Framing the Past for the FutureArab Tribalism in the Modern Levant

Jesse Clayton Marks 7/13/16 Adv: Dr. Peter Garretson

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Framing the Past for the Future: Arab Tribes in the Modern Levant

By

Jesse Clayton MarksFlorida State University

Bachelor of Arts in Middle East Studies 2016

Advisory Committee:Dr. Peter GarretsonDr. Zeina SchlenoffDr. Will Hanley

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Dedication

To Dr. Peter Garretson for his unwavering support, encourage, and mentorship over the years

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Acknowledgements

During my years at Florida State University, I have received support and encouragement

from many professors, administrators, and students especially those in the FSU Middle East

Center. I would like to thank all of the members of my dissertation committee: Dr. Peter

Garretson, Dr. Zeina Schlenoff, and Dr. Will Hanley for your patience, assistance, and support as

I have journeyed through the process of researching and writing a dissertation. Additionally, this

dissertation would not have been possible without the advice and assistance from Dr. Dawn

Chatty from the University of Oxford’s Refugee Studies Centre in procuring sources on Arab

tribes in the Levant.

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Abstract:

Arab Tribes are a powerful social, cultural, and political institution throughout the Arab

world. Though they originated from a common ancestry, thousands of years of conquest and

migration resulted in a broad range of tribal characteristics and practices. Even between closely

related tribes in the Levant, there are differences from country to country. Traditionally, Arab

tribes are defined through an international relation’s paradigm. This is exemplified with the

United States’ rapid assessment of the tribal system in Iraq during the Iraq War in order bolster

support for the U.S. led coalition. However, this framework fails to understand the historical and

cultural foundations of the system and often results in negative consequences including the

growth and expansion of multinational non-state actors, sectarianism, and terrorism. This

research seeks to develop a framework that integrates an understanding of the historic relevance

of tribes with the function and role of tribes in the modern context with an emphasis on the

impact of tribal identity on tribal relations with the state from the late Ottoman era into the

present and on forced migration in the present Syrian crisis.

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Framing the Past for the Future: Arab Tribalism in the Modern Context

Table of Contents

Introduction: ...................................................................................................................

Literature Review.............................................................................................................

Chapter 1: Defining the “Tribe” in the Historical Context .........................................

Chapter 2: The Perfect Model.......................................................................................

Chapter 3: Tribes in the Levant ....................................................................................

Chapter 4: The Role of Tribes in Modern Conflict: ....................................................

Chapter 5: Building a Case for Identity: Tribalism and the State: .............................

Chapter 7: Tribal Identity and Forced Migration.........................................................

Conclusion:.....................................................................................................................

Bibliography: .................................................................................................................

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Introduction

On June 10, 2011, the anniversary of the death of former Syrian President, Hafiz Al-

Assad, coordinated protests erupted all over Syria in efforts to engage the support of Syrian

tribes in the growing revolution against President Bashar al-Assad. The day of protests,

nicknamed the “Friday of Tribes”, were heavily attended in major cities from Dara’a to

Hasekah.1 The Syrian Conflict broadly considered an ethnic conflict has proven to be much more

complex than a question of ethnic or religious solidarity. This sudden emergence of Arab

tribalism paralleling uprisings and conflict in other areas of the Levant was an unexpected

surprise to many in the region. Tribal involvement in the Syrian Spring was seen as a turning

point in the movement to overthrow the Assad regime. However, June 10th did not mark the

beginning of tribal involvement in the region. The Syrian War was birthed in a tribal feud with

the Syrian Government that spiraled into a civil war to overthrow the Assad regime. The factors

that fueled this conflict and the following refugee migrations are deeply rooted in Arab tribal

identity and historical prominence of tribal culture in the Levant.

Arab Tribes are a powerful social, cultural, and political institution throughout the Arab

world. Though they originated from a common ancestry, thousands of years of conquest and

migration resulted in a broad range of tribal characteristics and practices. Traditionally, Arab

tribes are defined through an international relation’s paradigm. This is exemplified with the

United States’ rapid assessment of the tribal system in Iraq during the Iraq War in order bolster

support for the U.S. led coalition. However, this framework fails to understand the historical and

1 “Support Kurds in Syria (SKS)”. Friday of Tribes 10 June 2011.

http://supportkurds.org/friday-of-tribes-10-june-2011/

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cultural foundations of the system and often results in negative consequences including the

growth and expansion of multinational non-state actors, sectarianism, and terrorism. This

research seeks to develop a framework that integrates an understanding of the historic relevance

of tribes with the function and role of tribal identity in the modern context.

Firstly, it is necessary to understand the historical and religious relevance of Arab

tribalism and its impact on the Middle East. In Chapter 1, I define tribalism in the Levant from a

historic context. This is based upon a survey of the earliest tribes in the Arab Peninsula, the

Qahtani and the Adnani. This is accomplished through gathering and analyzing numerous

sources from religious texts, Hadith, genealogical histories of the region, and scholarly sources

on the topic. In Chapter 2, I explore the impact of Islam on Arab tribalism through a discussion

of Mohammed’s genealogy and its implications for Arab tribalism. This is then applied to

construct a working lineage model of the Arab tribe in the modern Middle East. In Chapter 3, I

provide an overview and analysis of the ethnic, sectarian, and tribal demographics of the Levant

and the complexities of transitional tribes following the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. In

Chapter 4, I present the arrest and torture of fifteen Syrian boys from Dara’a and its relationship

to the birth of the Syrian conflict as a case study on the role of tribal identity in collective action

and migration. In Chapter 5, I explore the relationship between Arab tribes and the state from the

nineteenth century to the present in order to build a case for the prominence of tribal identity

over national identity in tribal communities. Lastly, I apply the perspectives on tribal identity

discussed in chapter 4 to establish a connection between tribal identity and forced migration.

This is accomplished by comparing the Circassian tribal migrations during the eighteenth century

with the present Syrian refugee migrations to Jordan and Iraq.

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Literature Review

At the onset of this project in 2014, the Syrian conflict was limited in the number of non-

state combatants and predated the rise of the so-called Islamic State. Large swaths of the territory

in east Syria and West Iraq, though still in conflict, were not under the direct control of terrorist

organizations. Additionally, displacement from these regions was not as widespread. The

international community entered into a discussion on the role of Arab tribes and their

involvement in the conflict with various works being published by international think-tanks, the

U.S. Government, and various media outlets. 2 While the framework used by many of these

authors to evaluate Arab tribes was void of the historic and cultural perspectives that play a

major role in a holistic understanding of Arab tribes, Dr. Dawn Chatty, a senior researcher for

the Oxford Refugee Centre, published numerous works that explored these two perspectives and

their impact on the current conflict in the Levant. Among her many contributions to the field of

Middle East Studies, Dr. Chatty challenged the orientalist perceptions in the western policy

framework in the Levant. In her work, Guests and Hosts: Arab Hospitality Underpins a Humane

Approach to Asylum Policy, Dr. Chatty addresses the importance of understanding the

local history, context, and customs especially in the field of forced migration and humanitarian

response for western policy makers. 3 I was presently aware of the prevalence of tribal identity as

2 Abouzeid, R. “Syria's Friday of Dignity Becomes a Day of Death.” Time. March 25, 2011. http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2061452,00.html; Drott, Carl. 2014. "Arab Trbes Split Between Kurds and Jihadists." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. May 14. http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=55607; Heras, Nicholas. "A Profile of Syria's Stategic Dar'a Province." Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, June 30, 2014. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-profile-of-syrias-strategic-dara-province; O'Leary, Carole A, and Nicholas Heras. 2012. "Syrian Tribal Networks and their Implications for the Syrian Uprising." Terrorism Monitor Volume: 10 Issue: 11. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39452#.V54x-k1TGUk

3 Chatty, Dawn. 2013. "Guests and Hosts: Arab Hospitality Underpins a Humane

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a social identity in the Levant following various trips to Jordan, but a conversation with Dr.

Chatty challenged me to ask the question “What is an Arab tribe in the historic context and how

does this inform the general understanding of Arab tribes in the modern context?”

After overseeing the planning and implementation of three national level surveys with the

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on the migration intentions of refugees, I

developed a deeper understanding of refugee migration trends following their initial

displacement. Seeing how tribes both impacted the Syrian conflict and were victims of the

conflict led to a redefining of my initial research question to include: “How does tribal identity

impact forced migration?” Following an increase in conflict on the Syria-Iraq border with the

rise of multinational, non-state actors in late 2014, it became difficult to gather and produce new

data on Arab tribes and migration. Previous to the expansion of ISIS, Haian Dukhan published

his research entitled Tribes and Tribalism in the Syrian Uprising that discussed the role of Arab

tribes in the Iraqi and Syrian conflict and included first-hand accounts of refugees who fled from

Syria to Iraq because of their tribal connections to the country. 4 The author’s research played a

significant role in identifying this phenomenon across the Syrian-Iraqi border.

Following the publishing of Dukhan’s paper, the focus of this research project shifted

from the Iraq-Syria border to discuss tribes and migration on the Jordanian-Syrian border.

Initially, I intended to interview Syrian refugees to evaluate if (and how) tribal identity affected

their choice to flee to Jordan. I soon found that I would not be able to carry out the interviews as

needed due to the political and cultural sensitivity of the project and my lack of access to the

Approach to Asylum Policy." Cairo Review (American University of Cairo) Spring: 76-85. https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/guests-and-hosts-arab-hospitality-underpins-a-humane-approach-to-asylum-policy.

4 Dukhan, Haian. 2014. "Tribes and Tribalism in the Syrian Uprising." Syria Studies 6(2). https://ojs.st-andrews.ac.uk/index.php/syria/article/view/897.

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refugees. However, I began to informally learn about the impact of tribalism on the Syrian

conflict from conversations with a variety of individuals including a prominent researcher, Dr.

Musa Shteiwi and member of the prominent Tarawneh tribe. Additionally, before the focus of

the project shifted from Iraq/Syria to Syria/Jordan, I gathered data from open-source information

and built a database of Arab tribes in Iraq in order to explore multinational and cross-border

tribes in the Levant by observing the geographic locations of the different tribes and their

branches.

My secondary sources were selected and obtained through a broad range of outlets

including academic databases, the American Center for Oriental Research, the British Institute

Amman, targeted document searches in Arabic and English through Google Scholar and Google

Search, and key-word searches in Arabic and English on various forms of social media (twitter,

forums, and tribal websites). A number of sources (early Islamic texts, Hadith, and tribal internet

sources) were translated into English from Arabic for purpose of this thesis. Certain sources

including the references to the arrest and release of tribe members for protesting charges were

found in Arabic and translated to English. Additionally, through interviews with scholars in

Jordan, I was offered suggestions for further reading on tribalism and tribal structures in the

region. All of the translations were done by the researcher, through a translation application, or

with the assistance of a native Arabic speaker.

Dr. Chatty’s various works on forced migration and the Levant provide a large

background on the cultural and social practice of Arab tribes. Her works address these practices

and traditions from the late Ottoman era until the present. Similarly, Hakan Ozoglu in his

research discusses the characteristics of tribes in the Middle East borrowing from Albert

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Hourani. His work is also focused from the Ottoman era until the present.5 To understand the

origin and history of Arab tribes, the Quran and early Hadith must also be explored as they

provide the religious justification and historic context for tribalism in early Islamic societies.

Moreover, understanding the meaning of the passages in context requires additional exposition

from both early and contemporary Islamic scholars. The major sources on the historic role of

tribes used in this research are Daniel Varisco’s Metaphors and Sacred History: The Genealogy

of Muhammad and the Arab “Tribe”, Al-Maqqari’s The Breath of Perfume from the Branch of

Green Andalusia (circ. 1600), Abbas Azawi’s Tribes of Iraq (Ash’ir al-Iraq) (1964), and

Qalqashandi’s The Proficiency in Knowing the Arab Lineage (Circa. 700-800 CE).6 Varisco’s

work portrays the importance of Mohammed’s genealogy from an academic perspective

carefully detailing the role of each layer in the Prophet’s tribal structure. The works of Maqqari,

Azawi, and Qalqashandi provide historical narratives complimenting the structure provided in

the Varisco text.

The extent of tribal influence in the modern Middle East is difficult to measure without a

consistent or uniform understanding of the tribe as a societal institution. However, by defining a

tribe in the historic and religious context, it provides a foundation for understanding their place

5 Ozoglu, Hakan. 2004. Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State: Evolving Identities, Competing Loyalities, and Shifting Boundaries. State University of New York Press; Hakan Ozoglu heavily focuses on Kurdish tribal structure in this work. However, Dr. Chatty reaffirms the consistency and commonality between Kurdish tribes and Arab Bedouin in Iraq in her book, Displacement and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East. For this citation, refer to note 9 below.6

Varisco, Daniel Martin. 1995. "Metaphors and Sacred History: The Genealogy of Muhammed and the Arab "Tribe"." Anthropological Quarterly, July: 139-156. www.jstor.org/stable/3318071; al-Maqqari, Ahmed Mohammed. 1500-1600. The Breath of Perfume rom the Branch of Green Andalusia (Arabic). http://waqfeya.com/book.php?bid=7608; Azawi, Abbas. 1964. Tribes of Iraq (Arabic). Baghdad. http://alhakawati.net/arabic/civilizations/14.pdf; Qalqashandi, Ahmed bin Ali bin Ahmed Fazari. 700-800. "The Proficiency in Knowing the Arab Lineage (Arabic)." Archive. https://archive.org/details/nihayt-alarb

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and role in the modern context. Resat Kasaba’s work A Movable Empire: Ottomans, Nomads,

Migrants, and Refugees provides a detailed overview of the relationship between nomadic tribes

and the Ottoman Empire during late Ottoman era into the beginning of the modern era in

Anatolia and the Levant.7 His works capture the resurgence of tribalism at the end of the

nineteenth century and Ottoman attempts to destabilize tribal identity during the centralization of

the Empire. Also, this work paints a picture of pre-colonial Syria before the fall of the Ottoman

Empire. Joseph Massad’s Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan

documents the history of Jordan’s tribe from the pre-mandate period until the late twentieth

century. He provides insight into the development of the Jordanian monarchy’s relationship with

the country’s tribal population including how the tribes have allowed the monarchy to maintain

stability through the country’s history. 8 From the early twentieth century into the contemporary

Levant, Dr. Chatty’s work Displacement and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East provides

a comprehensive history of forced migration in the Levant addressing the displacement of the

Kurdish tribes of Anatolia, Circassians, Chechnyans, Palestinians, and more. 9 Because of the

tribal structure of minority forced migrants in the Middle East, Dr. Chatty discusses tribalism in

the context of forced migration in the modern area. This is critical in the discussion of tribal

identity’s impact on forced migration because it provides various examples of their

intersectionality in a regional context. By analyzing one of these examples of tribal migration

7 Resat Kasaba. 2009. A Movable Empire: Ottomans, Nomads, Migrants, and Refugees. London and Seattle: University of Washington Press:

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Joseph Massad. 2001. Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan.New York: Columbia University Press.

9 Chatty, Dawn. 2010. Displacement and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East. Cambridge University Press: 238.

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into the Levant, I will be able to compare the case to the modern forced migration of Syrian

tribes in the south.

Chapter 1: Defining the “Tribe” in the Historical Context

Origins of Arab Tribes in the Arab Peninsula

According to Islamic tradition, Arab tribes find their origins in two ancient Arab tribes

from Arab Gulf and Middle East region during time of Abraham, the Qahtani and the Adnani.

The Qahtani originated from the southern Arab Peninsula particularly in Yemen. Often they are

referred to as the Arab Koh or the pure Arabs. The Adnani are commonly referred to as the

Arabized-Arabs because they originated from areas north of the Arab peninsula, the modern

Levant. Adnani are believed to be descendants of Ishmael, the son of Abraham. The phrase

“Arabized-Arabs” comes from the belief that Ishmael originally spoke Hebrew before journeying

to Mecca where He was arabized after marrying a woman from a Qahtani tribe. As the validity of

the narrative can be debated, the important distinction to be made between the two tribes are

their origins. While the Qahtani are considered “pure Arab”, the importance of the Adnani

connection to Abraham in tradition must be noted. The significance of the Adnani-Ishmael

connection provided the contextual claim of Muhammad as the seal of prophets because it places

him in the genealogy of Abraham.10

The distinction between the two tribes historically tends to impact the historical context

of tribes more than the modern context. With the expansion of Islam and the Islamic Empire

from the Arab Gulf into the rest of the Levant and North Africa, there was an inevitable

10 Parolin, Gianluca. 2009. Citizenship in the Arab World: Kin, Religion, and Nation-State. p. 30. Ampsterdam University Press: 30

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movement and settlement of these tribes into new areas. One of many examples of this early

migration are the Shammar, a Qahtani tribe that is found in Jordan, Iraq, and Syria. Like the

Shammar, Qahtani tribes have been living in the Levant for centuries.

Resistance to the term, “tribe”:

Sociologists have debated the term “tribe” especially since its broad use to identify

societal structures in Asia, Africa, South America, and areas lacking “white” populations in

attempts to marginalize and alienate various populations. As there are large amounts of

scholarship in this specific debate, I want to provide a brief and selective definition of tribe

borrowing from Daniel Varisco. A tribe is “a state of mind, a construction of reality, a model for

organization and action” in a general context.11 In the Arab context, one important problem in

defining a tribe comes with the introduction of English to the anthropological study of Arab

tribes. It is difficult to fully define the term tribe due to the various types of social structures and

groups that exist even within Arab history. The Arabic word “qabila” that is most often

translated as tribe in English was incorporated into Turkish, Persian, and Berber.12 Each language

represents a very distinct definition of what “qabila” means and its various distinguishable

characteristics. Broadly defined, nomadic cohesion among early Arab tribes was described by

Ibn Khaldun in his work Muqaddimah with the Arabic word ‘asabyia.13 At the time, his

depiction of tribal solidarity was broadly applied to tribes in his time period that were in

predominantly Arabic-speaking countries. Simply put, ‘asabiya is defined as the fundamental

11 Varisco, 140

12 Varisco, 141.

13 Khaldun, Ibn. The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History. Edited by N. J. Dawood. Translated by Franz Rosenthal. Princeton University Press (Bollingen Series).

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connections in a tribal society that sustain social cohesion among each member therein.

Historically, these connections were built and strengthened by marriage, kinship, blood, religion,

and common ancestry. For reference, the term tribe in this paper will be herein defined as the

structure of communities who are linked via marriage, blood, dialect, common history, and

historical ancestry in the Middle East.

Kinship and Ancestry

Two of the previous elements in tribal formation that define the social structure are

common ancestry and kinship. The first introduced by Albert Hourani suggests that that tribal

solidarity is owed not to kinship per se but to “a myth of common ancestry” by which tribes are

linked by a historical connection (whether fictitious or legendary) to an important historical or

religious figure.14 This is exemplified in the assumption that Qahtani are truly “pure Arab.”

Rather, the connection falls into the realm of myth. The second suggests that tribal solidarity is in

fact owed to collective kinship. Hourani is correct in his assertion that tribes find a degree of

solidarity in “the myth of common ancestry” especially in tribes embracing Islam where the

common ancestor has religious significance.15 However, common ancestry, as important as it is,

is not reinforced in the modern day since these historic connections are often outdated. The

inconsistency in tribal labeling alludes to a process by which family structures redefine

themselves as a tribe. Through the establishment of family and marriage connections, kinship

groups provide a deep solidarity between Arab tribes in the modern context.

Arab tribes are often defined and redefined over the centuries since the pre-Islamic

period. The Qahtani lineage, originating from the southern Arab Peninsula, are the earliest

14 Ozoglu, 43-46

15 See note 11 above.

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ancestors of many of existing Arab tribes. Of these (most of whom reside in Yemeni), some

maintain the Qahtani name while numerous others consider themselves descendants of the

Qahtani. However, not all tribal descendants keep the Qahtani name. This reaffirms the notion

that tribal identity is not concrete rather an evolving concept.

Arab tribes predate Islam and extend well into the "Jahiliyya" period. Major tribes in the

Arab Peninsula include variations of many modern tribes including the Anizah and Hashemites

(the Royal Family of Jordan). Without a central state in the Arab Peninsula during the pre-

Islamic period, tribes and tribal society dictated daily life, trade, security, and sustenance. Tribal

customs laid the foundation for many of the customs found in the Middle East today. With the

rise of Islam and the Prophet Mohammed, tribalism adopted a level of religious significance.

Islam both challenged and complimented the role of tribes in daily life.

This is where the difficulty in defining a “tribe” originates. Hourani’s assertions

regarding ancestry are strengthened by the emphasis that Islamic scholars placed on the science

of genealogy in order to preserve the lineage of the Prophet and provide a religious motivation

for maintaining a proper record of Arab tribal genealogies.16 However, as exemplified by the

Qahtani example, descendants often adopt a new tribal identities. This is evidenced by thousands

of tribes throughout the Arab world as opposed to a limited number of larger state-like tribes.

Chapter 2: The Perfect Model

During the “Jahiliyya” period (the pre-Islamic era considered by many Muslims as the

era of ignorance), oral tradition was the mechanism that carried knowledge of tribal lineage and

ancestry to the next generation. Through the telling and retelling of oral history within the tribe,

knowledge of family lineages was cemented into the collective memory of the tribe. Following

16 See note 11 above.

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the rise and spread of Islam, it became necessary for Islamic Scholars to document the ancestry

of the Prophet Mohammed to prove his descent from the prophet Abraham. Thus, the science

behind the genealogical structure (al-nesib) of the Prophet was of utmost importance to Islamic

scholars because of the theological significance of the Mohammed-Adnan connection in

supporting the Prophet’s claim as the seal of the prophets. In the words of the Prophet as narrated

by Wathilah ibn al-Asqa, “that the Messenger of Allah (ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص) said: ‘Indeed Allah has chosen

Isma'il from the children of Ibrahim, and He chose Banu Kinanah from the children of Isma'il,

and He chose the Quraish from Banu Kinanah, and He chose Banu Hashim from Quraish, and

He chose me from Banu Hashim.’”17 On this claim, the significance of this genealogy is firmly

established in early Islamic society. The science behind genealogy in Islam inspired early scholar

Ahmed bin Ali bin Ahmed Fazari Qalqashandi, an eighth century scholar, to pen extensive his

extensive work on the genealogical system: The Proficiency in Knowing the Arab Lineage where

Qalqashandi reaffirms the importance of the Prophet’s genealogy and its significance to the life

and practice of Muslims.18

Arguably, the science of genealogy is a cornerstone in Islamic society with applications

in society, law, religion, and family. This arrived at a point in history where tribal affiliation and

ancestry determined privilege and class in society. Tribes traced their lineages to prove their

relation to the earliest followers of the Prophet. This is exemplified in the role of tribal lineage in

determining who is qualified to serve in the role of Imam. As confirmed in the Hadith narrated

by an-Nasa’iyy, Ahmad, and al-Bayhaqiyy, the Imam-ship is the birth privilege from the

Quraysh tribe.19 In addition, tribe and lineage was an important aspect of determining marriage

17 Verse 1, Book 46, Hadith Number 3605 narrated by Wathilah ibn al-Asqa.18 Qalqashandi, Ahmed bin Ali bin Ahmed Fazari. 700-800. "The Proficiency in

Knowing the Arab Lineage (Arabic)." Archive. https://archive.org/details/nihayt-alarb.

19 Darulfatwa Islamic High Council of Australia (IHCA). 2015. "Genealogy, Its Benefits

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compatibility of the husband to the woman. Al Bukhari narrates the words of the Prophet stating,

“the woman is sought for marriage due to four matters: her money, prestigious lineage, beauty

and religiosity…”20 There are numerous additional examples of the prominence of lineage

throughout the Quran and Hadith with a large amount of scholarship on the topic from the past

millennia.

Paralleling the rise and spread of Islam was the shift from the collection and transferring

of information from oral tradition into writing. In addition to the collection and transcribing of

Hadith, the genealogies and ancestry of tribes were also transcribed. The genealogical structure

of the Prophet’s genealogy became the primary model of tracing ancestry. Qalqashandi explains

that this genealogy should be present in the memory of every Muslim. He further reiterates the

Quranic importance placed upon the role of the tribe for Muslims in the Quran citing Al Hujurat

13.21 The science behind the genealogy of the Prophet Mohammed is very complex with different

variations depending on historical context. For the scope of this paper, this overview presents the

most agreed upon layers of ancestry that are in agreement with the Quran and the Hadith.

and the Utter Need for It." DarulFatwa.org.au. November. http://www.darulfatwa.org.au/en/genealogy its-benefit-and-the-utter-need-for-it. “It is confirmed about the Prophet that he said: “the Imams (leaders) are from the tribe of Quraysh”, narrated by an-Nasa’iyy, Ahmad, al-Bayhaqiyy and others” 20

See note 16 above. This specific Hadith relates to which of the four criteria for choosing a wife is the most important concerning Islam. Bukhari narrates the prophet stating: “The woman is sought for marriage due to four matters: her money, prestigious lineage, beauty and religiosity, so choose the one attributed with religiosity and you shall be delighted (translated by Darulfatwa).”This Hadith, according to the author from IHCA, is evidence of the importance of the science of genealogy in Islam because of the religious importance placed upon a strong lineage for marriage purposes.

21 Qalqashandi, 5. Cited Quranic Passage: O mankind, indeed we have created you from male and female and made you peoples and tribes that you may know one another. Indeed, the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you. Indeed, Allah is Knowing and Acquainted. - Al Hujurat 49:13 (Sahih International Translation)

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The structure of Arab tribes is separated into eight layers. The exact definition of each of

the eight layers in the genealogical structure is hard to apply to the modern context because of

the re-defining of tribes over the centuries culminating into the structure that exists today. For

this reason, it is difficult to apply the classic genealogical model of the Prophet to modern tribes.

For example, the broadest relationship in the tribal structure is the “sha’b” which describes a

relationship larger than the qabila and can directly refer to a nation. For this context, the first and

largest level of the tribe is qabila with the smallest level being usra which describes intermediate

and close family relationships. Between these two levels are relationships defined as a clans or

‘asheera. The term ‘asheera has two meanings in the tribal context in the Levant: (1) it is used to

define a clan or (2) it is used interchangeably with qabila to define a tribe. This phenomenon

found is typically found in Jordan.22 Dr. Chatty argues, in an interview with Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace, the term ’asheera is used to define larger tribes and qabila is

used to define tribal confederations using Lebanon as the context.23 Both qabila and ’asheera are

used interchangeably in the modern context. This is closely related their size or historic presence

in the region. For example, the Shammar, a group of nearly 1.5 million present in both the

Levant and the Arab Peninsula, are commonly called a tribe (qabila) in Iraq and Syria;

meanwhile, they are considered a clan (‘asheera) in Jordan.

22 Bin Muhammad, Ghazi. 1999. The Tribes of Jordan at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century. Amman: Rutab, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. rissc.jo/books/Tribes-of-Jordan.pdf. In his work The Tribes of Jordan at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century, author Ghazi bin Muhammad writes that all Jordanians of East Bank origin (Jordanian and Palestinian) belong to a tribe whether traditionally settled, semi-nomadic, or Bedouin (fully nomadic). Ghazi introduces the word “tribe” with the Arabic word ’ashira which is used to define a clan in the traditional description of tribal structure in the Middle East.

23 Chatty, Dr. Dawn, interview by Aron Lund: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2015. Syria's Bedouin Tribes: An Interview with Dawn Chatty (July 2). http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=60264.

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The following figure is a model of the degrees of tribal ancestry in the historical context.

While opinions on which ancestor represents each degree, the degrees themselves are consistent

in the classical writings of Al Maqarri.24 Dr. Chatty suggests a similar structure of tribal systems

as the following: the confederation, the tribe, the sub-tribe, lineage, and extended family. Both of

these sources complement each other.25 See figure below

Figure 1: Genealogy Model for Arab Tribes26

24 Al Maqarri: Vol. 4. Pg. 308.

25 Chatty, Dawn. 2010. Displacement and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East: 238

26 Abdullah, Dr. Moataz. n.d. "Degrees of Genealogy (Arabic)." Majmaah University.http://faculty.mu.edu.sa/mtabdullah/%D8%B7%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%A8; Azawi, 1964; Al-Maqarri; Varisco, 141-143; Chatty, Dawn. 2010. Displacement and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East: 238. This figure is a visual adaptation of the genealogical model for Arab tribes from the historic context I have designed from various descriptions of the genealogical strucutre from both modern and early sources.

21

To best apply a working model to classify levels of tribes, the following is a working description

of tribal structure in the Levant for the purpose of this paper.

Figure 2: Genealogy Model for Arab Tribes in the modern context

Chapter 3: Tribes in the Levant

Before the Sykes-Picot Treaty, the portion of the Levant known as Bilaad al Sham (or

Greater Syria) consisted of one territory that incorporated Jordan, Syria, Palestine, Israel,

Lebanon, and (sometimes included) Iraq. Outside of urban areas and major cities, the rural

country-side was dominated by tribes and tribal confederations. Nomadic tribes moved freely in

the territory without worry of national borders or restrictions until the region was divided

between colonial powers. While some nomads were given special access to move between

22

countries, many tribes were forced to settle. Despite new laws and borders, tribes continued to

enjoy large amounts of power in rural districts of their nation.

In Iraq, Sunni tribes played an important role in the containment and eventual defeat of

Al-Qaida in the Anbar region. Yet, many of these same tribes are responsible for aiding the

expansion of the so-called Islamic State into Iraq following the organization’s rapid conquest of

Iraq’s western border. In the aftermath of the U.S. War in Iraq, sectarianism drove the country

into violence and bloodshed. The post-war government of Nouri Al-Maliki institutionally

marginalized the Sunni tribes of Anbar. Eventually, sectarianism paralyzed the Iraqi

government’s ability to function thus further frustrating both Sunni and Shia tribes and aiding the

Islamic State’s swift entrance into western Iraq.

The ethnic construction of the Iraqi state contributes heavily to the sectarian-nature of the

country. The north is predominantly controlled by Kurdish tribes. The East and the Southeast are

predominantly controlled by Shia Arab tribes. The West (Anbar) is predominantly controlled by

Sunni tribes. In the northern province of Nineveh, the ethnic landscape is more diverse including

large populations of Christians (centered near Mosul) and Yazidis (centered in Sinjar). See

Figure 1 and Figure 2.

23

24

Figure 1: Distribution of Tribes in Iraq (Note: Map does not distinguish the religious/ethnic

identity of the tribes). 27

Figure 2: Ethnic Distribution of Iraqi Population28

27 Izady, Michael. 2016. "The Gulf/2000 project." Maps.http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/maps.shtml.

28 See note 24 above.

25

Syria, like Iraq, has consistently struggled with sectarianism along religious and ethnic

segments of society. Sunni Arabs who comprise the vast majority of the population have lived

under the Alawite-dominated government of the Assad family. The Alawites, a Shia minority

that is often characterized by differences in Islam practices from other Shi’a, have enjoyed strong

relations with Iran due to the perceived “commonalities” shared by the two religious groups.

Additionally, Syria is home to diverse minority populations of Arab Christians, Druze, Turkmen,

Ismailis, and Kurds. The Kurds settled on the Turkish border in the governorate of Hasakah and

northern areas of the Aleppo governorate. The Alawite populations are focused in the western

provinces of Latakia and Tartus with a considerable presence in Damascus. The Druze

population is focused predominantly in the Suwayyda Governorate bordering Jordan to the

South. The remaining areas of Syria are heavily Sunni Arab stretching from the Dara’a

Governorate across the Syrian desert into Dayr al-Zur (Der az-Zur), al-Raqqa, Aleppo, Idlib, and

into Hasakah. The vast religious and ethnic diversity has led to power struggles and territorial

issues among segments of society. See Figure 3.

26

Figure 3: The Ethnic Distribution of Syria29

Cross Border Tribes:

Tribes are often connected to a multinational family network with extensions across

neighboring borders. These tribes exist throughout the Levant. Two specific regions where cross-

border tribes play an important role in society in both the modern and historical context are in the

29 Izady

27

desert of eastern Syria-western Iraq and the northern Jordan-southern Syrian border. Both areas

historically have been dominated by nomadic Sunni tribes for centuries often as members of

larger tribal confederations.

Syria-Jordan

Areas in southern Syria (Quinetra, Dara’a, and Suweida) bordering Jordan are largely

settled by tribes with cross-border ties to branches in northern Jordan. The Dara’a governorate

lies a few kilometers from Jordan. The population is largely tribal with Christian, Druze, and

Shi’a minorities. The four major tribes that dominate the region are al-Zou`bi, al-Hariri, al-

Na`ime, and al-Rifa`i.30 Despite tribal competition, these tribes are reported to share grievances

against the Syrian Government because of marginalization and abuse especially leading up to

and after the Arab Spring.31

The major tribes of Dara’a enjoy strong ties with tribe branches in northern Jordan. These

relationships predate the Jordan-Syrian borders drawn under the Sykes-Picot Treaty of 1916.

While the families are separated by legal boundaries, there is still a deep, historical relationship

connecting the two regions. Many in the tribal branches in Jordan are a powerful political force

in the government ensuring that the relationship between Jordan and southern Syria remains

strong. Three prime ministers in Jordan, including the first Prime minister of Jordan who built

the first government with King Abdullah I, descend from the Al-Rifa’i family. The al-Zou`bi, al-

Hariri, al-Na`ime, and al-Rifa`i tribes extend throughout Jordan.32 These relationships have

30 Nicholas Heras. 2014. "A Profile of Syria's Stategic Dar'a Province." Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, June 30. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-profile-of-syrias-strategic-dara-province.

31 See note 27 above.

32 See note 27 above

28

ensured continuity in a variety of fields including economic partnerships, political relations, and

culture between Jordan and Syria.

The majority of the Syrian refugee population in Jordan are refugees originated from

Dara’a. According to the Jordanian Government, many of them fled to Jordan seeking shelter

with relatives. In the beginning of the crisis, Jordanian policy toward Syrian refugees reflected

this. Initially, Syrians were not given special recognition as refugees in Jordan until Jordan had

surpassed its capacity to host refugees without international assistance and camps. It was

decided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Jordanian Government

to build a refugee camp and begin registering those already living in the country.

Syria-Iraq

While the border that stretches the length of Syria and Iraq separates the two countries, it

has failed to sever the cross-border tribal confederations that have existed in the region for

hundreds of years. Larger tribes like the Dulaim and the Shammar have vast populations spread

between Syria and Iraq. The Dulaim tribe consists of nearly 1,000 different clans that are

majority Sunni with a few Shi’ite clans who converted in the last two hundred years.33 They are

currently the largest tribe in Iraq with a population of nearly 3,000,000 predominantly centered

in the Anbar region. The Shammar tribe is one of the larger and more powerful tribes in the

Levant with a population of 1.5 million. In Iraq, the majority of Shammar settled in urban areas

and major cities in the north including Mosul. In Syria, they are one of the dominant powers

represented in the “Arab Belt” that exists in Eastern Syria separating the Kurdish north from the

33 Yitzak Nakash. 1995. "The Shi'is of Iraq." Princeton University Press, 27

29

rest of the country. The Shammar network stretches from Iraq and Syria into Saudi Arabia and

Jordan.

These family linkages likewise exist between tribes in Eastern Syria and Iraq. Larger

tribes like the Anizah and the Shammar have ties across the Iraqi-Syrian border. The Shammar,

for example, extend from Anbar, Iraq and stretch into eastern Syria in the governorates bordering

Iraqi and south Syria’s Kurdish region. See figure 4 below.

Figure 4: Tribal Map of Syria34

Chapter 4: The Role of Tribes in Modern Conflict

34 Izady.

30

Bashir Abazid and Spray Painting: A Case Study of Tribal Mobilization, Collective Action,

Value-Added Theory, and Forced Migration

The Syrian Civil War finds its origin in the story of several school-age youth painting

graffiti expressing anti-Assad slogans on the wall of their school in late February. Bashar

Abazid, the youth accredited with actually painting the graffiti, and his friends were

subsequently arrested, beaten, and tortured for weeks. Within days of the arrests, protests were

held in the southern city of Dara’a demanding the release of the youth. The subsequent increase

in protests at the mistreatment of the youth by the Syrian security forces was met with violence

from the Assad regime after several protesters were killed by live ammunition fired at crowds of

protesters. A series of demands were made by protestors to be answered by March 25, 2011, the

planned national protest called the “Friday of Dignity.”35 This day, tens of people were killed in

protests held in Dara’a and across governorates in Syria. It was not long until the protests spread

to the majority of major cities around the country. Bashir Abazid and his family were forced to

flee to the Jordanian Governorate of Irbid (in the border village of Ramtha) close to the Syrian

border where they remained for several years as Syrian refugees.

Tribal mobilization in one of the key factors that plays an important role in movements in

the Middle East. In nations such as Iraq, Syria, and Jordan, tribes easily shift political power or

provide stability for current systems of government. The mobilization of tribes was a key factor

in the rise of Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, the resurgence of protests against the

35 Rania Abouzeid. 2011. "Syria's Friday of Dignity Becomes a Day of Death." Time.

March 25.

31

Iraqi Government over the marginalization of Sunni tribes in Anbar, and many other situations.

In the tribal structures, each collective member of the tribe is responsible for the other members.

In events where a tribe acts together, this group act is defined as “collective action”. The protests

in Dara’a are an example of tribal organization and mobilization. Haian Dukhan argues that the

beginning of the Syrian revolution is in fact the result of “collective action” at its inception, but

the Syrian Government’s aggressive response caused the shift from collective action to collective

violence. To defend his position, Dukhan applies Neil Smelser’s pillars of collective behavior to

the context of tribal involvement in the Dara’a protests. He concludes that the collective action

(he defines as “collective violence”) which developed as a response to the regime’s violent

tactics directly corresponds with the concept of “intiqaam” which means revenge from a factual

or perceived wronging of one’s kin.36

Dara’a is commonly known by many in the Middle East as a power center for Arab tribes

in Syria because of the numerous tribes with extensive family networks in the southern

governorates. A number of these tribes also have family and tribal extensions in areas of northern

Jordan. The consequences of the Syrian Civil War in Dara’a forced many from the governorate

to flee to Jordan as refugees.

The concept of intiqaam can be applied to the catalyst of the collective action, namely the

arrest and torture of Bashar Abazid and his fourteen friends. The Abazids are a sizable family

located in southern Syria specifically in Dara’a. Following the arrest and abuse of Bashir and the

other boys, the fathers of the detained youth met with Political Security Chief, Atef Najib, to

discuss the boys’ release. There are two accounts of the story, one propagated by the Syrian

Government and the other propagated by the protesters. According to the Government narrative,

36 Dukhan, 8

32

Najib invited the fathers to his office where He defended the legitimate detaining of the boys, but

admitted the possibility that some of the boys had been physically mistreated. According to the

second narrative, the fathers were insulted for their sons’ bad behavior and told to “forget their

sons, go home and make more sons with their wives.”37

It is difficult to determine which narrative is factual, but the point remains that the

Fathers did not receive their sons and felt deeply disrespected by the Syrian regime. The Abazid

family together with the other tribes began protesting. Demonstrations were held on a regular

basis protesting the detainment of the youth and demanding their release. Within a matter of two

weeks, a number of other members of the Abazid family (ages 17-30) were arrested for their

involvement in protests.38 The subsequent arrests of members in the same family in the same city

were not uncommon at the beginning of the Syrian protests. This phenomenon continued

throughout the first period of protests and demonstrations in attempts to quell further instigation

from the families of detainees and victims. Ultimately, this method would eventually have the

opposite of the intended effect as protests spread from Dara’a to Hama and Homs, two other

population centers where tribes have a significant presence. 39 On June 11, 2011, the tribes across

Syria mobilized for the “Friday of the Tribes” protests that ended in the deaths of protesters

across the country.40 As a response to the consistent violence from the Syrian Regime, tribal

37 Charles R. Lister. 2015. The Syrian Jihad: Al-Qaeda, The Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency. Oxford University Press, 17

38 The Free Syria (Arabic). 2011. "Victims." The Free Syria Web Site. March 25. Accessed October 2015. http://www.thefreesyria.org/f-s-1/kadaia-27032011.htm.

39 Dawn Chatty. 2013. "Syria's Bedouin Enter the Fray: How Tribes Could Keep Syria Together." Foreign Affairs Online. November 13. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2013-11-13/syrias-bedouin-enter-fray.

40 Carole A. O'Leary and Nicholas Heras. 2012. "Syrian Tribal Networks and their Implications for the Syrian Uprising." Terrorism Monitor Volume: 10 Issue: 11. http://www.jamestown.org.

33

collective action evolved into collective violence. After several months, the tribes had inspired a

revolution against the Assad Regime and encouraged the vast majority of Syrians join.

Tribes and tribal members particularly in southern Syria are connected to larger family

networks with extensions across the Jordanian border. These relationships are best seen in those

between Sunni tribes in southern Syria-northern Jordan (Na’ima, and Sunni tribes in eastern

Syria and western Iraq (Shammar/Dulaim tribes). In 2012, the tribal heads of major multi-

national tribes and tribal confederations (including the Shammar) met in northern Jordan in

Mafraq (the current location of the Za’atari refugee camp). At this meeting, tribal leaders

reaffirmed that the Syrian uprising originated from the tribes. Therefore, they demanded a larger

representation and role in the Syrian National Coalition.41

The majority of the Syrian refugee population in Jordan are refugees are Dara’a. Initially,

Syrians were not considered refugees until Jordan had reached a breaking point economically. It

was decided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Jordanian

Government to build a refugee camp and begin registering those already living in the country. In

the case of Bashir Abazid, he and his family fled to the Jordanian Governorate of Irbid (in the

border village of Ramtha) close to the Syrian border. Just a short distance from the Syrian

border, Irbid is home to a number of Jordanian families from the Abazid family including the

Mayor of Irbid, Khaled Abazid. It is more reasonable for tribal populations to flee to a

destination with a similar culture and dialect where they have extended family.

Chapter 5: Building a Case for Identity: Tribalism and the State

41 Dukhan, 12; O’Leary and Heras.

34

Building a Case for Tribal Identity: Levant Tribes 18th and 19th Centuries

For tribes living under the Ottoman Empire, freedom of mobility and migration defined

their identity and reinforced the importance of nomadism in tribal identity. For centuries, the

borders of the Ottoman Empire extended from Iran stretching west into North Africa

encompassing thousands of tribes, ethnicities, and sects. Nearing the end of the Ottoman Empire,

Ottoman control of the empire’s periphery began to slip. Finding it difficult to balance war with

Russia and Egypt in addition to the daily bureaucratic operations of such a large territory, many

tribes asserted power and authority over swaths of territory through the empire. In attempts to

maintain stability and power in these areas, Ottoman officials placed specific emphasis on

managing relations with these tribes. Paralleling this, previous attempts to produce a sedentary

society within many areas of the Ottoman Empire during this time period had failed. Instead, the

trend shifted toward the opposite end of the scale, a number of societies within the Ottoman

Empire that moved toward nomadism (Kasaba, pp. 86).42 This led to the expansion of power and

influence of the tribes. Resat Hasaba suggests that the degree of power obtained by tribes led

some tribes to behave as if they seceded from the empire. 43As the center weakened, tribes

became a dominating force in rural Anatolia and the Levant. Their identity as nomads created an

“air of haughty pride which seems to be meant to assert that a nomadic life gives to them an

immeasurable superiority over all strangers, cottagers, or tillers of the soil.”44 Tribes of modern

influence in the Levant including the Albu-Hamed and the Shammar were cited in an Ottoman

report drafted by representatives of the Empire stealing weapons and livestock during a series of

42 Resat, 86

43 See note 38 above.44 Kasaba, 89

35

raids on villages near Mosul. Ottoman attempts to solidify control of these tribes were

accomplished through leveraging certain tribes against others, a tactic which is still used to

control tribes in the modern states. However, the preservation of tribal identity and practice

persisted despite constant attempts to undermine tribal social cohesion. A major part of this

identity is grounded in nomadism, more specifically in freedom of movement.

Building a Case for Tribal Identity: Levant Tribes in the 20th Centuries

Tribal mobility persisted as an important privilege of Arab tribes in the Levant into the

twentieth century. The fall of the Ottoman Empire inspired many tribal leaders to support the

establishment of an Arab independent state encompassing the various territories within modern

Syria led by Faisal of the Hashemite family (the first King of Iraq).45 However, this Kingdom

was undermined with the Sykes-Picot Agreement that instead carved up the desert in the Levant

between Trans-Jordan, Syria, and Iraq placing it under British control and French control. Larger

tribes including the Anizah and the Shammar that traveled the vast deserts were cut off from

branches across the newly-drawn borders and were forced into a transnational status. Sykes-Picot

was the first major blow to the tribal dominance in the Levant in the twentieth century.

Under the French mandate, Bedouin were granted special status and maintained relative

freedom of mobility. Some tribes were separated into two categories: nomadic and semi-

nomadic. Those considered nomadic were given a greater degree of privilege by the French

Mandate authority because of their perceived nobility and support of the French authorities

against the agricultural tribes.46 The end of the French Mandate period over the Syrian territories

45 Dawn Chatty. 2013. "Syrian Tribes, national politics, and the uprising." DebatingDevelopment, University of Oxford. September 12. http://blog.qeh.ox.ac.uk/?p=441.

46 See note 43 above.

36

ended in 1946 and Syria received independence. Shortly after, members of the Syrian

nationalization movement seized control of the government leading to a desire to enforce a new

national “Syrian” identity. From 1946 to 1958, the privilege and military power of the tribes in

the country began to deteriorate as did the tribes’ relationship with the central Syrian state. Seen

as threats to nationalism, tribes fell victim to state policies that threatened their livelihoods.

These policies while aimed at educating the tribes and integrating them into Syrian society

attempted to restrict their mobility and force them to settle. This was an attempt to undermine a

key part of tribal identity, nomadism, with nationalism. The final blow to tribal privilege and

power came with President Shukri al-Kuwatli’s and Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s

creation of the United Arab Republic, a merging of Egypt and Syria into one state, on February

1, 1958. The Arab nationalist movement that united Egypt and Syria brought into question the

special legal privileges granted to the Syrian Bedouin. On September 28, 1958, the President of

Syria repealed the Law of the Tribes and proclaimed that henceforth tribes would cease to

possess any separate legal identity.47 This act effectively removed any legal privileges and

protection from the tribes. In response, many tribal leaders and Sheikhs fled Syria.

The rise of Hafez al Assad following the 1970 Syrian coup reintroduced tribes into the

political realm. Seeking to broaden support for the new regime, Assad invited sheikhs and tribal

leaders to return to Syria promising improved relations and greater autonomy in legal and

cultural traditions. His reforms restored privileges previously denied to the tribes following the

removal of the Law of the Tribes in 1958. These reforms were aimed at propping up new tribal

powers allied to the state in east Syria.48

47 See note 43 above48 See note 43 above.

37

Before the British control of Transjordan in 1921, Transjordan was largely populated by

nomadic tribes who enjoyed freedom of mobility. During the Ottoman period, this area

maintained a large degree of autonomy until the Sykes-Picot Agreement. The establishment of

the Protectorate of Transjordan effectively brought over 100,000 nomadic (nearly half of the

territory’s population) Bedouin under the administration of the British Government who would

install the Hashemite family as the overseers of the territory. Two major challenges (among

numerous others) to developing the protectorate were (1) transitioning nomadic tribes from self-

sufficiency to dependence upon the state and (2) integrating the tribal identity with a national

identity. Unlike the Syrian nationalists, the Transjordan government built a holistic governance

structure that heavily encouraged the involvement of the tribes in the public sector and military.

A major component of this project involved shifting tribal allegiances away from the tribe by

replacing the object of the tribe’s allegiance with the military and public sector institutions

(government, police, intelligence, and more) which would transition allegiances to the state.49 In

the years following Jordan’s independence in 1946 and redefinition in 1949, the Kingdom

continued to make necessary changes to the various legal and social systems governing the

Bedouin tribes as needed with relative stability. Following various large-scale Palestinian

refugee migrations to Jordan, the Kingdom faced a new issue within its society: the struggle

between national identity, sect identity, and tribal identity. While all are considered “Arab”,

Jordan now consisted of a tribal Jordanian population (often self-referred as “pure Jordanians”),

a Palestinian refugee population, a Jordanian-Palestinian mixed population, a Christian Jordanian

population, and Christian Palestinian population. Following Black September in 1970, the

national identity of Jordanians was called into question. Millions of Palestinians were granted

49 Massad, Joseph. 2001. Colonial Efects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan.New York: Columbia University Press: 58-59

38

Jordanian citizenship further blurring the definition of what constituted a “Jordanian.”50 This

presented a particular challenge to the Jordanian tribes who were the nation’s first citizens and

enjoyed a large degree of political, social, and legal privilege. Instead of policies aimed at

deconstructing tribal privilege implemented in Syria, the government called for a convention to

discuss an “extra-judicial understanding between the county’s tribes and the palace.”51 This

convention was held by the state and attended by both officials of the state (Muhammad Hashim,

the King’s advisor on tribal matters, the Jordanian Armed Forced General Habis al-Majali, the

interior minister, Ahmad Tarawneh, the head of Jordan’s police, and the governors of all of the

governorates) and all tribal leaders and prominent tribal personalities who were knowledgeable

of tribal laws and practices.52 One of the main purposes of this understanding was to absorb the

tribal legal structure into the broader state legal structure. For example, members of tribes who

serve in the police and military are exempt from tribal law in situations where they are accused

of acting against the tribe. This is exemplified in times of national defense or civil protection

where actions against a tribe member might be necessary. These changes were a governmental

effort to extend a greater degree of legal control over the Jordanian tribes while maintaining the

perception that tribes were free to practice their traditions. These changes in the lives of

Bedouins were taking place in the realm of law at the same time as state development planners

were excising sedentarization schemes to end the nomadic lifestyle of the Bedouins.53

50 Massad, 55-59 51 Massad, 61

52 See note 46 above.53 Massad, 62

39

In the 1970 and 1971, the Kingdom of Jordan carried out two major military campaigns

inside her own borders against Palestinian Nationalists rebelling against the government. As the

cornerstone of the military, tribesmen fighting in the Jordan Armed Forces went to war against

Palestinians in their own country. This situation exposed a frustration among the tribes who

resented the government for being “used by the government when it was in danger and ignored

by it when it felt safe.”54

This resentment reflects a foundational struggle of the Jordanian tribes namely

determining social identity. Which identity is more important: national identity or tribal identity?

In the Jordan context, both can be argued depending on the context. I argue that the presence of

the struggle nearly eighty years after the country’s founding is evidence of the fundamental

importance of tribal identity to those in the tribal system. The consistent attempts of states to

deconstruct tribal identity have ultimately failed in the MENA region because of the deeply

rooted religious, historic, and cultural significance of the tribes.

In both Jordan and Syria, the systematic sedentarization of tribes became a trend during

the early to mid-twentieth century. The process effectively began with targeting the freedom of

mobility within the Sykes-Picot borders. By restricting the movement of tribes, the states

targeted a foundation of Arab tribal identity in the twentieth century, nomadism. Nomadism in

tribal identity, as previously described by Kasaba, when restricted threatens the structure of

tribalism as a whole and causes the social institution to fracture. Ibn Khaldun’s framework in his

work Muqadima analyzing the rise and fall of civilizations depends heavily on the historic

significance of tribes in the region. In this framework, a tribe, bound together by lineage and

social solidarity (asabiya), invades and conquers a sedentary community. The tribe transitions

54 Massad, 66

40

from nomadic substance to sedentary lifestyle. Eventually, the sedentary tribe becomes the target

of a different tribal conquest and are then conquered or forced to flee.55 The systematic

sedentarization of the tribes in the modern context has no doubt played an important role in

destroying social cohesion and tribal solidarity by forcing the tribe to settle. However, in Syria,

this process created animosity between the tribes and the state. Even with the change in political

tactics by Hafiz al Assad who sought to integrate some tribes into the state system in order to

solidify his power, the marginalization of tribes persists until the present day. This neglecting of

tribes heavily contributed to the tribal involvement in the Syria Revolution following the Arab

Spring in 2011. In Jordan, the integration of tribes with the state was implemented carefully in

order to shift the allegiances of the tribes from the tribe to the Jordanian monarchy. This

Kingdom was largely successful in restricting cross-border migration of Bedouin while

encouraging internal migration of Bedouin. In this approach to integration, Jordanian tribes were

granted a degree of freedom (or perceived freedom) to practice their traditions and even

nomadism (particularly in southern Jordan) while still under direct control of the monarchy. The

end result is an integrated identity that balances a support for state, tribe, and monarchy. While

this does not remove the threat of tribal resurgence in Jordan, it does provide a mechanism to

minimize and mediate between the tribes and the government as necessary, thereby preserving

their tribal identity.

Building a Case for Tribal Identity: Levant Tribes in the 21st Centuries

While the twentieth century saw the systematic oppression of tribes and the tribal system

throughout the region, the numerous conflicts that erupted in roughly the first decade of the

twenty-first century have largely affected and employed the tribes as active participants in both

55 Khaldun

41

violent conflict and peace negotiations. This resurgence of tribal involvement in the Syrian and

Iraqi conflicts reflects the failure of the states to undermine tribal identity among tribal

communities. Without weakening centers of power in both countries, the loyalty of the tribes is

often “for sale” for non-state actors who are perceived as “defenders” of tribal customs.

The 2003 Iraq War exposed sectarian tensions that, until this time, remained slightly

under the surface during the regime of Saddam Hussein. These tensions existed along lines of

multilayered social identity: tribal identity, sect identity, and ethnic identity. The three major

populations in Iraq are Sunni Arab, Shi’a Arab, and Sunni Kurdish. All three are largely

organized by tribe, religious sect, and ethnicity. Each collective group consists of thousands of

smaller tribes and clans who act often as a collective through tribal confederations, political

parties, and ethnic solidarity (in the case of the Kurds). Initially, many governmental actors in the

Iraqi conflict recognized the value of tribal allegiance in winning the war. The United States

employed a coalition of Sunni tribes known as the Anbar Awakening (Sahwat al Anbar) to

combat the Sunni-insurgency and the growing threat of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). However, in a

contrasting role, tribes aided in the growth and expansion of non-state actors and multinational

non-state actors. Larger Sunni tribes like the Shammar and Dulaim, granted governmental

sponsorship under Saddam Hussein’s regime, were accused of joining in the Sunni insurgency

that lasted for several years from 2004-2006. Shi’a tribes, like the Shammar and Dulaim, joined

growing resistance movements against the Coalition forces and the Sunni insurgents. Today, the

Iraqi Government led by President Haider al-Abadi is dominated by the Shi’a and is largely

supported by Shi’a tribes in southern Iraq. Even, the so-called “Islamic State” recognized the

importance of tribal allegiance making it a priority as they expand. By exploiting Sunni tribes’

frustrations with the Iraqi Government following a systematic marginalization of Sunnis in the

42

government, ISIS won a strategic victory aiding its rapid expansion through Iraq. ISIS

successfully convinced tribal sheikhs that their Sunni identity and freedoms of tradition would be

preserved if they assisted the group’s sovereignty. The United States military, likewise,

successfully mobilized a number of Sunni tribes by reaffirming each of their identities: as Arabs,

as Sunnis, and as tribes.

Tribal Identity in the Arab Spring

The Arab Spring presented a critical opportunity for Arab tribes to re-emerge amidst the

political chaos of the region and reclaim their identity as a collective. In Jordan, the tribes joined

thousands of Palestinian-Jordanians in the streets of Jordan to protest the legitimacy of the

government after the government failed to appease their demands. In Syria, the Assad regime’s

paranoia led to a national suppression of communities suspected by the government of

perpetuating his toppling including the Arab tribes. This crackdown induced a tribal reemergence

into the national spotlight and pushed the country into a civil war. The Syrian response to tribes

in the wake of the Arab Spring differed strongly from the Jordanian response. The Syrian

Government’s paranoia provoked a violent response with heavy consequences. Meanwhile, the

Jordanian response of isolating the tribes to keep them out of the protests, while criticized by

many, provoked the tribes to do the opposite. The difference between the two responses is

Jordan’s recognition and understanding of tribal identity.

The rapid expansion of tribal influence in the Syrian revolution is evidence of the

resurgence of tribal identity within tribal societies as an attempt by tribes to recapture their

previous status and identity. The Arab Spring in 2011 created a regional feeling of uncertainty

for the Syrian regime whose policies reflected their growing suspicion of the revolutionary

43

movement. This suspicion was largely directed toward the Sunni tribal populations of southern

Syria as seen in the Bashar Abazid example. The Syrian government’s consistent mistreatment of

the tribes for nearly a century fostered deep animosity and mistrust among Sunni tribes for the

Syrian state. Gradually, the tribes were joined by the Muslim Brotherhood and various segments

of society in protest of the Assad government. The violence spiraled into a full-blown civil war.

Tribes organized into paramilitary fighting groups comprised of members of specific tribes.

Tribes soon reemerged as powerful actors in the Syrian civil war.

The Assad regime’s violent response to the Syrian tribal uprisings is reflective of their

prominent framework for dealing with tribes. As Syria transitioned into a nationalist country,

tribalism was perceived as a hindrance to the development of the state and a threat to

nationalism. This response framework has been rooted in the Syrian Government since the rise

of the Syrian nationalist movement in 1946. Through the Arab nationalist movement, there were

systematic attempts to settle the tribes and force a nationalist identity upon them. In the wake of

the Syria civil war, Syrian nationalism was brought into question. Two major ideas of Syrian

nationalism were held by the majority of Syrians: (1) Syrian nationalism is rooted in your love

and support for the Syrian regime and 2) Syrian nationalism is rooted in love and support for the

Syrian people who have been wronged by the Syrian regime. The Sunni tribes fell into the

second category; however, some tribes who benefited from the regime’s patronage remained

loyal to Assad. It is important to note that the tribes who fall into the second category maintain

their tribal identity without threatening their role in the revolution. As opposed to Iraq where

identity is multilayered by ethnicity, sect, and tribe, the government of Syria, a nation with an

ethnic diversity similar to Iraq, vilified any identity other than “Syrian.” Yet, in this structure,

tribes were disparaged by the Syrian regime who, in contradiction to this idea, identified as both

44

Syrian and Alawite. In fact, the Alawite identity granted a greater degree of social and legal

privilege. Despite this system of tribal suppression, tribal identity continued to flourish in Syrian

society. The preservation of tribal identity despite persecution was a major catalyst for a rapid

emergence of tribalism in Syria.

The Kingdom of Jordan withstood two years of protests in the wake of the Arab Spring

disproving the predictions of many that Jordan would be the next to fall. During previous

conflicts and moments of instability in the tenure of the monarchy, the Jordanian tribes played an

integral role in the nation’s stability and the stability of monarchy. Following the success of the

Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt, the Jordanian monarchy attempted to isolate tribal youth from

involvement in the protests in order to discourage tribal participation in the movement. However,

this policy failed. The Hirak movement of Jordan, a political movement consisting of forty tribal

youth activist groups originating in rural Jordan, spread across the country. Emerging as a

powerful political entity in Jordan, the movement surprised observers and analysts alike. Middle

East analyst Sean Yom, in his description of the movement, comments:

“Rarely had so many tribal Jordanians in so many different localities pushed for

democratic change through nonviolent protests that defied both state repression and communal

pressures. In doing so, they exposed the changing politics of an East Bank tribal populace long

described metaphorically as the monarchy’s “bedrock.” Western analysts frequently inquire as

to whether this bedrock has cracks, but this is the wrong metaphor: more accurately, the tribal

layers comprising the regime’s social foundation are tectonically drifting, with enormous

consequences for order and stability.”56

56 Sean Yom. Tribal Politics in Contemporary Jordan: The Case of the Hirak Movement. Retrieved from the Middle East Journal. Volume 68, No. 2, Spring 2004. Accessed 14, July, 2016.

45

The surprising impact of the Hirak movement in Jordan and the tribal movements in

Syria are linked to a resurgence in tribal identity out of response to state suppression of the tribal

community. Syria’s attempts to forcefully assimilate tribes while simultaneously extinguishing

their tribal identity ultimately met with failure. On the other hand, Jordan’s relationship with the

tribes fostered both tribal identity and national identity among the tribes.

The Hirak movement and tribal movements of Syria highlight a foundational question for

tribalism in the contemporary Middle East as previously addressed: Which identity takes

precedence: tribal identity or national identity? Consistent historic examples of tribal

relationships with the state from the late ottoman period until the modern context insist that tribal

identity is stronger than national identity. However, there is a dichotomy between the two that

persists even now. The idea that tribes are an institution of a nation-state (as in Jordan)

contradicts a founding characteristic of the nation-state, a singular autonomous government

overseeing the state. As Dr. Kristen Kao comments on this relationship, “The modern nation-

state demands that there be only one centralized governing power with a monopoly on the

legitimate use of force. Yet, tribes expect to be at least partially autonomous.”57 Despite this

contradiction, tribes in Jordan have maintained a large degree of legal autonomy and social

autonomy that has been granted by the monarchy for decades. This is reflected in the identity of

the Jordanian tribes who claim both national identity and tribal identity. Neither supersedes the

other. Rather, identity is prioritized from context to context creating a layered identity where

tribes define themselves by nationality, tribal identity, and sectarian identity. Different identities

57 Kristen Kao. 2015. "Do Jordan’s tribes challenge or strengthen the state?" RethinkingNation and Nationalism Memos. The Washington Post, May 8. https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/05/28/do-jordans-tribes-challenge-or-strengthen-the-state/.

46

can be mobilized when it supports a specific need. Sunni Tribes in Iraq present a strong example

of layered identities as national identity was prioritized during the initial U.S. invasion in 2003.

However, the sectarian breakdown of the country and the ensuing Sunni insurgency led to a

reorganization of identity where tribes prioritized sectarian and tribal identity over national

identity. A major moment of identity reorganization happens during times of great distress. The

death of Muath Al-Kasasbeh, a Jordanian pilot murdered by the so-called Islamic State, was a

moment of national tragedy for the Kingdom of Jordan. Many in Muath’s tribe, the Al-Kasabeh

family, and the tribe of his wife, Al Tarawneh, prioritized national identity as Jordanians and

expressed that Muath’s death was an attack on Jordan. The hashtag “We are all Muath” trended

shortly following the attack in Jordan. Also, the arrests of Bashar Abazed and fourteen other

youth in Dara’a by the Syrian regime were perceived as a tribal tragedy where tribal identity was

prioritized over national identity or sectarian identity.

In this framework, tribal identity in the Syria Spring and Jordan Spring was a peculiar

blending of both tribal and national identity. In both contexts, tribes became a powerful political

force and advocate for pro-democratic and political reform. The Hirak movement resulted from

grassroots organizing of tribal youth (tribal identity) to advocate for reforms alongside other

youth and Islamic movements that would benefit the nation as a whole. In Syria, tribes organized

together against the Syrian regime and partnered with a broad range of groups from religious

organizations to nationalist youth movements. The Free Syrian Army (FSA), born from these

partnerships, was a cross-section of all three identities. In both contexts, tribes acted in the

interests of the national population because it conformed to their tribal interests.

Chapter 7: Tribal Identity and Forced Migration

47

Not present in the modern discourse on forced migration is the impact of the tribal

identity on forced migration. There are various perspectives that seek to define the motivations

for migration forming over the last century. These neoclassical theories of migration and social

movement perceive motivation for migration as an outcome of cost/benefit analysis.58 Arguably,

it is difficult to apply these theories to the modern refugee context in Syria where displacement

and deprivation occur rapidly providing little time to process motivations covered in these

theories. Instead, victims of displacement are forced to evaluate the destination as opposed to the

reason for movement. Furthermore, collective movement has been observed as a major trend in

modern movement of victims of forced migration. Due to the immediate displacement of

millions over the six-year conflict in Syria, the world witnessed a collective movement of

internally displaced (IDP) Syrians and Syrian refugees. This trend can be observed during the

late Ottoman era as well where there was vast displacement throughout the fringes of the

Ottoman Empire which led to large migrations of minorities into the contemporary Levant. One

of these groups, the Circassians, a tribal population displaced from the Caucasus, collectively

migrated from Circassia to Anatolia with many reaching as far south as Jordan and Palestine.

The Circassian tribes presented a threat to Ottoman Empire because of their deep loyalty to their

own tribes and the tribal sheikhs.59 This was dealt with by strategically separating large tribes

and resettling them in various areas of the Levant separate from tribal leadership. This served

two goals for the Ottomans. Firstly, it attempted to eliminate the opportunity for the

reorganization of Circassian tribes. Secondly, the Circassian communities were used by the

58 Zaloznaya, Marina, and Theodore P. Gerber. 2012. "Migration as Social Movement: Voluntary Group Migration and the Crimean Tatar Repatriation." Population and Development Review, June: 259-284.

59 Kasaba, 118; Chatty, Displacement and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East. 104-105

48

Ottoman Empire to sustain sovereignty in rural areas outside the traditional reach of the empire

employing Circassian families as mediators, military personnel, and provincial officials.

The centrality of tribal identity was not lost amongst displacement and Ottoman attempts

to settle, nationalize, and assimilate the Circassian populations. For both the Cirssanian tribes

and modern displaced Syrian tribal populations, tribal identity plays a critical role in determining

the destination of migration. In displacement, social identity and collective behavior are of the

utmost importance as survival is dependent upon communal self-reliance. Syrian tribal

populations displaced by the Syrian conflict currently face a similar situation that the Circassian

tribes who were displaced following the Russian conquest of the Caucasus region faced. In the

end of the Circassian migration to the Levant, tribes remained together. They migrated

collectively, settled collectively, and survived collectively. Tribal solidarity persisted in the midst

of desperate conditions.

Fighting in the Syrian conflict has left millions displaced and forced millions to flee the

country as refugees. The tribal populations in southern Syria were largely scattered following the

violent battles that raged in both the urban areas and rural villages. A large percentage of the

Syrian tribal populations fled to Jordan. The expansion of multinational non-state actors in the

conflict since 2014 (Al-Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State) has further displaced refugees

living in the eastern Syria. Many fled across the Syrian-Iraqi border where they settled with Iraqi

relatives.60 While the Iraqi Government struggled to deal with the influx of Syrians entering the

country, an agreement was made that allowed members of tribes to sponsor relatives from Syria

who entered as refugees. In an interview with a Sheikh from the Jabbour tribe before the

60 Dukhan, 17-18

49

expansion of ISIS in 2014, Haian Dukhan, quotes the Sheikh stating, “The tribes in Iraq and

Syria are the same but the political borders have divided us. Each family in Syria has uncles,

aunts and cousins in Iraq.”61 This relationship is critical in establishing a motivation for Syrians

to flee to Iraq as opposed to other options of refugees including Kurdish-held Hasakah

Governorate in northern Syria.

In Jordan, the cross-border tribal connections established a logical destination for

refugees fleeing Syria. At the beginning of the conflict, Jordan’s policy toward Syrians reflected

this relationship with southern Syrian tribes. 62 It was initially agreed that Syrians entering Jordan

as refugees would not receive special refugee status due to the assumption that Syrians would

settle with their relatives. However, when it became increasingly evident that the conflict would

become protracted, Jordan shifted its policy on Syrians. Firstly, the northern border with Dara’a

governorate was closed. Secondly, refugee camps were built and rapidly expanded to provide

shelter for the thousands of refugees entering the country per day. Lastly, Jordan began a

national process of registering Syrians in the country. Since this policy transition, tribes in Jordan

have enjoyed wasta (privileged connections) in regards to the retrieval of Syrian family members

who are granted refugee status in Jordan. In a conversation with a lawyer and grandson of a

prominent tribal sheikh in southern Jordan, he explains the informal process by which his tribe is

able to extract Syrian family members who are forced into refugee camps and national refugee

system. He continued explaining how the ibn al-‘ashira (trans. sons of the tribe) used the system

61 Dukhan, 1862 Ensour, PM Abdullah. 2015. "Opening Speech for Refugees, Security, and Sustainable

Development in the Middle East: The Need for North-South Dialogue." Amman, March 25. Prime Minister Ensour opened this conference with a speech that addressed Jordan’s initial policy toward Syrians fleeing the war. In this address, he stated that this policy took into account the vast family ties between southern Syria and Jordan.

50

of wasta to enter into the heavily secured refugee camps and brought the family member back to

the tribe’s home in southern Jordan. This process brings to light an important factor that

motivates Syrians to seek refuge in Jordan, namely privilege by blood. While the emergence of

this system is largely hidden from the international governing bodies of the humanitarian

community, it is well-known among many in the host-community. Arguably, for its continuation,

it is necessary that it remains “below the surface.”

Conclusion

Arab tribes are a fluid concept that is defined and redefined over the course of time. The

earliest tribes, the Qahtani and the Adnani, served as the mythic parents to the thousands of Arab

tribes who trace their ancestry to these two. While it is difficult for factual genealogical pairings

to be confirmed between tribe, this mythic connection between the modern tribe and their early

ancestors whether the earliest tribes or those who “rode with the Prophet” (as many state)

strengthens the importance of the tribe in society.

The integration of Islam with Arab tribes created a religious solidarity between the early

followers of the Prophet Mohammed. His direct connection to a prominent Arab tribe and

lineage became the singular most important claim of the Prophet that He was the last prophet

chosen by Allah. This claim was substantiated through the creation of a tribal model by which

scholars could show Mohammed’s direct relationship to Ishmael, the son of Abraham. This

structure was adopted by many tribes who used lineage to gain political privilege and authority.

Many ruling families in the Middle East including the Hashemites of Jordan and Saud family of

Saudi Arabia reinforced their claims to authority through this genealogical structure.

51

The historic and religious significance placed upon Arab tribes has firmly cemented the

“tribe” as a dominant social institution in the Levant. Similar to the days of Ibn Khaldun, the

concept of social cohesion (assabiya) continues to play an active role in Arab tribal society. This

is manifested in the actions of the tribe as a collective whether it is celebrations, religious

practice (religious identity is carried from generation to generation), or even conflict.

Tribal identity has persevered despite systematic attempts to settle, integrate and

nationalize tribal populations from the eighteenth century until the present. The modernization of

the Middle East that accompanied the late Ottoman period into the colonial era failed to

destabilize the tribal system in the Levant. In some situations, tribalism reemerged and

flourished. In the Khaldunian perspective, tribes are strongest when the center is weakest, and

tribes are weakest when the center is strongest. This theory explains how tribal relations with the

Syrian state deteriorated while tribal relations with the Jordan monarchy flourished.

In the final years of the Ottoman Empire, a systematic centralization of power following

the loss of territories on the far-reaches of the empire forced the Ottoman Empire to rely on

tribes to assist in maintaining order. Tribes exploited the weakening center and expanded their

influence and power over large territories in the Levant. The fall of the Ottoman Empire

presented the opportunity for powerful tribal leaders to mobilize in support of an independent

Arab state led by King Faisal, the Hashemite. However, the tribes supporting the new Syrian

state were forced to defend their claim against the French colonial forces who quickly seized

control of the country. This defeat weakened the influence of the tribes and strengthened the

French Mandate authority over Syria. In efforts to establish a governing system that did not

marginalize the tribes, the French integrated many prominent tribes into the system of

52

governance and granted them special legal and political privileges. This lasted for nearly thirty

years. Syrian tribes soon faced a new challenge following Syrian independence, a strong national

center that perceived the tribes as a threat to the new state. Through a systematic process, tribal

influence was weakened substantially through reforms aimed at stripping tribes of special

identities and privileges. Tribal identity, though weakened, persevered. In 1970, Hafez al-Assad

rose to power after toppling a weakening government. In order to strengthen support for his

authority, he extended an olive branch to the tribes offering a greater degree of privilege and

freedom in exchange for support. Again, tribes reemerged as a powerful entity in Syria. This

time, though, the most powerful were allied to the Assad regime. When the Assad family’s

control of the government was at its strongest, they effectively controlled the tribal populations

by propping up certain tribes to control the others. This state control of the tribes, while it

benefited some, marginalized large numbers of tribes in Syria. Following the death of Hafez al

Assad in 2000, the Assad regime began to weaken until the Arab Spring began in 2011. The

Syrian uprisings in 2011 challenged the Syrian government and exposed the regime’s weakening

condition. The government’s violent responses to peaceful protests provided a critical

opportunity for Arab tribes to reemerge as a powerful actor in Syria. The case of Bashar Abazid,

the boy arrested for anti-regime graffiti sparked collective violence among a tribal population

that experienced systematic marginalization for decades. The result of a fractured tribal

relationship with the Syrian government was tribal uprisings that spiraled into a civil war.

In times of conflict and unrest, Arab tribes act as a collective exemplified through tribal

revenge (intiqaam) during the early uprisings of the Syrian conflict. Despite the redefining of the

“tribe” over the centuries, the behavior of tribes is largely consistent throughout the Levant. In

Iraq and Syria, tribes play a critical role in both avoiding conflict and fueling it. The colonial

53

period failed to sever the relationships of many tribes in the Levant especially those previously

spread through the deserts of Jordan, Iraq, and Syria. However, it created a complex system of

cross-border and multinational tribal networks whose actions are typically driven by their tribal

identity as opposed to their national identity.

From the onset of the Jordanian state, tribal identity was considered during the

organization of the governance structure. The British authorities overseeing the protectorate of

Transjordan took advantage of the strength of the tribal populations and immediately integrated

them into the new state. The British propped up the Hashemite family as the rulers of

Transjordan. This monarchy sought not just to integrate, but establish the country with tribes as a

cornerstone. This was first accomplished through an early policy aimed at transitioning the tribes

into military and public service in order to transition tribal allegiance to state allegiance. This

successfully transitioned tribes from self-reliance to state-reliance effectively creating a layered

identity among Jordanians where tribal identity and national identity coexisted. As opposed to

the Syrian-Tribe relationship, the tribes formed the foundation of support for the monarchy. The

Jordanian approach to tribes encouraged both the continuity of tribal identity and the absolute

necessity of national identity. This relationship has been challenged on numerous occasions (the

Palestinian migrations from 1948, 1967, and 1973; Black September, and the PLO resistance

movements); however, the greatest challenge to the tribal-monarchy relationship began during

the Arab Spring in 2011. Like Syria, Jordan faced the resurgence of tribal identity in 2011. The

monarchy sought to discourage tribal youth from involvement in the Arab Spring; however, they

failed. A national movement driven by tribal youth developed into one of the nation’s newest

political entities with far reaching support. Today, this movement has continued to push to

democracy and political reform in Jordan through peaceful means. Additionally, it has not called

54

for the removal of the monarchy. Because of layering of identity for Jordanian tribes, tribal

relations with the Jordanian monarchy have created an environment of mutual interest and

mutual dependency where one relies on the other for stability.

The perseverance of tribal identity has impacted many layers of Arab society.

It remains the foundation of tribal solidarity in the Levant. This is the key to understanding the

role of tribal identity in contexts of forced migration. By applying Khaldun’s theory of assabiya

to situations of rapid displacement, I find that tribal identity is a factor determining where

victims of displacement choose to settle becomes one of significant value. Dukhan’s research in

Iraq showed how Syrian refugees fled across the Iraq border to find refuge with their kin in

Anbar, Iraq. The tribal system in Jordan provides a similar opportunity for the vast number of

refugees from the Dara’a Governorate. Jordan’s policy reflected this kin relationship between

Jordanian tribes and Syrian tribes until conditions forced it to change. While this theory is in its

infancy, it is clear that tribal identity has played a role in refugee’s motivations for choosing a

destination of flight.

Tribes, often seen as a backward, outdated system in need of change, are one of the least

understood social institutions in the Levant despite their prominence in the region. Yet, the West

has attempted to use tribes in both exacerbating conflict and conflict resolution. In the present

Syrian conflict, any agreements between warring groups inside Syria ranging from ceasefires to a

hostage release are often brokered by tribes. As the world struggles to find a solution to conflicts

in the region, the tribes seem to be a good place to start. As the humanitarian community shifts

its policy planning to long-term sustainable options for Syrian refugees, the tribes could play a

key role in relieving pressure from host-governments and the international community by

55

providing shelter and opportunity for their fellow tribe members currently struggling in urban

communities and refugee camps. Tribalism in the MENA region presents a very unique research

opportunity that until the present has largely been unexplored and remains misunderstood.

56

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