FoW - Fate of a Nation

MOTIVATION AND SKILLSllrround~d by htnriu Amb staUS, Imulpati r;rat~ ,IJ"ats to its nlT1:iwL With ~n~m,

troops Just houf'J aUla! from t/~ capllal of Ttl Aflilt IN Imull Difmc~ Forc~ n"tlrd 10

k rtJ1Uumrl] "Ild] 10 fishr. 71N IsTtlf/is trained IN;,. tank nru,. harrJ, Imoll!;n: rlwr thrywtTr oumumlNrrJ. A Plu:ah Tan'kim (Tank CAmpanJ) is raUlI Confident VC'Ie:ran.

HEADQUARTERS

1 Ccnlurion

'f I Magach 3

J Magach 2r-

I M51 hherman

I M50 Sherman 85

I MI SupcrShentUn 80

COMBAT PLATOONS

I~

3 CenlUrion

2 CCRfurion

4 Magach 3

3 Magach 3

2 Magoach 3

4 Magach 2

3 Magotch 22 Magach 2

4 M51 Ishc:rman

3 M5l Ishernun

4 M50 Sherman

3 M50 Sherman

4 M I Super Shcrman

3 M I Super Sherman

Israel had no doubl5 that [he most dangerous foe W<l$ thehuge Unitr.d Arab Republic army in the Sinai, hUl considered the much smaller, bur better trained. Jordanian Armyfacing Central Command to be' another major threat.

When Jordan arracked, Israd answered with a swiftarraek on £wo main axes. The 10'" HaITI (Mount Zion)

----.... ----....Command Tank Tank

•'.: .----.... ----....

Tank Tank

Meeh:mised Brigade. r.quipped with M 1 Shcrrnan tanks(along wirh lWeJVC 20 pdc-armed Ccnturions added to the520'" Tank B:malion), attacked towards jerusalem, whilethe 37'" and 45'" Bnmlt (Lightning) Armoured Brigades.mainly equipped with M50 and MSl Shcrmans and AMXlight tanks, lluacked towards ]enin from [he north.

WEAPONS PLATOONS

ISRAELI TANKS

GUNNERY FIRSTMlcr demonstrating ab)'Sm~ gunnery :againSl the Syriansduring me opening m.g~ of the Water Wu, the Isradi5revised thdr gunnery tr.lining. Unlike most ;armies whopicked (he oo-t recruits as the tank commanders, the ISl'3dispicked their best as the gunners.

All Amlourt'a Ta"it /tllnl thnt didnot mOl't in th,.J,fOl'tnltnl

Sltp mol} ft-roUpikd rolls To Hit whl'» Sh()(Jtinl,J,tir mamgum lit pL:llOO1U with ail uams mDrt t/w" J6~/40cm RUM!,

Tanks u'itb Autofogtbn tilt nor bnufirfro", thlJ ruk.

AUTOlOADERThe French AMX-13 had :m automatic loader allowing megunner [Q fire rwch~ ShOlS bt-fon: rdo;;ading the gun (a processrequiring the crew [0 dismount and taking 15 minutes ormort). h wasn't as quick.firing as:l crew member loading thegun, but it did allow a very small tank 10 mount a powerfulgun in a small, light turret.

AA/X tll1llu do not ruff" an) pMoll] To Hit whil~ mo!)ingund l11il) rr-rollpikd rol4 To Hit iftJJtJ aia not "'01,(, inrlu MDII~mtnt Sup.

SEARCHLIGHTSSomt unks .....trt fiut<!. .....ith seuchlighlS for night fighting.Unfoftun;ltdy. thest VVt thtir position llw:l.y whtn ustd.

A platl)()1I witl1n &nrch/ight rolls two dirt nnd MittS thrbrst mult whm rollillg on thr Night ViIibi/iry 7ilhl~ (supngt 172 oftIlt rllkboolt). Othtr plalD(}ns shooting at thrp'lUoon brillg sllotlU sl'oot as ifthry had rollca a 6011 thrNight Visibility Tabk.

Trdnu wing &arrhugJftS rlln INI«rI Ot onydistdnu ItS ifthgthet in tllrir Shooting Sup. ilnd do not NfUnt as Q",Uttkd bymhrr niglot or W'rilin Il!ltn shot ilt.

SKIRTSThe British-supplied Ccmurion tlInks .....ere fiut<!. with'bazooka skirts' or 'Inz.ookll plates' and turret S1o\\<;lge binsto protttt them from bnooka-llrmt<!. tank humcrs.

IfU flWIt prottettd by SltlrtS fti4 an Armour Saw IIgoillU awtnpOll u'ith a Firt'poWtr mting of5. or 6 hitting ItS SidtImnour, roll a sptriAl4. Slum SAw:

Iftht illlit' is suurojiJl, tlv Skim prourt th~ limit fromtM hu, u,J,irh hIU no t/fm.

• If tN SilW is not sucuujiJl, tiN shot pntnratn thr IWa",",ur ItS nOmull

STABILISERSA slabiliscr is II device fined 10 tht lank's gun Ihat kcc:ps itlevel so Ihe gunner can slay on l;lrgel whilt tht tank moves.

A moving tanlt firing a tu" fitud with a Stablliur 1"0011

nt itJ full ROF.

• Ifthe 1"" has ROF 1 or mo", it adds a pentlll) of. /to the seD" To Hit.

Ifthe1"" hAS ROF /. itll"0m the nOnmll 'l- / ptnall]To Hit u·l>m moving.

Bifo" ul(Nlting, a tJ,,1t cunc~ nOt UI ug tit Subilisn:

M:l Ahllhlek

~1U ~lh ~1~1 ~11\FN FAl tllm FN FAllllm FN FAL telm FN FAL tllm... ....

M3 Ahllf·hek M3 Ahllf-hek..

~1U ~11\ .....Joll. )AllFN FAl tllm FN FAl tllm FNMAG l.ijjht Mortar.... LMGteam turn... ~~

MJ Ahllf-het BJindieideMJ Ahltf4rld tllm.. • .. ..

• . ..

If fl Mounud Amlult TrallJp6r1 uam is Dmrqyttl byDtftnsivt Fi/'(, ail furf·tlling PtlJItn:m FaD Btu-It rl5.milU"'} ftom Ik UII"U thty Um' c#a1fin:. Iftk P-wrn:mCI",n"t do '''is, Ihry a" lkstroyttl Tht plalOO" Is /'lot auu)lI'liltJ("llllJ Pin"d ()q1lJn "·hm tht Passnrgm Dlsmou/'It,iI/'Id u·ill O/'lly Fall &ult iflll4lttSfiL~ hItS or /WO /Jmroy'4tior &ikti Out whirln as UJUJl If 11 Mounud AssaultTranspon uam iJ DtStroytd during tk assault, an)P,1SS~"g~rsart D~ftrr1J~d with il.

Tht PaHt1Igtrs do /'lot nud to Dismount 10 CounSmltta.lt.7hry 'IIn SliIJ It-founsnI or DiJmoltrrl tU tINy u'ish, If t/lryDUMDum to u,untmzrtil,lt. tk,r TrillIJport t~am u"ll INStnt to tht !?rAI'.

If tht pUrtoo" /JO(ulltarily Brrlllts Offl/'JIU"" of Countt'/'·IIttaclt"'g, /lnd tht mtirr platoon iJ mounuti ", A-!tJuntdAsslllllt TmTIJpttrt uurns. thry may NSt t/~ Bualt Off71mmgh lh~ EIJ~I1/J ruk (m png~ /66ofslu rukboolt) liS ifthry UJt7r Ta"k U41ms.

At rI~ nul oftht AisJuJr Sup. Jfoltntttl Awtltlt Tril1tJ!"'rtttll"U thllt art &llkJ OMt art Srnt to tht lUar if lhtyNt... "0 Pas.snrf!TJ. or ilUI011ldhCflUJ !kmOUIlt (~ PUtt101 oftlv rukboclt) anti ilrt 110 lo/'lg" &ikti Out iftl'tJhJt't Passmgm.

As il 7imlt Tta",. a }.founttd AJs4ult Transport NAmcArry"': P,u~,,:m I1UlJ Cha'1.C ''''0 CollliUla"dfigl,t IPIlW4ub ro",bllt. As Opm+topJ't'ti 7iI,,1t UA"U, Iht plat.,.,,,Will IN joruti 111 FaD Bark'" fit't h,t! or two Dmrt1]ttI or/Jgikti Out t'thldn 11'1 Dtftnmv: Firr (su paSt 154 ofwrukboolt).

HQ SECTION

FN FAL uams do not ruff" tIll' uSUIII -+ / to hu f"NllrJftrjinnt It ROF / u~ajHJ" u:h;k MO'-i": or PJnllnl DoWPt.

Wl1t"II 1I0t Pillllnl {)qU'lI. FN FAL itA,," rr-rvll alljaJkJrolls to hit in IkjouIw F," dun,,: 4J1AuUs.

'------'

•

ArmOlfrrd Trampon UIlms", a plalOt1n ,,,th tJw MOlfllltdA~saultsp«ial ruu a" Mou",nI Assault Trallsports.

A Mounud AMau/t Tmmpurt IJ<IJ 11 dual "aturt. lX'h"~

~mpty, it is just an ordinary Transpon wun, ~etpt rlMttlu) ao not haw to b~ Smt to tilt lUar wllm ~mpry--thry

rail "mili" 011 tht tabu ilna ('O"hnu~ to fig"t.

IX1Jn, (11"]1"1 PlUsmp. it ,\fOUl/itaAsJAult Tnllrsptm 11

trrilUti IU it Ta,,1t ullmprnotryth",ttxupt PlatDOJf MomkClurhlfit i.scarry",t tu'fJ or mort PamnX" Udms, It alJoJws Tank £Srorl1.

ISRAELI INFANTRY

The motorised infamry, a11~ Ch" Milmochan {pronounc.ed kh·eer nuh-moh·khahnl in Hebrc,,;, ;,Accompanied the ranks into baulc, clearing built-up are:!.!and fortified positions. Their main weapons were theBdgian FN FAL tiRe (used both as a rifle and. in it)

he:l.V)·-b;lfrelled form. as a sqLUd automatic welponl and[he F~ ."..tAG mKhine-gun. Each platoon hold a Briti 1,

52mm (2") light mom.r. a num~r of Iklgian RL-83Blindicidc ('Armour Killer"' bazoobs. and plell~' ofpowerful Belgian Mccar ami-rank riRe grenades.

AUTOMATIC RIFLESThe Isradi Army~ the FN FAL as both its standard riAeand (in iu heavy·barrdled form) as its squOld autom:uicwe:;lpon. This gi\'cs the riflemen the abili(}' to rn2intain theirlircpower on the 010\'(' and deliver inrense bursts of lire :I.t

short range.

MOUNTED ASSAULTThe: ISr:l.di Ch'ir Ml1mochan, thdr motorised infanuy, de·..d·opc:d t«hniques for fighting from Ihdr vehicles 10 e:n.able:the:m (0 kc:ep up with the- p~cC' ofopt:r:Hions.

•

Jeep

Observer Rifle team

~OOF 25 pdr gun

~OaF 25 pdr gun.,.,-.

HQ SECTION

ARTILLERY BATIERY

~OQF 25 pdr gun

~oaF 25 pdr gun

~U' ~tCommand Rifle toam Staff team...

Company. liC, and an] PLuoo1l Commtmd trams dq nDtsuffir rhr lIorfllil! + I prtla!ty to Rnngt I" whm SpollltlgforArtil1l''! &mbardmrtltl from pLUM'" IaKm as (1 Comblllor Wr(1POlll t'ho;«.

UNDER COMMANDThe battalion mortars maintained a dose association wid\the troops they supported. :allowing them to respond 10

requests for support quickly and accurately.

ISRAELI ARTILLERY

PlatOOI/ and 2iC Command Uil1m COli tlct as Sponinguamr and rt!qunt ani1!l'T]fl" in t!J~ Innlt' mallna al n

Company Command unm, mffirwg th~ snml' + 1 pmalt]10 Ra"gr /" (m pagt 126of,hI' ntubco!t).

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Th~ main rowed artillery piece in Israeli service wa~ theBritish OQF 25 pdr field gun, a lighrwC'ighr. but hardhining weapon. As well as the original British Quadtractors, the Isroleli artillery used the American Dodge11.,_[00 and GMC 2YJ.-Ion trucks as gun tractors.

EXCELLENT COMMUNICATIONSModern radio systems gave every hraeli officer the C3pabili[)'[0 request artillery fire whenever needed, making their anil·lery incredibly Aexible and responsive.

ISRAELI AIRCRAFT

OnC(: Ihey had d~ah a devastating blow to th~ Arab airforc(S in O~ralion Mo/ml. th~ I~radi Air Fot(:~ rum~d

iu ut~",ion to ~upporljng th~ arm)' on Ih~ banldidd.n~ Frc.nch Da.»auh Oum:an (Hurric:m~. pronounc~

OPERATION FOCUS0JKf'Jtion Mo/ud(Focus) was a pre-emptive air strike by rheKlml HaAvir, the Isrndi air force, on the Arab air forces.Combined with their superb new SbalJak air-superiorilYfighlNs, the surprise srrike ga\'e the Israelis wral dominancein Ihe air for the rest of the war.

Imu/i 4irrrllfi roU tU'D diu on th~ How M4nJ Airrnzfitilbk 4n" t4lt~ tJ¥ Mt mult.

Imu/i 4irrnlfi lUffUJ i" Ft:!,t« Intn'UJ'uo" tin " roU of5+ filth« than tlv ,1JI4d16.

FAST MOVERSFast-moving je:t aircrotfr an: difficull to hil wilh manuallyaimed anri-aircraft guns. It Qk(S an C:J.:cellenr crew and a bilof good luck w hit one.

Fnst-moving 1ft airmlfi roll a dit for tarn hit from anAmi-aircrafi uxapon. On 41CO" of5+, tI"11pttd throught/lt dangtr %0'11', Iht slulls buntin: iNhi"d t~m. and a"un"armd Otlvru/il~thty a" hit tU nOm/oil

oo-ra-gahn) was th~ main Israeli ground-aluck aircr.th.Cart}'ing four 20mm cannon and a tonn~ ofbomb$. th~ir

anaoo on Arab fot(:(S enabl~ hard-preurd soldiers onth~ ground to o\ocrcom<, pod:eu of r(Suunce,

TALL FLIGHT STANDSAircraft, such :as Ihe: Ourogan and Shd/Jak, that use the: railRight stand require some adjustme:nr.s 10 the rules.

AirrTllfi 0" fltJljlit,!ll IMIIN must hI'pl/utd within 6-/15n"oftI't! rargtt rathl"T than tI,~ /l1IIal -1 ~/JOcm oftht largtt.

NAPALMn(' Isradis used IUpalm against Arab columns and rroopconce:mnuions. Thu je:lli~ pc:uol was a horrific weaponagainSl infantry and unarmourc:d \·e:hicl(S.

-~~~

.\'ajMl", usn a Doubl~-k,,"'h Tnnplau (lrl30cm by6"/J5cm) i"su"dIt/I"t usual Trmp"'t~_ Plnu tI~ TnnplauI'lUilrt to Itv 1l1b/~ ~dgtl afur "mo/'il1: II~ /Iircmfi, u:uht;'~ l1a"ou' md dOltst to u'hm till' ItIrrmfi was posiriollttl.

7(-«1111 /("d~r tlJt Ttmplart art hit on a roll 0[6. On(y Fullynrmoll"d L~hJ(lts ".111( I"') proUrtiOl1 agailUt Napalm. IfIl'~r oth" 'JpI' of ,'tlllck or ua", is hit by NapalM. it isllutOmJ.ttCllU'1 Dmroytd ulllm it is in a BUIMinK. rt~1 ifif IS in Bulklpmofo,,'tr. A FuU,-armourrd t't'Mck hit by.Vapal", d«s,,0I tJI~~a" Armour s"r't'. Imuad. on tl rollof5+ Ilv Lv:h,ck is &lkti Out. OtJxrN.'/~. Ik CTt14-' tl"fi"~

ISRAELI SPECIAL RULES

If11 Platoon Coml".1nd Inftmry tram is Dt1~J, 'InO'''"ttam tnltts Of'" IInmttliatt~r- 1Wn0lV IIny DIM Infi11lt1JItam in II~ p"uoon tloal if /l'ilhin Command Disl<lnuof rlu Commlllld Itam tmd rrplnu ir with rllt orig,nalPin/DOn Command (Mm. If rht Plntoo" ummfll/d tramwas a W't,mor 'blm, il is nOIl! Jus, 4 mU/dard /'!.uoonCommand Itam.

If tI P!4tD01I Coml1/1md "limit Uti", is D~troyt'd. alUu}ltruam taltn owr muntdiattlJ. Nommatt RIt! othtr "limitUti", ill rht plAtoon t/>,u is Il'ithi" ummanJ Dist.muof tht Dtstrtl?d ummand ttam to br ,ht ntlll PIA,oonum"",,,d UII",.

Ifborh p!DynY arr roUlng on Ihu taOk. Il1ftt IN h/I."" roU.with Ih/f plJryrr lu-Inl, I'" ,UI4..fttT. Ifbothp~ roll thr14",1' numbrr. drunnil1t ,lit aU.tclt" ss normAL

An Imuli plnyrr //lilY Iltltmp' tQ jig;', tit night. If')¥} do so,roll a dir bifo" dtrtrmilli"f which plnp is Iht fIItncftrr:

0" a roll of 6, thl' baulr taltts p"'u at DdU'" (t«

pagt 273 of tilt ",/rboQJrJ and ,ht }sratU pl4J" is rlltIIUMIt"-

• Dna roU0[5. rht hatt'" ulttsI'lnUl1t Duslt (sapagl' 273oftk ruklxxJlt) 11/", tilt Imub playn- is Ihl' attacft"-

• Otlltn':iK tnr famt is fought using IN normAl ",Inand tht Iltl4rk" is dl1t'1'7P1inrrJ a.s normAL

Ifthn-r is no ttam ofan Ilpproprnm typt wilhi" unnmal1dDistanu. donI l/~ P!.IlIO(ln OJ",man4 rum is DrslrD)ttiand rIJt pl.lIt1On is kfi kfllinlN.

7ht Drigi".,/ PltzUNJn CD",,,,."" Ita", elln still~ Ihit rultunik 11 Warrior ttam IS kading Inr pl4toon and IletrnfIV lIS Co",m.tlu! Ita",. hllr rht I'llk dots not IlpP/] '0 t/~

Uarnor Itam.

EVERY SOLDIER IS A LEADEROffic~rs com~ up from th~ r.anks giving th~m ac1~ I"C'buion·ship wilh th~ir soldim. Ord~rs arc' discussed Mfol"C' baul~ sothat anfon~ cm take O\~r th~ lead should th~ offic~r fall.

24-HOUR DAnLETh~ Lsr.ldi command knew that it had to win th~ 1967 warfast if iI \\';1$ going to win it at all. As a result. atracks wt'.rt:otd~l"C'd ro cominu~ aft~r duk. wi(h only a few houl") (0

resupply octween one battle and the ncXL

bt/ltr wa,. RplatDOII tlJilI atttmp" to maltt n IYw AgainstAlan] mo/'t Call1l0t till" an] pllrt in an flSUJ/I/t III ,ht IlImtmm.

Imuu p/iJroonJ m,zJ rr-roD (tn] ftikd PuttfH)n MOr'llkChrclts (lIS opposrd to (,,1," MO/lt'ilrio" T~ts).

lsra~/i Company Comma"d trams milJ rr-roll an] fai/cdCompany Morale' Clvcks (as oppose'd to orb" Mlnl/'ution

Ttsts). In rhr "bstf/cC' of(/ Company or Hlgkr CommAndunm. Im} fllmooll Command mllll Oil tb, IIlhlc farl (Ilk, f1

Company Mornlt Chuk.

Any PWUHJ1/ umh If P!4tDOn ComWUlM unm wuty RU""'P't11Tw AgAimt M/m] mOlv 1'1 ill Awzllb Sup.

IWJ. Sk,U TNI for tllch pJ.mx)n.

• If tl" un is p.tssttJ. t/ot pkuoon mats tl" Amlull ~tp

lIS a ,\{Of'tmtnl Sttp In "'h/ch It om mow up ID anollvr4 i lOon, rrgan/Ins ofits Itormal mOlYmml J,lt4nu.

• Iftht ttst is ftikd. tilt p"UOOlt cannot mot~ lilt!Junhtrthis turn.

Although it is 1I0t tht A!owmmt Sup. wwu malti1lg a FtwAgaiflSt MallY mow may AloUIIt Imd Dis11l0u1ll fIS ifit U'dStllr A-!ot'tmtlll Sup.

PIAUXJ1/.S cannot maltt NU' Against Ma"., mot'N if tl"!mowaAt tilt Doublt. &r,ud {)oll'n or &ilni Out 1~11IdN

C4nnot mIlftt Fni.' Ag4ilUt Alan., mo/n. uams ,1"" _dE.~ and EArs to Tn'ta! Cont to Ground "'rnf] troopsC4111101 maftt" m' AglllIISI ,\{an] mot¥'.

O"IyAnrlCutrd lyllu!ts (Iln malttFtu' Agamst Ma"., MUl'('S

iftky arr Pimud Duu'n, Otl1" rypa ofuamI (annot m.tlttFro: AgainJt ,\1,,"., mot'tf if tI'tJ art PmnnJ Do"·n.

GUlf trllms tAtt jhot tar/itr", tht fJlrn Il"ld 1",,,,obJk Gunttams C41JnOI11l4ltt a Ftu.' Agains, ,Han.r mOl'#'. ss,,{t fro",Unlimbtring. umns oftm, typt ,hat hltt'#'firtfJ an Artilkry&mbtn'dmmt C01l"ot maltr a Ftlt' Against .Halt} mot't.

FEw AGAINST MANV

A WAR OF SURVIVALIsraeli soldiers arc' well aw:are ofAr:;ab propagoand.t dtm.. ndingthe destruction ofthe SUIC oflsracl. Not surprisingly, Isr.adisoldiers arc dctcrminro 10 fight 10 protect thdr homes.

Israeli soldiers kn("w the)' wcrt' oumumbc:r«i and facingthreats from all sides. Hc:sir;llion was f.l.tll and reluaancc asin. Rapid mO\'cmcnt. wh...,hcr slOrming rorward or ducking~ck from encm}' hl"C" was esscnti",lro survi\'lll :lInd \'iClo~'.

MODELS TO USE FOR ISRAELIS

Th~ Ls-radis 2~ moddl«l as;l. combin21ion orn~w cod~ for ~uipm~m specific 10 [h~m ~d Am~riC2l1 .lIOd British codofor old ~11 ~uipm~m slill in use by w hr:adi Dcf~ncc Fon:~. This [2bl~ gi\cs Ih~ rdev<lnl cod~.

Tum Code Team Code

Sho't AISBX02 M-l TCM-1O AIS161

C~nturion AISBX02 J«P U5411

Magach 3 AISBX01 Dodge -\I"-ton truck US413

Magach 2 A1SBXOl GMC 2h-ton lruck US430

MS1 i5herman A1SBX03 Quad U2Ctor BRl77

M50 Sherman AlSBX04 M3 A h:l.if-lrack US201

M I SUJX'r Sh~rm2n US044 H;pJf-trac:k SIOW<Ig~ AJS671

HVSS Sh~rm~ Tracks USOI91 Choir ~bmochan (Molorised) rJatoon AIS722

A.\IX .'\1541 25 pdr gun BR)73

~t3 D1120mm) AJS204 D:l.SS:l.ull Our:agan MeOI

M7 (105mm) BRI~O hr:adi DccW AJS94 I

TANK TEAMSAnnour

T~ Mobiliry Fronl .... Top N~a!A.,.... ...,. 'OF All';'''''''' Fi..".-r

TANKS

~hlll SlowTmk 12 6 , Co-~~ M(i•.~Oal AA MC. Protcmd ~mmo, Skirls, Unfdl~hle, Wide mda.'-IO'im",p" ~Oil()(km 1 18 1. S""'«. 5f4""isn,

COllurion Slow Tank 12 6 , Co-u MC•.~ ca! AA MC. Protean! imInO. Skiru, Unrdiable, Wide Inc:bOQF10flI' filII 40"/J0lJr1If 1 " j. S-lu, Sullllun:

\1.op:h ] \undm!T;ank " • , ,SO aI Cupola ....tG. Co-u \1(1, \rIde tneh.l- /05",...S'"' .0i J(J{Jn., 1 /8 1. .'-"

\Updl2 SundardTank " • , .SOal Cupob MG.Co-u \lC. \rMk lrxb.AUI5lOw.p" 4071(J()r,. 1 /. j.

\m~ """"'" T'", • Co-u MG. Hul \IG.. 'iO aI AA \1G, ProteaN MIlmo.

u}';",.. DJ504I"" .11 'i'8t1noI 1 /. 1. ,....MSOS'-man SumhnlTanlr. , I Co-u MC. Hull MC..50 aI AA MG, Profccud:unmo. Unn:liabk. WICk 1rxU.

:'5-CN-50pn Jl"18lInII 1 N j.

M I SUpt'f Shcrman ')linwro Tanlr. , • I Co-u .\1(;, Hull :\1G. 'iO aI AA MC. I'rolCCfCd .unmo, L:nmiabk. \Vide I=U..\If -6m",l"" .U"18Orm 1 IJ j.

AMX UghlTank , , I Co-u MC. PrOI<'l:IC'd lJ1lmo.''i-CN-50I'''/ Jl"I8Omt J N j. AlilPltHuin.

SELF-PROPELLED GUNS

\B 0 1l1O!nm) Hili-tm:k.:d 0 0M6')llOr<f",~ 6I-/6Ocwt j ,. 'i-w .......w.-..

M-OOSmm) SundudTw 0 0 .50aIAA MG.W'lA I 105",.. "'-'uur lrl60trw 9 1. HJI__uJ,~PJf. 5.....Fm"l_iwtJ_,fn 72"1/8OcM ; ;. s-t.o ..~,

ANTI·A1RCRAFT GUNSM3 TI.~I-.w H~f.mll;lr:d I 0 0

TCM-ZO ftM" p'" 167.jfkttr , , ,. AIl"..,KTllfi.

VEHICLE MACHINE-GUNS\/Io"f.oMG 16"'4b j 1 • ROF I '[Mho IWA"1II fifr.

.50 r,,1 l'thick MG 16"'4b j ; ,. ROF I if"'''" aotA,.'" firt

Airrnl1 W";Ipon To Hil Anti'lank Fircp0'lVC't NOla

Damult Ourwn Clnnon j. 8 ,. rot MOI·cr.

Born'" 4. , ,.Napalm 6 ,. N3.p:llm.

Nl)ICST.pFirrpfllDn'

ArmourFront SideROF Anti-rank

-'--__"o~__~O__"P~_=.t5Kngcr-61t<l.50cal AA MC. Passenger-fired Hull MC.

Range ROf Anti-wak Fircpower Notes

16~f4lkm , 2 G

16-'4Ocm 2 G Autom,l.lic rifles. Tank Amuh 4.

lu"'40cm , 4. Smoke, Cm lire ol'cr fric.'nd1r ttam~.

8-'20.:01 11 ,. TankMuuh 5.

16"/4Oc01 2 6 Mo\"o:l.i a HelVY Gun te<lrn.

Mobility ..... ROf Ami-tank Fircpo~t Notes

Man'rack~ l6"/4Ocm , 2 G RQF 1 when pinnal do""'" or movini;

Heavy 24",6Ckm 2 , J. Gun shidd. Smoke, Turntable.

BO"/2OOcm 4 5. SmolN bombardmmt.

INFANTRY TEAMS

T~

RiAc fe.lm

FN FAlft:l.m

Light Monar l~m

BlindJcidc lelm

Sulflcam

GUN TEAMS

FN MAC lMG

25 pdl gunH•.",S &mb4rdmtnl

Mobility&,"g<

J~P

Dodge W-lon, GMC 2l!l-ton. or Qwd \'('h«Jed

M3 Ahllr·mck Half-melee.!

TRANSPORT TEAMS

I Tram

KUTEYBH DEBABHTANK BAITALlON

•You must field one platoon from each box shaded black and may held one platoon from eachbox shaded grey.

MOTIVATION AND SKill7Jv I(}/dim ofr/>t U"ilra Arab &puhlic u"" amfidnll 01">(' abdlfJ #jrIN ~mbl1lrJ Arabamtin (0 QnmIJ Israrl 71/rir rigid mllninl!r u>tJl u uh rI'fir mum/istd command andmllmli ,,,,..tin. A Kuuyhh ~babh (Tanlt &u<llifJn) is raud as ConfideDI Conscript.

HEADQUARTERS

•• •

10 T·34/85M

9 T-34/85M

8 F14I85M7 T·j4/85M

6 T·34/85M

5 T~34/85M

COMBAT COMPANIES

195 poinu185 poinu

1,0 poinu

155 points

140 points

120 poinu

WEAPONS COMPANY

Thc: sClbiliscr on the: latc:r mood T-54 and T-55 ranks e:nabled thc:m to 6re on the: move with a reasonable: degree of accuracy.Give:n thc: difficulty of loading thc: hugc: IOOmrn rounds in a cramped turret. anything that made: each shot more Iikdy [0 hitwas a big improvemefl[_

A mOI..i1tK fdnJr jiringll tu" fiutd u:irh a Subi!i$" ,1'6(J1J at Its full ROF

• Iflht run JlIJJ ROF 2 /1r mort. il addJ tI pmrr/ry of+1 to ,''' «Ort To Hit.

• Iftilt run JJ<lS ROF J, it iporn Iht nonnal + / pm,;'" T; Hit u'/xn mot'lng (bullIllI frt';I1lS tltt +1 to hir[or tltt Tu'asJNdalruM.

lkfo" shooting, (/ tant can c!IOOst not to us, Its Stllbili,tT.

lSU-51-2

AIR DEFENCE COMPANY

•--

Comm.nd ZSU-57-2

DEBABH AIR DEFENCE COMPANY

!fan Arab W~rriororPIn/(xm CommandItam mot~ in tlv.\/ot'ffllmt Sr,p. all 0/tN limit Itllrns in its pldtotJn (Anabco"'JHlllJ) must mot~as u.~Il.lft'"Pldtoon CommandItamdo~ not motor, 0111] Timlt Itams that startd th, MotwnmtSltp Our o/Command may mO/li.

Any Tank Itam thut mOI'iS /ldds +1 to thi seo" "qui"d tobit u/hm shootillg with its mllill glln. lhis gil'a a CUlI/U""

th't' prl/lt/ry of+2[or ROF 1 uxapons {such as rllt 122",mlun on Ij,t IS-JM and tilt 100",,,, gun on /h, T-$·i andT-55J un/iSJ tht] hm't' SlJbilistTJ. Marhi,u-xufU do notJJ1lfi'r tl"s pmlllry.

TAA'ATIUlIt, ob«!ic:ncc: to dckrs and submission to thc: will ofAllah, ....'aS an imponant tipt:et ofArab culwl"('. This meshedwdl with Sovic:t doarinc: that ~u.ired a 12nk companyto OJX'ratc: :IS a singlc: c:ntiry undc:r thc: dOS(' control of thc:companr commandc:r.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC TANKS

.A plJltDOn with lnfrartt{ Surrl>lighu roll.> two d,et ilnJwkl1 tJ~ bm mull u.J~" ITJllmg on th~ Xight Vislbllll]7ilbk (1"JHl~2-2 6ft/~ rukbook). \'d'icln U'uh "ifrarnJStarcMighu do not nff/I to "-roU Bogging Chuln u,l1tnmWlng &ugh urmill at Night.

Mnks using Infr""d ~arrhliglmmn bt um allmy nU/Kt'lJ"ddo notto/1II1 (IS ConfMltdbJ(irh" nigh,or t,rTtl ;11111"1'11

11101 at by 6thrr tanfl'J tll'opprd with Infra"d Srarc!llights,~" if,be oth,r Milks do not UJt duir uarrlJligbts.

Unlilt,. \fhurn tal/ks, So/lm tanks did /,ot inrtJrpomu aIt bi"·/ight option in rhri" uartNighu, wc"rmot ,Jlumm,uttllrgmftr olk, tram.s.

--------"

The ZSU-57-2 anti-aircraft tank is the chassis of a T-Hbattle tank mounting twin 5""mm anti-aircraft guns inan opc:n-lOppro turre:t. hs ratc: of 6rc m.de: it dodl)'to aircraft. while iu high-\·docity. long-b.rl"('llc:d gunspunch through light umour with~.

INFRARED SEARCHLIGHTSWhen tilt Isr:adis concinued their at ....cks into me- night theywefC shocUd IO diSCO\~rmat the' Latest Sovin tanks usro bythe Arabs moum~ infra~ searchlights mat .1llow«l them[0 locue rargeu in [he dark f,u mort a.sily.-----

STABILISERS

SUPPORT COMPANIES

AK47 AssaultRilleteam

••

AK47 AssaultRiffeteam

~~., ~~.,AK47 Assault AK47 Assault

Rifle team Rifle team

Bhndicideteam

HQ SECTION

INFANTRY PLATOON

AK47 AssaultRifle team

,It.'UCommand AK47

Assault Rille team

~~., "1~'. ~~., "1~'.AK47 Assault AK47 Assault AK47 Assault AK47 Assault

Rifle team Rifle team Rifle team Rifle team

~Jl ~JlBlindlclde AK47 Assaul! Bhndlclde

learn Rifle team team

~~., ~~.,AK47 Assault AK47 Assau!t AK47 Assault AK41 Assault

Rifle team Rifle learn Rifle team Rifle team

AK47 AssaultRifle learn

~~.,~~nAK47 Assault AK47 Assault

Rifle team Rifle team

The Unilcd Arab Republic followed So'licr Docuinc,supporting their tanks wjlh mechanised infantry batralions, Krltryb/' MnhnlJ Mrykn1l9kryb (pronouncedkur-tee-bah moo-shah! mec.kan-ik--ec-a) in Arabic,mounted in six-wheeled BTR-152 armoured rransporters. -Ibe inf.anrrywcfl~equippedwith a mix ofSoviet .1ndlocally-made equipment. Soldiers carried a mix ofAK47:w:auh riA~ and locally-made semkwtQmalic rifles,backed up with Ik:lgian Blindicide ('Armour Killer')bv.ookas, Soviet RPD machine-guns. and B-IO 82mmrecoilless guns.

8-/082111171 moiUm guns I~ thr &coillm Gum rule 0"

pogr 119 of thr rulebook. 7bis ",rons ,hltt tIlt finng tMmntwr counts lU Conuokd whm tlX] fin t/~ rrroillrst pm.andrllt'JCanJlOlfirt tf" rtcoiUrssgunjrv", bllildmgJ or iftlurris a[rimal] InfilllfrJ uom within r/jrm /Nhi"d r/ltm.

RECOILLESS GUNSThe B-10 82mm recoilless gun gave rhe inf.uHry an dfectivelight anti-tank weapon at [he company level. UnfoTtunarely,du= huge backbJasl from firing il revealed its position. makingit impon3nt [0 knock out the larger with the fiTS! shots.

Command BTR·5QPK

SCOUT COMPANY

.... ....PT·76 PT·76.... ....PT.76 PT·76.... ....PH6 PT·76

• •

'un1~.~ )U~

....

Each tank and mechanised infuntry regiment had ascoutcompany equipped with amphibious PT~76 tanks andBTR-50PK transporters. Soviet docnine (as usW by theUnited Arab Republic) c21led for a rapid, uninterruptedadvance, so the reconnaissance elements were tx(>(Ct..-d

to move forward at speed until engaged, then eithero\'crrun the defenders or bypass them and continueadvancing. If WOrS! C3ffie to worst, (he destruction ofthe SCOut company would alert the following troops (Q

(he presence of a Strong defensive position.

These companies combine tanks for firepower andinfanlry in light BTR-SOPK transponcrs to l(ad th(:advance, If the company ran into ami-tank guns, th(:infantry platoon could dismoun! and assault ro cI(arth~ W3y forward, covcr~d by their rmnsporters andth~ tanks.

CARRIES PASSENGERSThe BTR~50PK used by the scout companies was primarilyan armoured personnel Gurier. These troops wc~ trained to

do 'reconnaissance by battle', that is to drive forward llntill_--.:====~:::::::~they encountered resistance they couldn't overrun! -'

The SCOut company was supposed 10 lead the advance.pushing forward 10 locare enemy suongpoints before [heycould engage and delay [he main force.

BTR-50PK aTmou,~d ptnonntl carTitfS art umk ttllfflS.

Ho~r, (ach BTR·50PK can carry lip to JOllr InJanrry/tilt/IS as PtlSSt1Igtn as ifit WilS a Transport tram. BTR-50PKarmfJ/lrtd prnoll/ltl rarrirrs cannot bt Mm to tlu RMrduring thr gamr li/u Tr/lmport uoms.

If thr BTR-SOPK annourrd pmonnrl Cil1Tirn art PimudDown, thrir Passmgrr {(mm art alstJ Pinntd Dollm. &ilrdOut BTR-50PK arlllourtd pmo1lnt'! carrim do not roll toRfflIOU}l( at tilt md oJ tI~ Sup in tht UIIlJ that ArmourrdTmnspom do,

Ifan BTR-SOPK armollrtd pmol/ntl (arri" is Dmroytdby shooting, Artilltry Bombardmrnt Dr air awuk, thtPtlJSt1Igm faltt n 5+ Passmgtr S'Wt IIlu/; tlu Iun'lll(}fSDismollnting U"dtr Flu and bUDming PIIUJtd Downas usunl. If/m BTR-50PK armourtd ptrsolJ1lrl corTi" isDnlroytd III (1!I fUr/mlt, an] PaMrJlg~rs art IlutDmaricallyDmroyrd.

MrchanirtdplntOOtU combining BTR-50PKilrmourtdptrSlJllIIrl carrltTS a"d Injill1rry tt<lmJ coum bOth typtt oJuamfl'hrn dtftnninlng ifthtplaroon flas Mori' uams Dmroytdrhan Still Fighting in Pllltoon Mora/~ Clm:kI.

SPEARHEAD OF THE ADVANCE

77Jt Scout Company um tilt SptnrJmul ~pkJymrm sprridlrult on pagr 26/ ofthr rulrbook. It is not It !Ut:O,mltiSSdllcrPlntOOll.

l

PT--76

18 l22mm M·30

12 122mm M·30

6 122mm M·jO

18 IS2mm 0·1

12 IS2mm 0-1

6 IS2mm 0-1

The Runians h.n·e traditionally had 2 mong 2nilleryarm. The ,XlVin Army mainuin~ mu tradition withQCh division support~ by multiple batu.lions of 18guns nch. The Unitt:d An.b Rt'publlc. lxing organist'don Soviet lines, carried things further. concentralingwhole arrillerl brig;.tdes la mu:imi~ its effect.

Most of Ihe 20rtillerr was old Second \'('orld War SUrplU5(even if il got a new name). The 122mm M-30 was theold 1938 modd ~nd me IS2mm D-l was the old 1943modd. rkspite meir age, thq: ~lill outrang~ [he Isradiartillery. as wt:ll as throwing hn"jer shells.

Commlnd AI(·OAsSlutt Rllle tllm

HOWlQer

HOWIt!er

•

HOWll2lf

•

HOWll2lr

•

HOWItzer

GUN BATIERY

ObselVef AK·OAsSlult Rifle team

Howrtzef

HOWitzer

Despite Israel's surpriSC' utack on the Arab air force. the'sheer num~f of ;liKra" .n-ail"ble to Ihe UnitC'd ADbRepublic and its allies allowed thC'ffi to condnue small·scale air anacks until [he end of the' war.

TANK KILLER

ThC' SU·l00M .Klf-propellt'd gun was used as a long-r:tngeami-tank weapon 10 support ranks and infantry againstIsradi tanks. Its rate' of fire '>\.';lS slow. but its accuracy wasgood whC'n me cre'w took the'ir time' to line' up their shots.

~'hen mer rece'ivt<! thC'ir T-,;4 tanks. the' UnitwAl'1lb RC'public also purchased Cttchoslovakian·builtSU·IOOM .Klf·propellC"d guns. Despite' thC' dC'Signdating back to the' e'nd of the 5C'c:ond World War, the'100mm gun in the' SU·IOOM could Still knock OUt ;mytank fighting in 1967.

SU-looM

AIR SUPPORT

MELAZEM A,WEL

ANTI TANK COMPANY

SU·looM

An SU-/OOM that did not mOl~ int/~ Mowmmt SltP malrr-ro/lflulaJ rolls To Hit U'hm shooring tbl'ir 11/lIm guns a,pLuoons with 1111 rrams 1110" than J6~140nn au'ay.

------ ------COIllflland SU-IOOM SU·lOOM

------ ------SU-IOOM SU·1OOM

------ ------

)-0 poinu14, poinu

) 15 poinu

85 poinu

6SU-looM,SU-looM

4SU-looM

3SU·looM

FAST MOVERS TALL FLIGHT STANDS

MODELS TO USE FOR THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Aircraft on filIIflight sr.uuis must bl' p!llcrd u'ithin 6 "/15rmofthl' large't rallvr tha" tilt uH#l1 4 MIJ0cm oftlv targn.

Aircraft, such as [hC' MiC 17. [hat use the t;lll Right standrequire' some' adjustments to th~ rulC'S.

Fl1Jt-molJmg jit mrmifi roll a di~ for tacl, hit fom 'u/

Anri-lIirrrafi wtapon, 0,/ a UOIY 0/5+. thry tpud throughtlv ,"mg" UJn~. th, s/'l'lls burmng IHhmd IPt"" IInd (I"unhanntd. OtMnt·/Se' Ihry"" IlIt as normal

The' United Ar.lb RC'public's troops are moddlC'd as it combina(ion of new codes lor ~uipme'nt spcocific [0 tht'm and$o\oict codes for old \);""11 C'quipmem still in wc: b)' [he Sinai Rdd Arm)'. This (able' gives me' rdC'Vallt codes:.

T",m Cod, T",m Cod,

T-34185M AARBX03 BTR-152 AAR211

1S-3M MRRXOI Meshah McybnC}-kC'}'h (M«hanised) Platoon AAR722

T·54orT-55 AARBX02 l22mm M-30 howincr SBX10

SU-\OOM SBXI4 152mm D-I howil""U'r SBXIO

PT-76 AAR031 MiG-\7 AAC03

BTR-50-PK AAR22\ Arab and Jordanian Dt'ca15 AAR941

ZSU-57-2 AARBX04

Fast-moving jet aircraft a.rc difficult to hit with manuallyaimed anti-aircraft guns. It takes an excdle'nt Ctt'W and gooddt'al of luck to hit ont'o

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC SPECIAL RULESALAMAM CENTRALISED CONTROL

AIIJ Arab pliUbOfI with a Command uam mayarumpt R1/

Alnmflm mOl't tU Jilt sUlrt oftlu Shooting Srrp insll'{ld ofshootinK. !fapimoo" RUrmpts to maltt 1111 Alnmam mOlll'. it11I11y /lOt shoot, rT'l'1I ifit ftifJ to maltt 1111 Alamam mOIlf!.

QUALITY OF QUANTITYFollowing the focus on mass and shock effcc[. the Arabarmies used large~~le assaults to overcome Israeli defences.With whole companies assaulting at once, only a strongdefence with plenty of firepower could StOP them.

Thus a United Arab Republic company is led by a Pl:ttoonCommand team and operates like a large platoon. A UnitedArab Republic battalion is led by a Company Command teamand operates as a large company. This means for example.that while an lsrneli platoon must remain in command tomove freely, an entire United Arab Republic company mustbe in command 10 do the same.

The armies of the United Arab Republic wcrc' equipped andtrained by the Soviet Union. The Sovicr Army's dcx.:rrinestressed the use of massed forces and shock elrect over smallunit tactics, and this meshed well wilh the Arab armies' focuson obedience and high-level planning,

To reflect this. United Arab Ikpublic forces are organi~d

differently from other armies. For game purposes, a UnitedArab Republic company is created as a single platoon and awhole battalion operates like most armies' companies.

A plntOO1l (Arab company) u:itb at !rasr jiftWI Infantry orGUI1lt11mS I" Command hllJ Quality ofQlUl1Itity. IIle/udrany atuulud trams, and any Warrior and hIl1~pt'lIdelJl

unm! thrlt hlll't }ointd if wlull d~urmining if tl p!afoon(Amb company) hnJ Quality ofQuantity.

A plnroon (Arab company) stnrting tm Shooting Sup withQMlity ofQ/lantity mwt tilkl' at !~'1Jf U1l hils (i1/suad oftht l/!lIn!fil'l') in (/ sing!1' Shoo/illg Step brforr tbry buomrPimll'd Down, altbougb a sing!t hit .from an AT/il/tryBombrlrdmrnt lIdl PillS tlm1/ Down_

Ttams from a p!moon (Arab company) lIarting tlJI' Assa,,!tSup witl; Quality of QJUt1ltiry may Chargt ifi/O Comactand COllntuatta~'kfrom 12 -/JOCI1/ muay.from tlu flll'myrnthrr tlw, 8 720c1I/ as /lSl/al. uamsfimlJl'r than J2'"/30rl1/11" stil/ Non-assalllting tMt/l.J.

A plllloon (Arab company) with at Itast jiftt~1/ AssaultingInfimtry uams "'UIt takt tU I~a!l un hits in Dl'jrmil't FirrbtJort thry arl' Pi1l1/l'd DOll'" (mdforctd to Fall Bark

\'Vlurtwr th~ ruin tlllk abouI Il plltroon. rtltd ,hat as anATllb rompally. W'hl'rr rhe mlt! rallt about I1 company. "adIhm aJ an Arab b.l/talion.

lhe Al':lb armies ha\'c been fed a steady diet of anti-Jewishpropaganda since the formation of Israel. The basic messageis usually the same, 'Soon all Arabs will unite [0 smile Israeland destroy the Jews.' Many Arab soldiers were eager toawmam, 10 advance. and get m grips with the Israelis. oftenrashly S0, and take the offensive all the way!O Td Aviv.

Roll a MotilJfltion ust ftr ,hI' p"'rooll:

if rhr rm is slIcuJSful. rhl' pli1tOOl/ ma, mow flf/othrr47/fkm.

• OtlurwiJl', rh, plntOO1l CR1IrltU "",,'t' till! IUp.

All of,hI' normal rula appt, ftr ,/,is mowmmt. PlntDOrlS

ram/f)( makr A/all/am mmm if thry a" PimU'd Doum ormtJIlf'dAt tlu Doub!~. Boggtd DowlI or &lIkd Out IIl'hiclncal'lI/Ot malu Almnt1m mOl'($.

Ifall Arab pllllOOIl with a Platoon Command uam or allaUflched Command Udm fails a PlIlIMIl Momlr Cluck(afirr any "~ro"s). or an Arab compll11Y with a High",COlt/pail). or 2iC Command tram fit/Is a Comp,my MomlrClN'Ck, roU a dil':

On n roll of5 or 6. you PiUJ rhr Plmoon or Compally~10mle Cluck. but "mol't' tlu most Snlior Command uamim"Olt'rd aJ it hrads to thr rtar. In thr caJr ofa Plmoon/1-10",1, Chrck this is thr mOJ/ sl'1/ior Comll/1md uam inor}ohtrd 10 tht platOOIl. In tlJe cast ofa Company Morall'Omk. it is thr C011lmnlld Imm thut would non11ltlfy rakttlu MotiMeion "St, if this Ivas thr last uam in a plntDdIl.tht platoon is no longrr 0/1 the ftlblr. bltl is not Dt1rro~ti

• OthrrU/is~, tlu PlarO(J11 or Compa11.'! Moralr Check isfilllrd as noroml.

While the officers of the Arab armies were from [he upperP:lfIS of sociery, the- $Oldie-cs we-re nomads, villagers, andpcasams. The gulf between them w:lS enormous. Officerslived well, but paid scant attention to the wellbeing ofthcir trOOps. When the siruation deteriorated. most officersput thcir own survival well ahead of th:lI of eheir trOOps.Fonunately for the Arab cauSC', the soldiers were much more

)abri. far-alistic, and oflen fought [0 the cnd, even withouttheir officers,

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC ARSENAL

• • • •

A/lfi-1lirmtftc_~_~ -'

Co-:u: MC. Amrhibiou'. Wldt' lradu.Iit.,fnhsn:

AA MG. Amphibious. Curia four pa5$Cngt'l'$, Widt' lr:lt'k$.

13.

o,.

111

112

S!:;lndard Tank ,Jl"l8tkm 2

Slandard Tank

Standard Tank 1JliBh 5

ArmourMobility Ff'(Inl Sidt T., N''I!e:5

"'g< ROF A",i-tank FirrpllllJV

"'I~nd.rdTJnk , I 1 Co-u MC. Hull MC,JZ"'8fkm 2 12 3.

Slow Tank " 10 2 Co-u MC. .50 cal AA MC, Unrthblt.J2"I8Ocm / /5 2. Brrllluh1fllsgh pn. SWw tril,."",.

S!~ndardTank 12 , , Co-u MC, .50 u.l AA M(jJ178Qn., / 16 "S[owTank , 5 Ovc:rload.,d.40il0Qmr 1 16 2. H,,/J m(l~IIU1J, Tun! !illn.

M,m-AIRCRAFT

Z5U-57-2Tw·;n 5-68 5.:-mlH

SCOUT TANKS

PT-76[)'56Ti6m",p"

BTR-501>K

TRANSPORT TEAMS ArmourT~ Mobilily Fron! Sidt T., NOles

U:up"" RJ,,,gt ROF Antl·",,,k Firrpqw'tr

BTR-15;! Whttl.,d 0 0 Pawa:nger-6n:J AA MG.

VEHICLE MACHINE-GUNSl'thkltMG J6"14(km 3 2 6 ROF J ifoIJ~IJ."llpomfirr

.Wed/MC 16-/-I0cm 3 , 5. ROF J ifOIMr II.'t:4f'01rSfift.

TumWtap(lH

TANK TEAMS

T-34/85M85m", ZlS-53 p"

IS-3M122mm[).Z5Tpm

T·54oIT-55D-/OT lOOm"'lw"

SU-lOOMlOOm", [)./OS pili

INFANTRY TEAMS

T=. ...." RaF Anli.l;lnk l-i",powt, Notes

.'\1\47 Amult Rille lc:ltll S"/2Ikm 1 1 , full RQF whtn mOl-ing.

Blindicide tcam S"l2lkm 1 11 " T-ankAmuh 5.

\taR' Ile-am lG-f.4lkm 1 1 , Mm"CS a~ ~ 11",,")' Gun l"am.

GUN TEAMST~ Mobility "'g< RaF Ami-lank fi",powC'r Notrs

RPD LMG Man-p.acktd IG"'4(km I , 6 ROr 2 when Pinn<:d Down or moving,

B-I082mm recoill=gun M~n'p-ack.,d 24"'6Ocm 2 " " ~ooi1less gun.

ARTILLERY

122mm M-3O howilll.'f Immobik 2""'6Ocm, 2. Blelkthrough gun, Gun shidd.

Flri"! !trJmbarrl'lIrnt 80"1.'>()(irM , 3.

IS2mm D·l howiCU'f lmmobik 24"J6(km 10 I. Bunkt'f blISter. Gun ~hidd.

Rnn! bo",banlmtnl 80"'2OOcm 5 1.

AIRCRAFTAircraf, Weapon To Hit Anli-Iank Fi",pown NOIt'$

\llG-\7 un>J(>11 ,. 10 ,. F-aS{ Mover.

"'mM •• I ,.

You must field one platoon trom each box shaded black and may field one platoon from eachbOll shaded grey.

JORDANIAN TANKS

21C Command tankComp.ny Command tank

If a 1Xnrrior or Plntf)()n Conmlnlld unm mo/.-'t'J in IIJ~

MOI'tmml Sup, all oftiN 'limit uoms i" in plalOD/1 mrmmolX itS 1«11. IfIM P!Iltoon ummllnd uam don 'lOr mov~,

only 'lil1llt uams rhat slllrtttl Ih, M(WfflI~nr Sup DUI ofCDmmond nuly mOI't_

A"y 7imJr uam thal mova adds .. / ro riot SeDrr rrquirrd rohir U'htn shoor",: with its mam gun. 7hiJ g;/.-'t'J 11 cumulatlt't p",airy 0/ ...2 ftr subrlisM RDF2 U)tapons. Ma.hi,,~

guns tlo nor SUfftr rhiJ pnwlty.

M48 Panon

••

COMPANY HQ

SARAYA MUDR EHQ

Following Btilish praaice, the armoured regimentswere baualion sized, composed of Ihrtt company-sizedarmoured squadrons, called 5Ilraya Mudr", (pronouncedSUHee-ya. moo-der-rah) in Arabic. The Jordanian Ar..bArmy W.lS the besl equipped in the Middl~ Easl. wilh allof ils tanks being modern M47 and M48 Panon tanksfrom the United Slates or CenrUIions nom Britain.

llWfl, obedience 10 elders ..nd submission to the will ofAllah.was an important aspect of Arab culture. Jordanian militaryft:ldirion owed a 101 10 the British Army. but even more to

their own hislory ..nd traditions, especially after the t:Ipidcxp:msion of lhe army and the resulting lack of well-trainedjunior officers and NCOs.

TAA'A

185 poinu

195 points

Jordan ....~ a sffi:.l.lI country with a rd:Hi\'dy sm~l army.Until 1956, the: Jortbniln Army had httn a long-~rvicc:

professional force: led by Briwh officers. With the formation of the: Jordanian Arab Army, the British wc:re kickedOut and the: army expanded four-fold. including the:creation of rwo uffioured brigades Ca-ch of rwo armouredregimcnlS) and (Wo independent armoured regiments.

A mOI",t u",1t ftlud u'ilh iI SubiliHr can firr iI milm gu"u:ilh ROF 2 or fMrr ill infUU RDF. bU11Uids 11~1l1'J of... / ro rh, scorr to h". 71,1S is in llliJinon 10 W ... 1 III hilftrrk Ttlll'a ,ptriillruk. living a lOlal of ...2 to hll.

&fitrr shoorml- 11 u,,1t Cl", choo~ nor to UH ilS Sulbilun-.

MOTIVATION AND SKILL7ht jordnninn army still maim it dfgm ofprofmionalismftom its rutt:lagt by rhr British

Armlt 71ltjr brli1'ill tINir ability to INnt ,hi Imu/is has ta/un 12 pou"dint 0"'" tIN lastbrark although ntW rqulpmnu is slowly mtoring rhrir ronfidmrf. AJorrianian SaraJaMudr'r (Annourttl Squadron) is mua'Confidcnt Trained.

HEADQUARTERS

Ifa lanlt proucud by Sltirts fa;b an Armour Sav, against aUftapon wilh a Firt'poWN" raling 0/5... or 6 hilting itr Std,armour, roll a sp«iaI4... Skim S4vr:

Ifrk MW is succmfitl, rI" Skim protm tlK II1nJr fro",tht hit. which hits no 4ficr.

If rlN Mvt: r1 nOI succnsfil tht shor pnumllN rI" Silkarmour as normal.

STABILISERS

The British-supplied Onturion tanks were fined with'bazooka skirts' or 'bazooka plales' and turret stowage binsfO prolect them from bazooka-armed lank humers.

The Centurion was fined with a vcr)' efficient slabiliser IhatkepI ,he gun pointing:1.I the target between shou as the lankffiO\·ed. This made shooting on Ihe m~ nom a Ccnrurionmuch marc dfecri\'e than olher t2flks.

COMBAT PLATOONS

3 Ctnlurion

2 CcnluriOD

3 M48 Pallon

2 M48 Panon

••290 points

195 points

275 pointS

185 pointS

MOlAZlM THANI

Command Tlnk

•TInt.

Jordan's :umourw fored us«i rh~ umc British unrurionand American M48 Panon mnks :lJi their ISr.leli foes.However, since they faced mainly up·gunn«i Shermantanks and AMX light ranks. thC'y usually outmarchcd theIsraelis on a lank·for-rank basis.

Tlnk

.. "

WEAPONS PLATOONS

••-0 points

The M42 anti-aircraft tank is b;unl on the chassis of theM41 \t'a1keT Bulldog light tank. Mounting twin &fors40mm 2nti-:.lIircraft guns, thC)' are deadly against aircraft.~'en modern jcu.

MOtAZIM THANI

MOlAZIM THANI

Comn.nd M42 (TWIn 4Omm1

ANTI AIRCRAFT PLATCX)N

MUDR E ANTI-AIRCRAFT PtAlOON

Mm..

~25 pelf gun

~2S pelr gun

......~ .......~

25 pelrgun

RIFLE SQUAD

MOlAlIM THANI

MOLAZIM THAN!

....Jeep

..

HQ SECTION

MESHAH MEYKANEYKEYH(MECHANISED) PLATOON

-r~n, ~n."fllfle/MG Rlfle/MG

turn team

~2S pelrgun

...~

2S pelf gun

Command Rllle team Slaff Ieam Obsel'\'er Rifleleam

~-r., ..Commlnd MI13

Rlflt/MG tum

-Wit. --...11.M20 Super light Morar

Bazooka lIam learn

• •

-r~n.,~n." -r~n'-1."nRdleIMG "''''''' ...""', RiftWMG~.m turn ~.m lum.. ..

MIl3 MllJ

155 points

85 points

1"':"5 points

135 points

MI/3

3 RiAc Squads

2 RiRc Squads

G25 pdr

325 pd,

IIQ Sewnn wllh.

SUPPORT PLATOONS

25pdT

The Jordani:m artillery W6S cquippM with old BritishOQF 25 pdr guns. Despite its age, dte gun still performeditS job well, deli\'t:ring a high volume of firt 10 silcnulargcu while the tanks :.lnd infimtry mmowvrtd imouSlIuh posilions.

The Jonbnian mechanised inliumy, called Mnh4hMqltanryluyh (pronouncai moo-shin mer-bn-ik-tt-a)in Anbic. wc~ mounted in modcm American M 113armoured ~rsonncl arricrs. Their uniforms and tquipment wC'rt brgcly S«ond World War surplus from BritishStocks. although t~ir riRc ....';15 me' M I Garmd and theiranti-tank ,",,«Ipon me M20 Super Buoob from theUnilN t21t:$.

AlAMAMThe Ar:ab armies have b«n fed a steady diet of ami-Jewishpropaganda since the form;ltion of Israel. The basic mCSSOlgeis usuall)' the same, 'Soon all Arabs will uniu:~ lO smile Isradand deslroy the Jews.' Many Ar:ab soldicf$ were eager toaJaml1m, 10 advance. and gCI 10 grips with the: Israelis, oftenrashly so, and l:lke the: offensive alllhe ....';Iy to Td Aviv.

An] Arab pLuoon with a Command uam mOJ Qtr~mpt Itn

Alamsm mOI'( ill rht tlim oftI~ SJJf)()11ll1 Srtp InsumJ ofshtxtti"f.1filpIA/IN", illtmtpts to milk' on ALmUlm m(J1V. It

nuy not moot, n'tn ifit jails 10 mslu An A"'"",,,, mow.

Roll il Motmltlon T~l/or tIN P"lIDO":

• Ifrh, It'SI is IllTUUJul ,Iv pLuDO" mill mOl't "nolM4~/J(km.

Otl~Twiu. rhl' platoon elmllO! mot~ th" lUp.

All of rhr l10mwl ruIn apply ftr this mo/'t'mmt. PlatoonscannOt mak, ,llama", mOIJt'S ifthry Ilrt PilUud Down or

mouldAt lhl' Dou61,., Boggrd Down fJr Bail,d OUlwhidnrmmot maJu Awmam motJn.

JORDANIAN liONSJordanian (loops display«l an e;ccq>lional stubbornness inholding theit positions. lime after time their troops foughtwhere they stood, refusing to give up ground until defe::l.led.

Wkn Jord4nlAn p14t«Jns rm thl'lr MotIvation IDCou1ltmutdclt In alSilults. you 11IIly "-roIL tJ~ dil' andapplythl' rr-rolkd mult to aILJordanIAn p14toons that failed onth, original roll.

JABRIJordanian officen were mostly 8edouin loyal to KingHussein, while mosl of the soldiers in the technical services(including mOSt rank crews) were town-dwelling Hadariand viewed wilh suspicion. The gulf between [hem was asignificant weakness. When Ihe situation deteriorated. manyofficen pur their own survivaJ ahead of that of their trOOps.Fortunately for the Arab ClU$C', the soldiers were much morejabri. fauJi51ic. and often fought to the end. even withouttheir officers.

If'ln Arab p14UN1f1 u ith " PIotoon Gnn"''',", uam or a"atuuhrd Comma,", tl'am fails 11 PIouJt11t Mora!.l' Chrrlt(II/t" any rr-rolls). or an Arab comjNt"J k,/th 11 Hi!,hrr.Comp4nJ. or 2iCCommand uam falls 11 ComjNt"J MorakCh«It, roIL a die:

On it roO of.5 or 6, you pdll the Pwtoon or CompanyAforak Ch«lt, but "mOlle the most srmor Command tramimJ()lt~d al it headl to the "ar. I" the cast ofa PwtoonMora" Checlt thll 11 the mort Imior Command tram inorjoinrd to the plaloo", /" the cme ofa Compllny MorakOvclt, It is Ih, Command uam that UIOUIJ normally talt,thr Motiwtilm Tnt IfIhis /L'ilS the last leam in 11 p14l1xm,Ihi' plat«Jn is no /on!," on tIN tllb/e, but I1 not Datruytd.

• Othtru'Isr, tIN Pllltoon or Company Morak Chrrlt uftikd IZl normal

JORDANIAN ARSENAL

2 eo.n MC. SO al AA MC. Prolml:d lJnI'I)(l. Sbtu.. litlJdioabk. Wt<k Inch.j. S".SUb.U-

2 SO ea! Cupol. MC. (b.u MC. W".& U1Id::J..J.

16

,r816

15

11Z

"2

Anno.,Froot Sid~ Top NousROF ,bti-"''',. Fi~~

Mobiliry...,.Skn.·T~k

40"IJOOc7rt

Sundard T:lnk40"JIOtkM

TANK TEA.MS

Atm-AIRCUfT GUNS

Mol! (TWln 4Omm) Lipl Tmkrlml ,\1241""'",:-111 24°16Oow

T",,,Cmluhoa

OQFZO,J7,..

M4S,\141 9Ortf", 1"11

Te;tm Code

M113 AjOBXOI

Meshm \fcybn~kcyh(Mt:dunised) Pl;ttoon Aj0722

St;tffttam BR710

25 pelr gun BR573

Ara.b and Jordani;tn Dttals AAR941

ROF An,i·'.nk Fl"fIO"'~r NOla

2 9 J. Gun Ihidd. Smok, Turntable.<I 5+ S-u"",""",lIInlt

6 ROF IlfHltntoUf»nlfirr

.s. ROF J ifllkrwr.,.nlfirt.

Cod.

AlSBX02

AISBXOI

AJ0161

U5411

US413

BR277

z;

,

...,.2""/6Ocm80 "'2(JOn"

MODELS TO USE FOR JORDANIANS

,

J,

Anno~

FroOI Side Top NolO

ROF A_d."" Frrr,.-r

Mobility

Hea\'Y

...,. ROF Anti.cank Fl"po~r Nota

16"/4(km , 616"/4Ocm , , 6

16"/4Ocm 1 1 ,. '\moke. Can fi~ ~r friendl), InJlll.

S"/2Ocm 11 ,. Tank Auauh S.

16"t4Ocrn , 6 Ml"U;u. Hnvy Gun ItarlI.

16"/4ibr

/6"14Onrr

Mobility.....J«p

Whttlal

LiglH TVIk

Te;tm

CcnlUrion

\,148

M42 (fwin 40mm)

J~P

Dodge ~-fOn truck

Quad tra.C1or

The Jord;tni;tns ue modelkd u ;t oombinuion of new codes for equipment specific 10 them ;tnd American and Britishcodes for old WWlI ttjuipmcnl still in use by lhejorcbni;tn Ara.b Army. This table gives the relrnmt codes.

TRANSPORT TEAMS

INFANTRY TEAMS

\(I",-~MG

.50 eM/",",/(k MC

GUN TEAMS

VEHiClE MACHINE-GUNS

2S pd, gunFm.",8tJ","M1N1lt

!.ighl MOrlar ,nm

M20 Supr. Bawou lcam

Slafftum

--

III 111111119 420020 224629

Product Cod~ W/3/2-SCPFlmntJ Oftrarwebsite ;(nd diswssion forum:

hnp:l/www.Hanu:;sOfWu.com. pyright Battlefront Mini,.tur llluiled. 2ij.J, All righb re~en'ed.

Tbis is a supplementfor Flames Of war, the WorM War II Milliatures Game.A copy of the rulebook for Flnm~s OjWl(zr is necessary (Q use (he coments of (his book.

Designed In New Zeelend

"nen by: Phi! Yalo.. EdkDrac~ ~n-Paul Brisit-'oul. Graphic Oap Sa Goodiron. V-olnAlien. ,001\. Victor :tuis Townky. Cawu An; \ In' RI \\'ai. C;pcd",1 tIJJnki 12,..t* prOof readers. pb.}1:el

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Printed In the United Kingdom

:t.!::N•!

In June 1967, escalating tensions between Israel and the surrounding Arab nations erupted into open warfarewhen the Israelis launched a surprise air strike against the opposing air forces on the ground, followed by anattack against the Arab forces in the Sinai Peninsula. Within six days they had decisively beaten every Arab force"opposing them. Despite its brevity, the Six-Day War was a complex affair fought on three fronts, and involved

", non-stop battles between an unusual variety of forces .. ~~;~-" ~

:tT::;:S.~nce the founding of the moderni::~siate of Israel in 1948, there havek;);een numerous wars fought between

Israel and its Arab neighbours.While it would be simple to dismissthese conflicts as religious disputes,_additional factors have almost alwayscontributed to regional tensions whichhave so often escalated into full-scale war. The Six-Day War was noexception to this trend. In addition tothe unresolved religious and territorialdisputes resulting from the foundingof Israel, water politics and even ColdWar manoeuvring contributed to theeventual outbreak of war in 1967.

1948: INDEPENDENCE

In 1947 the United Nationsrecommended the adoption of aplan which would divide the BritishMandate of Palestine into separateJewish and Palestinian states. WhileJewish representatives accepted the

(plan, the Arab League vigorouslyopposed it, preferring instead that the

:-l\1andate become a Palestinian state-~which promised to respect the rights

~ffipf the Jewish minority.

Conflict between the Jewish andPalestinian communities in theMandate increased after the UNresolution and eventually escalated tothe 1948 Arab-Israeli War, as a resultof which Israel won its independence.

1956: THE SUEZ CRISIS

The Suez Canal provides a directroute between the Indian Ocean andthe Mediterranean, saving a lengthytrip around Africa. Britain andFrance, who owned and controlledthe Suez Canal, considered it to bevital to their global interests. Clashesbetween the Egyptians and the Britishgarrison led to a coup against theEgyptian King Farouk in 1952, andthe establishment of a republic underthe presidency of Colonel GamalAbdel Nasser.

When Nasser expelled the British andthen seized the Suez Canal in October1956, tensions between Britain,France, and Egypt reached breakingpoint. The British and Frenchdeveloped a plan to invade Egypt andreclaim the Suez Canal, and invitedJ§rael t~ join them.

Ten days later, Israel invaded th~Sinai Peninsula, with the Britishand French invading Egypt the nextday. In a little over a week Egyptwas defeated and the fighting wasover, but international condemnatioIt\1ti~

soon forced the withdrawal of Britain~~~,~~~France and Israel. This left Nasser an Arab hero for standing up tothe 'Imperialists' .

There had long been a desireamongst Arabs to establish a unitedArab state that would restore theirpower and international prestige.Nasser's elevated status allowed himto form the United Arab Republiccombining Egypt and Syria in 1958as the Syrians struggled to avoid aCommunist takeover. While the uniononly lasted three years before Syriasplit away in one of a seeminglyendless series of coups, Egyptremained the United Arab Republicuntil 1972.

THE WATER WAR

Even agriculture was political inthe Middle East, and could lead towar. As a small state surrounded by

;f,~'~;~:f,,;giiwn 6n:'5'JuH~'~ ,Israel'"commenced Operation Moked(Focus), a surprise attack plannedto hit the United Arab Republic AirForce on the ground. Nearly all ofIsrael's operational jets penetrated

,,:\Egyptian airspace at low altitude ina surprise attack that crippled theUnited Arab Republic Air Force,destroying 293 aircraft for the loss ofjust 19 aircraft out of the 183-strongstrike force.

As soon as word of the success ofOperation Moked reached Israel,the signal Sadin Adorn (Red Sheet)went out to the troops waiting nearthe Egyptian border. Althoughoutnumbered, the Israelis planned to'surprise the United Arab Republic'sSinai Field Army with a threepronged attack which would outflankkey defensive positions, neutralizingthe e;f¥emy's numerical advantage.

_,The northern prong was BrigadierfGeneral Israel 'Talik' Tal's division,task~d with taking the Rafah Junction

"and El Arish to open the coastal road~'~~0 the Suez Canal. Here the Arabs

had their own 7th Infantry Division(under Major General Abd el AzizSdriman) and the Palestinian 20th

~_TIdInfantry Division (led by Major", 'eral Mohammed Abd el Moniem

Basil!) "ii{t~ger~d d~i~nces'laldout 'according to Soviet doctrine. Theadvance, led by the Magach (M48Patton) and Sho't (Centurion) tanksof the 7th Sa'ar (Storm) ArmouredBrigade, quickly ran into about 30Palestinian Sherman tanks and over100 Arab T-34 medium and IS-3heavy tanks backed up by SU-100Mtank destroyers.

The hard fighting for Khan Yunis inthe Gaza Strip, and then Rafah onthe Sinai border, took the entire day,despite the 60th Armoured Brigade(equipped with M51 Isherman andAMX light tanks) and 202nd ParatroopBrigade attacking Rafah from theflank. By nightfall, one battalionhad broken through to El Arish(but was critically low on fuel andammunition) and another was on theway south from Rafah, but the restof the division was still moppingup resistance. Throwing caution tothe wind, and concerned about apossible counter-attack by the Arab4th Armoured Division, Tal orderedhis troops to stop 'clearing their supplyline and to push on through the night.By dawn El Arish was secure and theArab forces destroyed.

BIR LAHFAN

Tal's fears about a counter-attackby Major General Sidki el Ggp

"":4ih A;m~~reCl'Di~i~ioIlwe~e\v'founded. By nightfall, while theIsraelis were still fighting at Rafah,several hundred Arab T-54 and T-55tanks were nearing the road juncti9Pat Bir Lahfan, just south of El ArisIY'!t:Fortunately for Tal, Brigadier Gene;(~:.;'

Avraham Yoffe's division had beenordered to advance up the unchartedWadi Haradin, a dried-up river bed"in a steep-sided gully. The advanc~~,~:

took all day, with the Centurion taii1(crawling over soft sand and throughrocky defiles, but the 200th ArmoureBrigade reached Bir Lahfan with theArabs completely unaware of their"advance.

The Arab tanks drove up the road,headlights on. One volley and thesituation changed completely as theArabs switched off their lights. TheArab tanks had infrared searchlights,and began to engage the Israelisout of the darkness. Some Israelicommand tanks had searchlightsand used these to engage, but wererapidly picked off. The rest of theIsraelis were reduced to shootingat gun flashes. The Israeli tankswere running low on ammunitionas dawn approached, but weresaved by helicopters deliveringammunition, and the arrival of the7th Armoured Brigade from El Arish",;~

around 1000hrs."

THE INVASION OF THE WEST BANK~

N•

MEDITERRANEAN SEA I • Hadera

Netanyaft

TelAvive

Lad•

oRamlah

ISRAELI

I:

~

I

,I

29~ t~ f/lHebron

Map ironl CAM 216 The Six Day War1967: Jordan and Syria.© Osprey Publishing Ltd.

The southern prong was spearheadedby Major General Ariel Sharon(later Prime Minister of Israel). Hisdivision's goal was to clear the roadthrough the interior of the Sinai viaAbuAgeila and Jebel Libni. Sharonfaced Major General Sa'adi Nagib's2nd Infantry Division with its regiment

.ofT-34 and IS-3 tanks and SU-100Mtank destroyers, supported by a brigadeof artillery. The division was wellfortified, with minefields and trenchsystems along the Urn Katef ridge

'blocking the main route to Abu Ageila.

Sharon's detailed and complex plan"combined airmobile and ground

'g.&operations. During the day Sharon,~':lna6ved his troopsit~nto position

• Afula

,\

\~\ x:,;6~

\\

,\

X ~40§ ,::::;- Damiya Bridge

-!,.~

$'J 0 R\.o A N

'l,tAbdullah Bridger;-

, Dead Sea:

........- 5-6 June .... --- 7-8 June

o 15 miles~ , . c

o 20km

and probed the defences. Whenhis attacks were rebuffed, Sharonwaited until nightfall to press theattack. Under cover of the biggestartillery force ever assembled by theIsraelis, Sharon's infantry attackedthe northern end of the Urn Katef linewhile the supporting tanks attackedfrom the front, pouring fire intothe trenches ahead of the infantryadvance. Meanwhile a small unit ofparatroopers (reduced even furtherby the diversion of their helicoptersto resupply Yoffre's troops at BirLahfan) landed behind the Arabartillery park and attacked them fromthe rear. This significantly reduced theamount of artillery fire falling on themain attack. The defences were soonbreached and, although they wereslowed by mines, the 14th ArmouredBrigade pushed through to takeAbu Ageila and link up withYoffre's force.

When reports of the fall of El Arishand Abu Ageila reached the EgyptianField Marshal'Abd al-Hakim 'Amr,he panicked (as he had in 1956) andordered a general retreat to the SuezCanal. Although the Arab army hadtaken losses and given ground, it wasfar from defeated and retained manyformations in good order. However,this single order sealed its fate. Withthe Sinai Field Army now in fullretreat, the Israeli armoured brigad~;$

bypassed the enemy ground forcesand pushed for the Suez, taking thecritical passes in the central Sinai,while the Israeli air forces poundedthe fleeing columns. By 8 June, afterjust three days, the Israeli capture ofthe Sinai was complete.

THE WEST BANK

Despite the success of the initialIsraeli attacks, President Nasserconvinced King Hussein of Jordanthat the United Arab Republic waswinning a crushing victory againstIsrael, with their forces closing inon Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Jordanresponded with air and artillerystrikes on Israeli airfields and citiesand prepared to attack southward tolink up with Nasser's fictitious attack.Israel attempted a diplomatic solutionwith Jordan, but King Hussein replied'the die is cast' .

Jordan's pre-war plans for Operatiolr'~i~l~,t.

Tariq (Victory) called for the captureof the Jewish part of Jerusalem asa bargaining chip for the groundthey expected to lose to the Israelis.Instead, they opened their war bymoving the 60 th Armoured Brigadesouth from its reserve position tolink up with Nasser's nonexistentattack, and moved the 40th ArmouredBrigade into reserve.

The Israelis took advantage of thisto launch an offensive to protect theroute between Jerusalem the rest ofIsrael, and another from the northto cut off the entire West Bank fromJordan east of the Jordan River. TheIsraelis attacked a series of Jordanianpositions overlooking the road intoJerusalem, taking them all on thefirst day. As in subsequent battles,the Jordanians fought hard until theirfortifications were breached, thenfragmented and were mOPllyd up in

~et'~~_~~

small grori;~. By 1000 hrs on 6 June, .after 24 hours of hard fighting, thebulk of Jerusalem was in Israeli hands.

In the north, Brigadier General EladPeled's division struck south on twoaxes, aiming to take the town ofJenin from behind with one brigade,while bypassing it and pushing on toNablus, a key position in the centreof the Jordanian positions, with theother brigade. The Israeli armouredbrigades, mainly equipped withUpgunned Sherman tanks, ran intothe lead elements of the Jordanian40th Armoured Brigade at nightfall,and struggled to overcome the heavierJordanian M47 and M48 tanksh~olding defensive positions for mostof the next day, despite heavy attacksby the Israeli Air Force.

Fortunately for Peled's men, KingHussein, fearing an Israeli invasionof central Jordan, ordered all of hisforces back across the Jordan Riveron the night of 6 June. Realizing thatthe way lay open, the Israelis raced,forward to complete the capture ofthe entire West Bank.

Israeli forces had avoided enteringthe Old City in the first two days offighting fearing damage to holy sites'and international backlash. However,by 7 June, with a UN imposedceasefire presumed to be imminent,

> Israeli paratroopers finally assaultedand captured the Old City as well.

Despite being the prime cause of thewar, Syria had only conducted minoroffensive operations on 5 and 6 June,easily repulsed by Israeli forces, thenhunkered down behind their GolanHeights fortifications. Having dealtwith the United Arab Republic andJordan, Israel turned its attention toSyria. After vigorous debate, seniorIsraeli politicians approved militaryoperations against Syria. Thesecommenced at 1130 hrs on 9 June,attempting to beat the UN ceasefiredeadline set for the next day.

The Golan Heights were almostimpassable to tanks, with heavilyfortified bunkers to a depth of severalkilometres. The fighting was brutaland often at very close range. Thisresulted in the Israelis losing moretanks here than on either of the othertwo fronts, despite a lack of largescale clashes with enemy armour.Israeli forces broke through the initialline of resistance and reached theGolan Plateau by the evening, butfearful of a Syrian counter-attack,continued their advance throughoutthe night. By the morning of 10 June,the Syrian forces were in full retreat,demolishing their own bunkers asthey fell back.

On 11 June 1967, a general cease--fire;agreement was signed, ending theSix-Day War. By this point, Israelhad captured the Sinai, West Bank,Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights,increasing its territory greatly.However, this also added a millionArabs to its governed population.While these new territories wouldserve as useful buffer zones againstfuture aggression, the addition ofsuch a large, essentially hostile,population would prove to be aconstant problem.

While the 1967 Six-Day War proved '~~.

that Israel had the means and politica:f~:';c

will to defend itself, it did not leadto a lasting peace. Israel hoped touse the Sinai and Golan Heights as'bargaining chips for long-term peacetreaties with the Arab states, but to J.Arabs 'The Setback' , as they name~{

the war, had to be avenged. The next~:z ~

six years saw constant skirmishingacross the Suez Canal, then, in 1973;the Yom Kippur War saw a newEgyptian-lordanian-Syrian alliancetry to reverse their humiliating defeatin the Six-Day War. Though that warwould eventually pave the way toa peace process between Israel andsome of its neighbours, the regionremains volatile to this day.

I(SOF'67By Dr. Michael ,L. McSwiney :I.~!!§~.

, ~

~'~J1~~the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel pitted its roughly 800 tanks against the nearly 2500 tanks of the surroundingArab nations. While both sides fielded modern designs like the British Centurion, the American M48 Patton, and

,',Jhe Soviet T-55, these were expensive. Older designs dating back to the Second World War made up the numbers.

The M4 Sherman tank wasdeveloped in 1941 in anticipationof America's involvement in theSecond World War, and went onto become the standard tank of thewestern Allied forces. The Shermanunderwent many evolutionarychanges during the war, and by theend of it nearly 50,000 had beenproduced. The later versions of theSherman tank fought on throughthe Korean War in the early 1950s,but the Sherman was phased out ofAmerican service soon thereafter.

Israel acquired its first Shermantank via a clandestine arrangementwith British soldiers tasked with

,destroying military equipment priorto the British withdrawal fromPalestine in 1948. By 1956, theyhad several hundred Sherman tanks

_scrounged from various scrap yardsaround the world, including 60 MlShermans provided by France (Mlwas the Israeli designation for the

M4Al tanks armed with 76mmguns). The Israelis acquired moreMl tanks in the late 1950s, havingsome 300 at their peak. By 1967 theremaining Ml tanks had been fittedwith the improved HVSS suspensionof the 'Easy Eight' and were usedfor infantry support work on theJordanian front.

UP-GUNNED SHERMANSWith the surrounding Arab nationsreceiving increasingly powerfulSoviet tanks, the Israelis began tomodify their Sherman tanks to keeppace. The first model, the M50Sherman, mounted the French 75mmCN-75-50 gun from theAMX-13light tank in a modified 75mm turret.The first 50 vehicles were readyjust in time for the 1956 war. Themobility of these initial vehicles waspoor and the engine was overworked,so the engines were replaced withpowerful Cummings diesel enginesand the suspension upgraded toHVSS like the Ml Super Shermans.

In 1967 the Israelis had 179 M50'French' Sherman tanks.

First shown publicly in 1965, theM51 Isherman (a name used by thecrews from a contraction of 'IsraeliSherman') was an even more radicaladaptation of the venerable Shermandesign. Based on the 76mm-armedMl chassis, the M51 was armed witha modified French 105mm gun fromthe latestAMX-30 main battle tank.The gun itself had been shortenedand a huge muzzle brake wasadded to handle its recoil. Becauseof these changes and the crampednature of the Sherman turret, it alsoused modified ammunition witha shorter cartridge. Using HEAT(High Explosive Anti-tank) rounds,the M51 proved a deadly fightingmachine capable of defeatingopponents armed with far moremodern Soviet designs such as theT-54, T-55, and even the T-62 when itfaced them in 1973. Total productionof the M51 was roughly 180 vehicles.

Crew: 5 (cdr, gnr, ldr,dvr, co-dvr)

Weight: 34 tonnesLength: 8.09m (26' 7")Length (hull): 5.89m (19' 4")Width: 3.00m (9' 10")Height: 2.74m (9')

Crew: 5 (cdr, gnr, ldr,dvr, co-dvr)

Weight: 39 tonnesLength: 9.00m (29' 6")Length (hull): 5.89m (19' 4")Width: 3.00m (9' 10")Height: 2.74m (9')

Weapons: 75mm CN-75-50, 2x MG, .50 calAAMG

Ammunition: 62 roundsArmour: 51mm (2")Speed: 45 km/h (28 mph)Range: 160 km (100 miles)

Weapons: 105mm D1504,2 x MG, .50 calAA MG

Ammunition: 55 roundsArmour: 64mm (2.5")Speed: 45 km/h (28 mph)Range: 160 km (100 miles)

PALESTINIAN SHERMANSThe Egyptians used Sherman tanks inthe 1956 war, but by 1967 they werenearing the end of their effectiveservice life. The remaining 30 werehanded over to the 20th PalestinianDivision in the Gaza Strip, formingtheir one and only tank battalion.As with the Israelis, the Egyptianshad recognised the limitations of theSherman's short-barrelled 75mmgun and gone to the French for asolution. They settled on the samegun as the Israeli M50, but ratherthan modifying the turret, simplyreplaced it with the turret from anAMX-13 light tank to create the M4/FL-10. A handful of these served in

. the Palestinian tank battalion.

AMX

Crew: 3 (cdr, gnr, dvr)Weight: 15 tonnesLength: 6.36m (20' 10")Length (hull): 4.88m (16')Width: 2.50m (8' 2")Height: 2.30m (7' 7")

Weapons: 75rnrn CN-75-50,1-2 x MG

Ammunition: 37 roundsArmour: 40mm (1.6")Speed: 60 km/h (37 mph)Range: 350 km (215 miles)

In an effort to minimise futureconflicts in the Middle East, themajor powers set up an armsembargo after the 1948 war.However, when the Suez Crisis cameto a head, France hastily equippedtheir new ally, Israel, with up-gunned

~ Sherman tanks and brand-new AMXJ3 light tanks.

The AMX-13 is smaller than a WWIIStuart light tank, with the same speed

,"and armour, but mounts a gun aspowerful as that of the Panther tank.

C They achieved this feat with a radicaloscillating-turret design. The gun

«',was fixed to the top half of the turret

allowing a twelve-round autoloaderto feed directly into the rear of thegun. The whole top half of the turretrocked back and forward on thebottom half elevating and depressingthe whole weapon system.

While this removed a crew memberand made the turret extremelysmall, it did have drawbacks. Theautoloader was slower than a humanloader, and once the twelve readyrounds were used, the tank had toretire out of range while the crewspent 15 minutes or more out of thetank reloading it. Combined with itslight protection, this led to the AMX·

being relegated to reconnaissanceroles in the 1967 war

CENTURION

The Centurion was designed duringWorld War 11 to provide the BritishArmy with a universal tank capableof withstanding hits from German8.8cm anti-tank weapons. The firstmock-up was completed in May1944, but only a few prototypeswere completed before the end of ,hostilities. Powered by a Rolls-ROYc~Meteor engine mated with the newHorstmann suspension, the Centurionwas slow, but had excellent cross-

Crew: 4 (cdr, gnr, Idr, dvr) Weapons: OQF 20 pdr (83mm),Weight: 51 tonnes MG, .50 cal AA MG

',_ Length: 9.83m (32' 3") Ammunition: 65 roundsLength (hull): 7.56m (24' 10") Armour: 118mm (4.7")Width: 3.39m (11' 1") Speed: 34 km/h (21 mph)Height: 2.94m (9' 8") Range: 100 km (60 miles)

Weapons: 105mmL7,MG, .50 calAAMG

" Length: 9.85m (32' 4") Ammunition: 72 roundsength (hull): 7.56m (24' lO") Armour: ll8mm (4.7")

Width: 3.39m (11' I") Speed: 34 km/h (21 mph)Height: 2.94m (9' 8") Range: 100 km (60 miles)

country performance. Initially armedwith the magnificent 17 poundergun, in 1948 the Centurion Mk IIIwas up-gunned to the 20 pounderto enable it to tackle newer Soviet

, tanks. With a strong combination ofarmour, firepower, and mobility, the

~ Centurion was the first main battle'tank of the post-war era.

~':}*~$ypt and Jordan both received'i,'xitish Centurions, but supplies

;·.:~:~eased when the Suez Crisis-alienated them from Britain. TheEgyptians did not use the handfulthey received, but the Jordanian ArabArmy still had a battalion of about 44,Centurions fighting around Jerusalemin 1967.

SHO'T - SCOURGE

Israel attempted to acquire Centuriontanks for several years from Britain,but was rebuffed until after the SuezCrisis of 1956. In 1959 a clandestinearmy delegation was sent to Britainto begin training and familiarization

,.,with the Centurion tank. As the'''-',~~: ;f::,'':''

agreement was secret, the code nameSho't (Scourge or Whip) was usedto refer to the Centurion in Israeliservice. Israel initially receivedroughly 20 used Mark 5 tanks,but later began to purchase newMark 8 tanks. By the time of the1967 conflict, Israel had nearly 300Centurions in service. All but 12 usedaround Jerusalem had been upgradedwith the new British 105mm L7 gun.

The Centurion originally had a poorreputation with the Israeli DefenceForce, being thought unreliable andinaccurate. This turned out to bea result of the Israeli's extremely'rough and ready' approach tomaintenance and gun calibration.After an embarrassing incidentduring the Water War in which theyfailed to hit anything in a day-long engagement with the Syrians,the Armoured Force dramaticallyimproved their maintenance andgunnery practices. After that theCenturion became the preferred tankfor its accurate gun and resiliencewhen hit.

After the Six-Day War of 1967, theIsraelis further upgraded their Sho'tCenturions by replacing the Meteorpetrol engine with an AmericanContinental diesel engine, giving itmore speed and a longer range

M48 PATTONAnother Western tank used in quantityby both sides in the Six-Day War wasthe American M48 Patton. Althoughdescended from the M26 Pershingof WWII, the M48 was an almosttotally new design. The M41 90mmgun was longer and significantly morepowerful than the old WWII gun, ','while the engine generated 60% more/:~'·'

power, more than compensating forthe extra weight of its thicker armour.The resulting tank was the equal ofany main battle tank in the world,despite a reputation for flammabilitywhen hit.

MAGACH - BATTERING RAMIn its on-going quest for more andbetter tanks, Israel managed to

"x~acguire more tp-an a.-'~~' !K"l

The United Arab Republic fi~~lded

the SU-100M, a Czech variant on theSU-100, with considerable success inthe 1956, 1967, and 1973 wars. Mostdivisions had a battalion of 16 to 22SU-100M tank destroyers to back uptheir medium tanks.

15-3Unlike the Western nations, theSoviet Union continued with heavytank development long after WWII.First seen by Western nations atthe 1945 Victory Parade in Berlin,the IS-3 was an evolutionarydevelopment of the Iosif Stalin seriesof heavy tanks used extensivelyduring WWII. The IS-3 heavy tankmade excellent use of sloped armouron the hull and had a hemisphericalturret which would be seen onnearly all post-war Soviet tanks.Armed with the outstanding D-25T122mm gun, the IS-3 was, however,relatively slow and suffered fromreliability issues, especially in thehot desert.

Egypt acquired roughly 100 of thesetanks, assigning them to supportthe T-34/85 tanks in the infantrydivisions and back up the T-55 tanksin the mechanised and armoureddivisions. Their combat resultsduring the Six-Day War were notauspicious. Designed for attackson heavily fortified positions, they

T-54 AND T-55

were not as effective in fast-movingtank battles. While the 90mm-armedIsraeli M48 tanks had great difficultypenetrating the frontal armour ofthe IS-3 at normal combat ranges,the slow rate of fire of the IS-3,poor fire control, and poormechanical reliability proved tobe significant handicaps in knockingthem out in return.

T-54 AND T-55Originally designed as anevolutionary replacement for theT-34 medium tank, the T-54 (and thelater T-55) quickly evolved into theSoviet Union's first main battle tank.Entering full production in 1947, theT-54 and T-55 series became the mostproduced tank in history with up to100,000 units eventually rolling offthe assembly lines over the next 35years. The hallmarks of the designwere its mechanical simplicity, goodmobility, compact design, and thepotent D-10T 100mm gun (the sameweapon as used in the SU-100M).Unfortunately the compact designresulted in a cramped interior whichinterfered with the effective operationof the tank and its armament.

The T-54 and T-55 were liberallyprovided to Soviet allies and satellitestates including the United ArabRepublic and Syria. The Sinai FieldArmy had several hundred T-54 and

T-55 tanks grouped in the 4th Armoured Division and the 6th Mechanised Division.

Despite many of them being fittedwith infrared equipment andstabilisers, they generally faredpoorly against the better utilisedIsraeli armour. Their poor gunneryand abysmal tactics allowed the well- , ';trained Israelis to turn back the Arabattacks, even at night.

THE AFTERMATHBy the end of the Six-Day War,Israel's effective area had increasedthreefold through the addition of theGaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, theWest Bank, and the Golan Heights.The Arab nations had lost hundredsof tanks whereas Israeli losses hadbeen comparatively light. Israelhad captured vast stocks of Arabarmour including Centurions, M47and M48 Pattons, IS-3 heavy tanks,and T-54 and T-55 medium tanks.Many of these vehicles were pressedinto Israeli service and saw actiona few years later during the 1973Yom Kippur War. Israel's successin the Six-Day War, however, was ~'c

not due to overwhelming technicalsuperiority, but rather to superiortactics and her ability to achieve nearcomplete air-superiority at the outsetof the conflict.

Crew: 4 (cdr, gnr, ldr, dvr) Weapons: 100mm D-10T,Weight: 37 tonnes MG,12.7mmAAMGLength: 9.02m (29' 7") Ammunition: 34-43 roundsLength (hull): 6.57m (21' 6") Armour: 100mm (3.9")Width: 3.27m (10' 9") Speed: 48 km/h (30 mph)Height: 2.38m (7' 10") Range: 500 km (300 miles)

Crew: 4 (cdr, gnr, ldr, dvr) Weapons: 122mm D-25T,Weight: 46 tonnes MG, .12.7mmAAMG

~ ,<~ength: 9.73m (31' 11") Ammunition: 28 rounds_ Length (hull): 6.77m (22' 3") Armour: 120mm (4.7")

Width: 3.07m (10' 1") Speed: 37 km/h (23 mph)H~ight: 2.44m (8') Range: 240 km (150 miles)

COLO SOF'67

•US Field Drab (873)

Brown Wash

US Field Drab (873)and Iraqi Sand (819)

PAINTING MIDDLE EASTERN SKIN

Give them a Brown Wash.

Painting skin tones is perhaps oneof the most tricky and most debatedparts of painting miniatures. After abit of experimentation, we came upwith the following method.

Basecoat the skin areas in USField Drab (873).

Highlight with a 50:50 mix ofUS Field Drab (873) and Iraqi Sand(819), and add further highlights ofIraqi Sand (819) if you wish.

The Arab-Israeli War of 1967 presents a whole new palette of colours for modellers. The Israelis used a range ofgrey-khaki and olive colours, while the United Arab Republic used unadorned pale creams, and the Jordaniansused sand, green, and khaki. This article is an introductory guide to painting the forces that fought in theSix-Day War.

One of the most interestingdiscoveries when researching the SixDay War was the scarcity of detailedinformation. The Israeli DefenceForce still maintains a high degree

. of secrecy about its operations, whileArab sources suffer from a lack ofcameras at the time and quite limiteddetail. Even research by modellerslooking at original vehicles comes toconflicting opinions. As a result, thisarticle is our best guess, but if youhave different information then feelfree to try something else (and letus know!).

ISRAELI TANK MARKINGSThe Suez Crisis was Israel's firstlarge-scale use of tanks. In it theydiscovered that small markings wereliable to be missed in the heat ofbattle. As a result, their markingsin 1967 were far larger and moreobvious. Unfortunately, their meaningis still somewhat obscure due to theIsraeli penchant for secrecy!

The three most obvious markingswere barrel stripes and chevronsindicating the battalion and company,numbers and letters indicating theplatoon and the tank's position in it,and a big stripe for air recognition.The following seems to be the mostcommon pattern, but others have

.been observed.

The number of the battalion wasindicated by the number of stripeson the gun barrel. Companies areindicated by chevrons (V-shapedmarkings) pointing down for thefirst company, forward for thesecond company, and up for the thirdcompany. These were painted on anyconvenient flat panel on the side. OnCenturions this was usually the sideskirt. On Pattons, this was usually theturret side.

Platoons were generally indicatedby the numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4, withthe individual tanks indicated by theletters aleph (N), bet (J.), and gimel()), the first three letters of the Hebrewalphabet. The platoon commander may

have been marked as aleph or perhapsjust the unadorned platoon number.

A broad white stripe with a blackoutline formed the Israeli airrecognition marking. The stripe ranfore and aft across the engine deck,and often down the rear plate as well.It may also have been displayed onthe turret top as some photos showthis. Half-tracks and jeeps had astripe running across from one frontwheel to the other forming a T withthe fore and aft stripe running back tothe passenger compartment and oftendown the rear of the vehicle as well.

Many vehicles also carried battalionor brigade symbols on the front left(looking forward) mudguard, but themeaning of most of these is unknown.

/

I~ 11

BATTLEFIELDS OFJ '\ i/11.,

'THE SIX"'DAYWA:R~~xt'l -'~ ,

y Phil Yates

Despite much of the fighting taking p ace'! "';dese~ts in,ihe wor (I',. thttti~ftlefields oft'the Six-Day War were far from barren. The opening battles in the Gaza Strip were fought in and around built-upareas. The battles in the Sinai Desert that followed were mostly fought over defensive positions where the terrainlimited movement. In the central front, the West Bank of the Jordan River is a green and verdant land. To thenorth, the Golan Heights on the Syrian border are steep, rocky, and desolate. All of these offer interesting chal-:Ienges to the wargamer.

::';;~The Israelis divided their borders into,,~:'three military commands: Northern,~Central, and Southern. Thesecorresponded to their three hostileneighbours: Syria, Jordan, and the

. United Arab Republic (Egypt). Each ofthese areas had quite different terrain.

SOUTH - SINAI DESERT

The fighting in the south openedwith an attack on Khan Yunis andRafah Junction in the Gaza Stripon the coast to the north of theSinai Peninsula. This area is hard,dry desert, covered with scatteredscrub and trees, broken by steepsided gullies called wadis and rockyoutcrops, and crossed by roads andrail lines. The Arab towns are a mixof old and new building styles, but

,all are flat-topped, well suited to aclimate with minimal rainfall. Alongthe coast at El Arish the Israelis raninto soft sand dunes and dense grovesof palm trees. The remnants of past

-battles still littered the area.

Further south the rainfall almostceases altogether. The tracks that passfor roads wind their way through

'¥-s~nd dunes, wadi~, escarpments,.l<

rocky ridges, wide flat plains, andnarrow passes through the westernhills. Arab defensive positions tendedto be located to cover the small deserttowns where the tracks intersected,and even the odd Turkish fort of daysgone by. Both sides were familiarwith the battlefields, many of theofficers having fought over the sameground eleven years earlier.

CENTRAL - WEST BANK

The area west of the Jordan Rivercaptured by Jordan in the 1948war is generally quite rugged. Thehighlands to the west are some ofthe best farmland in the Holy Land,combining pasture, crops, and woodswith numerous villages and towns.To the east towards the Jordan Valley,the land is drier and less populated.

Jerusalem, where most of the fightingin the south was centred, was asmall but densely populated city in1967. Many of the battles foughtfor Jerusalem involved attempts todefend or capture the many rockyheights in the region.

To the north, the armoured battlestook pla\e in more open t~rrain,

still hilly, but not so rugged as thearea around Jerusalem. Much of thefighting took place around villages oron the outskirts of towns where roadsfrom different areas converged.

NORTH - GOLAN HEIGHTS

The Golan Heights on the 1967Syrian border with Israel is a 400mto 1000m (1300 ft to 3000 ft) highplateau overlooking northern Israeland the Sea of Galilee. From theIsraeli side, the Golan Heightsare steep and rugged. The rockyground is difficult to climb on footand impossible for vehicles excepton the few roads and tracks thatlead into Syria. Behind the borderfortifications, the mountain villageswere the site of a few last-ditchSyrian counter-attacks. The harshmountainous terrain was the mainreason that the Israelis took heaviercasualties against the Syrians thanagainst either of their other foes.

The following pages show some samplebattlefields from the area and describethe terrain in terms of Flames OjWar, aswell as listing which Battlefield in a Boxterrain sets from Gale Force Nine to useto recreate them.

» e overwlielmingnalrat~ve·OT:theSix-Day w;rr r », 9J1t~~nds~'eeping'> ~» vretories ogyptia;:i:,';Syrian and Jordanian forces, effortlessly pushing hundreBs of miles through the Sinai and West Bank while the}

, foes faltered and ran. The more realistic story is that there were many tough fightsin which personal bravery,and sacrifice were found on both sides, and risky, yet brilliant tactics, were required to win the day. The Israeli!lefence Force commanders knew they had to win the war definitively to secure the future of their country.

4 Commanders making decisions far from higher command 'took exceptional risks to achieve their goals and often'~paid the ultimate price.

;;~;~t9 represent these battles of the Six~~~'~ay War in Flames Of War we need

r:: zoom in from the strategic leveldown to the stifling and unforgiving

, battlefields of Rafah, Bir Lahfan, andJenin. It was on these battlefieldsthat Israeli junior commanders facedoff against their Arab equivalents tomake the strategic victory possible.Many of these encounters wereclose-run things or even local Israelidefeats. In Fate OfA Nation, Israelicommanders are challenged toequal the outstanding performance

,of their predecessors, while Arabcommanders are offered the chanceto show what could have been hadtheir higher command kept its nerve.

Despite the very different setting, theregular Flames OfWar missions on

_pages 253 to 288 of the rulebook workwell for the Six-Day War. There areaccounts of both sides attacking anddefending in battles remarkably similarto these missions throughout the war.

~~"I've selected three of my favouriteencounters as examples. These are not

.' weant to encompass the entire battles,~but rather represent smaller scale

jiactions within th~ battles ..:. ~~ .

The critical battles of the Six-DayWar were short, sharp, and oftenbrutal affairs that required herculeanefforts by Arabs and Israelis aliketo contend with the forces arrayedagainst them. Using the Flames OfWar rules and missions to portraythese battles is an enjoyable challengethat highlights the destructive natureof modern armoured warfare in anenvironment where no quarter isgiven between opponents.

RAFAH JUNCTION, 5 JUNEThe critical actions to secure theRafah Junction unfolded as a seriesof frantic and often confused battlesduring which the Israelis sought tobreach or bypass the Arab fortifieddefences, repel counter-attacks,and reduce the bypassed positions.In one of these actions Seren(Captain) 'Danny' of the IsraeliArmour School Battalion pushed hiscompany into the positions of the11 th Infantry Regiment of the Arab7th Infantry Division, only to findhis tank company surrounded onall sides. They engaged SU-100M

tank destroyers and infantry antitank guns to their front, then wereattacked from the rear by IS-3Mheavy tanks that they had bypassed.

MISSION: SURROUNDEDMission: Surrounded (see

page 282 of the rulebook).

• Attacker: United Arab RepublicKuteybh Debabh (Tank Battalion)with: IS-3 heavy tanks supportedby SU-100M tank destroyers,mechanized infantry, and artillery.

Defender: Israeli P'lugahTan'kim (Tank Company) with:Magach 2 tanks and a smallmotorised infantry platoon.

Terrain: Captain 'Danny' waslost after bypassing the IS-3 unit andfound himself in a flat plain brokenby low ridges of Sand Hills formingsmall valleys, with some areasof Scattered Scrub and Soft Sand(Desert Hazards) adding to the chaosof the battle.

FoW - Fate of a Nation

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