Feuer, Lewis - Ethical Theories and Historical Materialism

8/12/2019 Feuer, Lewis - Ethical Theories and Historical Materialism

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S S Quarterly, Inc.Guilford Press

Ethical Theories and Historical MaterialismAuthor(s): Lewis S. FeuerSource: Science & Society, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Summer, 1942), pp. 242-272Published by: Guilford PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40399480.

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ETHICAL THEORIES AND HISTORICALMATERIALISM

LEWIS S. FEUER

thesis f historicalmaterialism, ithrespect oethics,sthatphilosophical uestions anishwhenthe tatus fethicalstatements nd theories s clarified rom he standpoint fsociological cience.We shalltry odemonstratehis hesis yexam-iningthe theories f the best-knownontemporarythicalphilos-ophers.We shallfind hat heethical heories fbourgeois hilosoph-ers are examplesofideologyn the sense whichEngelsgaveto thisterm. Ideology s a process ccomplished y the so-called hinkerconsciously,ndeed,butwith false onsciousness. he realmotivesimpellinghimremainunknown o him,otherwiset would not bean ideologicalprocess t all/'1 We shall thengo on to showhowhistoricalmaterialismrovides he foundation or purely cientificpolitics.2

1 The Correspondence of Marx and Engels (New York: International Publishers,1935)P- 511-2 Political philosophersregard it as axiomatic that social policies are founded onethical doctrines. According to their view, a political theorytells of thingsas theyought to be, and cannot thereforebe a branch of science; for science studies onlywhat is the case. E. F. Carrittthusregardspolitical philosophyas thatbranch of ethicsin which you reflect n such propositionsas I ought to obey this law. Cf. Moralsand Politics (Oxford UniversityPress, 1935), p. 4. Political theorists have conse-quently been long puzzled by the standpoint of historical materialism; they havefound it difficult o give credenceto a view which aims to eliminate ethical ideologyfrompolitical reasoning. Marx, indeed, held that ethical philosophywas a type ofthinkingwfiich was peculiar to exploitative societies; he believed that it wouldvanish with the total disappearance of class antagonisms. Cf. The CommunistMani-festo (InternationalPublishers,New York: 1932),p. 29. He was, moreover, verse tothe use of phrases about duty and right, and he held that the goddesses of'Justice,Freedom,Equality' were best described as modern mythology, f Corre-spondence,p. 162,p. 347. Marx's criticshold, on the otherhand, that the ethicalmodeof thought s a universal traitof all societies,that it is only the specificcontent ofethical ideas which varies with different istoricalconditions. They argue that scien-tific ocialism tries to conceal its ethical premises,that it must perforcecontain nonscientificomponents.A terminological aution: in thisessay,we are concerned with ethics in the sense ofethical ideology; we shall not use ethics vaguely to mean any mode of socialbehavior.

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ETHICSANDHISTORICALMATERIALISM 243By wayofdefinition,emay haracterizethical tatementssthosewhich se wordsike ought, good, bad, duty. f apersonays,oneought ottobear rms, henhe is using thicallanguage.An ethical heory sone which ries o analyzewhatethical ermsmean. Suchanalyses,s we shall ee,turn uttobeideologicalxercisesfthe false onsciousness.Fromthepsychologicaltandpoint,thical ermsmaybe de-scribed s theterms fthe super-egoanguage. The super-egosmadeupof ocial alueswhich rederivedhroughhe onditioninginfluencesfparents,ursemaids,eachers.3Moralrestrictionsreexternalnorigin,uttheyre ubsequentlyintrojected inotherwords,interiorized )ithinhe hild.4 he source fthese estric-tions s,in lateryears, epressed;he child s nowswayed ytheadmonitionsfan autonomousonscience,y themanwithinhebreast,heabstractndidealspectatorf oursentimentsndcon-duct, s Adam mith utst.5The super-ego,hich akes ver he

parental unction,olds aloftcertaindeals, and criticizes uractivities.6The functionfethical ermss thevehicles fsocialmanipu-lationnowbecomeslear.The personwho uses uchtermss try-ingtohaveyou dentifyimwithyour uper-ego. e addressesouwith vocabularyhich ouchesff ensionsndanxieties,vocab-ularywhich tirs heunconsciousn wayswithwhichyoucannotcope. Disobedienceo an ethical tatementarrieswith t a senseofmoralguilt, he outcome f a conflictetween onsciencenddesire.7It is importantobear nmind he ocialpsychologyfethicalterms ecausewe are thusenabledto understandheideologicalcharacterfethical heories. ecause uchtheoriesreelaboratedwithin false onsciousness,ecause hey repropounded ithan ignorances totheunderlyingotives, emustook for hose

3Cf. MuzaferSherif,The Psychology f Social Norms (New York, 1936),p. 179.4 Op cit.,p. 182. The author likewisespeaks of established social values as stand-ardized fixationswhich the individual incorporates n himself. Cf. p. 125. The Theory of Moral Sentiments,Part hi, chapter 3.6F. H. Bradley thus describes n the terminology f idealistic philosophywhat thepsychologistwould call the compulsive character of moral laws. Cf. Ethical Studies(Oxford,1927),second edition,p. 110.



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244 SCIENCE AND SOCIETYphilosophic evicesbymeans ofwhichthe ethicaltheory ecomestheagency f resistance osociological nalysis.

ITo beginwith, et us examinetheethicaltheoryftheEnglishintuitionist chool in the formwhichhas been givento it by theso-called ealisticphilosopher,G. E. Moore. This type fdoctrinehas perhapssomewhatmore than an academic importance.Onescholar,R. G. Collingwood, asgoneso far s tosay: If therealistshad wantedto trainup a generation f Englishmen nd English-women expressly s the potentialdupes of everyadventurernmorals nd politics,.. no betterwayofdoing t could have beendiscovered. 8Moorehas arguedthat good is indefinable,hat t is a uniqueproperty,n irreducible ssencewhich s not to be foundin theworldof material hings.Mooremaintains hatanybodywho triestodefine good in somescientific ay s necessarily uilty fwhathe calls the naturalistic allacy. Moore's proofof his thesis sanalytic ; t is supposedto follow olelyfrom discussion fwhatwe meanby good. On furthercrutiny,owever,heproof urnsout to be an exposition fcorrectmores s articulatedn linguisticusage according o a Cambridgedon. Encrustedwithin inguisticusage,we find the devices whichthe psychologist ould call theresistances o sociological nalysis.Moore arguesthat we cannotsay that pleasureis good, be-

cause we don't have the same feelings bout pleasure as we doabout good. To say pleasure s good, he observes,s obviously7Cf. Sigmund Freud, New IntroductoryLectures on Psycho-Analysis New York,1933), p. 88-96. The cultural super-ego has elaborated its ideals and erected itsstandards.Those of its demandswhichdeal with the relations of human beings to oneanother are comprisedunder the name of ethics. Civilization and Its Discontents(New York, 1930), p. 130. Karen Horney, New Ways in Psychoanalysis (New York,1939),p. 208. The observationsof child psychologists ave given ample confirmationto the genetic theoryof moral obligation. Jean Piaget thus states: Every commandcoming froma respectedperson is the starting-point f an obligatoryrule. Rightis to obey the will of the adult. Cf. The Moral Judgmentof the Child (London,

1932), p. 193; also, Susan Isaacs, Social Development in Young Children (London,1938),p. 269-71and 371 f.SAn Autobiography(Oxford, 1939),p. 48. Also, H. W. Arndt, The Social Outlookof BritishPhilosophers, cience & society,Vol. iv (1940), p. 443 f.



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ETHICS AND HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 245differentrom aying pleasure s pleasure. Now it is quite obviousthat Moore is not lookingfor definition f good. Ratherhe isaskingwhetherheresanyemotiveymbolwhichwill havethe ameaffectivealue forhimself s the word good. He thenfailsto findan emotiveequivalent. This was quite to be expected,for theapprovedmoresof middle-class nglishmenhave been molded insome measureby the Puritanoppositionbetween pleasure andgood. 9Forsuch a person, o setofwords an constitute defini-tion of good becauseno otherwordshave been the vehicle forthe same childhoodexperiences.The word good is associatedwith all the emotionswhichthe child feltwhenit acted in suchaway s tokeepthe oveof someparental uthority.The wordelicitsunconscious esponses nd anxietieswhichno scientificerms ancall forth.

We can thusexplain along lines of social psychology hytheEnglish ntuitionistsind hat good is indefinable. Our explana-tion hows t the sametimethatthere s no groundfor aying hatwe are enabled by a moral intuition to apprehendsome non-naturalqualityofgoodness. Moore,as an intuitionisthilosopher,wisheshowever o resist he materialisticnalysis f ethical terms.He wishes oguarantee hat hesuper-egos an unanalyzable ntity,and toproject tsmandatesnto a metaphysicalealmtowhichonlythe ethical ntuitionhas access.10 or thematerialisticnalysisun-derminesheground ftraditionalthical onsciousness,ndagainstsucha threat,he ntuitionistmust ummon ll the forces frepres-sion. The naturalistic allacy s thus inventedas a device forrulingout of orderany scientifictudyof ethical language. Andsincethememories f earlymoraleducation ie repressed,here sa kindofplausibilityo theviewthatwe have an immediate ourceof ethical insight.11he scientist, owever, eeks to penetrate e-

8 I can imagine a state of thingsin which all desires were satisfied, nd yet canjudge of it that it would not be so good as another in which some were leftunsatis-fied/'G. E. Moore, Philosophical Studies (New York, 1922),p. 339.10This motivationis not restrictedto philosophersbut is quite common amongsociologists. Talcott Parsons thus writes: The source of specificmoral obligationscannot be derived from the empirical propertiesof 'human nature' as revealed byscientific sychology, The Place of UltimateValues in Sociological Theory, The In-ternationalJournalofEthics,xlv (1935), p. 289. Parsons adopts a metaphysicalposi-tion of a 'voluntaristic haracter' (p. 285). This is an example of the persistence fa theological procedure among accreditedsociologists.



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246 SCIENCE AND SOCIETYneath he consciousdeologicalevel;he thenfinds ot a uniquequality fgoodness,utratherhe omplexfanxieties hichendto ethical erms heirpeculiar lavor.That ethical ermsre ap-parentlynanalyzables simplyn indication hattheir nalysisrequires burrowingntotheunconsciousackground.he edictsofthe uper-egohenpresenthemselveso longer s the ntuitivedeclarationsfconscience.12Moorereplies o thematerialisticnalysthatmoral bligationcannot e regardeds a psychologicaldea. The notion f bettermoral aste eregardsssomethinghich iesoutsideheprovinceof the ociologist.It seems o mequiteclear, aysMoore, thatwhenwesayourmoralitys higherhan nother,.. we arenotmerelyssertinghat t has a certain elation o ourfeelings,utareasserting,f may ay o,that hepersonwhohas thas bettermoral aste han heperson hohasnot. 13Moore ejectshe ocio-logical nalysisecauset eads otheview,nhisopinion,hat womenwhobelong odifferentocietiesannot verdiffern moralquestions. ndthisviewhe simply indsnacceptable ithoutur-ther rgument.he criterionfproof videntlyesolvestselfntonothingmore han n appealto theconventionaleliefs fupperclassEnglishmenith gentleman'sraining. n ethical heorysheld to be demonstratedhen t conformso thecanons fgoodform nd mperialistonorwithwhich heyouthn the chools ftheupper lassesre nculcated.14oore nvokes uch anonsike-wisewhen egives rief onsiderationospecificoliticalndsocialquestions. he moral ules fthe tatusuo areendorsed henhewrites hat it seemsdoubtfulwhether thicscan establish heutilityfany ules ther han hose enerallyractised. t is note-worthy,moreover, ow the ethicsof Moore's CommonSensecoincideswiththerequirementsf dominantnterestsn Britisheconomy.The desire fproperty, e states,s so universalndso stronghat t wouldbe impossibleo remove. herefore,eargues,he commonegalrules or heprotectionfpropertyre

il Cf. John Locke, An Essay ConcerningHuman Understanding,Book I, chapter 2,paragraph 23.12Cf. Ralph Barton Perry, Value as SimplyValue, The Journal of Philosophy,xxvii (1931), p. 523; W. K. Frankena, The NaturalisticFallacy, Mind, xlviii (1939),p. 472-7.



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ETHICSAND HISTORICALMATERIALISM 247justifiedythe ethics f Common ense.15he ethical ntuitionthus ransformsherequirementsfcapitalistconomyntouniver-sal moral aws.What s the basiccontrasthenbetweenMoore'sphilosophicalmethod ndthemethodfhistorical aterialism? ooreproposesthatt s theofficefphilosophyoaccept hepropositionsf com-mon ense ndthen oanalyzeheirmeanings.16heMarxian cien-tist,nthe ther and, efusesogive nyprimacyothe tatementsof common ense. Historicalmaterialismffirmshat anguageitselfs a historical,volvingroduct;xistentinguisticsagehasbeenmoldedbytheagencies f classconditioning,nd itwouldbe a gross rror omistake he classprejudicesmbeddedn lin-guistic abits ormmutable etaphysicaleliverances. arx ike-wiseheld thatthe limitationsf bourgeoisconomistsxpressedthemselvesn a commitmento theprevalenteconomiclang. 17Thebourgeoisconomistho s contentedith he ategorieshichbusinessmenhavefound sefulwillnotgetvery arn his cientificanalysis. or the economicanguagewhichhas beenmoldedtoassist ourgeoiselationsfproductions notnecessarilyhe ppro-priate nstrumentortheanalysis f those conomic elationsfwhicht is the xpression;hebourgeoisinguisticormsmay ervetoowelltoconceal he ssentialelationsf economic evelopment.Vulgarconomys a theoryhichonformsobourgeoiscommonsense. t issimilarlyblunderoaccept he tatementsfcommonsense thics s the ouchstonefanalysis.18ather, istorical ate-rialismeadsus toexpecthat he thicalanguagefcommonenseis notexempt romhe awsofhistoricalhange. Commonense13Op. cit.,p. 335 f.14The inter-relationships etween the ethical code of the public schools and thesocio-economic nterestsof aristocratic nd middle class England are set forthwithfull detail in Edward C. Mack, Public Schools and BritishOpinion since i860 (Colum-bia UniversityPress,1941). See also Harold J. Laski's observations n The Danger ofBeing a Gentleman (New York, 1940).15George Edward Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge UniversityPress), p. 161and 157.16 A Chinese philosopher who recentlyvisited Cambridge remarkedmock-regret-fullythathe had hoped to learn fromMoore the nature of the world

and had insteadlearnta greatdeal about the correctuse of the English language, R. B. Braithwaite,Philosophy, n University tudies,Cambridge,1933,ed. by Harold Wright (London,1933)P- So-l Capital, 11, . 21, in, p. 951.



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248 SCIENCE AND SOCIETYethics, ike its economiccounterpart,mayserveonly too well toconceal the social relations romwhichtheefficacyf ethicaltermsderives. Indeed,so intent s Moore on barring heapplicationofsociological nalysis o ethicalusage thathe is drivenfinally o theassertion hat t is a mistake oregard thics s concerned ssentiallywithhumanconduct.19 hings maybe good,he says, veniftherewereno humanbeings live. The moral ntuition/' yprojectingits udgmentsntoa metaphysicalphere, ludesthe socialscientist;it has translated ts pronouncements, owever,into meaninglessstatements.The dialecticof common sense thus culminatesnnonsense.

The realisticmovementn Englishphilosophywhichbegan asa hopefulprotest gainst dealisticmetaphysicsailed,as we haveseen n theforegoingnstance, o achievea thoroughgoingcientificapproach. It was not immuneto thetemper fminddominantnEnglish cademiccenters.The doctrines fabsolute dealismwhichwereprevalent t the end ofthenineteenthenturywere argelyrationalizationfa tradition kin to Torydemocracy. 20he Eng-lish idealists criticized aissez-faireiberalism which gave only anegative reedomo thepoor; at thesametime,however,hey on-finedall proposalsof social reformwithinthe frameworkf theexistent ocial organism.English idealismsoughta paternalistic,traditionalistictate.Those who were rebellious gainstthisframeof mindoftenfoundthemselves rawnby its attractions.McTag-gart,underwhose influenceMoore and Russell were for a whileHegelians,wentthroughust such an evolution.He came to Cam-bridge sa young adical,with agerhopesfor eriouspoliticalwork.But he soonchanged.Some said itwas becausehe had readHegel,and had cometo see thatmaterial hingswereunreal. More deep-seatedcauses,however, ad broughtbout a receptivityo thecon-servativephilosophy. The glamour of ancient institutionsikethose of Cambridge, ooted n a distantpast . . . seemed to makeready-madechemes or hereformationfsociety, n linesof shal-18George H. Sabine, in discussingMoore's ethical realism, remarks: His valua-tions become rationalizationspartlybecause they protectthemselves rom criticismbythe specious claim that the evidence is well known and need only be consulted,Social Studies and Objectivity/'Universityof California Publications, xvi (1941),P. 135i&Cf. Principia Ethica, p. 40; 83-85.



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ETHICS AND HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 249low, ifwell-intentioned,heories,ook preposterous,ike a gardencityof erry-builtottages. 21 e subsequently ecamea Tory andan opponentof tradeunionism.The preoccupation ftheEnglish dealistswas to showthatnomaterialisticnalysis ould be providedfor ethical notions.22 eal-istic hilosophersike G. E. Moorecriticizedhemore xtreme hesesofidealism,but shortlyook over a metaphysicaltandpointwhichwas likewisehostile to materialism. ambridgephilosophyunderthe aegis of Moore became a singularproductof the leisure-classmentality.t tookdelight n proclaiming hat the knowledge tsoughtwas unimportantnd useless.23 hilosophicarguments e-came a typeofsport;theprimary bjectwas to exhibitprowess.24Although heCambridge hinkersegarded hemselves s criticar*empiricists,t was quite evidentthattheyhad departedfar fromtheways f classicalEnglish mpiricism.Men like Lockeconceivedof theirwork as contributingo a definite ocial function. ockedrew on the resources f sociological nd psychologicalnalysis otakethepropsfromunder the ideologyof innate ideas and thedivineright heoryfkings. twaswith ustcause thatmenspokeofhimas thephilosopher f theGloriousRevolutionof 1688; hehad providedthe bases fora social orderwhichhe hoped wouldsafeguard oleration nd men's rights.The Cambridgeschool ofthe twentiethentury ad no desire,however, o tamperwiththeestablishedociety.Theycould thereforeccept ts common ensewithout ualms; their nalyses evolved roundexistent inguisticusage,butnever ought o alter t. No centralhypothesisfrecon-struction uided theirwork;theyelaboratedmanyverbaldistinc-20Cf. George H. Sabine, The Social Origin of Absolute Idealism, The Journalof Philosophy,xn (1915), p. 169ff.Also, Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends,Ed. byJ. H. Muirhead (London, 1935),p. 46-48.21G. Lowes Dickinson,/. McT. E. McTaggart (Cambridge, 1931),p. 112.22Cf. A. E. Taylor, ContemporaryBritish Philosophy (Second Series), (New York,1926),ed. by J. H. Muirhead, p. 273t23Cf. Principia Ethica, p. 63; also, C. D. Broad, Preface to Examination of Me-Taggart's Philosophy (Cambridge, 1933); Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of theLeisure Class, chapter 10.24 . . . we followed an argumentin the spirit of adventure,and not with theobject of making for port. In our view,nothing was final but the rules of soundnavigation; and everyoneseemed ready to be argued out of his fundamental con-victions of the term before, John Laird, ContemporaryBritish Philosophy (FirstSeries),ed. by J. H. Muirhead (London, 1924),p. 215.



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250 SCIENCE AND SOCIETYtionswhichwere mployed,owever,o do nothing.MoralPhi-losophy ecameexclusively game betweenpedagogues ndundergraduates.

IILogicalempiricistsrofesso be loyalfollowersf scientificmethodnd mathematicalogic.Theirresistanceo thematerial-isticanalysis f their thicalviewswill thereforee clothednlogical rmor. heirdevices, owever,xemplifyhe resistance-phenomenonust s competentlys Moore'smetaphysicaloctrineof the naturalisticallacy. ogicalempiricistsftenhold thatethical isagreementsesolve hemselvesinallyntodisagreementsconcerningultimate alues. Now whatare ultimate alues ?To definehem,he mpiricistmploysis ogical kill o constructan axiomaticystemor hose thical tatementshich xpressheviews owhich eadheres.A statementsan ultimate-valuetate-

ment, romhis tandpoint,f t s a postulatensome uchformal-izedsystemfethical tatements.or nstance,omepersonsffirmtheir ltimate alues obe racialpurity nd dominance fthemasterace ;they vertherebyhat heirpolitical ehavioron-forms o specificthical tatements hichfollow rom heirulti-mate-valueostulates.25Those whoadhere o this heoryindt an ideologicalool ofgreat sefulness.f a personwishes o makea consistentefenseforhisactions utdoesnotcare o havehisunderlyingotivesetforth,e findstvery onveniento invoke ertain asic valuesas thegroundfhisbehavior. value s ultimate nlywhenyouare reluctantoansweruestionsoncerninghyyouhold t.Theaxiomaticmethodhus ontributeso thefulfillmentffunctionsfresistancendrepressionn a uniqueway.For t is always ossibleto constructome xiomaticystemfultimate alueswhichwilljustify ourbehaviorno matterwhat t be. And consistencywithin our wnframeworkssupposedomakeyou mmune romcriticism hichdoesnot acceptyour ultimate alues.26

Now it is, ofcourse, ossible o constructormalystemsf25Cf. AlfredJ. Ayer,Language, Truth, and Logic (New York, 1936),p. 160 ff.;AlfRoss, Imperatives nd Logic, Theoria, vii (1941),p. 53 ff.;Rudolf Carnap, Philosophyand Logical Syntax (London, 1935),p. 24.



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ETHICSANDHISTORICALMATERIALISM 251ethical tatements.he significancehich s attached o themmayhowevere unwarranted.nethical-postulateet, ornstance, aycontain he statementhat he dominance f the master ace san ultimate-value.his is regarded,n effect,s equivalento theassertionhat heres somebasicdrive owarduchdominancentheperson's sychologicalrganization.uchreasonings charac-teristicf whatwemay all ideologicalnference,n which heconclusionsgrounded,otonovert vidence utrather nunder-lying lassbiases.The particularnferencen question ssumesthat to every ultimate-value ostulate here orrespondsn aone-to-one annerome neradicablend unconditionedrive. tisobviouslybsurd, owever,omaintain hat rganismsave omebasicdrive owardracialdominance, or uch ultimate aluesare theproductfcomplex rocessesf socialconditioning. hatis theproper stimatehen of theformalismsystemf ethicalaxioms?n effect,e has taken group fverbal esponses,onfinedsolely o the consciousevel, nd has systematizedhemwithhislogical echniques.he resultantroducts an axiomaticet fortheutterancesfthe false onsciousness. he empiricist akeshisvalue-utterancest thefacevalue,and thusprovides imselfwith deductiveormulationfhisprejudices. hose whoresisttheeconomicndpsychologicalnalysisftheir ultimatealuesareprone otakerefugen the ogical mpeccabilityftheir xio-matic ystems. here set ofultimate-valueostulatess thus m-ployed, ehavewhat s commonlyalleda rationalization.is-toricalmaterialistnalysissthen egardedskance ecausetbringsinto ight hedisparityetween erbal retensionsndunderlyingmotives.Logicalempiricistsave often escribed thical tatementsscommands.hisdescriptions scarcelydequate, ecause hererecommandshich renotethical tatements.he orders fa high-wayman,or nstance,renotclassifieds ethical tatements.hehighwaymans notregarded ith hose motions hichwe attachtoa moral uthority.ommands,n the ontrary,hich recalledethicaltatements,end oevoke bedience ithoutheuseof hreatsas tothe onsequencesfdisobedience. uilt-anxietiesrom n un-26Pareto's views on ethics are allied to those of the logical empiricists. As foiMarx's ethics, t was no better than the 'bourgeois' ethics,but it was different, heMind and Society,edited by ArthurLivingston (New York, 1935), in, p. 1412.



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252 SCIENCE AND SOCIETYconscious ourceprodtheperson o conformo ethical njunctions.A purely hilological nalysis fethical tatementss unsatisfactorybecauseit leaves out of thepicture ssential ocial factors.27Logical positivisms the ideologyof middle-classmen livingunder conditionsquite unlike those of the placid Victorian ra,whichprovided hesetting ortheEnglish dealists.The predom-inant mphasis f ts mostprovocative eriodmight e characterizedas ethical nihilism. t was the desire of a large segment f theacademic class in Germany nd Austriato preserve kindofneu-trality hroughouthesevere lass truggles hichfollowed heFirstWorld War. Events had upset all the old certainties; he pre-warvalues of statushad beenjolted,and experienceswith nflation adcalled into question the basic bourgeoisyardstick.During thisperiod the ethical nihilism of Wittgenstein ound a receptiveaudience.28 he questionsof ethicsand politicswereheld to betranscendental;ne's choices on such matterswere arbitrary,ndthe academic cientist ad nothing o sayabout suchproblems.Be-hind thepositivist ritiqueof metaphysics,herewas an emotiveelement, desire o be free rom esponsibilityoanysocialgroup.29The academic lass endeavored o preservets socialstatusby nsist-ingon the rrelevance f its science to socialissues.The equivocal thesisthat ethical statements re nonsensehadthusmoreof an ideological ontent han s generallyupposed.Un-derconditions f economicdepression,omesections f themiddleclass nclineto sucha viewbecausetheywishtorejectthe so-called27Most commands are, of course, a mixture of ethical and non-ethicalcomponents.The injunction to be honest in one's business dealings, for example, receives com-pliance partiallywith a view to such desired economic consequences as good creditbut also with a view to satisfying ne's conscience. It is the latter componentwhich provides the domain of ethical terms.

28Ludwig Wittgenstein,Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (New York, 1922), p. 183.20Moritz Schlick noted the emotive use of metaphysical by positivists;he re-marked,moreover,upon those behavioral traitswhich indicated a preoccupation ofrevolt against somethingnot yet overcome. The empiricistthesis that ethical state-ments are devoid of meaning might be regarded as the logical expressionof a con-flictbetween differentultural ideals which is resolvedby a complete rejection of alltheir claims. Cf. GesammelteAufstze (Vienna, 1938), p. 391 and 394; also ErichFromm,Escape fromFreedom (New York, 1941), p. 284. Karl Mannheim notes thatmodern positivism has always retained its affinitywith the bourgeois-liberalout-look, Ideology and Utopia (New York, 1936),p. 147. Mannheim's own theoriesarethe sociological analogue of the logical empiricistphilosophy.Cf. also PierreVienot,Is GermanyFinished? (New York, 1932),p. 80 ff.



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ETHICS AND HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 253propagandaof both theworking lassand finance apitalists.Onecan thentacitlydhereto the status uo becauseall persuasive en-tences re nonsense.30he citizens f Thucydides'day who wereofneither arty*were ikewiseperturbed ythe inguistic henom-ena ofa revolutionaryra. The meaningofwords, aid Thucyd-ides, had no longerthe same relationto things, utwas changedby them[the political partisans] s theythoughtproper. 31 ike-wise,the contemporary ovement f linguistic riticism oes notproceedfrom he motivesof pure scholarship, ut ratherfromtheenhanced le of anguage o those fa middle-classerspective.32The method flogicalempiricisms confined o analyzingwhatmightbe called the manifest ontentof ethical statements. heempiricist oes not try o penetrate eneaththelevel of the falseconsciousness.He takesthe ideologicalstatementsn the form nwhichthey re uttered n the conscious evel,and showsthey remeaningless.33or ideological statements o not assertanythingwhichcould possiblybe confirmedy experimentalmethods.TheMarxiananalyst oweverwishes o go muchfurther. he Marxiantakes he deological tatements,nd bysociologicalmethods,makes

30Eduard Heimann states that thoseGerman economistswho welcomed the seman-tics doctrinefound it an easy stepping-stone o the Nazi creed of anti-intellectualism.Cf. Social Research, vu (1940), p. 360. During an era of stable capitalism,the middleclass professesto found its political action on ethical ideas. The semantical critiqueof thoseideas is an aspect of the crisis n middle-classmentality, he dislocationwhichpreparesthe soil forthe spread of fascist deology.31Thucydides (transi, by Benj. Jowett), Oxford, 1900), Book III, Section 82.32 This whole business of criticizing anguage, saysNeurath, was in the air andhas increased in the last decades. Universal Jargonand Terminology, Proceedingsof the AristotelianSociety,xli (1940-41),p. 132, 143. Neurath alludes to Chase'swork, in which the semantical rejection of Marxian economic concepts like capi-talism is made the vehicle fora defenseof a piecemeal reformism.Empiricists ikeNeurath regard capitalism as a word which should be in the Index VerborumProhibitorum because they think it has no clear referent. The Marxian scientistmakes furtherdiscriminationsike merchantcapitalism and financecapitalism inorder to keep his terminology lexibleenough to meet the requirementsof changinghistoricalsituations. The petty-bourgeoisheorist howshi incapacityforconfrontingsocial change by simplyrevolting gainst theoretic ategoriesentirely.33Schlickdid try o apply a psychologicalmethodto ethical theories n hisProblemsof Ethics, transi,by D. R. Rynin (New York, 1939). His treatment, owever,exhibitstypicalinadequacies. He discussesvaguelyhow ethical valuations correspondto whatsociety finds useful (p. 90-96),but does not considerhow his term society coversup conflicts f class interest.Also, though the book is a psychologicalone there s noconcernwhateverwith the unconsciouscomponents n ethical ideology.



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254 SCIENCE AND SOCIETYexplicit heir atent ignificance.deological tatementsre thustransformedntoassertions,or nstance,fclasspreferencesndrepressions,ssertions hich remeaningfuln a scientificense.Thepsychologistho scertainshemeaningf symptomybring-ing nto heforegroundhose nconsciousesires fwhichtis theexpression,hesociologist hotraces he classconsequencesf abehavior-pattern,ontributeo the Marxian nalysis.34

The preoccupationf ogical ositivistsith he nalysisf an-guage erved curiousdeological unction.35heir concernwithstatementsassolelywithregard o conformityo the rulesof alanguageystem.he basicmeaningf deologies, hich ociolog-ical analysiseveals eneath henonsensicaltatements,as some-thing hich ound oplace ntheir chemefthings. urthermore,thoughll ideologiesreframedn a meaninglessorm,hey iffervastlyn their ocialfunctioning.he underlyingontent f theDeclaration f ndependencelaces t on a differentootingrom,letussay, Nazi ideology. he empiricistccount hrowshemnthe ameboat.The kind fanalysis hichwas ociallyequired ycontemporaryroblems as evaded n deferenceo themotives f

84 t should be noted that the assertion of an ideological proposition s equivalent,from a purely formal standpoint,with the transformed atent statement. In otherwords, if a racial ideology is asserted,then finance capitalism seeks a dictatorship,and vice versa.35Logical empiricismhas a tendency lso to make formal ogic serve as an ideology.A fetishism frigor s pursued,a faith in formal ogic. The logician takes on theaustere rle of criticism which can be directed particularly against psychologistsand social scientists.This fetishism f formalrigor is somethingquite different romthe flexible,dialectic developmentof scientificmethod. Accordingto the latter stand-point, the degree of rigor to be required is relative to the historicalstage of develop-ment of the given science. It is thus a mistake to impose upon a science criteriaofrigorwhich are purely abstractand unhistorical; such a use of formal stipulationsenables the logician to reject theories which the practising ocial scientistfindsmostuseful. One finds logicians raising the demand that historicalmaterialismprovidethemwith the exact time-specificationsf predictedtrendson the model of a highlyidealized physical theory. Such criticisms overlook that historical materialism ascompared with rival sociological hypotheseshas been providingan approach of im-measurably greater productivity.Pure logic servesas a kind of faade moreoverforthe inner conflictswithin the academic mind. The critical method, as thus em-ployed, is a device for guaranteeing that, whatever the question, the philosopherwill end up without takingsides.



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ETHICS ANDHISTORICALMATERIALISM 255academicscapism.t was nthis ense hat mpiricismrovidednideologyfsterile erbalism.36

IllInrecent ears,raditionalthicalheoryasbeen osome egreereplacedy subject alled theoryfvalue. RalphBarton erry,itsprincipal epresentative,efines alue sany object f nterest/1Accordingothis iew, onflictsnsuewhenmendisagrees to theirrespectivealues.37he value-theorist,owever,s describingon-flictss theyppearn refractedorm o the false onsciousness.Men clashbecause heirnterests eet n somecommon round.Rival deologiesrvalue-systemsay bscure commonbject finterest. wogroupsmay, ornstance,oth eek mperialistpoils.There s thennobasicdisagreementn interest. onflictrises n-der such circumstancesecause, elative o the giveneconomicorganization,hererenotenoughpoils ogoround.Mendonot uarrelwhen heir alues redifferentrovidedhattheproductiveesourcesnd economicystemermitheir mplesatisfaction.f oneman ikesmotion ictures nd another ikesbooksnstead,herewillbenoconflictetween hem nless scar-cityn productiveesourcesrises.Thus,theground f conflictsneitherhe dentityordifferencenvalues.Rather,ts ocus sthestruggleor heproductive eanswhich re essential o thesatis-factionfman'swants.Whensocio-economiconditionsenerateconflict,thics nter hepicture; ormen thenhave motive or

tryingocoerce thersnto hangingheir alues rfor justifyingtheir wn.38The methodmployedyvalue-theorys taxonomic;t classifiesmen's values ccordingo theformsnwhich hey reembodied36Marx emphasized that the dissolution of ideological nonsense was not to beachieved without sociological analysis. Always, for these Germans, it is simply amatterof resolvingthenonsense of earlier writers nto some other freak .. ; whilereallyit is only a question of explaining this theoreticaltalk from the actual existingconditions. The real, practical dissolution of these phrases, the removal of thesenotions from the consciousnessof men, will, as we have already said, be effected y

altered circumstances, ot by theoreticaldeductions, The German Ideology (Interna-tional Publishers:New York, 1939),p. 31f.37cf. also Donald C. Williams, Ethics as Pure Postulate, Philosophical Review,XLii (1933), p. 402.



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256 SCIENCE AND SOCIETYin theexistenttructurefsocialrelations. errywrites, or nstance:A fruitfulheory f valuewillacceptthose table and well-markedunities n whichthevaluesof life are alreadygrouped.The greatfoci of interest re science,conscience, rt, industry, tate, andchurch.Perhapsthere s no absolutereasonwhythisshould be so,but there s no denying he fact that t is so. Perry's riterion fvalue thus ends tself s an instrumentorthemaintenance f thestatus uo, the stable ndwell-markednities. Conservativesavealways aid that hosewhocriticize ocial institutionsre insensitiveto the values which are thereinpreserved.39he conservativethinker ouldfind erry's efinition fvaluesuitable noughforhispurposes.Men maybe conditioned o acceptat leastverbally hevalues of exploitativenstitutions;heoppressed lassesare thensaid to have theirsubmissive nterests. he historicalmaterialistwill scarcely, owever, cceptsuch statementss evidencethatmenreallyvalue theirexploitedstatus, heir stationand its duties.Perry's riterion f value, in otherwords,does not enable us todistinguish etween values whichare acknowledged nlywithinthe falseconsciousness romvalueswhich xpressmen'sfree,un-contaminated esires.To determinewhethermen's allegianceto certain values isinduced olelybytraditional ears, oascertainwhether heir espectforthese values is the productof class intimidation ather hanaresponse o their wnneeds,recoursemustbe had toa study fthesocialbackgroundsfvalue-judgments.We must nquireas towhymensaythey ike thethings hatthey o. Value-theorists,aturally,exhibit ll the symptomsf the resistance-phenomenonhensuchhistoricalmaterialist nalysis s suggested.They assert that suchanalysiss guilty fan egregious lunder, owhichtheyhavegiventhespecialname geneticfallacy. According o thisdoctrine, he

38An ideology,from this perspective, s a set of ethical statementsby means ofwhich a group triesto convince itself as well as othersthat the measureswhich it istakingto achieve its aims are justified. This involvesan appeal to ultimate valuesof which the group is the sole representative. It should be emphasized that theideology s at least in part designed to justifythe group's presentacts beforethe barof its inherited conscience. The super-ego,as the vehicle of tradition,must be soreconstructed s to give sanction to the new policies. Ethical statements, n otherwords,often servea selfpersuasi e function.39Ralph Barton Perry,General Theory of Value (New York, 1926), p. 694, 260;Lord Hugh Cecil, Conservatism London, 1927),p. 56.



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ETHICS AND HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 257study f the socialbackgroundsfvalue-judgmentsas no bearingon theirvalidity; the value of anythings independent f its his-tory. 40 ence, it is said,whenMarxists how how certain stheticpreferencesrise,for nstance, rom onditioningnaccordancewithleisure-classanons,nothinghas been demonstratedoncerninghevalidity f thevalue-judgment.et us showbrieflyhe miscon-ceptionswhichunderliethedoctrine fthe geneticfallacy.If a person sserts,suchand sucharemyvalues, what methodshallwe employ o verifyr disprovehis statement?Although hespeakermaybe thoroughlyonest,tmaybe thathisstatementsresimply ntrospectiveeports f his false consciousness. Are theyindeedhisvalues?Orwasheperhaps oldbypersonswhomhe fearedthat hese houldbe his valuesso thathe finally eganto assert hemas his own,despitethe factthathe rejectedthemfullywithinhisunconscious? he my in the expression myvalues is, indeed,ambiguous. Myvalues maymeanthevaluesofmy uper-ego,heinculcated deologicaltraditions; myvalues maysignify,n thecontrary,referenceshich re contaminated yno element fsup-pression.When a person tates suchand such are myvalues, hegenerallyakes he my n somesensewhichconnotes hat hey rehis own free choices.The methodof historicalmaterialism ro-vides an operationalcriterion orascertainingwhether heyare,indeed,his own values.Moreover,when a person omesto realizethathe subscribes o values forno otherreason than thehold oftraditional nxieties, henhe no longerclaims these valuesas hisown. The validity fvalue-statementss thusdependentn twowayson historicalnalysis.The study fthegenesis f values is first nessential omponentnanyexperimentalffortoconfirmudgmentsabout one's values, and secondly, he veryprocessof that studyoperates o altertheperson'sudgment f what his preferencesre.Men, for nstance, re taughtby fascist ulers that the state is asupreme alue; historicalmaterialistnalysisweakens heholdwhichsuch deologyhas upon their motions.An inquiry nto the socialoriginsof ideology,by leading to a full awareness f underlyingmotives,dissolvesthe false consciousness. Marx once said thatthe humanessence s an ensembleof social relations.This is for-gottenbythe theorists f the geneticfallacy. recisely study f

40Morris R. Cohen, Reason and Nature (New York, 1931),p. 369.



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258 SCIENCE AND SOCIETYsocialbackgroundssrequiredodetermine hether man's alue-judgmentsre ideological r not. Forthe my n the assertionsabout myvalues s notan unanalyzablessence; t encloseswholenetworkf socialrelations.Although alue-theoryxhibitsdeologicalnadequacies,t isclear, owever,hat scomparedotraditionalthical heory,t s aprogressiveteptoward scientificpproach o socialproblems.41In Americanheory,heterminologyf valueshas tended o sup-plant hat f moralduties. he duty-languagebtainsn those o-cietieswhere lasshierarchys the socialtradition;heexploitedclassesretherebyonditionedoregardhe necessities f theirlot as virtues. he developmentftheAmericanndustrialrderagainst hebackgroundf a mobile ocietylteredmen'sethicalperspective.xpanded roductionasdependent ponthe ncour-agementfa diversityfwants.t was nowregardedshelpful otheprosperityf theeconomyhatmenabandonwhateverheyretainedf hementalityf n economyf carcity. terminologywasrequiredwhichwould ttach pproval o thevaried ctivitiesofa risingtandardf iving; t the ame ime,he mportf tradi-tionalmoral ursuits as obeacknowledged.sPerryays, theoryofvalue n themodernense s in effectsort fdemocraticevo-lution gainst hereditaryristocracy. itherto,the pecial aluesciences ave ncluded nly uchvalues s have ssumedn institu-tionalform,nd have thereforecquired certainprestige rauthority. he newtheoryfvalue beginswith promiscuousacknowledgmentftherightsfevery alue,howeverowly nddisreputable. 42Nevertheless,t doesnot eem hat dherenceo the erminologyof an autonomousalue-scienceelps olveproblems hich ouldnot therwiseehandledatisfactorily.ndeed, ll that alue-theoryhas tosaywhichsmeaningfulouldbe said ust s wellwithin hebody fsociologicalcience.Andto do sowould ssistnkeepingideologicalactorsromontaminatingurscientifichoughtboutsocialproblems.41Cf. Ralph Barton Perry,Shall not Perish From the Earth (New York, 1940),p. 21-23.42Ralph Barton Perry, The General Theory of Value (New York, 1926), p. 10.He notes furtherthe economic basis of the value-standpointwhen he remarkshowvaluable objects have been multiplied and diversifiedby the development of in-dustry nd commerce, bid., p. 13.



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ETHICS AND HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 259IV

It hasgenerally een takenforgranted hatthe ethicalmode ofspeech s a characteristicf the anguageofall societies. Mostschol-ars are agreedthatthespecific ontent fethicalstatementsarieswith differentocieties;themode of speechitself s, however, e-gardedas a universal ocial law. The outcomeof our analysis, nthe contrary,s thatthe ethicalmode of speech depends on theexistence fspecialsocialconditions.The elimination f these on-ditionswould be accompaniedby the obsolescence f ethicalstate-ments.The terms f thesuper-egoanguagewould tend to vanishfrom ur vocabulary, orethical deologywouldhave lost itstradi-tional socialrle.43This propositions fimportance ecausethoseauthorswho have stressedmost the emotivemeaning of ethicalstatementsall backat thispointon their wnclass values. Thur-man Arnold,for nstance, alls ethicalstatementsfolklore, ut,he opines, hey rea folklorewhich s sociallynecessary.44 philos-opherwith Cambridge ackgrounddds thatthere s no reason oscornsuch statements ecause it is only by such means that ourpersonalities row.45 et us explainwhat s meantby theobsoles-cence of the ethical mode of speechbyreference o a simplifiedsociologicalmodel.

When a ruling lasscomestopower, tshegemonyests n sheer43Freud himself suggeststhat the content of the cultural super-ego varies withhistorical conditions. But he seems to regard the existence of some super-egomech-anism as an eternal social necessity. The fear of the super-ego should normally

nevercease, since it is indispensable in social relations in the formof moral anxiety,and it is only in the rarest instances that an individual succeeds in becoming inde-pendentof the community. Cf. New Introductory ectures,p. 138. The whole issuehingeson themeaningof independentof the community. The social relationsof acommunitymay be of two kinds,cooperativeor coercive. The fear of the super-egois the essential foundationonly for coercive social relationships. A man may, how-ever,cooperatewith his fellow-menwithoutbeing actuated by super-egofears. Socialinterdependence s compatible with psychologicalfreedom. Despite his tendencytoeternalizethe super-ego,Freud does recognizethat in solving the problemsof civili-zation an actual change in men's attitude to propertywould be ofmore help in thisdirectionthan any ethical commands. Cf. Civilizationand Its Discontents,p. 140.44Cf. Thurman W. Arnold, The Folklore of Capitalism (New Haven, 1937), p.343-5-45Charles Leslie Stevenson in The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms, Mind,XLVi 1937),p. 29.



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260 SCIENCE AND SOCIETYforce.Attheirnception,he lass elationsre overtnd visible. stime oes n, movementeginswhichmay e describednWhite-head'sphrase s proceedingfrom orce o persuasion. he gov-erning lass,throughts control f educationalnstitutionsndopinion-manufacturingndustries,nstills hedominantttitudesnpeople.Class elations ecome mbeddednfolklore,n persuasivesentences,ndaregroundedn moral bligation. he useof thicalstatementsakestpossible o reduce onsiderablyhebudget ormilitaryepression;thical raininghusprovides device fgreatutilityothosemost oncerned ith he dministrativeconomyfthe ocialorder.46he mechanismfthe uper-egos strengthenedbyall the genciesf social ontrol,or n thisway, hegoverningclass angetpeople odothings hichhey on't iketo do.Ethicallanguage elps otieup people's motionsnsuchways s to securetheir ommitmentomodes funenjoyableehavior.Letussuppose, owever,hat societysevolvedwhich pprox-imates o classlesselations. o that xtent,he conditions hichcalledfor heuseof persuasiveentences, amely,onditionsfcoercion,would have vanished.And to that extent, thicalstatementsouldbecomebsolete;heir sagewouldnolonger ul-fill ny ocial unction.ersuasivetatementsave place nspeechwhenpeoplegrow p emotionallyependentn the uggestionfsome uthority. here ocialconditionsresuch hatpeoplemaydevelopnto ompletemotionalndependence,hefoundationorthe nfluencefethicaltatementsisappears,nd the atter ecomearchaicxpressions.47enthen ealwith ocial ndeconomicrob-lemswith ompletelarityoncerningheir esires,nd withoutheintrusionf the ethical uestion, hat s,whetherheir roposedactionhas theapproval f their uper-ego,.e., theirnursemaid,

46Perhaps the clearest contemporary xample of such a use of ethics is found inJapanese society. Classes in ethics are held in all the large factories,where rules ofhumilityand hard work, coupled with reverence for employers and Emperor, areimpressedupon theworking girls. This instruction s said to be designed to counter-act Marxist influenceswhich have proved incapable of extirpation.For an earlierexample, cf. Masaharu Anesaki,History of JapaneseReligion (London, 1935),p. 285.47 Cooperation, on the otherhand, seemsto be essentially he social relationwhichtends to eliminate infantilephenomena. And this is enough to show that cooperation. . . leads eventually to results that are qualitatively the opposite of constraint,Piaget,op. cit.,p. 350.



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ETHICS AND HISTORICALMATERIALISM 261parent,rteacher,ntheir les s thevehiclesftraditionalocialrelationsnd attitudes.48Againstheforegoingheory,ariousbjections ight e raised.Somepersons old,for nstance,hat t is a universalawthat llsocial nstitutionsryokeep he llegiancefpeoplebydevelopingtheiruper-egoslong hannels f nstitutionaloyalty.very ocietyis thusheldto haverecourseo ethicalmperatives,hich t incul-cates hroughhe ducationalrocess.49efind, owever,hat omesocietiesf thepasthaverequiredess of suchmechanismshanothers.ndeed, otheextento which societys progressive,hatis,makes ossible risingtandardf iving,othat xtent societyavails tselfessofdevices or hemanufacturef loyalty. hilos-ophers ftheprogressiveiddle lass ikeJohnLockewerethuscriticalfthe thicalmetaphysicshichwasusedon behalf fpolit-icalreaction.nstitutionshich refounded n exploitationry operpetuatehemselvesytheuse ofethical deology.nstitutionswhich redeliveringhegoods othepeople an affordobe udgedsolelyby theirfruits. s social institutionsose theirrepressivecharacter,he thicalmode f peechoses ts ocialground.Moralphilosophy,s a subject-matter,ad its nceptionn theclass trugglesfthe lassical reek ra.50 thical octrinessto thenature fright nd justicewerethenelaboratedn the form frationalrgument. hen class trugglesrowntensemongmenwho hare commonulture,hey ive ise o ethical heories hich

48The value theoryof the late D. W. Prall arrived at a similar conclusion withrespectto the fatuousnessof duty ethics. Prall believed, however,that an autono-mous discipline, the theoryof value, enables one to derive such theorems as con-formity o rule cannot as such be value. The critiqueof duty-ethicss thus itselfcastin the terminology f a more enlightenedethics. The traditionalcategoriesare stilloperativewithin such a framework.Cf. David W. Prall, The Present Status of theTheoryof Value,University f CaliforniaPublications n Philosophy, (1923),p. 101 f.49Frankwood E. Williams, a distinguishedpsychiatrist,ound that the Soviet meth-ods of educationproceeded along a different attern. Cf. Russia, Youth and thePres-ent-Day World, FurtherStudies in Mental Hygiene (New York, 1934),p. 241. Thosewho believe that the super-egoand the Oedipus complex are universal patternsofhuman psychology re led to conclude that a Communist economymust founder ifit dares tamperwith them. See W. R. D. Fairbairn, The Sociological Significance fCommunism, Considered in the Light of Psychoanalysis, The British Journal of** **cal Psychology,xv (1935), p. 229. For the reply of Soviet scientists, ee EllaWinter,Red Virtue (New York, 1933),p. 179.50Cf. L. T. Hobhouse, Morals in Evolution,Fifth Edition (New York: HenryHolt &Co.), p. 544.



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262 SCIENCE AND SOCIETYare used as ideologicalweapons.Each class triesto show thatitsstandpointnherits he mantle of the traditional ultural deals.51With theebb ofclassantagonisms,thicaltheories s distinct romethical statementsikewisetend to vanish.Somequestionmightbe raisedconcerningheprocess ymeansof which hemandates fthegoverninglassare translatedntoseg-ments fthechild's conscience.The stateacquires ts statuswithinthecultural uper-egos the result fa sequenceof whatmightbecalled delegations fauthority. he parental uthorityarly ellsthe child to respectthe authority f policemen, ministers, ndteachers.The child perceives, urthermore,hat ts parentregardshimself s subordinate,n certain espects, o otherauthorities.Adelegationof authority nsues when the child attachesto theteacherrespectand fearwhich are derivativefromthe parentalsource.The teacher n turnenjoinsthepupil to respectdominantinstitutions nd theirsymbols.The initial parentalauthoritysusuallyreinforced hen the child is taught, or nstance, o honortheparents.There is thus n interactiveeinforcementetween heparental nd delegated uper-egos.he situations altered, owever,duringa periodof social crisis.Such a periodis characterized ywhatmaybe called a conflict etween ivalsuper-egos. he childat schoolmaybe taughtthat the values of the parentare mis-taken.The delegated uthoritys thus used to undermine heorig-inal parental uthority.Acute psychological ensionswithin ndi-viduals are thusconcomitantwith the clash of social institutions.The governing lass uses its powersto induce institutionsuch asthe family nd school to ingrainwithin he child thosehabits ofsubserviencewhichhelp keep the established rder ntact.52

51For the class basis of the ethical schools among the Jews,see Louis Finkelstein,The Pharisees: The Sociological Backgrounds of Their Faith, Second Edition, 2 vols.(Philadelphia, 1940). JamesHenryBreastedassignsthebeginningof ethicalconceptionsto the incipient class struggles n ancient Egypt. The Nile Valley, he states, is theearliest social arena, where we may observeman victoriously mergingfroman age-long strugglewith nature, and enteringthis new arena of social forces, o begin thebaffling truggleof mankind within himself/'The Dawn of Conscience (New York,WSi)*p. 11. Cf. also p. 355f.52Flgel has called attention to the considerable degree of correspondencebe-tween the nature of the family systemas found in any countryand some of thepolitical features . . , 'The PsychoanalyticStudy of the Family, Second Edition(London, 1926), p. 128f. A rigid systemof familyrule is correlatedwith politicalconservatism; he relaxation of parental authority s concomitantwith tHe loosening



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ETHICS AND HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 263Manypeople believe thatethicaltraining s a necessaryonse-quence of the educationalprocess, hat the processof upbringingcannotdispensewiththe cultivation fa super-egomentality.How,it is asked,can childrenotherwisebe taughtessentialhabits ofcleanliness nd cooperation?t is easy,however, o mistakefor auniversal aw ofeducational sychologyhat s rather n historicallyconditioned ulturaltrait.Worksuch as thatwhichSusan Isaacs carriedout in herexperi-mental choolsuggests hat educationaltechniquecan be renderedcompatiblewiththe development f psychological reedom. Weneverusedgeneral ategories, hewrites, such as naughty,'good/or horrid/n otherwords,we wantedtohelp thechildren o real-ize and adjustto otherpeople'swishes s everydayacts ather hanas mysteriousbsolutes/'There was no trainingn obedience forobedience's ake. The area of definite ommand nd prohibitionwas thuskept as small as possible.Moreover, ven within theselimits, ppeal wasmade wherever ossibleto the children's ntelli-

gence, nd to theobjectivegroundsforthe desired behavior.Ouraimwas to essenprogressivelyheneedformere mplicit bedience,justbecause t was tous an instrumentfeducation,notan absoluteof governmental uthority.This generalizationhelps us to understandthepsychologyof the Nazi ideology. Flgel remarksthat there exists a tendencyto resurrect omeof the parental attributesand give them a political application by bestowingthemupon the State. . . . The adult individual is thus led to transfer nto the State thatattitude of dependencewhich he originally dopted in relation to his parents,failingto thisextentto attain that full degree of self-reliance nd independence . . . , ibid.,p. 236. The Nazi rgimehas sought to reinforcehabits of obedience and to stampout independent thought by lending its aid to the authoritarianpatriarchal family.The Nazi philosophy,moreover, mphasizes the process by which the individual at-tains his own full freedom by identifying imself with the will of the state. Thisinsistence on the individual's identifying himself with the state is the philosophicanalogue of the process by means of which a person attains some stability throughidentifying his own desires with the commands of his super-ego. The series ofHegelian stageswhich the individual's will traverses n its path to final identificationwith the all-inclusiveState Absolute is the ideological expressionof the route whichmen's minds take under the conditioning nfluencesof authoritarianrule. Cf. AlfredMeusel, National Socialism and the Family, The Sociological Review, xxvni (1936).Beccaria, the great Italian theoristof the eighteenthcentury,described with claritythe antagonismbetween the freerepublic and strongfamily spirit. Such contradic-tions between the laws of a family nd the fundamental aws of a State are a funda-mental source of other contradictionsbetween public and private morality,givingrise consequentlyto a perpetual conflict n every ndividual mind. For whilstprivatemorality nspiresfear and subjection,public moralityteaches courage and freedom.From Crimes and Punishments, ranslatedbyJ. A. Farrer (London, 1880),p. 237f.



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264 SCIENCE AND SOCIETYvalue. In general, e tried o use ourparental owersn suchway storeduce he hild's eedfor hem/'53Within heframeworkf a societyoundedn exploitativeco-nomic elations,he use ofeducationalmethodsuch as those fSusan saacs annot ecomewidespread.he developmentf a so-cialist conomyends, owever,oliberate hosemovementshichare retarded ndercapitalism.Within n exploitativeconomy,moreover,nstitutionsike he amilyrecontaminatedy hepreva-lent ethical ttitudes. parentwho s bulliedduringheday na factoryillreactna compensatoryayby bullying is childrenathome.The familyhus etainshetechniquesfdisciplinendcoercion hich re thegroundworkor he thicalmode f peech.54

VWhat earingsoes heMarxiannalysisf thicaldeologyavefor hosewell-known ovementsn contemporaryhought,uch s

pragmatism,hich eek oapply cientific ethodoethics?Onlybriefndicationsan be venturedn this ontext. ewey's heorythat a scientificthics spossibles,from urstandpoint,notherexample fan ethical heory hich xhibits he usualtraits fre-sistanceo analysis. he Americanmiddle lass dmires sciencebut t alsohas a strongttachmento traditionalthical ymbols.Deweys thus lwaysryingoredefineheoldvocabularynscien-tific erms. his compromisistpproach,however, imply x-presses reluctanceo have he raditionalymbolscrapped.55hetermsfthe uper-egoanguageretoomuch partofthe tatusquo, and the uggestionhat heyre outmodedeaves hemiddleclasswith n emotional acuum. Scientificthics s thus xperi-

53Susan Isaacs, The Experimental Constructionof an EnvironmentOptimal forMental Growth, in A Handbook of Child Psychology,edited by Carl Murchison(Worcester,Mass., 1931),p. 139-143.54Here again, such institutionalphases enter theirobsolescentstagewith the begin-ningsof socialistreconstruction.55The expression compromisist pproach is used in Marxian analysis to denotethat frameof mind which seeks to reconcilescientificmethod with the requirementsof class interests. t seeks to imposea kind of consistency n motivationswhich remaininherently ncompatible.The economic basis of compromisism has its analogue inthe compromisist spect of neurotic behavior. Psychoanalysis arly recognized thateveryneuroticsymptom wes its existenceto some compromise, The Basic Writingsof SigmundFreud, Modern LibraryEdition (New York, 1938),p. 967.



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ETHICS AND HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 265mentalup to thepointwherethe values of the middleclass areconcerned.

Dewey'spragmatic evelopment f the idealistphilosophywasundertakenargely o developan ideologywhichwould be expres-sive of the Americanprogressivesf themuck-rakingra.56 thicalslogans bout the nterestfthewholeand theapplicationofintel-ligence opoliticswerewell-suitedo the middle-class eformmove-ments.When thesesame ethicalformulaewereapplied byDeweyto the problemsof class struggle nd international elationsfiftyyears ater, hey nvolved profoundmisreading f events.Dewey's scientific thics s, in effect,n ideologydisguised nscientificanguage. t is themoredifficulto get at his ideologicalcorebecause t is embeddedwithin he nterstices fethicalpropo-sitionswhich are conventionallycceptable.Deweyand his follow-ersmake abundantuse of dicta ike endsareneverbetter hanthemeansused to attain hem. 57n accordancewith uchmaxims, heyhave painteda dire pictureof the SovietUnion. Politicalmeanslikeproletarian ictatorship ereheld to involveconsequencesikelackof initiative nd loyaltymongthepeople. Such formulae reconfutedwhen confrontedwith sociologicalfact.Social relationswhichare foundedhistoricallyhroughdictatorialmeans are notthemselvesrrevocablyommitted o a dictatorial uperstructure.Afterthe CromwellianRevolution,for instance,had established

56 n a letterto William James in 1891,he speaks of the inspirationderived fromFranklin Ford, a financial newspaperman, whose efforts t muck-rakingcame upagainst obstacles of financial controlof the press; these he traced to the social struc-turewhich prevents ree nquiry. Dewey's idealist problem, the unity of intelligenceand the externalworld, then came to mean the securingof the conditionsfor intel-ligence's objective expression. Dewey told James how Ford became concerned withinquiry as a business,the selling of truth for money, in which the whole wouldhave a representative s well as the various classes. The bourgeois progressive m-phasis on the interest f the whole as above that of classes is herein evident. In aninterestingpassage, Dewey envisages a dictatorshipof bourgeois intellectuals,whohaving seized the telegraphsand printing presses, shall, throughfree inquiry in acentralizedway, demand the authorityof all other so-called authorities. Cf. RalphBartonPerry,The Thought and Characterof WilliamJames (Boston,1935),n, p. 518f.57Dewey has redefined he theory f valuation as concernedwithpropositions boutthe relation of means and ends; value-propositions f the distinctive ort existwhen-ever thingsare appraised as to theirsuitability nd serviceability s means, Theoryof Valuation, InternationalEncyclopaedia of UnifiedScience,n, no. 4 (1939), p. 51 1This definitionof the scope of the valuation-theoryconformsto Dewey's centralobjective,the criticism f the Marxian theoryof political action.



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266 SCIENCE AND SOCIETYwith some firmnesshe economicrelationswhichtherisingbour-geoisie sought,therewas a relaxationof the dictatorialpressuresagainstthe landed aristocracy.The Marxianconception f themeans-endelation s dialecticalin a way n whichDeweys, forall his criticism f fixed nds, isnot. According o Dewey,the character f the end bears theindel-ible imprintof the means employed.Accordingto the Marxianconception,his s a static misconceptionfthehistorical rocess.For the state of affairs ealizedthrough ertainmeans,mayin itsowndevelopmentmake thecontinuance f thosemeanshistoricallysuperfluous. he scaffolding hich is used to construct greatbuildingdoes not remainwithit as an historicalnecessity.TheDeweyan theory f the means-end elation s an ideologicalprojec-tionwhichhas no cogency romhe tandpointfsociological cience.Deweybelievesmoreoverhatwe generally avea choiceofpos-sible means to attain a givenend. He forgets, owever, hat themeans available are historicallyonditioned, hathistory eed notpresent rogressive ovements ith generous ollection falterna-tives.Deweyreasons s a metaphysician ithan aim to showthatmenhave a social freewill; he objectsto theuse ofany dogmaofinevitability. he Marxians,however, o notregard hequestionas one ofmetaphysics.hey taketheground ather hat n appliedsocialscience s possible.The Marxiananalysiseads topredictionsconcerninghedeclineofcapitalismwhich re then usedas a guideforpoliticalaction.Nobodywould attachmuchweight o a meta-physicianwho criticized heair corpsforguiding tsoperationsnaccordancewith the bestavailablemeteorologicalorecasting.uchhowever, s preciselywhatDewey does withregardto the socialsciences.The petty-bourgeoistopia ofmultiplepossibilitiesakestheplace ofsociological nalysis.58As against any relianceupon class struggle, ewey urgesthatthe method fcooperativentelligence e usedas the nstrumentforsocial action.59 eweyuses theword method, however,n anon-scientific,deological ense. He believes,n idealistfashion,hat

58Dewey further isregards he sociologicalfactthatclass motives color the estimateof appropriatemeans. A policy of appeasement may be espoused by men dominatedby narrow class interests;efforts o secure their cooperative intelligencemay them-selves be a device of appeasement.WLibralism and Social Action (1935), p. 79-81.



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ETHICSANDHISTORICALMATERIALISM 267the method sedn nquiryhapeshe tructureffacts hose at-tern s otherwisendeterminate.eweybelieves,n otherwords,that ocial aws re mposednsocialdatabythe cientist's ethodsofresearch. e thus rgues hat heMarxianmethod rings lassstrugglesnto xistence. o hold,however,hatmethodhapes hestructuref indeterminate ata is to assert statement hichmakes oscientificense.Moreover,lass trugglesertainlyidnotbeginwithMarxwho, sa social cientist,as oncerned ith stab-lishingheir rucial le n socialchange. he idealisticvertones*which ewey ttacheso method rovide imwith covert eviceformaintaininghat gitationsmadeby agitators.he pragmaticmetaphysicsbscureshefact,ouseTawney's ords,hatt s muchrather he gitatorshoareproduced ytheagitation.60Dewey'smethod fcooperativentelligence,n effect,overtlyassumeshat he ontemporaryocial cenesone nwhich here reno developed lass truggles. e haveherewhatmight e calledthe academicallacy, he ssumption,notherwords,hat oliticalissues re like theproblems ithwhich n academic roupdeals,solublewhen ll the cholars et together.o assert hatwe liveinsuch societys toprojectne'spetty-bourgeoisishes ponreal-ities.The prestige-valuef cientificymbolsuch s method ndintelligenceamouflageshat sessentiallyprocessf deologicalreasoning.Dewey,f ourse, ould isapproveftheforegoingmploymentof hemethodfhistorical aterialism.ndeed, isreactionsowardthemethodre a clearexample f the resistance-phenomenon.Deweyusesthe methodgainst thers;61e objects o itsapplica-tion ohimself. ussell ttemptedomethingn the atter irectionwhenhe found he loveoftruth bscuredn America ycommer-cialismof whichpragmatisms the philosophicalxpression.Dewey hinkst sufficientoreply hat his is much s if were olinkhisphilosophyothe nterestsftheEnglishanded ristocracyinstead f withhis dominantnterestn mathematics. ussell'sanalysis,e avers,s akin to that order finterpretationhichwouldregard hetendencyfFrench houghto dualism s an

60R. H. Tawney, Land and Labour in China (London, 1932),p. 69.61Cf. Dewey's analysisof the Platonic theoryof knowledgeas the intellectualex-pressionof the Greek leisure class in The Quest for Certainty (New York, 1929).



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ETHICS AND HISTORICALMATERIALISM 269theproblemfconvincingis Calvinistonsciencehatpleasuresgood. To a world fmenwhoare taught o distrustheirm-pulses,Rabelais's dmonition,Fayce que tuvoudras, s itselfcommand fethicaleverity.The controversiesetween edonistndanti-hedonistften e-solve themselvesntorecitationsf their espectiveeelings ithregardotheword pleasure. . H. Bradley,ornstance,egardsthe heoryhatpleasures man's nd as the music-hallheoryflife. 65nother riter,owever,inds hathedonisms consistentwithhisownvalue-judgments,ndthenproceedsoformulateisacceptancen metaphysicalerms.66othtypes f argumentreelaborationsf the false onsciousness.he greatworkof theutilitarianhinkers,owever,uch s John tuartMill is basicallyof scientificharacter.67hat srequireds that his cientificorebeseparatedrom he deologicalntegumentnwhich t senclosed.

VILetusnow eviewhe mplicationsfhistorical aterialismithregardothe thicalmodeofthought.The obsolescencefethicaldeologys a corollaryf historicalmaterialisms appliedto thesuperstructurefa socialistociety.Ethical aws omentobeing sattemptso solve ocial ntagonisms,notbyremovingheir asic auses, utthrough oral oercion. nappeal o ethical octrines a confessionhat hegiven tandpoint

does notenable socialantagonismsound o be resolved. uchamoral aw,for nstance,s the command o honorone'sparentsreflectsnstitutionalontradictionsithin hefamilynder ertainhistoricalonditions.he Biblical njunctionhus eems o havecome othefore uringhe risis ndergonentheHebrews1ransi-65Bradley,op. cit.,p. 90.66Felix Cohen, Ethical Systemsnd Legal Ideals (New York, 1933),p. 188 and 220.67 t is interesting o note that Marx's evaluation of Bentham's utilitarianismdidnot coincide with Engels' early judgment. Marx regardedBentham as a genius inthe way of bourgeois stupidity, Capital, 1 (New York, Modern Library edition), p.668. Engels, however,spoke of Bentham as the great practical philosopher who isalmost exclusivelythe propertyof the proletariat, The Condition of the WorkingClass in England in 1844 (London, 1936), p. 240. For Marx's judgment of Mill, seeop. cit., p. 669.



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270 SCIENCE AND SOCIETYtionfrom patriarchalconomyo a sedentarygriculturalndurban conomy.68he familynlists he upportfethicaldeologyonlywhentbecomes field ftensions,hich eflectconomicon-tradictions. hen the atter re eliminated,hen he socialprob-lems fthefamilyreon theway obeing esolved;he thical e-vices re needless.69A socialist ayof ifegrowswithout thicaldeology.n a de-veloped ocialist rder,menare nothaunted ytheanxieties finsecurityhich amifyheir ctivitiesn a capitalist orld.Theyarenotdriven ytheaggressivempulses hich redominaten acompetitiveconomy,or are they ormentedythe frustrationswhich haracterizeclass ociety.he capitalist orldbreeds m-bivalentmotionsnmen's ocialrelations.he socialnature f tstechnologyakesmencooperative;ts classrelationsmake, t thesame ime, orwhatHobbescalled thiswarofeverymanagainsteveryman. Men's ives n a socialist orld re ives n a commonenterprise.heirwork s free romnner trife.Ethics srequiredto makemencooperatenlywhen heirmutual ttitudes oneoflatenthostility. socialistconomy rovideshegroundworkora societyf menofgoodwill.70Moralityn a socialist ociety ecomes branch f sociologyandpsychology;tcontains ostatementsithdistinctivelythicalterms,nd is not cast n theform f imperatives. henmen'sthinkings no longer eflectedysuper-ego echanisms,hey reready o answerhequestion:whatmodes f behavior nder hegiven echnologicalonditionsrebest alculatedopromoteheirhappiness? socialist rder emoveshefoundation,oreover,orsystemsf classmorality.ocieties asedon exploitativeelations' 8Cf. Adolphe Lods, Israel, translatedby S. H. Hooke (London, 1932), p. 148,191,397; The Prophetsand the Rise ofJudaism (London, 1937),p. 63-66.69Likewise, In a society n which the motive forstealinghas been done away with. . . how the teacher of moralswould be laughed at who tried solemnlyto proclaimthe eternal truth: Thou shalt not steal. Cf.,FriedrichEngels,Herr Eugen Dhring'sRevolution in Science (New York, International Publishers),p. 109.70Engels thus states: A reallyhuman moralitybecomes possible only at a stage ofsocietywhich has not only overcomeclass contradictions, ut has even forgotten hemin practical life, loc. cit. Cf. V. J. McGill's noteworthy ssay, Sender's Theory oSympathy nd Love. Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch, Vol. II (1942)p289 f.



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ETHICS AND HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 271are characterizedysuchsystems.71he militarist irtues fSparta,for nstance,werethedefence eactions f a ruling lasswhich ivedin perpetualfearof an uprisingby theenslaved Helots. With theabolitionofclasses, owever,heclassmentalities f fear nd resent-mentbecomepsychologicalypes f thepast.The socialist ocietydoes not peremptorilyejectmoressolelybecausethey rose under thecapitalistystem,or uchorigin s notincompatiblewiththeirutilityn a socialist rder. The bourgeoisieitselfwaslonga progressivelass, nd itsachievementsre absorbedwithin the socialist ociety.Historicalmaterialism oes, however,lead to the revaluation f men's customs n terms f theircorre-spondence opresent eeds.72Confrontedwith theproblems t the construction fa socialisteconomy,Lenin tried to define a conceptionof moralitywhichwouldanswer o the ocialconditions f a transitioneriod. Moral-ity, he said, is thatwhich serves o destroyhe old exploiting o-cietyand to unite all the toilersround the proletariat,which iscreating new communistociety. 73 oralitys thus dentified iththosemodesofbehaviorbywhichpeople can mostreadily rganizean economyn whichtheywill have available the meansofhappi-ness. Its content oincideswith thepractice f the social scientistwho sendeavoringoworkout the foundationsf a socialist ociety.The socialscientist oesnot, ike themetaphysician,eclare nymode of behavior to be mandatory nder all social conditions.His proposals re as flexible s the diversitiesn historical ondi-tions hemselves; issolutions arywiththestateofthetechnologi-cal and social relations.Absolute ethicalmaximshave no place inthescientist'spproachto social problems.Historical materialism reparesmen for such a scientificp-proachto socialquestions; tsmethod s analogousto thatbywhichthe psychiatristradicatesunconsciousdeterminants o irrationalaction.To bring heoriginof an institutionntofullconsciousness

71Adam Smith thusobserved: In everycivilizedsociety, n every societywhere thedistinctionof rank has once been completelyestablished,there have been always twodifferentchemesor systems f moralitycurrent n the same time; of which the onemay be called the strictor austere; the other the liberal, or, if you will, the loosesystem.The former s generallyadmired and revered by the common people; thelatter is commonly more esteemed and adopted by what are called people offashion. . . The Wealth ofNations (New York, 1937),p. 746.72Ella Winter,Red Virtue,p. 131.78SelectedWorks,rx (New York: InternationalPublishers,1937),p. 475-477.



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272 SCIENCE AND SOCIETYis to take hemostmportanttep oward issolvinghe rrationalattachmentywhich t controls ne's behavior. he mythsndfolklore hich repromulgatedyvestednterestshape,n largemeasure,heways fmen's hinking.he bourgeoisstereotypeslosetheir old nmen'smindswhen heir haractersclarified.hedevelopmentfclassconsciousnessringswith t the full under-standingf and thereforereedomromdeologicalnfluences.74Historicalmaterialismrovidesmenwith scientificdiom nwhich o articulateheir iscontent ith he apitalistrder. Thelanguagenwhichmen xpressheirspirationseflectsheir egreeof ntellectualevelopment.he theological ode fexpression,orinstance, ay ffordsignificantehicle or ocial riticism;ever-theless,tsuse indicateshatoutmodedwayshavenot losttheirgrasp. The emotive elationswhich re thusperpetuatedendthemselvesooeasily o an ideologyf politicaluietism. he in-fluencefMethodism,ornstance,ntheEnglish orkinglass,wasan importantactorn stavingff revolutionaryrisisn eigh-teenth-centuryngland.75Withtheacquirementfscientific a-turity,heworkinglassfinds he traditionalormnadequate;tnolonger eels onstrainedouse the pprovedmotiveanguage.76The Marxian bjectives todevelop hecapacitiesfpeople othat heymay chieve self-reliantnderstandingfpolitical rob-lems. The historicalmaterialistelpsmento acquirethe fullequipment f scientific aturity.e seeksan idiom devoidofpoliticalmetaphysics,n idiom n which profound uestionsfstate reseenas problemsboutthehomely ealities feverydaylife.Historicalmaterialismhushelpsto makemenfree.College ftheCity fNewYork

74Marx was aware that the efforts equired for men to achieve full clarityconcern-ing their nterestswould be considerable. You have got to go throughfifteen,wenty,fifty earsof civil war and national wars not merely n order to change your condi-tions but in order to change yourselvesand become qualified for political power.To his opponents,he said: Just as the democratsturned the word 'people' into asacredbeing,so you have done with the word proletariat/ Correspondence, . 02.75Lecky and Halevy both suggestedthis view. Cf. E. R. Taylor, Methodism andPolitics (Cambridge,England, 1935),p. 13 and 62.76The recognitionof exploitativerelationswithin the religious categories s itself,however, n achievementof historical mportance, ... a verytrue economic contentmay be concealed behind the formaleconomic incorrectness. Cf. Engels' preface toKarl Marx, The Povertyof Philosophy (New York), p. 11.

Feuer, Lewis - Ethical Theories and Historical Materialism

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