvement of Multipurpose Shelters


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Target


Number of newly constructed shelters with improved design standards and connectivity with the community

Text 0 50 353 352

24-Dec-2008 28-Jun-2013 31-Dec-2017 30-Jun-2017

Comments (achievements against targets): Target achieved. 1 shelter dropped due to land dispute.


Target


Numbers of shelters repaired and improved upon with improved connectivity (such as access roads) with the community

Number 0.00 250.00 460.00 459.00

24-Dec-2008 28-Jun-2013 31-Dec-2017 15-Jun-2017

Comments (achievements against targets): Target achieved. 1 shelter dropped due to irreparable condition.

Component: Rehabilitation of Coastal Embankments


Target


Length of coastal embankments including appurtenant structures

Text 0 100 502 501

24-Dec-2008 28-Jun-2013 31-Dec-2017 15-Jun-2017


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rehabilitated and upgraded with improved design standards

Comments (achievements against targets): Targets achieved

Component: Long-Term Disaster Risk Management Program


Target


Number of emergency vehicles for effective communication and response to disasters

Text 0 N/A

18 18

24-Dec-2008 21-Jun-2013 31-Dec-2015 15-Jun-2017

Comments (achievements against targets): Target achieved. Original indicator and target did not exist in the original credit


Target


Detailed multi-hazard models are used to generate maps

Text No maps exist 100% MRVA Maps and Atlas generated and used

Final Multi-hazard Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (MRVA), Model and Map submitted

24-Dec-2008 28-Jun-2013 31-Dec-2016 27-Dec-2016

Comments (achievements against targets): The MRVA models and atlas has been developed and are being used to generate maps


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Target


Preparation of future operations for the long-term disaster risk reduction program. This includes, RMIP, CEIP, and MDSP.

Text No report 100% Completion of preparation and study reports including design and bidding documents

CEIP, MDSP under implementation, RMIP (RBIP) negotiated.

24-Dec-2008 28-Jun-2013 31-Dec-2017 15-Jun-2017

Comments (achievements against targets): Future operations were prepared are under implementation

Component: Monitoring and Evaluation of Project Impact


Target


Timely submission of quarterly M&E reports

Text No report N/A 31 (24 Quarterly and 7 Annual Progress Reports)

29 (22 Quarterly and 7 Annual Progress Reports)

24-Dec-2008 28-Jun-2013 31-Dec-2017 29-Jun-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): Target partially achieved


Target



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Household survey completed at MTR and once in every year thereafter

Text Baseline survey done in 2010

N/A 4 4 (HH survey report at MTR in 2012, Project Evaluation Report in 2013, Project Evaluation Report in 2014, Impact Evaluation report in 2017)

24-Dec-2008 28-Jun-2013 31-Dec-2017 29-Jun-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): Household surveys were not conducted in 2015 and 2016. Annual reports were produced every year.

Component: Project Management, Technical Assistance, Strategic Studies and Training, and

Emergency Support for Future Disasters


Target


PCMU to capture the results of the project components and submit report at MTR and at project closing

Text No results report N/A Final report on results submitted

Project Completion report submitted at closing

24-Dec-2008 28-Jun-2013 31-Dec-2017 15-Jun-2017

Comments (achievements against targets): Achieved. Indicator did not exist in original credit

Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Formally Revised Actual Achieved at


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Target Completion

Support Strategic study and detailed design for a pilot project identified during project implementation

Text No study N/A Support Strategic study and detailed design for a pilot project identified during project implementation

Strategic studies and detailed designs carried out during implementation. The Coastal Embankment Improvement Project (CEIP) and the Multipurpose Disaster Shelter Project (MDSP) are now under implementation. The River Management Improvement Project (RMIP) was Negotiated

24-Dec-2008 28-Jun-2013 25-Dec-2017 14-Dec-2015

Comments (achievements against targets): Target achieved. CEIP and MDSP are under implementation


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B. KEY OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT

Objective/Outcome 1: Recovery of livelihoods and damage to infrastructure

Outcome Indicators

1.Recovery of agriculture sector and livelihoods for cyclone affected populations

2. Reduced risk to lives and assets due to rehabilitation of protective infrastructure

Intermediate Results Indicators 1.Number of agricultural equipment, inputs distributed 2. Length of coastal embankments rehabilitated 3. Number of disaster shelters rehabilitated

Key Outputs by Component (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 1)

1. Use of agricultural inputs, equipment by farmer beneficiaries 2. Agricultural area protected from saline intrusion 3. Disaster shelters rehabilitated to protect human lives and livestock

Objective/Outcome 2: Building long term preparedness

Outcome Indicators

1. Strengthened disaster risk management in the government and communities 2. Reduced risk to lives and assets due to resilient protective infrastructure 3. Improved preparedness of agricultural beneficiaries to future disasters

Intermediate Results Indicators

1. Number of emergency equipment distributed, multi hazard models generated 2. Number of new school-cum-disaster shelters constructed 3. Number of farmers received training and capacity building on improved techniques


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Key Outputs by Component (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 2)

1.Emergency equipment in use, early warning system set-up and DDM, DMC staff and CPP volunteers trained 2. MRVA models and atlas being used to generate maps 3.Reduced risk to lives and assets through new and resilient protective infrastructure 4. Use of agricultural inputs, equipment by farmer beneficiaries


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ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION

A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS

Name Role

Preparation

Masood Ahmad Task Team Leader

Mohi Uz Zaman Quazi Team Member

Zafrul Islam Team Member

Nihal Fernando Team Member

S A M Rafiquzzaman Team Member

Zahed H. Khan Team Member

Kishor Uprety Senior Counsel

Chau Ching Shen Senior Financial Officer

Burhanuddin Ahmed Senior Financial Management Specialist

Zafrul Islam Lead Procurement Specialist

Fabio Pittaluga Senior Social Development Specialist

Reefat Sultana eam Member

Supervision/ICR

Swarna Kazi, Shahpar Selim Task Team Leader(s)

Shahpar Salim Co-Task Team Leader

Arafat Istiaque Procurement Specialist(s)

Mohammad Reaz Uddin Chowdhury Financial Management Specialist

Amani Haque Team Member

Jorge Luis Alva-Luperdi Counsel

Nadia Sharmin Safeguards Specialist

Md. Akhtaruzzaman Senior Social Development Specialist

Sugata Talukder Team Member


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B. STAFF TIME AND COST

Stage of Project Cycle Staff Time and Cost

No. of staff weeks US$ (including travel and consultant costs)

Preparation

FY08 10.733 48,485.10

FY09 17.176 74,597.97

Total 27.91 123,083.07

Supervision/ICR

FY09 25.723 89,692.68

FY10 50.431 154,392.35

FY11 49.899 183,096.38

FY12 44.528 187,038.21

FY13 67.525 245,648.31

FY14 67.176 278,253.15

FY15 48.940 91,434.42

FY16 36.684 64,346.45

FY17 34.035 93,269.27

FY18 40.620 210,209.17

FY19 8.647 48,457.47

Total 474.21 1,645,837.86


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ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT

Components Amount at Approval

(US$M) Actual at Project

Closing (US$M)

Component A: Recovery of Agriculture Sector

16.00 29.68

Component B: Reconstruction and Improvement of Multipurpose Shelters

40.00 193.17

Component C: Rehabilitation of Coastal Embankments

20.00 80.90

Component D: Long-Term Disaster Risk Management

16.00 20.80

Component E and F: Monitoring and Evaluation, Project Management

17.0 5.00

Total 109.00 329.55

109. The above costs at Project closing include the KfW parallel financing of US$4.85 million (disbursed 100%), taking

the total disbursement to over $329 million. Disbursement amount Page 2 datasheet does not include the KfW financing.

Table 6: Disbursement by credit and grant

Financing Agreements Signed Amount (US$ million)

Revised (50) Amount

(US$ million)

Disbursed Amount (US$ million)

Percent (%) Disbursed

Original IDA Credit 45070 109.000 106.00 106.014 100.00

IDA Additional Financing I 48190 75.000 72.298 72.315 99.98

IDA Additional Financing II 53420 140.000 127.481 119.987 92.91

Total IDA 324.000 305.779 298.316 96.99

BCCRF TF 99305 25.000 23.060(51) 23.060 100.00

GFDRR TF 93588 3.000 3.000 3.000 100.00

KfW 4.850 4.850 4.850 100.00

Total ECRRP Funding 356.85 336.689 329.226 97.78

50 Revised amount after Level II restructuring in December 2015 51 US$ 1.94 million Cancelled


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ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS

110. Estimation of benefits in disaster recovery projects at best can be determined using probabilistic scenarios (for

e.g. probability of lives lost in an event, or probability of extreme event), uncertainty associated with extreme events and hence the impact on the efficiency of infrastructure due to various events. The key return on investment in recovery projects is the averted damage/loss or reduced risk to life. In absence of any empirical metrics to quantify reduced risk to life, the analysis uses measures like value of statistical life to estimate benefit from reduced risk of fatality. Recovery projects also have spillover effects, which can be significant from a resilience building perspective but are often difficult to quantify. The analysis highlights both tangible and intangible benefits. Most benefit streams considered are conservative estimates as it does not quantify some of the spillover benefits and assumes least additional benefit from project interventions. For example, despite infrastructure like shelters having been upgraded to withstand greater intensity and frequency of cyclones (stronger windspeeds), following build-back-better principle of disaster risk management. Climate change impacts are also considered while estimating benefits of embankment interventions using probabilistic scenarios of extreme events.

111. Economic analysis was performed as part of the ICR of the Emergency Cyclone Recovery and Restoration Project

to assess the rate of return of capital investments in the recovery and restoration of rural livelihood after the cyclones Sidr in 2007 and Aila in 2009. The project funding had three main components:

• Component A – Recovery of Agricultural Sector and Improvement Program

• Component B: Construction and Improvement of Multi-Purpose Shelters

• Component C: Rehabilitation of Coastal Embankments

112. The component A focused on recovery and restoration of livelihood of the cyclone affected residents. There was insufficient data for quantitative benefit costs analysis for component A. Thus, qualitative methods were used for component A and the quantitative economic analysis is based on Components B and C. Separate analysis was conducted for the two components B and C and the results aggregated by using respective costs weights.

Component A – Recovery of Agricultural Sector and Improvement Program

113. The US$ 29.8 million modest costs were only nine percent of the total project costs of US$ 329.2 million.52 This component provided livelihood support via input packages to marginal households affected by cyclones Sidr in 2007 and Aila in 2009. The marginal households were divided into three categories based on the main source of their livelihood, (a) crop dependent households, (b) fisheries dependent households, and (c) livestock dependent households. Within each type, different households received different input packages based on needs and specializations.

114. Benefits from livelihood recovery interventions include (i) increase in yield53 (ii) increase in household income (iii)

resilience to future disasters due to access and use of improved technologies and silos. There is however not

52 Total project costs are from Government of Bangladesh (2018). 53 A major proportion of marginal farmers (from 51 to 72%) indicated that their harvest and income had increased using the HYV seeds and improved farming implements and practices compared to traditional practices.


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enough data to calculate dollar value of sustained benefits of the component. Table 1 shows almost 300,000 beneficiaries reported to have increased income resulting from the project component. Therefore, the economic benefit of this component is substantial.54 Additional benefits from livelihood interventions include (i) knowledge sharing of technologies with non-beneficiaries (ii) utilization of earnings for investment in alternative livelihoods (iii) investment of increased income in children’s education, health and improved nutrition (iv) an increase in the decision-making power of women due to their greater involvement in agricultural production.

Table 1: Number of beneficiaries and benefits by livelihood type

Types of marginal household dependent on: Number of beneficiaries55

Percent of households reporting improvement in income

Crops 241,558 96%

Fisheries 37,089 100%

Livestock 37,928 76%

Total 316,575 94% Source: The main report of beneficiary household survey, 2014

Component B: Construction and Improvement of Multi-Purpose Shelters

115. This component included the following investment activities considered for the economic analysis. Construction of new and rehabilitation of existing multipurpose shelters, and construction and rehabilitation of access roads to the shelters. The new multipurpose shelters function as primary school buildings during most part of the year. The existing shelters may serve as school buildings or other community buildings. Many of the new and rehabilitated shelters have an area designed to keep livestock (killas) during cyclones. The access roads component of the project is intended to connect the remote shelters to the existing road network.

116. The main benefit of constructing new shelters and rehabilitating existing shelters is to save human lives and

livestock at the time of cyclones. For the rest of the year, the shelters are used as primary schools. The connecting roads allow for quicker evacuation to the shelters during cyclones including provision of immediate emergency and relief supplies. The roads also provide access to the school during the rest of the year.

There are three main benefit areas from the shelters:

• Number of human lives saved by shelters

• Number of livestock saved by shelters

• Educational and other ancillary benefits from increased number of classrooms

117. As for the construction of the roads connecting the shelters to the existing road network have following benefits:

• Faster evacuation of people and livestock to the shelters

• Provision of emergency food and other supplies to the shelter before disaster (preparedness)

54 The Main Survey Report does not quantify the amount of increase in income of the beneficiaries attributable to the project benefits.

The baseline survey with 3018 households was conducted in 2010. The final household survey with 960 households was conducted in

2017. The same households were not sampled in the baseline and final surveys. 55 Total percent is the average of types weighted by the number of beneficiaries for each type.


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• Faster relief delivery to the shelter after disaster

• Effective access to the primary schools during the school year

118. For the purposed of this analysis we only consider the following benefit of the component B, (a) saving human

lives, (b) saving livestock, and (c) increased labor productivity of additional children getting primary education when they enter the labor force. We note that benefit of saving livestock from cyclones is very important to the population at risk. The surviving livestock provide much needed food security as well as ready liquid assets immediately after the disaster. New shelters and renovation of existing shelters replaced or renovated existing schools with bigger classroom capacity. The main impact report 2014 shows 20 to 25 percent increase in student enrollment resulting from the improved school and road access.

119. The cyclone shelters are also used for other non-educational community purposes. We do not quantify these

significant benefits. Thus, our estimates are conservative. Costs calculations

120. For the purposes of the economic analysis, the total cost of component B is taken to be USD 190.8 million disbursed in the amounts described in Table 2 over the nine-year period from 2010 to 2018.

121. Following the end of the project the continued operating and maintenance costs of the project is as follows: 0%

of the total cost annually for the first five years, 1% of the total cost annually for the next five years, and 10% of the total cost annually for the remaining years.56

Table 2: Costs of component B by year

Component B duration (Years)

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total

Costs (m$) 1.30 7.12 21.19 37.61 28.92 25.92 36.66 20.27 11.80 190.78

Counterfactual benefit calculations without the project

122. To understand the counterfactual of potential losses from the cyclones, we begin with the measured benefits of the 459 existing cyclone shelters. We assume in the absence of the project no new shelters will be built and the existing shelters will not be rehabilitated. We assume an average existing shelter has the design capacity to shelter 1000 human lives.

123. We estimate the potential benefits for a range of effective capacity of the existing shelters. Table 3 shows that

the total number of lives that can be saved by the existing 459 shelters is between 51,900 and 467,100. Assuming only half of the existing shelters have killas to save livestock and each killa has the design capacity to hold 200 livestock, the number of livestock saved is between 5,190 and 46,710.

124. Note, a higher effective capacity of existing shelters implies restoration of each shelter to its design capacity will

have fewer benefits. Conversely, restoration of an existing shelter with low effective capacity to its full design

56 The assumption of high operating and maintenance costs in the later years are based on feedback from the country team.


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capacity will have higher benefits from the perspective of the project.

125. Without the project the restoration and renovation of existing shelters would not have allowed additional children to attend primary schools. Thus, these children would not benefit from increased labor productivity from attending primary school.

Table 3: Effective human and livestock capacity scenarios for 450 existing shelters

Effective Capacity

%

Effective Capacity

Numbers Total Numbers

Livestock per

shelter Total Livestock

90% 900 467100 180 46710

75% 750 389250 150 38925

50% 500 259500 100 25950

30% 300 155700 60 15570

10% 100 51900 20 5190

Economic Analysis of Component B

126. The main benefit component of this project is saving human lives. Value of Lives Saved. Cost-benefit analysis is particularly useful in the comparison of alternatives. In order to enable decision making in the context of life-saving investments, some numerical estimate must be attached to the value of life57. The relevant concept is the so-called Value of a Statistical Life (VSL). VSL estimates are derived from willingness to pay surveys and reflect the intrinsic value of life to a greater degree than approaches that depend on estimates of foregone income (that is, what the victims could have earned on the labor market if they had survived). The use of VSL mitigates, to a certain extent, the concerns around trivializing the value associated with human life (which has been an obstacle to attributing such values in economic analysis). In addition, although it embodies the individual respondents’ utility preferences, the average VSL (as used here) is a neutral measure that is applicable regardless of income earning potential.

127. Due to the paucity of contextualized and reliable VSL estimates applicable for the ECRRP, the “benefits transfer”

method was used to value the lives potentially saved by the project as calculated by Viscusi and Masterman (2017). The “benefits transfer” calculation involves selecting a relevant reference country, in this case, the United States.

128. Viscusi and Masterman provides compelling empirical evidence for the unit income elasticity of the VSL. They

estimate VSL for 189 countries using World Bank data. Viscusi and Masterman estimate the value of statistical life for Bangladesh to be US$ 595,870.00. We use this estimate to arrive at the value of statistical lives expected to be saved by the cyclone shelters.

129. We calculate the component benefits based on the design capacity of the shelters. We acknowledge that under

emergency conditions a shelter may provide refuge to many more than its design capacity. However, by using the design capacity of the shelters we underestimate the benefits.

57 Natural Hazards Unnatural Disasters, https://www.gfdrr.org/sites/gfdrr/files/publication/NHUDReport_

Full.pdf


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130. The main benefits are based on the following assumption on expected lives saved: (i) The 352 new shelters each

have the design capacity based on the shelter types ranging from 1300 to 1750 individuals, (ii) the 459 existing shelters once rehabilitated each is reinstated to their design capacity of 920 individuals and (iii) additional monetary benefits of expected livestock saved are based on the 191 type 3 shelters and 15 self-standing killas have the design capacity to shelter 200 cattle each.

131. It is not possible to know if an individual would have died if he or she had not taken refuge in a shelter provided

by the project. However, we assume that those who seek refuge in a cyclone shelter would face higher risk of death if they were not in the shelter during a super cyclone. Those who do not seek refuge in a cyclone shelter may have cyclone resilient houses, or access to other cyclone resilient structures. We assume between 1 to 5 individuals out of each 1000 who take refuge in a project shelters would have died if they didn’t have access to that shelter.

132. The cyclone shelters serve as primary school buildings for the rest of the time. We estimate that three additional

students have the opportunity to attend school in each class room, as a result of the larger school building built or rehabilitated as cyclone shelters. Educational opportunity for more children is likely to result in life-time benefit of higher wages for these children as they grow up and enter the workforce. These benefits are not included in these calculations.

133. The benefit from renovating existing shelters will depend on the effective capacity of these shelters prior to the

renovation and rehabilitation. We assume the existing shelters with 1000 design capacity were at 50 percent capacity prior to rehabilitation. Rehabilitating such a shelter would accommodate 500 additional individuals. The shelters were designed for a 50-year life. Even though the shelters may have a longer useful life, we only consider benefit streams up-to 2068.

Discount rate

134. Based on the descriptive methodology, the discount rate is usually set at 12 percent for the economic analysis of World Bank projects. A recent technical note (World Bank 2016) recommends a different approach of calculating the discount rate as the product of per capita growth rate of the country and the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption. The per capita annual growth rate of Bangladesh is about 6 percent. The elasticity of marginal utility of consumption is harder to calculate but is expected to be in the range of 1 to 2. Therefore, we use the range of 6 to 12 percent discount rate for Bangladesh.

Cyclone probabilities

135. Bangladesh is a global hotspot for tropical cyclones. Nearly every year, cyclones hit the country’s coastal regions in the early summer (April–May) or late rainy season (October–November). Between 1877 and 1995, Bangladesh was hit by 154 cyclones, including 43 severe cyclonic storms, 43 cyclonic storms, and 68 tropical depressions. Since 1995, 5 severe cyclones have hit the country’s coast. On average, a severe cyclone strikes the country every three years (GOB 2009). As a result, lives and property in lower-lying coastal districts along the Bay of Bengal are highly vulnerable to inundation from cyclone-induced storm surges. Cyclone Sidr (November 2007) and Cyclone Aila (May 2009) provide recent examples of devastating storm-surge in Bangladesh (Dasgupta and others, 2014).

136. Cyclone Sidr (2007) was a super cyclone that could return once in every ten years. Table 4 shows the definitions

of severe, very severe, and super cyclones and their respective probabilities of occurrences in Bangladesh.


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Table 4: Cyclone types wind speed and probability of occurrences

Cyclone types Speed KM/h probability per year

Super cyclone > 220 10%

Very severe cyclone 119-220 20%

Severe cyclone 90-119 30%

Source: Dasgupta et al (2014)

137. The calculated expected annual benefits assume that a super cyclone like Sidr is expected to hit Bangladesh once in ten years.58 The higher speed and severity of cyclones are associated with higher deaths among those without adequate shelters. Assumptions

138. The assumptions for the benefits calculations discussed above are summarized below: 1) The operating and maintenance costs of the project is as follows: 0% of the total cost annually for the

first five years, 1% of the total cost annually for the next five years, and 10% of the total cost annually for the remaining years.

2) The calculated benefits are from human and livestock lives saved by the shelters. Other benefits to the transportation and education sectors are not included.

3) An existing shelters with 1000 design capacity were at 50 percent capacity prior to rehabilitation. Rehabilitating such a shelter would accommodate 500 additional individuals in a super-cyclone.

4) The newly built shelters would accommodate 1300 to 1750 individuals based on their design type and design capacity.

5) Shelters and killas that accommodate livestock, are assumed to have the design capacity of 200 cattle each.

6) Based on OPCS guidelines and shelter design specifications, the project life is assumed to be 50 years. 7) Based on OPCS guidelines discount rate is assumed to be in between 12 and 6 percent. 8) The benefits are based on the expected lives saved in a super-cyclone with 10 percent probabilities.

Potential lives saved in very-severe and severe cyclones were not included in the calculations. 9) The probability of death of an individual who takes is accommodated in a shelter if that person was

not accommodated is assumed to be 2 in 1000. The sensitivity analysis considers lower and higher number of expected lives saved.

Conservative estimates

139. We find the project to have the minimum internal rates of return (IRR) of 22.1 percent. The use of high discount rate of 12 percent results in the net present value (NPV) of US$ 175 million, with the benefit costs ratio (BCR) of 2.3. Alternately using the minimum of 6 percent discount rate we estimate the NPV to be US$ 673 million, and BCR to be 3.7. The IRR, NPV and BCR would be higher if the probability of lives saved are more than 2 in 1000.

58 According to the IPCC AR4, storm surges and related floods are likely to become more severe

with increases in intense tropical cyclones in future (IPCC, 2007). Hence, from a practical

perspective vulnerability of Bangladesh to cyclones/ storm surges may increase even more

as a result of climate change.


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Sensitivity Analysis

140. Sensitivity analysis was conducted by changing key parameters of probability death as described above. Given that base case IRR, NPV and BCR are calculated with very conservative assumptions, more realistic assumptions regarding the probability of more deaths highlight the possibility that the actual benefits may be much more substantial than in the conservative case.

141. Table 5 shows the results of the sensitivity analysis using 12 and 6 percent discount rates. The three parts of the

table show the IRR, the NPV, and the BCR respectively. In each part the leftmost column shows 1 in 1000 probability of death show the smallest returns. Correspondingly, the rightmost column 5 in 1000 probability of death show the highest returns from the project.

Table 5: Sensitivity analysis for probability of lives saved using 12% and 6 discount rates

Effective Capacity of Existing

Shelters

Lives Saved per 1000 Shelter Capacity

1 2 3 4 5

Discount Rate

IRR NA 13.9% 22.4% 28.0% 32.3% 35.9%

NPV 12% 25 181 338 494 651

6% 229 691 1,153 1,614 2,076

BCR 12% 1.2 2.3 3.4 4.6 5.7

6% 1.9 3.7 5.6 7.4 9.2

142. Assuming 2 per 1000 shelter design capacity lives are expected to be saved in case of a 1 in 10-year super cyclone

the IRR is 22.4 percent. The NPV and BCR are in the ranges of US$ 181-691 million, and 2.3-3.7 using 12 and 6 percent discount rates respectively.

Component C: Rehabilitation of Coastal Embankments

143. This component included the one investment activity considered for the economic analysis. Construction of new and rehabilitation of existing embankments totaling 501 KM in length protecting 174 thousand hectares of land and benefiting 3.8 million people. The embankments and polders were designed to protect against up-to one in 25-year return-period floods.

144. The main benefits of preventing floods in the affected areas include protection of agricultural crops, mainly rice; protection of residential houses, businesses, and other private infrastructure; protection of public buildings such as school and health care facilities; protection of other public infrastructure such as roads, bridges; and protection of other communication structures.

145. The substantial benefits of the prevention of damages to private and public buildings and other infrastructure was not included in this analysis. We only use prevention of damages to the rice crop in the area as measured benefits. Thus, the economic analysis of this component is very conservative. The actual benefits are likely to be much


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higher.

Costs calculations

146. For the purposes of the economic analysis, the total cost of component C is taken to be USD 85.7 million disbursed in the amounts described in

147. 148. Table 6 over the ten-year period from 2009 to 2018. Following the end of the project the continued operating and

maintenance costs of the project will be 1.0 percent of the overall costs.

Table 6: Distribution of costs of component C

Component B duration (Years)

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total

Costs in US$m $0.05 $0.70 $3.48 $6.38 $7.85 $2.95 $24.59 $14.49 $11.97 $13.20 $85.66

Counterfactual benefit calculations without the project

149. We assume the area and the people in the projected area would remain unprotected without the project. Thus, the benefit without the project is calculated to be zero. Assumptions

150. The main assumptions of this section are summarized as follows:

• The operating and maintenance costs of the component assumed to be 1 percent of the total cost annually.

• The calculated benefits are from avoided flood damage to the yield of Aman paddy production in the project component area. Other benefits of avoided flood damages to housing and other assets, and loss of employment and productivity are not included.

• The project life is assumed to be 20 years.

• Based on OPCS guidelines discount rate is assumed to be in between 12 and 6 percent.

• The benefits are based on the design capacity of the embankments of protection from one-in-25 year floods damaging 90 percent or more of the Aman paddy production.

• The floods are expected to arrive in the increasing frequency of one-in-five year periods.

Economic Analysis of Component C

151. The main benefit component C of this project is saving property damages from floods. Most of the households in the project area are agricultural households engaged in crop cultivation. Rice is the main crop. This analysis considers the protection of rice crops from flood damages as the main benefit of this component. We calculate the component benefits based on the prevention of annual expected damages from floods.

152. We start with the assumption that one-in-twenty-five-year flood, with 4 percent annual probability would cause 90 percent of crop damage. However, with climate change the one-in-twenty-five-year flood is expected to be frequent. That is, while the frequency of the expected occurrence of the flood would increase, the damage from


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the equally severe flood would remain the same. We consider the same flood with return probabilities of 10, 20, 30 and 40 percent.

153. Table 7 shows the results of increasing probability of a one-in-twenty-five-year flood. Assuming the return

probability of one-in-twenty-five year flood is increased to one-in-five years, the IRR is calculated to be 20.9 percent. Assuming the discount rates of 12 and 6 percent, the NPV is in the range of USD 46 million and USD 166 million, with the BCR in the range of 2 and 3.5.

Table 7: Sensitivity analysis of IRR for increasing probability of flood

Measure

Discount

Rate

Probability of Flood

4% 10% 20% 30% 40%

IRR NA 2.6% 12.1% 20.9% 26.9% 31.5%

NPV 12% -27 0.3 46 92 138

6% -19 50 166 281 397

BCR 12% 0.4 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0

6% 0.7 1.8 3.5 5.3 7.0

Overall Economic Performance of the project

154. The overall economic performance of the project is based on the weighted average of the conservative estimates of the IRR, and BCR for components B and C. Error! Reference source not found. shows the summary of the components as well as the aggregated results.

Table 8: Overall performance of the project

Component Cost IRR NPV BCR

Discount rates → 12% 6% 12% 6%

Component B: Shelters $190.8 22.4% 181 691 2.3 3.7

Component C: Embankments $85.7 20.9% 46 166 2.0 3.5

Overall $276.4 21.9% 227 857 2.2 3.7

155. The total project costs for the ECRRP was US$ 336.68959 million dollars. This economic analysis considers 82

percent of the total costs. By this conservative estimate the overall project IRR is 21.9%, the overall project NPV is in the range of US$ 227-857 million, and the overall BCR is in the range of 2.2-3.7 for 12 and 6 percent discount rates respectively.60

References

Dasgupta Susmita, Mainul Huq, Zahirul Huq Khan, Manjur Murshed Zahid Ahmed, Nandan Mukherjee, Malik Fida Khan & Kiran Pandey (2014) “Cyclones in a changing climate: the case of Bangladesh”, Climate

59 Revised amount after Level II restructuring on December 2015 60 NPV and BCR are reported as ranges instead of point estimates according to OPCS recommendations (Word bank, 2016).


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and Development, 6:2, 96-110, DOI: 10.1080/17565529.2013.868335 Government of Bangladesh, 2018, PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT on Emergency 2007 Cyclone Recovery and Restoration Project (ECRRP), ECRRP:PCMU, Programming Division, Planning Commision, June, Dhaka Power and Participation Research Centre (PPRC) 2016, “Politics, Governance and Middle Income Aspirations Realities and Challenges An Empirical Study” mimeo, Dhaka, Bangladesh. Online: http://www.bd.undp.org/content/bangladesh/en/home/library/democratic_governance/politics--governance-and-middle-income-aspirations--reality-and-.html, accessed November 16, 2017. Shafiq, M. Najeeb (2007) “Household Rates of Return to Education in Rural Bangladesh: Accounting for Direct Costs, Child Labour, and Option Value”, Education Economics, 15:3, 343-358, DOI: 10.1080/09645290701306358 USEPA (United States Environmental Protection Agency) 2000, Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses, Office of the Administrator, EPA 240-R-00-003, September. Viscusi, W. 2003, ‘The value of a statistical life: a critical review of market estimates throughout the world’, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, vol. 27(1), pp. 5-76 Vascusi, W., Masterman, C, 2017, Income Elasticity and the Global Value of a Statistical Life, Vanderbilt University Law School, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper number 17-29. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2975466 World Bank, 2016, Discounting Costs and Benefits in Economic Analysis of World Bank Projects, OPSPQ, May 9, Washington DC.

http://www.bd.undp.org/content/bangladesh/en/home/library/democratic_governance/politics--governance-and-middle-income-aspirations--reality-and-.html

http://www.bd.undp.org/content/bangladesh/en/home/library/democratic_governance/politics--governance-and-middle-income-aspirations--reality-and-.html

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2975466


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ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS

156. The ECRRP Project Coordination and Monitoring Unit (Planning Commission) reviewed the draft ICR and overall

agreed with the Bank’s assessment. The following comments were provided by the borrower and have been taken into account.

157. We appreciate the in-depth and comprehensive ICR, which has commented on all stakeholders in a fair and

judicious manner covering in detail “Lessons Learnt from ECRRP” in particular besides every other aspect of physical, environmental, social and financial aspects of the project.

158. GoB had high ownership of the project concept. In retrospect, entrenched attitudes in the disaster risk

management made it difficult in the initial years (prior to the Project) to move away from the firefighting approach. GOB has proactively invested in disaster risk management through ECRRP and we consider ECRRP to be the flagship engagement for continued long-term disaster risk management activities in Bangladesh. All the implementing agencies worked in synergy which helped to achieve the PDO and Intermediate Indicator Targets.

159. The Project achieved multi-sectoral long-term disaster preparedness that included improved farmer resilience

through improved agricultural inputs, training and technology and construction of new disaster-resilient shelters and embankments (with build-back-better elements). ECRRP had a bottom-up approach towards building long-term preparedness by focusing on local risk reduction capacity building interventions. The feasibility, preparation, and development of three ongoing World Bank-financed projects were a result of ECRRP, including the US$ 375 million Multipurpose Disaster Shelter Project (MDSP), the US$ 400 million Coastal Embankment Improvement Project (CEIP-I) and the US$ 210 million Modern Grain Storage Facilities Project, in addition, the preparation of the River Management Improvement Project was also undertaken by ECRRP.

160. Overall, the document is factual and gives an overview and account of key milestones, accomplishments, outputs,

challenges, and way forward they were addressed.

Project Development Objectives(PDO)

161. There exists a strong correlation between the PDO and Bangladesh’s 7th five-year plan which emphasizes continued

investment in reducing and mitigating the effects of the underlying risk as well as a sustainable development pathway that is resilient to disaster and climate change. The PDO recognizes that in changing climate, the disaster risk reduction is a continuous and long-term initiative to bring in system level resilience to effect sustainable changes on the ground along with community.

Ratings

162. We could not understand that why the team proposed to rate the overall outcome to be “Moderately Satisfactory’.

We would argue that the rating can be improved to “Satisfactory” as the project achieved all of its revised key PDO indicator targets, and in some case, surpassed them as well as had 97% IDA disbursement as of loan closing. Considering that, the pending land acquisition payment should not be a reason to impact the ratings, especially as the PMU of World Bank-financed CEIP-I is currently monitoring, tracking, catalyzing and coordinating with the DC


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offices for completing payments to the remaining affected landowners and reporting to the Bank on a monthly basis. Meanwhile, there is a substantial progress done over the period.

163. There appears to be a disconnect between the overall rating of efficiency and efficacy and the assessments. The

assessments show that the operation achieved its objectives and targets, and went beyond recovery, to build the resilience of populations to future disasters. Delay in kick-starting implementation, pending safeguard concerns, delays in implementation may not have a significant impact on the efficacy and efficiency of the Project. We recognize the time delays in the project, but there have also been critical factors (consecutive cyclones and extreme rainfall/ remote and climate vulnerable project location) outside of control that resulted in a longer time needed to complete the project.

164. The Bank performance in project identification, preparation assistance, appraisal, and supervision has been

“Satisfactory”. Visits of the supervision missions and technical missions were of great help in the expeditious implementation of the project components. The field visits by the mission members provided objective and useful feedback for remedial measures. On vital issues, the concurrence of the Bank was received expeditiously. Besides these, they worked side by side with the implementing agencies for successful implementation of ECRRRP which is now a flagship project in the public sectors of Bangladesh.

Lessons Learnt

165. The credentials of Joint Venture Partners should be verified carefully and the provision should be made in the Bid

Document that the Joint Venture partner should actively participate during the execution of the work by deploying their resources. There must be some penal provision for faulty designs and poor performance by the Design & Supervision Consultants as well as a provision for regular periodic review of their performance.

166. The major lesson learned from ECRRP is the delay on account of land acquisition and delayed payment to the

affected persons. The recommendations regarding accelerated land acquisition procedures for emergency situations need to be strictly enforced under future coastal projects.

167. ECRRP had detailed arrangements in the Resettlement Action Plan and Process Framework to address the adverse

impacts of resettlement and land acquisition for the project. Accordingly, BWDB has placed the required resources to the Deputy Commissioner’s (DC) office. It is to be noted, as per the GoB laws, funds placed with DC’s account must be paid to the legal owners. However, complexities linked to land titling due to incomplete and unavailability of ownership records as well as ownership dispute have delayed the payment process. If there is ownership dispute under settlement in the court of law (which also takes time), the court decides, the payment goes to the winning claimer(s) as per verdict.

168. We appreciate the World Bank for introducing several best engineering practices in the project, safeguard

compliance documentation and Institutional Development initiatives which have benefitted the implementing agencies as a whole.


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ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (IF ANY)

1. World Bank. 2008. Bangladesh - Emergency 2007 Cyclone Recovery and Restoration Project . Washington, DC:

World Bank. 2. World Bank. 2010. Bangladesh - Additional Financing for the Emergency 2007 Cyclone Recovery and

Restoration Project . Washington, DC: World Bank. 3. World Bank. 2013. Bangladesh - Emergency 2007 Cyclone Recovery and Restoration Project : restructuring .

Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. 4. World Bank. 2013. Bangladesh - Additional Financing for Emergency 2007 Cyclone Recovery and Restoration

Project . Washington DC ; World Bank. 5. World Bank. 2015. Bangladesh - Emergency 2007 Cyclone Recovery and Restoration Project : restructuring .

Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. 6. World Bank. 2017. Bangladesh - Emergency 2007 Cyclone Recovery and Restoration Project : restructuring .

Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. 7. World Bank. Implementation Status & Results Reports (ISRs). Sequence Number from 4 to 19. 8. World Bank. Aide Memoirs from 2008 till 2018 9. GoB. 2008. Cyclone Sidr Damage, Loss, and Needs Assessment for Disaster Recovery and Reconstruction

10. GoB. Project Evaluation Reports 2013, 2014, 2017 11. GoB. Baseline Survey Report, June 2011 12. GoB. Annual, Monthly and Quarterly Progress Reports of PCMU, LGED and BWDB from 2010 till 2017 13. FAO. 2014. ECRRP Component A Implementation Completion and Results Report. 14. Department of Disaster Management (DDM). 2016. Institute of Disaster Management and Vulnerability

Studies University of Dhaka. Research Report - An Assessment of the Effectiveness of Emergency 2007 Cyclone Recovery and Restoration Project.

15. DDM. ECRRP D-1 Component Project Completion and Result Report 16. Bangladesh Water Development Board. 2018. ECRRP Project Completion Report 17. FAO-ECRRP. Agriculture Mechanization Activities Impact Assessment Report. Report number

UTF/BGD/040/BGD 18. PCMU (Planning Commission). 2018. Project Completion Report. 19. Azuko. 2015. Human Centered Design Review of ECRRP Shelters.


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ANNEX 7. MAJOR CYCLONES THAT HIT THE BANGLADESH COAST (1965-2017)[1]

Month/Year

Maximum Wind speed (km/hr)

Type of Disturbance[2] Tropical Cyclone

Category[3]

Storm Surge height

(meters)

Death Toll

May 1965 161 Very severe cyclonic storm

II 3.7-7.6 19,279

December 1965

217 Extremely severe cyclonic storm

III 2.4-3.6 873

October 1966

139 Very severe cyclonic storm

II 6.0-6.7 850

November 1970

224 Super cyclonic storm III 6.0-10.0 300,000

May 1985 154 Very severe cyclonic storm

II 3.0-4.6 11,069

April 1991 225 Super cyclonic storm IV 6.0-7.6 138,882

May 1997 232 Super cyclonic storm IV 3.1-4.6 155

November 2007 (Sidr)

240 Super cyclonic storm IV 3.5-6.0 3,363

May 2009 (Aila)

92 Severe cyclonic storm I -- 190

May 16, 2013 (Mahasen)

95 Severe cyclonic storm I -- 24

Cyclone Roanu May 21, 2016


II 2.0 24

Cyclone Mora May 29, 2017


II 1.5 7

[1] Bangladesh Meteorological Department (BMD) 2017 and Government of Bangladesh (GoB) 2017 [2] Classification of cyclonic disturbances followed by RSMC- Tropical cyclone, New Delhi [3] Cyclone intensity categories used by Australian Bureau of Meteorology


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ANNEX 8. Types and Options for Multipurpose Cyclone Shelters developed under ECRRP

Key Features//Option Type TYPE 1 TYPE 2 TYPE 3 TYPE 4 1/ TYPE 5

Floor Area (m2) 300.5 342.91 290.57 396.37 301.21

Number of Floors 2 2 3 2 2

Number of Classrooms 3 3 3 5 3

Teachers Rooms 1 1 1 1 1

First-Aid Room 1 1 1 1 1

Room for Pregnant Women 1 1 1 1 1

Store Room 1 1 1 1 1

Toilet (male) 2 2 2 2 2

Toilet (female) 2 2 2 2 2

Tube well 2 2 2 2 2

Rainwater collection tank 2 2 2 2 2

Water filter Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Solar panel Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Water pump Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Capacity (persons) 1,300 1,500 1,300 2/ 1,750 1,300

Capacity (livestock) - - 200 - -


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ANNEX 9: PROJECT M&E IMPACT EVALUATION SURVEY DESIGN ASSESSMENT

169. The baseline household survey was conducted in 2010 (submitted 2011). Total of 3018 household were sampled,

of which, 152 households were in the control groups and 2866 households were in the treatment. The control group was about 5 percent of the total sample size which is inadequate for any kind of impact evaluation analysis. The final household survey was conducted in 2017 where 960 households were sampled, of which 720 were in the treatment group and 240 were in the control group or about 25 percent of the total sample size. While this is an improvement over the baseline, it is still short of the guideline of equal number of control and treatment sample size.

170. The main drawback of this design is that the same households were not surveyed at the baseline and during the

final survey. If the same 152 baseline households were surveyed in 2010 and 2017, then we would have a clearer picture of the impact of the project on this sample. Similarly, it is not clear if the same treatment households in the baseline survey were re-surveyed in the final survey. Since different households were surveyed in the baseline and in the final surveys, the double-difference method of impact evaluation cannot be used with this data. It is not clear from the report what method was used. Common methods are propensity score matching, regression discontinuity design, instrument variable- based analysis, or difference-in-difference regression analysis. One key measure of impact evaluation is to measure the average effect of the treatment on the treated (ATT). Calculation of ATT would require the use of one of the above-mentioned methods of impact evaluation. The report does not report any ATT in its tables.


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ANNEX 10: LEGAL LAND ACQUISITION PROCESS IN BANGLADESH

171. Legal Framework and Land Acquisition: Citizens in Bangladesh have the constitutional right to hold, transfer or otherwise dispose of property subject to extenuating restrictions imposed by law. However, the Government has the right to acquire private property if it is required for public purpose or serves public interest. The governmental expropriation of land is determined by the Acquisition and Requisition of Immovable Property Ordinance, 1982 (Ordinance II of 1982) with amendments up to 1994. The Deputy Commissioner is empowered on behalf of the Govt. to acquire property for public interest in his/her jurisdiction.

172. Land Acquisition Steps and Procedures:

(i) The Requiring Body (RB) submits land acquisition proposal to the Deputy Commissioner (DC) along

with requisite documents and papers. (ii) The DC initiates a feasibility study within 21 days of receipt of the proposal. (iii) The DC places feasibility report before District Land Allocation Committee (DLAC). (iv) DC starts Land Acquisition (LA) case after approval from DLAC. (v) DC issues notice under section (u/s) 3 of the Ordinance for public appraisal of proposed land

acquisition. (vi) DC starts joint verification by Acquiring Body (AB) and Requiring Body (RB) within 3 days of notice

u/s 3. (vii) Objections against proposed land acquisition can be submitted to DC u/s 4 within 15 days of above

notice. (viii) Objection, if any, shall be heard and decided by DC. (ix) If the property exceeds fifty standard bighas61 (16.50 acres or 6.68 ha) the DC shall submit the record

to the Govt. for decision. (x) If there are objections and the property does not exceed fifty standards bighas, the DC shall send

the record to the Divisional Commissioner for decision. (xi) If there are no objections and the property does not exceed fifty standards bighas the DC shall make

decision within 10 days. This can be extended to 30 days with permission of the Divisional Commissioner after the expiry of objection period.

(xii) The Commissioner issues decision within 15 days from the date of submission of the report or one month if stating reasons (section 5).

(xiii) Contingent on Commissioner’s decision the Govt. issues decision within 90 days from the date of submission of the report.

(xiv) The land acquisition decision of the Govt., the Commissioner and the DC is final. (xv) Decision of acquisition is notified publicly. After 15 days interested persons can meet the DC and

place their claim regarding the property and the value of property (u/s 6).

61 The bigha is a traditional unit of measurement of area of a land, commonly used in Nepal, Bangladesh and in a number of states of India.


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(xvi) After hearing claims the DC shall award compensation (within 30 days from the date of notice u/s 6) with value of property that was on the date of notice u/s 3, and within 7 days serve notice to the persons interested and send estimate of compensation to the RB.

(xvii) The RB shall deposit estimated amount to the DC within 60 days from receipt of the estimate (u/s 7).

(xviii) The DC shall consider market value of property on the date the notice u/s 3 was served. The DC shall pay compensation for damage that may be caused during taking possession of the property, shifting of property during taking possession and diminution of profits from service of notice u/s 6 for taking possession of the property. The DC in every case shall award an additional sum of “fifty per cent” on such market value in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition (u/s 8).

(xix) Within 60 days of deposit of estimated amount by the RB, the DC shall pay compensation to the persons entitled. If there be any dispute or failure to draw compensation the DC, after 60 days, shall deposit the amount to the Public Account of the Republic which shall be designated funds for taking over possession of the property (u/s 10).

(xx) The DC shall pay 50% of the value of standing crops (u/s 10A) to the Bargadar (share croppers). (xxi) When the compensation has been paid or deemed to have been paid, the property shall stand

acquired and vested absolutely to the Government. A declaration to that effect shall be published by the DC in the Official Gazette (u/s 11).

(xxii) The Ordinance has the provision of arbitration in the case an affected party does not accept the award of compensation made by the DC. The affected person has the right to apply to the Arbitrator for revision of the award (u/s 28) within 45 days from the date of serving the notice of award. The Arbitrator is a Judicial Officer not below the rank of Subordinate Judge.

(xxiii) The Arbitrator can revise the amount of compensation in favor of the applicant or update the award made by the DC. When the amount of compensation is enhanced, an additional compensation up to a maximum 10% can be offered for payment.

(xxiv) Both the parties have the right to file an appeal with the Arbitration Appellate Tribunal against the award of the Arbitrator (u/s 34). The Arbitration Appellate Tribunal shall consist of a member who shall be appointed by the Government from among persons who are or have been District Judges. The decision of the Arbitration Appellate Tribunal will be final. The compensation determined by the Arbitration Appellate Tribunal in respect of each land owner shall not exceed the amount specified in the award of the Arbitrator by more than 10%.

Under the 1982 Ordinance the Government is obliged to pay compensation only for the assets under acquisition and then hand them over to the requiring body.

173. Time Frame for Land Acquisition Land acquisition process consists of different steps and takes a considerable time to accomplish the functions. Standard procedures for processing land acquisition by the Deputy Commissioner (DC) takes about 311 days to 406 days to complete. Time limit for different stages of land acquisition provided in the Ordinance/LA Manual 1997 is summarized in the table 1.1 below.

Table 1.1: Time Limit at different stages of Land Acquisition


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Sl. No.

Issues/Steps Maximum time limit in days

Remarks

1 Submission of LA proposal to DC by the RB

2 Feasibility study by DC (Circular No. 8/95, MoL) and Place feasibility report before District Land Allocation Committee

21 days After receipt of proposal from the requiring body (RB).

3 After approval by the District Land Allocation Committee (DLAC), the DC will start LA case and issue notice under section 3 of the LA Ordinance regarding proposal for acquisition of the property

4 Starts joint verification by AB and RB representatives within 3 days after issuance of notice under section 3 (LA Manual 1997, Directives sl. 35)

3 days Start joint verification within 3 days of service of notice u/s 3.

5 Objection (u/s 4) against acquisition proposal. 15 days After issuance of notice under section 3

6 Hearing of Objection by DC and prepare report 30 days After expiry of objection period.

7 Approval by DC if quantity of land below 50 big has (16.50 acres/ 6.68 hectors approx.) and no objection. If there is objection DC sends the record with report to the Govt. or to the Divisional Commissioner as the case may be.

10 days/ 30 days

With permission from Commissioner 30 days after expiry of objection period.

8 Return the proposal to DC with decision of Divisional Commissioner or the MOL

15 days and 90 days respectively

From submission of the report by DC.

9 Invite claim from persons interested under section 6.

After approval by DC/ Div. Commissioner/ MOL

10 Hearing on claims 15 days After15 days of service of notice u/s 6.

11 Making of award and estimate for compensation by DC (LA Manual 1997, Directives sl. 44)62

30 days After notice u/s 6

12 Notice to persons interested (u/s 7) 7 days From the date of making award of compensation

13 Deposit of compensation money to DC by RB (u/s 7) 60 days From the date of receipt of estimate from DC

14 Payment of compensation (u/s 10) 60 days From the date of deposit of compensation money by RB

15 Compensation deemed to have been paid After expiry of above 60

62 The process of title verification, valuation, preparation of award and estimates may require more than 60 days, although the law allows only 30 days.


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Sl. No.

Issues/Steps Maximum time limit in days

Remarks

days u/s 10.

16 Application to Arbitrator (u/s) 28) 45 days From the date of service of notice of the award

Total days: 311 to 406 days.

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