Final Report (Public Admin)

8/2/2019 Final Report (Public Admin)

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PREFACE

Although the idea of good governance has found significant place in philosophies,

approaches, thinking and action and has been surfaced in scientific and behavioral theories

since ancient and medieval ages, the concept of good governance emanated in the modernworld around 25 years before. In 1989 the concept of governance was for the first time

highlighted in a World Bank document on sub Saharan Africa when good governance wasmeant to mean sound development management. From this beginning to today, good

governance has been seen in different perspectives but its most important and relevant

perspective is the role it can play in improving the governance of public institutions workingfor the common good.

In this research report an attempt has been made to describe the concept of good governance

as it needs to be understood in its modern perspective and the manner in which it can be

used as a tool by researchers and planners alike for bringing improvement in publicinstitutions. A special effort has been made in this report to focus on the perspective in

which it needs to be perceived particularly for bringing improvement in good governance inthe Pakistani context.We are extremely thankful to Professor Dr. Humayun for providing us an opportunity to

explore into this subject and present a wider perspective of concept and approaches in good

governance and its relevance to modern thinking and institutions.This report has been divided into seven chapters. The first chapter on introduction focuses

on the why of good governance and a discussion of actors in good governance. Chapter

two of the report looks at the ethical approaches to good governance and the need for public

accountability. Chapter three discusses the characteristics and attributes of good governancewhile chapter four throws light on the ancient Indian political heritage of good governance

with special reference to the concept of common good and common kindness from religious

perspectives. Chapter five discusses the linkages between good governance, human rightsand development. Chapter six deals with good governance and its linkage with the

fundamental features of administrative law discussing measures needed to promote good

governance. Chapter seven is devoted to improving good governance in Pakistan byreforming its civil service. This chapter throws extensive light on the development of civil

bureaucracy, impact of military rule on civil service reforms. The chapter also focuses on

the challenges in reforming the civil bureaucracy in Pakistan and suggests recommendationsfor improving the service delivery in key areas of public concern.

This research report provides a good theoretical and descriptive foundation for researchers

in the area of good governance and opens the way for many more researches for improving

good governance in various areas of public institutions in Pakistan and the countries in the

developing world which are confronted with similar contextual circumstances. We wish toacknowledge the assistance of National Institute of Management, SZABIST and various

other sources for providing us contemporary literature for review and discussion in thisreport.


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TABLE OF CONTENTS


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1.0. INTRODUCTION: GOOD GOVERNANCE

Good governance has gained significant attention in the world especially in the last decade.

In recent years, good governance has attracted the attention of economists, politicalscientists, lawyers, politicians, national institutions, and institutions of World Bank andIMF. Since some empirical and theoretical controversies have been found on the concept

and importance of good governance but it can be considered as a prerequisite for economic

growth and development. Governance can also be seen as the instrument of the effectivenessof a societys institutions. If the institutions are appropriate and effective, the outcome

should be good governance.1

There is no single and exhaustive definition of good governance, nor is there a

delimitation of its scope, that commands universal acceptance. The term is used with greatflexibility; this is an advantage, but also a source of some difficulty at the operational level.

Depending on the context and the overriding objective sought, good governance has beensaid at various times to encompass: full respect of human rights, the rule of law, effectiveparticipation, multi-actor partnerships, political pluralism, transparent and accountable

processes and institutions, an efficient and effective public sector, legitimacy, access to

knowledge, information and education, political empowerment of people, equity,sustainability, and attitudes and values that foster responsibility, solidarity and tolerance.

The concept of governance is not new; it is as old as human civilization. Simply

governance means the process of decision-making and its implementation. The concept of

governance can be used in several contents such as corporate governance, internationalgovernance, national governance and local governance. Governance refers to the manner in

which power is exercised in the management of a countrys economic and social resources.2

Governance is the instrument of political, economic and administrative authorities to

manage a nation's affairs. It is the diverse mechanisms, processes, relationships and

institutions through which residents of country and groups communicative their benefits,exercise their rights and obligations and arbitrate their differences. In good governance

countries, the working condition is generally more favorable for providing protection and

guarantees for investors. Good governance is therefore a compartment of governance,wherein public capital and problems are managed effectively, efficiently and in response to

vital needs of society. Effective elected forms of governance rely on public participation,

accountability and transparency. There is an increasing amount of research on the factorsthat lead to good or bad governance in the world.

Good governance creates a good environment for investment, including investment in

people, and leads to higher income, reduces poverty, and provides better social indicators.According to UNDP, governance can be worked out as economic, political and

administrative authorities to manage a country's affairs at all levels. It joints the systems,

processes and institutions, through which residents and groups articulate their interests, put


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into affect their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences. More

modern studies have pointed out that face-to-face interactions, trust and partnership within

voluntary associations enhance the capacity of people to work together. By helping residentsto overcome combined action problems, trust and membership in voluntary associations are

recognized as important factors in building the basis for responsive governance. 3

World Bank has described the concept of good governance in various dimensions such as

rule of law, government effectiveness, regulatory quality and control of corruption. Thesedimensions cover the whole society and economic sectors of the economies. As a matter of

fact, this study will locate the variables that have more effect on these dimensions.

According to the Banks own definition, governance encompasses the form of politicalregime; the process by which authority is exercised in the management of a countrys

economic and social resources for development; and the capacity of governments to design,

formulate and implement policies and discharge functions (World Bank 1991 1992 1994;World Bank 2000a). However, while recognizing the importance of the political dimensions

of governance, the Bank interprets the concept restrictively, arguing that the first aspect whether a government is democratic or not - falls outside its mandate. As a result, it focuseson the economic dimensions of good governance, which has been equated with sound

development management.4

Governance has engaged all concerns of society and economic operators for economic

development but it is also considered as a fundamental element to be incorporated in the

development strategy. Nonetheless, having its importance, differences also exist in respect

of hypothetical formulations, policy prescriptions and conceptualization of the subject itself.Researchers have different ideology convictions due to which its formulation differs in

different areas. Policy analysis stand empirically on the historical research of governance

gives distinction to government failures to deliver, leading to propositions for downsizing orrightsizing, while policy prescriptions for good governance take an evolutionary observation

of the matter questioning relevance of public sector management of certain activities in a

changed context. Good governance is the term that symbolizes the paradigm shift of the roleof governments.

1.1.0. ACTORS IN GOOD GOVERNANCE

Since governance is the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are

implemented, an analysis of governance focuses on the formal and informal actors involved

in decision-making and implementing the decisions made and the formal and informalstructures that have been set in place to arrive at and implement the decision.

Government is one of the actors in governance. Other actors involved in governance vary

depending on the level of government that is under discussion. In rural areas, for example,other actors may include influential land lords, associations of peasant farmers,

cooperatives, NGOs, research institutes, religious leaders, finance institutions political

parties, the military etc. The situation in urban areas is much more complex. Figure 1


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provides the interconnections between actors involved in urban governance. At the national

level, in addition to the above actors, media, lobbyists, international donors, multi-national

corporations, etc. may play a role in decision-making or in influencing the decision-makingprocess.

All actors other than government and the military are grouped together as part of the "civil

society." In some countries in addition to the civil society, organized crime syndicates alsoinfluence decision-making, particularly in urban areas and at the national level.

Similarly formal government structures are one means by which decisions are arrived at and

implemented. At the national level, informal decision-making structures, such as "kitchen

cabinets" or informal advisors may exist. In urban areas, organized crime syndicates such as

the "land Mafia" may influence decision-making. In some rural areas locally powerfulfamilies may make or influence decision-making. Such, informal decision-making is often

the result of corrupt practices or leads to corrupt practices.

However, there is a significant degree of consensus that good governance relates to political

and institutional processes and outcomes that are deemed necessary to achieve the goals ofdevelopment. It has been said that good governance is the process whereby public

institutions conduct public affairs, manage public resources and guarantee the realization of

human rights in a manner essentially free of abuse and corruption, and with due regard forthe rule of law. The true test of "good" governance is the degree to which it delivers on the

promise of human rights: civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights. The key

question is: are the institutions of governance effectively guaranteeing the right to health,adequate housing, sufficient food, quality education, fair justice and personal security?


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2.0 GOOD GOVERNANCE: ETHICAL APPROACH AND NEED FOR PUBLIC

ACCOUNTABILITY

Ethics in simple words mean rules of moral conduct; therefore, ethical approach indischarging public responsibilities is most essential for good governance. Similarly, since

public works basically benefit the citizens, therefore the policy and planning of public

affairs and works must be as per their needs hence, there is a need for Citizens Charter forgood governance.5

2.1 CONCEPTS OF ETHICS AND GOOD GOVERNANCE

2.1.1 Meaning of Ethics

A sociological understanding of ethics would be that they cover norms of behavior whichemerge from self discovery by people who have several subtle ways to integrate social

cohesion with self realization.

2.1.2 Meaning of Good Governance

According to Oxford University, it is the act or manner of governing or the way of

controlling.

Peter Drucker said governing is not doing, it could be inducing or making it easy for othersto do.

Vivek Chopra defines good governance as unambiguously identifying the basic values of

societies and pursuing them.6

Minocha quotes World Bank guidelines and more operationally defines its criteria as

political accountability, availability of freedom, law abiding, bureaucratic accountability,information available transparently, being effective and efficient, and cooperation between

government and society.

2.1.3 Relationship between Ethics and Good Governance

Ethics and good governance cover the same ground except that governance is concerned

with the acts of the state, the the administration and the the bureaucracy.

Nevertheless, if one chooses to judge the goodness of governance only by the outcomes, andethics only as covering the means, the two terms may not mean the same thing. However, it

is proposed to treat the two terms to mean the same except that governance would cover the

role of the State and the Bureaucracy. The role could be both as doers as well as

providers of the impetus for other actors in civil society.


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2.2 SOME VITAL ISSUES CONCERNING ETHICAL ASPECT OF GOOD

GOVERNANCE

Following are some of the issues to be considered.

2.2.1 Political neutrality of the bureaucracy:

It is of the view that policy making was the exclusive right of political masters andbureaucracy was to implement it. Politicians usually worked under a system of short

tenures, tended to take a very short term view of things and this is one of the reason

personal agenda and unethical practices. Civil servants, who have the longer tenure,expected to take a longer term view of things; one may call as the more ethical view of

things.

In this situation, it may turn out that planning and policy were the more natural functionsof bureaucracy. Further it was soon evident that policy making and implementation can

never be absolutely separated. So, the older ethics of aloofness and anonymity thereforelost their validity.7

2.2.2 Burden of Poverty:

It is a legitimate ethical expectation of poor people that State and Bureaucracy wouldbring them up to a minimum standard of quality of life. This would require them often

not only to govern but actually to do. Bureaucratic effectiveness, efficiency and

managerialism in poverty alleviation then become important ethical guidelines for thecivil servants.

2.2.3 Conflict Resolution:Another important role which the situation demands is that civil servants would provide

mechanisms and assistance to the society to resolve their conflicts.

2.2.4 Collaboration:

Another strong role emerging for the bureaucracy is to provide a mechanism for people

to come together and ensure long term conservation of the environment. Individualism

has been fostered for reasons of efficiency. But efficacy is lost as the players keep awayinformation from each other. Some have tried to correct this with carefully crafted

economic legislation, using free market mechanisms. But the more useful way is by

direct negotiation and collaboration.

2.2.5 Mistrust in Tax Administrations:

The mistrust between the civil servants and tax-paying public is phenomenal in tax

administration. The true test for ethics in governance is for this mistrust to be broken.


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2.3 CITIZENSS CHARTER AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY

In a welfare state of modern era the state has to discharge many fold public duties and

responsibilities in the interests of the society, therefore its nature too has many fold. Hence

scholars feel that a citizens charter is needed to guide, supervise and evaluate theperformance of the government.

2.3.1 Notions of Administrative Accountability

Governments accountability syndrome has been changing over the last half a century inalmost all the democratic systems. In a recent article, Prof. Bruce Stone of the University of

Western Australia has identified four different notions administrative accountability

parliamentary control, managerial control, judicial review and accountability to market andcustomers.

1. Parliamentary Control:

In parliamentary control, administrators should be continuously responsive to theconcerns of members of parliament. It is related to three fundamental sanctions or

powers available to parliament: its power to legislate, its power to withhold support

from ministers, and its power to appropriate moneys.

2. Managerial Control:

Here the emphasis is on strategic rather than detailed, control; an emphasis on agencyself evaluation and reporting plus periodic, formal external evaluation.

3. The third notion of accountability as judicial or quasi judicial review is most evidentin the imposition of legal values on decision making through expansion of judicial and

quasi judicial review of administrative actions.

4. The fourth notion is related to the tendency of a more customer driven attitudeadopted in providing efficient and prompt public services to the citizens by creating

opportunities for customers to exit by means of denationalization and deregulations.

2.3.2 KEY ELEMENTS OF SETTING OF CHARTERS

The key elements are1. Standard: Setting monitoring and publication of explicit standards for the services

that individual users can reasonably expect. Publication of actual performance against

these standards.2. Information and openness: Full, accurate information, readily available in plain

language, about how well they perform and who is in charge.


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3. Choice and consultation: the public sector should provide choice wherever

practicable. There should be regular and systematic consultation with those, who use

services.4. Courtesy and Helpfulness: Courtesy and helpful service from public servants must

be there. Service available equally to all who are entitled to them and run to suit their

convenience.

5. Putting things Right: If things go wrong, an apology, a full explanation, and a swiftand effective remedy to be offered. Well published and easy to use complaint

procedures with independent reviews, wherever possible to be introduced and

maintained.6. Value for Money: Efficient and economic delivery of public services within the

resources, the nation can afford.8


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3.0 CHARACTERISTICS OF GOOD GOVERNANCE

Good governance has 8 major characteristics. It is participatory, consensus oriented,

accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and

follows the rule of law. It assures that corruption is minimized, the views of minorities are

taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard indecision-making. It is also responsive to the present and future needs of society.

3.0.1.

PARTICIPATION

Participation by both men and women is a key cornerstone of good governance.

Participation could be either direct or through legitimate intermediate institutions orrepresentatives. It is important to point out that representative democracy does not

necessarily mean that the concerns of the most vulnerable in society would be taken into

consideration in decision making. Participation needs to be informed and organized. Thismeans freedom of association and expression on the one hand and an organized civil societyon the other hand.

3.0.2. RULE OF LAW

Good governance requires fair legal frameworks that are enforced impartially. It also

requires full protection of human rights, particularly those of minorities. Impartialenforcement of laws requires an independent judiciary and an impartial and incorruptible

police force.

3.0.3. TRANSPARENCY

Transparency means that decisions taken and their enforcement are done in a manner that

follows rules and regulations. It also means that information is freely available and directlyaccessible to those who will be affected by such decisions and their enforcement. It also

means that enough information is provided and that it is provided in easily understandable

forms and media.


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3.0.4. RESPONSIVENESS

Good governance requires that institutions and processes try to serve all stakeholders within

a reasonable timeframe.

3.0.5. CONSENSUS ORIENTED

There are several actors and as many view points in a given society. Good governancerequires mediation of the different interests in society to reach a broad consensus in society

on what is in the best interest of the whole community and how this can be achieved. It also

requires a broad and long-term perspective on what is needed for sustainable humandevelopment and how to achieve the goals of such development. This can only result from

an understanding of the historical, cultural and social contexts of a given society or

community.

3.0.6. EQUITY AND INCLUSIVENESS

A societys well being depends on ensuring that all its members feel that they have a stakein it and do not feel excluded from the mainstream of society. This requires all groups, but

particularly the most vulnerable, have opportunities to improve or maintain their well being.

3.0.7. EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY

Good governance means that processes and institutions produce results that meet the needsof society while making the best use of resources at their disposal. The concept of efficiency

in the context of good governance also covers the sustainable use of natural resources and

the protection of the environment.

3.0.8. ACCOUNTABILITY

Accountability is a key requirement of good governance. Not only governmental institutions

but also the private sector and civil society organizations must be accountable to the public

and to their institutional stakeholders. Who is accountable to whom varies depending on

whether decisions or actions taken are internal or external to an organization or institution.In general an organization or an institution is accountable to those who will be affected by

its decisions or actions. Accountability cannot be enforced without transparency and the rule

of law.


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3.1. KEY ATTRIBUTES OF GOOD GOVERNANCE

The concept of good governance has been clarified by the work of the former Commission

on Human Rights. In its resolution 2000/64, the Commission identified the key attributes of

good governance:

transparency

responsibility

accountability

participation

responsiveness (to the needs of the people)

By linking good governance to sustainable human development, emphasizing principles

such as accountability, participation and the enjoyment of human rights, and rejecting

prescriptive approaches to development assistance, the resolution stands as an implicitendorsement of the rights-based approach to development.


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4.0 GOOD GOVERNANCE: ANCIENT INDIAN POLITICAL AND ISLAMIC

PERSPECTIVE

4.1 Modern political thoughts

India the land of spirituality is basically the land of practical applications of thephilosophy of good governance since the early days of human civilizations. The concept of

Ramrajya is basically the concept of good governance which was the basis of Rams

polity during the period of Ramayana. Ancient Indian philosophers and political thinkerstermed polity as Raj Dharma

4.1.1 THE CONCEPT OF DHARMA

Dharma comes from the root dhri which means to hold or uphold; that by which people are

held and sustained together. According to Hindu thinking, Brahman (Supreme Being) is theultimate source and cause of universal common good not only of humans but also of all

beings in the creation. The common good for Hindus is the highest ethical standard whicheveryone ought to apply according to his or her DHARMA. Furthermore, Hindu tradition

requires that a common good takes precedence over a private good (including individual ormaterial good) and that represents the full development of entire community as a whole.

Two concepts evolve from the concept of Dharma. One is called Common Good and the

other is called Caring for others9

4.1.1.a CONCEPT OF COMMON GOOD:

In Sansktrit, the term Common Good is related as Sarva Loka Sangraha that means anaction or deed done which results in common good of all and everyone. Hindu religion

emphasized upon the welfare of not only humanity but the entire creation.

4.1.1b CONCEPT OF CARING FOR OTHERS

The second term that is used more frequently in Sanskrit is Sarva Hitey Ratah relates to

the action resulting in caring for others, and includes duties which ought to be directed

towards universal upliftment and welfare. This notion is absolutely entangled with thegeneral concept of common good. It is the obligation that human beings owe not only to

teach other but also to other beings as well.

4.1.1c CONCEPT OF KINDNESS OF ISLAM

Islam was the first to recognize basic human rights and almost 14 centuries ago it set up

guarantees and safeguards that have only recently been incorporated in universaldeclarations of human rights.10

They acknowledged that contemporary Islamic practice in many respects does not conform

to the true principles of Islam. However, they noted that "Islam was the first to safeguard

personal rights and freedoms for religious minorities."11 They asserted that because "human

rights and freedoms are not attributed to Nature but are considered to be gifts of God inaccordance with the Islamic faith,"


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Moreover, they affirmed that Islam's codification of human rights constitutes "a solid

foundation for an effective exercise of human rights and freedoms and protection against

any infringement of them."12

4.3 INDICATORS OF GOOD GOVERNANCE

The indicators of good governance however have not changed so much as it may appear, atleast in India. In ancient times Kautilya called the king a servant of the State who would

harbor no personal likes, it would be rather the likes of the servants that would be

followed by him.1. King must merge his individuality with duties:

The first indicator of good governance is that the ruler should surrender his

individuality in the interest of his duties. In the pre-Kautileyan literature 12, ruler willnot be all absolute, arbitrary and authoritarian. The ruler must have the ability to

persuade and motivate colleagues and to co-ordinate as a leader so that everyone

must work upon the agreed goals and that goals must be achieved on time.

2. A properly guided administration:

In order to ensure peoples welfare, there must be a properly guided administration.

Proper guidance excluded commitment to an individual, his family or his whims. Atthe same time, this indicator assumes that civil service, by its very nature, cannot be

responsive and responsible. With a colonial heritage it is more true. In a feudal

setup, the civil servant, far from being a servant, becomes a mai baap to the people;and a tail wagging dog to the master to gain suitable posting, transfer, and deputation

and to get unprecedented familys welfare. Thus civil servants, like greedy children,

need to be watched and guided but not controlled or enticed.

3. Disciplined life with a code of conduct:A ruler is to be subjected to a rigorously disciplined life and an elaborate code of

conduct. This will also apply to ministers and other high officials of the Statebecause their code of conduct and behavior would become a model for others to

follow.

4. Another indicator is that salaries and allowances of all public servants including the

top, should be fixed and reasonable.

5. Law and orderThe fifth indicator suggested by Kautilya, is that king gets salary for rendering

services to the people and his chief duty was to maintain law and order that is toprotect life and liberty. The king will have to pay from his own pocket if he foundguilty of negligence of duty on this part. Whatever of the property of citizens robbed

by thieves, and King cannot be able to recover, shall be made good from his own

pocket.

6. Carrying out preventive / punitive measures against corrupt officials:


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Another indicator is to carry out preventive and punitive measures to punish corrupt

government servants, judges or jailors.

7. He also emphasized modern administrative practices. Some of them are uniformity

in administrative practices, competent ministers; possess qualities of leadership,

intellect, energy, good moral conduct. Above all he must not be lazy in his decision

making and allow things to drift.


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5.0. GOOD GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

5.1.0. How are good governance and human rights linked?

Good governance and human rights are mutually reinforcing. Human rights principles

provide a set of values to guide the work of governments and other political and socialactors. They also provide a set of performance standards against which these actors can beheld accountable. Moreover, human rights principles inform the content of good governance

efforts: they may inform the development of legislative frameworks, policies, budgetary

allocations and other measures.

On the other hand, without good governance, human rights cannot be respected andprotected in a sustainable manner. The implementation of human rights relies on a

conducive and enabling environment. This includes appropriate legal frameworks and

institutions as well as political, managerial and administrative processes responsible forresponding to the rights and needs of the population. The links between good governance

and human rights can be organized around four areas: 13

Democratic institutions

When led by human rights values, good governance reforms of democratic institutionscreate avenues for the public to participate in policymaking either through formal

institutions or informal consultations. They also establish mechanisms forth inclusion of

multiple social groups in decision-making processes, especially locally. Finally, they mayencourage civil society and local communities to formulate and express their positions on

issues of importance to them.

Service delivery

In the realm of delivering state services to the public, good governance reforms advancehuman rights when they improve the states capacity to fulfill its responsibility to provide

public goods which are essential for the protection of a number of human rights, such as the

right to education, health and food. Reform initiatives may include mechanisms of

accountability and transparency, culturally sensitive policy tools to ensure that services areaccessible and acceptable to all, and paths for public participation in decision-making.

Rule of law

When it comes to the rule of law, human rights-sensitive good governance initiatives reformlegislation and assist institutions ranging from penal systems to courts and parliaments tobetter implement that legislation. Good governance initiatives may include advocacy for

legal reform, public awareness-raising on the national and international legal framework and

capacity-building or reform of institutions.


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Anti-Corruption

In fighting corruption, good governance efforts rely on principles such as accountability,

transparency and participation to shape anti-corruption measures. Initiatives may include

establishing institutions such as anti-corruption commissions, creating mechanisms ofinformation sharing, and monitoring governments use of public funds and implementation

of policies.

5.2.0 Good governance, human rights and development

The interconnection between good governance, human rights and sustainable developmenthas been made directly or indirectly by the international community in a number of

declarations and other global conference documents. For example, the Declaration on the

Right to Development proclaims that every human person and all people are entitled toparticipate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development

(article 1). In the Millennium Declaration, world leaders affirmed their commitment topromote democracy and strengthen the rule of law as well as to respect internationallyrecognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to development.

According to the United Nations strategy document on the millennium development goals

(MDGs), entitled The United Nations and the MDGs: a Core Strategy', "the MDGs have tobe situated within the broader norms and standards of the Millennium Declaration,"

including those on human rights, democracy and good governance.14

The concept of good governance in the main international human rights instruments

From a human rights perspective, the concept of good governance can be linked to

principles and rights set out in the main international human rights instruments. Article 21of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes the importance of a participatory

government and article 28 states that everyone is entitled to a social and international order

in which the rights and freedoms set forth in the Declaration can be fully realized. The twoInternational Covenants on Human Rights contain language that is more specific about the

duties and role of governments in securing the respect for and realization of all human

rights. Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires statesparties to respect and to ensure the rights recognized in the Covenant and to take the

necessary steps to give effect to those rights. In particular, states should provide an effective

remedy to individuals when their rights are violated, and provide a fair and effective judicial

or administrative mechanism for the determination of individual rights or the violation

thereof. Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, statesare obliged to take steps with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the

rights recognized in the Covenant by all appropriate means.


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6.0 GOOD GOVERNANCE AND ADMINISTRTATIVE LAW:

In every society the primary concern of the citizens is good governance, which means that

they should have a good and efficient government. For a government to be good, it isessential that the systems and sub-systems of governance must be efficient, effective,

economical, ethical and equitable. In addition to that governance process must also be just,

reasonable, fair and citizen caring. In promoting the culture of good governance, how faradministrative law can be utilized is the immediate task.

6.1 FUNDAMENTAL FEATURES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:

Administrative Law is the branch of Public Law which fundamentally relates to the

pathology of public power. As we all know, public administration, which is the combination

of different centers of power managed by public bureaucracy. The public institutions arecreated for public purpose. These institutions are repositories of public power.

There is no power which is not linked with responsibility. Therefore, the need of existence

of public accountability as one of the main concerns of the public administration systemscannot be ignored. Therefore, public authorities must be subjected to the requirement of

public accountability. Following are some of the features of administrative law: 15

6.1.1 Principle of Rationality:

The power of administration, which is a combination of legislative, adjudicatory and

discretionary powers, needs always to be exercised for public purposes. Administrative lawprescribes the boundaries for proper and rational exercise of public power.

The legislative power of administrative should not be unconstitutional and unreasonable.The concerns of the judiciary in regard to the reasonableness of subordinate legislation are

the testimony to the fact that rules and regulations formulated by the administration under its

delegated authority must be reasonable. Reasonableness of rules and regulations is essentialfor non-arbitrary exercise of power.

6.1.2 Principle of Natural Justice and Fairness

The administrative adjudicatory powers, in the same way, are subjected to the requirements

of natural justice or the principle of fairness. Right of haring, rule against bias and reasoneddecision are the essential major requirements of principles of natural justice in

administrative decision making process.

6.1.3 Checking misuse of discretionary powers


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The discretionary power of administration is the most important as well as the most

dangerous kind of power. It is said that there is no invention known to the human history

which is as dangerous as the invention of discretionary power.

The judicial control of discretionary power is available at two stages. Firstly at the stage of

conferment of discretion and secondly at the stage of its exercise. The judicial control at the

first stage seems to be liberal because there is no actual danger involved at this stage.

The judicial control at the second stage is most important and is being done broadly on the

following two major grounds; non exercise of discretion and abuse of discretion. In the eyeof law, the exercise of discretion by a wrong person or mechanical exercise or acting under

dictation of discretionary power would be considered as non-exercise of power. It is the

authority to whom the power is conferred who is competent to exercise the power andnobo0dy else. Similarly unnecessary exercise of power or unreasonable exercise of power

will be termed by the Court as abuse of power which is prohibited.

6.1.4 Openness, Impartiality, Rationality and Participation

Finally, the fundamental values of administrative law are openness, fairness, impartiality,

rationality and participation which go beyond the traditional concern of judicial review ofadministrative action.

6.2 MEASURES NEEDED TO PROMOTE GOOD GOVERNANCE

Conceptually, the ideals of good governance, broadly speaking, are the fundamental values

of administrative laws. The hope, expectations and aspirations of citizens from the

government are that the system of governance should be citizen friendly and caring,responsive and accountable, effective and efficient, just reasonable, fair, open and impartial.

The core requirements of good governance, may however be recognized and operationalised

depending upon the need of the system of the governance. The commitment of thegovernment to fundamental principles of honesty, integrity, transparency must be there for

providing better services to the humanity.16

1. Citizens Complaint Handling

The institution of governance must be alive to the complaints of the citizens. There

should be effective and efficient complaint handling system which must be inexpensive,

transparent, impartial and rational. The internal grievance handling mechanism in thevarious government organizations need to be restructured and reoriented to make it

citizen friendly.


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2. Open and Accessible:

To be good, it is essential that the government must be open and ready to provideinformation. In a democracy, it is supposed that the people will participate and offer

creative contribution in the process of governance. For this, it is essential that they must

be provided reliable information.

3. Judging performance according to set standards:

One of the criteria of good governance is that the government lays down its standard ofperformance and is prepared to be evaluated against those standards. The setting of

standards of performance and linking it, in case of non performance, with personal

accountability will no doubt enhance the efficiency and thereby bring responsiveness inthe government. The setting of standards of performance with a well organized

complaint system will no doubt enhance the credibility of the governance process in

peoples mind.

4. Establishing Accountability:

Recently, the World Bank identified the need of political and bureaucratic accountabilityas one of the requirements of good governance. The need of accountability is always

linked with the concept of power. There is no power which is not linked with

accountability.


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7.0 REFORMING PAKISTANS CIVIL SERVICE

7.1 INTRODUCTION

Pakistans civil bureaucracy has too often colluded with the military to retard the growth of

democratic institutions and to gain or retain power even under elected civilian governments.

At the same time, over-centralization, corruption and political interference in the civilservice have undermined government capacity to deliver public services. Some 30

commissions have been constituted since independence to reform the civil service, but very

few recommendations have been accepted or implemented. While the civil service is

resistant to radical change, there is genuine and widespread support within the civilbureaucracy for meaningful reforms, particularly those that would serve and promote

individual as well as institutional interests. The political leadership must demonstrate the

will to reform the bureaucracy to enhance the legitimacy of state institutions, build moreeffective, accountable government, and fill a vacuum presently exploited by the military and

violent jihadi organizations.

Pakistans bloated public sector is broadly perceived to exist only to provide jobs to the

unemployable, in the words of a retired senior civil servant. There are presently around 2.4

million regular civil servants for a population of 170 million, or one civil servant for every

67 citizens. In comparison, India has one civil servant for every 110 citizens.17 Corruption iswidespread and public confidence in government agencies such as the police, the state-

owned power sector and the revenue services is particularly low. Every regime change is

invariably accompanied by broad transfers and postings of officials at the policy-making

levels in the secretariats as well as at the operational level in the districts. This politicizationof the bureaucracy contributes to its dysfunction, with promotions increasingly dependent

on officers proximity to those in power.

Military rule has also gravely undermined the civil services capacity and professionalism.

Co-opted during General Ayub Khans rule in the 1960s as a willing junior partner, thebureaucracy, led by the elite Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) cadre, had dominated virtually

all institutions of governance. General Zia-ul-Haq chose not so much to co-opt the

bureaucracy but rather infiltrated it directly, instituting quotas in the civil service for

military officials, and using it to implement his Islamisation policies. General PervezMusharraf significantly expanded the system of appointing serving and retired military

personnel to civil service posts, violating rules and quotas, and deepening the militaryscontrol over the civil service. His devolution plan resulted in corrupt bureaucrats joininghands with equally corrupt and unaccountable local officials. Thanks to Musharraf, the

bureaucracy is more demoralized, more politicized, and less efficient than ever before, said

a senior civil servant.

Ironically, the militarys repeated interventions during the flawed democratic transition in

the 1990s were justified on the grounds of redressing inept and corrupt civilian rule.


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Retaining control over foreign, security and economic policy, the high command impeded

the performance of elected governments, appointing and dismissing them at will either

through a civilian proxy, the president, or a direct coup in October 1999.

A professional, competent civil service will not only be more capable of delivering public

services and curbing corruption, it will also fill a governance vacuum that is being exploited

by violent extremists and an ambitious and interventionist military leadership. Both thePakistan

Peoples Party (PPP), which leads a coalition government at the centre, and the main

opposition party, the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML-N), have a stake inrevitalizing public service delivery if a fragile democratic transition is to stabilize. This

report analyses the structure and functioning of Pakistans civil bureaucracy, identifying

critical flaws as well as measures to make it more accountable and able to provide essentialpublic services such as law and order, education and land revenue management. Such

reforms are vital if the civil service is to be transformed into a tool of good governance,

enhancing in turn the legitimacy of elected governments.

7.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUREAUCRACY

7.2.1 COLONIAL HERITAGE

Pakistans civil bureaucracy has its origins in the Indian Civil Service (ICS), often described

as the steel frame that enabled the British to rule their large and unwieldy Indian empire.

The ICS was established on the recommendations made by the Aitcheson Commission,which was set up in 1886 to create a scheme to reform the public service in imperial India.

Until then public service employees were divided into those with regular contracts, which

specified the nature and terms of service, and those without such agreements. Contractualappointees (the Covenanted Civil Service), were exclusively British until growing demands

for local participation led to the creation of a Statutory Civil Service, in which one sixth ofthe positions previously reserved for the Covenanted Civil Service were filled by Indians

nominated by local governments and subsequently approved by the governor general.18

7.2.2 CIVIL-MILITARY BUREAUCRATIC: NEXUS (1947-1973)

For the first decade after independence (1947-1958), Pakistan, while theoretically a

parliamentary democracy, was ruled by a cabal of senior civil servants, with the military asjunior partner, albeit one with a steadily expanding role in political affairs. General elections

were repeatedly postponed. The governor-general, the all-powerful head of state and almost

always a former civil servant, regularly dismissed prime ministers, their cabinets and thenational and provincial legislatures.

The third governor-general, Ghulam Mohammad, a former bureaucrat, launched the first of

many extra-constitutional assaults on the legislature when, in 1953, he dismissed PrimeMinister Khwaja Nazimuddin even as the latter enjoyed majority support in parliament. A

year later he dismissed the Constituent Assembly when it tried to curb his powers. Ghulam


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Mohammad also formalized the entry of the army into politics by appointing General Ayub

Khan, the armys commander-in-chief, as defense minister.

In 1956, Ghulam Muhammads successor, Iskander Mirza, promulgated Pakistans first

constitution, which established a federal parliamentary system but also gave the president,

who now replaced the governor-general as head of state, the power to dismiss the prime

minister. Mirza used this power liberally, dismissing four prime ministers between 1956 and1958, with the support of the civil bureaucracy and the military high command. In 1958,

Ayub deposed Mirza and imposed martial law. According to a political analyst and retired

bureaucrat,it was the civil service that essentially ran the country during the Ayub era. One of Ayubs

first measures was to ban political parties and disqualify hundreds of mainstream politicians

from holding elected office through the Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order (EBDO).Prohibiting anyone from holding public office who used his political position for personal

advantage or to the detriment of the state, EBDO was selectively used against opposition

politicians. Three tribunals, each presided over by a senior judge, but also comprising a civilservant and an army officer of the rank of lieutenant colonel, enforced the order. 20

To provide a democratic faade to his rule, Ayub devised a local government system called

Basic Democracy, under which the country was divided into 80,000 single-memberconstituencies, each electing a member on a non-party basis. Local councils were created at

the district and sub-district levels, with roughly half their members nominated instead of

elected. These councils received state funds to perform municipal and civic functions, butthe district bureaucracy, dominated by CSP members who monopolized the powerful offices

of chief secretary, commissioner, deputy commissioner and assistant commissioner,

exercised complete authority over the councils, including the power to overrule or suspendcouncil decisions and orders. In 1960 they elected him president in a referendum with 95.6

per cent of the vote, and re-elected him in 1965, albeit this time in a contested but rigged

election. By extending the militarys control over local government and establishing a newpolitical base at the grassroots, Basic Democracy centralized control over the federating

units. Controlling access to state resources, centrally-appointed district bureaucrats were

able to dominate local politics by dealing directly with the new elite, bypassing political

parties and isolating them from the electorate.

In 1969, facing countrywide demonstrations, the military high command forced Ayub toresign, but replaced him with army chief General Yahya Khan who imposed martial law,

abrogated the Yahya Khan suspended 303 senior civil servants on charges of corruption,

misconduct or abuse of authority; tried them before specially constituted military tribunals;

and then either dismissed them from service or forced their retirement.

The military regime held Pakistans first general elections in 1970 in the belief that no party

would gain a parliamentary majority. The Awami League, however, swept the polls in theBengali-majority East wing, winning a majority of National Assembly seats and the

mandate to form the first elected government. Refusing to cede power to their Bengali

opponents, the high command launched a military operation in East Pakistan, triggering the


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civil war that culminated in Indian military intervention and a military defeat that resulted in

East Pakistans secession and the formation of Bangladesh in December 1971.

7.2.3 BHUTTOS ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS

Forced to resign, Yahya Khan was replaced as president and chief martial law administrator

by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. PPP had won a majority of the seats in West Pakistan in the 1970polls. In 1973 Bhutto adopted a consensus constitution that established a parliamentary

government and placed the military under civilian control. He assumed the office of prime

minister. Seeking to curb the civil bureaucracys power, Bhutto dismissed 1,300 civilservants on the grounds of corruption and incompetence, and instituted reforms to curb the

civil services autonomy and place it under the political executives control. More

significantly, Bhutto removed constitutionally guaranteed protections of employment thathad previously shielded the bureaucracy from political interference. As a result, the

executive could now dismiss even the most senior civil servants merely by issuing a show-

cause notice. According to a retired senior bureaucrat, the withdrawal of these protectionsdestroyed the civil service by opening the floodgates of political interference. 21 Instead of

establishing political control and oversight over the bureaucracy, this measureinstitutionalized manipulation by the political executive.

Bhuttos administrative reforms also fundamentally changed the bureaucracys structure.

The elite CSP cadre, which dominated civil service positions at all levels of the

administration federal, provincial and district was abolished; service distinctions wereterminated; and all civil service cadres were labeled occupational groups.

Bhuttos reforms failed to diminish the bureaucracys power. Although its organizationalstructure underwent considerable change, most notably through the CSPs abolition, the

elite cadre continued to enjoy wide-ranging powers. If anything, their authority actually

increased as the Bhutto government nationalized some 30 private sector industries, anunprecedented expansion of the public sector that provided the bureaucracy new

opportunities for corruption. Previously the bureaucracy had been confined to its own

domain but its members suddenly became heads of banks, industries and other corporations,

and discovered how lucrative such positions could be, said a former federal secretary.Ironically, the main beneficiaries of many of Bhuttos ostensibly populist policies, such as

nationalization, land reforms and labour programs, became the very civil bureaucrats

whom the regime was supposed to be giving a much needed dressing down.22


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7.2.4 THE CIVIL SERVICE UNDER ZIA-UL-HAQ

In July 1977, Bhutto was ousted in a military coup by army chief Zia-ul-Haq, and executed

in 1979. The military regime, which lasted until Zias death in 1988, forcibly suppressed

political opposition and launched a far-reaching Islamisation drive to achieve domestic

legitimacy with support from the religious right. A traditionally secular civil bureaucracywas now compelled to reframe the ideological orientation of the civil servant through

measures such as a uniform dress code and enforced prayer breaks during office hours.

There was a minimal emphasis on professional work ethics so long as officials weredeemed good Muslims.

Zia established a commission on civil service reforms, which proposed a number of radicaldepartures from Bhuttos system such as abolishing all occupational groups; creating several

technical services to accommodate specialists in fields such as agriculture, education,

engineering and medicine; revamping district administration; and creating numerous in-service training institutions.41 However, aside from ending lateral recruitment and merging

the TAG into the DMG, Zia largely retained the federal bureaucratic structure. Ziainstitutionalized military induction into the civil service, a practice that had been conducted

on an ad hoc basis by earlier regimes, permanently entrenching the militarys presence inthe bureaucracy. In 1962, Ayub Khan had introduced a 50 per cent reservation for ex-

servicemen in some posts in the bureaucracy and appointed eight army captains to the elite

CSP. Bhuttos lateral entry scheme had resulted in as many as 83 military officers appointedto senior public service positions. While Zia initially only re-employed retired military

officers on a contract basis, in 1980, he decreed that 10 per cent of vacancies in the federal

bureaucracy at BPS-17 and 18 would be reserved for retired or released military officers.These officers would not be selected by the FPSC but by a High Powered Selection

Committee headed by Zia himself. The committee would also fill 10 per cent of senior

vacancies (BPS-19 and above) in the Secretariat Group, Foreign Affairs Group, AccountsGroup and Information Group. Former military officers would also be employed on three- to

five-year contracts. Many officers of the rank of brigadier and above were thus inducted as

federal and provincial secretaries. In 1982, eighteen out of 42 ambassadors were retired

military officers. In 1985, a serving major general was chosen to head the IntelligenceBureau, the countrys main civilian intelligence outfit, for the first time. By 1985, 98 former

military officers were permanently inducted in BPS-17 and 18 posts, while 111 held senior

appointments on contract.

The bureaucracy was thus reduced to a wholly subordinate role by the regimes policy of

grafting military officers to key jobs in the central and provincial administrations, public

sector industries as well as other semi government and autonomous organisations.46 LikeAyub, Zia also used local bodies to cloak a highly centralized, authoritarian system of

government under

the garb of decentralization, establishing three tiers of local government in the rural areas union (village), tehsil (town) and zila (district) and three tiers in urban areas town

committees, municipal committees and municipal corporations.47 Non-party elections to

union councils/town committees were held in 1979, 1983 and 1987. These electedcouncilors served as the electoral


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college forzila and tehsilcouncil chairmen. While the local councils main responsibilities

were the management of small-scale public welfare and development activities, civil

bureaucrats (commissioners and deputy commissioners), who served as ex-officio, non-voting members of the zila councils, retained control over general administration and law

and order. Spawning a new local political elite that owed its allegiance to the military

regime, Zias local government scheme systematically eroded bureaucratic neutrality at the

lower levels of administration.48 It was during Zias period that officers from the DMGand the PSP, in particular, became the power base for local politicians at the district level,

said a former bureaucrat who had served

as deputy commissioner in Punjab during the 1980s.

7.2.5 THE BUREAUCRACY UNDER CIVILIAN RULE

The democratic interlude of the 1990s saw Benazir Bhuttos PPP and Nawaz Sharifs PML-

N each forming governments twice, but prevented each time from completing a full term bythe military through its civilian proxy, the president, and in the case of Sharifs second

government, through Musharrafs October 1999 coup. Bent on undermining each other, thePPP and the PML- N did little to bolster parliamentary democracy, instead entering into

untenable alliances with the military to gain power. They also further eroded bureaucraticneutrality through large-scale postings and transfers of civil officials, at both the district and

policy-making levels in the federal and provincial secretariats, with each change of

government. Bhutto and Sharif both had their own team of civil servants who werepatronized and promoted not on merit but on their perceived loyalty to their respective

political masters, said a retired bureaucrat, who had served as federal secretary during the

1990s.50 Appointing senior officers known for their political affiliation rather than theirprofessionalism, Bhutto and Sharif created an atmosphere where the corrupt could get

away with their schemes be they politicians, tax-evading businessmen, or self-serving civil

servants.51 The military exploited this perception of rampant corruption to justify itspolitical interventions, masking the actual goal, to retain control over foreign and domestic

policy.52 The democratic transition also saw Zias local government scheme gradually

decompose: local bodies were dissolved in the NWFP in 1991, in Sindh in 1992, and in

Punjab in 1993. The primary motivations were political, rather than the desire to improvegovernance and curb corruption. Wary of the electoral influence of local officials, who had

served as willing clients of a military regime, elected governments opted to appoint

administrators regular federal and/or provincially appointed civil servants to run localcouncils


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7.3 MILITARY RULE AND CIVIL SERVICE REFORM

7.3.1 RESTRUCTURING DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION

Musharraf, like Ayub and Zia, seized on the idea of using local government to achievelegitimacy and consolidate military rule. In 2001, the newly created National Reconstruction

Bureau, headed by a retired lieutenant general, devised a Devolution of Power Plan that

established three tiers of local government at the district, tehsil (sub-district) and unionlevels. Musharrafs devolution plan differed considerably from Zias local government

system since administrative and developmental powers were delegated to locally elected

officials.54

The plan subordinated district officials to the indirectly elected district nazim (mayor). The

posts of deputy commissioner/ district magistrate and assistant commissioner/ sub-divisionalmagistrate, who had traditionally controlled executive, judicial and revenue functions in the

district, were abolished and replaced by an administrative structure headed by a districtcoordination officer (DCO) directly responsible to the nazim. Magisterial powers were

transferred to district and sessions judges,55 and revenue and police oversight powers to thedistrict nazim. This restructuring had less to do with improving governance than extending

the regimes reach to the local level, sidelining mainstream political parties and bypassing

the provincial legislatures. Critics also charged the military regime of colluding withofficials in occupational groups such as the police and the income tax group to cut the

powerful DMG (District Management Group) down to size. By abolishing the office of the

deputy commissioner apparently in the name of grassroots democracy, the militaryactually intended to eliminate a potential institutional competitor and thereby ensure

unimpeded control over the districts through the new institution of the nazim, said a former

Sindh chief secretary.56

Under the DCO, in order of seniority, were a number of executive district officers (EDO),

district officers (DO) and deputy district officers (DDO). Each tehsil administration was

headed by a tehsil/town nazim assisted by a tehsil/town municipal officer (TMO), thesenior-most administrative officer at the tehsil level. The lowest tier of local government,

the union council, was headed by a union nazim assisted by up to three union secretaries

who coordinated community development and service delivery. Since all three tiers operatedindependently of each other, the resultant administrative confusion and conflicts over

jurisdictional rights undermined service delivery. The DCO and TMO are seldom on the

same page, leading to painfully slow progress on developmental projects. If the district and

tehsil nazims are political rivals, it can even lead to administrative paralysis, said a districtofficer in Sukkur, Sindh.57

As many as eleven provincial departments were devolved to the districts, with an EDO

heading each department. The DCO coordinated the activities of all district departments andexercised general supervision over all projects and service delivery mechanisms.58

Provincial administrators also still exercised considerable influence on district functioning

through an extensive network of departmental linkages. As a result, district officials wereforced to balance the demands of the nazim with the often conflicting orders of their


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provincial bosses. Given the absence of accountability of the district nazim, opportunities

for corruption also increased. While the provincial Local Government Commission could

conduct special audits and inspections of district government, these were at best sporadicand no substitute for permanent, institutionalized checks and balances.60 Moreover, the

DCO, now the districts principal accounting officer as well as head of the district

development committee that approved development schemes, was not accountable to either

the provincial legislature or the district council. In financial and administrative matters, theoffice of the DCO is more powerful now than its predecessor, the deputy commissioner,

before devolution, said a district officer in Sindh. Therefore, if the nazim and DCO decide

to make common cause, there is virtually no limit to the corruption that they can commit.

Most civil servants interviewed for this report argued that Musharrafs devolution plan

undermined administrative efficiency, compromised bureaucratic neutrality and eroded civilservice morale. They insisted that the previous system, while certainly flawed, was not as

dysfunctional as a non-party based order, rooted in the politics of patronage, ethnicity and

caste.62 Most civil servants also argued that responsibility for law and order and revenueshould not belong to nazimsbut to nonpartisan administrators who would not be swayed by

personal or political considerations. All developmental functions must remain in the handsof elected officials, said a former deputy commissioner of Karachi, but control over

revenue and the police must be placed in the hands of a neutral administrator who should, atthe same time, be subject to ruthless accountability. Only then can public confidence in the

institutions of the state be restored. Another added: I was a supporter of devolution to start

off with but am now convinced by its disastrous implementation that the deputycommissioner must be restored as the nucleus of administrative authority in the district.

Although the constitution designates local bodies a provincial subject, Musharraf had placed

his devolution plan under the Sixth Schedule of the constitution, requiring presidentialapproval for amendment. That requirement lapsed on 31 December 2009, allowing

provincial assemblies to legislate on the local bodies in their provinces. Provincial

governments in Punjab, NWFP and Balochistan, critical of Musharrafs devolution scheme,appear inclined to restore the executive magistracy, granting a districts deputy

commissioner magisterial powers. In January 2010, the Balochistan provincial assembly

unanimously passed a bill to dissolve local bodies, dismiss all nazims and replace them with

administrators until fresh local elections were held within a year.65 The Awami NationalParty (ANP)-led government in the NWFP has produced a draft Local Government Act that

proposes significant reductions in the powers of nazims and other elected officials and a

corresponding increase in the district bureaucracys authority. The PML-N-led Punjabgovernment has restored the office of commissioner while incrementally reviving the

magisterial functions of the DCO. It has also introduced legislation to appoint

administrators to replace nazims until the devolution scheme is revised, and local polls held

on a party basis. The proposed Punjab Local Government Act 2010 envisages a return toZias Local Government Ordinance of 1979, also restoring the rural-urban divide (discussed

above) abolished by Musharrafs devolution scheme.68 The Muttahida Qaumi Movement

(MQM), the PPPs coalition partner in the Sindh government, a major beneficiary ofMusharrafs devolution scheme, particularly in urban Sindh, wants to retain the nazim

system. While there is indeed pressing need for the devolution of political, administrative

and economic power, any new scheme must avoid past pitfalls by taking into account thelegitimate concerns of elected politicians and provincial governments. Party-based, direct


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elections for local government positions are crucial to ensure electoral accountability of

local officials and curtail the divisive impact of non-partisan elections. Yet any reforms to

district government will have little chance of success absent broader civil service reformthat addresses the inherent problems of weak capacity, over-centralization and widespread

corruption

7.3.2 MILITARISING THE CIVIL SERVICES

Musharrafs nine-year rule also saw a dramatic rise in military interference in the civil

bureaucracy. Shortly after assuming power, Musharraf appointed army monitoring teams tosupervise civil administration at all levels from the sub-division and district to federal and

provincial departments. In what was perhaps the most humiliating exercise that the civil

bureaucracy was ever subjected to in Pakistans history, junior military officers of the rankof major and even captain supervised and evaluated the performance of senior civil

servants, said a former federal secretary, adding that, as a result, morale in the

bureaucracy plummeted.70 The appointment of 3,500 serving and retired militarypersonnel to these monitoring teams, ostensibly in the name of reducing corruption,

increasing accountability and monitoring governance, instead led to a blatant abuse ofauthority. Military officials were also appointed to key civilian posts, including the

chairmanship of the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC), which is responsible forrecruitment of the federal bureaucracy. Military officers, some serving but mostly retired,

were appointed heads of a large number of civilian organizations, many of which required

technical expertise, such as the chief executive of the Alternative Energy DevelopmentBoard; chairman of Pakistan Steel Mill; and chairman of the Pakistan Telecommunication

Authority. Virtually every aspect of the civil bureaucracys functioning, from recruitment

and early, mid-career and senior- level training to postings and promotions, was placed inthe hands of military personnel. In 2002, the Pakistan Administrative Staff College, the

countrys main training institution for senior civil servants, was transformed into the

National School of Public Policy (NSPP), and headed by a retired lieutenant general. In2006, a retired major general was appointed director-general of the Civil Services Academy,

which trains fresh recruits to Pakistans premier civil services. While the present

government has replaced the major general with a civilian bureaucrat as director general of

the Civil Services Academy, it has retained Musharrafs appointee as head of the NSPP.

7.3.3 REFORM ATTEMPTS

In 2006, the National Commission on Government Reforms (NCGR) was set up to

recommend reforms that would enable the government, its institutions and infrastructure

to better meet the social, economic and political challenges that Pakistan faces in the 21st

century. Headed by Ishrat Hussain, a retired civil servant and former State Bank governor,the NCGR produced a report after two years of consultations with provincial and district

governments, serving and retired civil servants, and civil society members. The commission

submitted the report in May 2008 to Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani, who pledged toconsult provincial governments and other stakeholders on the reports recommendations as

well as to debate them in the National Assembly. He has yet to do so.75 Hussains successor

as chairman of the NCGR, Chaudhry Abdul Ghafoor, a PPP parliamentarian, intends torevisit the recommendations and produce a new report. The NCGR report recommends


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administrative restructuring, human resource management, and simplification of existing

rules and procedures and improvements in service delivery. Discarding the original report in

favor of a new one may unnecessarily divert resources and delay implementation. Thegovernment should instead present the existing recommendations for review and approval

by a special parliamentary committee on government reform, on which half the members are

nominated by the government, half by the opposition, and co chaired by the prime minister

and leader of the opposition. Once approved, a final bill should be presented for a vote inthe National Assembly and, if passed, implemented without delay.

The military government established another reform related body, the Civil Service ReformsUnit (CSRU), headed by a retired major general, to catalyse and oversee the

implementation of civil service reforms. According to a World Bank assessment, it failed to

make any significant progress in civil service restructuring. Indeed, by the time the electedgovernment took office in 2008, the militarys adverse impact on civil services, once the

preferred option for the best and brightest of Pakistans youth, could be gauged by the fact

that very few were willing to join it. In the CSS examination of 2007, only 190 of 290vacancies were filled, leaving the remainder to be filled after the next exam

7.4 REFORMING THE BUREAUCRACY

7.4.1 TACKLING OVER-CENTRALISATION

Over-centralization of powers and functions has consistently undermined any seriousattempts at civil service reform. Combined with cumbersome rules and procedures and a

rigidly defined hierarchical structure, centralization prevents the bureaucracy from

effectively managing a public sector that has expanded considerably since the 1970s. Eventhe recruitment or transfer of clerks and other low-level support staff cannot take place

without the approval of the secretary or at times even the minister, distracting senior

officials from more vital tasks of implementing government policy. While centralization issaid to reduce costs and improve service delivery, it has made the bureaucracy less

responsive to public concerns and priorities. In fact, rigid centralized procedures undermine

service delivery, contributing to a corresponding increase in public dissatisfaction with the

bureaucracy. Ministries have virtually taken over the functions of attached departments andsubordinate offices. The lower and middle tiers of multi-tiered ministries are often

uninformed or unclear about their role because of the absence of an effective framework for

delegating authority. Standard operating procedures for most ministries have not beenrevised for years, leading to further confusion among staff about their powers, functions and

responsibilities. Despite apparently rigid rules and regulations, there are neither adequate

control mechanisms nor effective supervisory structures to ensure bureaucratic efficiency

and accountability. Officers complain that while countless reports are commissioned,prepared and filed, very few are ever properly reviewed. There is always a tendency to

avoid responsibility and pass the buck on to others, a secretariat officer said. Even where

clearly defined powers to handle a given situation exist, most concerned officers will bereluctant to exercise them, preferring instead to transfer responsibility upwards or

sideways. Excessive centralization, particularly in granting approval for projects, leads to

inordinate delays in service delivery.


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Rules and procedures should be revised to reduce hierarchical rigidity and encourage

delegation. Some precedents exist. For instance, in June 2008, Zubair Bhatti, then DCO of

Punjabs Jhang district, delegated powers to tehsilofficials to issue certificates of domicile.Previously, residents had to travel from theirtehsils to district headquarters, often a distance

of over 100 miles, to obtain these and other documents. For those who were poor, this was

a particularly painful waste of time and resources, said Bhatti. Such delegation of

authority must be instituted in large and unwieldy districts in particular in order to reduceunnecessary costs and delays

in service delivery.

7.4.2 COMBATING CORRUPTION AND INCREASING ACCOUNTABILITY

Bureaucratic corruption takes several forms, including abuse of discretionary power, misuseof regulatory authority, as well as institutionalized and participative practices described

below. Rules granting discretionary power to officials were designed by the British to

protect their colonial interests, said a former police official. Since then, they have rarelybeen revised or even reviewed. Where changes have been made, they have increased rather

than reduced discretionary powers since the rules are framed by the regulatory bodies whohave a vested interest in retaining the status quo.117 Although government contracts, for

example, are awarded through open tenders and other ostensibly open processes, the lack oftransparency in executive authority and decisions make these procedures easier to

manipulate. With the growth of the economy and the increasing complexity in procurement

issues and government contracts, the incentive to misuse authority as well as the ability todo so have both increased, said an official in the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA),

which investigates official Corruption. Unlike institutionalized corruption, whereby a

government organization provides cover to its own corrupt officials, participative corruptioninvolves collusion between the bureaucracy and the private sector. The latter is particularly

prevalent in Pakistans tax administration, where the complexity of taxation laws, excessive

taxation rates, lack of proper documentation in the private sector and widespread tax evasionmake the income tax and customs and excise departments among the most corrupt in the

country. Low salaries and pensions and inadequate welfare programs for civil servants have

also encouraged widespread corruption, while at the same time lowering morale and

increasing inefficiency. Many capable officials opt to join the private sector. Unlike militarypersonnel who benefit from their institutions substantial network of welfare organizations,

health facilities for civil servants are poor and housing and transportation inadequate.

Despite low salaries and soaring inflation, there is no subsidized schooling for civilservants children. If low salaries and benefits are a major cause of bureaucratic corruption,

the deterioration in both internal and external accountability mechanisms is an equally, if

not more, significant contributing factor. In theory, a civil servant is answerable to his

immediate supervisor and upwards to the secretary who, in his capacity as principalaccounting officer, is accountable to the minister and to parliament. Several factors undercut

this chain of accountability, including inadequate training; the absence of merit in

appointments and promotions; and poor practices and norms. Other problems include weakregulatory mechanisms, unchecked discretionary powers, weak standard management

systems and procedures, and the failure to regularly upgrade rules and provide easily

accessible information on service delivery. A 1998 World Bank report highlighted the civilservices failing accountability mechanisms, including lack of follow-through in areas like


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time-keeping and tour reports. Over ten years have passed since the publication of that

report but many of the defects it identified in terms of a lack of bureaucratic accountability

remain in place, said a recently retired federal secretary. Many bureaucrats argue thatvalues and norms have deteriorated significantly over the last three decades, which saw two

military regimes and a dysfunctional democratic transition in the 1990s. There was a time

when corrupt bureaucrats were exceptions to the rule and were shunned both by their peers

as well as by society at large, said a former federal secretary who joined service in the1960s. Today, there is a far greater acceptance of corruption and abuse of authority not

only within the bureaucracy itself but also in society in general. Moreover, the system of

evaluation through annual confidential reports (ACRs) seldom, if ever, records criticismsand is, in any case, ill-suited to developing a performance- oriented ethos since it

emphasizes personal qualities over the achievement of specified goals. Higher level

accountability mechanisms, such as quarterly and annual reports submitted by the secretaryabout the performance of his or her division, are mere formalities. The dysfunction of

successive parliamentary public accounts committees also resulted in public hearings into

alleged official malpractices often occurring after the officials had been transferred orretired. There are some encouraging signs of change. Currently, the leader of the opposition

in the National Assembly, the PML-Ns Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, chairs the PublicAccounts Committee (PAC), as stipulated by the Charter of Democracy (CoD) signed by

former prime ministers Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto in 2006. Previous PACs, beingheaded by chairmen from the ruling party, were always unwilling to ruffle feathers, said

the PML-Ns Zahid Hamid, a PAC member. This PAC, however, has been extremely

proactive, and the main reason for that is its chairmanship being allocated to theopposition. The PAC was indeed the most active of all National Assembly committees

during the first year of the current parliament, with regular hearings and investigations into

bureaucratic corruption and inefficiency. The committee thus demonstrated its potential ofbecoming an important check on bureaucratic malfunctioning. Federal secretaries, the

principal accounting officers of their respective divisions, now make much more of an

effort to acquaint themselves with audit objections against them before they are due toappear before the PAC, since they know they are in for a grilling, said a PAC member.

The PPP and PML-N should implement the Charter of Democracys recommendation for

an independent accountability commission, whose chairman shall be nominated by the

prime minister in consultation with the leader of opposition and confirmed by a jointparliamentary committee with 50 per cent of members from treasury benches and remaining

50 per cent from opposition parties.125 With overall responsibility for accountability, the

commission could play a vital role, in tandem with the FIA, in curbing financial and othercorruption by government officials, provided it is answerable to the National Assemblys

PAC. Granted complete autonomy and provided his rulings are properly implemented, the

federal ombudsman could also act as an effective check on the bureaucracy.23


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7.4.3 RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING

1. Recruitment

The recruitment functions of the federal and provincial public service commissions are

limited to officer-level positions in BPS-16 and above, leaving lower level recruitment todepartmental selection committees headed by the departments secretary. Recruitment to

Pakistans civil services is rarely based on detailed job descriptions and qualifications for

particular posts. The annual CSS exam involves written tests in compulsory and electivesubjects, followed by a psychological aptitude test and an interview. Candidates with

academic backgrounds in high-scoring subjects such as botany, biology or mathematics

have an advantage over those with liberal arts backgrounds. Moreover, a selectedcandidates academic or professional background is not taken into consideration in

assignments to one of the federal occupational groups. As a result, doctors and engineers

can, and often do, end up in services like the police, district management or the ForeignService. Candidates selection to occupational groups should be based on their educational

and professional backgrounds so as to provide ministries with the right recruits.

2. Training

The first step for civil servants recruited through the CSS examination is a common pre-

service training program, followed by specialized training conducted by each of the central

superior services. During in-service training, federal and provincial officials at the level ofdeputy secretary take courses in administration and development at the National

Management Institute; successful completion is mandatory for promotion. The National

Management College conducts training of senior officers in BPS-20, successful completionagain a prerequisite for promotion to BPS-21. Generally, individual ministries or divisions

arrange trainings in foreign universities and institutes. Under the World Bank-financed

Public Sector Capacity Building (2004- 2009), BPS-17-19 grade officers were sent abroadto attain masters degrees in relevant disciplines, while BPS- 20-21 grade officers attended

Harvard Universitys Kennedy School of Government under the Executive Development

Program. Such programs are useful but should be expanded to include both cadre officers

and specialists. There are no such extensive training opportunities for specialists, althoughroughly 700 are recruited annually by the FPSC, compared to 150 to 200 CSS-qualified

officers. The shortage of qualified and motivated instructors in government training

programs should also be addressed. Most instructors are serving officers who regard thesepostings as punishments. According

Final Report (Public Admin)

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