Famine Crimes - Clark University€¦ · Famine Crimes ..... 19 Methodology ..... 22 Northern...

FAMINE CRIMES Military Operations, Forced Migration, and Chronic Hunger in Eastern Burma/Myanmar (2006-2008)

BY KEN MACLEAN

Cover Photo

Woman fleeing attacks in Kyaukkyi Township, Nyaunglebin District (Bago Region) Free Burma Rangers (2007)

Maps

1. Myanmar States and Regions, available at: http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/mapsonline/base-maps/myanmar-statesregions (accessed 3 March 2018).

2. Township Map, International Human Rights Clinic, Legal Memorandum: War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity in Eastern Myanmar (Cambridge: Harvard University Law School, 2014), p. 11.

3. Government and KNU Administrative Boundaries, available at: http://khrg.org/sites/default/files/maps/Locally_defined_Karen_State_1_North_Final.jpg (accessed 3 March 2018).

C L A R K U N I V ER SI T Y | I N T E R N A T IO N A L D E V E L O PM E N T , CO M M U N I T Y , A N D E N V IR O N M EN T 2

This report is published by Ken MacLean © Ken MacLean 2018. All rights reserved. Contents may be reproduced or distributed on a not-for-profit basis for media and related purposes. Commercial reproduction is prohibited.


Table of Contents

Acknowledgments........................................................................................................................... 7 Differences in Transliteration ......................................................................................................... 8 Acronyms and Terminology ......................................................................................................... 10 Map 1 Burma/Myanmar................................................................................................................ 11 Map 2 Township Map................................................................................................................... 12 Map 3 Government and KNU Administrative Boundaries........................................................... 13 Introduction................................................................................................................................... 14 Famine Crimes .............................................................................................................................. 19 Methodology................................................................................................................................. 22 Northern Offensive ....................................................................................................................... 26 2004-2005 Forced Migration Summary.................................................................................... 29 2006 Forced Migration Summary............................................................................................. 34 2007 Forced Migration Summary............................................................................................. 40 2008 Forced Migration Summary............................................................................................. 46

Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 52 Appendix 1 Tatmadaw Command Structure................................................................................. 57 Appendix 2 Destroyed, Relocated, or Abandoned Villages (Thandaung Township)................... 59 Appendix 3 ERA Reports ............................................................................................................. 60 Appendix A Thandaung and Tantabin Townships (Toungoo District, Karen State) ............... 61 Report Number KORD-2004-02........................................................................................... 62 Report Number KORD-2004-06........................................................................................... 70 Report Number CIDKP-2004-02.......................................................................................... 78 Report Number CIDKP-2004-09.......................................................................................... 83 Report Number CIDKP-2005-01.......................................................................................... 88 Report Number CIDKP-2005-08.......................................................................................... 93 Report Number KORD-2005-02......................................................................................... 103 Report Number KORD-2005-05......................................................................................... 114 Report Number KORD-2006-03......................................................................................... 123 Report Number KORD-2006-04......................................................................................... 132 Report Number CIDKP-2006-15........................................................................................ 144 Report Number CIDKP-2006-16........................................................................................ 152 Report Number KORD-2007-05......................................................................................... 160 Report Number KORD-2007-06......................................................................................... 169 Report Number CIDKP-2007-19........................................................................................ 176 Report Number KORD-2008-09......................................................................................... 184 Report Number KORD-2008-13......................................................................................... 190 Report Number KORD-2008-21......................................................................................... 201 Report Number CIDKP-2008-11........................................................................................ 207 Report Number CIDKP-2008-12........................................................................................ 217 Report Number CIDKP-2008-16........................................................................................ 227 Report Number Et Tu Hta IDP Camp................................................................................. 239

Appendix B Mone Township (Nyaunglebin District, Bago Region) ..................................... 247 Report Number CIDKP-2004-05........................................................................................ 248 Report Number CIDKP-2004-07........................................................................................ 252


Report Number CIDKP-2004-12........................................................................................ 256 Report Number KORD-2005-03......................................................................................... 259 Report Number KORD-2006-08......................................................................................... 267 Report Number KORD-2006-16......................................................................................... 277 Report Number CIDKP-2006-02........................................................................................ 285 Report Number CIDKP-2006-14........................................................................................ 292 Report Number KORD-2007-09......................................................................................... 297 Report Number KORD-2007-15......................................................................................... 305 Report Number CIDKP-2007-06........................................................................................ 319 Report Number CIKDP-2007-21........................................................................................ 326 Report Number KORD-2008-10......................................................................................... 334 Report Number CIDKP-2008-05........................................................................................ 341 Report Number CIDKP-2008-06........................................................................................ 348

Appendix C Kyaukkyi Township (Nyaunglebin District, Bago Region) ............................... 355 Report Number KORD-2006-02......................................................................................... 356 Report Number KORD-2006-06......................................................................................... 366 Report Number KORD-2006-13......................................................................................... 377 Report Number CIDKP-2006-06........................................................................................ 385 Report Number CIDKP-2006-13........................................................................................ 391 Report Number KORD-2007-10......................................................................................... 402 Report Number KORD-2007-11......................................................................................... 410 Report Number CIDKP-2007-09........................................................................................ 416 Report Number CIDKP-2007-22........................................................................................ 426 Report Number CIDKP-2008-04........................................................................................ 431 Report Number CIDKP-2008-07........................................................................................ 436 Report Number CIDKP-2008-13........................................................................................ 441

Appendix D Hpapun Township (Hpapun District, Kayin State) ............................................ 449 Report Number KORD-2006-05......................................................................................... 450 Report Number KORD-2006-10......................................................................................... 460 Report Number CIDKP-2006-09........................................................................................ 470 Report Number KORD-2007-08......................................................................................... 481 Report Number KORD-2007-12......................................................................................... 489 Report Number KORD-2007-13......................................................................................... 498 Report Number CIDKP-2007-01........................................................................................ 504 Report Number CIDKP-2007-05........................................................................................ 514 Report Number CIDKP-2007-17........................................................................................ 521 Report Number KORD-2008-04......................................................................................... 530 Report Number KORD-2008-06......................................................................................... 538 Report Number KORD-2008-11......................................................................................... 545 Report Number KORD-2008-12......................................................................................... 553 Report Number CIKDP-2008-09........................................................................................ 560

Appendix E Pasaung and Pruso Townships (Bawlahke and Loikaw Districts, Kayah State) 565 Report Number KSWDC-2004-01 ..................................................................................... 566 Report Number KSWDC-2004-05 ..................................................................................... 572 Report Number KSWDC-2005-03 ..................................................................................... 578 Report Number KSWDC-2005-07 ..................................................................................... 585


Report Number KSWDC-2006-01 ..................................................................................... 589 Report Number KSWDC-2006-05 ..................................................................................... 595 Report Number KSWDC-2007-03 ..................................................................................... 602


Acknowledgments

First and foremost, I wish to acknowledge the extreme hardships and suffering of the tens of thousands of individuals whose experiences constitute the basis of the report. It is my hope that the report provides a fuller account of what occurred and, should transitional justice initiatives ever become possible, be of practical use in the future. I also thank the brave and dedicated staff at KORD (Karen Office for Relief and Development) and CIDKP (Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People). KORD and CIDKP staff, as part of their efforts to provide emergency humanitarian aid to these IDPs, carefully documented the human rights violations the state’s armed forces (Tatmadaw) committed against civilians in eastern Burma/Myanmar during the military operations known as the “Northern Offensive” (2006-2008). I am also grateful to the Thai Burma Border Consortium (TBBC), now The Border Consortium (TBC), for making it possible to gain access to the KORD and CIDKP documents. I would additionally like to thank the International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC) at Harvard University for allowing me to review 1) the interviews its research team conducted with Karen IDPs who fled from the conflict area to Thailand seeking refuge; and 2) the expert testimony three specialists provided them.

The report is intended to complement and to expand upon the work of the above organizations and individuals. However, the views expressed and conclusions reached are entirely my own, as are any errors, which are fully mine.

On a final note, IDPs developed a wide range of self-protection strategies that are still inadequately understood and, according to some, are undermined by traditional approaches to delivering humanitarian aid in conflict settings.1 The report is not meant to downplay the significance of these strategies or the agency of IDPs more generally. This important topic is simply beyond the scope of this analysis.

1 For academic studies, see, e.g.: Kevin Malseed, “Networks of Noncompliance: Grassroots Resistance and Sovereignty in Militarized Burma,” The Journal of Peasant Studies 36, no. 2 (2009): 365-391; Ashley South, “The Politics of Protection in Burma: Beyond the Humanitarian Mainstream, Critical Asian Studies 44, no. 2 (2012): 175-204; Stephen Hull, “The ‘Everyday Politics’ of IDP Protection in Karen State,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 28, no. 2 (2009): 7-21.


Differences in Transliteration

Significant differences exist across Karen dialects—the two most widely used ones being S’gaw and Pwo. The differences are such that speakers of one dialect cannot always understand the speakers of another. Additionally, the script is a modified version of the Burmese alphabet. Consequently, the transliteration of village and place names varies.2 In January of 2011, fourteen leading Karen civil society organizations (CSOs) reached a consensus on a new standardized transliteration system.3 Previous spellings remain in widespread use, however, and nearly all of the source material included in this report predates the new system. The variant spellings that exist in the sources reflect this history, which is compounded by the fact that fact-finders are often writing in their third or fourth language. Minor inconsistencies should not be used to challenge the credibility of the people who documented the human rights violations featured in the report.

The small size of many of the villages in conflict-affected areas complicates matters further. Historically, agricultural practices (e.g. swidden) and poor soil fertility in upland areas contribute to repeated instances of village “fission” (i.e. out-migration of multiple, but not all of the households) to settle other areas. For the past four decades, military operations have been the driving force behind out-migration in conflict-affected areas. Approximately twenty-five percent of the villages across the country lack official GPS coordinates as a result. A number of Karen CSOs maintain their own geospatial databases, in addition to the Karen National Union (KNU). But most of the databases are relatively new due to the lack of equipment and technical expertise prior to this point. Moreover, these groups generally do not make their geospatial data publicly available due to security concerns. Thus, the exact coordinates of many small villages (especially those abandoned, relocated, or destroyed in remote areas) are not precisely known. Instead, the locations of such villages are approximations based on the testimonies of local people, typically IDPs who fled them. Again, minor discrepancies should be regarded as a result of this history.

Finally, government and KNU administrative boundaries overlap, but they are not the same, which can be a source of confusion for people unfamiliar with these territorial distinctions (see Map 3).4 The table below provides both names for the districts and townships mentioned.5

2 Similarly inconsistencies are found in transliterations of Burmese village and place names into English. See The Permanent Committee on Geographical Names, “An Introduction to the Toponymy of Burma” (2007), available at http://pcgn.org.uk/Burma%200907.pdf (accessed 15 July 2014). 3 Copy on file with author. 4 Compare MIMU, “South East States/Regions and Townships” (2013), available at http://www.themimu.info/search/node/south%20east%20region%20and%20township (accessed 22 December 2017) with KHRG, “Locally Defined Northern and Central Karen Districts (2012), available at http://khrg.org/sites/default/files/maps/Locally_defined_Karen_State_1_North_Final.jpg (accessed 22 December 2017).5 States and Divisions are divided into districts. These districts consist of townships. Village tracts, the smallest administrative unit in rural areas, are groups of adjacent villages that range anywhere between 5 and 25 in number.


http://pcgn.org.uk/Burma%200907.pdfhttp://www.themimu.info/search/node/south%20east%20region%20and%20townshiphttp://khrg.org/sites/default/files/maps/Locally_defined_Karen_State_1_North_Final.jpg

Government and Locally Karen-Defined District and Township Names

District (Burmese)

District (Karen)

Township (Burmese)

Township (Karen)

Toungoo Taw Oo Thandaung Daw Pa Kho Toungoo Taw Oo Tantabin Taw Ta Tu Nyaunglebin Ker Lwee Htu Mone Mu Nyaunglebin Ker Lwee Htu Kyaukkyi Ler Doh Nyaunglebin Ker Lwee Htu Shwegyin Hsaw Htee Hpapun Mu Traw Hpapun Lu Thaw

Local informants use KNU-designations when providing testimony. The report follows this practice when referring to events at the village tract and village levels.


Acronyms and Terminology

CIDKP Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People (Humanitarian organization) DKBA Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (NSAG) FBR Free Burma Rangers (Humanitarian organization) fonds An aggregation of documents originating from the same source KHRG Karen Human Rights Group KNLA Karen National Liberation Army (Military wing of the KNU) KNPLF Karenni National Peoples’ Liberation Front (NSAG) KNPP Karenni National Progress Party (NSAG) KNSO Karenni National Solidarity Organization (NSAG) KNU Karen National Union (Non-state political organization) KORD Karen Organization for Relief and Development (Humanitarian organization) KSWDC Karenni Social Welfare and Development Center (Humanitarian organization) Kyat Myanmar currency IHRC International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard University Law School NSAG Non-State Armed Group SPDC State Peace and Development Council (Military junta from 1988 to 2011) Tatmadaw Myanmar State Armed Forces TBBC Thai Burma Border Consortium (Humanitarian organization)

Measurements

Basket 2 tins Tin Standardized unit of volume, approximately 10.5 kg (paddy) or 16 kg (milled

rice) viss 1.6 kg

Military Terms

Baw Bi Doh “Short Pants” (Guerrilla Retaliation Units) BC Battalion commander Camp Basic military unit (10-11 soldiers) Company 100 soldiers (at full strength) Column Combination of companies IB Infantry Battalion LIB Light Infantry Battalion LID Light Infantry Division (10 battalions for combat operations) MOC Military Operations Command NSAG Non-State Armed Group ROC Regional Operations Command SOC Strategic Operations Command (3-4 battalions for defensive operations) TOC Tactical Operations Command (3 battalions for combat operations)


Map 1 Burma/Myanmar


Map 2 Township Map


Map 3 Government and KNU Administrative Boundaries


Introduction

“They stayed quite close to the village, and they came back and told us the military came to camp in our village. I did not hear how many soldiers were in the village. On November 28, 2005 we saw the smoke. We slept on the hill and then in the morning we saw from this place the smoke. It was in the morning about 7.30 a.m. The smoke we saw was at first blue and black in color, later on we saw the red colored smoke. It was in the distance so we did not see the fire but we saw the smoke. I stood together with my wife and children. We stood up and watched for just a moment about 2-3 minutes. I estimate that the fire lasted about two hours -this is my guess because there were many houses in the village. The villagers who were watching also came back and told us that the village had been burned down.”6

Tatmadaw battalions carried out dry-season offensives in eastern Burma/Myanmar for decades. The offensives primarily targeted civilian populations, displacing tens of thousands of people each time they occurred. The goal: to cut the ability of the Karen National Union (KNU) to obtain the food, money, intelligence, and recruits needed to maintain a degree of autonomy in a context where successive military regimes sought to destroy it. 7 The Northern Offensive, which lasted approximately two years (2006-2008), was the biggest one to date. The military operations connected with it provide the conflict setting for this report.

The Northern Offensive, according to many observers, began with an attack on Hee Daw Kaw, a remote village in the rugged mountains of Thandaung Township, Toungoo District.8 Fortunately, the residents, as the above quote indicates, had some advanced notice of the troop movements before the soldiers fired mortars and automatic weapons into the village. Approximately three hundred people fled with limited belongings and about two weeks worth of food, to nearby hiding sites in the forest. Nearly six hundred more people from surrounding villages fled as well. 9 Columns 1 and 2 of IB-73, under Southern Regional Command, camped in Hee Daw Kaw for two days before burning twenty-five to thirty homes to the ground. The soldiers also killed all the animals, destroyed food supplies and whatever personal property remained, then buried anti-personnel landmines before departing to prevent the IDPs from returning.10

Systematic and widespread attacks on civilians did not begin in earnest, however, until late January and early February following the arrival of at least seven combat divisions (See Appendix 1 for

6 Clinic Database, Interview no. 124. See also interview nos. 87 and 128. Other local sources identified IB-75 as participating in the attack. See KORD-2006-03.7 Ashley South, Burma’s Longest War: Anatomy of the Karen Conflict (Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2011). 8 Tatmadaw units began to impose severe travel restrictions in Toungoo and Nyaunglebin Districts to isolate KNU/KNLA areas in early October of 2005 as part of preparations for the Offensive. “KNU Says Junta Carries Out All Cuts Policy in Karen Areas,” BBC Burmese Service (2 October 2005). See also, “Burmese Troops Shell and Burn Five Villages,” Irrawaddy, 30 November 2005. 9 For further details, see KHRG, “Recent Attacks on Villages in Southeastern Toungoo District Send Thousands Fleeing into the Forests and to Thailand” (16 March 2006), available at http://khrg.org/2006/03/khrg06b3/recent-attacks-villages-southeastern-toungoo-district-send-thousands-fleeing (accessed 11 January 2018). 10 FBR Report: Burma Army Attack in Karen State (28 November 2005), available at http://www.freeburmarangers.org/2005/11/28/900-idps-as-villagers-flee-burma-army-attacks/ (accessed 1 December 2017).


http://khrg.org/2006/03/khrg06b3/recent-attacks-villages-southeastern-toungoo-district-send-thousands-fleeinghttp://khrg.org/2006/03/khrg06b3/recent-attacks-villages-southeastern-toungoo-district-send-thousands-fleeinghttp://www.freeburmarangers.org/2005/11/28/900-idps-as-villagers-flee-burma-army-attacks/

details on the Tatmadaw Command Structure).11 More than fifty battalions then commenced large-scale clearance operations targeting rural populations in townships across northern Kayin State, eastern Bago Region, and southwestern Kayah State.12 Military operations damaged and destroyed homes and means of livelihood of civilians in more than 100 villages in Thandaung Township alone, several of them on more than one occasion, over the next two years (Appendix 2).13 The Offensive left more than 160,000 people in urgent need of food aid according documentation two cross-border humanitarian organizations—the Karen Organization for Relief and Development (KORD) and the Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People (CIDKP)—gathered as part of their relief missions during the Offensive. KORD, formed in 1993 following a major military offensive, is a fully independent CSO. CIDKP, created in 1998 after another major military offensive, is the humanitarian wing of the KNU.14 However, the staff of CIDKP, although part of the KNU’s administrative status, operates according to international humanitarian principles. More than two decades of foreign donor support, including grants from Western governments, for cross-border humanitarian assistance to IDPs demonstrate a high degree of confidence in the documentation practices of both organizations and their professionalism more generally.

The report relies on KORD and CIDKP field data. But it also expands upon an earlier report. The International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC) at Harvard University Law School published an influential legal memorandum in 2014. The field-based research, upon which the memorandum was based, sought to determine, first, whether the abuses committed during the Northern Offensive (2006-2008) violated international criminal law and, second, whether sufficient evidence existed to assert that specific Tatmadaw (i.e. Myanmar state armed forces) officers could be charged with these crimes.15 IHRC focused its investigation on two military units – Southern Regional Military Command and Light Infantry Division 66 (LID-66) – in Thandaung Township.16 The 150 in-depth interviews generated more than 1,000 pages of witness statements. The content of which led IHRC to assert that that three commanding officers could be charged with crimes against humanity and war crimes, as defined in Articles of 7 and 8, respectively, of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). 17 The officers, the Clinic further concluded, could be held legally responsible for these crimes under two theories of liability: individual criminal liability under Article 25 and command responsibility under Article 28. In the Clinic’s view, the evidence already

11 The divisions, each of which consists of ten battalions, augmented the 22 garrison battalions already quartered there. Local reports indicate that many of the battalions were severely undermanned; nevertheless, best estimates place the total number of troops in or near KNLA-controlled areas at between 10,000-15,000 at the start of the Northern Offensive. Clinical Expert Declaration, Expert 3, para. 36.12 Such operations were not limited to these three areas. Tatmadaw battalions carried out similar ones elsewhere in northeastern and southeastern Burma/Myanmar (Shan State, Mon State, and Tenasserim Division, now known as the Tanintharyi Region), but on a smaller scale. 13 Thai Burma Border Consortium (TBBC), Internal Displacement Survey (Bangkok: TBBC, 2007), pp. 68-70; TBBC, Internal Displacement and International Law (Bangkok: TBBC, 2008), pp. 55-57. The lists also include the names of villages damaged, destroyed, or relocated in the other affected townships. Villages in these areas are often referred to as “hiding (ywa bone) villages,” as their inhabitants flee whenever Tatmadaw troops approach. 14 For background, see Burma Ethnic Research Group, Forgotten Victims of a Hidden War: Internally Displaced Karen in Burma (Chiang Mai: BERG and Friedrich Naumann Foundation, 1998). 15 IHRC, Legal Memorandum: War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity in Eastern Myanmar (Cambridge: Harvard Law School, 2014a). 16 Light Infantry Divisions normally operate independently. But during the Northern Offensive, LID-66 fell under the de facto control of the Southern Regional Command. 17 ICC (2011), pp. 5-42; IHRC (2014a), pp.1-2, 7. IHRC had equally strong evidence on several lower-ranking officers but chose not to focus on them.


gathered is “sufficient to satisfy the standard required for the issuance of an arrest warrant by the ICC as set forth in Article 58 of the Rome Statute.”18 The individuals are:

Major General Ko Ko, the commander of Southern Regional Command during the Offensive. He was promoted afterwards to Myanmar’s Home Affairs Minister;

Brigadier General Khin Zaw Oo, the commander of LID-66 during the offensive until May 2006. He was promoted afterwards to Myanmar Army Bureau of Special Operations (BSO) 4; and

Brigadier General Maung Maung Aye, the commander of LID-66 during the Offensive after May 2006.

The data corroborate IHRC’s findings, which documented nine underlying crimes: 1) attacking civilians; 2) displacing civilians and forcible transfer; 3) destroying or seizing the adversary’s property; 4) pillage; 5) murder and execution without due process; 6) enslavement; 7) torture and other inhumane acts; 8) rape; and 9) persecution.19 KORD and CIDKP field data, reproduced in Appendix 3, provide further evidence of these crimes.20

Particularly notable is the information on indiscriminant attacks on and the willful killings of civilians by Tatmadaw units, the subject of a second policy memorandum by IHRC.21 International humanitarian law requires “Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants… and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objects.”22 Violations of the principle of distinction, which applies to non-international as well as international conflicts, constitute war crimes.23

KORD and CIDKP data again supports IHRC’s conclusion that indiscriminant attacks reflect long-standing operational policy, which dictates how (non-) commissioned officers command soldiers under their tactical control.24 Civilians in “black areas,” i.e. areas where government control is “weak or non-existent,” are reportedly subject to being shot-on-sight, for example. Based on IHRC

18 IHRC (2014a), pp. 3, 7-8. The question of guilt, of course, would be determined by the court. 19 IHRC (2014a), pp. 47-57. 20 IHRC interview also identified IB-48, under the command Zaw Tun, as being particularly brutal (2014a), pp. 65-67. ERA requests also documented the involvement of IB-48 in numerous attacks on civilians, including willful killings, during 2004 and 2005 (KORD-2005-02, KORD-2005-5, CIDKP-2004-02, CIDKP-2004-09, and CIDKP-2005-08). IB-48 appears to have ceased operations after 2005 according to KORD and CIDKP data.21 IHRC, Policy Memorandum: Preventing Indiscriminate Attacks and Wilful Killings of Civilians by the Myanmar Military (Cambridge: IHRC, 2014b). 22 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (AP I), adopted 8 June 1977 and entered into force 7 December 1998. See, in particular, Article 51(4)(a). 23 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Conflicts (AP II), adopted 8 June 1977 and entered into force 7 December 1998. The Burma/Myanmar government did not sign this protocol. Many of the provisions are now part of customary international law and thus apply, even without the government’s ratification. 24 For further discussion, see Section III, “Causes of Attacks on Civilians at Three Levels of Military Authority” (IHRC 2014b), pp. 26-37.


interviews, Tatmadaw units considered nearly all of Thandaung Township to be a “black area” during the Northern Offensive.25

Three-quarters of the documents examined for this report (seventy fonds total 26 ) include allegations of indiscriminate attacks, with automatic weapons and mortars being the most commonly used weapons. Furthermore, the data indicate that such attacks, which often result in injury or death, are not limited to the criminal actions of battalion troops operating in Thandaung Township under LID-66 or Southern Regional Command orders. These indiscriminant attacks occurred on a widespread basis in Tantabin, Mone, Kyaukkyi, Shwegyin, Hpapun, Pasaung, and Pruso Townships.27

The report, however, focuses on an important, but under-examined grave breach of the Geneva Conventions—namely, “the extensive destruction or appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.”28

According to one military expert, Tatamdaw units carry out counter-insurgency operations in four phases: “(1) An ‘assault’ that drive out insurgents and inhabitants; (2) ‘clearing,’ which involves the destruction of homes, fields, and property; (3) ‘gleaning’ of information, including capturing villagers; and (4) ‘mining,’ whereby landmines are placed to make areas uninhabitable.”29 Military columns commonly “move in tandem along parallel courses to drive civilian populations from a given area” as well.30

The goal is to depopulate contested areas. Thus, the temporal patterns of these operations typically follow the agricultural cycle. Farmers plant upland paddy fields between May and June, and harvest their crops between October and November.31 Tatmadaw units routinely target villages during these critical periods, and the destruction of food supplies and seeds have a devastating impact of the ability of farmers to cultivate enough food to survive from season to season. The

25 IHRC (2014a), pp. 25-29. 26 A fonds is an archival term for the aggregation of documents originating from the same source. KORD and CIDKP fonds typically contain an “Emergency Ration Assistance” (ERA) request, which functions as a situation analysis and IDP needs assessment; an ERA Distribution Summary, which provides an updated situation analysis and details on aid delivery, and, in some cases, and ERA Impact Assessment.27 Thandaung Township (KORD-2006-03, KORD-2006-04, CIDKP-2006-15, CIDKP-2006-16, KORD-2007-05, CIDKP-2008-11, CIDKP-2008-12); Mone Township (KORD-2006-08, KORD-2006-16, CIDKP-2006-02, KORD-2007-09, KORD-2007-15, CIDKP-2007-06, CIDKP-2007-21, KORD-2008-10, CIDKP-200806); Kyaukkyi Township (KORD-2006-02, KORD-2006-06, CIDKP-2006-06, CIDKP-2006-13, KORD-2007-09, KORD-2007-11, CIDKP-2007-09, CIDKP-2007-22, CIDKP-2008-04, CIDKP-2008-13); Hpapun Township (KORD-2006-05, KORD-2006-11, CIDKP-2006-09, KORD-2007-08, KORD-2007-12, CIDKP-2007-01, CIDKP-2007-05, CIDKP-2007-17, KORD-2008-04, KORD-2008-06, KORD-2008-11, CIKDP-2008-09); Pasaung and Pruso Townships (KSWDC-2006-01, KSWDC-2006-05, KSWDC-2007-04); and Ei Htu Hta IDP Camp.28 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), Article 8 (2)(a)(iv), available at http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/99_corr/cstatute.htm (accessed 8 January 2018); Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 12 August 1949, Article 147,” International Committee of the Red Cross International Humanitarian Law Database,” available at https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/380-600169 (accessed 8 January 2018). 29 Clinic Expert Declaration, Expert 1, cited in IHRC (2014a), p. 25. For additional details, see Free Burma Rangers (FBR), A Campaign of Brutality (Chiang Mai, Thailand: FBR, 2008), p. 17. 30 FBR (2008), p. 17. 31 Interview Saw Barnabas, Karen Environmental and Social Action Network (3 June 2003).


http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/99_corr/cstatute.htmhttps://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/380-600169https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/380-600169

destruction of cash crops, especially cardamom, further exacerbates the situation because villagers often sell them to purchase rice when stores run low.32

One hundred percent of the KORD and CIDKP fonds provide highly detailed accounts of how Tatmadaw units destroy, remove, or otherwise render useless objects indispensable to survival— namely, agricultural areas, crops, food stuffs, and livestock.33 The primary purpose: to deprive the KNU of food, funds, intelligence, and popular support, a strategy known as the “Four Cuts” (Pya Ley Pya).34 The deliberate starvation of civilians as part of the Four Cuts qualifies as a war crime and a crime against humanity under the Rome Statute.

32 According to local producers, between 65-75% of all farmers in Thandaung Township cultivate cardamom. China is the primary market for its seeds. Heavy government and KNU taxation, as well as landmine contamination, constrain larger-scale production. PeaceNexus Foundation, An Assessment of Business Opportunities in the Kayin State (Prangins, Switzerland: PNF, 2013), pp. 15, 24. In terms of the annual cycle, villagers harvest and sell betel leaf (January-May), durian (March-June), cardamom (August-September), dog fruit (August-September), and then betel nut (October-December). Caring for the crops between harvests requires a significant time and labor commitment year-round. Travel restrictions and clearing operations often make doing so extremely difficult to impossible. 33 The practice violates Article 14 of Protocol II, which prohibits the starvation of civilians. See also, ICRC, “Customary International Humanitarian Law,” Rule 54, available at https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule54 (accessed 8 January 2018). 34 IHRC (2014a), p. 25; Maung Aung Myoe, “The Counter-Insurgency in Myanmar: The Governments Response to the Burma Communist Party,” PhD Dissertation, Australian National University, 1999, pp. 134-138. Tatmadaw units have employed the tactics since the 1960s, and they remain in use today in conflict-affected areas, e.g. Kachin State and northern Shan State.


https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule54https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule54

Famine Crimes

The right to food in situations of armed conflict has its origins in elements of humanitarian law, human rights law, and international criminal law.35 However, efforts to hold individual state actors responsible for using food as a weapon of war remain extremely difficult in large part because the concept of “famine crimes” is not yet codified into a single, comprehensive legal framework.36 Several factors contribute to this situation. Famine, as a concept, has no universally agreed upon definition, for example. Some experts regard famine as an “event,” whereas others view it as a “process.” Consequently, different methodologies using different indicators exist, and they measure different aspects of a food security crisis, predominantly in quantitative terms.37 But the number of deaths is not a definitive indicator of famine, though these figures are often used as a proxy for it. In reality, famines vary in intensity and magnitude, and they have complex and multi-faceted “macroeconomic, socio-cultural, psychological, and other consequences” on affected populations.38 The report adopts this more expansive understanding as a rejoinder to the biggest obstacle to prosecuting famine crimes. The obstacle requires a substantive shift in thinking—from a long-standing preoccupation with questions regarding the causes of and responses to instances of extreme man-made food insecurity to ones that ask whose actions cause or contribute to famine and what can be done to hold them legally accountable?39

Currently, the deliberate starvation of civilians is criminalized under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)—directly, in the case of war crimes, and indirectly, in the case of crimes against humanity and genocide.40 The crimes under the Rome Statute require both the requisite prohibited act (actus rea) and intent (mens rea).41 The latter legal concept, which must be present for prosecuting alleged perpetrators, requires either proof of intent to commit a crime

35 Jelena Pejic, “The Right to Food in Situations of Armed Conflict: The Legal Framework,” IRRC 83, no. 844 (2001): 1097-1109; Diane Kearney, “Food Deprivations as Crimes Against Humanity,” International Law and Politics 46 (2013): 253-289. 36 Several cases, one in Cambodia and another in Rwanda, have resulted in convictions of defendants charged with withholding food from imprisoned populations. See, e.g., Co-Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, Case No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, Judgment (26 July 2010) and Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment (21 May 1999). 37 Stephen Devereux, Theories of Famine (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993). 38 Paul Howe and Stephen Devereux, “Famine Intensity and Magnitude Scales: A Proposal for an Instrumental Definition of Famine,” Disasters 28, no. 4 (2004), p. 362. 39 For background, see, e.g.: Alex de Waal, Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1997), p. 152; Amartya Sen, “Famines and Other Crimes,” in Development as Freedom (London: Anchor Books, 1999); Jenny Edkins, Whose Hunger? Concepts of Famine, Practices of Aid (New York: University of Minnesota Press, 2002); Jenny Edkins, “The Criminalization of Mass Starvations: From Natural Disaster to Crime Against Humanity.” In The New Famines: Why Famines Persist in an Era of Globalization, ed. Stephen Devereux (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 52. 40 Article 8 (2)(b)(xxv) of the Rome Statute specifically lists starvation as a war crime. Article 7 (1)(k) defines “Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health,” as a crime against humanity. This report argues that famine crimes, although not an enumerated act itself, is a means of committing one. The charge of genocide is not applicable in the case under discussion (see below). Finally, a consensus on the definition of crimes of aggression, which also falls under the jurisdiction of the ICC, was not reached until 2017. The ICC has no authority to investigate alleged crimes of aggression, which could include famine crimes as an element, prior to this date. 41 International Criminal Court, “The Elements of Crimes” (The Hague: ICC, 2011), available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/resourcelibrary/official-journal/elements-of-crimes.aspx (accessed 2 December 2017).


https://www.icc-cpi.int/resourcelibrary/official-journal/elements-of-crimes.aspx

or knowledge that one’s (lack of) action would permit a crime to be committed. Proving mens rea is very challenging due “to the evidentiary requirements and the ability of defendants to assert plausible intervening causes.” Frequently, this is the case where contributory factors, such as natural disasters (droughts and flood), as well as logistical challenges (poor roads and insufficient transport vehicles), are present.42

Legal scholar David Marcus has proposed two changes to address the evidentiary problem with regard to famine crimes. The first proposal involves elevating famine crimes to a stand-alone top-level offense that falls under the ICC’s jurisdiction.43 The second proposal entails lowering the mens rea requirement solely for famine-related prohibited acts.44 The concept of “faminogenesis,” he argues, offers the means to achieve this end.

State conduct that contributes to the creation and/or the perpetuation of famine is “faminogenic,” according to Marcus. 45 He divides faminogenic conduct into four categories, which he differentiates in terms of degrees of intent. Fourth-degree and third-degree faminogenic conduct do not meet the mens rea requirement, however, as poor governance characterizes the former and indifference to starvation defines the latter. Both types of (in-) action are reprehensible, but not criminal at the international level due to the absence of demonstrable intent. By contrast second-degree and first-degree faminogenic conduct do satisfy the mens rea requirement and may qualify, if other conditions are also met, as a mass atrocity crime under the 1998 Rome Statute. “Governments [that] implement policies that themselves engender famine, then recklessly continue to pursue these policies, despite knowing that they are causing mass starvation,” are guilty of second-degree faminogenic crime Marcus states.46 Whereas, first-degree faminogenic conduct, he continues, displays clear intent to “deliberately use hunger as a tool of extermination to annihilate troublesome populations.”47

42 Renee Dopplick, “Famine and International Criminal Law Under the Rome Statute,” Inside Justice (27 April 2009), available at http://www.insidejustice.com/intl/2009/04/27/famine_rome_statute/ (accessed 2 December 2017).43 The Preparatory Commission for the ICC included draft text proposing that it would have jurisdiction over acts that affect the “conditions of life [which] may include, but is not necessarily restricted to, deliberate deprivation of resource indispensible for survival, such as food.” Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Addendum, Part II, Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes, UN Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2, Art.6(c) n.4, available at http://www.icls.de/dokumente/icc_elements_crime.pdf (accessed 2 December 2017).44 For an assessment of the pros and cons of both proposals, see Dopplick (2009). She points out that the wording of Article 30 is such that it is unclear whether “recklessness,” the key element of second-degree faminogenic conduct, satisfies the “intent and knowledge” requirement set out in the Rome Statute. 45 David Marcus, “Famine Crimes in International Law,” The American Journal of International Law 97, no. 2 (2003), p. 245, fn. 1. 46 Marcus (2003), p. 247. The difference between third- and second-degree faminogenic conduct appears at first glace to be slight but is in actually significant. Both forms of conduct involve indifference. However, the former concerns instances in which the government fails to respond to non-anthropogenic famine, such as droughts and floods. The latter concerns instances in which the government knowingly continues to implement a policy or policies that cause the famine. 47 Ibid.


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The counter-insurgency tactics Tatmadaw soldiers historically utilized in eastern Burma/Myanmar do not meet the threshold of first-degree faminogenic conduct, which is genocidal in intent.48 Instead, the Tatmadaw’s deliberate destruction and confiscation of civilian food supplies and objects is second-degree in nature and, as the prima facie evidence indicates, is a mass atrocity crime.49 As the conduct, which inflicts “great suffering or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health by means of an inhumane act,” is one of the prohibited acts.50

A crime against humanity differs from an ordinary crime in that it must have been committed in the context of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population, and was knowingly carried out “pursuant to or in furtherance of State or organizational policy,” the mens rea requirement. 51 The report details these tactics, the strategic goal of which was to starve civilians out of the mountains, denying Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) the ability to obtain material support (e.g. food, money, information, and recruits) from them in the process.

The report focuses on famine crimes in Thandaung Township and neighboring Tantatbin Township, which is also part of Toungoo District. The report also makes reference to similar patterns in three neighboring districts: Nyaunglebin District (eastern Bago Region), Hpapun District (northern Kayin State), and Bawlakhe District (southwestern Kayah State). The details pertaining to the affected townships in these districts appear in Appendix 3. The field data contained therein provide further documentation of the widespread and systematic nature of the famine crimes Tatmadaw units committed in eastern Burma/Myanmar prior to and during the Northern Offensive (2006-2008).

48 Article 6, “For the purposes of this Statute, ‘genocide’ means any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group…” ICC (2011), p. 349 Such objects include: “foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations, and supplies and irrigation works.” Article 54 of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), 8 June 1977, available at https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/INTRO/470 (accessed 2 December 2017). Additionally, “destroying or seizing the property of an adversary unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of the conflict” constitutes a war crime in non-international armed conflicts. See Article 8(2)(e)(xii), ICC (2011), p. 41. 50 Article 7 (1) (k) Crime against humanity of other inhuman acts, ICC (2011), p. 12. 51 Clinical Expert Declaration, Expert 3, para. 57. Quoted in IHRC (2014a), p. 6.


https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/INTRO/470

Methodology

The IHRC report draws from several sources. First, the research team, with the assistance of local partners, conducted interviews with more than 160 people who fled Thandaung Township during the Northern Offensive and could report on events that primarily occurred between January 2005 and December 2006. Informants included villagers, village leaders, former porters, and former soldiers. The transcripts generated more than 1,000 pages of witness statements, which prosecutors could use as a stating point for their own research. Second, the report includes information from expert declarations conducted with four individuals with extensive knowledge of the key issues examined: Tatmadaw counter-insurgency strategy and tactics, the humanitarian impacts of the state-sponsored violence on civilian populations in the affected area, and international criminal law. Third, the Clinic also referenced reports prepared by internationally known and respected third-party local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as Free Burma Rangers (FBR) and the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG). Both NGOs conducted human rights fact-finding work in some of the affected areas during the Northern Offensive.52

This report supplements the one IHRC prepared both spatially and temporally. It does so by covering a much large geographic area than Thandaung Township, though I feature events in it, and a somewhat longer period of time (2004-2008). The additional details indicate that the patterns the IHRC report documented were not isolated. Rather, the patterns were widespread and systematic, and evinced clear evidence of command responsibility, which is also critical for proving individual criminal liability.53

IDP profiles, generated by KORD and CIDKP, provide the core data for this report. IDP profiles rely upon enumerative techniques. Quantitative methods are geared towards the rapid collection of demographic information, the statistical accuracy of which varies depending of the type utilized, such as: 1) aerial or satellite imagery for areal surveys, 2) flow monitoring (counting the number of people passing a fixed point when IDPs are on the move), 3) dwelling counts, and 4) headcounts. These methods are ideal when speed is critical and/or access to displaced populations is difficult or impossible due to natural disasters, government restrictions, armed conflict, and so on. The results provide the core data for the profile, which minimally consists of the number of displaced persons, often disaggregated by age and sex, as well as the geographic location(s) of the IDPs. Qualitative methods utilize focus group discussions and key informant interviews with which they generate supplementary data, most often: cause(s) of displacement, patterns of displacement, protection concerns, humanitarian needs, and potential solutions.

The data in Appendix 3 contain information derived from both quantitative and qualitative methods. The data are redacted to include only relevant information on military activities and humanitarian needs. Administrative and financial details are removed. The same is true of the supporting information the profiles contain: township maps (indicating the location of the affected villages), letters of recommendations from local administrative officials, and photographs. The excerpts are lightly edited for clarity.

52 IHRC (2014a), pp. 15-20. 53Appendix 3 contains the names of alleged perpetrators to demonstrate these command-and-control relationships. The officers identified should be regarded as innocent until proven otherwise in a court of law.


The profiles, which are archived as fonds, consist of three primary parts. First, the emergency ration assistance (ERA) request, normally prepared within sixty days of the displacement. Information provided to KORD and CIKDP teams by district- and township-level officials, as well as village heads and IDPs, serves as the basis for the ERA requests. Second, the ERA distribution summary, usually submitted three-four months after the request. The summary also includes further details on military operations and abuses that occurred after the submission of the ERA request. Third, an ERA impact assessment, when included, is typically submitted seven-nine months after the distribution of cash aid. Impact assessments were rare prior to 2008, when they became a standard part of the ERA reporting.

Villagers typically flee either in response to a direct attack or ones nearby.54 They are rarely able to bring much with them in terms of personal items (e.g. clothing, blankets, and mosquito nets) or food. Tatmadaw units, as the ERA documents indicate, destroyed and/or confiscated whatever was left behind. Villagers maintained several secret food caches, especially bags of rice wrapped in plastic and buried underground, in the forest for this reason.55 The amounts stockpiled were not sufficient for any length of time, however. IDPs reported that they commonly ate thin rice porridge mixed with bamboo shoots, wild yams and/or roots for weeks or months on end, which contributed to increased morbidity and mortality from preventable diseases, especially diarrhea and malaria, the result of sleeping in the forest without mosquito nets.

ERA funds provide IDPs with some emergency financial support, which enabled them to make decisions about their livelihood options. Cash assistance was calculated by multiplying the number of IDPs times the amount needed to provide each of them with a three-month supply of food, the cost of which was calculated using the local price of a big tin—a standardized unit of volume weighing approximately 10.5 kg., if paddy, and 16 kg., if milled rice. 56 (The report uses 1 tin/person/month for calculations.) Cash, in sharp contrast to heavy sacks of rice, was much easier to transport across rugged terrain into conflict-affected areas. Additionally, providing IDPs with funds to purchase rice and other urgently needed necessities locally prevented inflationary pressures, which would otherwise have reduced food security in the surrounding region by raising prices.57

The cash assistance totals in paddy/rice kilogram equivalents thus functioned as a proxy for the impact of the military operations on food security. The totals are somewhat misleading, however, as they do not take into account future losses. Existing fields may become permanently unusable because of landmine contamination and/or the construction of new Tatmadaw camps nearby, which posed an ongoing security threats to those civilians. Commercially valuable spices (e.g. cardamom), the most important cash crop in upland areas, and trees (e.g. areca palms), also

54 Other villagers are the primary source of information about nearby military patrols and attacks according to one survey: 64% of the time in IDP hiding areas. TBBC (2005), p. 53. 55 According to the same survey, 60% of the villagers living in IDP hiding areas cache food supplies or crops in case they need to flee on short notice. Ibid., p. 54. 56 Paddy, because it retains its protective hull, is less likely to spoil or rot when it becomes damp as a result of humidity or rain. However, it can be difficult to remove the hull (typically by pounding) when in hiding. 57 KORD and CIDKP, like other local cross-border humanitarian organizations, convert Thai baht into Burmese kyat using money-changers based on the border. The market rate during 2006 fluctuated around 1,300 kyat per 1 US dollar (author’s field notes).


required years of cultivation before they produced seedpods and betel nuts, respectively. (The former takes 3-4 years, while the latter requires 4-5 years.). Nevertheless, tracking the cash totals provides a useful, if imperfect, measurement of severity and magnitude of the famine crimes that occurred.

The statistics that follow offer additional baseline data on living conditions in the conflict-affected townships prior to the Northern Offensive. The findings illustrate how precarious food security already was at the time (2004-2005).

The Back Pack Health Worker Team (BPHWT), a multi-ethnic cross-border humanitarian organization made up of mobile medics, conducted a rapid health assessment survey in 2004. The researchers collected basic mortality and morbidity data from two thousand households (approximately 140,000 people) in eight zones in southeastern Burma/Myanmar, many of them within the boundaries of KNU-delineated Karen State. 91.7% of the households responded, nearly one-quarter of them in areas the Tatmadaw targeted during the Northern Offensive.58 Notably, 71.6% of the people surveyed in Toungoo District, where Thandaung and Tantabin Townships are located, reported the destruction and/or looting of their food supplies by Tatmadaw units.59 45.4% of them stated that they abandoned their homes at least once over the previous year because of military operations.60 Unsurprisingly, BPHWT found that health status of people in the zones surveyed – using standard indicators such as child malnutrition frequencies, protein deficiencies, mortality rates, and the prevalence of preventable diseases – were broadly consistent with those documented in war-torn Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo.61

The Thai Burma Border Consortium (TBBC), an international humanitarian organization, also conducted a large-scale, multi-cluster survey during 2004 (6,070 people in 1,071 households in sixty areas across six states and divisions (now known as regions). 62 The households were variously located in relocation sites, mixed administration areas, IDP hiding areas, and ethnic ceasefire areas. TBBC’s cross-border CSO partners carried out the data collection, and they documented the prevalence of the following patterns over the past year among those surveyed:

Protection Issues

57% of households forced to provide labor for authorities; 52% of households ordered to pay arbitrary taxes and/or other forms of extortion; 24% of households with crops or food stocks damaged and/or destroyed by authorities; 17% of households with a member arbitrarily detained without cause; 12% of households forcibly evicted; and 1.2% of population wounded or killed by military assault in past two years.63

Coping Strategies

58 Back Pack Health Worker Team [BPHWT], Chronic Emergency: Health and Human Rights in Eastern Burma (Chiang Mai, Thailand: BPHWT, 2006), p. 29.59 Ibid., p. 43. 60 Ibid., p. 46. 61 Ibid., p. 65. 62 TBBC, Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma (Bangkok: TBBC, 2004), p. 1. 63 Ibid., p. 5.


71% of households accessing loans to survive disruptions to livelihoods; 30% of households accessing aid to survive disruptions to livelihoods; 17% of households migrating for work to survive disruptions to livelihoods; and 22% of households selling assets to survive disruptions to livelihoods.64

All of the protection threats have a direct impact on the food security of households in eastern Burma/Myanmar, as the statistics on civilian coping strategies makes clear. These patterns also inform two further troubling findings. The survey found that only 23% of all households had access to two meals/day for every month in the past year, and the chronic shortages contributed to a 16% rate of acute malnutrition (moderate to severe wasting) in children under the ages of five.65

TBBC conducted another multi-cluster survey in 2005, covering 1,044 households residing in Tatmadaw relocation sites, mixed administration areas, IDP hiding areas, and ethnic ceasefire areas.66 TBBC published the results in October, shortly before the Northern Offensive began. Forced labor as well as travel restrictions to fields and markets, 51% and 30% respectively, posed significant challenges to food security for civilians in mixed administration (also known as brown) areas. 16% of them reported the destruction or confiscation of food by authorities as a problem. Travel restrictions also affected 19% of IDPs in hiding areas. But the destruction or confiscation of food, at 30%, was by far the single largest threat to their livelihoods in the past year.67

64 Ibid., p. 5. 65 Ibid. p. 6. 66 TBBC, Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma (Bangkok: TBBC, 2005), pp. 10-12. 67 Ibid., p. 49.


Northern Offensive

The Northern Offensive affected a wide-swathe of KNU-delineated Karen State, primarily Daw Pha Kho, Htaw Ta Htu, Lu Thaw, Mu, Ler Doh, and Hsaw Hti Townships.68 The boundaries of these locally recognized administrative units roughly correspond with Thandaung, Tantabin, Hpapun, Mone, Kyaukkyi, and Shwegyin Townships on government-delineated maps. 69 The KORD and CIDKP data sets make it possible to describe the Tatmadaw’s widespread and systematic use of faminogenic practices across all six townships, the details of which appear in Appendix 3. But Thandaung (Daw Pha Kho) and Tantabin (Htaw Ta Htoo) Townships, both of which fall within the boundaries of Toungoo District on KNU-delineated maps, are the primary geographic focus of the report. Many of the operations simultaneously targeted villages on both sides of the township boundary—hence, the decision to analyze them concurrently. Battalions under Southern Regional Command also operated further south in Mone Township, which borders Tantabin. Details regarding their activities are included in the forced migration summaries for this reason as well.

Tatmadaw units have carried out attacks against civilians in Toungoo District for decades. The earliest reports of Four Cuts operations in the district date back to 1974-1975, and major offensives occurred again in 1992 and 1996-1997.70 The latter offensive enabled the Tatmadaw effectively to divide the region in half, with the various commands in control of areas north of the Toungoo – Kler Lah – Maw Chi Road and the Southern Command in areas south of it. Road construction, completed using considerable amounts of civilian forced labor between 1995 and 1998, contributed to the increased militarization of Thandaung and Tantabin Townships.71 The process resulted in a significant rise in the number of Tatmadaw bases and camps, as well as the number of villages forced to relocate closer to them.72

Much of the district is mountainous, especially in the southeast. Elevations in this area often range from 1,000-2,500 meters above sea level. With few exceptions, remote areas are accessible only on foot or, in places where rivers drain the Ka Ser Lu Range, small boats. The KNU/KNLA still retained a significant presence in the both townships following the above offensives. But Tatmadaw military operations conducted during 2002, 2003, and 2004 further eroded the ability of the KNU to administer daily affairs and Brigade No. 2 of the KNLA to retain territory.73

68 See Map 3. For more detailed maps, see KHRG, “Location,” available at http://khrg.org/reports/location. 69 See Myanmar Information Management Unit, “GIS Resources,” available at http://themimu.info/gis-resources for official maps. 70 KORD and CIDKP informants routinely reference these offensives when recounting local conflict histories. 71 IHRC (2014a), pp. 30-31. 72 KHRG, False Peace: Increasing SPDC Military Repression in Toungoo District of Northern Karen State (25 March 1999), available at https://khrg.org/1999/03/khrg9902a/false-peace-increasing-spdc-military-repression-toungoo-district-northern-karen (accessed 18 December 2017). 73 See ERA requests in: CIDKP-2002-13, KORD-2002-15, KORD-2003-04, KORD-2003-06, KORD-2004-02, CIDKP-2004-02, KORD-2004-06, and CIDKP-2004-09. For background, see KHRG, Flight, Hunger, and Survival: Repression and Displacement in the Villages of Papun and Nyaunglebin, available at https://khrg.org/2001/10/anthony0103dps/flight-hunger-and-survival-repression-and-displacement-villages-papun-and (accessed 1 December 2017); KHRG, Expansion of the Guerrilla Retaliation Units and Food Shortages in Toungoo District of Northern Karen State (16 June 2003), available at https://khrg.org/2003/06/khrg03u1/expansion-guerrilla-retaliation-units-and-food-shortages-toungoo-district-northern (accessed 1 December 2017); KHRG, Enduring Hunger and Repression: Food Scarcity, Internal


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According to KORD and CIDKP documentation, Tatmadaw attacks on civilians in Thandaung Township, which is sparsely populated, displaced 6,784 people in 2002, 7,570 people in 2003, and 14,838 people in 2004. Using 2014 national census data, which is the only official data available, the successive operations displaced approximately nine, ten, and nearly twenty-percent of the township’s total rural population, respectively.74

Despite the informal “gentleman’s [ceasefire] agreement” between the KNU and the Tatmadaw, reached in January of 2004, the latter’s battalions continued to expand their presence in Toungoo District, in addition to neighboring Hpapun District. The Tatmadaw did so by building dry-season roads and establishing new camps in areas where they previously had none. 75 These actions violated the terms of the agreement, which specified what areas troops could be stationed as well as rules regarding their deployment, and resulted in more than 200 skirmishes during the first six months of the ceasefire. 76 The skirmishes contributed to further displacement. According to KHRG researchers, an estimated 10,000-12,000 IDPs continued to hide in the rugged mountains of Toungoo District, with approximately half of them in Thandaung Township and the other half in Tantabin Township.77 Villagers residing in areas close to roads and/or military encampments endured a sharp increase in demands for forced labor, money, and the provision of construction materials by Tatmadaw troops as well. Together, these patterns significantly reduced the ability of both populations to grow and to forage sufficient food, engage in day labor with which to purchase necessities, travel to markets, and so on.78

One cross-border humanitarian aid expert offered three possible reasons as to why the 2004 informal ceasefire did not hold.79 First, construction of Naypyidaw, the new administrative capital began in late 2005, and the desire to create a “security perimeter” to protect it was likely a contributing factor.80 Second, the regime also wanted to build a series of hydroelectric dams along

Displacement, and the Continued Use of Forced Labor in Toungoo District (24 September 2004), available at https://khrg.org/2004/09/khrg0401d/enduring-hunger-and-repression-food-scarcity-internal-displacement-and-continued (accessed 1 December 2017). 74 The census found 96,052 people living in the township, nearly eighty-percent of them in rural areas. The average population density is population density of 26.44 people km2. See https://www.citypopulation.de/php/myanmar-admin.php?adm2id=030103 (accessed 1 December 2017). 75 In 1995, the Tatmadaw maintained 10 camps in Eastern Pegu Division (now Bago Region). By 2005, the number had increased to 17. The militarization of Karen State was far more pronounced over this same period, with the number of camps rising from 20 to 75. See map, “Militarization in Eastern Burma 1995-2005,” in TBBC, Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma (Bangkok: TBBC, 2005), p. 19. During this same period, Tatmadaw activity resulted in the destruction, relocation, or abandonment of 146 villages in Eastern Bago Region and 672 villages in Karen State. Ibid., p. 23. 76 TBBC, Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma (Bangkok: TBBC, 2004), p. 32. 77 KHRG, ‘Peace,’ or Control? The SPDC’s Use of the Karen Ceasefire to Expand Its Control and Repression of Villages in Toungoo District, Northern Karen State (21 February 2005), available at https://khrg.org/2005/03/khrg05f3/peace-or-control-spdcs-use-karen-ceasefire-expand-its-control-and-repression (accessed 15 December 2017). For a time-specific map, see TBBC (2004), p. 33.78 KHRG (2005). 79 U.S. Embassy, “KNU Letter to SPDC Appeals for Peace,” Cable No. 05RANGOON908 (5 August 2005). 80 The theory, although widely reported at the time, is not convincing. It fails to explain why large-scale clearance operations targeted Karen civilians in townships in eastern Bago Region and Karen State, both of which are quite distant from Naypyidaw.


https://khrg.org/2004/09/khrg0401d/enduring-hunger-and-repression-food-scarcity-internal-displacement-and-continuedhttps://khrg.org/2004/09/khrg0401d/enduring-hunger-and-repression-food-scarcity-internal-displacement-and-continuedhttps://www.citypopulation.de/php/myanmar-admin.php?adm2id=030103https://www.citypopulation.de/php/myanmar-admin.php?adm2id=030103https://khrg.org/2005/03/khrg05f3/peace-or-control-spdcs-use-karen-ceasefire-expand-its-control-and-repression

the Salween River, three of them (Weigyi, Dagwin, and Hatgyi) in Karen State.81 To do so, permanent control of the sites and the access routes to them was needed. Third, the affected areas are part of the KNU “heartland” and “hardline elements in the regime” may have wished to defeat them militarily on the assumption that they would, unlike KNU/KNLA leaders farther south, never surrender.82 The IHRC report concluded that the primary goal of the Northern Offensive was in fact to clear the targeted region of civilians, and thus deprive the KNU/KNLA of much needed resources.83 KORD and CIDKP data corroborate IHRC’s conclusion.

81 Salween Watch Coalition, “Damming Burma’s War Zone: Proposed Salween Dams Cement Military Control Over Ethnic Peoples (1 October 2006), available at https://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/damming-burma’s-war-zone-proposed-salween-dams-cement-military-control-over-ethnic-peoples (accessed 11 January 2018). 82 U.S. Embassy, “Offensive in Karen State?: A Cross-Border Aid Worker Offers Views,” Confidential Cable No. 06BANGKOK3799 (28 June 2006). For a Karen analysis of the causes behind the offensive, see KHRG, “Civilians as Targets” (30 April 2006), available at http://khrg.org/2006/04/khrg06c1/civilians-targets (accessed 28 December 2017). The October 2004 arrest of Prime Minister and Chief of Military Intelligence, Lieutenant-General Khin Nyunt, is one sign of this shift. The subsequent purge of his supporters by hardliners, led by Senior General Than Shwe, effectively ended reconciliation efforts with non-ceasefire NSAGs and political liberalization more generally. Brigadier-General Ye Win and Brigadier-General Win Myint, who oversaw combat forces in Thandaung Township were among them. Both were appointed ambassadors, which is widely seen to be a form of exile. “All Change: Burmese Junta Reshuffles Officers Again, Democratic Voice of Burma (20 May 2005). 83 IHCR (2014b), p. 35.


https://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/damming-burma's-war-zone-proposed-salween-dams-cement-military-control-over-ethnic-peopleshttps://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/damming-burma's-war-zone-proposed-salween-dams-cement-military-control-over-ethnic-peopleshttp://khrg.org/2006/04/khrg06c1/civilians-targets

2004-2005 Forced Migration Summary

In late 2003, three battalions (IB-53, IB-75, and IB-124), under the Southern Regional Command, carried out search-and-destroy patrols along both sides of the Day Loh River in Thandaung Township, as well as constructed new front-line camps on the Kayah Border.84 The patrols, which lasted nearly a month, affected 3,307 people (558 households) from 17 villages.85 According to one local source, General Tin Aye, the Southern Military Commander, ordered Khin Maung Oo, the Military Strategy Commander, to instruct his battalions to destroy all paddy farms, as well as paddy and rice barns. IDPs reported that troops located and destroyed 58 paddy farms and forced them to abandon more than 100 cardamom gardens. Ongoing patrols into January of 2004 prevented the IDPs from clearing new fields, and the remaining rice they had spoiled due to heavy rains. One villager from Ga Mu Der explained, “In the present situation, the living of those under the SPDC control are like living without a life.”86

Pasaung (Bawlakhe District) in Kayah State, borders Kayin State (see Appendix E). Much of the rugged and heavily forested terrain is a black zone due to the presence of a hostile armed ethnic group, the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP). Tatmadaw units have long targeted villages in it, especially those close to Thandaung and Tantabin Townships.87 10 Tatmadaw battalions operating in Pasaung Township in late 2003 and early 2004 caused 1,998 people (402 households) from 17 villages in the Maw Chi area to flee south to 5 hiding sites in neighboring Toungoo District, located to the west, and Hpapun Township, located to the south.88 The decision to leave was, in part, prompted by an order signed by the commander of IB-55, which stated: “Those who refuse to relocate [to Pasaung, Maw Chi and Nan Kit] will be regarded as illegal people or anti-government elements, and the government will not take any responsibility on them in case of any matter occur[s].” 89 Tatmadaw soldiers, in other words, will regard them as insurgents and treat them accordingly. The IDPs were able to carry only a few weeks of food as a result, which prompted KSWDC’s request for emergency ration assistance.90

Troops under Eastern Regional Command (IB-54, IB-135, LIB-337, LIB-429, LIB-502, LIB-511) also sought consolidate village south of Maw Chi Town, another black area. The battalions carried out search-and-destroy operations in May and laid landmines throughout the area. The operations

84 IB-73, LIB-590, and LIB-599, under the Southern Regional Command, carried out clearing operations in four village tracts in KNU-delineated Mone (Mu) Township, which borders Toungoo District during this same period. (The villages are located relatively close to Mone and Paungseik Towns.) The operations affected 1,819 people (281 households) from 9 villages. CIDKP-2004-05. 85 Military activities do not always result in displacement, especially in brown areas where everyday forms of exploitation (e.g. forced labor, extortion, and theft) erode food security and generate requests for ERA. Flight is the common practice in black areas. To avoid confusion, I use the “affected” rather than “displaced,” as it applies in both conflict contexts. 86 KORD-2004-02. 87 The number of Tatmadaw camps in Kayah State as a whole rose from 12 to 50 between 1995 and 2005. Military activity resulted in the destruction, relocation, or abandonment of 270 villages during this same period. Specific figures for Pasaung and Pruso Townships are not available, however. TBBC (2005), pp. 19, 23.88 The Toungoo Town – Baw Ga Li (Kler Lah) – Maw Chi – Pasaung Town all-season road provides the primary access route for Tatmadaw operations to the north (Thandaung Township) and south (Tantabin Township), in addition to the Maw Chi area in neighboring Kayah State. 89 KSWDC-2004-01. 90 Ibid.


prompted 2,098 people (392 households) from 16 villages to flee—some to Hpapun Township (80 households), whereas others relocated south of the Toungoo – Maw Chi Road (312 households). Many of the IDPs broke into small groups (2-3 households) for hiding purposes, but that makes them more vulnerable. A KSWDC staff person explained, “many of their hiding places are known to them [the battalions] and it means that if killed, there is no one to report it.”91

Between December 2003 and April of 2004, several of the same battalions under Southern Regional Command (IB-39, IB-48, IB-92, IB-124, and LIB-589) cleared civilians out of the Western Klay War area (Thandaung Township) and the Kaw Thay Der area (Tantabin Township).92 The area is close to the Toungoo – Maw Chi Road, near the Kler Lah Relocation Camp, adjacent to the Kayah State border. In addition to indiscriminant attacks on civilians, troops targeted cash crops, e.g. coffee, betel nut and, especially, cardamom. The operations affected 2,740 people (496 households) from 9 villages.93

Six battalions (LIB-94, LIB-117, LIB-508, LIB-509, LIB-511, and LIB-509) belonging to Tactical Command 551 of LID-55 carried out similar operations, which began in December of 2003 and continued until mid-March of 2004. The battalions concentrated their patrols north of Bu Hsa Khee Village and south of the Toungoo – Maw Chi Road, adjacent to the Kayah State border. Two other armed ethnic groups allied with the Tatmadaw, KNPLF and the KNSO, participated as well. Between mid-March and late April, military activity led 4,457 people (750 households) from 22 villages to flee, many of them to hiding sites in the deep forest. The troops, local administrators stated, burnt homes, as well as destroyed farms and food supplies (more than 1,500 baskets of paddy were lost). For IDPs in hiding sites, the nearest place to purchase rice and other necessities (markets in Kler Lah and Tha Daw) was a twenty-mile hike through a conflict zone on foot. For people who returned to their villages by the end of the year, further militarization meant that forced labor had become a defining feature of everyday life.94

During this same period, several of the same Southern Command battalions (IB-39, IB-48, IB-55, and IB-75) conducted search-and-destroy operations in Thandaung and Tantabin Townships, west of the Day Loe and Ya Loe Rivers. The area is a black zone, as one informant explained: “When the Burmese troops meet with them [civilians] the troops open fire to them…” Local sources again stated that General Tin Aye, the Southern Military Commander, ordered Khin Maung Oo to increase the frequency of the missions and to plant more anti-personnel landmines. The joint operations, which continued into mid-April of 2004, affected 4,334 people (795 households) from 17 villages.95

In May of 2004, LID-55, led by Col. Thet Oo, launched clearance operations in the Maw Chi region of Kayah State that continued until late September. “The SPDC,” one local source explained, “labeled the Maw Chi region a black area, which means that the area is void of law and order…” Fifteen different battalions, plus KNPLF and KNSO troops, participated. LIB-135

91 KSWDC-2005-03. 92 LIB-599, also under Southern Regional Command, forcibly relocated 1,521 (152 households) from Ko Ni Village, south of Mone Town, in February 2004. Local sources report travel restrictions, torture, and indiscriminant attacks on civilians between February and May. CIDKP-2004-12.93 CIDKP-2004-09. 94 KORD-2004-06. 95 CIDKP-2004-02.


Commander, Lt. Col. Aung Aung, ordered 7 villages to relocate to Bawlahke, stating: “Noncompliance will be termed as KNPP sympathizers and threatened to be severely treated,” i.e., people who refuse will be considers supports of the insurgent group and treated accordingly. The inhabitants of these villages refused, as did thousands of others, who went into hiding. All told, 4,123 people (788 households) from 41 villages in affected areas of Pasaung Township needed funds with which to purchase emergency rations according to KSWDC.96

Battalions under Southern Command (IB-73, IB-124, LIB-53, LIB-60, LIB-590) utilized forced labor to resupply their frontline camps between September and December 2004. Patrols originating from these camps caused 3,838 people (750 households) from 16 villages in the Maw Nya Bwa and Kaw They Der areas (Tantabin Township) to go into hiding temporarily. The timing of the search-and-destroy patrols, which primarily targeted food supplies, prevented villagers from harvesting crops during November and December. CIDKP field staff were not able to document the total crop losses, including cardamom, resulting from the patrols, however.97

Troops from the same Southern Command battalions (joined by LIB-439) also conducted search and destroy patrols south of the Toungoo – Maw Chi Road, adjacent to the Kler Lah – Bu Hsa Khee Road, which cuts southeast towards neighboring Hpapun Township. The patrols began in November and continued into February 2005. IDPs report that the battalions stole or destroyed the majority of the harvest, burnt paddy barns in each of the affected villages, and seized betel nut, approximately 240,000 viss, from 178 gardens in the area. Firefights with KNU troops (at least six occasions in December) made the situation increasingly unstable for the 2,906 people (457 households) from 15 villages that sought refuge in the forest. (Most of them were living in temporary groups, 5-10 households, to reduce the likelihood that patrols would find them.) The KORD assessment team wrote, “At the time we visited the area, we found that the villagers were depending on the little paddy that were not found by the SPDC, and we believe that they [the IDPs] will finish it already. Now they will have to depend on borrowing from lowland villages or working on daily labor as on any kind of work they could find.”98

Southern Regional Command battalions (IB-26, IB-48, IB-60, IB-73, IB-75, IB-92, LIB-440) continued search-and-destroy operations in Western Klay Soe area (Thandaung Township) and the Kaw They Der area (Tantabin Township) during the hot season.99 These battalions targeted upland paddy fields and cardamom gardens between February and June 2005. 3,841 people (6

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