New Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) Document · 2020. 7. 16. · document of the...

Document of

The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No: ICR00004907

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

IBRD-81210

ON A

LOAN

IN THE AMOUNT OF

US$139.64 MILLION

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

FOR THE

JAKARTA URGENT FLOOD MITIGATION PROJECT

(Jakarta Emergency Dredging Initiative)

August 23, 2019

Urban, Disaster Risk Management, Resilience and Land Global Practice

East Asia And Pacific Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective February 28, 2019)

as at Project Closing

Currency Unit = Indonesian Rupiah (Rp)

Rp 14,076 = US$1

FISCAL YEAR

January 1 - December 31

(Exchange Rate Effective December 22, 2011)

as at Appraisal

Currency Unit = Indonesian Rupiah (Rp)

Rp 9,070 = US$1

Regional Vice President: Victoria Kwakwa

Country Director: Rodrigo A. Chaves

Regional Director: Benoit Bosquet

Practice Manager: Abhas Kumar Jha

Task Team Leader(s): Marcus John Jin Sarn Lee

ICR Main Contributor: Dixi Mengote and Natasha Zamecnik

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AMDAL Analisis Mengenai Dampak Lingkungan, or Environmental Impact Assessment as required under Indonesian law

BAPPENAS Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional, or Ministry of National Development Planning

BBWSCC Balai Besar Wilayah Sungai Ciliwung-Cisadane (BBWSCC), or river basin management authority of Ciliwung-Cisadane rivers

BMKG Badan Meteorologi, Klimatologi, dan Geofisika, or Meteorology, Climatology, and Geophysical Agency

BPBD Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah, or Provincial/Regional Disaster Management Agency

BPK Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, or Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia

CDF Confined Disposal Facility

CPF Country Partnership Framework

CPIU Central Project Implementation Unit (successor to the PMU)

CPMU Central Project Management Unit

CPS Country Partnership Strategy

CSC Construction Supervision Consultant

DED Detailed Engineering Design

DGCK Directorate General Cipta Karya (DGCK), or Human Settlements (under MPWH)

DGWR Directorate General for Water Resources (under MPWH)

Dinas SDA DKI Jakarta Dinas Sumber Daya Air (SDA), or DKI Jakarta Water Resources Department

Dinas PU-DKI Jakarta Dinas Pekerjaan Umum (DPU), or Public Works Department of DKI Jakarta

DKI Daerah Khusus Ibukota, or Special Capital Region

DO Development Objective

EIA Environmental Impact Assessment

EIRR Economic Internal Rate of Return

ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework

FGD Focus Group Discussions

FMIS Flood Management Information System

GDFRR Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery

GoI Government of Indonesia

GRS Grievance Redress System

HH Household

ICB International Competitive Bidding

IP Implementation Progress

IRI Intermediate Results Indicator

ISR Implementation Status and Results

JEDI Jakarta Emergency Dredging Initiative (alternate Project name)

JUFMP Jakarta Urgent Flood Mitigation Project

LARAP Land Acquisition and Resettlement Action Plan

MOF Ministry of Finance

MPWH Ministry of Public Works and Housing

MTR Mid-Term Review

NCICD National Capital Integrated Coastal Development

NPV Net Present Value

NSCWR National Steering Committee for Water Resources

O&M Operations and Maintenance

PAD Project Appraisal Document

PAP Project Affected Person

PDO Project Development Objective

PID Project Information Document

PIU Project Implementing Unit

POE Panel of Experts

PUSAIR Pusat Penelitian dan Pengembangan Sumber Daya Air, or National Research Center for Water Resources

RF Results Framework

RPF Resettlement Policy Framework

RW/RT Subdivisons of village. Rukun Warga (or block/hamlet level) / Rukun Tetangga (sub-block/neighborhood level)

SA Social Assessment

TA Technical Assistance

WJEMP West Java and Jakarta Environmental Management Project

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DATA SHEET .................................................................................................................................................. 1

I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES .......................................................................... 6

A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL ................................................................................................................... 6

B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE) ............................................. 9

II. OUTCOME ........................................................................................................................................... 11

A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs ...................................................................................................................... 11

B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY) ............................................................................................... 11

C. EFFICIENCY ...................................................................................................................................... 16

D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING ........................................................................... 17

E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY) .................................................................................... 17

III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME .................................................. 19

A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION ............................................................................................ 19

B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION ..................................................................................... 20

IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME ................... 21

A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) ................................................................... 21

B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE ........................................................... 24

C. BANK PERFORMANCE ..................................................................................................................... 27

D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME ............................................................................................... 29

V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................................. 30

ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS ................................................................................ 33

ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION ............................................ 44

ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT ................................................................................................. 47

ANNEX 4. OVERVIEW OF JAKARTA’S DRAINAGE SYSTEM AND PROJECT LOCATIONS ................................ 48

ANNEX 5. MAP OF KELURAHANS ................................................................................................................ 50

ANNEX 6. RAINFALL INFORMATION ............................................................................................................ 54

ANNEX 7. OVERVIEW OF FLOOD MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM ................................................ 55

ANNEX 8. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS ................................................................................................................. 56

ANNEX 9. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS ..................... 64

ANNEX 10. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS ...................................................................................................... 65

The World Bank Jakarta Urgent Flood Mitigation Project (P111034)

Page 1 of 66

DATA SHEET

BASIC INFORMATION

Product Information

Project ID Project Name

P111034 Jakarta Urgent Flood Mitigation Project

Country Financing Instrument

Indonesia Investment Project Financing

Original EA Category Revised EA Category

Full Assessment (A) Full Assessment (A)

Organizations

Borrower Implementing Agency

Republic of Indonesia

Ministry of Public Works and Housing (DG Water

Resources), Provincial Government of DKI Jakarta,

Ministry of Public Works and Housing (Regional Office of

Ciliwung-Cisadane River Basin), Ministry of Public Works

and Housing (Research and Development Agency),

Ministry of Public Works and Housing (DG Human

Settlements)

Project Development Objective (PDO) Original PDO

The Project Development Objective (PDO) is to contribute to the improvement of the operation and maintenance of priority sections of Jakarta’s flood management system.


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FINANCING

Original Amount (US$) Revised Amount (US$) Actual Disbursed (US$)

World Bank Financing IBRD-81210

139,640,000 139,640,000 91,072,221

Total 139,640,000 139,640,000 91,072,221

Non-World Bank Financing 0 0 0

Borrower/Recipient 50,210,000 46,290,000 26,833,579

Total 50,210,000 46,290,000 26,833,579

Total Project Cost 189,850,000 185,930,000 117,905,800

KEY DATES

Approval Effectiveness MTR Review Original Closing Actual Closing

17-Jan-2012 08-Aug-2012 02-Feb-2016 31-Mar-2017 28-Feb-2019

RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING

Date(s) Amount Disbursed (US$M) Key Revisions

31-Mar-2017 82.98 Change in Implementing Agency Change in Results Framework Change in Components and Cost Change in Loan Closing Date(s) Change in Financing Plan Reallocation between Disbursement Categories Change in Legal Covenants Change in Financial Management Change in Procurement Change in Implementation Schedule

KEY RATINGS

Outcome Bank Performance M&E Quality

Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory Modest


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RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived DO Rating IP Rating Actual

Disbursements (US$M)

01 31-Mar-2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0

02 31-Dec-2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0

03 27-Jul-2013 Moderately

Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 0

04 05-Feb-2014 Moderately

Unsatisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 9.70

05 04-Aug-2014 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 10.33

06 27-Feb-2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 30.45

07 19-Jun-2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 35.10

08 14-Dec-2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 40.25


10 22-Dec-2016 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 82.54


12 08-Dec-2017 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 85.66

13 02-Jun-2018 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 88.89

14 09-Dec-2018 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 94.14

15 28-Feb-2019 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 94.14

SECTORS AND THEMES

Sectors

Major Sector/Sector (%)

Public Administration 15

Other Public Administration 15


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Transportation 15

Other Transportation 15

Water, Sanitation and Waste Management 70

Other Water Supply, Sanitation and Waste Management

70

Themes

Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3) (%) Finance 14

Finance for Development 14

Disaster Risk Finance 14

Urban and Rural Development 47

Urban Development 5

Urban Infrastructure and Service Delivery 5

Disaster Risk Management 42

Disaster Response and Recovery 14

Disaster Risk Reduction 14

Disaster Preparedness 14

Environment and Natural Resource Management 40

Water Resource Management 40

Water Institutions, Policies and Reform 40

ADM STAFF

Role At Approval At ICR

Regional Vice President: James W. Adams Victoria Kwakwa

Country Director: Stefan G. Koeberle Rodrigo A. Chaves

Director: John A. Roome Benoit Bosquet

Practice Manager: Franz R. Drees-Gross Abhas Kumar Jha


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Task Team Leader(s): Fook Chuan Eng Marcus John Jin Sarn Lee

ICR Contributing Author: Dixi Mengote and Natasha Zamecnik


Page 6 of 66

I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES

A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL

Context 1. Country and sector background. Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia, is one of the most populous cities in the world.

In 2010, the population of the city administered by the Provincial Government of Jakarta (Daerah Khusus Ibukota or DKI) was 9.6 million, while greater Jakarta had reached over 24 million. In terms of economic growth, Indonesia’s economy performed well between 2001 and 2011, averaging 5.3% annual growth despite the slowing world economy at the time.

2. The geography of Jakarta makes the city vulnerable to flood risk. Greater Jakarta is surrounded by several

dormant volcanoes whose slopes form the upstream catchment areas of the 13 major rivers that flow through DKI Jakarta, which lies in the delta of the Ciliwung river to the Java Sea (see Annex 4). Flooding is a perennial occurrence and has been increasing in severity and frequency during the past decade. At present, 72.7% of Jakarta is prone to flooding, threatening the lives of about 980,000 residents, or about 10% of Jakarta’s population.1 Every year, large parts of the city are flooded during the rainy season, which starts in November and ends in April. The flood events of February 2002, 2007, and 2008 were especially severe, each causing loss of human life, displacement, outbreaks of disease, labor and school days lost, and reputational damage.2

3. The historical record of Jakarta’s flood events reveals that chronic inundation often resulted from, or was

aggravated by, drainage infrastructure failure rather than intense precipitation.1 The drainage system, originally designed for a 1-in-25 year storm event, did not function as designed for a number of reasons, including urbanization and population pressures, land subsidence, poor maintenance, inadequate solid waste collection, and weak institutional coordination.3

4. Urbanization and population pressures caused changes to land coverage and allotment of space for effective

drainage, exacerbating the city’s vulnerability to flooding. Urban infrastructure and services lagged behind the high population growth due in particular to urban-rural migration, which resulted in informal settlements, oftentimes along canals or riverbanks.4 About half of the city’s small lakes, which had traditionally played a major part in Jakarta’s flood control system, were converted into residential or commercial areas from the 1990s. Encroachment and development along critical catchment areas together resulted in increased rainwater runoff and diminishing storm water retention capacity both within the city and in upstream catchment areas.

1 Sedlar, Frank, Inundated Infrastructure: Jakarta’s Failing Hydraulic Infrastructure, Michigan Journal of Sustainability, Volume 4, Summer 2016. Available from: http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/mjs.12333712.0004.004 [Accessed 16 July 2019]. 2 Aldrian, Edvin, Dominant Factors of Jakarta’s Three Largest Floods, Jurnal Hidrosfir Indonesia, Volume 3, No. 3, December 2008. Available from: http://ejurnal.bppt.go.id/index.php/JHI/article/view/653/498 [Accessed 21 July 2019] 3 Cochrane, J, 2016, What’s Clogging Jakarta’s Waterways? You Name It, New York Times, Available from: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/04/world/asia/jakarta-indonesia-canals.html [Accessed: 13 June 2019] 4 During 1980-2005, the population of Greater Jakarta doubled from 11.9 million to 23.7 million. Every year, an estimated 250,000 people join the rural-urban migration to Jakarta. Reference: Jha, A. et al, 2012, Cities and Flooding: A Guide to Integrated Urban Flood Risk Management for the 21st Century, World Bank, Available from https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/2241 [Accessed 22 July 2019]

http://ejurnal.bppt.go.id/index.php/JHI/article/view/653/498


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5. Land subsidence, principally caused by intensive deep groundwater abstraction and construction weight, continued at alarming rates. 5 Due to land subsidence, a number of the rivers that flow through Jakarta no longer empty into the sea by gravity. Despite high annual rainfall, the hollowed aquifers cannot be recharged adequately as 97% of Jakarta is covered in concrete.6

6. Poor planning and execution of operations and maintenance (O&M) - The Ministry of Public Works (MPWH) and

DPU-DKI Jakarta (Public Works Department of DKI Jakarta) did not have sufficient resources earmarked for the maintenance of flood control infrastructure. At appraisal, it was reported that no new discharge capacity had been constructed in Greater Jakarta since the late 1980s. Between 1970 and 2010, no national- or city-level dredging or waterway maintenance was carried out, leading to a major reduction of the system’s drainage and retention capacity.3 Years of neglect resulted in the deterioration of embankments and build-up of sediment in canals and retention basins, with some canals operating at less than a third of their original capacity.7

7. Limited coverage of solid waste collection services - Increased solid waste generation by a rising urban population

coupled with inadequate management of solid waste further compromised the drainage system. DKI Jakarta collected less than 40% of the city’s solid waste, while 15% (approximately 1,000 tons a day) was discarded into the city’s canals.8 Solid waste dumping and wastewater discharge into the canals and rivers also contaminated the water, resulting in foul odor, health impacts and blocked river flows.

8. Weak coordination between the authorities responsible for flood management complicated the implementation

of a comprehensive strategy to tackle Jakarta’s vulnerability to flooding. MPWH and DPU-DKI are both responsible for managing Jakarta’s flood control system. While MPWH is in charge of floodways crossing provincial boundaries, DPU-DKI is responsible for drains and retention basins within the Special Capital Region of Jakarta. Financial resources have not always been allocated according to management functions, while poor coordination amongst both and with authorities within greater Jakarta that managed upstream waterways hindered the achievement of a comprehensive flood management strategy.

9. Rationale for Bank assistance. At appraisal, flood mitigation and management had become a critical economic,

social and political issue due to the significant economic losses resulting from the February 2007 flood event, which inundated 75% of the capital, resulting in 57 deaths, over 400,000 people affected, approximately US$900M in financial losses, and approximately US$140M in flood-related insurance claims.9 Due to the flood’s extensive impact on the city, the then-Governor requested the Bank’s assistance for flood mitigation in Jakarta, and in an unprecedented step, agreed to use part of the Bank loan to finance the rehabilitation of floodways under MPWH’s authority. The 2008 flood, which caused 30 deaths and shut down Jakarta’s Soekarno-Hatta international airport for three days, created a further sense of urgency among all stakeholders.

10. In response to the flooding threats, DKI Jakarta’s Medium-Term Development Plan (2007-2012) included the

normalization of rivers and channels as a key plank of the city’s flood management program. In addition, the

5 Some parts of Jakarta have sunk by 4m from 1974 to 2010, with the most affected areas on the north coast. Reference: Garschagen, M et al, 2018, Is Jakarta’s New Flood Risk Reduction Strategy Transformational, Sustainability, 10(8), 2934; https://doi.org/10.3390/su10082934. 6 Wright, P, 2018, Jakarta Is the World's Fastest-Sinking City and It May Have Only a Decade Left, Weather.com, Available from: https://weather.com/science/environment/news/2018-04-06-jakarta-indonesia-sinking-groundwater [Accessed 01 July 2019] 7 World Bank, 2016, 'Keeping Indonesia’s Capital Safer from Floods', Available from: https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2016/01/08/keeping-indonesias-capital-safer-from-floods [Accessed 01 July 2019] 8 Figure of 15% as reported in Project Information Document (PID) Concept Stage (2008), versus 20% as reported by Cochrane (2016). 9 Cheong, A, 2018. A retrospective view of floods in Jakarta, JBA Risk Management. Available from https://www.jbarisk.com/news-blogs/a-retrospective-view-of-floods-in-jakarta/ [Accessed 16 July 2019].


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Project was fully consistent with the Bank’s 2009-2013 Indonesia Country Partnership Strategy (CPS). It contributed to the crosscutting engagement areas identified in the CPS and supported the coordination between central and local government agencies towards improving the provision of basic services for drainage and flood management. More specifically, the Project supported: (i) CPS core engagement 2 – Infrastructure by increasing the quantity and efficiency of the national and sub-national government’s spending on infrastructure; and (ii) CPS core engagement 5 – Environmental Sustainability and Disaster Mitigation, by helping to improve the flood management system in Jakarta while establishing environmental and social best practices.

Theory of Change (Results Chain)

Activity Output

Investment in canal

maintenance (1)

Volume of dredged material removed from canals and retention basins

Project Operations Manual for dredging

and Resettlement Policy Framework for

affected persons produced

Higher Outcome

Improved O&M to increase drainage

capacity in priority sections

(3) Reduced damage

and loss of life due to flooding;

better quality of

life in Project areas

Length of embankments

repaired or constructed

Length of canals maintained (2)

Flood management information system

developed

Problems: O&M backlog for drainage infrastructure, severe flooding, loss of economic activities and life

Assumptions: (1) Land acquisition and resettlement can be done in timely manner (2) Restoring canals to their original design capacity is adequate to make observable reduction in current flood risk (3) Improvements can be maintained over time (4) Flood management database and models are maintained and shared by implementing agencies

Improved flood

management

TA for flood management

Middle Outcome

Lower Outcome


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Project Development Objectives (PDOs) 11. The PDO in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) and the Loan Agreement was to contribute to the improvement

of the operation and maintenance of priority sections of Jakarta’s flood management system.

Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators

12. The Project’s key outcomes were improved operations and maintenance of Jakarta’s drainage system that would ultimately reduce flooding impacts for some 1.8 million people living in 57 kelurahans (urban villages) in areas within DKI Jakarta that are affected by the Project. Reduced flooding would be measured by three outcome indicators: (i) the water level of inundated areas, with a baseline of 70 cm and a target of 11 cm; (ii) the number of hours of water logging in inundated areas, with a baseline of >24 hours and a target of <24 hours; and (iii) the extent of inundated areas, with a baseline of 100% and a target of 20%.

Components 13. Component 1. Dredging and rehabilitation of selected key floodways, canals and retention basins (US$176.1M;

actual cost US$111.44M). During preparation, a Dutch institute for applied research in water and infrastructure produced models that concluded, based on the 2007 flood, that the flood risk could be reduced by 40% if the canals were functioning as designed and maintained regularly.10 This component supported the dredging and rehabilitation of 11 floodways/canals and four retention basins, which were identified as priority sections of the Jakarta flood management system in need of urgent rehabilitation and improvement in flow capacities (see Map at end of report). The dredged material was to be transported and disposed into proper disposal sites. The length of the 11 floodways/canals was estimated at 67.5 km, while the four retention basins covered a total area of 65.1 ha. About 42.2 km of embankments were to be rehabilitated or constructed within these floodways, canals and retention basins. Where necessary, mechanical equipment such as pumps, gates, etc. were to be replaced or repaired.

14. Component 2. Technical assistance for project management, social safeguards, and capacity building

(US$13.4M; actual cost: US$6.11M). This component supported contract management, engineering design reviews, construction supervision engineers for the dredging and rehabilitation works and technical assistance (TA) for implementation of the project, including the Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF), Resettlement Plans (RP) and the Grievance Redress System (GRS). TA included support to improve institutional coordination for O&M of the flood management system as well as the establishment of a Flood Management Information System (FMIS). It covered the cost of implementing required RPs, establishment and operation of the GRS to resolve resettlement-related complaints, and a Panel of Experts (POE) to advise on technical aspects such as dredging and dredge disposal, environmental and social management monitoring, and resettlement practices.

B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE)

Revised PDOs and Outcome Targets 15. The PDO was not revised. However, the Project underwent a Level 2 Restructuring in March 2017 (see Data

Sheet) which deleted the original outcome indicators. This revision had been anticipated at appraisal because the only baseline data available were from 2002, and the situation on the ground, particularly on land subsidence, land use, sea water level and rainfall data, was expected to evolve significantly in the intervening years. The restructuring introduced three new outcome indicators that focused on flood mitigation in 34 flood-

10 Brinkman, J (Deltares) and Hahm, H (World Bank), 2007. Jakarta Floods. Presentation slides, available from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTINDONESIA/Resources/226271-1170911056314/jakarta.floods.ppt [Accessed 13 June 2019]

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTINDONESIA/Resources/226271-1170911056314/jakarta.floods.ppt


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prone kelurahans during the most significant flood event of GOI’s fiscal year (FY), specifically: (i) average flood depth; (ii) average length of inundation; and (iii) number of neighborhood units (RW or RT) experiencing inundation (see Annex 1). The PDO indicators and their targets were revised to align them with the 2013 flood mapping data generated by the Provincial Disaster Management Agency of DKI Jakarta (BPBD).

Revised Components 16. The restructuring identified loan savings in the order of US$44M, resulting mainly from foreign exchange gains

from depreciation of the Rupiah against the US Dollar since Project preparation and approval. To utilize the savings, the restructuring added two key activities to Component 1: (i) construction of the Sentiong pumping station (PS), meant to become the largest pumping station in the Jakarta area at an estimated 40m3/s pumping capacity; and (ii)a review of the master plan on flood management in the Cisadane-Jakarta-Bekasi area, meant to support the long-term vision and strategy for flood and water management in the Greater Jakarta area. The restructuring reallocated US$28.7M for construction of the pumping station and US$3M for the master plan, although it should be noted that neither activity was completed. The name of Component 1 was updated to “Dredging, rehabilitation and flow capacity improvement of selected key floodways, canals and retention basins”, and the cost was slightly reduced from US$176.1M to US$172.53M.

Other Changes 17. The restructuring also extended the loan closing date by 23 months from March 31, 2017 to February 28, 2019

to provide ample time for completion of the remaining project activities and implementation of the above new activities. To measure progress of the new activities, two changes were made to the intermediate outcome indicators in the RF, namely: (i) inclusion of the ‘additional drainage pumping capacity added by the Project’ to reflect the results of the Sentiong PS; and (ii) reduction of the end target value for ‘additional storage added to retention basins’ to exclude emergency dredging works completed under DKI Jakarta’s own financing to increase retention storage volumes following the January 2013 floods.

18. The main administrative changes under the restructuring were: (i) designation of the National Research Center

for Water Resources (PUSAIR) of MPWH as an additional Project Implementation Unit (PIU) to implement the master plan review; (ii) addition of a limited provision for incremental operating costs for the MPWH to support PUSAIR as PIU; (iii) removal of the requirement for the advisory Panel of Experts (POE), as project issues were capably handled by the Construction Supervision Consultant (CSC) and the Bank’s Jakarta-based team; and (iv) reallocation of loan proceeds among categories to fund the additional activities.

19. The loan closed on February 28, 2019 with a cancellation of US$48.5M, resulting from Project cost savings and

exchange rate gains. The additional activities added at restructuring were not completed.

Rationale for Changes and Their Implication on the Original Theory of Change 20. The changes resulting from the restructuring did not impact the Theory of Change. The additional activities, the

Sentiong PS and the master plan review, were both aligned with the PDO.


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II. OUTCOME

A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs

Assessment of Relevance of PDOs and Rating 21. The PDO remained highly relevant to the country’s development priorities, CPS objectives and Bank strategy

throughout implementation to closing. Flood risk management remained a priority in the 2016-2019 Country Partnership Framework (CPF) Engagement Area 1: Infrastructure Platforms at the National Level, which focused on water, sanitation, irrigation and dams. The project’s dredging and embankment rehabilitation works directly supported flood mitigation through infrastructure improvements, while the reduction in flood risk strengthened disaster mitigation. Infrastructure investment and disaster risk management remained key priorities for DKI Jakarta throughout implementation. In a continued effort to ease water flow from upstream areas and improve water capacity the DKI 2019 Provincial Government Budget allocated funds for land acquisition around rivers and water channels amounting to Rp500 billion and surrounding reservoirs, lakes, and retention basins amounting to Rp350 billion11 and pledged to clean the rivers and seas through the National Action Plan on Marine Debris (2017-2025).

22. The Sentiong PS and master plan review added to Component 1 at restructuring were intended to further

improve the flood management situation. Unrestrained urbanization limited the available space for infiltration and increased the runoff, with much of the water catchment areas north of the city converted into largely impervious middle- and upper-income housing and commercial buildings, and less than 10% pervious green space.12,13 The PS became a high priority as studies carried out by DKI Jakarta after the Project commenced showed that severe land subsidence had exposed the city to coastal flooding. Consequently, pumping was required to empty the drains in subsided areas where gravity was no longer sufficient. The review of the master plan on flood management in Cisadane-Jakarta-Bekasi area was likewise a priority, as it was meant to update the flood models for Jakarta and synchronize the flood management works with the latest infrastructure details, topography maps, land use plans, land subsidence data, and coastal flood defense plans.

B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY)

Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome 23. The PDO was to assist the borrower contribute to the improvement of the operation and maintenance of

priority sections of Jakarta’s flood management system. The PDO was achieved through a combination of physical works and institutional improvements. The Project focused on no-regret measures in priority sections of Jakarta’s flood management network, such as rehabilitation of embankments and dredging of main waterways (i.e. removal of accumulated material in rivers, canal, main drains, retention ponds) to their original design capacity. The sections of the canals were prioritized based on several Bank-funded flood management studies

11 Wildan, M, 2019, Bisnis Indonesia: Naturalisasi Sungai: DKI Komitmen Lanjutkan Pembebasan Lahan (River Naturalization: DKI Commits to Continue Land Acquisition), PWC, Available from: https://www.pwc.com/id/en/media-centre/infrastructure-news/april-2019/to-proceed-with-land-acquisition.html [Accessed 09 Aug 2019] 12 Between 2000 and 2010, urban land in Indonesia increased by about 1.1% each year—the largest increase in absolute amount of urban land after China. Reference: Indonesia's Urban Story, 2016, World Bank. Available from https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2016/06/14/indonesia-urban-story [Accessed 01 Aug 2019] 13 Water catchment areas, protected forest areas, green areas and urban forests were converted into middle- and upper-income housing and commercial buildings between 1985-2005. Reported by The Jakarta Post Editorial Board, 2018, “Preparing for very bad floods”. Available from: https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2018/12/15/preparing-for-very-bad-floods.html [Accessed 09 Aug 2019]


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completed in the aftermath of the 2002 floods. About 1.8 million people living in the 57 affected kelurahans stood to benefit from the Project based on an average density of 166 persons per hectare.

24. Review of outcome and output indicators. As stated above and in the M&E section below, the PAD outcome indicators had baselines dating from 2002, and were extremely vague, with no time period established, had unclear linkages to the Project works, and no defined measurement methodologies. Furthermore, the 57 kelurahans used in the RF were not mapped with high accuracy. They were administrative boundaries that either contained or were adjacent to the Project sites, and not the catchment boundaries of the Project sites (see Map 1 in Annex 5). These issues make using the PAD’s PDO indicators problematic, and consequently, no usable data is available for this assessment.

25. During the 2017 restructuring, the original 57 kelurahans were reduced to 34 kelurahans in a bid to link indicators to kelurahans with available flood mapping data obtained from BPBD. However, these 34 kelurahans are not a subset of the 57 kelurahans used in the PAD, with only nine overlapping. Furthermore, the 34 flood prone kelurahans do not precisely cover the Project sites, missing a number of sites in Central and East Jakarta from the PAD list. There is also little overlap between the flood prone kelurahans and BPBD’s data collection points, as the latter is concentrated in East and South Jakarta (see Map 1 in Annex 5). Given the lack of comparable base maps and data, it is difficult to establish whether the achievement of targets, based on upstream flood data, is the result of downstream Project-financed dredging and embankment works.

26. Revised PDO indicator 1. The average flood depth in the Project’s 34 flood prone kelurahans during the most

significant flood event of the financial year fell from the 2013 baseline of 100-150 cm to 28 cm in 2018, and the target of 20 cm was 92% met. The lower average flood depth suggests that after significant rainfall, areas are no more than ankle-deep (as opposed to 1 to 1.5m deep) in flood water, causing less physical damage and reducing economic losses. Unfortunately, there was no documentation on how the actual value was derived. The only available raw data was reported in the MTR (see Annex 5), and this reveals that the actual value was reported as range-based data from 26 measurement points across East and South Jakarta. The reporting of only one actual value raises doubts regarding how it was measured and reported, and whether one value is representative of the conditions in the 34 very distinct kelurahans. Moreover, there is no record of the raw data collection between the MTR in February 2016 and loan closing in February 2019.

27. Revised PDO indicator 2. The average length (duration) of inundation in the Project’s 34 flood prone kelurahans

during the most significant flood event of the financial year, fell from a baseline of more than 7 days to 6.7 hours, essentially meeting the target of six hours in 2018. This indicator suggests that after significant rainfall, the 34 kelurahans were flooded for a much shorter period, leading to lower economic and social losses.

28. Revised PDO indicator 3. The number of neighborhood units (RW or RT)14 in the Project’s 34 flood prone

kelurahans experiencing inundation during the most significant flood event of the financial year, was 80% met. The number fell from a baseline of 100% (i.e. all 34 kelurahans inundated) to 32% in 2018, slightly higher than the target of 15%. This suggests that flooding was far less pervasive with economic and social losses limited to a smaller total area. However, as with PDO indicator 1, the baseline reference, measurement methodology, and raw actual data for PDO indicators 2 and 3 were not well-documented.

14 Village is the lowest level of government administration locally, further divided into RW or block/hamlet , and RT or sub-block/neighborhood.


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29. Nonetheless, the PDO indicators seem to reveal a substantial reduction of the city’s vulnerability to flood events in terms of the level, duration and extent of flooding, despite higher than average monthly rainfall during the historically flood prone months of January and February15 between the start of works in 2013 and substantial completion of works in 2017 (see Annex 6). Though the methodology for setting the PDO indicators and measuring results was ambiguous, anecdotal evidence from the PIU suggests that the dredging and embankment rehabilitation works resulted in observable improvements for residents in DKI Jakarta. During ICR interviews, the PIUs stated that before the Project, inundations lasted for days, but after completion, flooding was reduced to just a few hours.

30. Given the ambiguity of the PDO indicators, the intermediate result indicators (IRI) will be used to assess the

project’s achievements. As mentioned earlier, dredging of floodways, canals and retention basins was a no-regret measure even with severe land subsidence, as deeper canals provided additional storage to hold back water during a flood event. The construction and repair of embankments protected against slope failure, and provided additional height to cope with backwater effects that could arise from coastal flooding.

31. Surveys of the selected key floodways, canals, and retention basins carried out during project preparation

estimated the total volume of dredge material to be about 3.4 million m3 (of which about 95,000m3 were assumed to be solid waste). Approximately 42.2km of floodways, canals, and retention basins embankments needed rehabilitation or construction. These key outputs were captured as IRI targets: (1) volume of dredged material removed from the floodways, canals and retention basins (including solid waste); (2) additional storage added to retention basins; (3) length of embankment repaired or constructed; and, (4) additional drainage pumping capacity added by the Project, included during the restructuring to capture the capacity added by the Sentiong PS.

32. IRIs #1 and #2 were fully achieved. IRI #3, the 55.66km of actual embankment rehabilitation, exceeded the target

of 42.2 km by 28%. IRI #4 on additional pumping capacity was not achieved because the Sentiong PS was never built. Technical issues originally stalling its construction were resolved, but procurement issues could not be overcome.

33. Although the extent to which the canals were normalized to their original design capacity is not known, overall,

the dredging and embankment rehabilitation works resulted, at least anecdotally, in an improvement in water quality and a reduction in flood-related damage and losses for some 1.7 million people in the 34 kelurahans.16 Many of the canals were built around the 1920s, and recent reports claim that the canals flowing into the sea or the coastal retention ponds have lost up to 75% of their capacity.17 While the cumulative effect of dredging was not well-substantiated by the IRIs, the fact that it attempted to revert the drains to their original design capacity (see Paragraphs 3 to 8 above) is a positive development. The PIU shared during the ICR interviews that the local community has been very grateful for works done under the Project, and recognized that the water quality in the

15 Rainy season is typically between October and December, peaking around January to February when floods occur. Reference: BMKG, in The Jakarta Post, 2019. https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/09/05/extreme-weather-imminent-ahead-of-rainy-season-in-october.html 16 This population is based on the total area of the 34 kelurahans (approximately 1,125ha) and a population density of 155ppha in 2012, according to 2012 Java Spatial Model data as reported in the 2012 FMIS report. It must be noted that the PAD estimates 1.8 million people affected in 57 kelurahans based on a higher density of 166ppha, but the exact 57 kelurahans are not known. See Annex 5 for more details. 17 Tarrant, B. 2014. ‘Special Report: In Jakarta, That Sinking Feeling Is All Too Real’. Reuters. Available from http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/22/us-sealevel-subsidence-jakarta-sr-idUSKBN0K016S20141222. [Accessed 21 July 2019]


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drains and retention basins had improved, although no interviews or measurements of water quality pre- and post-implementation are available to confirm these.18

34. Despite the lack of data, recent news coverage suggests an improvement in the overall flood management

situation in DKI Jakarta in the years following Project implementation. Interviews picked up by local news outlets in October 2018 quote the DKI Jakarta Water Resources Agency (SDA) as stating that, “while the flood-prone areas have remained the same since 2015, there was a noticeable reduction in terms of quantity, the number of flood points, [and] inundation points”.19 The incumbent Governor was also quoted in April 2019 as saying that “the number of internally-displaced people due to flood was down to 1,600, from 20,000 in 2015, […] due to better control of flood water upstream”.20

35. In addition to physical works, the project included a management support component to address weaknesses

in engineering oversight, supervision of environmental plans, and implementation of RPs and GRS. Institutional improvements were supposed to include: (i) improving institutional coordination between responsible agencies to encourage coordinated development and O&M of Jakarta's flood management system; and (ii) strengthening the capability of the responsible agencies to improve the operations, maintenance and management of Jakarta's flood management system. However, the project offered no stand-alone TA or training to build capacity specifically on canal/floodway O&M.

36. Component 2 had one IRI that measured the length of canal to be cleaned/maintained by DPU-DKI annually.

At project closing, 24.6km of canals were cleaned/maintained (there is no defined distinction between cleaning and maintenance), which achieved 95 percent of the original target of 25km. However, like the other targets, it is not clear how this target was derived. Nonetheless, the cleaning and maintenance of the canals continue under new programs. For example, beginning in 2016, DPU-DKI formed and operationalized special purpose task forces to combat specific city challenges including flood clearing drainage channels and conducting post-flooding emergency work.

37. Component 2 also contained a TA for a Flood Management Information System (FMIS). This was prepared in

2012 under a Dutch grant of US$0.5M. Although it was not Project-funded, it was deemed a critical Project contribution and hence was included in the Loan Agreement. However, the “support to improve institutional coordination for O&M of the flood management system”, as described in the PAD, was very limited. In fact, only the first phase of the FMIS (FMIS1) was completed in a span of four months (see Annex 6). Despite the short timeframe, the FMIS1 accomplished five key tasks: (i) information systems improvement; (ii) flood extent, hazard mapping, and simulations for three case studies in DKI Jakarta; (iii) establishment of an early warning system and dissemination (including a common webserver and a mobile phone app); (iv) proposing an institutional framework

18 “DKI Jakarta Governor Anies Baswedan said the condition of river water quality in Jakarta from 2014 to 2017 had experienced significant changes. Where, lightly polluted rivers from 23% fall to 12%. The polluted river is down from 44% in 2014 to 17% in 2017”. https://metro.sindonews.com/read/1399183/170/banjir-jakarta-bbwsc-pengerukan-kali-harus-dilakukan-rutin-1556273306 19 Martiyanti, E (ed.), 2018, 'Kadis SDA DKI Klaim Kuantitas dan Titik Banjir Berkurang (Head of Jakarta SDA Claims Quantity and Reduced Flood Point)', JawaPos.com (The Java Post), 3 Oct. Available from: https://www.jawapos.com/jpg-today/03/10/2018/kadis-sda-dki-klaim-kuantitas-dan-titik-banjir-berkurang/ [Accessed 1 July 2019]. 20 SindoNews may have erroneously reported the 2015 figure as 230,000. Detik cites the figure as 20,000, which is more reasonable, as it suggests a 92% reduction. Reference: Komaruddin, 2019, 'Korban Terdampak Banjir Tahun Ini Berkurang Dibanding Zaman Ahok Komaruddin Bagja Arjawinangun (Flood Affected Victims This Year Are Less Than Ahok's Age)', SindoNews.com, 29 Apr. Available from: https://metro.sindonews.com/read/1399844/171/korban-terdampak-banjir-tahun-ini-berkurang-dibanding-zaman-ahok-1556520701; Detik, 2019, 'Banjir Jakarta di Mata Anies, Realita Beda dengan Dunia Maya (Jakarta Flood in Anies' Eyes, Reality is Different from Virtual)', Detik, 28 Apr. Available: https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4528348/banjir-jakarta-di-mata-anies-realita-beda-dengan-dunia-maya [Accessed 1 July 2019].

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for mainstreaming FMIS; and (v) staff training carried out over one month. As the consultant had previously worked with the GoI and had access to a spectrum of GoI flood-related studies, data and activities, they were able to build a more sophisticated flood model than was available during Project preparation.21 In particular, they developed a fully operational hydrologic and hydraulic modeling framework.

38. The FMIS1 was eventually supplemented by a series of Bank-executed Trust Fund projects financed by the

Australian Government22 and a Joint Cooperation Program (JCP) with the Dutch Government23 to strengthen DKI Jakarta's capacity in hydraulic modeling and investment planning, including supporting the assessment of various pumping schemes in north Jakarta, and planning for optimization works of these polder systems. These complemented the dredging and embankment rehabilitation works done under the Project, by providing inputs for possible adjustments and synchronizing the model with latest conditions and plans from the Project and from other DKI Jakarta works. The FMIS and many other related studies, many of them on-going, continue to guide the GoI’s pipeline of flood risk mitigation projects today.

39. The Project provided much-needed guidance on dredging, embankment rehabilitation, and associated

activities. During the ICR interviews, it was revealed that prior to the Project, dredging was not carried out for major drains not only because of a lack of guidance on engineering techniques, but also an aversion to projects with associated resettlement and land acquisition. Indonesia’s land acquisition compensation standards, especially involuntary resettlement of informal communities, did not meet international standards at the time. While DPU-DKI has some experience in cleaning waterways, their work was largely on clearing smaller canals and micro drains, whereas the Project dredged main floodways, canals, and retention basins.24 The Project systematic guidance for dredging and its associated issues via the Project Operations Manual (POM), Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF), and Grievance Redress System (GRS). The preparation of the safeguard documents, though protracted and difficult, established new environmental and social management best practices on the (i) proper disposal of dredged material, (ii) dredging techniques to minimize negative indirect and direct impacts on the communities living and working near the project sites, and (iii) resettlement practices incorporating consultations, appropriate assistance, and compensation. The GoI considers the RPF a model framework that can be used for other projects and anecdotally, is now a key reference document for other organizations facing resettlement issues. Best dredging practices will likely continue to be adopted in maintenance work and dredging in other parts of Indonesia.

Other Benefits

40. The Ancol Confined Disposal Facility (CDF), where dredged material removed by the Project was disposed, is part of ongoing sea reclamation works at Ancol situated off the coast of Jakarta. It is privately operated by the concessionaire and operator of the reclamation, and is not financially connected to the Project. The disposal was done cooperatively and in a mutually beneficial manner with the developer to demonstrate safe disposal methods and possible use of the dredged material. The 3.4 million m3 of dredged material contributed about 28% of the estimated 12 million m3 of fill material needed for the reclamation. The selection of Ancol CDF was highly

21 The current hydraulic modeling framework for Jakarta builds on flood models from 2007 to 2011, as reported in the 2012 FMIS report. 22 Deltares, et al, 2014, Jakarta Flood Management Study (JFMS). Financed through the Indonesia Infrastructure Support Trust Fund (INIS-TF). 23 Deltares, et al, 2013. JCP Component D2: Flood Early Warning System, Document D2.7: Final report Jakarta Floods. Available from : https://publicwiki.deltares.nl/download/attachments/92572119/D2.7%20Final%20report%20Jakarta%20Floods%20January%202013%2C%20April%202013%20.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1377260556000&api=v2 [Accessed 22 July 2019] 24 Based on the RPF, the dredging works carried out by DKI Jakarta in the past focused on smaller canals called “local drains”. As Jakarta has no sewer system, those canals also serve the function as “open sewer”. On the other hand, the Project mainly dredged relatively large canals, which are referred to as “floodways”. These control flood by discharging stormwater straight into the sea, and do not necessarily drain the areas where the canals belong.


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beneficial for the Project, as it proved to be the best option because of its large disposal capacity, minimal resettlement issues, and minimal aesthetic and environmental impact, as compared to inland disposal sites previously considered during project preparation.

Justification of Overall Efficacy Rating 41. The Project’s overall Efficacy rating is Substantial. The targets for canal dredging and embankment works were

fully met, and the Project succeeded in improving the structural and physical condition of priority sections of Jakarta’s canals. The accomplishments of the FMIS, as well as the development of a comprehensive RPF, GRS, and POM for dredging and disposal, contributed to the improved O&M the flood management system. Overall, the considerable effort to complete the originally planned dredging packages should be recognized.

C. EFFICIENCY

Assessment of Efficiency and Rating 42. According to the ICR economic analysis, the Project has a higher EIRR than that in the PAD analysis. The ICR

cost-benefit analysis reproduced the methodology and applied the same assumptions used in the PAD. The economic internal rate of return (EIRR) as calculated increased significantly following Project completion. At appraisal, the EIRR of the Project was 381%, assuming an 8% discount rate, and a net present value (NPV) of Rp29.7 trillion or US$3.1 billion. The ICR analysis incorporated some small changes, such as the loan savings and the omission of certain unrealized economic benefits. Tax revenue from the reclamation of Ancol from sales of surface water converted to drinking water were not included because they never materialized. Assuming these changes, the estimate for the economic internal rate of return (EIRR) at completion is 413%, while the ICR’s NPV is slightly lower at US$2.79 billion.

43. At appraisal and completion, the economic analysis framework measured the prevention of: (i) national

budgetary reallocation due to flood mitigation, (ii) additional tax revenue and economic activity disruption, and (iii) indirect economic losses. The original economic analysis also relied on two key assumptions, that a flood of the same magnitude as the 2007 flood would occur every two years, and that the Project’s contribution to flood mitigation was 40%.25 These assumptions were tested, particularly the flood cycle assumption, and even under conservative scenarios of the Project contributing only 1% to future flood mitigation efforts, the Project would still be economically feasible.

44. The assumed frequency of a major flood has a significant impact on the Project’s economic performance. A

sensitivity analysis was conducted assuming less frequent flood cycles, and based on a review of literature on flood events in Jakarta, a 20 year return period was deemed reasonable for this ICR.26 At a 20 year frequency, the estimated EIRR (16%) remains higher than the discount rate (8%). This suggests that the Project will generate significant economic benefits over its lifetime (See Annex 8 for detailed Efficiency analysis).

25 Based on early flood estimates by Deltares using 2007 flood data, the only data available at the time of Project preparation. Reference: Brinkman JJ, Hartman M. Jakarta flood hazard mapping framework. Jakarta: World Bank report; 2008. Available from https://www.hkv.nl/upload/publication/Jakarta_Flood_Hazard_Mapping_Framework_MH.pdf 26 The PAD indicated that the PDO indicators were based on 2002 data. A desktop review of the February 2002 flood event estimates the rainfall return period to be 20 years. (Yunika et al, 2012, Watershed Hydrological Analysis of Jakarta Extreme Floods, Jurnal Teknik Sipil, Vol 12 No 1, Oct 2012, 66-74. Available from: https://ojs.uajy.ac.id/index.php/jts/article/view/622/642 [Accessed: 12 June 2019]). The January 2013 flood, which had historically the largest rainfall during the baseline year for flood mapping data, has an estimated return period of 30 years. (Wijayanti et al, 2017, Estimation of river flood damages in Jakarta, Indonesia, Nat Hazards (2017) 86:1059-1079, doi 10.1007/s11069-016-2730-1, Available from: https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11069-016-2730-1.pdf [Accessed: 12 June 2019])

https://ojs.uajy.ac.id/index.php/jts/article/view/622/642

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11069-016-2730-1.pdf


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45. Value for money. Given a lack of data on concurrent flood mitigation projects in Jakarta, the ICR is unable to undertake a detailed comparative value for money analysis. However, rough calculations on the unit cost of dredging and embankment repairs suggest that the Project works were done below reference costs. Project unit costs for dredging and embankment were found to be less than half that of similar projects in the region, such as the Guangxi Laibin Water Environment Project and the Mekong Delta Region Urban Upgrading Project.

46. Administrative Efficiency. A combination of procurement and implementation delays, as well as opportunity

costs associated with delayed implementation, hindered administrative efficiency. Delays of 18 to 36 months for contract packages impacted the net present value of the Project. Despite the capital and human resources spent throughout the delayed period of implementation, only about 5% of the project costs was incurred for project management and M&E related expenditures, which is almost 40% lower than the average of 8% for Bank projects. Furthermore, the GoI incurred a commitment fee on the undisbursed loan amount, which was unadjusted for the cancellation of US$48.5M, and opportunity costs from the unrealized construction of the Sentiong PS and the master plan on flood management despite two additional years for implementation following the Project restructuring. The additional funds and time could have been used to improve M&E or support more works. Nevertheless, substantial project savings and reduction of PAPs signalled gains in administrative efficiency. The Project was completed at about 62% of the total cost, and with a 98% reduction in the PAPs, compared to the figures estimated in the PAD.27 This translates to a 38% decrease in the cost per beneficiary, from US$105 at appraisal to US$70 at closing.

47. Efficiency is rated Substantial. The Project achieved the development objective at a substantially reduced cost

and with a high EIRR, even under conservative assumptions. However, the 23-month extension resulted in administrative inefficiencies as the achievements under Component 1 were incremental, and the additional PS and master plan review proposed at restructuring were not achieved.

D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING 48. The PDO was highly relevant to Jakarta’s flood management situation at appraisal and loan closing. The operation

substantially achieved its objectives, as evaluated by the IRIs, and efficiency was substantial thanks to significant loan savings. However, due to the lack of clarity in the reported data, the limited application of FMIS findings, and the unfulfilled activities added at restructuring (i.e. the Sentiong PS and master plan study), the Overall Outcome rating is reduced to Moderately Satisfactory.

E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY)

Gender See ‘Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity’ section

Institutional Strengthening 49. The Project led to improved institutional coordination among the PIUs. The Project’s institutional design

incorporated the different stakeholders involved in Jakarta’s water sector under an umbrella structure that maintained the existing management structure over the different canals/rivers. The management of flood related disaster risks in Jakarta is complicated due to the number of provincial and national government institutions involved in the myriad factors that impact flooding in the city. In addition to working together with stakeholders

27 The project cost (including TA) was US$189.85M as in the PAD, compared to US$120.62M as at project closing. The PAPs was estimated to be 1,109 HHs as in the PAD (although the completion report states that the figure is 1,144 as at the RPF cutoff date—a minor difference), compared to 22 HHs as at project closing.


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within the water sector, those working on flood management have to deal with issues related to rapid urbanization, land subsidence and rising sea levels, ageing floodways, canals and retention basins, persistent solid waste accumulation in the drainage system, and resettlement. Therefore, agencies working on urban flood management require wide-ranging knowledge and skills, since these flooding issues involve many policy fields, complex technical aspects and the ability to coordinate with stakeholders in different agencies. Through the seven-year implementation of the Project, a strong foundation for working together was established, and is expected to facilitate better cross-agency collaboration on flood- and land-related challenges within DKI Jakarta.

50. The Project contributed to Indonesia’s decentralization and regional empowerment efforts. A key obstacle to

infrastructure investment at the subnational level has been the limited financial capacity of subnational governments in Indonesia, with a high degree of reliance on fiscal transfers, and limited options for subnational infrastructure financing. The Project was among the first to utilize new government regulations that provided for central government financial support to local governments for economically beneficial projects. Specifically, out of the total loan financing of US$139.64M under the Project, US$69.34M was to be on-lending by the central government to the Provincial Government of DKI Jakarta. By helping to operationalize this system, which allowed for borrowing by subnational governments for economically beneficial projects that were not directly revenue generating, the Project contributed towards decentralization and regional empowerment efforts as enshrined in the 2001 decentralization law.

Mobilizing Private Sector Financing N/A

Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity 51. Though all of Jakarta’s residents are negatively impacted by urban flooding, it is the poor and vulnerable who

are generally disproportionally affected. Low-income communities tend to live on marginal land that is cheap or free, such as along the riverbanks and canals, which due to their location and poor housing construction quality, tend to be more vulnerable to flooding risk. Flooding, like other natural disasters, can exacerbate poverty through the loss of lives, destruction of assets, disruption of economic and educational activities and impact on health. Within such communities, women, children, the elderly and those with disabilities may be disproportionately affected. The Project did not specifically target specific groups within low-income communities, but rather intended to benefit all residents of flood-prone areas, regardless of gender, age or other attributes. The dredging of canals not only reduced the environmental impact of all the garbage having accumulated in the areas near informal settlements, but also the public health issues caused by the overflowing (following floods) and stagnant water. According to the city’s public works department approximately 20% of the city’s daily waste ends up in the local rivers and canals. When flooding occurs much of this waste ends up in the settlements near the rivers/canals edge contributing to flood related diseases.

52. The adoption of the project social safeguards, particularly the Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF), resulted

in the better handling of the communities that were affected and resettled throughout project areas. The adoption of best practice standards for dredging, and for environmental and social management, had an impact beyond the scope of the Project. The development of a new philosophy on how to deal with resettlement has had positive implications for poor communities that need to be resettled both in Jakarta and in the rest of Indonesia. See Social Safeguards section.


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Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts N/A

III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME

A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION 53. The Project leveraged a high level of interest from the GOI in the aftermath of the 2007 floods, but preparation

was hampered by administrative delays. DKI Jakarta also publicly positioned the Project as a key piece of its flood mitigation strategy, and consequently, public awareness of the Project was high over the project preparation period. However, the initial sense of urgency for JUFMP waned despite being originally conceived as the Jakarta Emergency Dredging Initiative (JEDI) due to the lengthy preparation period, which took more than four years (from mid-2007 to end-2011). Prior to Board approval, there were proposals to incorporate both ‘JEDI’ and ‘JUFMP’ in the project name, because JEDI had all along been used during the extensive preparation period, but JUFMP more accurately reflected that it was not an emergency project processed under the Bank’s Operational Procedure on ‘Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies’. Eventually, the Bank and GoI agreed to officially name the project ‘Jakarta Urgent Flood Mitigation Project (Jakarta Emergency Dredging Initiative)’ to accommodate both needs.28

54. The Project design successfully balanced between a set of works large enough for the PDO to be achieved, and

one that was manageable in environmental and social complexities. The PDO statement was simple, partly because the Project was initially planned as an emergency project. The Project was also unique as an investment lending project that specifically focused on DKI Jakarta, as opposed to other projects with a nationwide scope. The Bank recognized that the Project was part of a larger set of flood risk management solutions and therefore kept a narrow focus on improving drainage in priority areas in Jakarta. Extensive surveys of floodways, canals and retention basins, embankments and disposal areas were conducted to support project design and to ensure that the concerns of the public and other stakeholders, who had then been closely monitoring the project, were addressed. Consultations included the dissemination of the latest project design, scope and status, and broadly garnered positive support for the Project and its floods mitigation aims. Environmental and social complexities were important considerations for project scoping, especially given that the Project introduced safeguards for each package and promoted resettlement practices that were different from GOI’s business-as-usual approach.

55. Project preparation took into account the inclusion of all responsible institutions as a means to encourage and

establish long-term cooperation regarding flood management system planning and maintenance. Early engagement of the relevant institutions from all levels of government, including the Ministry of Finance (MOF), Bappenas, MPWH and DKI Jakarta, was key to Project preparation. Clear institutional arrangements were key to ensuring long term coordination in O&M. Set-up of the implementation arrangements, with a CPMU, CPIU and three PIUs, was challenging at first, particularly because it was an untested approach with no institutional precedent. The similar background (infrastructure planning / flood management / Project implementation) of agency representatives and implementing staff eased coordination.

28 Based on ‘Agreed Minutes of the Technical Discussions between the Republic of Indonesia and IBRD regarding JUFMP (JEDI)’, December 13-14, 2011.


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56. Component 1 activities were well-defined and structured with appropriate timing and sequencing of tasks given the project context. Component 2 activities, on the other hand, were not as focused and could have explicitly required and tracked investments in training. Nevertheless, structural interventions under Component 1, comprising dredging and embankment repairs, were clearly separated from non-structural interventions under Component 2, comprising TA, modeling, and mapping. A sequenced implementation design allowed for the dredging in project sites with the least potential environmental and social impact before proceeding to more complicated sites, providing continuous reviews and feedback, enhancing the chances of success at every part of the sequence and providing a key implementation risk management mechanism for the Project.29 The sequencing also avoided overburdening the implementing agencies and the construction supervision consultant during the first year, when detailed actual implementation processes, procedures and routines were being established and operationalized.

B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION 57. The Project’s institutional framework successfully reduced bureaucratic obstacles. The PIUs benefited from a

strong mandate set at the start of the Project, in the aftermath of the 2007 flood event (see Rationale for Bank Assistance), since each agency had clear roles and responsibilities to avoid overlapping of functions. BBWSCC was in charge of major floodways, DGCK was in charge of critical national institutions and canals of national importance, and DPU-DKI was in charge of the remaining drains, floodways, retention basins, and all social safeguards. The institutional framework encouraged more agile coordination among PIUs at the operational level, since they had a higher degree of autonomy over issues under their mandate, and did not have to go through each Directorate’s leadership (as per usual protocol) before resolving issues.

58. Staff and funding resource constraints during the early years of the Project (July 2013 to February 2015), and

implementation delays (December 2017 to closing) led to ‘Moderately Unsatisfactory’ IP ratings. The lack of supporting personnel at the CPMU resulted in delays related to the timely completion and submission of various project monitoring reports/documents, such as procurement plan and interim unaudited financial reports. Furthermore, a change in the DKI Jakarta administration required a period of reviews and adjustments, which also caused delays.

59. Considerable efforts were made to reduce risks that were not directly under the responsibility of PIUs but could

pose a reputational risk to the Project and/or the Bank during implementation. The overall risk rating was High for implementation, given the scope of the resettlement and the environmental risks. First, many non-Project infrastructure activities occurred near Project sites or coincided with the Project implementation period. For instance, a road works project that was implemented next to a Project site progressed with limited prior coordination on-site and competing space requirements. The Bank had to exercise caution in managing situations where land acquisition and the resettlement of PAPs from such road works could be incorrectly linked to the Project. The Bank also had to be clear in defining the scope of works, as seen in the lengthy but clear definition of sites in the RPF that could be considered as ‘linked’ to the Project. Second, disposal within the Ancol CDF was an integral part of the Project, but the overall reclamation effort in Ancol itself was unrelated to the Project. No issues arose regarding the disposal activities, and the project adhered to safeguards requirements as defined in the Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF). However, during Project implementation, the north-facing boundary (made up of sand-filled geotubes) was damaged by a wild floating barge. This was reported

29 Under Component 1, the major works were to be implemented in two sequenced batches: Phase 1 works (for four sites under three works contracts, which did not involve involuntary resettlement); and, Phase 2 works (for 11 sites under five contracts).


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and discussed with the Ancol developer, but remedial action was still pending as of this writing. No direct impacts caused by this event can be seen on site.

60. Procurement delays pushed the implementation timetable back, which resulted in the extension of the loan

closing date. The first batch of contracts (Packages 1, 2A, 2B and 3) was contracted approximately 18 months behind schedule, while the last package was procured (Package 6) 36 months behind schedule. This resulted in significant overlap between the packages and reduced construction time. The MTR was deferred by six months due principally to significant implementation delays, where there was no significant activity at the time to warrant the assessment of physical implementation and a very slow pace of resettlement plans (LARAPs) preparation. Issues with the procurement process also led to a failure to execute the two activities added following the restructuring, namely, the PS and master plan review. Disagreements between the Bank and PUSAIR on the eligibility of bidders for the master plan review delayed the procurement process to the point that it was no longer feasible to complete the master plan review by the Project’s revised closing date. This led to PUSAIR’s decision to discontinue the procurement process and to subsequently undertake the master plan review through a central government budget allocation. The issues raised during the contracting of the master plan review in turn affected the commencement of the PS procurement process.

61. The Construction Supervision Consultant (CSC) benefited from the implementation structure established by the

Project. However, on-ground issues could have been resolved faster if regular coordination meetings among the consultant, PIUs and contractor had been maintained, and if the three PIUs had recognized a clear chain of command between the consultant and the contractors. Furthermore, implementation capacity differed amongst the PIUs, which impacted coordination with the CSC. While formal coordination ceased upon loan closure, the informal but close working relationship between the respective agency staff has eased communication across the various implementing agencies within Jakarta.

62. Turnover at the decision-making level influenced implementation progress and Project commitment. Between

preparation in 2009 and loan closing, Jakarta saw four governors, who often had diverging views on flood management and resettlement. A new DKI administration in 2012 brought a period of review and readjustments, as the new administration reviewed ongoing activities and formulated its own policies and plans. Frequent staff and management turnover slowed the Project’s implementation pace due to the review of activities and the learning curve required by new staff. Efficiency waned as newly hired staff had to get acquainted with Project specifics.

IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)

M&E Design 63. As discussed above, the original design anticipated that all the PDO indicators would be reviewed and adjusted

during the MTR. The original three PDO indicators were vague, the baselines were from 2002—fully 10 years before Board approval—and were not attributable to the project activities. The new PDO indicators from the 2017 Restructuring provided a measure of the extent of the reduction of flooding frequency and intensity within Project areas. These were taken as a proxy of O&M improvement of the key sections of the Jakarta flood management system.


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64. While some changes to the physical landscape were expected, the extent of change from land subsidence was completely unexpected. The degree of land subsidence meant that direct measures of physical flooding in specific areas (levels, extent, etc.) could no longer be directly compared against the 2002 baseline. The sheer size and the non-uniformity of the physical change also made any attempt to adjust the available measures to compensate for land subsidence highly unreliable. Original estimates assumed land subsidence of approximately 1 cm a year, however studies at the time of Project appraisal found typical subsidence rates of 7.5 - 10 cm a year, with some parts of the city experiencing rates of up to 25 cm per year in extreme periods. Long-term measurements reveal that some parts of the city were sinking by a total of up to 4 m between 1974 and 2010.30

65. The absence of reliable baseline data on flooding, coupled with the lack of a comprehensive M&E methodology

both at appraisal and at restructuring, ultimately led to a weakly-supported RF. For the PDO indicators, there was no clear and robust methodology to monitor the progress, and no additional tools to evaluate and verify achievement of targets. For the IRIs, though the targets were achieved, the link to the outcome is weak.

66. As mentioned in the Efficacy section, there were shortcomings in the design of both the original and revised

PDO indicators. The PDO indicators at appraisal appeared to be placeholders, as suggested by caveats in the PAD that they would inevitably have to be changed at some point during implementation. There were some improvements to the PDOs at restructuring, owing to better data from BMKG, but the revised indicators still had several issues. First, the use of ‘the most significant flood event of the year’ does not reflect the spatial (area) and temporal (time) variation of rainfall causing the flooding. It is also in a sense, a moving target, as the most significant flood event could vary significantly year by year. A narrow definition of the indicator using the most significant rainfall event also misses the impact other often concurrent events, such as floods caused by overtopping of riverbanks, or by tides and sea level rise. Second, the use of FY2013 data as the reference is arbitrary in the sense that it does not reflect historical highs or a rainfall event for which flood management infrastructure should be designed. Notwithstanding this, as 2013 was the first year that significant flood events were mapped in DKI Jakarta and coincidentally the first year of Project-funded works, it was understandably used as a reference point to compare flood duration and depth between events that occurred before and after Project works. Third, both the original and revised baseline values were subjectively determined based on anecdotal experience during the 2002 and 2007 flood events, for which no flood data was systematically available. This has been confirmed during ICR interviews.31

67. In both cases—PAD and RP—the PDO indicators attempted to measure flooding impacts caused by multiple factors, which are outside the scope of the Project and generally challenging to isolate. All three PDO indicators are based on the ‘most significant event of the financial year (FY)’, with a FY2013 baseline. However, given the variation in the topography and physical conditions of each kelurahan (e.g. imperviousness, soil conditions, slope, flow path length to river, subsidence, etc.), and the fact that kelurahan administrative boundaries were used rather than hydrologic catchments, it is unclear whether the actual values reported are accurate and representative of the catchment. Finally, there is no formal documentation of how the baseline and target values were derived, or how the actual values were measured and reported. With such unreliable outcome data, the ICR

30 Philip Sherwell, 40 billion to Save Jakarta, The Story of the Great Garuda, The Guardian. 31 For the water level: there was about 1-1.5m flooding in most parts, hence a baseline of ‘100-150cm’ was used, and a target of ‘0.25cm’ was a reasonable reduction. For the flood duration: a baseline of ‘>7 days’ was used because Jakarta was ‘flooded’ for a week, and a target of ‘<0.25 day’ was used because Jakarta’s inhabitants generally consider a few hours of ‘inundation’ to be acceptable. For the areal extent: historical floods coincided with the 57 kelurahans, so a baseline of ‘100%’ was used, and a target of ‘15%’ was used because there have always been some areas (especially along the canals) that are perennially flood-prone.


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will discuss results suggested by the revised outcome indicators, but the core of the outcome assessment uses the Intermediate Results Indicators which have clear attribution and are easily understood.

68. The IRIs, while quantifiable and more reflective of target achievement, had similar shortcomings as the PDO indicators. IRIs#1 to 3 were based largely on estimates of dredge material as documented in the PAD. However, it was not clearly established whether the dredging of this volume will fully restore the floodways, canals and retention basins to their original design capacity. It is also not clear whether the baseline and target values for IRI#2, the additional storage added to retention basins, is a subset of the dredged volume in IRI#1, as both refer to retention basins. IRI#5, the length of canals maintained/cleaned, does not imply that the Project led to improved institutional capacity for flood management, but that DPU-DKI is carrying out its O&M mandate more effectively.32 It is not clear how the increased effectiveness of DPU-DKI can be attributed to improved institutional capacity as a result of Project support, as there was no evidence of the Project deliberately driving related training activities. It also cannot be strongly correlated to the amount disbursed for Component 2, as maintenance and cleaning activities could have been funded independently by DKI Jakarta. The establishment of multi-pronged cleanup programs, such as the orange and blue teams with separate solid waste management and drainage clearing components, may be a better indicator of a holistic improvement in the way drainage O&M is viewed, and their activity could be monitored more readily throughout the project period.

69. Project M&E could have benefitted from additional tools, such as beneficiary surveys and interviews to gauge

flood management improvements in businesses, schools, clinics and households around the Project locations before and after implementation. Additional measurements for water quality could have also been added, so that anecdotal evidence of water quality improvements could be substantiated. Lastly, a depth-damage function could have been used to evaluate the indicator’s baseline and target values, and provide better linkage to PDO achievement. A conventional approach for the economic estimation of direct flood damage to buildings is using functions that relate inundation depth to economic damage, based on analysis of past events and on expert judgment. However, while the level of target achievement for PDO indicator 1 was substantial, there was no correlation presented between the measured flood depth and the anticipated economic loss.

M&E Implementation 70. The DGWR was responsible for monitoring Project implementation. Data was collected regularly and used to

monitor progress on the various construction Project packages. The supervision consultant played a key role in assisting the CPIU and PIUs to supervise, monitor, evaluate and report on the achievement of Project outcomes, including Project construction and disposal activities, environmental and social safeguard activities. The CSC provided monthly as well as quarterly progress reports. The PIU DKI Jakarta, with the support of the walikotas (mayors) of the relevant municipalities, was responsible for monitoring and evaluating the resettlement plans.

71. However, as mentioned in the Efficacy section, there was poor correlation between Project areas and

monitored areas, and unclear measurement and documentation procedure for actual values reported. In general, the issue with flood depth and duration monitoring in Jakarta is the lack of well-distributed measurements. There are in-stream gauges and water level readings in some areas, but the data are often not properly recorded, hence the reporting of a single actual observation value for multiple kelurahans. To provide a more consistent measure of flood extent and duration (and thereby quantify the impact of the Project), it was decided to refer to official flood maps that were regularly generated by BPBD since 2013, which happened to be

32 The most important and intensive O&M responsibility (including O&M for pump operations and dredging) for the floodways, canals and retention basins in Jakarta falls under DPU-DKI.


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the year before the start of any Project-funded physical works. While the map is based on administrative units of neighborhood, it was updated during flood events, providing spatial information about flood occurrence.

72. Despite these shortcomings, the floodways, canals and retention basins are part of an interrelated system, so it

is not inconceivable that the observed reduction in flooding incidence in parts of DKI Jakarta, while inadequately measured, are associated with Project-related improvements to the O&M of the system. The IRIs included in the RF measured the output of the dredging and rehabilitation activities, which determined the degree to which floodways, canals or retention basins were returning to their original design capacities.

73. The Bank team reviewed the CSC’s monthly progress reports and assessed whether any changes were necessary

with regards to Project implementation. The CSC’s scope of work included supervising and supporting the implementation of the LARAPs, as well as monitoring for any activities at the Project “linked” sites. In general, the reporting of contractual progress (physical and financial) of the CSC consultancy and physical works contracts was satisfactory.

M&E Utilization 74. Utilization of the Project M&E was fairly straightforward. It provided data regarding dredging and embankment

work. The M&E reporting was used to inform Project management regarding possible issues related to linked sites, i.e. if there were possible breaches in safeguards, which were then addressed by the Bank or relevant stakeholders. Significant changes regarding land subsidence resulted in the incorporation of new activities during the 2017 restructuring.

75. During construction, many changes to the existing design were made based on governing field conditions,

requests from residents in neighboring communities, concerned agencies, etc. These design changes were confirmed with the joint field inspection of all concerned parties, technical, environmental and social studies.

Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E 76. The overall rating of the quality of M&E is Modest. There were significant shortcomings in the M&E system’s

design and implementation. Addition tools, such as surveys, should have been included in M&E design to more clearly assess the achievement of the stated objectives and test the links in the results chain.

B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE 77. The Project was classified as a Category A Project, with two policies triggered: Environmental Assessment

(OP4.01) and Involuntary Resettlement (OP4.12). Project activities related to dredging and construction/repair of embankments generated sludge/sediment that had to be handled, stored, stockpiled, transported and disposed, while physical works in some areas required the removal of informal settlements. Indirect Project impacts included traffic disruption, reduction in air quality due to dust and foul odor emissions, increased noise levels, reduction in surface water and seawater quality, etc.

78. Environmental Safeguards. The borrower undertook a comprehensive environmental impact assessment process

identified risks associated with Project activities. The Project included a set of mitigation and oversight measures to address these risks and ensure compliance with national and local government and Bank safeguard requirements.


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79. Throughout implementation the Project complied satisfactorily with environmental safeguard policies. The Project adopted EIA/EMP requirements based on the Indonesian requirements (AMDALs) which were augmented by a Project specific Supplementary EIA which together met GoI regulations and the Bank’s OP4.01. The AMDALs for each sub-project package (together with supplementary requirements) were provided to the Bank and were publicly disclosed (in Bahasa Indonesia) on 30 March 2010 in DKI Jakarta, and on 26 January 2011 in Washington. Following its publication, a supplementary report containing more detailed social and environmental information from further preparation activities, especially in relation to construction contract formulation and the adequacy of the Ancol AMDAL, was published in September 2011.

80. Dredging. The environmental impact stemming from the removal of about 3.4 million m3 of sediment (of which

about 95,000 m3 is solid waste) was properly mitigated through proper handling, storage, transportation and disposal. The Project implemented the safeguards requirements as defined in the ESMF as well as best management practices for each sub-Project/particular package. Most of the dredging and transportation activities were conducted at nighttime to minimize traffic disruptions with tight monitoring of occupational health and safety measures.

81. Disposal. Disposal sites were not financed through the Project but were integral to the Project nonetheless. The

main disposal location, Ancol Confined Disposal Facility (CDF), was built as a fully enclosed facility in accordance with AMDAL and was the first time a confined facility was used solely for the disposal purpose of a specific Project in Indonesia. Construction of the boundary walls was completed before the dredge material disposal began and acted to isolate and retain all non-hazardous materials. Two other, smaller disposal sites were also used. All sites were regularly monitored and tested for any potentially hazardous materials contamination by sampling the soil in the dry area and in the offshore wet area. No hazardous materials, such as heavy metals, were ever found.

82. Complaints were handled by the GRS system with support from the CSC. Complaints were largely related to

construction-related inconveniences and damage. Complaints were taken up with the contractors and resolved on-site through close consultation with the community on schedules and project adjustment or rectification. A total of 256 complaints were received from both community and non-community sources, and broadly classified under safety, security, traffic, building damage, environment, utilities, LARAPs, and dredging. About 90% of the complaints were addressed within three months, and 99% within six months. All complaints were resolved within a one-year period.

83. Social Safeguards. When the Project triggered the Involuntary Resettlement Policy (OP 4.12), a preliminary social

assessment (SA) study was carried out in 2008 and social impact assessments were carried out in 2009-2010 as part of the EIA process. In addition to standard EIA consultation processes, specific Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were carried out at each Project site to communicate the Project to the relevant communities, obtain more detailed information on the environmental and social impacts of the Project, and gauge communities support for the Project. The FGDs covered all kelurahans containing Project sites.

84. One of the most significant contributions of the Project was the adoption of best practices regarding

resettlement policies. The context at the time of Project preparation was a sustained trend of rapid urbanization in Jakarta that had led to numerous land rights issues as informal settlements were cleared through evictions to


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make way for new developments. Many of the people evicted, as well as newer migrants from outside Jakarta, settled along the canals and reservoirs, constraining access for maintenance of the canals.33

85. Prior to the Project, many aspects of the then-prevailing practices in DKI Jakarta for carrying out land

acquisition and resettlement were not in line with the Bank’s requirements. The main differences were related to: (i) institutional set up for the teams responsible for acquiring the land/resettlement; (ii) alignment between GoI’s regulations pertaining to land acquisition and the Bank’s policy on land acquisition/resettlement, as GoI regulations do not explicitly regulate assistance and do not cover income restoration; and (iii) the level of socialization and the public consultation process for land acquisition/relocation. The Project contributed to improving land acquisition and resettlement practices in DKI Jakarta by: (i) formulating an effective institutional arrangement; (ii) providing a clear RPF; and (iii) identifying both resettlement-related impacts and non-resettlement related via the SA Study, AMDAL-related consultations, and the FGD and other consultations carried out as part of the preparation of the RPF and preliminary RPs.

86. DKI Jakarta prepared the project Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) to clarify the principles, procedures and organizational arrangements to be applied to the preparation of RPs for the project where involuntary resettlement was identified. All project sites were screened for PAPs and an RP prepared in accordance with the RPF where PAPs could not be avoided. The RPs identified affected people and laid out the framework for compensating and restoring the livelihoods of entitled households with a clear and agreed timeline between the PAPs and DKI Jakarta. RPs (locally known as LARAPs) were prepared for seven project locations screened to include involuntary resettlement and reviewed by the World Bank. The review focused on ensuring that the RPs had been prepared in accordance with all the provisions of the RPF and the adequacy of implementation arrangements, e.g., implementation plans and budget. The LARAPs were publicly disclosed between July 1, 2015 and June 5, 2017, and implemented prior to the commencement of works. The LARAPs, based on DKI Jakarta policy, cover (i) relocating Project Affected People to an appropriate place or “resettlement to decent locations” [sic], (ii) compensation on land; (iii) compensation on structures; and (iv) minimizing resettlement by finding various appropriate project design alternatives, such as modifying the detailed engineering design (DED).

87. To minimize resettlement and non-resettlement social impacts, the Project limited works to priority sections,

carefully selected dredging approaches and equipment technology, reduced the rights of way of inspection areas to minimum allowable standards for maintenance and security and detailed engineering designs (DEDs) geared toward minimizing impact. These measures reduced the initially expected PAPs from 2,513 households (HHs) (occupied by 6,507 persons) to 1,197 HHs (occupied by 5,228 persons). During RPF preparation in November 2010, the Bureau of Infrastructure and Environment for DKI Jakarta conducted consultations: (i) with agencies/units in DKI Jakarta, i.e. municipalities, policy agencies, the Transportation Agency, leaders of sub-districts and urban villages, etc.; and (ii) among representatives from NGOs, community groups, and the media. At the RPF cutoff date, only 1,144 HHs were deemed to be affected. During implementation, further efforts were made through on-site inspection, consultations and field engineering and construction adjustments to reduce the PAPs to 672 HHs (occupied by 3,360 persons). In the end, most packages steered away from resettlement and only 328 HHs were impacted, in which (i) 22 HHs were relocated to public low-cost rental apartments, (ii) 44 HHs were relocated

33 Nirmala, Ronna. "Jakarta Business District Floods After West Flood Canal Dike Collapses | Jakarta Globe." Jakarta Globe. January 17, 2013. Accessed March 17, 2016. http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/archive/jakarta-business-district-floods-after-west-flood-canal-dike-collapses/.

http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/archive/jakarta-business-district-floods-after-west-flood-canal-dike-collapses/


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to surrounding areas in the original location, and (iii) 262 HHs were partially affected (< 20%) and compensated.34 However, there is no detailed information on the resettlement cost, which was borne by DKI Jakarta.

88. Procurement. Procurement capacity varied amongst the PIUs, in particular with regard to experience in managing

large works contracts under International Competitive Bidding (ICB) procedures following the pre-qualification process. Procurement suffered from significant delays for a range of issues, including lack of experience, lengthy evaluations and reviews, and issues on bidder eligibility. The first group of packages (Packages 1, 2a, 2b and 3) took 17 months from the start of the pre-qualification process to contract signing. The long pre-qualification process shortened the packages’ construction periods. The contract signing of the CSC was also delayed by four months due to delays in the PIUs’ internal approval process. Following this experience, the Bank advised the PIUs to follow post-qualification processes for the second batch, which shortened the procurement process to eight months. Despite the delays, in general, procurement processes under the project were carried out in accordance with Bank policy as stipulated in the Loan Agreement.

89. Financial Management. The Borrower maintained adequate accounting records of all transactions and submitted

its interim financial reports (IFRs), audit reports and followed up on audit findings in a timely manner. Most of the external audit reports received unqualified (clean) opinions, except for qualified opinions for the (i) FY 2014 audit, due to an Rp 8.6 billion overpayment and internal control weaknesses, which have since been resolved; and (ii) FY 2018 audit, due to the conduct of dredging with barge and disposal work not in accordance with the agreed methods and incomplete documentation supporting the work, which have not been followed-up on despite Bank reminders. The FY 2019 audit (for 2 months ending on Feb 28, 2019) has not yet been conducted by BPK, and the Bank is closely following up on its submission. Internal audits prior to the external audits were not prepared despite Bank recommendations.

C. BANK PERFORMANCE

Quality at Entry 90. The Bank made a substantial and concerted effort to incorporate all available and useful sector information to

address challenging issues upfront, such as: using results from hydraulic models from other flood modelling studies to determine priority sections for dredging; analyzing the quality of water and dredged material in the floodways, canals, and retention basins; drawing on best practice dredging methods used in past projects;35 using drone photography36 for a rapid assessment of dwellings and other structures eligible for compensation, as well as the availability of working space; and reviewing alternatives for transportation and disposal of dredged material. The willingness at project preparation to address complex technical and safeguard issues and changing situations, despite considerable risk, should be recognized.

91. The Bank successfully identified and facilitated the preparation of the environment and social safeguards. The

careful and at times protracted discussions regarding project safeguards during preparation were key to the

34 However, the Completion Report cites that DKI Jakarta did not fully implement the LARAPs, arguing that only the mechanism of relocation to low-cost housing can be applied based on Jakarta Governor Regulation No. 111 of 2014 concerning the ‘Mechanism of Occupancy on Low Cost Housing’. Othe reasons for non-relocation were the limited availability of low-cost housing units or refusal to relocate for various social and economic considerations. 35 Referring to the Pilot Dredging Project, initiated in November 2008 as a component of the Government of Netherlands supported Jakarta Flood Management 2 Project (JFM2). 36 During project preparation, aerial photography (using drones) was used to establish the actual number of PAPs objectively, especially since there was movement of people in the years between project preparation and appraisal. There was no established technique then, and drone photography was considered a novel approach for a rapid assessment of dwellings and other structures eligible for compensation within the project sites and linked sites.


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achievement of the Project’s development outcomes, and had an important and likely lasting impact on the government’s policy towards environmental standards and resettlement. However, the lengthy preparation period could also be interpreted as a lack of responsiveness to the Project’s original emergency needs. An urgent project was developed, which despite successfully preparing environmental and social safeguards over four years, still suffered from weaknesses in the RF and M&E design. In addition, while the reduction of resettlement numbers from appraisal to completion by adjusting the DEDs is a positive story, the huge difference raises questions regarding the technical due diligence at appraisal.

92. During Project preparation, there were diverging viewpoints between the Bank and DKI Jakarta on the

resettlement of the informal communities located by the river and canal edges. The Bank’s principle is that all Project Affected Persons (PAPs) should receive fair compensation based on free, prior and informed consent (FPIC). On the other hand, DKI Jakarta saw the PAPs as illegal squatters encroaching on state lands, and therefore did not agree with the principle of compensation. DKI Jakarta considered compensation as being inconsistent with the law because it involved transferring funds to those illegally squatting on public land. The negotiation of the Project’s resettlement approach was protracted, with a number of Bank safeguards specialists weighing in on the issue. Ultimately, after almost 1.5 years of discussionns, a consensus was reached, which reduced the Bank’s reputational risk, led the government to prepare an RPF for the Project, and adopt a resettlement policy largely based on Bank-supported best practices (compensation-based).

Quality of Supervision 93. Staff turnover had an impact on the Project implementation due to the resulting learning curve following new

appointments. Personnel turnover both at the Bank and with the GoI personnel slowed implementation progress and resulted in delays as new staff were brought up to speed. Nevertheless, though there were four task team leaders throughout Project preparation and implementation, the key supporting specialists remained the same. This provided continuity despite management changes, and the fact that most Project staff were based in the Jakarta office facilitated closer interaction with Project stakeholders.

94. Site supervision was a key problem during implementation. The CSC team was highly skilled and brought in

experience to the Project. CSC personnel supervised the work contracts and operations at the disposal sites, handled all project complaints, and provided reports in a timely fashion. However, effective site supervision was lacking due to a generally low regard for environmental issues and a lack of awareness among local supervision staff. Environmental principles guiding the Project could have been reinforced among the site supervision staff through deliberate training.

95. Project management could have benefitted from a more proactive, strategic approach. More could have been

done with the FMIS December 2012 findings, especially taking into account the Project extension and substantial project savings. Despite a general perception that the FMIS was not operational, the FMIS1 outputs were more than just a database used in the flood control rooms of DKI Jakarta agencies. Running a hydraulic model using the project parameters (such as normalized drain cross-sections) and demonstrating the cumulative effect of dredging and embankment rehabilitation could have added to project legitimacy, substantiating the value proposition of the Project as a no-regret approach with quantifiable data, and highlighting quick wins or system inefficiencies. The FMIS1 revealed that most of the elements for further improvement of flood O&M in Jakarta, in particular the data, were in principle available. Likewise, the adjustment of the economic analysis following the Project restructuring could have highlighted the benefits from investments in the master plan review and Sentiong PS.


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96. Some of the indicators in the Results Framework were difficult to measure and vague. The PAD noted that the

RF and the PDO indicators would likely be adjusted during the MTR. The changes were expected due to the continued and rapid physical changes affecting the city, and the validity of old baseline data. However, even at the MTR, there were fundamental weaknesses in the PDO indicators and IRIs, particularly in how the baselines were set, the actual values measured, and the results tied to the larger outcomes, that were largely unresolved.

97. There also appears to have been an over-reliance on BPBD’s 2013 flood mapping data in revising the indicators,

which were translated into unclear PDO indicators, and too little attention paid to what could have been strategically achieved with the existing FMIS1 model or an extension thereof. FMIS1 produced flood maps, web- and mobile-based flood early warning system applications that were broadcast in the flood control rooms of DPU-DKI, BBWSCC, and BMKG, a proposed institutional framework for FMIS, while providing a one-month staff training. The integration process started by FMIS1 to bring together and synchronize these elements was well received by all key organizations, which was shown by the excellent and intense cooperation during the first phase of FMIS. More could have been done to leverage and sustain this level of interest among the PIUs.

Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance 98. Bank performance is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory. There were significant shortcomings in the Bank’s

performance in terms of both quality at entry and quality of supervision.

D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME 99. Maintenance activities (garbage collection and maintenance dredging) continue as part of the integrated flood

management approach for Jakarta. If maintenance operations are not carried out regularly or effectively, new sedimentation and blockages will result, once again reducing the city’s drainage capacity. In an effort to maintain and improve on the cleaning of the canals and rivers, the GoI pledged to spend US$1B a year on cleaning rivers and seas and launched the National Action Plan on Marine Debris (2017-2025) which calls for efforts to reduce 70% of the city’s plastic debris by 2015.37

100. Project benefits are being maintained, even enhanced, with the recruitment of Jakarta’s “orange troops” that

installed floating plastic pontoons to intercept garbage and who maintain the drains.38 In an effort to maintain the canals, DKI Jakarta Environmental Agency (Dinas Lingkungan Hidup) and Water Resource Agency (Dinas SDA) recruited “orange troops” and “blue troops” to carry out solid waste cleanup and maintenance work. Beginning in 2016, DKI Jakarta introduced and operationalized special purpose task forces—teams consisting of several thousands of personnel each—to combat specific city challenges including floods related challenges. An “Orange team” (Pasukan Orange) specifically targeted at clearing solid waste, and a “Blue team” (Pasukan Biru) sent to areas being threatened by flooding or being flooded to assist the communities, undertake emergency work to reduce the extent and duration of the flooding, and carry out cleanup work.

101. Despite DKI Jakarta’s efforts, many of Jakarta’s rivers and canals are still heavily polluted, as citizens still

continue to pollute the waterways with sewage and solid waste. The GoI must implement a more aggressive information campaign to inform and convince the public about the importance of not keeping the waterways clean, and roll out over time a plan to upgrade the open sewerage system. While the orange and blue troops

37 Country Profile Indonesia, October 2018, Managing Municipal Solid Waste and packaging waster, Circular Economy Briefing Series (look up). 38 Farraz Theda, Indonesia: Looking beyond infrastructure to address flooding in north Jakarta, 18 Oct 2017 https://www.preventionweb.net/news/view/55540


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signal the beginning of a more systematic maintenance plan, such efforts have to be supported by a broader effort to secure O&M budget to maintain the capacity of the canals. This is all the more important given mounting climate change and land subsidence pressures, which could subject the flood management system to higher levels of risk.

102. While the Project was originally designed as an urgent response to restore the capacity of Jakarta’s canals and

floodways, additional flood mitigation measures, including solid waste management, integrated water resources management (including disposal of wastewater, abstraction of groundwater, and provision of bulk water services), and coastal flood defense will be important going forward. Jakarta has embarked on a medium to long-term comprehensive and integrated strategic approach to slow land subsidence, improve infrastructure and continue to proactively manage the risk of floods. Presently, the GoI continues to focus on comprehensive solutions to mitigate urban and tidal flooding through the maintenance of Project achievements, such as continued cleanup and dredging, and a review of the flood management master plan of the Cisadane-Jakarta-Bekasi area (similar to the study added in the restructuring but never implemented).39 In addition, DKI Jakarta, the central government and private stakeholders are preparing the National Capital Integrated Coastal Development (NCICD) program40, a long term plan which is expected to include major coastal protection infrastructure such as a sea wall, as well as large-scale land reclamation in Jakarta Bay.

V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

103. Achievement of targets. Despite missed opportunities and shortcomings in the measurement of indicators, the originally planned activities were largely achieved. The project was substantially completed between the restructuring in March 2017 and closing in February 2019, as about 91% of the final net loan amount had already been disbursed at restructuring. This suggests that despite poor progress in the final years of implementation, most of the loan amount was prudently used to fund planned activities. Nevertheless, more could have been done to utilize the loan savings and drive the completion of the activities added under the restructuring.

104. Influencing changes in local practice. Though difficult to achieve, changes in local practice often have a far-

reaching impact and can bring about real progress in national policies. For example, establishing the institutional arrangements, conducting thorough technical studies, and preparing a comprehensive RPF were crucial for project success, despite the initial difficulty in agreeing on the safeguards and adjusting business-as-usual resettlement practices. The RPF, which has now been accepted by DKI Jakarta, will be useful for public projects elsewhere that require resettlement. Likewise, the POM and FMIS should be disseminated for use in drainage O&M projects in other urban areas. Lessons and recommendations in these areas would be very relevant and informative for other flood management projects in Indonesia and the region involving investments in institutional capacity building.

39 During the Project period, implementation of the masterplan review had been stalled by difficulties in the procurement process. The PIU for the masterplan review, the Water Resources Research and Development Center (PUSAIR) under the Research and Development Agency of MPWH, informed the Bank in December 2017 that it was terminating the procurement process, and that the masterplan review would be undertaken subsequently by securing a central government budget allocation. 40 More information on the NCICD can be found in a May 2018 summary from the Committee for Accelerating Priority Infrastructure Provision (KPPIP). Available from: https://kppip.go.id/proyek-strategis-nasional/o-proyek-pembangunan-tanggul-penahan-banjir/national-capital-integrated-coastal-development-ncicd-tahap-a/


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105. Limited information for Project design. Around the world, flood management programs in changing urban contexts are increasingly required to initiate work with limited and imperfect information while monitoring, and subsequently adjusting program scope and targets during implementation, as was the case for this Project. Future projects could benefit from learning points distilled from the design of this Project, such as clearly defining project sites and linked sites, conducting rigorous environmental impact assessments, and developing evidence-based baselines, targets, and indicators. A closer monitoring of the results and quality of data reported by the local agencies could have facilitated adjustment of the RF during implementation.

106. Holistic flood management program. Urban flood risk management is a multi-faceted issue, which involves

managing groundwater abstraction, solid waste, land subsidence, resettlement, and land use, while adapting to sea level rise and climate change effects. For this Project, a fully objective assessment of the flooding situation before and after implementation is challenging because the effects of dredging and embankment rehabilitation over the project period cannot be isolated from the many other intertwined variables. The Bank's involvement in such a complex undertaking as flood risk management could have been part of a more comprehensive program and longer-term timeframe, rather than a one-off effort on dredging and embankment rehabilitation. The results of this Project could be reviewed as part of a holistic and quantitative flood management program.

107. Sustainability of O&M activities. While the setup of the “orange” and “blue” troops for cleanup, maintenance,

and emergency response is commendable, the overall sufficiency of institutional, technical and financial capacity for O&M was not explicitly dealt with and not included in the Project scope. Financial planning and management for flood infrastructure O&M is often a key gap and critical tool needed for enhancing sustainable O&M and may be worth further review in future efforts. Further interviews can also be conducted to establish whether and/or how there were any intended or unintended outcomes on raising the public’s level of awareness about the importance of keeping the floodways, canals, and retention basins clean, given the significance of O&M in sustaining the Project results.

108. Post-implementation review. There is no post-implementation study to quantify the effectiveness of the project-

financed dredging and embankment rehabilitation, despite FMIS1 demonstrating that the data and technical systems are available for such an analysis. A closer review of the FMIS1 report outputs could have guided deliberations on the tasks to be pursued further, either as additional project activity under or a separate but related undertaking. In particular, the use of the FMIS to analyze the combined effect of the project package measures on the extent of inundation, and a comparison of pre- and post-intervention flood hazards (including dredging) would have been a powerful and conclusive tool to attribute observed improvements to Project-funded works. Nevertheless, DPU-DKI’s on-going master planning study for the Cisadane-Jakarta-Bekasi area is a laudable effort to gain a better understanding of and plan for a more comprehensive solution for the flood situation in DKI Jakarta.

109. Documentation and surveys. There is virtually no documentation of PIU and Bank team’s observations that the

dredging and embankment rehabilitation did produce a noticeable positive change in the flood management in DKI Jakarta. Given the absence of technical studies during the Project period to establish the impact of dredging and embankment rehabilitation (quantitative approach), the project could have benefitted from beneficiary satisfaction surveys regarding improvements in the flood situation in the affected kelurahans, the transfer of displaced persons to adequate housing, and other social impacts (qualitative approach).


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110. The successes of the Project, in particular the satisfactory completion of all eight of the original dredging and rehabilitation works packages with significant cost savings, could have been better communicated to Project beneficiaries and DKI Jakarta residents at large. These can be used to strategically position key issues and lessons learned, not only for public engagement about future urban flood management projects in DKI Jakarta, but also for future infrastructure projects with GoI that require sensitive handling of environmental and safeguard issues, or for information campaigns to the public on proper waste disposal.


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ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS

A. RESULTS INDICATORS A.1 PDO Indicators Objective/Outcome: Improvement of operaton and maintenance of priority sections of Jakarta's flood management system

Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Formally Revised

Target

Actual Achieved at Completion

Average flood depth in 34 flood prone kelurahans during the most significant flood event of the FY

Text 100 - 150 cm 20 cm 28 cm

30-Jun-2013 31-Dec-2018 31-Dec-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): This indicator measures local reduction in flood water depth. For the Target value, the Restructuring Paper (RP) does not explicitly mention the target date, which could either be 31 December 2018 following the revision of PDO indicators in the MTR, or 28 February 2019 following the extended closing date in the RP. It is not clear what "most significant flood event of the FY" is--whether it is GoI's financial year (Jan-Dec), or the Bank's (July-June). As mentioned in the 'Efficacy' section, it also does not reflect the spatial and temporal variation of rainfall, and inherently assumes rainfall to be the predominant cause of flooding. Besides the variation in rainfall, the mismatch between the flood mapping locations with the Project-affected kelurahans (known) and the catchment boundaries (unknown) further complicates the attribution of 'local reduction' to Project-funded works.


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Nonetheless, although the final target of <20cm was missed by 8cm, when viewed as percentage reduction against the baseline, the reduction of 92.4% is significant.


Target


Average length of inundation in 34 flood prone kelurahans during the most significant flood event of the FY

Text > 7 day < 0.25 day 0.28 day

30-Jun-2013 31-Dec-2018 31-Dec-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): This indicator measures local reduction in duration of flood water inundation. For the Target value, the Restructuring Paper (RP) does not explicitly mention the target date, which could either be 31 December 2018 following the revision of PDO indicators in the MTR, or 28 February 2019 following the extended closing date in the RP. It is not clear what "most significant flood event of the FY" is--whether it is GoI's financial year (Jan-Dec), or the Bank's (July-June). As mentioned in the 'Efficacy' section, it also does not reflect the spatial and temporal variation of rainfall, and inherently assumes rainfall to be the predominant cause of flooding. Besides the variation in rainfall, the mismatch between the flood mapping locations with the Project-affected kelurahans (known) and the catchment boundaries (unknown) further complicates the attribution of 'local reduction' to Project-funded works. Nonetheless, the actual value of 0.28 day (expressed as 6.72 hours) basically met the target of 0.25 day (expressed as 6 hours), when viewed as percentage reduction against the baseline of >7 days (expressed as 168 hours).


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Target


The number of neighborhood units (RW or RT) in 34 flood prone kelurahans experiencing inundation during the most significant flood event of the FY

Text 100% 15% 32%

30-Jun-2013 31-Dec-2018 31-Dec-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): This indicator measures local reduction in areal extent of flooding. For the Target value, the Restructuring Paper (RP) does not explicitly mention the target date, which could either be 31 December 2018 following the revision of PDO indicators in the MTR, or 28 February 2019 following the extended closing date in the RP. It is not clear what "most significant flood event of the FY" is--whether it is GoI's financial year (Jan-Dec), or the Bank's (July-June). As mentioned in the 'Efficacy' section, it also does not reflect the spatial and temporal variation of rainfall, and inherently assumes rainfall to be the predominant cause of flooding. Besides the variation in rainfall, the mismatch between the flood mapping locations with the Project-affected kelurahans (known) and the catchment boundaries (unknown) further complicates the attribution of 'local reduction' to Project-funded works. Nonetheless, although the final target of 15% was missed by 17%, when viewed as percentage reduction against the baseline, the reduction of 80% is significant.


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A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators

Component: Dredging, rehabilitation and flow capacity improvement of selected key floodways, canals and retention basins.


Target


Volume of dredge material removed from the floodways, canals and retention basins (including solid waste)

Cubic Meter(m3)

0.00 3400000.00 3400000.00 3428277.00

22-Dec-2011 31-Mar-2017 31-Dec-2018 31-Dec-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): This indicator measures the volume of dredged material removed, which indicates the restoration of the floodways, canals or retention basins to their original capacities. The MTR notes that this indicator is expected to surpass the original targets at the end of the contracts, on account of the design changes (mostly additional works) anticipated to align the JUFMP works to the changed physical landscapes as well as additional activities to further improve the flood management infrastructure using project savings. The final target was fully achieved, and even exceeded by 8%.


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Target


Additional storage added to retention basins

Cubic Meter(m3)

0.00 596740.00 80500.00 80500.00

22-Dec-2011 31-Mar-2017 31-Dec-2018 21-Nov-2016

Comments (achievements against targets): This indicator measures the extent to which flood water retention volume has increased in the four retention ponds included in the project, namely, Waduk Melati, Waduk Sunter Utara, Waduk Sunter Selatan, and Waduk Sunter Timur III. The target value of 596,740m3 in the Jan 2012 PAD was reduced to 108,000m3 in the Feb 2016 MTR. This was because DKI Jakarta formally informed the CPIU that no further dredging is required in Waduk Sunter Utara, Waduk Sunter Selatan, and Waduk Sunter Timur III, as emergency dredging had already been carried out by DKI Jakarta following the major floods in January 2013. DKI Jakarta has reported to the CPIU and the Bank that 265,117m3 was dredged in these retention ponds, and this is not a contribution from the project’s financing. Is it unclear why this was not counted as GoI counterpart funding contribution to the project, when it could potentially have been counted as a project output by having the Loan finance the works. The documentation on the reduction of the target value is not clear, as the original target in the PAD was reduced by 82% in the MTR, but the reported contribution by DKI Jakarta is only 44% of the original target. The target was further reduced to 80,500m3 in the 2017 RP, but no further information was reported. It must be noted that the 80,500m3 actual value had already been achieved on 21 Nov 2016, as reported in the ISR dated 22 Dec 2016. That being the case, the indicator should have been dropped in the RP if it had already been achieved in 2016 and was no longer part of the project. Nonetheless, the formally revised target was fully met.


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Target


Length of embankment repaired or constructed

Kilometers 0.00 42.20 42.20 55.66

22-Dec-2011 17-Jan-2012 31-Dec-2018 30-Sep-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): This indicator measures the length of embankments repaired and/or constructed. The Construction Supervision reports do not make a clear distinction on whether it is repair of existing or construction of new embankment. The MTR notes that this indicator is expected to surpass the original targets at the end of the contracts, on account of the design changes (mostly additional works) anticipated to align the JUFMP works to the changed physical landscapes as well as additional activities to further improve the flood management infrastructure using project savings. A minor anomaly in the reporting of figures was noted. In the 2017 RP and all (but one) subsequent ISRs, the target value was 42.2km, while for the ISR dated Dec 2018, the target value was 43.50km. Nonetheless, the formally revised target was fully met.


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Target


Additional drainage pumping capacity added by the project

Text 0 m3/s 40 m3/s 0 m3/s

01-Feb-2017 28-Feb-2019 28-Feb-2019

Comments (achievements against targets): This indicator measures the additional pumping capacity from the pumping station at Sentiong-Ancol, which was proposed in the 2017 RP. The pumping station was never built, so achievement is zero.

Component: Technical assistance for project management, social safeguards, and capacity building


Target


Number of km canal maintained / cleaned (minimum).

Kilometers 11.00 25.00 24.60

22-Dec-2011 17-Jan-2012 31-Dec-2018

Comments (achievements against targets): This indicator measures the operations and maintenance of canals. As described in the 2016 MTR, this is meant to reflect the extent to which DKI Jakarta’s operational capacity has improved such that it is able to carry out regular maintenance of its flood management infrastructure. The indicator is basically met.


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B. KEY OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT

Objective/Outcome 1: To contribute to the improvement of the operation and maintenance of priority sections of Jakarta’s flood management system.

Outcome Indicators

1. Average flood depth in 34 flood prone kelurahans during the most significant flood event of the FY 2. Average length of inundation in 34 flood prone kelurahans during the most significant flood event of the FY 3. Number of neighborhood units (RW or RT) in 34 flood prone kelurahans experiencing inundation during the most significant flood event of the FY

Intermediate Results Indicators

1. Volume of dredged material removed from the floodways, canals and retention basins (including solid waste) 2. Additional storage added to retention basins 3. Length of embankment repaired or constructed 4. Length of canal maintained / cleaned (minimum) 5. Additional drainage pumping capacity under the project

Key Outputs by Component (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 1)

Outputs are the same as the IRIs above.


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C. ORIGINAL AND REVISED PDO INDICATORS

Data measured Original Indicator

(as in PAD)

Original Values

(as in PAD)

Restructured Indicators (as in Mid-Term

Review)

Restructured Values

(as in Mid-Term Review)

Baseline Target Baseline Target

Flood water level Water level of inundated area

70 cm 11 cm Average flood depth in 34 prone kelurahans during the most significant flood event of the FY

100-150 cm < 20 cm

Duration of inundation

Number of hours of water logging in inundated areas

> 24 hours < 24 hours Average length of inundation in 34 flood prone kelurahans during the most significant flood even of the FY

> 7 days < 0.25 day

Areal extent of inundation

Extent of inundated areas

100% 20% Number of neighborhood units (RW or RT) in 34 flood prone kelurahans experiencing inundation during the most significant flood event of the FY

100% 15%


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D. COMPARISON OF BASELINE, TARGET, AND ACTUAL PDO INDICATORS

PDO Indicator Unit of Measure

Baseline Target Target, as %

Reduction from

Baseline

Actual Actual, as %

Reduction from

Baseline

Actual, as % of Target

Reduction from

Baseline

1 Average flood depth in 34 flood prone kelurahans during the most significant flood event of the financial year

cm 125 20 84.0% 28 77.6% 92.4%

2

Average length of inundation in 34 flood prone kelurahans during the most significant flood event of the financial year

hr 168 6 96.4% 6.72 96.0% 99.6%

3

Number of neighborhood units (RW or RT) in 34 flood prone kelurahans experiencing inundation during the most significant flood event of the financial year

% 100 15 85.0% 32 68.0% 80.0%


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Intermediate Results Indicator Unit of Measure

Baseline Target Actual Actual, as % of Target

Component 1

1 Volume of dredge material removed from the floodways, canals and retention basins (including solid waste)

m3 0 3,400,000 3,428,277 100.8%

2 Additional storage added to retention basins

m3 0 80,500 80,500 100.0%

3 Length of embankment repaired or constructed

m 0 42.20 55.66 131.9%

4 Additional drainage pumping capacity added by the project

m3/s 0 40 0 0.0%

Component 2

5 Number of km canal maintained / cleaned (minimum)

km 0 25.0 24.6 98.4%


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ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION

A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS

Name Role

Preparation

Hongjoo J. Hahm Task Team Leader

Yogana Prasta Advisor for Operations

Melinda Good Senior Counsel

Dayu Dharmapatni Senior Urban/LARAP Specialist

Guy Alaerts Lead Water Resources Specialist

Andrew Sembel Environment Specialist

Jose Zevallos Senior Social Specialist

Imad Saleh Senior Procurement Specialist

Rajat Narula Senior Financial Management Specialist

Arlan Rahman Infrastructure Specialist

Micah Fisher Capacity Building Specialist

Jan Yap Water Engineer

Heinz Unger Senior Environment Specialist

Marget Davis Senior Social Specialist

Desy Task Team Assistant

Juan Martinez Senior Urban/LARAP Specialist

Supervision/ICR

Marcus John Jin Sarn Lee, Fook Chuan Eng, Iwan Gunawan Task Team Leader

Budi Permana, Yash Gupta Senior Procurement Specialists

Novira Kusdarti Senior Financial Management Specialist

Risyana Sukarma Team Member, Sanitary Engineer

Shankar Narayanan Social Specialist

Evarist F. Baimu Counsel


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Evilia LNU Team Member

Rambat Sakwan Social Specialist

Iwan Gunawan Team Member

Virza Syafaat Sasmitawidjaja Environmental Specialist

Kian Siong Environmental Specialist

Aswin Arif Hidayat Team Member, Financial Management Analyst

Natsuko Kikutake Team Member

Yong Jian Vun Team Member

Dixi Mengote ICR Primary Author

Natasha Zamecnik ICR Primary Author

Kai Shen Lim ICR Team Member

Adam Joseph Revello ICR Team Member

Mulya Amri ICR Team Member

B. STAFF TIME AND COST

Stage of Project Cycle Staff Time and Cost

No. of staff weeks US$ (including travel and consultant costs)

Preparation

FY08 16.406 58,768.01

FY09 42.306 213,055.62

FY10 38.409 181,760.81

FY11 73.376 397,489.72

FY12 34.989 239,068.01

Total 205.49 1,090,142.17

Supervision/ICR

FY12 10.501 51,293.40

FY13 95.578 283,096.78

FY14 76.659 270,583.87


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FY15 109.645 240,222.10

FY16 87.832 149,535.68

FY17 69.746 464,667.61

FY18 23.632 233,053.83

FY19 13.004 128,312.04

Total 486.60 1,820,765.31


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ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT

Components Amount at Approval*

(US$M) Actual at Project Closing*

(US$M) Percentage of Approval

Dredging, rehabilitation and flow capacity improvement of selected key floodways, canals and retention basins

176.45 111.79 63.3%

Technical assistance for project management, social safeguards, and capacity building

13.4 6.11 45.6%

Total 189.85 117.91 62.1

*includes front end fee of US$350,000, i.e. 0.25% of IBRD loan amount


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ANNEX 4. OVERVIEW OF JAKARTA’S DRAINAGE SYSTEM AND PROJECT LOCATIONS

Map 1. Jakarta’s 13 rivers (kali, or K.), main drains, and flood canals (banjir kanal)

Reference: Water System in DKI Jakarta, 2012. Dinas Pekerjaan Umum, Provinsi DKI Jakarta (Public Works Service, DKI Jakarta). Available from http://www.serverjakarta.com/peta_13sungai.aspx. [Accessed 22 July 2019

http://www.serverjakarta.com/peta_13sungai.aspx


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Table 1. Contract vs Actual Work Schedule (as reported in CSC Completion Report)


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ANNEX 5. MAP OF KELURAHANS

Map 1. Comparison of kelurahans in PAD and MTR

Legend: red - 61 kelurahans, which was the precursor of the 57 kelurahans in PAD41; blue – 34 kelurahans as in MTR; yellow – Project sites and linked sites as in PAD; orange – data collection locations as in MTR

41 The actual list of 57 kelurahans reported in the PAD, based on a working list of 61 kelurahans, could not be retrieved. It is possible that the 4 kelurahans omitted from the working list are kelurahans in the north coast of Jakarta with no residential component.


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Table 1. List of 34 kelurahans in MTR

DISTRICT KELURAHAN DISTRICT KELURAHAN

1 CENTRAL JAKARTA

BIDARA CINA 19 SOUTH JAKARTA

RAWA JATI

2 DURI KOSAMBI 20 KAMPUNG MELAYU

3 ULUJAMI 21 KAPUK MUARA

4 WARAKAS 22 PEKOJAN

5 EAST JAKARTA

CAKUNG TIMUR 23 PENGADEGAN

6 CAWANG 24 PETAMBURAN

7 CILILITAN 25 PLUIT

8 CIPINANG MELAYU 26 SEMPER TIMUR

9 KEDAUNG KALI ANGKE 27 SUNTER AGUNG

10 KEDOYA SELATAN 28 WEST JAKARTA

JELAMBAR BARU

11 MAKASAR 29 KAPUK

12 MANGGARAI 30 KEDOYA UTARA

13 SEMPER BARAT 31 PADEMANGAN BARAT

14 SUKAPURA 32 RAWA BUAYA

15 TANJUNG PRIOK 33 TEGAL ALUR

16 NORTH JAKARTA

BUKIT DURI 34 WIJAYA KUSUMA

17 CENGKARENG BARAT 18 PEGANGSAAN DUA

Figure 1. Supporting data from 2016 Mid-Term Report: Data of Jakarta flood impact showing overall

decreasing trend

1 10

100 1,000

10,000 100,000

1,000,000 10,000,000

Number of Flood Affected

2013

2014

2015


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Figures 2 & 3. Supporting data from 2016 Mid-Term Report: Depth and duration of inundation in

kelurahans in East Jakarta, 2013-2015

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Figures 4 & 5. Supporting data from 2016 Mid-Term Report: Depth and duration of inundation in

kelurahans in South Jakarta, 2013-2015 [errors not editable]

0

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ANNEX 6. RAINFALL INFORMATION

Table 1. Rainfall in Jakarta by month42

Note: 2018 data not published by BMKG.

42 All data from BMKG, and compiled by BPS DKI Jakarta. The 2009 to 2013 data is taken from BPS – Statistics of DKI Jakarta Province, https://jakarta.bps.go.id/statictable/2015/04/20/55/banyaknya-curah-hujan-jakarta-menurut-bulan-2013.html ; while the 2014 to 2017 data is compiled from Jakarta Dalam Angka Publication, published annually by BPS DKI Jakarta. Data from 2018 is not available.

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

January 275 622 1075 412 137 214

February 158 147 689 639 452 521

March 174 184 174 221 294 139

April 196 204 168 111 192 157

May 118 101 47 79 112 135

June 67 257 174 48 186 139

July 14 257 214 1 189 120

August 2 61 39 12 217 1

September 16 50 0 5 221 166

October 44 110 52 6 173 112

November 252 197 65 103 152 195

December 254 339 211 194 42 254

TOTAL 1570 2528 2908 1831 2366 2152

MonthYear


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ANNEX 7. OVERVIEW OF FLOOD MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM

Overview of FMIS38F39F

43: The FMIS Phase 1 project started on September 25, 2012 and was completed on December 15, 2012. The project was carried out by Deltares in joint venture with HKV and in association with Puslitbang Air (PusAir), MLDRoyalHaskoningDHV and ITB. Technical assistance was provided to develop the FMIS (through grant financing from the Government of the Netherlands under the WASAP-J trust fund). This tool has been developed and is currently implemented in the DKI Jakarta’s Public Works Agency. The FMIS can be used as an assessment, planning and optimization tool towards DKI Jakarta’s efforts to continue to build the city’s flood management system. The Bank team recommended that the FMIS should be updated from time to time to ensure that its database stays relevant. Main Tasks: The FMIS services under the current contract are sub-divided into 5 main tasks:

1. Information Systems Improvement 2. Flood extent, hazard mapping, and simulations 3. Early warning system and dissemination 4. Develop framework for institutional setting of FMIS 5. Training for related Staff

Jakarta Flood Early Warning System (J-FEWS): As part of the FMIS services, the system has been further developed and further extended into the Jakarta FEWS (J-FEWS). In close liaison between the Ministry of Public Works, DKI’s Public Works Agency, BBWSC and the Indonesian Meteorological, Climatological and Geophysical Agency (BMKG), all telemetric stations and online data systems (e.g. weather forecast, radar) have been revisited and connected to J-FEWS. The important manual flood management operational Posko / Piket system has also been integrated in J-FEWS. J-FEWS was launched on November 22, 2012 and implemented at the control rooms of the four agencies above. However, based on ICR interviews with Bank staff, the J-FEWS system is not operational. Besides the development and implementation of JFEWS, the Flood Hazard Mapping (FHM) modelling framework was also upgraded and further improved to prepare the FHM framework for the further evaluation of mitigating measures and for use in the flood early warning operation. Such update was required to represent and include the many changes in the Jakarta water system over the past years. Major Findings and Lessons Learned: The FMIS process showed that most of the elements for further improvement of flood and disaster operation in Jakarta are in principle available. The integration process started by FMIS to bring together and synchronize these elements was well received by all key organizations, which was shown by the excellent and intense cooperation during the first phase of FMIS. However, as the Standard Operation Procedures (SOPs) for the different organizations define the exact tasks of the organizations, formal updating of the SOPs is required before the FMIS can formally be implemented and used in operations.

43 Reference: Aide Memoire / Implementation Review dated September 17 – October 9, 2013, and FMIS report dated December 2012


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ANNEX 8. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS

The ICR’s cost-benefit analysis reproduced the methodology used in the PAD, applied the same assumptions while also including a sensitivity analysis. According to the analysis below, the Project will produce reasonable economic benefits over the next two decades. During Project appraisal, the economic analysis was conducted based on socio-economic losses caused by the 2007 flood disaster. According to the analysis, implementation of the Project would result in two key benefits—prevented infrastructure damages and economic activity disruptions. Based on the activities in the PAD, the economic rate of return (ERR) for the Project was estimated to be at 381%, with a net present value of Rp29.7 trillion or US$3.1 billion44 using an 8% discount rate. For the ICR, the PAD economic analysis methodology was maintained with minor changes to reflect actual Project implementation. Several assumptions were tested to ensure that the economic analysis closely resembled the reality of Project outcomes, and to provide accurate estimates of the economic benefits. The ICR economic analysis yielded an EIRR of 413%, higher than at Project appraisal (381%). However, when incorporating more realistic assumptions of flood cycles i.e. 20-year flood cycles instead of 2-year flood cycles, the EIRR of 11% is modest and remains higher than the discount rate of 8%. Methodology during Project Appraisal and Restructuring At appraisal, a cost-benefit analysis was conducted to examine the economic feasibility of the Project from 2011 to 2030. A chart describing the methodology is detailed in Figures 1 to 4 below. The main economic benefits assumed in the PAD stem from: (i) prevention of national budgetary reallocation due to flood mitigation, (ii) prevention of tax revenue and economic activity disruption, and (iii) prevention of indirect economic losses. (i) Budget Reallocation. The economic benefits generated stem from the contribution of the Project in mitigating future floods in the Greater Jakarta area, and thus, reducing the potential catastrophic reallocation of the budget towards specific flood related purposes (school rehabilitation, road rehabilitation, post flood health treatment, government office rehabilitation or park rehabilitation). (ii) Tax Revenue Losses. The economic benefits generated result from the prevention of potential tax revenue losses and economic activity disruptions. Tax revenues that could be lost originate from Ancol reclamation land taxes, incremental land taxes from flood-free areas, DKI electricity taxes from the prevention of economic activity disruption, taxes from ships utilizing dredged water ways and sales tax from river and channel water converted to drinking water. Economic activities are assumed to be from the entertainment industry, parking services and the hospitality industry. (iii) Indirect Economic Losses. The economic benefits generated are derived from the prevention of losses similar to those following the 2007 Jakarta flood (from estimates by the Ministry of National Development Planning (Bappenas). Losses resulted from damage to housing, infrastructure, social sectors, economic

44 To ensure consistency with the Project appraisal economic analysis, this economic analysis assumes an exchange rate of 1:9,000 (US$:Rp)


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sectors, and others such as government building damages. The economic analysis also included the economic value of the number of school and work days lost and health-related losses due to the inability to attend school or go to work.

The economic analysis assumed that floods of the same magnitude as the 2007 flood would occur every two years, and that the Project’s contribution to flood mitigation was 40%—this implies that under the with-Project scenario, losses from future floods would be mitigated by 40%.45 Other assumptions include increases in property’s taxable value and the number of days economic activities are affect by floods. The Project’s economic costs were assumed to be Project costs during the appraisal stage, and O&M costs every five years, beginning in 2018. Assuming a discount rate of 8%, the estimate of the economic rate of return for the Project was 381%, and the net present value (NPV) of incremental benefits Rp29.7 trillion. The economic analysis was not adjusted following the Project restructuring despite the assumed benefits from the new activities and the significant loan savings. Economic Analysis at Project Completion The overarching framework of the ICR’s economic analysis is based on the Project appraisal analysis, as the PDO and main Project components remained unchanged. The ICR economic analysis did remove the land tax from Ancol reclamation as well as the sales of surface water as benefits included in the PAD from the ICR’s economic analysis. This is reflected by the dashed line squares in Figure 3. In terms of Project costs, the ICR’s economic analysis incorporated the final loan savings of approximately US$45.5 million. Several key assumptions were tested, including the effects of the Project on flood mitigation, two-year flood cycles and the five-year O&M costs. The current economic analysis methodology does not address several key considerations. First, the ability of government authorities to collect taxes from all the assumed benefit streams, which include property taxes and sales tax, and secondly, that the land subsidence in Greater Jakarta could reduce the potential economic benefits of the Project’s contribution to flood mitigation. Third, current practice on flood protection benefits are estimated on the basis of flood modelling, which estimates the area flooded by depth duration for given return periods for a range of land use categories. In the absence of such data, the methodology in the PAD with some slight adjustments was adopted for the ICR. Results Computing the net economic benefits of the Project up to year 2030, the economic analysis assesses whether Project activities will be economically feasible and worthwhile. The methodology assumes that Project benefits will be derived on a biannual basis from 2011 to 2030. The biannual assumption is based on a 2-year flood cycle, which will be tested under the sensitivity analysis. More realistic flood cycle scenarios of 5 years, 10 years and 20 years will be tested. The results produced should be interpreted alongside other key considerations outlined in the ICR to assess the Project’s economic impact.

45 Based on early flood estimates by Deltares using 2007 flood data, the only data available at the time of Project preparation. Reference: Brinkman JJ, Hartman M. Jakarta flood hazard mapping framework. Jakarta: World Bank report; 2008. Available from https://www.hkv.nl/upload/publication/Jakarta_Flood_Hazard_Mapping_Framework_MH.pdf


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To calculate the Project’s net present value (NPV), the economic analysis uses the concept of valuing future economic benefits, while assuming a constant discount rate. A discount rate of 0% suggests no preference between now and in the future, while a high discount rate of 15% represents a strong preference for spending now. Assuming a discount rate of 8%, the net present value, the benefit/cost ratio and the internal rate of return of the economic benefits of the Project on specific disasters are summarized in Table 1. Taking into account the project costs incurred in 2011 to 2013, and expected project benefits up to 2030, the Project was expected to generate a NPV of approximately US$2,786 million, with an EIRR of 413% and a benefit-to-cost ratio of 37. The sensitivity analysis for the economic analysis was done with regards to two variables: (i) the assumed impact of the Project on future flood mitigation, and (ii) changes in O&M costs. Results of the sensitivity analysis are shown in Table 2, interpreted in terms of the changes in each variable required to switch the NPV from positive to negative—known as the ‘switching value’. The principle behind switching values is that assumptions can be tested through a range of values to determine at what value the economic benefits generated by the Project are not justified by its costs. Ceteris paribus, the Project could sustain a decrease in the impact of the Project on flood mitigation to as low as 2%, and up to an increase of O&M costs of 880% of the investment outlay, and would still remain economically feasible. Another key assumption tested is the 2-year flood cycle assumed during Project appraisal. A sensitivity analysis assuming Five-year, 10-year and 20-year flood cycles was incorporated, and the results summarized in Table 3. The results suggest that the EIRR is highly sensitive to the flood cycle assumption and decreases significantly depending on the cycle of years assumed. However, even if a flood of similar magnitude to that of the 2007 Jakarta flood occurs every 20 years, the EIRR remains higher than the discount rate of 8%, with a positive benefit to cost ratio and NPV. This suggests that the Project is likely to be economically feasible even under conservative flood cycle assumptions. Comparing the results during Project appraisal and Project completion, the significant difference between the estimated EIRR can be attributed to the loan savings of the original loan amount of US$189 million to US$166 million. The NPV estimated during Project completion of US$2.8 billion is slightly lower than the estimated US$3.1 billion, but the benefit-to-cost ratio increased marginally from 36 to 37. These results suggest that even under conservative assumptions, the Project remains economically viable, and is expected to generate significantly large economic benefits for the coming.


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Figure 1. Economic analysis framework during Project appraisal stages and during completion


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Figure 2. Benefits stream one. Avoidance of national budgetary reallocation due to mitigation of floods


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Figure 3. Benefits stream two. Tax revenue and avoidance of disruption towards economic activities


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Figure 4. Benefits stream three. Avoided indirect economic losses


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Table 1. Summary of NPV, EIRR and Benefit/Cost ratio during Project appraisal and Project completion.

Key Indicators Economic analysis during Project appraisal

Economic analysis during Project completion

Investment outlay (US$M) 189 166

NPV (US$M) 3,109 2,786

EIRR 381% 413%

Benefit/Cost Ratio 36 37

Table 2. Switching values of NPV during Project appraisal and Project completion.

Switching values scenarios Economic analysis during Project appraisal

Economic analysis during Project completion

Impact of Project on flood mitigation (Baseline: 40%) Project able to sustain a decrease in the impact of the Project on flood mitigation to as low as 2%.

Project able to sustain a decrease in the impact of the Project on flood mitigation to as low as 2%.

Increase in O&M costs as a percentage of investment outlay (Baseline: 3% of investment outlay)

Project able to sustain an increase of O&M costs every five years of up to 870% of investment outlay.

Project able to sustain an increase of O&M costs every five years of up to 880% of investment outlay.

Table 3. Summary of NPV, EIRR and Benefit/Cost ratio under different flood cycle assumptions.

Key Indicators Flood-cycle (5 years) Flood-cycle (10 years) Flood-cycle (20 years)

NPV (US$M) 1,072 416 91

EIRR 912389% 29% 11%

Benefit/Cost Ratio 14 8 5


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ANNEX 9. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS

A draft version of this ICR was conveyed to the Government of Indonesia, with a request for comments. As at the time of final submission of this ICR, no comments had been received from the Government of Indonesia.


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ANNEX 10. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

The World Bank, Jakarta Urgent Flood Mitigation Project: Project Appraisal Document (Report No: 65973-ID) December22, 2011. The World Bank, Jakarta Urgent Flood Mitigation Project: Project Information Document Appraisal Stage (Report No.: AB683), October 13, 2011 The World Bank, Aide Memoires for Jakarta Urgent Flood Mitigation Project t (Loan NO. 8121 – ID), from 2012-2018 The World Bank, Aide Memoire and Mid Term Report (Loan NO. 8121 - ID), February 2, 2016. The World Bank, Restructuring Paper for Jakarta Urgent Flood Mitigation Project Report No: RES23406. The World Bank, Implementation Status Reports for Jakarta Urgent Flood Mitigation Project, ISR11368, from 2012-2019 The World Bank, Loan Agreement for Jakarta Urgent Flood Mitigation Project, Loan no: 8121-ID, February 17, 2012. Deltares, HKV, PusAir, ITB and Royal HaskoningDHV, Flood Management Information System (FMIS), funded by the Water and Sanitation Sector Program, Package J (WASAP-J) Trust Fund, administered by the World Bank (Grant No: TF#092649), December 2012. Government of the Republic of Indonesia, Ministry of Public Works, Directorate General of Water Resources, Indonesia JUFMP Environmental Assessment – Executive Summary, September 2011. Construction Supervision Consultant for Jakarta Urgent Flood Mitigation Project, Monthly Progress Reports, from 2016-2019. Korea Engineering Consultants Corp., in association with PT. Puser Bumi Mekon, PT. Tetira International, PT. Duta Cipta Mandiri. Project Completion Report – Main Report, February 2019. The World Bank, Guangxi Laibin Water Environment Project: Project Appraisal Document (Report No.: 74404-CN), April 29, 2013 The World Bank, Mekong Delta Region Urban Upgrading Project: Project Implementation Completion and Results Report (Report No.: ICR00004415), June 18, 2019

Note: additional sites only involve embankment rehabilitation works as requested by DKI Jakarta

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