Human Nature and Concepts
Transcript of Human Nature and Concepts
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Gendlin, E.T. (1993). Human nature and concepts. In J. Braun (Ed.), Psychological
concepts of modernity , (pp. 3-16). Westport, CT: Praeger/Greenwood. From
http://www.focusing.org/gendlin/docs/gol_2060.html
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HUMAN NATURE AND CONCEPTS
by Eugene T. Gendlin, University of Chicago
THREE THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS
Today it is against fashion to affirm a universal human nature or a bodily, animal
nature in humans or a reality that is not just an interpretation. Of course, I won't
affirm these in that innocent way that is being rightly rejected — but I will affirm
all three, after all.
Human Nature
Is there a universal human nature? Yes, certainly, but it is not something that just
is. It is still developing and is the sort of thing that can always develop further. The
fact that the human infant can learn and can variously complete its body's
behavior patterns is a greater degree of organization. But, in Western science,
when something is incomplete, it looks less organized, indeterminate. We have no
good concepts, as yet, for an order that is inherently incomplete not because it
lacks organization but because it can further organize itself — and do so variously.
So we must move past two simplistic notions. What is universal in human nature
cannot be found just by itself, separated out. Human nature always occurs in its
particularized versions, this way or that way. We will not see the complex order of
human nature by looking for what is common. That would miss the order thatenables various ways of carrying forward.
Second, it is equally simplistic to conclude that there is nothing universal, as if
cultural variety were imposed on just nothing, as if the human body had
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no organization of its own with which to create, learn, and perform culture. In that
view, the various cultures float, dropped down by divine decree, so that there is an
utter gap between culture and body.
The present patterns do play some role in how it can be carried further, but not by
simply determining that there is always also a human nature that could have beencarried forward otherwise and — what is more important — can now be carried
forward differently than would be possible in accord with the pattern alone.
Animal Nature in Human Bodies
It is often said that humans lack instinct. It seems that human bodies are less
organized than any other animal's: we don't do even our most bodily activities in
the same way. Unlike every other animal species, we don't eat the same things or
perform the same mating dance preparations for intercourse; we don't build the
same nests; and we're not even afraid of the same things. For centuries in the
West, and especially today, it is said that the human body has lost its animalinstincts.
Certainly it is wrong to think that human beings are complete animals with a
cultural second floor merely added on top. The "completion" or carrying forward of
further development reorganizes and elaborates what was there before. But these
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cultural completions — or rather, ways of carrying forward — cannot be understood
just as themselves, just as patterns, imposed on nothing. To be lived, they involve
the body. They are always a carrying forward of body-life, and they need to be
understood as processes of body-life in situation.
We are bodies and animals, but in this regard, the difficulty for our Western
science is that we think of bodies as mere machines, organized by abstract,
mathematical, science-imposed patterns. Along with this view of the body, animals
were/are considered mere machines. This is not because scientists never talk to
their dogs when they get home. Rather, it is because we have had no concepts for
animal l ife.
What people assert about the body comes from the type of concept in use; it is
always a flat, complete pattern, imposed by science or by culture. With this type of
concept, animals have not been understood at all, and this gross lack dramatizes,
and plays a large role in, our lack of scientific understanding of ourselves.
The great complexity and near person-character of animals have not functioned as
a concept in our theoretical thinking of ourselves. The findings of ethology have
not been thought or used in theories of human nature. I say "the findings" — there
is no good theory of ethology. Let the findings function as concepts.
A mother duck will roll an egg back into the nest, if one has rolled out. It's not
easy, with her narrow bill. She has to adjust to the unevenness of the ground,
moving the egg in a zigzag. This behavior is inherited, and if no egg
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ever rolls out, she performs it eventually, anyway. Only, without an egg she moves
her bill easily, in a perfectly straight line. Shall we say that her body simply lacks
complexities that only the uneven ground gives her? Or is it more organization
than any one pattern, that she can incorporate any pattern of the ground?
The straight line might seem like an empty page, less organized than a page of
print. But the computer's empty screen, ready to have anything written on it, ismore organized than a page of print.
The human body can further develop in a variety of ways, and it has already done
that. Some of the variety it has developed is called "cultures." The human infant
arrives less fully formed than any other species. The duckling can walk from the
start; at birth it actually walks out of its egg. The human infant arrives with an
organization that is more complexly open for further development.
We need such concepts of animal life; otherwise it can seem that everything
human is first given by culture and given to a behaviorless, merely mechanical
body. It is right enough to say that all human meanings are elaborated and
reorganized by culture, but it is nonsense to say that only language and culture
create meaning, social interaction, or complex living. It omits the obvious fact of
the complex life of animals.
Interaction is Prior to Perception and Perspectives
I disagree with the Nietzschean saying "There are only interpretations, there is
nothing to interpret." That saying attacks but still also depends for its punch on the
old perspectival notion that reality is something that is just there. Then we
perceive and interpret it only from different angles or with different interpretive
schemes. The Nietzschean saying points out that we can never get at anything like
that; that would just sit in the middle and be interpreted. So there are only the
interpretations.
But be more radical, and don't assume that reality is something that is only looked
at or interpreted. We don't just stare at things and discuss them. We live also,
which means we interact in, and with, reality. It is not so much the variety of
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interpretations or perceptions that make reality various; rather it is our various
ways of living in, and with, it. No, we never get reality as such; we always get our
being in it and with it, we digest it or fail to digest it, swim or drown in it, walk on
it or sink into it. Science consists of the results of operations, not just a catalog of
the green and the dry.
Concepts and interpretations have to be thought of as special cases of living in,
and interacting with, reality. To understand concepts as operations is quite familiar
to us, but with our Western habits we begin with conceptual and interpretive
operations and skip all the interactions that come before.
Interaction is first—that's a quick way of making this point. It is better to let reality
itself be interaction process. Even the prefix inter still assumes that
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the two things precede. But if we are not innocent about assumptions of reality,
why keep the simplistic assumption that reality must be like a thing in space that
first exists separately and only then interacts? Perhaps reality includes processes
from which — only later — the things separate out, which we then say "interacted."
Perhaps life-interaction is real. Since we're here, this wouldn't be the wildest
assumption.
So I propose that human nature, living bodies, and reality be thought of neither as
a separately given order nor as simply lacking in any order but an order that is
carried forward by the variety of livings we observe, as well as in many other ways
that have never as yet happened.
TWO WAYS OF USING CONCEPTS
One of my favorite authors writes priceless, dense descriptions of many, many
incidents. People read his books for that reason. We easily forgive him the fact that
he isn't a good theoretical thinker. But he so well knows just which details to tell.
His tales are always significant. How is it that he can't let these significances help
him in theorizing? I pursued this question and noticed that when he begins to do
what he thinks of as theory, he leaves his rich know-how behind. He turns to the
established body of conceptual interrelations and begins afresh, without the
incidents and stories in which he is so able.
My story is intended to instance a common way of using concepts: in our public
discourse there are rather enclosed clusters of interrelated concepts, which make
up the theories in a field. Many people think that thinking consists only in entering
these and trying to move them around in interesting ways, with old and new
inferences.
Our concepts about concepts are quite confused, so I would rather let this story say
what I mean, thereby also instancing that there is another way to use concepts;one can make a concept from an incident, or, at least, one can let a concept be
related to an incident.
Concepts do relate to other concepts, but they also relate to situations. These two
relations cannot be split. However, we can think at the interface of these two
relations. (Of course, to take them as two that make an interface is itself a
diagrammatic concept that must be thought of in this interface way.) In whatever
way we picture or schematize this, we can move from any point of thought by the
inferences of systematic theory, and yet we also need not deny that each concept
brings a mesh of situations in which it would be used (from which it comes, in
which it is implicit, which are implicit in it, to which it applies, and so on). This
mesh can also move us to a next step of thought.
Understanding does not consist only of concepts. There is also an implicit
self-understanding as we live and act. We feel we know what we're doing, most of
the time. Our actions make sense; this means they carry forward our
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bodily sensed complexity of a situation. Articulated concepts also carry forward our
bodily-situational living. Either way, understanding consists of an implicitly
complex bodily sense of "Oh, yes, . . . . . , sure." The bodily lived complexity of the
situation is carried forward and thereby self-understood, in the action or in the
concept.
Each culture further patterns the bodily lived complexity of the situations, so that
quite different actions and concepts carry us forward and thereby make sense.
"Really" to understand another culture's (or person's) concepts and lifeways, we
must grasp how these carry forward those people's body-life in situations.
Therefore I think we need to use both the networks of conceptual relations and
also how concepts make sense by carrying forward situational living.
HUMAN NATURE SHOWN IN UNDERSTANDING ACROSSCULTURES
McKim Marriott
The anthropologist McKim Marriott (1989) has proposed that a culture be studied
in terms of its own concepts. He points out that a great deal of good sense about a
culture can be made if one first learns to sense and appreciate the concepts used
within that culture. It is a radical way to think more deeply about a culture,
compared with the thin, externally applied concepts of modern social science. Much
of what happens in a culture is simply lost when we describe it. Or, at least its own
significances are lost when it is rendered on our conceptual maps.
His proposal means that one must first deeply learn the concepts of the culture.
Only then could one begin to describe and think.
It is a wonderful and radical move beyond the limits of our present social science
and the debates between its various relativisms and reductionisms. Let us use not
just the indigenous concepts but a social science developed from these concepts, so
as to study a culture with and through its own concepts.
Richard Shweder
Richard Shweder, too, wants to grasp how people in other cultures think about
things, but he also wants to reveal the intentional world of the other and what has
been dogmatically hidden away (Stigler, Shweder, and Herdt, 1990). He argues
that the alien concepts we bring can often let us understand something better. It
seems to me that this is also true, but we have to ask what "better" means.
If I had to mediate that difference, I would argue that Marriott is totally right —
first. I agree with him that nothing much will work, as long as we cannot grasp how
a culture articulates and understands itself. As long as we
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map the culture on our own understandings, we won't get it on our map at all.
Only when at least some of its self-understandings have been grasped might it be
possible to judge that our further understanding with different concepts is better.
Of course, we can't dictate this time-order, since we come with our alien concepts
and lifeways first, and these may instantly let us understand something better. Wecan't postpone such better understandings, but we can postpone the judgment of
"better" until we have understood and developed the inherent concepts. Then, I
would grant, we have at least a chance of judging which alien understandings are
better.
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Understanding Across Cultures
If it is possible to do what Marriott does, it shows that we consist of something
more than the fixed patterns of our own culture. Although we are already formed,
we are still also open for further development and carrying forward in the other
culture's way. This may have severe limits, but the greater order of the body and
living, which I am trying to think about, is shown by whatever extent we can
actually grasp another culture's ways of living and understanding itself.
This human nature, open for carrying further, is also featured by Shweder near the
end of his introduction to Cultural Psychology . Four modes of understanding are
defined. Taken together, they constitute what I call a universal human nature. It is
that which can be a "situated . . . observer . . . trying to make sense of context-
specific experiences [so that the outcome is] a process of portraying one's self itself
as part of the process of representing the other" (Stigler, Shweder, and Herdt,
1990, 34).
Our nature, even as adults, is sufficiently incomplete so that our selves develop
further in such a process. That means to me not that we are less ordered than
animals but that we are more ordered in a complex way that lets us be carried
further.
In understanding the other culture through its own terms, we understand it
situationally through understanding ourselves. But we are already patterned by
our culture, so this understanding is necessarily a crossing of both. In
understanding that culture's concepts, we apply them to ourselves and thereby to
our own culture, which is implicit in us. Those concepts carry forward and make
further sense of our own living, which is already patterned by our culture. To grasp
oneself in an Indian situation is to understand our culture better than it
understands itself — to carry our acculturated bodies forward in a further way that
makes further sense of it. Some possibilities are revealed that ours "dogmatically
hides away" or happens not to develop.
To the extent to which we can understand our own selves in the situated terms of another place, human nature is not just patterns. Patterns as patterns cannot be
further patterned by other, contradictory patterns. Since we cannot
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strip off how we are already patterned, it must be that our selves and our lives and
bodies are not only by the patterns but something that can be carried further by
other patterns, even though as patterns they cannot fit together.
Since the first set can't be stripped off, making sense of oneself in another culture
is also a further understanding of one's own culture. I admit, of course, that if one
grasps oneself in an Indian situation, that doesn't yet constitute an Indian social
science of the West. But I am serious about that possibility.
I asked Marriott if he agrees that the social science he develops from Indian
concepts can be used to shed light on our own or any other culture we truly live in
— provided we grasp it first in its own terms. I think he said yes.
Of course, Marriott would know that this cross-application of Indian concepts to the
West is going on implicitly in him and that it could, in principle, be extended, so
that Indian concepts could be used here and the concepts of any culture could be
used in grasping any other.
Shweder pursues this point and makes it central. For example, he says that the
elaborate Indian concepts and rituals concerning a man's sisters-in-law reveal
human possibilities that we keep quiet about and don't develop overtly in our
culture. So the revealing goes both ways: some indigenously hidden human
possibilities in both cultures are revealed by coming from the one into the other.
He says that selfishness is elaborated and made overt here, and altruism in India,
but both exist in both cultures. Therefore, what goes on in each culture can be
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illuminated by the elaborations it lacks, which can be found in the other.
Shweder invokes Ruth Benedict's "arc of human possibilities" — and he makes it all
sound rather as if there were a given set of human possibilities, just as there will
always be some relations, ritualized or not, between a wife's husband and her
sisters. But I don't want to take this as if human possibilities were given in advance
and only left to be articulated or not. It seems so, because the marriage pattern is
somewhat similar in both cultures. But where the cultures are father apart, there
is not a neatly similar category differing only in "articulation."
So I can fault Shweder for sounding as if human possibilities are given and only
the articulations vary. On the other hand, Shweder also says, "Experience follows
belief." Now I can fault him for sounding all the other way, as if there is nothing
human across; there is only the variety of beliefs, which make the experiences.
But instead of criticizing both times, I would rather pull these two sides together
into one concept: "carrying forward."
A FIXED SET OF POSSIBILITIES VERSUS CARRYING FORWARD
Why do we assume that what is real must be already fixed and given? No, we
mean just possibilities. With our habits, each word we try sounds fixed.
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The arc of human possibilities—it seems, at best, that one might find an empty
spot between two others on that arc.
It seems to me, rather, that the more we develop, the more further development is
enabled. The degrees of freedom increase; we don't use them up. Carrying forward
is neither determined nor indeterminate, but theoretically that sounds odd,
unspeakable, and unthinkable. Yet, it is much less speculative and much more
familiar than the notion of fixed reality.
The phrase carrying forward says something most familiar. Most human events arenot just finished things. Rather, what an event or a situation is, has to do with
what will happen further—unless we do something now to change what will
happen. Just about every bit of living is for carrying forward, neither a determined
set of choices, nor just anything we like.
AN INDIAN MANNER OF USING CONCEPTS
I have been studying a basic aspect of my culture: the tendency to grasp
everything as fixed things that are organized only by patterns. In my culture there
are no terms for a highly organized openness to being further organized.
Marriott (1989) however, points out how different are the various cultures' notions
of what we call the body. It isn't as if we all had this concrete thing in common and
only thought about it differently.
What we call the "body" cannot be simply found and identified in terms of the
Indian concepts and concerns, nor in those of some other cultures. Let us therefore
leave fluid what is or is not the body. Let us let the word body work at that
interface—of course, it brings our familiar welter of concepts and uses, but let it
also work here, where we say that life and thought may not always identify
something distinct as the body.
It seems to me that Marriott's Indian concepts also tell why they would be used in
a certain manner, not as patterns but as a mesh of instances that they carryforward.
Marriott says that his Indian friends object to his chart of the concepts — arranged
in triadic relations. In our Western style they are just conceptual relations.
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Of course, Marriott is right to let Indian and Western conceptual manners carry
each other forward. In our culture we have highly developed conceptual relations
and logical theory. We neither can nor should lose these. It is part of the fact that
if we understand anything foreign at all, we cannot help understanding it better.
My proposed manner of using concepts can be contrasted with the more familiar
one of speaking only about logical, conceptual relations. In that familiar mode the
bodily carrying forward of the situational mesh has been "dogmatically hidden
away" so that it is underdeveloped, lacking an overt way to be thought.
I propose an approach for the empirical study of this mesh.
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THE SPECIAL CASE OF RELIGION
A Western social scientist in whose own living no spirituality functions will find it
hard to grasp Indian religion. That is not a cross-cultural problem. It is rather a
problem of subgroups within each culture, religious and nonreligious subgroups in
each.
I always argue that before you study Indian religion, why don't you study theCalvert Club or Hillel right here? What I mean is, please see it as a problem, if the
religious dimension of your own culture does not carry you forward. If only you see
this, then you won't mix it into the cross-cultural problematic.
Shweder's principle applies here too: various religious concepts develop and
articulate various human possibilities. The myth taken literally may be stupid, but
how it functions to carry experience forward may not depend on that kind of truth
and may not be stupid. Literal content doesn't tell you how it functions.
I come now to different manners of functioning.
DIFFERENCES IN MANNER OF PROCESS
I will use what I said about religion as my example.
It was a cross-cultural problem when the old-fashioned British Protestants found it
hard to open their Christian experience enough to let Indian patterns carry that
experience further. Traditional people know, as a matter of information, that other
religions are religions, but the alien symbols and rituals have no effect or make
them slightly sick.
Between different patterns-as-such there is no way across.
On the other hand, there always were marginal people who had lived in bothcultures and whose being, carried forward by one, could be further carried forward
by the other.
This difference in manner of process is that one's own patterns can function in such
a way that one senses not only the patterns but also, directly, the intricacy that
they carry forward; then other patterns can also function and carry one further. Or,
one's own patterns carry forward without that direct sensing; then these patterns
seem to be the carrying forward, and other patterns cannot have any further
effect.
Of course, there are many reasons why people might not allow other patterns to
work for them. I recognize that. I am not so interested in whether people are open
to religions other than their own. But this difference in manner of process canpredict many other variables. It is only one example of a difference in manner of
process. I will now cite others.
As I continue, I am not concerned with your subjective mode of using concepts or
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whether you spend years living in another culture or not. I am arguing, rather,
that our concepts must refer to the manner of process of the people
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we study. In that regard I propose a strategy for asking what I think are crucial
empirical questions.
We have to ask, in each case, just how the given concepts, ritual, or way of l ife
functions to carry these people's bodies and lives forward. If we do that, we come
upon vital differences in how whatever we study functions.
CULTURAL PATTERNS ARE PHENOTYPES
Different manners of process reveal very different events, which can superficially
seem the same.
To communicate my challenge, let me overstate it: I claim that much of what is
studied and reported in social science concerns superficial phenotypes that don't
tell us what anything is or how it works. I argue that the manner of process needs
to be taken into account, so that we might know what something is as an event
and how it works. I will show that asking about the manner of process leads totestable questions. When we look closely in this way we often see that two
superficially similar behaviors are different—not in detail, but rather are altogether
different kinds of events.
Example: Psychotherapy
We scaled a difference in process-manner for tape-recorded psychotherapy
interviews. Rather than studying what was said, we studied the manner, in this
case the degree of direct reference to directly sensed experience We found
improvement correlated with the extent to which people work not only with how
their problems are patterned just then but also with their directly felt body-sense
of what they are talking about. Change-steps arise from the bodily sense of a
problem. In contrast, little change comes from how a person's problem seems to be
patterned—from the patterns as such. Patterns often seem to show only how one is
— and must remain.
There are many other variables of process-manner. Each thing we study has its
own such variables.
Example: Women's Roles
At long last, in our society, women can leave the home and do things outside. It
gives some women the world. Before this change, a woman who wanted to dothings in the world was blamed and made to blame herself. "Why are my husband
and children not enough for me?" she would argue with herself. But now, too, some
are made to berate themselves. "There is nothing I want to do. Why don't I have
my own thing?" many of them ask.
Also, some who have a well-developed profession decide to stay home with their
kids. What pressure they now experience from others, and how they have
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to struggle to defend their choice! The choice is possible only for some. Others
must work, because two paychecks bring only what one brought, 20 years ago.
I argue that without inquiring into the manner of process, one wouldn't know much
about the old or new female roles in our society.
Would process-manner predict differences on other variables? Surely. How could it
not? Many measures, from global satisfaction to very specific stress-indexes, family
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interaction, and performance, should be predictably different
"Motherhood and the Virgin Mary in Western Ireland"
Maria Sullivan's paper, delivered to Person, Culture, Body Workshop, Committee on
Human Development at the University of Chicago, presented a lovely intricacy of
relations between psyche and culture. For example, she reports that the image of
the Virgin Mary calls on women to sacrifice themselves and also to keep silent
about their oppression. In that culture women are blamed for what goes wrongwith their husbands and sons. She mentions the psychoanalytic theory according to
which the mother's castrating is responsible for weakness in her sons. The
psychological explanation also remains silent about the oppression of women and
blames women for what is wrong with the men. On the other hand, it sheds some
light on what might go on within the family under these conditions. Sullivan is
right to let psychological and sociological explanations coexist and undercut each
other. I think this intricate mesh of culture-psyche relations is better than any one
set of concepts.
Is the Mary cult a reflection of the castrating psychological and family patterns?
Shall we interpret it as a justification of social oppression and a damper to repress
complaints? Is it a cultural symbol and ritual that we must study with respect,without mentioning economic and social conditions? Or is that cultural symbol
perhaps even a cause that creates experience and social conditions?
I would neither deny nor settle on one explanatory mode in general. For example,
I wouldn't limit myself, in advance, to the traditional notion that cultural symbols
have psychological origins or, vice versa, that cultural symbols create psychological
experience. I don't deny that social and political arrangements may cause them
both. I think one must always trace the detailed connections on all these lines.
Oppression on the social and economic level may explain something about the
family structure, while the castration theory may explain the dynamics by which
that structure produces certain results. The cultural symbol may be more than amere reflection of the social oppression; it may also cause or maintain that
oppression. Rather than an overall ideological choice of theory, I am for looking at
how these connections work in relation to each other, in the given instance.
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But I would also ask another kind of question: how does the Virgin Mary cult
function in carrying forward these people's bodies and lives?
I would ask, How would the image of the Virgin Mary's self-sacrifice function to
carry forward people's bodies and lives?
I predict that very different manners of process will be found to coexist in aculture. The spiritual approach to suffering can restore health and give energy, but
it can also be used to stifle oneself and make everything seem only superficially all
right. It would surprise me a lot if this difference and finer shades of it were not to
be found. It is unlikely that such a symbol would never realize a human possibility
and equally unlikely that every person would find this possibility. But what are the
percentages? That would matter a lot, and I cannot even guess. It is an empirical
question!
It should not be hard to differentiate a process-manner that gives serious value,
health, and energy to a mother from a manner of functioning that makes for
repression, smoldering anger, and the castrating of those around her. The
castration and resentment of sons can be measured with our psychometrics.Perhaps there are no differences in this result —that is an empirical question. The
mothers' interview transcripts would have to be reliably differentiable as between
repressive theological garbage and reports of physically felt, experiential
sustenance. That should be possible, if the right questions are asked.
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This would not resolve the inherent intricacy of various conceptual interpretations.
For example, we would still be concerned about social oppression, and we would
still affirm that it is mirrored in the prevalence of the Mary cult, even if it were
found that for a sizable proportion of mothers the spiritual concepts open genuine
human resources. That would not justify the oppression—anymore than I choose
suffering just to advance my personal development. Nor would it deny that the
social arrangements are the reason for the emphasis on the Mary image. But now
we would not just invoke the general concept that symbols "mirror" social
arrangements. Keeping this, we would know something about how such "mirroring"works.
I think poverty and the infant mortality rate have everything to do with whatever
we study, and they must always be considered. For someone who has not
experienced it, it is hard to understand a person whose little child dies, and then
another, and perhaps another. Yet this was the human condition in all ages until
now, and it is still the condition in many places. To grasp human nature and its
possibilities, it is worthwhile to understand how people manage to go on, both
repressively by an inward closing and in another way, if there is one. Such
understanding would never justify these conditions, which are no longer
unavoidable.
So the intricate mesh of various concepts and strategies would continue, but itwould change and become always more informed.
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Home Visitors in the Black Community
The program consultant said:
First we worked with mothers but they talked of their problems and we never got
to the kids. Then we worked with the kids and lost the mothers. Now we try to zero
in on parent-child relations.
We came with permissive middle-class ideas, but we learned that, in those
surroundings, it can express love to be hard on your kids, to beat them a lot, and
restrict them all the time. A permissive attitude can be deadly there. The worst
fear is to raise a "brat." Such a kid easily gets sucked into all the bad things that
go on all around you. Also, you have to leave your kid with people all the time, and
it's real bad for the kid, if he isn't welcome anyplace. So we learned that the same
kind of parent-child relations we wanted would look very different here.
We are after a personally loving and close interaction, but we thought we would let
it develop its own form in this very different socioeconomic class and culture. Then
we found it there, not all that frequently, but it is there. They beat their kids a lot,
but you can see the difference in those parents who are doing it right: They aren't angry; it's protective.
They can't childproof the place, clear the apartment of dangerous things; too many
adults living there. So they have to spank the child to get it not to touch a lot of
objects. But of course the kids' exploratory drive does get lost. What we do, is to
give them the idea, now and then, that exploring might be something good. After a
while, maybe they'll find some form in which they can save it. (Personal
communication, Dr. Victor Bernstein, 1988)
This report well exemplifies principles we have discussed: It brings home how
culture is at least partly a response to the real circumstances, not only an
unaccountable origin of differences. It shows that, across economic classes andcultures, the human sameness does not consist in a common form or pattern of
behavior. To get the same effect in very different surroundings — of course, what
one does would be different. That makes it seem that the sameness is hard or
impossible to think about. We have been developing concepts for this kind of "the
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same" across different patterns. Here it is the concept of the manner of the
process. This program consultant has a simple touchstone here ("They aren't
angry; it's protective"), but it marks a whole different complexity, a different
manner of process that makes all the content very different.
Bach and Vermeer, Aesthetic Values in our Culture
Educated people know that Johann Sebastian Bach and Jan Vermeer are highly
valued. It shows good taste to like them. But one should not return from a study of our culture to report only that. Nor should one examine only Bach's musical scores
or Vermeer's surface to understand how they function in our culture.
One needs to differentiate the manner of process. In some people Bach
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opens a bodily experience of infinity. Certainly, the social value put on it disposes
some people to open themselves to find the desirable experience. In one manner of
process, trying to find it makes it more likely. But there's also a different kind of
"trying," which immunizes.
Some people had to sit in silence on hard chairs as children taken to concerts.Their bodies will not open to this music. The influence of social values is not only
straightforward; it can build blockages.
Nor are there only two manners of process here. Rather, some people lack only the
experience. Others force themselves, put themselves down, or insist inside
themselves on some substitute they find. In short, there are also serious ways of
violating oneself.
Is it possible that a culture would talk about an experience that exists only in a
repressive, substitutional mode, an experience that simply cannot be found? I
think so, but I would like to know! Can it sometimes be found, but only in a
negligible percentage of special people? Or does the experience exist, but only in
others? I mean that a merely substitutional experience might be pushed on some
people, for the sake of something held desirable by others, as binding women's feet
made the women into upper-class luxuries — but for whom?
Don't we need to know which of such different manners of process obtain? Or shall
we report only the pattern that is highly valued?
There are those whose Bach-listening process extends just to recognizing it. This is
Bach, they love to say, and they've had it. Similarly, in the art museum these
people run through, pointing: a Van Gogh, a Vermeer, and so on. It is different to
spend a long while in front of a Vermeer and see the light reflected from each
upholstery nail.
These differences can be differentiated empirically, although one must always know
that people have heard the kind of talk that indicates the desirable experience, and
to some extent they can reproduce it. One has to ask more deeply. For example, if
we ask about the upholstery nails in the painting, we might get beyond the mere
transmission of canned talk.
CONCLUSION
Cross-cultural understanding is one rather rare way in which our human nature
bodies and lives can be carried forward. I argue that our nature, bodies, and
experiences have an order that is much more intricate than the overt patterns,
cultural or personal. That order is for further carrying forward by different
patterns, and sometimes creative of different patterns.
Cultural patterns — or any patterns — must never be treated as if they were
axioms, as if experience just derives from them. The higher animals already live
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much more complexly than could ever be derived from our cultural patterns alone.
The cultural patterns only modify and elaborate our bodily living and carry it
forward. I argue that we have to look how they do that — in various manners of
process.
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